dunnettreader + physicalism   9

philosophy bites: Galen Strawson on Panpsychism
Is there something that it is like to be an electron? That sounds implausible. Yet Galen Strawson believes this is the best explanation of how things are. Find out why.

Listen to Galen Strawson on Panpsychism

Listen to an earlier interview with Galen Strawson on the Sense of Self
metaphysics  naturalism  audio  ontology  panpsychic_monism  Strawson_Galen  physicalism 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Jared P. Friedman and Anthony I. Jack - Mapping cognitive structure onto philosophical debate re problems of consciousness, free will and ethics | Minds Online - Sept 2015 - Session 1 - Social Cognition
Mapping cognitive structure onto the landscape of philosophical debate: An empirical framework with relevance to problems of consciousness, free will and ethics -- Department of Philosophy and Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence, Case Western Reserve University -- There are some seemingly intractable questions that have remained at the heart of philosophical discourse since they were first asked. Is the mind distinct from the brain or are we just physical stuff? Are we autonomous agents or merely at the mercy of the causal and mechanistic laws of nature? When, if ever, is it acceptable to sacrifice one for the greater good of many? That these questions have remained at the heart of philosophy for so long, and that their ‘solutions’ (e.g., monism vs. dualism) seem to be incommensurable with each other, strikes us as enigmatic. Might the intractable nature of these and other appropriately identified problems reflect something peculiar about us rather than something peculiar about the way the world is? (...) This account maintains that the difficulties reconciling markedly different philosophical responses to these three questions arise from an unavoidable tension between two anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks, both of which are essential to human understanding. This account is motivated by the observation that both philosophers and non-philosophers experience difficulty in reconciling competing responses to these questions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  conference  cognition  antimonies  consciousness  mind-body  neuroscience  determinism  free_will  naturalism  physicalism  reductionism  causation  moral_philosophy  metaethics  intuitions  brain  experimental_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  James_William  monism  dualism  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Markus Gabriel interview with Richard Marshall - Why The World Does Not Exist But Unicorns Do | 3AM - May 2015
Markus Gabriel broods on why the world doesn’t exist and never stops wondering about Kant, existence, pluralism, fields of sense, Huw Price, about why he isn’t po-mo, nor a Meinongian, about why unicorns exist, about why he’s a realist, about dissolving the hard problem, about why naturalism and physicalism are wrong, about Schelling and post-Kantian idealism, about Badiou and Meillassouz, Heidegger, about resisting skepticism, about negative philosophy, mythology, madness, laughter and the need for illusions in metaphysics, and about the insult that is the continental/analytic divide . Gird up for an amazing story… -- humongous interview divided into 2 pages - each about twice as long as one of Marshall's regular interviews -- only page 1 picked up by Instapaper, and no single page option -- saved as 2 pdfs to Note
Instapaper  downloaded  intellectual_history  philosophy  metaphysics  ontology  ontology-social  realism  realism-speculative  postmodern  Rorty  Kant  Schelling  German_Idealism  pragmatism  pragmatism-analytic  Husserl  Heidegger  scepticism  myth  Brandom  French_intellectuals  continental_philosophy  philosophy_of_science  analytical_philosophy  Russell_Bertrand  Frege  physicalism  materialism  naturalism  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Charles Taliaferro - Dualism and the Problem of Individuation | JSTOR: Religious Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 263-276
Quite helpful review of various metaphysical debates from Descartes onwards, how the "substance" debates have evolved, including the old identity of indiscernables claim that's been thoroughly challenged in post WWII analytical_philosophy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  20thC  Descartes  Locke  Butler  Reid  metaphysics  ontology  substance  soul  dualism  physicalism  mind-body  consciousness  immortality  universals  particulars  identity  self  analytical_philosophy  logic  Leibniz  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Review by: Jose Luis Bermudez - Jonathan Lowe, Subjects of Experience | JSTOR: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 195 (Apr., 1999), pp. 272-275
Lowe develops his anti-physicalist approach to self, mind-body etc - Cartesian that self is substantial, Locke that it's primarily psychological, Aristotle that it's not immaterial -- implications for other areas beyond philosophy of mind, such as language -- an earlier version of his publications in the 2000s before his death? -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  jstor  metaphysics  ontology  philosophy_of_language  mind  mind-body  Descartes  Locke  physicalism  dualism  nominalism  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Giuseppina D’Oro - Le fossé dans l’explication n’est pas épistémologique mais sémantique | Érudit | Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 183-192 |
Giuseppina D’Oro - Université de Keele -- Traduction de l’anglais par Jérôme Havenel -- This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and Mcginn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind body-problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances. -- downloaded pdf to Note
metaphysics  ontology  epistemology  mind-body  consciousness  concepts  semantics  analytical_philosophy  Kripke  Nagel  reductionism  physicalism  naturalism  idealism  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert C. Bishop, review - Peter Ulric Tse, Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Jan 2014
Critical re reductionism or eliminativism underneath the Tse "persons choosing" lingo - one where equivocation on key notions such as willing, choosing, planning, valuing, information, assessment, and so forth, mask the replacements of what persons do when they engage in decisions by mechanized response to inputs. The richness of our human experience and practices of free will and action disappear. Equivocating on key terms such as 'assessing', 'deciding' and 'willing' likely would go unnoticed if you are presupposing a strictly instrumental view of action, where all cause-effect chains are modeled on efficient causation, and the main idea is to discern the most efficient or effective means for achieving a pre-set goal. -- On the instrumental view Tse offers, human actions are the effects of efficient causal chains no different in kind from a thermostat triggering the A/C to come on when a preset threshold is met (except that somehow the thermostat has an unidentified power to change the threshold once the threshold has been met). Tse likely does not realize that his being enmeshed in an instrumental view of action leads him to personify neurons and thereby mechanize assessing, deciding and willing, among other activities, at all levels of his account. -- Moreover, Tse likely does not realize how deeply the instrumental view of action is shaped by Western cultural ideals (Bishop 2013). -- In conclusion, Tse tells us that he is going to give us a neuroscientific account of free will and consciousness, but his metaphysics of realization, the personification equivocation and the commitment to an instrumental picture of action amounts to a philosophical account with philosophical assumptions... -- interesting on Causal Closure Principle of physics
books  reviews  philosophy_of_science  mind  neuroscience  free_will  determinism  reductionism  physicalism  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Daniel Stoljar interviewed by Richard Marshall - epistemic consciousness » 3:AM Magazine March 2014
Daniel Stoljar thinks all the time about what we can and can’t learn from introspection, about ignorance and the imagination, the epistemic view of consciousness, the ignorance hypothesis, slugs and tiles, distinctions between empirical and philosophical questions, physicalism as weltanschauung, whether materialism is part of a scientific world view, on materialism and physics and on whether metaphysics harmonising with science is any different from tourism doing so also. This one keeps hooking to the body. Brawlin’.
metaphysics  mind  mind-body  physicalism  materialism  epistemology  empiricism  phenomenology  consciousness  analytical_philosophy  books  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Jerrold J. Katz - Précis of "The Metaphysics of Meaning" | JSTOR: Philosophical Issues, Vol. 4 (1993), pp. 128-134
Lead paper to which a bunch of people respond separately and Katz responds to each in separate papers. Launches defense of Platonism (all physical spatio-temporal stuff is real but that isn't everything that's real) against "naturalism" - separate strands from Wittgenstein and a scientistic version from Quine. He focuses on meaning - that possible intensional without physical reference - that Quine's extreme physicalism rules out except neurobiologically. His discussion of the Wittgenstein strand looks like it gets into linguistics, Chomsky etc.
article  jstor  metaphysics  naturalism  physicalism  scientism  Platonism  Wittgenstein  Quine  philosophy_of_language  meaning  linguistics  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader

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