dunnettreader + regulation   39

Jeffrey Edward Green - Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable Envy toward the Superrich (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article aims to correct the widespread imbalance in contemporary liberal thought, which makes explicit appeal to the "least advantaged" without parallel attention to the "most advantaged" as a distinct group in need of regulatory attention. Rawls's influential theory of justice is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this imbalance, but I show how a Rawlsian framework nonetheless provides three justifications for why implementers of liberal justice—above all, legislators—should regulate the economic prospects of a polity's richest citizens: as a heuristic device for ensuring that a system of inequalities not reach a level at which inequalities cease being mutually advantageous, as protection against excessive inequalities threatening civic liberty, and as redress for a liberal society's inability to fully realize fair equality of opportunity with regard to education and politics. Against the objection that such arguments amount to a defense of envy, insofar as they support policies that in certain instances impose economic costs on the most advantaged with negative or neutral economic impact on the rest of society, I attend to Rawls's often overlooked distinction between irrational and reasonable forms of envy, showing that any envy involved in the proposed regulation of the most advantaged falls within this latter category. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
politics-and-money  political_participation  inequality-wealth  regulatory_capture  political_philosophy  political_culture  tax_havens  Early_Republic  inequality  estate_tax  intellectual_history  inheritance  republicanism  Plato-Republic  elites-political_influence  Jefferson  Harrington  crony_capitalism  Europe-Early_Modern  fairness  article  Aristotle  social_capital  social_theory  Rawls  social_democracy  Machiavelli  Plato  inequality-opportunity  jstor  bibliography  ancient_Rome  regulation  justice  liberalism  egalitarian  regulatory_avoidance  interest_groups  legitimacy  deliberative_democracy  political_history  class_conflict  downloaded  education-elites  social_order  elites-self-destructive  Roman_Republic  ancient_Greece  republics-Ancient_v_Modern 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Rafael La Porta and Andrei Shleifer - "Informality and Development" (2014) Journal of Economic Perspectives
In developing countries, informal firms account for up to half of economic activity. They provide livelihood for billions of people. Yet their role in economic development remains controversial with some viewing informality as pent-up potential and others viewing informality as a parasitic organizational form that hinders economic growth. In this paper, we assess these perspectives. We argue that the evidence is most consistent with dual models, in which informality arises out of poverty and the informal and formal sectors are very different. It seems that informal firms have low productivity and produce low- quality products; and, consequently, they do not pose a threat to the formal firms. Economic growth comes from the formal sector, that is, from firms run by educated entrepreneurs and exhibiting much higher levels of productivity. The expansion of the formal sector leads to the decline of the informal sector in relative and eventually absolute terms. A few informal firms convert to formality, but more generally they disappear because they cannot compete with the much more-productive formal firms.
Citation -La Porta, Rafael and Andrei Shleifer. 2014. "Informality and Development." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3): 109-26.
structural_adjustment  informal_economy  LDCs  access_to_finance  article  Labor_markets  doing_business  productivity  tax_avoidance  regulation  poverty_reduction  poverty  tax_policy  access_to_services  conditionality  entrepreneurs  economic_growth  aid  development  formal_economy  industrialization  downloaded 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Dewatripont, M. and Rochet, J., Tirole, J. - Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis (orig 2010) - Princeton University Press
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, Balancing the Banks draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future.

While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an adaptive prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints.

Offering a global perspective, Balancing the Banks should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.
Downloaded Chapters 1 & 2 to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  capital_markets  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  liquidity  risk_management  incentives-distortions  incentives  international_finance  global_governance  regulatory_arbitrage  regulatory_avoidance  regulation-costs  regulation-enforcement  regulation-harmonization  regulation 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Political Rents and Profits in Regulated Industries - ProMarket July 2016
A new working paper by James Bessen from Boston University finds that much of the rise in corporate profits since 2000 was caused by political rent seeking.
profit  business-and-politics  utilities  consumer_protection  competition  regulation  anti-trust  rents  market_failure  political_economy  paper  from instapaper
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Miriam Sapiro - Transatlantic trade and investment negotiations: Reaching a consensus on ISDS | Brookings Institution - October 2015
Two steps can accelerate this process. First, US and EU negotiating teams should reach agreement on a number of key principles ** There should be a neutral forum for adjudication, independent of the potential for bias inherent in a host state’s legal system.** An arbitration tribunal should operate under established principles of international law with consistency and predictability. ** The arbitrators should be beyond reproach in terms of independence, impartiality, and integrity. ** The tribunal should have the authority to dismiss frivolous and other non-meritorious claims early in the process. ** The proceedings should be transparent and open to the public. ** An option for annulment, and possibly appeal, should be considered. Second, (..) the US and the EU should appoint a senior group of experts to review in detail several of the more provocative proposals that have been put forward by the EU—such as creating an appellate mechanism for TTIP or, more broadly, an international ISDS court. This should be a broad group of experts representing a range of academic, legal, business, public interest, and other expertise, and reflecting deep knowledge of international investment law, arbitration rules, and judicial and regulatory decision-making. To build greater public support, the group should include voices that support modifications as well as oppose them, in an effort to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the various options, and to identify consensus where possible. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  trade-agreements  ISDS  EU  EU_governance  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  transparency  public_goods  investment-bilateral_treaties  investment  FDI  regulation  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  regulation-harmonization  environment  public_health  legal_remedies  legal_system  arbitration  international_law  international_political_economy  appellate_review  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Mary Hallward-Driemeier and Lant Pritchett - How Business Is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus Rules(2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3): 121-40
Affiliations World Bank and Harvard - What happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank's firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarize even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating "rules" to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which "deals" of various kinds are possible. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  development  institutional_economics  institutional_capacity  regulation  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  SMEs  World_Bank  doing_business  business_practices  business-norms  business_influence  investment  business-and-politics  business-ethics  FDI  investor_protection  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Werner Plumpe - The hour of the expert - economic expertise over 4 centuries - Eurozine - October 2012
What constitutes economic expertise? Looking at how European politics has answered this question over the last four centuries, Werner Plumpe argues that, at any given time, economic expertise is judged according to its coincidence with the conjuncture. -- Original in German -- Translation by Samuel Willcocks -- First published in Merkur 9-10/2012 (German version); Eurozine (English version) -- quite amusing, but nice overview that isn't excessively Anglo oriented
economic_history  economic_theory  expertise  sociology_of_knowledge  social_sciences  positivism  social_sciences-post-WWII  macroeconomics  economic_models  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Europe-Early_Modern  intellectual_history  grand_narrative  narrative-contested  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_policy  capitalism  capitalism-varieties  capitalism-systemic_crisis  laisser-faire  cameralism  government-roles  business_cycles  business-and-politics  Keynesianism  neoclassical_economics  Austrian_economics  liberalism-19thC  finance_capital  bank_runs  financial_crisis  regulation  Marxism  public_enterprise  public_goods  infrastructure  market_fundamentalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Ravi Kanbur, Michael Keen - Rethinking informality | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 05 June 2015
The ‘informal’ economy presents a key challenge for developing-nation policymakers due to its labour-market and tax-revenue implications. Informality is usually defined as the complement to formality, i.e. any activity that isn’t covered by a clear set of laws. This column argues that such a definition risks obscuring more than it reveals, by failing to understand and address the varieties of informality that exist. Sensible policy should focus on tailored interventions across different categories of taxpayer, not on reducing aggregate informality. -- nice way of looking at policy objectives - it's not just revenue collection, there's interactions with other types of regulation - they highlight labor laws, but lots of the "doing business" projects uncover many other regulatory compliance issues in developing countries that would interact as well
Instapaper  paper  development  regulation  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  informal_sectors  Labor_markets  labor_law  labor_standards  tax_policy  tax_collection  SMEs  micro-enterprises  doing_business 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Martin Albrow, review essay - Who Rules the Global Rule Makers? - Books & ideas - 3 November 2011
Reviewed: Tim Bütheand Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2011; and Vibert, Frank, Democracy and Dissent: The Challenge of International Rule Making, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2011. -- Tags : democracy | globalisation | European Union | governance | United States of America -- Thirty years of misguided deregulation have brought us the 2008 collapse. Two books look at how we should create new rules democratically. While adopting widely different perspectives, both beg the same question: can rulemaking alone ensure the wellbeing of people in a global society? -- saved to Instapaper
books  reviews  21stC  globalization  global_governance  privatization  MNCs  IFIs  regulation  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  deregulation  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capital_flows  capital_markets  sovereignty  capitalism  democracy  democracy_deficit  political_participation  US_foreign_policy  US_economy  US_politics  market_fundamentalism  markets_in_everything  markets-failure  plutocracy  Instapaper 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Dan Bogart - "There Can Be No Partnership with the King": Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise of England's East Indian Merchant Empire | via Brad DeLong - Equitablog
Dan Bogart, Department of Economics, UC Irvine - : “There Can Be No Partnership with the King”: Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise of England’s East Indian Merchant Empire: “The English East India Company helped build Britain’s colonial empire, but the Company was not a leader in East Asian trade for nearly a century after its founding in 1600. This paper argues that its early performance was hindered by a problem of regulatory commitment. It gives a brief history of the torturous renegotiations over its monopoly trading privileges and the fiscal demands by the monarchy. It also analyzes the effects of political instability, warfare, and fiscal capacity on the Company’s investment in shipping tonnage. Regressions show the growth of shipping tonnage declined significantly when there were changes in government ministers, when Britain was at war in Europe and North America, and when shipping capacity exceeded central government tax revenues. The findings point to the significance of regulatory institutions in Britain’s development and its links with politics and war. They also provide an important case where regulatory uncertainty lowers investment.” paper dated Jan 2015 -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  downloaded  economic_history  British_history  British_Empire  fiscal-military_state  state-building  UK_government-colonies  East_India_Company  trade-policy  trading_companies  trading_privileges  monopolies  British_Navy  17thC  institutional_capacity  regulation  monarchy-proprietary  James_I  Charles_I  Charles_II  James_II  English_Civil_War  Interregnum  taxes  political_culture  shipping  merchants  interlopers  military_history  Anglo-Dutch_wars  Glorious_Revolution  Nine_Years_War  War_of_Spanish_Succession  investment  uncertainty-regulation  uncertainty-political  British_politics  Restoration  colonialism  parties  faction  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeff Horn - Economic Development in Early Modern France: The Privilege of Liberty, 1650–1820 (release date for hardback mid-Feb 2015) | European history after 1450 | Cambridge University Press
Privilege has long been understood as the constitutional basis of Ancien Régime France, legalising the provision of a variety of rights, powers and exemptions to some, whilst denying them to others. In this fascinating new study however, Jeff Horn reveals that Bourbon officials utilized privilege as an instrument of economic development, freeing some sectors of the economy from pre-existing privileges and regulations, while protecting others. He explores both government policies and the innovations of entrepreneurs, workers, inventors and customers to uncover the lived experience of economic development from the Fronde to the Restoration. He shows how, influenced by Enlightenment thought, the regime increasingly resorted to concepts of liberty to defend privilege as a policy tool. The book offers important new insights into debates about the impact of privilege on early industrialisation, comparative economic development and the outbreak of the French Revolution. **--** 1. Introduction: profits and economic development during the Old Régime *--* 2. Privileged enclaves and the guilds: liberty and regulation *--* 3. The privilege of liberty put to the test: industrial development in Normandy *--* 4. Companies, colonies, and contraband: commercial privileges under the Old Régime *--* 5. Privilege, liberty, and managing the market: trading with the Levant *--* 6. Outside the body politic, essential to the body economic: the privileges of Jews, Protestants and foreign residents *--* 7. Privilege, innovation, and the state: entrepreneurialism and the lessons of the Old Régime *--* 8. The reign of liberty? Privilege after 1789 -- look for pdf of Intro once released
books  find  political_economy  economic_history  political_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  France  privileges-corporate  economic_culture  economic_policy  development  monarchy  profit  entrepreneurs  guilds  trading_companies  trade-policy  regulation  industrialization  industrial_policy  Colbert  Colbertism  urban_development  urban_elites  commerce  commercial_interest  French_government  Huguenots  Jews  colonialism  French_Empire  colonies  corporate_finance  monopolies  Levant  MENA  Ottomans  liberties  liberty  Ancien_régime  Louis_XIV  Louis_XV  Louis_XVI  French_Revolution  French_Revolutionary_Wars  Napoleonic_Wars  Restoration-France  bourgeoisie  haute_bourgeoisie  markets  markets-structure  foreign_trade  foreign_policy  foreigners-resident 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
John Irons and Isaac Shapiro - Report: Regulation, employment, and the economy: Fears of job loss are overblown | Economic Policy Institute - April 2011
After the first midterms debacle -- . In the first months since the new Congress convened, the House has held dozens of hearings designed to elicit criticisms of regulations, introduced legislation that would dramatically alter the regulatory process by requiring congressional approval of all major regulations, and passed a spending bill that would slash the funding levels of regulatory agencies and restrict their ability to enact rules covering areas such as greenhouse gas emissions. (..) opponents of regulation argue that agency rules are damaging to the economy in general and job generation in particular. Some say specific regulations will destroy millions of jobs and cite a study (critiqued later in this paper) purporting to show that regulations cost $1.75 trillion per year. Regulations are frequently discussed only in the context of their threat to job creation, while their role in protecting lives, public health, and the environment is ignored. This report reviews whether the evidence backs the perspective of regulatory opponents. The first section looks broadly at the effects of regulations, whether they play a useful role in the economy, and whether their overall benefits outweigh their overall costs. The second section assesses the theory and evidence for the assertion that regulations undermine jobs and the economy. The last section examines the kinds of studies that are discussed when regulations are being formulated; these studies, often cited in debates and therefore of great importance, tend to be prospective
estimates of the effects of proposed regulations. -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_economy  US_politics  Obama_administration  Congress  GOP  deregulation  cost-benefit  unemployment  business_influence  public_policy  public_goods  public_health  environment  climate  financial_regulation  US_government  regulation  regulation-environment  regulation-costs  common_good  commons  economic_sociology  economic_theory  economic_culture  statistics  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Geoffrey Jones (HBS Working Papers 2013) - Debating the Responsibility of Capitalism in Historical and Global Perspective
This working paper examines the evolution of concepts of the responsibility of business in a historical and global perspective. It shows that from the nineteenth century American, European, Japanese, Indian and other business leaders discussed the responsibilities of business beyond making profits, although until recently such views have not been mainstream. There was also a wide variation concerning the nature of this responsibility. This paper argues that four factors drove such beliefs: spirituality; self-interest; fears of government intervention; and the belief that governments were incapable of addressing major social issues.

Keywords: Rachel Carson; Sustainability; Local Food; Operations Management; Supply Chain; Business And Society; Business Ethics; Business History; Corporate Philanthropy; Corporate Social Responsibility; Corporate Social Responsibility And Impact; Environmentalism; Environmental Entrepreneurship; Environmental And Social Sustainability; Ethics; Globalization; History; Religion; Consumer Products Industry; Chemical Industry; Beauty and Cosmetics Industry; Energy Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; Forest Products Industry; Green Technology Industry; Manufacturing Industry; Asia; Europe; Latin America; Middle East; North and Central America; Africa
paper  downloaded  economic_history  business_history  imperialism  US  British_Empire  France  Germany  Japan  Spain  Dutch  Latin_America  Ottoman_Empire  India  18thC  19thC  20thC  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  business  busisness-ethics  business-and-politics  common_good  communitarian  environment  labor  patriarchy  paternalism  labor_standards  regulation  product_safety  inequality  comparative_economics  capital_as_power  capitalism  CSR  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_sociology  self-interest  ideology 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
What Is ISDS? | AFL-CIO Issues
What’s the risk? -- The risk is that foreign property owners can use this system of "corporate courts" to challenge anything from plain packaging rules for cigarettes to denials of permits for toxic waste dumps to increases in the minimum wage. For any law, regulation or other government decision that the foreign investor does not like, all it has to do is think of an argument for why the decision somehow violated its right to “fair and equitable treatment” or why it might reduce its expected profits and it’s got a case. And, sometimes, just threatening the case is enough for the proposed law or regulation to be withdrawn. -- downloaded pdf to Note "End Corporate Courts Now"
US_economy  US_politics  Congress  Obama_administration  US_government  state_government  regulation  regulation-harmonization  trade-agreements  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  unions  investor-State_disputes  investment-bilateral_treaties  corporate_citizenship  MNCs  dispute_resolution  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark S. Mizruchi - Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations | JSTOR: Theory and Society, Vol. 33, No. 5 (Oct., 2004), pp. 579-617
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), Berle and Means warned of the concentration of economic power brought on by the rise of the large corporation and the emergence of a powerful class of professional managers, insulated from the pressure not only of stockholders, but of the larger public as well. In the tradition of Thomas Jefferson, Berle and Means warned that the ascendance of management control and unchecked corporate power had potentially serious consequences for the democratic character of the United States. Social scientists who drew on Berle and Means in subsequent decades presented a far more benign interpretation of the rise of managerialism, however. For them, the separation of ownership from control actually led to an increased level of democratization in the society as a whole. Beginning in the late 1960s, sociologists and other social scientists rekindled the debate over ownership and control, culminating in a series of rigorous empirical studies on the nature of corporate power in American society. In recent years, however, sociologists have largely abandoned the topic, ceding it to finance economists, legal scholars, and corporate strategy researchers. In this article, I provide a brief history of the sociological and finance/legal/strategy debates over corporate ownership and control. I discuss some of the similarities between the two streams of thought, and I discuss the reasons that the issue was of such significance sociologically. I then argue that by neglecting this topic in recent years, sociologists have failed to contribute to an understanding of some of the key issues in contemporary business behavior. I provide brief reviews of four loosely developed current perspectives and then present an argument of my own about the changing nature of the U.S. corporate elite over the past three decades. I conclude with a call for sociologists to refocus their attention on an issue that, however fruitfully handled by scholars in other fields, cries out for sociological analysis. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  US_economy  US_politics  political_economy  political_sociology  economic_sociology  law-and-finance  law-and-economics  capitalism  corporations  MNCs  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  shareholder_value  shareholders  principal-agent  management  managerialism  corporate_citizenship  corporate_control_markets  corporate_law  M&A  business-and-politics  business-norms  power  power-asymmetric  status  interest_groups  lobbying  regulation  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Brayden G King and Nicholas A. Pearce - The Contentiousness of Markets: Politics, Social Movements, and Institutional Change in Markets | JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 36 (2010), pp. 249-267
While much of economic sociology focuses on the stabilizing aspects of markets, the social movement perspective emphasizes the role that contentiousness plays in bringing institutional change and innovation to markets. Markets are inherently political, both because of their ties to the regulatory functions of the state and because markets are contested by actors who are dissatisfied with market outcomes and who use the market as a platform for social change. Research in this area focuses on the pathways to market change pursued by social movements, including direct challenges to corporations, the institutionalization of systems of private regulation, and the creation of new market categories through institutional entrepreneurship. Much contentiousness, while initially disruptive, works within the market system by producing innovation and restraining capitalism from destroying the resources it depends on for survival. -- still paywall -- 155 references-- see bibliography on jstor information page
article  jstor  paywall  social_theory  political_sociology  economic_sociology  markets-structure  markets_in_everything  Innovation  social_movements  conflict  political_economy  regulation  capitalism  environment  institutional_change  social_process  change-social  CSR  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  self-regulation  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
theAIRnet.org - Home
The Academic-Industry Research Network – theAIRnet – is a private, 501(c)(3) not-for-profit research organization devoted to the proposition that a sound understanding of the dynamics of industrial development requires collaboration between academic scholars and industry experts. We engage in up-to-date, in-depth, and incisive research and commentary on issues related to industrial innovation and economic development. Our goal is to understand the ways in which, through innovation, businesses and governments can contribute to equitable and stable economic growth – or what we call “sustainable prosperity”.
website  economic_growth  industry  technology  Innovation  green_economy  development  business  business-and-politics  capitalism  global_economy  public-private_partnerships  public_policy  public_health  public_goods  urban_development  health_care  IP  Labor_markets  wages  unemployment  education-training  sustainability  financial_system  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  CSR  firms-theory  management  plutocracy  MNCs  international_political_economy  human_capital  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  supply_chains  R&D  common_good  1-percent  inequality  working_class  work-life_balance  workforce  regulation  regulation-harmonization  incentives  stagnation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Report: Zoning for Sea-Level Rise | Georgetown Climate Center - December 13, 2012
To help local communities address the increased flooding expected from sea-level rise and more frequent extreme weather events, the Georgetown Climate Center designed a model sea-level rise ordinance to provide local governments with a template for tailoring regulations to meet the needs of their community and its particularized vulnerabilities. To effectively balance all the competing interests in coastal resources in the face of climate threats, local governments will need flexible and robust land-use regulations. Zoning is the most powerful tool that local governments have to preemptively mitigate hazards. Through planning and zoning, local governments can determine what is at risk, what is safe to build, and where it is safe to build. By analyzing vulnerabilities and planning for impacts, local governments can shape landowner expectations and build political support for adaptive measures. Through regulations, local governments can ensure that fewer people and structures are in harm’s way when impacts occur, and that developers site and construct new structures to be more resilient to flooding and other impacts. Below is a link to the executive summary describing this work. -- didn't download
local_government  land_use_planning  property  property-confiscations  property_rights  climate  climate-adaptation  political_economy  regulation  regulation-environment  incentives  ocean  water  coastal_development 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Georgetown Climate Center Resources to Help Communities Prepare for Climate Changes | Georgetown Climate Center
With the planet warming and extreme weather becoming the new normal, states and communities are seeking out resources to help them anticipate climate impacts and protect residents, homes, businesses, and public infrastructure from rising seas, heat, drought, wildfires, extreme weather, and other climate impacts. The Georgetown Climate Center strives to help communities meet these challenges by addressing the legal barriers that communities face when adapting to rising sea levels, and seeks to help localities prepare for the increased frequency, scope, and severity of heat events and extreme weather. The Center also strives to help communities spend disaster relief funds wisely by preparing for the next big storm – not just rebuilding to meet the status quo. The Georgetown Climate Center provides its clients with broad legal advice and policy options, along with strategies to adapt to each set of challenges. It also provides technical assistance to selected states and localities.
website  climate  climate-adaptation  risk-mitigation  land_use_planning  infrastructure  local_government  ocean  coastal_development  property_rights  law-and-economics  law-and-environment  administrative_law  regulation  cross-border  federalism  public_finance  public_goods  disaster  technical_assistance 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Preparing Our Communities for Climate Impacts: Recommendations for Federal Action | Georgetown Climate Center - September 2014
The Georgetown Climate Center released 100 recommendations today to improve federal programs that could be used to prepare for climate change. The new report will inform the White House State, Local and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience.The report draws from a series of workshops with leading federal, state and local officials and builds upon lessons learned post-disaster in New Orleans (following Hurricane Katrina), New York (Hurricane Sandy) and Vermont (Hurricane Irene). The report identifies more than 30 federal programs, initiatives and laws that can be used to prepare for extreme events such as storms, floods and heat waves as well as rising seas. Although state and local governments will be the primary actors when it comes to preparing for climate change impacts, the federal government can boost – or impede – preparedness. The federal government sends billions of dollars to states and communities every year, some of which could be used more effectively to adapt to climate change. Federal laws and regulations also can be important drivers of state and local action. But, in some cases, federal rules have hindered state and local innovation. The recommendations in the report explore how existing federal dollars, programs, regulations and policies can be retooled, repurposed and deployed to promote and remove barriers to adaptation. -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_government  local_government  state_government  disaster  climate  risk-mitigation  environment  administrative_agencies  ocean  coordination-governments  regulation  cross-border  federalism  public_finance  infrastructure  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Special Series: Contract to Cheat - Misclassification of Labor in the Government Contracts Construction Industry | McClatchy September 2014
Across the country, roughly 10 million construction workers spend each day in a dangerous and fickle industry. They hang drywall, lay carpet, shingle roofs. Yet in the eyes of their bosses, they aren't employees due the benefits the government requires. Employers treat many of these laborers as independent contractors. It's a tactic that costs taxpayers billions of dollars each year. Yet when it comes to public projects, government regulators have done nearly nothing about it, even when the proof is easy to get. The workers don't have protections. The companies don't withhold taxes. The regulators don't seem to care. McClatchy reporters in eight newsrooms spanning seven states spent a year unraveling the scheme, using little-noticed payroll records that show how widespread the practice has become and what it costs us all.
US_economy  US_government  local_government  regulation  regulation-enforcement  labor_law  labor  wages  race-to-the-bottom  Obama_administration 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Zephyr Teachout, Lina Khan - Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power :: SSRN September 7, 2014
Zephyr Teachout, Fordham University School of Law -- Lina Khan, Yale University - Law School -- Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, Forthcoming. **--** The goal of this Article is to create a way of seeing how market structure is innately political. It provides a taxonomy of ways in which large companies frequently exercise powers that possess the character of governance. Broadly, these exercises of power map onto three bodies of activity we generally assign to government: to set policy, to regulate markets, and to tax. We add a fourth category — which we call "dominance," after Brandeis — as a kind of catchall describing the other political impacts. The activities we outline will not always fit neatly into these categories, nor do all companies engage in all of these levels of power — that is not the point. The point is that Bank of America and Exxon govern our lives in a way that, say, the local ice cream store in your hometown does not. Explicitly understanding the power these companies wield as a form of political power expands the range of legal tools we should consider when setting policy around them. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 38 - Keywords: antitrust
paper  SSRN  political_economy  economic_culture  big_business  antitrust  regulation  power-asymmetric  legal_system  consumers  governance  governmentality  corporate_citizenship  consumer_protection  concentration-industry  dispute_resolution  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Zhijie Chen, Jing Zhuo - The Trade and Culture Debate in the Context of Creative Economy: An Adaptive Regulatory Approach from Fragmentation to Coherence :: SSRN June 16, 2014
Zhijie Chen - The University of Hong Kong (PhD Student) -- Jing Zhuo - University of Macau. -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No 2014/07. **--** The trade and culture debate has been a long tension without a definite result. It has been widely argued that neither the existing WTO regulatory framework nor the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression can address the debate. More recently, some emerging domains in the digital age, including digital technology and intellectual property rights, have posed crucial challenges These trends invite the careful reconsideration of the role of law, the dominant legal responses and regulatory approaches; however they have not been paid due attention. This paper investigates a possibly more adaptive regulatory approach for the trade and culture debate under the changed regulatory environment. Compared with cultural industries, it appears that creative industries tend to more properly reflect the status quo of the current economy, and the concept of creative economy could be employed as the concept to design a new regulatory approach for the debate in the digital age. For the WTO regulatory framework, a two-steps approach could be considered. The first step is to formulae the ‘creative economy’ as a legal concept, followed by the second step of introducing the concept into the WTO regulatory framework. It is suggested that such approach could be a more adaptive and coherent regulatory approach for the trade and culture debate in the digital age. -- Number of Pages: 41 - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  global_governance  UN  UNESCO  culture  diversity  trade-policy  WTO  creative_economy  regulation  regulation-harmonization  digital_humanities  technology  Innovation  convergence-business  globalization  national_interest  public_goods  free_trade  protectionism  IP  property_rights  downloaded  EF-add  change-social 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Rostam J. Neuwirth - The Creative Industries as a New Paradigm for Business and Law: Of 'Smart Phones' and 'Smarter Regulation' :: SSRN June 13, 2014
University of Macau - Faculty of Law, E32 -- Fourth Biennial Global conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/05. **--** From a macroeconomic perspective, the historical evolution of trade and commerce has been closely entangled in a two-way or paradoxical relationship with the evolution of laws, where one is inextricably linked to the other and both mutually influence each other. At the microeconomic level, the same can be said about the relationship between businesses or industries and their underlying technologies. Recent changes, and notably the accelerated pace by which we recognize change, has led to a widespread trend of “convergence”. Convergence has been recognised in different contexts, namely in languages, technologies, and industries as well as regulatory matters. The objective of this article is thus to first trace and describe convergence from a linguistic, technological and industrial perspective. Subsequently, in order to ponder the future regulatory challenges in the regulation of global trade under the aegis of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it will focus on the question of whether technological and industrial convergence should be met by a similar trend towards regulatory convergence through regulatory harmonisation. Put differently, it will critically evaluate the present situation of regulatory divergence in the form of regulatory diversity and regulatory competition with a view of contributing to the debate of improving global trade regulation in the 21st century. - Number of Pages: 21 -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  global_governance  WTO  regulation  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  technocracy  accountability  public_policy  legal_culture  regulation-harmonization  technology  technology_transfer  economic_culture  creative_economy  political_participation  globalization  global_system  manufacturing  production  change-social  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Gregory Shaffer - How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State :: SSRN August 14, 2014
University of California, Irvine - School of Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/29. *--* The World Trade Organization (WTO) arguably shapes regulatory governance in more countries to a greater extent than any other international organization. This chapter provides a new framework for assessing the broader regulatory implications of the WTO within nation states, as opposed to viewing the WTO as a form of global governance above the nation state. It first examines seven types of changes required for national law and legal practice, which affect how the state raises revenue, how the state spends it, and the principles the state applies to regulation. The chapter then assesses four broader dimensions of regulatory change catalyzed by WTO rules: (i) changes in the boundary between the market and the state (involving concomitantly market liberalization and growth of the administrative state); (ii) changes in the relative authority of institutions within the state (promoting bureaucratized and judicialized governance); (iii) changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation (such as the role of lawyers); and (iv) changes in normative frames and accountability mechanisms for national regulation (which are trade liberal and transnational in scope). In practice, these four dimensions of change interact and build on each other. The chapter presents what we know to date and a framework for conducting further empirical study. - Number of Pages: 43 -- Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, Regulation, Regulatory governance, Market liberalization - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  global_governance  WTO  regulation  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  technocracy  accountability  public_policy  legal_culture  legal_theory  lawyers  political_participation  business-and-politics  norms-business  markets_in_everything  markets  neoliberalism  free_trade  democracy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE -- PARTING COMPANIES: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, COMPANY POWER, AND IMPERIAL MERCANTILISM. (2014). | The Historical Journal, 57, pp 617-638. Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW - University of Kent and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE - Seattle University School of Law --This article revisits the late seventeenth-century histories of two of England's most successful overseas trading monopolies, the East India and Royal African Companies. It offers the first full account of the various enforcement powers and strategies that both companies developed and stresses their unity of purpose in the seventeenth century. It assesses the complex effects that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ had on these powers and strategies, unearthing much new material about the case law for monopoly enforcement in this critical period and revising existing accounts that continue to assert the Revolution's exclusively deregulating effects and that miss crucial subtleties in the case law and related alterations in company behaviour. It asks why the two companies parted company as legal and political entities and offers an explanation that connects the fortunes of both monopoly companies to their public profile and differing constituencies in the English empire and the varying non-European political contexts in which they operated. -- * We warmly thank Michael R. T. Macnair for his indispensable advice and assistance regarding matters of seventeenth-century English law and are grateful to Clive Holmes for encouraging us to look into these issues and to Simon Douglas and Jeffrey Hackney for initial help in doing so. Paul Halliday, Daniel Hulsebosch, and Philip J. Stern provided helpful responses to specific research queries.
article  paywall  find  17thC  British_history  British_politics  economic_history  Glorious_Revolution  mercantilism  monopolies  trading_companies  East_India_Company  Royal_African_Co  colonialism  slavery  piracy  competition  parties  London  legal_history  judiciary  commercial_law  interest_groups  Whig_Junto  Tories  James_II  William_III  Parliament  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  regulation  West_Indies  ports  shipping  trade-policy  entrepôts  exports  imports  luxury_goods  consumers  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - The Hamlyn Lectures 2011: The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (2011) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-47 -- The idea in these lectures is to discuss the relation between property and the rule of law in a deeper way than this has been discussed in the past, ...that reflects realistic understanding of how property rights are created and modified. -- our thinking about the rule of law needs to focus on all the ways in which property is non-Lockean in its origin, legal status, and moral force. In the course of doing this, I will be looking at some of the rather naive assumptions underlying the tight connection that has been forged between property rights and the rule of law in neo-liberal political economy. And I will argue that we can abandon or modify some of these naive assumptions about property without compromising the very great importance that is properly attached to the ideal of the rule of law. There are three lectures in all. -- Lecture 1 addresses the alleged contrast between (a) the rule of law and (b) rule by law, and the suggestion that property rights might be privileged under (a). -- in the real world even Lockean property has an inescapable public law dimension. Lecture 2... is about the contrast between formal/procedural and substantive views of the rule of law and the dificulties inherent in identifying respect for private property rights as a substantive dimension of the rule of law. ...given the accordion-like expandability of the category of property, this cannot work to privilege property rights over other legal rights etc. Lecture 3 is a defense of legislation, including regulatory and redistributive legislation in light of the rule of law. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  political_economy  property  property_rights  rule_of_law  regulation  redistribution  Locke-2_Treatises  Hayek  libertarianism  liberty-negative  legislation  property-confiscations  power-asymmetric  social_order  neoliberalism  markets  institutional_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Case Against Free Speech (July 2014 working paper) :: SSRN
Free societies employ a variety of institutions — including courts and schools — in which speech is heavily regulated on the basis of its content ... in order to promote other desirable ends, including discovery of the truth. I illustrate this with the case of courts and rules of evidence. Three differences between courts and the polity might seem to counsel against extending that approach more widely. First, the courtroom has an official and somewhat reliable (as well as reviewable) arbiter of the epistemic merits, while the polity may not. Second, no other non-epistemic values of speech are at stake in the courtroom, whereas they are in the polity. Third, the courtroom’s jurisdiction is temporally limited in a way the polity’s may not be. I argue that only the first of these poses a serious worry about speech regulation outside select institutions like courts. I also argue for viewing "freedom of speech" like "freedom of action": speech, like everything else human beings do, can be for good or ill... and thus the central question in free speech jurisprudence should really be how to regulate speech effectively — to minimize its very real harms, without undue cost to its positive values — rather than rationalizing (often fancifully) the supposed special value of speech. In particular, I argue against autonomy-based defenses of a robust free speech principle. I conclude that the central issue in free speech jurisprudence is not about speech but about institutional competence; I offer some reasons — from the Marxist "left" and the public choice "right"— for being skeptical that capitalist democracies have the requisite competence; and make some suggestive but inconclusive remarks about how these defects might be remedied. - No of Pages: 41
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  free_speech  Mill  Hayek  Adorno  Frankfurt_School  Kant  Kant-ethics  Marx  autonomy  networks-information  evidence  epistemology-social  education  regulation  public_choice  public_sphere  public_opinion  political_participation  competition 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Bert De Munck - Conventions, the Great Transformation and Actor Network Theory | JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 37, No. 4 (142) (2012), pp. 44-54
This article proceeds from the field of tension between the synchronical approach of the economics of convention and the diachronical approach of economic anthropology (in the tradition of Karl Polanyi). It is argued that the economics of convention remain problematic to historians in that they fail to capture the long term transformations traditionally referred to as the emergence of modernity and the coming about of homo economicus. As a possible solution, the use of concepts and insights from Actor Network Theory is proposed. While this cluster of theories enables an historical perspective without considering modernity as a natural process, it confronts changing relationships between subjects, objects and cultural systems of meaning head on. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_sociology  economic_culture  markets  conventions  regulation  structure  microfoundations  historical_sociology  modernity  capitalism  synchronic  dyachronic  anthropology  Polanyi_Karl  Actor_Network_Theory  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - The Equalizing Hand: Why Adam Smith Thought the Market Should Produce Wealth Without Steep Inequality | Cambridge Journals Online - Perspectives on Politics - Dec 2013
For long overview of the article, see her post from the LSE blog -- Perspectives on Politics, 11, pp 1051-1070. doi:10.1017/S153759271300282X. - That the market economy inevitably leads to inequality is widely accepted today, with disagreement confined to the desirability of redistributive action, its extent, and the role of government in the process. The canonical text of liberal political economy, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, is assumed even in the most progressive interpretations to accept inequality, rationalized as the inevitable trade-off for increasing prosperity compared to less developed but more equal economies. I argue instead that Smith's system, if fully implemented, would not allow steep inequalities to arise. In Smith, profits should be low and labor wages high, legislation in favor of the worker is “always just and equitable,” land should be distributed widely and evenly, inheritance laws liberalized, taxation can be high if it is equitable, and the science of the legislator is necessary to put the system in motion and keep it aligned. Market economies are made in Smith's system. Political theorists and economists have highlighted some of these points, but the counterfactual “what would the distribution of wealth be if all the building blocks were ever in place?” has not been posed. Doing so encourages us to question why steep inequality is accepted as a fact, instead of a pathology that the market economy was not supposed to generate in the first place. --Deborah Boucoyannis is Assistant Professor at the University of Virginia (dab5fw@virginia.edu). Her interests lie in the historical preconditions for the emergence of the liberal order and of constitutionalism.
paper  paywall  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - For Adam Smith, inequality was contrary to the Wealth of Nations | British Politics and Policy at LSE – Feb 2014
Overview of her article in Perspectives on Politics - see Cambridge Journals bookmark - The assumption that Adam Smith accepted inequality as the necessary trade-off for a more prosperous economy is wrong, writes Deborah Boucoyannis. In reality, Smith’s system precluded steep inequalities not out of a normative concern with equality but by virtue of the design that aimed to maximise the wealth of nations. Much like many progressive critics of current inequality, Smith targets rentier practices by the rich and powerful as distorting economic outcomes.
paper  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Heterodox Economics - Readings | HMiRN
Extensive list of books, chapters, journal articles, periodically updated since 2011 -- Contents --
1. History and Methodology of Heterodox Microeconomics
2. Critiques of Mainstream Microeconomics
3. Principles of Heterodox Microeconomic Theory
4. Theory of the Business Enterprise
5. Structure of Production and Costs of the Business Enterprise
6. Costing, Pricing, and Prices
7. Investment, Finance, and Employment
8. Households, Consumption, and Market Demand
9. Industry and Market
10. Competition
11. Corporate Governance, Market Governance, and Market Regulation
12. Social Welfare
13. Heterodox Microfoundations and Modeling the Economy
bibliography  economic_theory  economic_history  economic_models  economic_sociology  firms-theory  Labor_markets  capital  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  M&A  regulation  consumers  consumer_demand  monopolies  finance_capital  taxes  competition  investment  prices  wages  heterodox_economics  microeconomics  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Ulf Henning Richter - Liberal Thought in Reasoning on CSR | JSTOR: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 625-649
In this article, I argue that conventional reasoning on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is based on the assumption of a liberal market economy in the context of a nation state. I build on the study of Scherer and Palazzo (Acad Manage Rev 32(4):1096-1120, 2007), developing a number of criteria to identify elements of liberal philosophy in the ongoing CSR debate. I discuss their occurrence in the CSR literature in detail and reflect on the implications, taking into account the emerging political reading of the firm. I conclude that the apolitical framework in the mainstream CSR literature has to be overcome since it does not reflect recent changes in the socio-economic conditions for economic actors in a globalizing world. -- over 200 references -- didn't download
article  jstor  international_political_economy  globalization  global_system  corporations  corporate_governance  CSR  nation-state  corporate_citizenship  firms-theory  regulation  accountability  business-and-politics  externalities  capitalism  political_economy  economic_sociology  management  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader

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