dunnettreader + rent-seeking   26

Against Max Sawicky!
Max Sawicky has a piece in Jacobin , giving grief to Brink Lindsey and Steve Teles’ new book on rent seeking, The Captured Economy , and arguing that Dean…
political_economy  regulatory_capture  rent-seeking  demo-libertarians  inequality  from instapaper
december 2017 by dunnettreader
José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, Isabel Tecu - Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership :: SSRN July 5, 2016
José Azar , University of Navarra, IESE Business School
Martin C. Schmalz , University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Isabel Tecu , Charles River Associates (CRA)
Ross School of Business Paper No. 1235
Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large diversified institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities. We use within-route variation over time to identify a positive effect of common ownership on ticket prices. A panel-IV strategy that exploits BlackRock's acquisition of Barclays Global Investors confirms these results. We conclude that a hidden social cost -- reduced product market competition -- accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance. -- Pages 61
Keywords: Competition, Ownership, Diversification, Pricing, Antitrust, Governance, Product Market
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
industry_consolidation  corporate_ownership  SSRN  interlocking_holdings  industry_structure  corporate_governance  conflict_of_interest  downloaded  rent-seeking  paper  institutional_investors  capital_markets  anti-competive_behavior  competition  cross-holdings 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Noah Smith - The Illusion of Lagging Productivity | Bloomberg View - August 2016
Re Dietrich Vollrath's recent posts on how part of it may be statistical illusion from industry collecting rents due to increased industry concentration, IP etc., which makes the stats on production look too capital-heavy.
economic_growth  US_economy  21stC  2010s  productivity  rents  rent-seeking  competition  statistics  from instapaper
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Corey Robin - David Ricardo: Machiavelli of the Margin - Nov 2014
In my course this semester at the Graduate Center, “The Political Theory of Capitalism,” we’ve been exploring how some of the classics of modern political economy translate, traduce, transmit, efface, revise, and/or sublimate traditional categories of and concepts in Western political theory: consent, obedience, rule, law, and so forth. Through economic thinkers like Smith, Ricardo, Keynes, Schumpeter, Jevons, and the like, we try and read political economy as the distinctively modern idiom of political theory. In the same way that religion provided a distinctive language and vocabulary for political thought after Rome and before the Renaissance, might not economics provide modern political theory with its own distinctive idiom and form? In other words, our interest in the political moment of economic discourse is not when the state intervenes or intrudes; it’s when economic discourse seems to be most innocent of politics. That’s when we find the most resonant and pregnant political possibilities. -- see site for some interesting comments -- downloaded pdf to Note
intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_economy  18thC  19thC  20thC  Ricardo  rents  rent-seeking  surplus  labor_share  labor_theory_of_value  marginalists  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert O. Keohane, review - Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1983) | JSTOR
Reviewed Work: The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. -- Journal of Economic Literature
Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 558-560 -- quite positive, but useful on where Olson's theory has blind spots -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  bookshelf  reviews  political_economy  economic_history  economic_growth  interest_groups  collective_action  international_political_economy  institutional_economics  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality  stagnation  rent-seeking  politics-and-money  status  status_quo_bias  social_order  hierarchy  change-social  change-economic  castes  discrimination  inequality  mobility  post-WWII  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Montfort Mlachila, René Tapsoba, and Sampawende Tapsoba - A Quest for Quality [of economic growth] -- Finance & Development, June 2015, Vol. 52, No. 2
Despite consensus in the economics profession that growth alone does not lead to better social outcomes (Ianchovichina and Gable, 2012), quality growth still lacks a rigorous definition or formal quantification. In a recent paper, we develop a quality of growth index (QGI) that captures both the intrinsic nature of growth and its social dimension. Our premise is that not all growth produces favorable social outcomes. How growth is generated is critical to its sustainability and ability to create decent jobs, enhance living standards, and reduce poverty. We aim in our design of the QGI to capture these multidimensional features of growth by focusing on its very nature and desired social outcomes. -- in F&D issue downloaded as pdf to Note
article  development  economic_growth  political_economy  LDCs  emerging_markets  GDP  GDP-alternatives  inequality  participation-economic  inclusion  marginalized_groups  access_to_services  access_to_finance  SMEs  micro-enterprises  Innovation  innovation-government_policy  rent-seeking  informal_sectors  living_standards  poverty  health_care  education  sustainability  unemployment  common_good  statistics  economic_policy  economic_sociology  economic_reform  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Caspar Siegert and Matthew Willison - Estimating the extent of the ‘too big to fail’ problem – a review of existing approaches | Bank of England -- Financial Stability Paper 32: 13 February 2015
​How big is the ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) problem? Different approaches have been developed to estimate the impact being perceived as TBTF might have on banks’ costs of funding. One approach is to look at how the values of banks’ equity and debt change in response to events that may have altered expectations that banks are TBTF. Another is to estimate whether debt costs vary across banks according to features that make them more or less likely to be considered TBTF. A third approach is to estimate a model of the expected value of government support to banks in distress. We review these different approaches, discussing their pros and cons. Policy measures are being implemented to end the TBTF problem. Approaches to estimating the extent of the problem could play a useful role in the future in evaluating the success of those policies. With that in mind, we conclude by outlining in what ways we think approaches need to develop and suggest ideas for future research. -- didn't download
paper  banking  financial_crisis  bank_runs  financial_system-government_back-stop  too-big-to-fail  rents  rent-seeking  risk_premiums  capital_markets  margin_requirements  equity_markets  leverage 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Médicins sans frontières - The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Threat To Global Health? -:May 2015
The IP protections for big pharma not only go against consensus on improving global health policy, they are in the opposite direction of Obama administration domestic policy! The trade technocrats who've been committed to a career of trade negotiations seem to have completely lost the plot. Looks like a classic case of regulatory capture (sharing "business promotion" process and goals with US MNCs, their most important "partners") of one part of the policymaking bureaucracy, which isn't even registering the fact of conflict with other parts of the government. The White House (and Treasury? ) appear to have bought the negitiators' claim that the deal is the "best" they can get, and if a part of it is attacked the whole thing will come apart. Besides the MNCs who will be able to exploit monopolies on a global scale and protect their newly acquired"property rights" from pesky national regulations, it's unclear who in the US benefits. But the trade technocrats are working in a bubble where "doing a deal" would be a triumph, regardless of the merits, after Doha fell apart. It also looks like "intellectual capture" with a failure to mark policies to market in face of counter evidence. There's been nothing on the trade front that has vocally challenged neoliberal verities the way the IMF is openly questioning its dogmas. I bet USTR is still mandating capital account liberalization in bilaterals while it's been abandoned as "best practice" at the IMF, with no timely input from the right people at Treasury to change the boilerplate demands. Jason Furman, or somebody close to the President, needs to show him how much the TPP embodies a host of awful stuff he's been openly fighting against. The secrecy has been working against him -- it distorts the signals. People whose judgment he'd trust haven't opposed specifics they'd scream against, since they haven't seen the details and aren't willing to be seen to undermine him, and he's only been pressured from the Left which can be completely discounted, since they're expected to be unhappy. But it's looking not just "hold your nose" poor -- it's actively terrible -- especially since it's also to be used as a blueprint for bringing more countries on board! Total dig's breakfast!
US_economy  US_politics  trade-policy  trade-agreements  Trans-Pacific-Partnership  IP  IP-global_governance  pharma  health  development  LDCs  monopolies  rent-seeking  inequality  unions  neoliberalism  Democrats  Obama_administration  Obama  Instapaper  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Economist's View: 'Social Costs of the Financial Sector' - Luigi Zingale lecture and paper - May 2015
Via Tim Taylor, a quotation from Luigi Zingales ("watch video of the lecture or read the talk at his website"): "While there is no doubt that a developed economy needs a sophisticated financial sector, at the current state of knowledge there is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence to support the notion that all the growth of the financial sector in the last forty years has been beneficial to society. In fact, we have both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to claim that a component has been pure rent seeking. ..." -- downloaded pdf to Note of Zingale paper
financial_system  financial_innovation  financial_sector_development  rent-seeking  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  economic_growth  video  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review by Andrew W. Lo :: SSRN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- The recent financial crisis has generated many distinct perspectives from various quarters. In this article, I review a diverse set of 21 books on the crisis, 11 written by academics, and 10 written by journalists and one former Treasury Secretary. No single narrative emerges from this broad and often contradictory collection of interpretations, but the sheer variety of conclusions is informative, and underscores the desperate need for the economics profession to establish a single set of facts from which more accurate inferences and narratives can be constructed. -- Pages in PDF File: 41 -- Keywords: Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, Book Review -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  reviews  books  economic_history  21stC  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  regulation-enforcement  rent-seeking  fraud  debt  debtors  housing  securitization  derivatives  bank_runs  banking-universal  Glass-Steagal  risk_management  risk-systemic  financial_economics  global_system  global_imbalance  capital_flows  institutional_investors  institutional_economics  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Michael Hudson - Veblen’s Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory - Working Paper No. 729 | Levy Economics Institute - August 2012
As the heirs to classical political economy and the German historical school, the American institutionalists retained rent theory and its corollary idea of unearned income. More than any other institutionalist, Thorstein Veblen emphasized the dynamics of banks financing real estate speculation and Wall Street maneuvering to organize monopolies and trusts. Yet despite the popularity of his writings with the reading public, his contribution has remained isolated from the academic mainstream, and he did not leave behind a “school.” Veblen criticized academic economists for having fallen subject to “trained incapacity” as a result of being turned into factotums to defend rentier interests. Business schools were painting an unrealistic happy-face picture of the economy, teaching financial techniques but leaving out of account the need to reform the economy’s practices and institutions. In emphasizing how financial “predation” was hijacking the economy’s technological potential, Veblen’s vision was as materialist and culturally broad as that of the Marxists, and as dismissive of the status quo. Technological innovation was reducing costs but breeding monopolies as the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sectors joined forces to create a financial symbiosis cemented by political-insider dealings—and a trivialization of economic theory as it seeks to avoid dealing with society’s failure to achieve its technological potential. The fruits of rising productivity were used to finance robber barons who had no better use of their wealth than to reduce great artworks to the status of ownership trophies and achieve leisure-class status by funding business schools and colleges to promote a self-congratulatory but deceptive portrayal of their wealth-grabbing behavior. -- Associated Program: Explorations in Theory and Empirical Analysis -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Veblen  entre_deux_guerres  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  political_economy  classical_economics  neoclassical_economics  marginalists  German_historical_school  professionalization  academia  philanthropy  Gilded_Age  robber_barons  finance_capital  technology  investment  monopolies  speculative_finance  financial_system  financialization  antitrust  history-and-social_sciences  rentiers  rent-seeking  business-and-politics  business-norms  busisness-ethics  business_schools  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Matias Vernengo - NAKED KEYNESIANISM: Institutions, what institutions? - September 2014
Nice breakdown of theorists of causes of development and underdevelopment and problems of trying to catch up -- So if you believe most heterodox economists institutions are relevant, but not primarily those associated to the supply side; the ones linked to the demand side, in Keynesian fashion are more important than the mainstream admits. Poor countries that arrive late to the process of capitalist development cannot expand demand without limits since the imports of intermediary and capital goods cause recurrent balance of payments crises. The institutions that allow for the expansion of demand, including those that allow for higher wages to expand consumption and to avoid the external constraints, are and have been central to growth and development. The role of the State in creating and promoting the expansion of domestic markets, in the funding of research and development, and in reducing the barriers to balance of payments constraints, both by guarantying access to external markets (sometimes militarily, like in the Opium Wars) and reducing foreign access to domestic ones was crucial in the process of capitalist development. In this view, for example, what China did not have that England did, was not lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, but a rising bourgeoisie (capitalists) that had to compete to provide for a growing domestic market that had acquired a new taste (and hence explained expanding demand) for a set of new goods, like cotton goods from India, or china (porcelain) from… well China, as emphasized by economic historian Maxine Berg among others (for the role of consumption in the Industrial Revolution go here). Or simply put, China did not have a capitalist mode of production (for the concept of mode of production and capitalism go here). Again, I argued that Robert Allen’s view according to which high wages and cheap energy forced British producers to innovate to save labor, leading to technological innovation and growth, and the absence of those conditions in China led to stagnation is limited since it presupposes that firms adopt more productive technologies even without growing demand. -- see links
economic_history  economic_theory  economic_growth  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  development  emerging_markets  Latin_America  Great_Divergence  demand  consumer_demand  British_history  China  institutional_economics  institutional_change  institution-building  institutions  supply-side  demand-side  cultural_history  economic_culture  political_culture  industrialization  Industrial_Revolution  international_political_economy  international_monetary_system  balance_of_payments  state-building  rent-seeking  rentiers  commodities  links 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter - Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United (Cornell Law Review, Forthcoming) - August 1, 2014 :: SSRN
Leo E. Strine Jr. - Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Yale University -- Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 788 -- One important aspect of Citizens United has been overlooked: the tension between the conservative majority’s view of for-profit corporations, and the theory of for-profit corporations embraced by conservative thinkers. This article explores the tension between these conservative schools of thought and shows that Citizens United may unwittingly strengthen the arguments of conservative corporate theory’s principal rival. Citizens United posits that stockholders of for-profit corporations can constrain corporate political spending and that corporations can legitimately engage in political spending. Conservative corporate theory is premised on the contrary assumptions that stockholders are poorly-positioned to monitor corporate managers for even their fidelity to a profit maximization principle, and that corporate managers have no legitimate ability to reconcile stockholders’ diverse political views. Because stockholders invest in for-profit corporations for financial gain, and not to express political or moral values, conservative corporate theory argues that corporate managers should focus solely on stockholder wealth maximization and non-stockholder constituencies and society should rely upon government regulation to protect against corporate overreaching. Conservative corporate theory’s recognition that corporations lack legitimacy in this area has been strengthened by market developments that Citizens United slighted: that most humans invest in the equity markets through mutual funds under section 401(k) plans, cannot exit these investments as a practical matter, and lack any rational ability to influence how corporations spend in the political process. -- Keywords: Corporate governance, political spending, Citizens United, conservative corporate theory, regulatory externalities, lobbying, profit maximization, constitutional law, election law, labor law
article  SSRN  SCOTUS  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  corporate_law  corporate_governance  principal-agent  management  shareholders  shareholder_value  campaign_finance  lobbying  elections  labor_law  US_constitution  constitutional_law  public_policy  interest_groups  oligarchy  rent-seeking  investors  savings  capitalism  capital_markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas R. Wells, “Recovering Adam Smith’s ethical economics”| real-world economics review, issue no. 68, 21 August 2014, pp. 90-97 | Real-World Economics Review Blog
Justice was thus central to Smith’s critique of the crony capitalism of his time, and to his alternative proposal of a “system of natural liberty” characterised both by a level playing field (the responsibility of political institutions) and a commitment to “fair play” (the moral responsibility of economic actors). The quotation above is often taken to indicate Smith’s rejection of the interests of the poor by ruling out the kind of redistributive policies found in a modern welfare state as akin to a referee changing the results of a game to favour one “team” over another. Yet that misses Smith’s commitment to procedural fairness, which introduces a concern that the rules of the game—the institutional arrangements that decide who should get what share of the gains of economic activity—should themselves be fair. If a country’s economy creates great wealth but the share going to the workers versus the owners of capital is kept artificially low by unfair institutions—such as restrictions on workers’ ability to bargain (WN I.viii.13)—that is a gross injustice which keeps the country less prosperous than it ought to be. Smith thus appears a more radical critic of the structural origins of economic inequality than many today on the political left. In Smith’s time no less than in our own, a political commitment to a free society and a free economy does not imply that we should simply accept our existing socio-economic institutional arrangements (cf Grusky 2012). On the contrary, it implies rigorous scrutiny and reform.
article  intellectual_history  political_economy  Smith  busisness-ethics  justice  Labor_markets  rent-seeking  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Suresh Naidu - Capital Eats the World | Jacobin May 2014
A first step could be a multisector model with both a productive sector and an extractive, rent-seeking outlet for investment, so that the rate of return on capital has the potential to be unanchored from the growth of the economy. This model could potentially do a better job of explaining r > g in a world where capital has highly profitable opportunities in rent-seeking ....More fundamentally, a model that started with the financial and firm-level institutions underneath the supply and demand curves for capital, rather than blackboxing them in production and utility functions, could illuminate complementarities among the host of other political demands that would claw back the share taken by capital and lower the amount paid out as profits before the fiscal system gets its take. This is putting meat on what Brad Delong calls the “wedge” between the actual and warranted rate of profit. -- We need even more and even better economics to figure out which of these may get undone via market responses and which won’t, and to think about them jointly with the politics that make each feasible or not. While Piketty’s book diagnoses the problem of capital’s voracious appetite, it would require a different kind of model to take our focus off the nominal quantities registered by state fiscal systems, and instead onto the broader distribution of political power in the world economy.
books  reviews  kindle-available  Piketty  political_economy  economic_theory  heterodox_economics  neoclassical_economics  economic_models  economic_growth  wealth  capital  finance_capital  capitalism  labor  Labor_markets  unemployment  markets_in_everything  tax_havens  investment  investors  savings  inheritance  profit  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  inequality  technology  1-percent  rent-seeking  rentiers  class_conflict  oligarchy  taxes  productivity  corporate_finance  property  property_rights  neoliberalism 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Ricardo Hausmann - Why technological diffusion does not occur according to economic theory. - Project Syndicate - May 2014
That is why cities, regions, and countries can absorb technology only gradually, generating growth through some recombination of the knowhow that is already in place, maybe with the addition of some component – a bassist to complete a string quartet. But they cannot move from a quartet to a philharmonic orchestra in one fell swoop, because it would require too many missing instruments – and, more important, too many musicians who know how to play them. Progress happens by moving into what the theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman calls the “adjacent possible,” which implies that the best way to find out what is likely to be feasible in a country is to consider what is already there. Politics may indeed impede technological diffusion; but, to a large extent, technology does not diffuse because of the nature of technology itself.
economic_theory  economic_growth  economic_history  institutional_economics  institutional_change  institution-building  development  US_foreign_policy  rent-seeking  elites  oligarchy  technology  capital  labor  knowhow 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - The Equalizing Hand: Why Adam Smith Thought the Market Should Produce Wealth Without Steep Inequality | Cambridge Journals Online - Perspectives on Politics - Dec 2013
For long overview of the article, see her post from the LSE blog -- Perspectives on Politics, 11, pp 1051-1070. doi:10.1017/S153759271300282X. - That the market economy inevitably leads to inequality is widely accepted today, with disagreement confined to the desirability of redistributive action, its extent, and the role of government in the process. The canonical text of liberal political economy, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, is assumed even in the most progressive interpretations to accept inequality, rationalized as the inevitable trade-off for increasing prosperity compared to less developed but more equal economies. I argue instead that Smith's system, if fully implemented, would not allow steep inequalities to arise. In Smith, profits should be low and labor wages high, legislation in favor of the worker is “always just and equitable,” land should be distributed widely and evenly, inheritance laws liberalized, taxation can be high if it is equitable, and the science of the legislator is necessary to put the system in motion and keep it aligned. Market economies are made in Smith's system. Political theorists and economists have highlighted some of these points, but the counterfactual “what would the distribution of wealth be if all the building blocks were ever in place?” has not been posed. Doing so encourages us to question why steep inequality is accepted as a fact, instead of a pathology that the market economy was not supposed to generate in the first place. --Deborah Boucoyannis is Assistant Professor at the University of Virginia (dab5fw@virginia.edu). Her interests lie in the historical preconditions for the emergence of the liberal order and of constitutionalism.
paper  paywall  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - For Adam Smith, inequality was contrary to the Wealth of Nations | British Politics and Policy at LSE – Feb 2014
Overview of her article in Perspectives on Politics - see Cambridge Journals bookmark - The assumption that Adam Smith accepted inequality as the necessary trade-off for a more prosperous economy is wrong, writes Deborah Boucoyannis. In reality, Smith’s system precluded steep inequalities not out of a normative concern with equality but by virtue of the design that aimed to maximise the wealth of nations. Much like many progressive critics of current inequality, Smith targets rentier practices by the rich and powerful as distorting economic outcomes.
paper  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
interfluidity » “Incentives to produce” are incentives to rig the game - March 2014
Steve Randy Waldman - Suppose, reasonably I think, that ceteris paribus humans prefer to “be good”. That is, we prefer to do work that is productive and engage in behavior that is ethical. Suppose, also reasonably, that a well ordered society depends upon people sometimes making choices opposed to their material interests on ethical or other grounds. Then it is obvious how inequality might be costly. Instead of talking about “incentives to” (produce, extract rents, whatever), we might describe outcome dispersion as a tax on refraining from mercenary behavior. If the difference between economic winners and losers is modest, people of ordinary virtue might refrain from participating in activities they consider corrupt, might even be willing to “blow the whistle”, because the cost of doing so is outweighed by their preference for behaving well. But as outcome dispersion grows, absenting oneself from or even opposing activities that would be personally remunerative but socially undesirable becomes too costly. The required sacrifice eventually overcomes a ceteris paribus preference for virtue. Preventing the misbehavior of large coalitions is a collective action problem. An isolated malcontent or whistleblower is likely to be evicted from the coalition without meaningfully improving behavior, if others choose to “circle the wagon”. Outcome dispersion both increases the costs to individuals of engaging in pro-social behavior, and diminishes the likelihood that bearing those costs will be fruitful, since others will have strong incentives not to follow.
political_economy  international_political_economy  finance_capital  inequality  civic_virtue  rent-seeking  monopolies  intellectual_property  health_care  migration  competition  plutocracy  incentives  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert F. Hébert - Interest Groups, Public Choice and the Economics of Religion | JSTOR: Public Choice, Vol. 142, No. 3/4 (Mar., 2010), pp. 429-436
This article reviews Bob Tollison's conjoint contributions to the burgeoning area of the economics of religion, underscoring his integration of public choice and interestgroup themes into the microeconomic analysis of faith-based organizational architecture, institutional decision making and doctrinal innovation. Beginning with study of the medieval Catholic Church, moving forward to the Protestant Reformation and beyond, it supplies a timeline of developments and the major findings of each phase of his research program. -- hegemonic ambition of public choice school -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  religious_history  sociology_of_religion  economics_of_religion  public_choice  interest_groups  rent-seeking  church_history  Roman_Catholicism  Reformation  Protestants  Counter-Reformation  secularization  organizations  institutional_economics  behavioral_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
NUALA ZAHEDIEH - Regulation, rent-seeking, and the Glorious Revolution in the English Atlantic economy | JSTOR: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 63, No. 4 (NOVEMBER 2010), pp. 865-890
The rapid rise of England's colonial commerce in the late seventeenth century expanded the nation's resource base, stimulated efficiency improvements across the economy, and was important for long-term growth. However, close examination of the interests at play in England's Atlantic world does not support the Whiggish view that the Glorious Revolution played a benign role in this story. In the decades after the Restoration, the cases of the Royal African Company and the Spanish slave trade in Jamaica are used to show that the competition between Crown and Parliament for control of regulation constrained interest groups on either side in their efforts to capture the profits of empire. Stuart 'tyranny' was not able to damage growth and relatively competitive (and peaceful) conditions underpinned very rapid increases in colonial output and trade. The resolution of the rules of the Atlantic game in 1689 allowed a consolidated state better to manipulate and manage the imperial economy in its own interests. More secure rent-seeking enterprises and expensive wars damaged growth and European rivals began a process of catch-up. The Glorious Revolution was not sufficient to permanently halt economic development but it was sufficient to slow progress towards industrial revolution. -- very interesting attack on North-Weingast, Pincus et al -- paywall Wiley -- enormous bibliography on jstor information page
article  jstor  paywall  Wiley  economic_history  British_history  British_Empire  American_colonies  West_Indies  Atlantic  17thC  18thC  Glorious_Revolution  fiscal-military_state  North-Weingast  rent-seeking  UK_government-colonies  economic_growth  trade  trading_companies  British_politics  Parliament  Nine_Years_War  War_of_Spanish_Succession  colonialism  mercantilism  tariffs  Whig_Junto  bibliography 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Michael Storper - Better Rules or Stronger Communities? On the Social Foundations of Institutional Change and Its Economic Effects | JSTOR: Economic Geography, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 1-25
Huge literature review -- didn't download -- Much of the literature on the impact of institutions on economic development has focused on the tradeoffs between society and community as mutually opposed forms of institutional coordination. On the one hand, sociologists, geographers, and some economists have stressed the positive economic externalities that are associated with the development of associational or group life. Most economists, in contrast, hold that the development of communities may be a second-best solution to the development of formal institutions or even have negative effects, such as the promotion of rent-seeking behavior and principal-agent problems. Societal institutions-such as clear, transparent rules and enforcement mechanisms-are held to be universally positive for development. But there are no real-world cases in which only one of the two exists; society and community are always and everywhere in interaction. This interaction, however, has attracted little attention. In this article, society and community are conceived of as complementary forms of organization whose relative balance and interaction shape the economic potential of every territory. Changes in the balance between community and society take place constantly and affect the medium- and long-run development prospects of every territory. The depth and the speed of change depend on a series of factors, such as starting points in the interaction of society and community, the sources and dynamics of change, and the conflict-solving capacities of the preexisting situation.
article  jstor  economic_history  social_history  social_theory  community  society  social_capital  economic_sociology  economic_growth  development  institution-building  rent-seeking  behavioral_economics  institutional_change  institutional_economics  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Simon Wren-Lewis - mainly macro: Stages of Economic Recovery in the UK - Nov 2013
Lots of links -- Presentation re 3 stages of economic recovery and why UK stalled for 3 years in not getting Stage 2 bounce back growth due to austerity after returning to growth in 2010 - and fears won't reach Stage 3, maintenance of high growth for long period to return to pre recession productive capacity trend line. Banks as a central worry

-- quote-- So answering the productivity puzzle is the key to knowing what kind of recovery we will have. My suspicion, shared by others at the Bank of England and elsewhere, is that some of the answer is to be found back where the recession began – with UK banks. Bank lending to firms is important in increasing productivity, because it allows the productive firms to expand (at home and overseas), and the new start ups to displace the older, less efficient firms. So when bank lending collapsed in the recession, productivity collapsed. If banks start lending again to these new and more productive (but also more risky) firms, we may be able to make up a good deal of that lost ground......

So how are we with fixing the banks? The honest answer is I do not know, but let me end with a concern. So this is a recession created by banks, and there is a real danger that the power banks have over governments, and this government in particular, may mean we never make up the ground we have lost.
21stC  UK_economy  Great_Recession  banking  financialization  financial_regulation  rent-seeking  risk  austerity  productivity  unemployment  wages  capital  investment  links  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Josh Bivens & Lawrence Mishel: The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes | Economic Policy Institute June 2013
The debate over the extent and causes of rising inequality of American incomes and wages has now raged for at least two decades. In this paper, we will make four arguments.

First, the increase in the incomes and wages of the top 1 percent over in the last three decades should largely be interpreted as driven by the creation and/or redistribution of economic rents, and not simply as the outcome of well-functioning competitive markets rewarding skills or productivity based on marginal differences. This rise in rents accruing to the top 1 percent could be the result of increased opportunities for rent-shifting, increased incentives for rent-shifting, or a combination of both.

Second, this rise in incomes at the very top has been the primary impediment to living standards growth for low and moderate-income households approaching the growth rate of economy-wide productivity.

Third, because this rise in top incomes is largely driven by rents, there is the potential for checking (or even reversing) this rise through policy measures with little to no adverse impact on overall economic growth.

Lastly, this analysis suggests two complementary approaches for policymakers wishing to reverse the rise in the top 1 percent’s share of income: dismantling the institutional sources of their increased ability to channel rents their way and/or reducing the return to this rent-seeking by significantly increasing marginal rates of taxation on high incomes.
US_economy  political_economy  inequality  rents  rent-seeking  taxes  Labor_markets  plutocracy  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2013 by dunnettreader

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