dunnettreader + reason-passions   22

Leo Damrosh - The Enlightenment: Invention of the Modern Self | The Great Courses
Enlightenment Invention of the Modern Self - from opening views in 17thC, through stages of the Enlightenment - a road to its (inevitable?) backlash in Romanticism
24 lectures
Only available as Audio download (and streaming) - list price $130
Rave reviews
Uses literary works and philosophical texts together
Frex completes the 2 lectures on British empiricism (focus on Locke and Hume re the self) with how Pope struggles with capturing complex psychology within the empiricist framework
After an introduction of 17thC religious and secular conceptions of the self, starts with 2 on La Princesse de Clèves
After empiricism, 2 on Voltaire and theodicy in Candide
3 lectures on Diderot and Jacques le fataliste
A lot of Rousseau - not the novels but the autobiographical works - how he analyzes himself in Confessions and Solitary Walker
Lots of biography, with Boswell's Johnson the vehicle
Some Franklin and Smith
Finishes with Laclos and Blake
Romanticism  bibliography  reason-passions  poetry  Boswell  self  moral_psychology  French_Enlightenment  Enlightenment  English_lit  French_Revolution-impact  Rousseau  free_will  Locke-education  buy  human_nature  Diderot  Blake_William  Locke  Hume-causation  autobiography  17thC  Rousseau-self  Hume-ethics  altruism  Johnson  Voltaire  novels  empiricism  18thC  moral_philosophy  Locke-Essay  intellectual_history  cultural_history  Pope_Alexander  courses  French_lit  Smith  Hume  determinism  epistemology  emotions  character  audio  psychology 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Damien Couet, review - Michael Slote, A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind - La Vie des idées - 30 décembre 2015
Recensé : Michael Slote, A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind, Oxford University Press, 2014, 272 p. -- L’éthique du care entend réhabiliter le rôle des émotions occulté par la pensée morale occidentale. Mais elle a besoin pour cela d’une conception sentimentaliste de l’esprit, dont M. Slote souhaite jeter les fondements. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle-available  reviews  moral_philosophy  moral_sentiments  moral_psychology  ethics  ethic_of_care  sympathy  empathy  epistemology  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  feminism  mind  rationality  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Newberry - Joseph Butler on Forgiveness: A Presupposed Theory of Emotion | JSTOR - Journal of the History of Ideas (2001)
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 233-244 -- corrects misreading of Butler's position - not overcoming emotions of resentment but restraining one's actions or forbearance of taking revenge -- and discusses why Butler has been misread -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  Butler  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  theology  forgiveness  moral_sentiments  morality-Christian  emotions  reason-passions  action-theory  agency  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Roundtable - Romanticism, Enlightenment, and Counter-Enlightenment | Philoctetes Center - April 17, 2010
, 2:30 PM
Romanticism, Enlightenment, and Counter-Enlightenment

Participants: Akeel Bilgrami, Taylor Carman, Garrett Deckel, Colin Jager, Joel Whitebook Isaiah Berlin introduced the work of a range of philosophers in the German romantic and German idealist tradition to the English-speaking world. His fascination with some of their ideas was accompanied by a concomitant anxiety about them. The anxiety issued from his staunch liberal commitment to the orthodox Enlightenment. Yet, the fascination was an implicit acknowledgement on his part of some of the limitations of the Enlightenment's liberal ideas. This roundtable will look at this underlying tension in Berlin, which many liberals feel to this day. Panelists will probe the role of reason, perception, and emotion in our individual and political psychology, and ask the question of whether or not there is something for liberalism to learn from what Berlin—rightly or wrongly—called the "Counter-Enlightenment." -- see YouTube bookmark for direct link -- video also embedded in program page
video  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  Enlightenment  Counter-Enlightenment  Romanticism  Enlightenment_Project  Enlightenment-ongoing  German_Idealism  liberalism  Berlin_Isaiah  reason  rationality  perception  emotions  reason-passions  political_philosophy  political_culture  social_psychology  moral_psychology  nature  nature-mastery  cognition  prejudice  cognitive_bias  mind  mind-body  philosophical_anthropology 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Review by: Georges Dicker - Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy | JSTOR: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Dec., 1998), pp. 447-449
Summary, chapter by chapter, without critique of Garrett take on Hume as a cognitive psychologist, and especially his brand of scepticism re induction, causation and self, but also covering moral philosophy (moral sentiments and role of reason in moral judgment). Where Garrett sees Hume diverging from Locke -- didn't download
books  reviews  jstor  intellectual_history  18thC  Hume  Hume-ethics  Hume-causation  scepticism  reason-passions  moral_sentiments  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  Locke  self  identity 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Review by: Timothy Chappell - John Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and Psychoanalytic Ethics | JSTOR: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 197 (Oct., 1999), pp. 560-562
Cottingham doesn't think much of current moral_philosophy that treats "beliefs" and "desires" as transparent entities that can be manipulated in theory -- they have abandoned not only Freudian insights but even the purported ultra rationalist Descartes who was clued in to the physiology of emotions, and that reason is embodied -- Chappell highly recommends -- didn't download
books  find  reviews  jstor  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  psychoanalysis  mind-body  passions  reason-passions  emotions  Aristotle  Descartes 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Frans Svensson - THE ROLE OF VIRTUE IN DESCARTES' ETHICAL THEORY, OR: WAS DESCARTES A VIRTUE ETHICIST? | JSTOR: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (JULY 2010), pp. 215-236
Looks useful 1st by trying to set criteria to distinguish virtue ethics from concern with virtue in other metaethics (deontology, consequentialism, eudaimonia) - he then looks at Descartes's letters to Queen Christina , supplemented with some remarks on moral psychology in Passions of the Soul. Contra Lisa Shapiro in a recent Blackwell Companion, his verdict is No. -- didn't download
article  jstor  intellectual_history  17thC  metaethics  virtue_ethics  virtue  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  good  reason  reason-passions  free_will  Descartes  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Objectivity, Morality and Adjudication :: SSRN In OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS, Brian Leiter, Cambridge University Press, 2001
Two familiar features of Dworkin's theory of adjudication generate a strange predicament. Dworkin maintains that most cases, including most "hard" cases, have "right answers." Yet he also argues that to discover that right answer, judges must avail themselves of moral considerations and moral argument: a party's rights follow from the principle which explains some significant portion of the prior institutional history and provides the best justification for that institutional history as a matter of political morality. Yet if morality is, as many seem to think, "subjective" in some sense, then there may be as many right answers as a matter of morality as there are judges and thus, consequently, no single right answer as a matter of law. Dworkin's response asks us to distinguish between sensible, but defeasible, "internal" attacks on the objectivity of morality, from unintelligible, and irrelevant, "external" attacks on the objectivity of morality. Dworkin's internal/external distinction may be usefully recast as two competing paradigms of objectivity. ... by the "Naturalistic Conception," objectivity in any domain must be understood on the model of the natural sciences, whose objects of study are objective in the sense of being "mind-independent" and causally efficacious. The "Non-Naturalistic Conception," by contrast, denies that the type of objectivity found in the natural sciences is the relevant type of objectivity to aspire to in all domains. Dworkin's version of Non-Naturalism bears a striking similarity to John McDowell's. I conclude that neither version provides an adequate account of objectivity: they fail to explain basic intuitions about objectivity (even in ethics), as well as leaving us with a picture of the "objectivity" of ethics that would, in fact, be quite congenial to the non-cognitivism that both McDowell and Dworkin purport to have left behind. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 42
books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  moral_philosophy  metaethics  morality-objective  objectivity  legal_validity  naturalism  epistemology-moral  reason-passions  reasons  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  judiciary  bibliography  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism :: SSRN - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2012
Legal philosophers have been preoccupied with specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance - law and morality. Positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and Raz propose a solution to this “Demarcation Problem” according to which the legal validity of a norm can not depend on its being morally valid, either in all or at least some possible legal systems. The proposed analysis purports to specify the essential and necessary features of law.... Yet the concept of law is an “artifact concept,” that is, a concept that picks out a phenomenon that owes its existence to human activities. Artifact concepts, even simple ones like “chair,” are notoriously resistant to analyses in terms of their essential attributes, precisely because they are hostage to human ends and purposes, and also can not be individuated by their natural properties. 20th-century philosophy of science dealt with a kindred Demarcation Problem: ...how to demarcate science from pseudo-science or nonsense. -- they sought to identify the essential properties of a human artifact (namely, science). They failed, and spectacularly so, which led some philosopher to wonder, “Why does solving the Demarcation Problem matter?” This essay develops the lessons for legal philosophy -- lest we want to become embroiled in pointless Fullerian speculations about the effects of jurisprudential doctrines on behavior, it is time to abandon the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  Logical_Positivism  linguistic_turn  concepts  analytical_philosophy  essentialism  natural_kinds  modal_logic  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  legal_system  positivism-legal  psychologism  natural_law  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  Carnap  Hempel  Popper  Fuller  Hart  Kelsen  Raz  Finnis  normativity  moral_sentiments  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Alan Goldman - DESIRES AND REASONS | JSTOR: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4 (OCTOBER 2009), pp. 291-304
Works through a more elaborate process of how information can interact with desires and deeper concerns to motivate, provide reasons for acting, or for changing desires, preferences or actions (reasons for acting) -- this "modified" internalist view still mostly Humean and doesn't accept premises of externalist that presumes external objective values -- didn't download
article  jstor  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  action-theory  practical_reason  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  rationality  values  Hume-ethics  reason-passions  Scanlon  contractualism  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Review by: Terence Penelhum - Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology. by John Bricke | JSTOR: Ethics, Vol. 108, No. 3 (Apr., 1998), pp. 630-633
Gives the book high marks - the review discusses ways Bricke reconciles key pieces of the Treatise and the problems for Hume's motivation of action generally via desires versus moral action via moral sentiments - and how this works (or causes difficulties) with the bundled self and identity -- didn't download
books  reviews  find  amazon.com  jstor  intellectual_history  18thC  Hume  human_nature  action-theory  moral_psychology  moral_philosophy  Hume-ethics  moral_sentiments  reason-passions  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Christine M. Korsgaard - Skepticism about Practical Reason | JSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 5-25
Looks like a key fairly early article in Korsgaard Kantian revival and debates over moral realism, internalist theories, moral_psychology and various versions of Hume. -- frequently cited -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  action-theory  Kant-ethics  practical_reason  practical_knowledge  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  normativity  Hume-ethics  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
SIMON BLACKBURN - The Majesty of Reason | JSTOR: Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 331 (January 2010), pp. 5-27
In this paper I contemplate two phenomena that have impressed theorists concerned with the domain of reasons and of what is now called ‘normativity’. One is the much-discussed ‘externality’ of reasons. According to this, reasons are just there, anyway. They exist whether or not agents take any notice of them. They do not only exist in the light of contingent desires or mere inclinations. They are ‘external’ not ‘internal’. They bear on us, even when through ignorance or wickedness we take no notice of them. They thus very conspicuously shine the lights of objectivity, and independence, and even necessity. By basking in this light, ethics is rescued from the slough of sentiment and preference, and regains the dignity denied to it by theorists such as Hobbes or Hume, Williams, Gibbard or myself. Hence, many contemporary philosophers compete to stress and to extol the external nature of reasons, their shining objectivity. The other phenomenon is that of the inescapable ‘normativity’ of means-ends reasoning. Here the irrationality of intending an end but failing to intend the means is a different shining beacon. It is that of pure practical reason in operation: an indisputable norm, again showing a sublime indifference to whatever weaknesses people actually have, and ideally fitted to provide a Trojan horse for inserting rationality into practical life. If the means-end principle is both unmistakably practical and yet the darling child of rationality itself, then other principles of consistency or of humanity, or of universalizing the maxims of our action, can perhaps follow through the breach in the Humean citadel that it has spearheaded. And so we get the dazzling prospect that if people who choose badly are choosing against reason, then this can be seen to be a special and grave defect. It would locate the kind of fault they are indulging. It would give us, the people of reason, a special lever with which to dislodge their vices. Being able to herd knaves and villains in a compound reserved for those who trespass against reason and rationality therefore represents definite progress. -- paywall Cambridge -- see bibliography on jstor information page
article  jstor  paywall  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  Hume-ethics  Hume-causation  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  action-theory  normativity  practical_reason  practical_knowledge  Williams_Bernard  judgment-emotions  reason  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Book Symposium: Jonathan Dancy, "Practical Reality" | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 2, Sep., 2003
(1) Précis of "Practical Reality"(pp. 423-428) Jonathan Dancy. *--* (2) Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons (pp. 429-435) R. Jay Wallace. *--* (3) Desires, Reasons, and Causes(pp. 436-443) Stephen Darwall. *--* (4) Two Accounts of Objective Reasons(pp. 444-451) Christian Piller. *--* (5) Psychologism and Humeanism(pp. 452-459) Wayne A. Davis. *--* (6) Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story(pp. 460-467) Michael Smith. *--* (7) Replies(pp. 468-490) Jonathan Dancy
journal  books  reviews  article  jstor  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  action-theory  normativity  practical_reason  practical_knowledge  Hume-ethics  reason-passions  judgment-emotions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Online guide to texts in early modern metaethics (Cole Mitchell)
This is an online guide to texts in early modern metaethics, organized by author in rough chronological order, and maintained by Cole Mitchell. I try to keep the focus on topics of metaethical interest: reason and the passions, the status of moral truths and their relation to God, the ‘why be moral?’ question, the relation between morality and self-interest, analogies between morality and other domains (geometry, law, aesthetics), teleology and human nature, etc.
This guide is still pretty rough and messy. Any feedback on this or similar projects would be much appreciated:
website  links  17thC  18thC  intellectual_history  metaphysics  moral_philosophy  metaethics  human_nature  mind-body  reason-passions  natural_religion  rational_religion  Deism  Cambridge_Platonists  Descartes  Malebranche  Hobbes  Locke  Clarke  Leibniz  Butler  Berkeley  Warburton  Hume  Hume-ethics  Bolingbroke  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Review by Peter J. Steinberger - Leslie Paul Thiele, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative | JSTOR: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 359-360
Ever since Aristotle, phronesis has been impossible to pin down. Steinberger - inevitable that someone would try to use new neuroscience, and if a book like this had to be written, at least Thiele makes a reasonably thoughtful stab at it. Given that faint praise, review sorts through how Thiele uses scientific evidence and speculation to date. He finds it reductionist and the production of the illusion of self via a MacIntyre type story hand wavy. -- didn't download
books  article  jstor  mind  neuroscience  moral_philosophy  emotions  reason-passions  phronesis  practical_reason  practical_knowledge  narrative  self  identity  consciousness  reflection  deliberation  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader

related tags

17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  action-theory  Addison  aesthetics  agency  altruism  amazon.com  analytical_philosophy  Aristotle  article  art_criticism  art_history  audio  autobiography  Berkeley  Berlin_Isaiah  Biblical_criticism  bibliography  Blake_William  Bolingbroke  books  Boswell  Burke  Butler  buy  Calvinist  Cambridge_Platonists  Carnap  character  Clarke  cognition  cognitive_bias  concepts  consciousness  contractualism  Counter-Enlightenment  courses  cultural_history  Deism  deliberation  Descartes  determinism  Diderot  downloaded  Dutch  EF-add  emotions  empathy  empiricism  English_lit  Enlightenment  Enlightenment-ongoing  Enlightenment_Project  epistemology  epistemology-moral  epistemology-social  essentialism  ethics  ethic_of_care  Evernote  feminism  find  Finnis  forgiveness  free_will  French_Enlightenment  French_lit  French_Revolution-impact  Fuller  German_Idealism  good  Hart  Hempel  Hobbes  human_nature  Hume  Hume-causation  Hume-ethics  identity  imagination  instrumentalist  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Johnson  journal  jstor  judgment-aesthetics  judgment-emotions  judiciary  Kant-aesthetics  Kant-ethics  Kelsen  kindle-available  legal_system  legal_validity  Leibniz  liberalism  linguistic_turn  links  lit_crit  Locke  Locke-education  Locke-Essay  Logical_Positivism  Malebranche  metaethics  metaphysics  mind  mind-body  modal_logic  morality-Christian  morality-conventional  morality-objective  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  moral_sentiments  narrative  naturalism  natural_kinds  natural_law  natural_philosophy  natural_religion  nature  nature-mastery  neuroscience  normativity  novels  objectivity  passions  paywall  perception  phenomenology  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_religion  phronesis  physiology  poetry  political-theology  political_culture  political_philosophy  politics-and-religion  Pope_Alexander  Popper  positivism-legal  practical_knowledge  practical_reason  prejudice  psychoanalysis  psychologism  psychology  Questia  rationality  rational_choice  rational_religion  Raz  reason  reason-passions  reasons  reasons-externalism  reasons-internalism  reflection  reviews  Romanticism  Rousseau  Rousseau-self  Scanlon  scepticism  self  sensibility  sentimentalism  Smith  social_psychology  Spinoza  SSRN  sublime  sympathy  theology  tolerance  utilitarianism  values  video  virtue  virtue_ethics  Voltaire  Warburton  website  Williams_Bernard 

Copy this bookmark: