dunnettreader + obligation   42

Richard McCarty, review - Kenneth Westphal, Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism (2016) | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, July 2016
Published: July 20, 2016

Kenneth R. Westphal, How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism, Oxford University Press, 2016, 252pp., $65.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198747055. - Reviewed by Richard McCarty, East Carolina University - gives high marks for way he approaches history of philosophy and current relevance, though thinks he's unfair to Hume and very untidy in how he applies his version of Kant - comment about re Pufendorf as predecessor to Hume's approach is useful - see quote and cite
books  kindle-available  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  moral_philosophy  natural_law  morality-objective  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  morality-divine_command  obligation  constructivism  contractualism  Hume-ethics  Kant-ethics 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Stathis Gourgouris - Democracy is a Tragic Regime | Academia.edu - PMLA 129-4, Theories and Methodologies
Begins with Castoriadas analysis and classical Athens - the "tragic" aspect inherent in democracy is a function of hubris - which is a failure of self-limitation - that since democracy is self-authorizing, it has no foundational or transcendent norms, no categorical imperatives - basic situation is that anything *can* be done - but not everything *ought * to be - downloaded to Tab S2
article  downloaded  political_philosophy  democracy  intellectual_history  political_history  ancient_Greece  ancient_philosophy  self-control  self-government  hubris  tragedy  Athens  normativity  norms  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  morality-divine_command  obligation 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Philip Pettit - The Birth of Ethics - 2014-2015 Lecture Series | Tanner Lectures
Philip Pettit
The Birth of Ethics
Lecture I: From Language to Commitment
With commentary by Michael Tomasello
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
Lecture II: From Commitment to Responsibility
With commentary by Pamela Hieronymi and Richard Moran
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
-- Seminar and Discussion with the three commentators
Thursday, April 9, 2015
lecture  intellectual_history  responsibility  human_nature  liberty  political_philosophy  constructivism  moral_philosophy  social_theory  legal_theory  community  philosophy_of_language  receprocity  video  obligation 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Death of God and the Death of Morality [Nietzsche] :: SSRN - September 16, 2015
University of Chicago -' Nietzsche famously proclaimed the "death of God," but in so doing it was not God's death that was really notable -- Nietzsche assumes that most reflective, modern readers realize that "the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable" (GS 343) -- but the implications of that belief becoming unbelievable, namely, "how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined," in particular, "the whole of our European morality" (GS 343). What is the connection between the death of God and the death of morality? I argue that Nietzsche thinks the death of God will undermine two central aspects of our morality: its moral egalitarianism, and its belief in moral responsibility and warranted guilt. I offer an account of how Nietzsche sees the connections, and conclude with some skeptical considerations about whether Nietzsche was right that atheism would, in fact, undermine morality. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 -- Keywords: Nietzsche, theism, morality -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  moral_philosophy  religious_belief  religious_culture  19thC  Nietzsche  theism  atheism  God-existence  moral_psychology  morality-Nietzche  morality-divine_command  morality-Christian  morality-conventional  morality-objective  Kant-ethics  egalitarian  guilt  norms  obligation  responsibility  free_will  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Frederick Schauer - The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 957 (2015)
My aim in this Article is to focus on the history of thinking about law in the context of 3 topics (..) to show that the continuous development of the theory of legal positivism, however useful it may have been or may still be, has possibly caused us to ignore other aspects of what was originally part of the positivist picture. (..)The first of these dimensions is the relationship between legal theory and legal reform. (..) that an account of the nature of law might be developed not simply as an aid to understanding or accurate description, but instead as a way of facilitating reform of law itself or reform of how a society understands the idea of law. Second, legal positivism, at the time of its late 19thC (or perhaps even earlier) origins, was focused on the importance of coercion, force, and sanctions as central components of law. But as with the creation of legal theories for the purpose of legal reform, this emphasis on the coercive side of law has also been banished to a kind of jurisprudential purgatory, for reasons and with consequences that deserve further examination. The third lost element of earlier versions of legal positivism is its focus on judicial decision making and the role of judges. Modern legal positivists, for whom 1961 is all too often the beginning of useful thought about the nature of law, do not, with few exceptions, consider theories of judicial decision making to be a necessary or even important part of the positivist perspective. But it was not always so. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  legal_reform  institutional_change  institutions  judiciary  judicial_review  law_enforcement  criminal_justice  punishment  coercion  authority  obligation  policymaking  political_change  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism-legal  positive_law  positivism  justice  Study_and_Uses  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alice Ristroph - Sovereignty and Subversion (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1029 (2015)
Hobbes’s account of law, like his account of punishment, does not fit well into our existing scholarly categories. (..). He was neither a legal positivist nor a natural law theorist, at least not as we usually use these labels. He adopted neither a retributive nor a consequentialist justification of punishment. Yet his account of human interaction, particularly with respect to law and punishment, captures actual experience better than the more familiar alternatives. Moreover, the space for subversion in Hobbes’s theory may make his account more normatively appealing than it has seemed to modern liberals. (...) 3 questions about Hobbesian theory: What is law? What is its relationship to punishment? And what are the implications of Hobbes’s theory for contemporary efforts to describe law or the relationship of law to punishment? The first (..) Hobbes’s legal theory is still so widely mischaracterized, sometimes even by Hobbes scholars, that it is worth returning to his claims. The second question has received much less attention, perhaps because a right to resist punishment seems so discordant with the authoritarian Hobbes we know, or think we know. And the third question has received still less attention, for contemporary jurisprudence scholarship rarely cites anyone who wrote before Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. I hope to show that, in many instances, Hobbes has been misread; even more importantly, I hope to persuade scholars of jurisprudence that what Hobbes actually said is worthy of their engagement. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Hobbes  17thC  political_philosophy  social_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  sovereignty  authority  obligation  punishment  resistance  liberalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Mark C. Murphy - A Commentary on Ristroph’s “Sovereignty and Subversion” | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1055 (2015)
She is correct in rejecting the assimilation of Hobbes’s legal theory to Austin’s, and in noting the strands of Hobbes’s view that disqualify him from counting as any sort of legal positivist. And I agree, on the whole, with her characterization of Hobbes’s account of justified punishment, and that this account has its attractions yet produces some puzzles which Hobbes does not fully resolve. My disagreements are with her second-order characterization of Hobbes’s legal theory. I want to discuss two related areas of disagreement. The first disagreement concerns whether we should assess Hobbes’s account of law in terms of the standards of general descriptive jurisprudence: Ristroph denies that it should be; I disagree. The second concerns whether we should take Hobbes’s treatment of the political as explanatorily prior to the legal to show that Hobbes was in some way apart from the natural law tradition in jurisprudence: Ristroph affirms this; I disagree. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Hobbes  17thC  political_philosophy  social_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  sovereignty  authority  obligation  punishment  resistance  liberalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Vanessa Carbonell, review - Lisa Tessman, Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews - May 26, 2015
Reviewed by Vanessa Carbonell, University of Cincinnati -- (..) she seeks to show that those impossible actions really were required and that you really did fail -- not in the sense of being to blame, but at least in the sense of having done wrong. (..) she looks to recent work in empirical moral psychology to support her vindicating story. Rather than dismiss people's experience of moral failure as irrational or misguided, Tessman claims that our intuitive moral judgments are largely arational. This chapter contains an overview of the "dual process" model of moral judgment and meticulously annotated discussions of the work of Daniel Kahneman, Joshua Greene, Jonathan Haidt, Jesse Prinz, Tamar Gendler, Philip Tetlock, and many others. Readers unfamiliar with this literature will find it a helpful introduction; readers familiar with and interested in these debates will probably find it overly ambitious. Suppose that we accepted every piece of Tessman's carefully assembled empirical story: that the dual process and social intuitionist models are roughly correct; that experiences of impossible demands are a moral case of Gendler's "alief"; that they involve Greene's "alarm bell" emotions; that moral judgments are what Prinz calls "prescriptive sentiments" or "oughtitudes"; that non-negotiable requirements trade on what Tetlock and colleagues call "sacred values"; etc. (..) It felt in the end like we simply had a lot more cool vocabulary for describing the purported data -- that people have experiences of impossible requirements and moral failure -- but no more reason to think that these experiences ought to be trusted as guides to what the demands of morality really are. -- interesting re overview of work in empirical moral psychology
books  reviews  epistemology-moral  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  ought-can  obligation  moral_sentiments  deontology  consequentialism  responsibility  intuitions  intuitionism  bibliography 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Tamanaha - Balkinization: Whither Jurisprudence? - Jan 2015
Scott Hershovitz's "The End of Jurisprudence" is a terrific article. [Downloaded from SSRN] For the past four decades, he asserts, "jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-Dworkin debate," and it is time to move on. -- "The time has come for jurisprudence to drop the metaphysics and take up morals. The question that jurisprudence should aim to answer is how our legal practices affect our moral rights, obligations, privileges, and powers. The metaphysical question posed in the Hart-Dworkin debate was a distraction; we have no good reason to think that our legal practices generate a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, whose metaphysics we must unravel. But the moral question is vital; it is contested everyday, in court and out, with serious consequences for peoples’ lives." (..) Though I agree this deserves attention, I do not agree that jurisprudence has or requires a particular end, whether this one or any other. The field thrives best when jurisprudence scholars pursue many different intellectual projects. In my view, jurisprudence remains vital by focusing on important legal phenomena and by drawing from other disciplines for insights. On that note, I offer my draft essay "What is Law?" [Downloaded from SSRN, as well as 2014 article by Roger Cotterrell]
philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  judiciary  legal_theory  legal_realism  normativity  moral_philosophy  norms  morality-conventional  obligation  Hart  Dworkin 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Derek Hirst, review - Victoria Kahn. Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640–1674 (2004) | JSTOR: The American Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 4 (October 2006), p. 1247
Derek Hirst, Washington University in St. Louis -- Reviewed work(s): Victoria Kahn. Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640–1674. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 370. $49.50. -- mixed review. -- he thinks she's on to a major way of looking how various metaphors were deployed and evolved in 17, with her readings of Hobbes and Milton 1st rate. She gets some facts and cites wrong when she strays out of her lane (cavalier not in the 17thC sense). But more damning is her lack of sufficient familiarity with Elizabethan and French discourses of romance, passions and bodies politic. Short -- didn't download
books  bookshelf  reviews  jstor  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  literary_history  17thC  Hobbes  Milton  British_history  British_politics  English_lit  English_Civil_War  Interregnum  Restoration  English_constitution  republicanism  social_contract  emotions  passions  human_nature  moral_psychology  obligation  reciprocity  trust  interest-discourse 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
James Schmidt - The Soldier, the Citizen, and the Clergyman, with a Postscript on Professors: Kant on Private Reason (Part II) | Persistent Enlightenment - August 2014
The only sensible response to the question “What would Kant think about Twitter?” is to point out that Kant hasn’t been thinking about anything for at least the last 210 years. But it might be worth pointing out, especially to those who evince concern about (as they tend to say) the “impact” of public statements made by faculty concerning various matters of public interest on the allegedly easily offended minds of students that Kant seems to have assumed that congregations could deal with clergy who instructed them in doctrines that — when they were not in the pulpit — they criticized in writings addressed to the public at large. But then Kant, while conceding that his was not an enlightened age, could still hope that it might be an age of enlightenment. I’d like to think the same. But the way things seem to be going, I wouldn’t bet on it.
intellectual_history  18thC  Germany  Kant  Frederick_the_Great  Prussia  free_speech  Enlightenment  Enlightenment-ongoing  obligation  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  political_culture  US_politics  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Charles Taliaferro - God's Estate [Locke's theory of God's ownership of the cosmos] | JSTOR: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 69-92
This article defends John Locke's notion that the cosmos is owned by God and explores the ethical implications of such divine ownership. Locke's theory, recently revived by Baruch Brody, is modified and defended against criticisms leveled against it by Joseph Lombardi and Robert Young. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  theology  metaphysics  moral_philosophy  creation  theism  Plato-religion  soul  immortality  property  property_rights  God-attributes  obligation  morality-divine_command  morality-Christian  Locke-religion  Locke-2_Treatises  cosmology  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Review Essay: Legal Thought in Enlightenment's Wake by Jeffrey A. Pojanowski :: SSRN - 4 Jurisprudence, 2013, Forthcoming
Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 12-80 -- This review essay considers Steven D. Smith’s most recent book, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse. Rather than focusing on the book’s argument about the practices and pathologies of the public square, this essay uses Smith’s chapter on scientific thought as a platform for exploring connections between Disenchantment and Smith’s prior work in legal theory. The catalyst for these reflections is Scandinavian legal realism. Considering these elements together sheds light on both the limits and virtues of central ideas about legal obligation and authority in contemporary jurisprudence. Such perspective points to a broader argument that jurisprudential debates about methodology and concepts may be as much about how we read the universe as they are about how we understand law. -- Keywords: jurisprudence, legal theory, obligation, authority, conceptual analysis, legal positivism
books  reviews  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  obligation  secularism  secularization  legal_realism  authority  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  legal_culture  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
JON GARTHOFF - LEGITIMACY IS NOT AUTHORITY | JSTOR: Law and Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 6 (November 2010), pp. 669-694
The two leading traditions of theorizing about democratic legitimacy are liberalism and deliberative democracy. Liberals typically claim that legitimacy consists in the consent of the governed, while deliberative democrats typically claim that legitimacy consists in the soundness of political procedures. Despite this difference, both traditions see the need for legitimacy as arising from the coercive enforcement of law and regard legitimacy as necessary for law to have normative authority. While I endorse the broad aims of these two traditions, I believe they both misunderstand the nature of legitimacy. In this essay I argue that the legitimacy of a law is neither necessary nor sufficient for its normative authority, and I argue further that the need for legitimacy in law arises regardless of whether the law is coercively enforced. I thus articulate a new understanding of the legitimacy and authority of law. -- didn't download -- bibliography heavily classic modern and contemporary philosophers
article  jstor  social_theory  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  philosophy_of_law  institutions  authority  legitimacy  legal_culture  legal_validity  liberalism  social_contract  consent  reasons  enforcement  deliberation-public  Habermas  democracy  norms  normativity  obligation  Enlightenment  Locke  Mill  Rawls  bibliography  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Scott J. Shapiro - What is the Rule of Recognition (and Does it Exist)? [chapter] :: SSRN in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, Matthew Adler, Kenneth Himma, eds., Oxford University Press, 2009
Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 184 -- One of the principal lessons of The Concept of Law is that legal systems are not only comprised of rules, but also founded on them ....we cannot account for the way we talk and think about the law - as an institution which persists over time, imposes duties and confers powers, enjoys supremacy over other kinds of practices, resolves doubts and disagreements about what is to be done in a community and so on - without supposing that it is regulated by what he called the secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication. -- In Part 1 I try to state Hart's doctrine of the rule of recognition with some precision. -- I also explore in this part whether the US Constitution can be considered the Hartian rule of recognition for the US legal system. In Part 2 I attempt to detail the many roles that the rule of recognition plays within Hart's theory of law. -- In Part 3 I examine three important challenges to Hart's doctrine: 1) the rule is under- and over-inclusive; 2) Hart cannot explain how social practices are capable of generating rules that confer powers and impose duties and hence cannot account for the normativity of law; 3) Hart cannot explain how disagreements about the criteria of legal validity that occur within actual legal systems are possible. In Parts 4 & 5, I address these objections. ...athough Hart's particular account of the rule of recognition is flawed, a related notion should be substituted - roughly, to treat the rule of recognition as a shared plan which sets out the constitutional order of a legal system. As I try to show, understanding the rule of recognition in this new way allows the legal positivist to overcome the challenges lodged against Hart's version while still retaining the power of the original idea. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  social_theory  social_order  political_order  change-social  institutions  constitutions  constitutional_law  constitutionalism  normativity  norms  obligation  institutional_change  positivism-legal  Hart  Dworkin  Raz  Finnis  US_constitution  conflict_of_laws  natural_law  legal_validity  legal_realism  sociology_of_law  community  planning  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Scott J. Shapiro - Authority (2000) :: SSRN
C 2000

Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum Research Paper 00-05; Cardozo Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 24 -- the so-called "paradox of authority" was first developed in the late 18th Century by the anarchist theorist William Godwin and later popularized by Robert Paul Wolff in the 1960's. Their aim was to demonstrate that legitimate authority is impossible. As they argued, the problem with all authorities is that they claim the right to demand obedience even when they are wrong. However, people should never act in ways they believe to be wrong. Hence, people should never recognize the right of authorities to demand their obedience. This paper discusses the many "solutions" that have been offered on authority's behalf. The responses fall roughly into two groups: those who believe that problems arise due to certain naive views about the nature of authority and rationality and that revision in our understanding is required, and those who maintain that the puzzle can be unraveled without any radical changes. --, the paper accepts that the paradox (or, as it is shown, paradoxes) of authority cannot be solved within standard theories of rationality and morality. Which revisions are necessary, it is claimed, depends on one's underlying theory of legitimacy.
paper  SSRN  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  authority  obligation  legitimacy  instrumentalist  autonomy  action-theory  rationality  decision_theory  deliberation-public  paradox  anarchy  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Scott J. Shapiro - What is the Internal Point of View? (2006 working paper) :: SSRN
In "The Concept of Law," Hart showed that sanction-centered accounts of every stripe ignored an essential feature of law. This feature he termed the internal point of view. Seen from the internal point of view, the law is not simply sanction-threatening, directing, or predicting, but rather obligation-imposing. Though the internal point of view is perhaps Hart's greatest contribution to jurisprudential theory, this concept is also often and easily misunderstood. This is unfortunate, not only because these misreadings distort Hart's theory, but, more importantly, because they prevent us from appreciating the true infirmities of sanction-centered theories and the compelling reasons why they ought to be rejected. -- The internal point of view is the practical attitude of rule-acceptance - it does not imply that people who accept the rules accept their moral legitimacy, only that they are disposed to guide and evaluate conduct in accordance with the rules. The internal point of view plays four roles in Hart's theory: (1) it specifies a particular type of motivation that someone may take towards to the law; (2) it constitutes one of the main existence conditions for social and legal rules; (3) it accounts for the intelligibility of legal practice and discourse; (4) it provides a naturalistically acceptable semantics for legal statements. Finally, sanction-centered theories are unacceptable for three reasons: (1) they are myopic in that they ignore one of the motivations that people might have for obeying the law; (2) they are unable to account for the existence of legal systems; (3) they cannot account for the intelligibility of legal practice and discourse. --
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  intellectual_history-distorted  20thC  21stC  Hart  positivism-legal  sociology_of_law  legal_system  norms  normativity  obligation  moral_psychology  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  punishment  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Legal Positivism and 'Explaining' Normativity and Authority (2006 last revised 2009) :: SSRN
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2006 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-05 -- It has become increasingly common for legal positivist theorists to claim that the primary objective of legal theory in general, and legal positivism in particular, is "explaining normativity." The phrase "explaining normativity" can be understood either ambitiously or more modestly. The more modest meaning is an analytical exploration of what is meant by legal or moral obligation, or by the authority claims of legal officials. When the term is understood ambitiously - as meaning an explanation of how conventional and other empirical facts can give rise to moral obligations - as many legal positivist theorists seem to be using the phrase, the project is contrary to basic tenets of legal positivism, and has regularly led theorists to propose doubtful theories that ignore "is"/"ought" divisions. -- Keywords: legal positivism, analytical legal theory, natural law theory -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  positivism-legal  natural_law  is-ought  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  obligation  authority  legitimacy  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism :: SSRN - Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 5, Aug. 2000
The nature and location of the disagreement(s) between legal positivism and natural law theory has often been unclear, in large part because of the way each approach has been misunderstood by advocates for the other side. Many commentators assume that the two approaches disagree about whether immoral rules can have the status of law, but there is little evidence to support this view. Natural law theorists from Aquinas to Finnis have allowed that immoral rules are law (can have legal status), only that they are not law in its fullest sense (because such laws do not create moral obligations to obey them). The article concludes that the debate between natural law and legal positivism is joined elsewhere: regarding the meta-theoretical question of whether it is possible and valuable to have a morally neutral theory of law. Legal positivists advocate morally neutral theories, while natural law theorists like Finnis expressly or implicitly argue for a pervasively moral-evaluative theory of law, arguing that one can only understand a reason-giving practice like law against the background of what it would mean to give a good (legitimate, moral-obligation-creating) reason for action. A variation of the same argument is that one can only understand law within a (teleological) theory that gives a place for the moral ideal (justice) to which law strives. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_history  intellectual_history  natural_law  positivism-legal  positive_law  Aquinas  moral_philosophy  values  obligation  reasons  reasons-externalism  action-theory  justice  legitimacy  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Natural Law Theory: The Modern Tradition by Brian Bix :: SSRN
Posted 1999 - chapter in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., Oxford University Press, 2002 -- The works of contemporary Natural Law theorists, including Lon Fuller, Michael Moore, Ronald Dworkin, and John Finnis, are discussed critically and their views are placed within the context of a tradition thousands of years old. In the summary of the broader context, the paper considers the connections and relationships between natural law theory and nature, God, natural rights, law, and legal positivism. The article also includes an extensive (but not exhaustive) bibliography. -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_history  intellectual_history  religious_history  ancient_philosophy  medieval_philosophy  Aquinas  moral_philosophy  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  positive_law  obligation  divine_command  sociology_of_law  nature  natural_religion  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
John Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings, ed. Mark Goldie - Online Library of Liberty
John Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings, edited and with an Introduction by Mark Goldie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010). 07/13/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2375> -- Part of the Thomas Hollis Library (series editor David Wormersley) published by Liberty Fund. This volume contains A Letter Concerning Toleration, excerpts of the Third Letter, An Essay on Toleration, and various fragments, including Constitution of Carolina excerpts, pamphlet debates e.g. with Samuel Parker. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  17thC  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  theology  Locke  Locke-religion  British_history  British_politics  religious_history  politics-and-religion  tolerance  dissenters  religion-established  religious_belief  religious_lit  religious_culture  political_culture  Church_of_England  atheism_panic  scepticism  Epicurean  heterodoxy  Christology  salvation  soul  natural_law  natural_rights  obligation  Catholics-England  Papacy  Papacy-English_relations  Protestant_International  colonialism  American_colonies  UK_government-colonies  reformation_of_manners  English_constitution  constitutionalism  Carolina  Shaftesbury_1st_Earl  Board_of_Trade  civil_liberties  civil_religion  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
John Adams, Revolutionary Writings, ed. C. Bradley Thompson - Online Library of Liberty
John Adams, The Revolutionary Writings of John Adams, Selected and with a Foreword by C. Bradley Thompson (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000). 07/12/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/592> -- This volume contains the principal shorter writings in which Adams addresses the prospect of revolution and the form of government proper to the new United States. There are pieces on the nature of the British Constitution and the meaning of rights, sovereignty, representation, and obligation. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  18thC  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_history  Adams_John  British_Empire-constitutional_structure  British_history  British_politics  English_constitution  US_constitution  American_colonies  US_politics  American_Revolution  citizenship  natural_rights  civil_liberties  sovereignty  representation  representative_institutions  obligation  authority  legitimacy  Early_Republic  government-forms  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature [1646], ed. Robert A. Greene and Hugh MacCallum - Online Library of Liberty
Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, ed. Robert A. Greene and Hugh MacCallum, foreword by Robert A. Greene (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001). 07/11/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/900> -- An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature is a concerted effort to find a middle way between the two extremes that dominated the religious dispute of the English civil war in the seventeenth century. At one extreme end of the spectrum was the antinomian assertion that the elect were redeemed by God’s free grace and thereby free from ordinary moral obligations. At the other end of the spectrum was the Arminian rejection of predestination and assertion that Christ died for all, not just for the elect. Faced with the violence of these disputes, Nathaniel Culverwell attempted a moderate defense of reason and natural law, arguing, in the words of Robert Greene, that “reason and faith are distinct lights, yet they are not opposed; they are complementary and harmonious. Reason is the image of God in man, and to deny right reason is to deny our relation to God.” -- Culverwell clearly intended to respond to Francis Bacon’s call for “a temperate and careful treatise … which as a kind of divine logic, should lay down proper precepts touching the use of human reason in theology.” -- Although, unlike the Cambridge Platonists, he quotes or refers to Bacon’s writings frequently enough to indicate considerable knowledge and approval of the Baconian gospel, the spirit of the Discourse is basically at odds with Bacon’s plan for man’s intellectual progress. In his emphasis upon scholastic psychology and his indebtedness to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Suarez, as well as in his flourishing rhetoric and richly metaphorical style, Culverwell does not forward the Great Instauration.
books  etexts  17thC  intellectual_history  theology  natural_law  English_Civil_War  Cambridge_Platonists  Calvinist  antinomian  Presbyterians  Arminian  reason  revelation  faith  religious_belief  Aristotelian  Aquinas  Suarez  Bacon  moral_psychology  obligation  religious_culture  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law: Or, the Laws of Nature and Nations [1737] with Supplements and a Discourse by George Turnbull trans., eds. Thomas Albert and Peter Schröder - Online Library of Liberty
Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law: Or, the Laws of Nature and Nations, with Supplements and a Discourse by George Turnbull. Translated from the Latin by George Turnbull, edited with an Introduction by Thomas Albert and Peter Schröder (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 07/11/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2305> -- The natural law theory of Johann Gottlieb Heineccius was one of the most influential to emerge from the early German Enlightenment. Heineccius continued and, in important respects, modified the ideas of his predecessors, Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius. He developed distinctive views on central questions such as the freedom of the human will and the natural foundation of moral obligation, which also sharply distinguished him from his contemporary Christian Wolff. The Liberty Fund edition is based on the translation by the Scottish moral philosopher George Turnbull (1698–1748). It includes Turnbull’s extensive comments on Heineccius’s text, as well as his substantial Discourse upon the Nature and Origin of Moral and Civil Laws. These elements make the work into one of the most extraordinary encounters between Protestant natural law theory and neo-republican civic humanism. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  18thC  intellectual_history  Enlightenment  Scottish_Enlightenment  Germany  Heineccius  Pufendorf  Thomasius  Wolff  Turnbull_George  natural_law  international_law  legal_theory  legal_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  human_nature  obligation  free_will  state-of-nature  government-forms  authority  legitimacy  natural_rights  natural_religion  civic_humanism  civic_virtue  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law [c 1750, tran 1763], trans. Thomas Nugent, ed. Peter Korkman - Online Library of Liberty
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, trans. Thomas Nugent, ed. and with an Introduction by Peter Korkman (Indianpolis: Liberty Fund, 2006). 07/11/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1717> -- The basis of this version of The Principles of Natural and Politic Law is Thomas Nugent’s 1763 English translation, which became a standard textbook at Cambridge and at many premier American colleges, including Princeton, Harvard, and the University of Pennsylvania. The first scholarly work on Burlamaqui was written by an American, M. Ray Forrest Harvey, who in 1937 argued that Burlamaqui was well known among America’s Founding Fathers and that his writings exerted considerable influence on the American constitutional system. In his introduction, Nugent said of Burlamaqui: “His singular beauty consists in the alliance he so carefully points out between ethics and jurisprudence, religion and politics, after the example of Plato and Tully, and the other illustrious masters of antiquity.”
books  etexts  17thC  18thC  Enlightenment  intellectual_history  natural_law  political_philosophy  human_nature  moral_psychology  obligation  sovereignty  Geneva  Calvinist  natural_rights  mixed_government  aristocracy-natural  elites  bourgeoisie  democracy  authority  legitimacy  civil_liberties  civil_religion  happiness  rationalist  Grotius  Pufendorf  Barbeyrac  Leibniz  Rousseau  governing_class  government-forms  governance  state-building  state-of-nature  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature - trans. John Maxwell (1727), ed. Jon Parkin - Online Library of Liberty
Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, translated, with Introduction and Appendix, by John Maxwell (1727), edited and with a Foreword by Jon Parkin (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005). 07/11/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1353> -- A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, originally titled De Legibus Naturae, first appeared in 1672 as a theoretical response to a range of issues that came together during the late 1660s. It conveyed a conviction that science might offer an effective means of demonstrating both the contents and the obligatory force of the law of nature. At a time when Hobbes’s work appeared to suggest that the application of science undermined rather than supported the idea of obligatory natural law, Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae provided a scientific explanation of the natural necessity of altruism. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  17thC  moral_philosophy  natural_law  human_nature  obligation  Hobbes  Cumberland  Restoration  self-interest  altruism  necessity  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Kenneth R. Westphal - Enlightenment Fundamentals: Rights, Responsibilities & Republicanism | Diametros
Kenneth R. Westphal is Professorial Fellow in the School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia (Norwich), and currently Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the Martin-Luther-Universität Halle Wittenberg. -- This essay re-examines some key fundamentals of the Enlightenment regarding individual rights, responsibilities and republicanism which deserve and require re-emphasis today, insofar as they underscore the character and fundamental importance of mature judgment, and how developing and fostering mature judgment is a fundamental aim of education. These fundamentals have been clouded or eroded by various recent developments, including mis-guided educational policy and not a little scholarly bickering. Clarity about these fundamentals is more important today than ever. Sapere aude! -- Keywords - Hobbes Hume Rousseau Kant Hegel, rational justification, mature judgment, moral constructivism, realism objectivity rights responsibilities republicanism media culture, Euthyphro question, natural law, Dilemma of the Criterion -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  French_Enlightenment  Germany  German_Idealism  voluntarism  obligation  morality-conventional  morality-objective  natural_rights  civil_liberties  civil_society  civic_virtue  Hobbes  Hume  Hume-ethics  Hume-politics  Rousseau  Kant  Kant-ethics  Hegel  judgment-political  public_sphere  media  political_culture  values  education-civic  education-higher  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add  21stC  Dewey  Quine  Sellars  analytical_philosophy  academia  professionalization 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Alfred Caldecott - The Philosophy of Religion in England and America (1901) - Google Books
Downloaded pdf to Note -- interesting from standpoint of how he classifies the philosophical elements - e.g. lumps Bolingbroke with Berkeley and Butler, not with Deists or Hume - clearly doesn't see how similar Bolingbroke and Hume really were, unlike Warburton who grasped it; also doesn't sneer like Leslie Stephen -- a specimen of fin de siècle academic professionalization after the divinity training raison d'être and "vocation" of Anglo-American universities had evaporated
books  etexts  Google_Books  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  intellectual_history  theology  philosophy_of_religion  British_history  US_history  reason  revelation  cosmology  God-attributes  God-existence  creation_ex_nilho  creation  scepticism  theism  Cambridge_Platonists  Locke-religion  Deism  rational_religion  natural_religion  materialism  mind-body  mind-theory_of  idealism-transcendental  subjectivism  Butler  Berkeley  Bolingbroke  theodicy  comparative_religion  comparative_anthropology  monotheism  ecclesiology  Hegelian  British_Idealism  moral_philosophy  moral_sentiments  obligation  intuitionism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Abigail Swingen, review - Sheryllynne Haggerty. "Merely for Money"? Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750-1815 | H-Net Reviews
Haggerty demonstrates that successful merchants in the 18thC British Atlantic world operated in a culture that had socially constructed expectations for their behavior. Those who did not conform to that culture could find themselves left out of it altogether. This is most effectively demonstrated in her chapter on obligation. ...“obligation” did not simply reflect the necessity to pay off a debt. For some larger merchant houses, it meant not calling in debts too quickly especially at times of crisis -- 18thC merchants, although largely self-regulating, expected and desired a certain level of regulation and protection from the British state. This was especially true in terms of overseas and colonial trades. ...merchants felt that the state was “obligated” to protect them, considering the various ways they contributed to the imperial economy. --ultimately one questions how these crises, and the sophisticated ways the merchants responded to them, compared to earlier similar moments of upheaval. Overseas (especially colonial) merchants had formed lobbying groups, both informal and formal, since at least the late17thC, as the work of Alison Olson and Will Pettigrew demonstrates. Because there is little consideration of change over time, however, one does not get a clear sense of the overall significance of the period in question. -- one is left wondering about the broader implications of the ways in which merchants confronted and negotiated with the “formal” empire. The merchants were caught up in a transformative period in the transition to a global capitalist economy. -- high marks for archival work and applying Greif (new institutional_economics) and folks like Hobbit re business concepts
books  reviews  economic_history  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  Atlantic  West_Indies  American_colonies  American_Revolution  slavery  merchants  mercantilism  protectionism  credit  creditors  trade-policy  trade_finance  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  interest_groups  economic_culture  institutional_economics  obligation  business-and-politics  capitalism  globalization  global_economy  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
A BOOK IN PROGRESS [PART 16]: MORALITY’S SUBJECTIVE TURN | Pandaemonium
the unravelling of morality in the 20thC, from the intuitionism of GE Moore to JL Mackie’s ‘error theory’ and moral nihilism. This extract begins with Moore and looks at how intuitionism gave way to emotivism. -- Like moral truths themselves, Prichard clearly saw his case as self-evident and intuitive. The idea of moral truths as intuitions harked back to the English Platonists of the 18thC. Prichard’s essay helped give those ideas new traction, launching the Cambridge Intuitionist school, that included WD Ross, EF Carritt, WHB Joseph and CD Broad. For each of the Intuitionists the good was self-evident. The trouble was that the goods that were self-evident were not the same to all of them. Since no empirical fact or rational argument could settle this debate, ..so the very notion of moral truth began to disintegrate. -- ‘Questions as to “values”’, Bertrand Russell wrote, ‘lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge.’ So arose ‘emotivism’, first sketched by AJ Ayer in his groundbreaking 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic -- Like Hume, Ayer insisted that when we talk of right and wrong we are not directly referring to things in the world but to our own attitudes towards these things. --The American philosopher Charles L Stevenson developed the emotivist argument, especially in his 1944 book Ethics and Language.-- GE Moore was no emotivist, nor thought that values were simply subjective. Yet the argument he set running in the Principia Ethica led inexorably to Stevenson’s emotivism. -- To suggest that slavery is a good would be more than simply ‘odd’. The trouble with emotivism is that it finds it difficult – nay, impossible – to capture this distinction.
intellectual_history  20thC  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  morality-conventional  analytical_philosophy  morality-objective  EF-add  metaethics  utilitarianism  obligation  Logical_Positivism  Cambridge_Platonists 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Amazon.com: Herbert Gintis' review of The Myth of Morality (Cambridge Studies in...
I believe humans make morality in the same way they make language: it is simply the way we evolved. A linguist recognizes that every language has rules that govern correct and incorrect speech, but it is folly to ask what are the ultimately correct rules. Languages have lots in common all over the world because humans evolved a mental structure conducive to certain linguistic regularities. Similarly, humans have evolved a fairly common set of moral principles across a wide variety of forms of social organization. It is true that we speak of moral principles as right or wrong, true or false, but that does not mean that we are wedded to a "realist morality." Note that we say "the sun rises in the East and sets in the West," and this does not commit us to an earth-centric astronomy. Language is simply too flexible and subtle an instrument to treat out-of-context discourse as though they betray epistemological or ontological commitments.
books  reviews  kindle-available  moral_philosophy  Kant-ethics  philosophy_of_language  utilitarianism  obligation  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Pufendorf - The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature - Online Library of Liberty
Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, trans. Andrew Tooke, ed. Ian Hunter and David Saunders, with Two Discourses and a Commentary by Jean Barbeyrac, trans. David Saunders (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). 5/5/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/888> -- 1717/1735 edition Anglicized political vocabulary from Pufendorf's secular and continental Absolutism even more than Tooke had in 1693. Added some notes from Barbeyrac's 1707 translation to stress religious elements of duties. Original De officiis -- Introduction and Barbeyrac materials extend Hunter's focus on the "civil Enlightenment" that opposed Leibniz's Platonic rationalist metaphysics, the Pufendorf, Thomasius and Huguenot strain erased from intellectual_history by Kant’s metaphysical Enlightenment version of history -- kindle-available -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  jurisprudence  legal_history  legal_theory  political_philosophy  Pufendorf  British_politics  Whigs  Huguenots  Barbeyrac  Leibniz  metaphysics  rationalist  empiricism  obligation  office  EF-add  natural_law  downloaded 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Erin Taylor, review - David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Dec 2013
Moral obligations arising from socially-structured transactions (like promising or consent) or involvements (like friendship) are notoriously difficult to theorize. Are such obligations explained by the goodness of the social practices that generate them? Or do they merely track the distinctive ways in which such social practices, once in place, make it possible to harm one another? On the one hand, social institutions like promising do seem desirable (and perhaps even morally necessary). The existence of that institution enables us to rely on others when we otherwise could not, and it thereby provides a foundation for social coordination. On the other hand, the wrong of breaking a promise is not primarily (if at all) a matter of undermining a useful social convention or free riding on the efforts of others who keep the institution alive. A broken promise wrongs the promisee in particular. Theories of the normativity of consent and associative obligations to kith and kin can be similarly divided. The intuitive appeal of both approaches has left many theorists at something of an impasse (or else just talking past each other). Shaping the Normative Landscape does two important things. First, it shows how these two general approaches can be reconciled. Second, it shows that some intractable difficulties across a wide range of normative phenomena have both an underlying unity and elegant solution. More importantly, the solution itself is intuitively appealing.
books  reviews  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  normativity  obligation  authority  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Kristen Irwin, review - Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Mighty and the Almighty: An Essay in Political Theology // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Jan 2014
The Mighty and the Almighty takes on the task of theorizing a political theology for the Christian. [T]his book originated in his 1998 Stone Lectures at Princeton... [and] retains both the advantages and the disadvantages of its original lecture format: astonishingly clear and accessible, but a relatively light sketch ...Despite the specifically Christian orientation of his project, Wolterstorff asks for the attention of the nonreligious: "In a participatory democracy such as ours, it's important that we each be open with and open to our fellow citizens concerning the deep sources of how we think about political issues". -- Though political theology is not nearly so popular as in the days of Augustine or Calvin -- two of Wolterstorff's foils -- Wolterstorff argues that it's overdue for careful contemporary consideration.-- a substantive account of the relationship between political authority and divine authority. -- The most innovative part of the book is Wolterstorff's use of the above distinction to offer a rereading of Romans 13... Rather than counseling universal submission to civil authorities, Wolterstorff argues, Paul is counseling submission to civil authorities insofar as they are executing "the God-assigned task of government to curb injustice. . . . to protect the rights of the public". Government clearly has the positional authority to issue whatever directives it deems appropriate to its citizens, but insofar as its directives violate justice or the rights of the public, government forfeits its performance-authority. The corollary is that "the directives that the government issues to the public for the purpose of curbing injustice are binding". -- In other words, the political authority of the state as the institution responsible for "protecting members of the public from being wronged by their fellows" can be derived both from natural rights, and from divine authority.
books  reviews  kindle-available  political_philosophy  political-theology  liberalism  liberalism-public_reason  authority  obligation  natural_rights  Early_Christian  Paul  Augustine  Calvinist  resistance_theory  passive_obedience  justice  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Kelly Sorensen, review - Nicholas Wolterstorff, Terence Cuneo (ed.), Understanding Liberal Democracy: Essays in Political Philosophy // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Sept 2013
Public reason liberalism -- the form of liberalism defended by Rawls, Larmore, Audi, Gaus, Rorty, Nussbaum, and to some degree Habermas -- usually requires citizens to publicly discuss and vote based on only those reasons that pass some sort of test that sifts away religious and comprehensive non-religious reasons. In the public sphere, those with such views are required by the role of citizenship to shape up or shut up -- "shape up" in the sense of offering instead reasons that can or could be shared by all other citizens. Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that public reason liberalism is a dead end, and defends instead what he takes to be a more defensible form of liberalism ("equal political voice liberalism"). His book is fresh and compelling, and an important contribution to political philosophy. This is a collection of 15 mostly new essays: Ten concern public reason liberalism. The rest take up the nature of rights (extending the account he has been developing in Justice: Rights and Wrongs and Justice in Love), the nature and source of citizens' political obligations to the state, and other issues in political philosophy. Wolterstorff calls his alternative form of liberal democracy "equal political voice liberalism," and he thinks it better accounts for the "governing idea" found in the longer historical tradition of liberalism, before public reason liberalism seized the spotlight in recent decades.
books  reviews  political_philosophy  liberalism  public_sphere  politics-and-religion  citizens  liberalism-public_reason  Rawls  Habermas  Rorty  justice  obligation  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Darrick N. Taylor -thesis - L'Estrange His Life: Public and Persona in the Life and Career of Sir Roger L'Estrange, 1616-1704 (2011)
KU ScholarWorks: Authors: Taylor, Darrick N. Advisors: Clark, Jonathan C.D. .....Downloaded pdf to Note..... The subject of this dissertation is the life and career of Roger L'Estrange, who was a licenser of Books and Surveyor of the Press for Charles II, as well as a royalist pamphleteer. It seeks to answer the question of how conceptions of public and private changed in late seventeenth century England be examining the career of L'Estrange, which involved him in many of the major pamphlet campaigns of the Restoration period. It argues that there was no stable "public sphere" in seventeenth century England, one that clearly marked it off from a private sphere of domesticity. It argues that the classical notion of office, in which reciprocal obligation and duty were paramount, was the basic presupposition of public but also private life, and that the very ubiquity of ideals of office holding made it semantically impossible to distinguish a stable public realm from a private one. Furthermore, the dissertation also argues that the presupposition of officium not only provided the basis for understanding relationships between persons but also of individual identity in seventeenth century England. It argues that L'Estrange saw his own identity in terms of the offices he performed, and that his individual identity was shaped by the antique notion of persona--of a mask that one wears, when performing a role--than to modern notions of individual identity. Lastly, it will argue that people in seventeenth century England still understood their world in terms of offices, but that changes in the way they understood office, visible in L'Estrange's writings, helped prepare the way for the reception of more modern ideas about public and private spheres that would eventually come to fruition in the nineteenth century.
thesis  cultural_history  political_history  political_culture  17thC  Britain  British_politics  Restoration  Exclusion_Crisis  Glorious_Revolution  1680s  1690s  1700s  L'Estrange  Charles_II  James_II  Whigs  Tories  political_press  pamphlets  censorship  propaganda  politics-and-religion  public_sphere  office  persona  identity  self  obligation  moral_philosophy  domesticity  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Robert Lamb: Locke on Ownership, Imperfect Duties and ‘the Art of Governing’ (2010) - The British Journal of Politics & International Relations | Wiley Online Library
Lamb, R. (2010), Locke on Ownership, Imperfect Duties and ‘the Art of Governing’. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 12: 126–141. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00397.x -- In this article, I discuss how Locke's account of virtuous moral obligation fits with his theory of individual rights, with specific attention to his account of ownership. I suggest that the best way to make sense of the relationship between the competing concepts of rights and virtue in Locke's thought is through the idea of imperfect duties: moral duties that do not necessarily have a legal equivalent. These duties indicate how a teleological account of morality can exist within the framework of a commitment to individual rights while also raising questions about how a Lockean government should act in regard to them. I identify the imperfect duties involved in the ownership of property and tentatively explore Locke's scattered recommendations for ‘the art of governing’ individuals.
article  Wiley  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_economy  moral_philosophy  virtue  obligation  property  property_rights  civil_liberties  Locke  17thC  Britain  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Kari Saastamoinen - Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem (2010)
Project MUSE - Kari Saastamoinen. "Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem."Journal of the History of Ideas 71.1 (2010): 39-62. Project MUSE. Web. 28 Aug. 2013. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>. ?...Downloaded pdf to Note - also available in html. ?... It is often maintained that Samuel Pufendorf founded natural equality on human dignity. This article partly questions this interpretation, maintaining that the dignity Pufendorf attributed to human nature did not indicate the Kantian idea of absolute and incomparable worth but only superiority in relation to other animals. This comparative dignity of humanity implied that all humans are equally obliged to obey natural law, but it did not offer a foundation for the similarity of their innate duties. The latter followed from the fundamental principle of natural law, the duty to maintain sociality, and from observations concerning human self-esteem.

?.... useful links to discussion of other 17thC and 18thC authors as well as centrality of Cicero in working through modern version of rights and duties.
article  Project_MUSE  antiquity  17thC  18thC  intellectual_history  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  natural_law  natural_rights  equality  obligation  Cicero  Pufendorf  Locke  sociability  self-love  emulation  dignity  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
John E. Hare review: Angus Ritchie, From Morality to Metaphysics: The Theistic Implications of our Ethical Commitments // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews August 2013
The book looks awful but the review is quite interesting Ritchie's use of or failure to use the history of philosophy. Ritchie undertakes to show the failures of axiarchism, the view that the good has a causal role, making things to be a certain way just because it is good for them to be that way. This is a version of final causation, and is familiar to anyone who knows Aristotelian metaphysics. When Ritchie comes to discuss axiarchism without divine purposes, which is Aristotle's position, Aristotle is not mentioned. The whole move from teleology in nature (what was called in the nineteenth century 'teleonomy') to teleology confined to the purposes of designers (as in Duns Scotus, for example) is examined as though there had not been centuries of discussion about it. ..... The other quibble is about Robert M. Adams. Ritchie attributes to Adams the view that because God is loving, God will perform the most loving action (169). But Adams would deny the maximization thesis implied here. More importantly, Ritchie thinks that if we ground moral obligation in God's character as loving, that means we do not ground it in God's will. Adams would deny the dichotomy here, because he thinks that God's willing and God's character are necessarily harmonious (Finite and Infinite Goods, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 47f). For Adams, God does constitute our obligations by command, which is an expression of will, but it is the expression of a loving will, not an arbitrary one (except in the antique sense of 'arbitrary' in which it means 'within a person's discretion,' in Latin arbitrium).
books  reviews  theism  metaethics  evolution  God-attributes  voluntarism  causation  teleology  obligation  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Terence Cuneo review: C. Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // August 2013
Many philosophers, including rational intuitionists and Kantians, have held that there are robust moral obligations. The central thesis of Evans' book is that anyone who holds that there are such obligations should take the divine command theory (DCT) very seriously. ?.... Understood in a third way, the aim of Evans' book is twofold: it is to establish, first, that the DCT is the best account of moral obligation available to fellow theistic philosophers and, second, that those who believe in robust obligation but do not think that God has anything important to do with them should consider the DCT carefully. They should do so because the existence of robust obligations is "difficult to explain without God"
books  reviews  metaethics  theism  obligation  natural_law  Hobbes  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader

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