dunnettreader + military   19

Unipolar Strategy in a Multipolar World
by Paul R. Pillar Vladimir Putin’s video show about formidable new Russian strategic weapons, which took up half of the Russian president’s recent…
US_foreign_policy  Russia  Russia-foreign_policy  multipolar  global_system  IR  military  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Failed states and the paradox of civilisation - Ernesto Dal Bó, Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, Sebastián Mazzuca | Vox.EU - July 2016
While cases of state failure have risen in the last decade, most notably in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, they are not a new phenomenon. Historical evidence from the early modern period, and even the Bronze Age, shows that the majority of formed states have failed rather than thrived. This column introduces the ‘paradox of civilisation’ to characterise the obstacles settlements face in establishing civilisations. The paradox defines the success of a civilisation as a trade-off between the ability to produce economic surplus and to protect it. It is therefore important to correctly balance military and economic support when providing aid. - Summary of NBER paper- downloaded vox version to Tab S2
paper  downloaded  ancient_history  civilization-concept  state-building  institutional_capacity  institution-building  failed_states  military  economic_growth  historical_sociology  agriculture  ancient_Near_East  ancient_Egypt  Sub-Saharan_Africa  MENA  Iraq  Syria  ISIS 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Anna Plassart - The Scottish Enlightenment and the French Revolution (to be released April 2015) | Ideas in Context series | Cambridge University Press
Historians of ideas have traditionally discussed the significance of the French Revolution through the prism of several major interpretations, including the commentaries of Burke, Tocqueville and Marx. This book argues that the Scottish Enlightenment offered an alternative and equally powerful interpretative framework for the Revolution, which focused on the transformation of the polite, civilised moeurs that had defined the 'modernity' analysed by Hume and Smith in the 18thC. The Scots observed what they understood as a military- and democracy-led transformation of European modern morals and concluded that the real historical significance of the Revolution lay in the transformation of warfare, national feelings and relations between states, war and commerce that characterised the post-revolutionary international order. This book recovers the Scottish philosophers' powerful discussion of the nature of post-revolutionary modernity and shows that it is essential to our understanding of 19thC political thought. **--** Part I. The Burke–Paine Debate and Scotland's Science of Man: 1. The Burke–Paine debate and the Scottish Enlightenment *-* 2. The heritage of Hume and Smith: Scotland's science of man and politics **--** Part II. The 1790s: 3. Scotland's political debate *-* 4. James Mackintosh and Scottish philosophical history *-* 5. John Millar and the Scottish discussion on war, modern sociability and national sentiment *-* 6. Adam Ferguson on democracy and empire **--** Part III. 1802–15: 7. The French Revolution and the Edinburgh Review *-* 8. Commerce, war and empire
books  find  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_economy  18thC  19thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  French_Revolution  Smith  Hume  Hume-politics  civil_society  civilizing_process  commerce  commerce-doux  science_of_man  social_sciences  IR_theory  French_Revolutionary_Wars  Napoleonic_Wars  nationalism  national_ID  historiography-18thC  historiography-Whig  military  Military_Revolution  mass_culture  levée_en_masse  conscription  sociability  social_order  empires  empire-and_business  imperialism  Great_Powers  balance_of_power  philosophy_of_history  progress  social_theory  change-social  change-economic  Burke  Paine  Mackintosh_James  Millar_John  Edinburgh_Review  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  Scottish_politics  1790s  1800s  1810s  international_political_economy  international_system  international_law  democracy  morality-conventional  norms  global_economy  mercantilism 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Épée de cour - wikipedia.fr
Intermédiaire chronologique entre la rapière et l’épée d’escrime, l’épée de cour est une arme créée dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIe siècle et utilisée jusqu'à la toute fin du XVIIIe siècle. Plus courte que son ancêtre et exclusivement ou presque conçue pour l’estoc, elle est reconnaissable à sa garde en figure de huit. Évolution toute en finesse et en rapidité de l'ancienne rapière, elle est quasiment réservée au duel et aux entraînements et compétitions dans les salles d'armes : elle n'apparaît que très peu sur les champs de bataille, où on lui préfère le sabre pour la cavalerie et la baïonnette pour l'infanterie, par ordonnance de Louis XV en 1767.
17thc  aristocracy  18thc  europe  military  cultural_history  duels  Pocket 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Joshua Landis - Syria Year-End Predictions and Analysis – (28 December 2014)
Syria will become increasingly fragmented in 2015. The Somalia-ization of the country is inevitable so long as the international community degrades all centers of power in Syria and the opposition fails to unite.
islamist  diplomacy  syria  turkey  us_military  russia  us_foreign_policy  iran  military  global  governance  iraq  un  oil  price  obama  admin  failed  states  mena  civil  wars  congress  Pocket 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
James Fallows - The Tragedy of the American Military | The Atlantic Dec 2014
how we've become a chickenhawk nation, with a titally unaccountable military and an out-if-contril military-industrial complex that isn't just wasteful but actively counterproductive re both military war-fighting capabilities and US strategic positioning in glibalized, multi-polar and real-time connected world - Fallows also reflects concerns re manageralist mindset that can neither deal with shifting big picture (othet than more, faster, etc is automatically better) nor allow innovative problem solving at tactical level - bureaucratic fiefdoms that don't combine coherently, in evidence by 1990s as Versailles in the Potimac, has only gotten worse, with the press corps more enablers than watchdogs - and the stuff that does get media attention is pennyante, easy to hype gaffes not the goring of any important interest's ox. The F-35 vs A10 debacle is the perfect illustration, in a breathtaking scale, of everything wrong re both DOD and the military services, and it's basically a non-issue for both the press and politicians of all persuasions.
technology  ir  us  government  cultural_history  inequality  21stc  hegemony  us_politics  us_foreign_policy  20thc  military  history  iraq  gwot  miitary-industrial  comple  fiscal  policy  accountability  congress  Pocket  from instapaper
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Nitzan - Global Capital: Political Economy of Capitalist Power (YorkU, Graduate Seminar, Fall Term, 2014-15) | bnarchives
The seminar has two related goals: substantive and pedagogical. The substantive purpose is to tackle the question of capital head on. The course explores a spectrum of liberal and Marxist theories, ideologies and dogmas – as well as a radical alternative to these views. The argument is developed theoretically, historically and empirically. The first part of the seminar provides a critical overview of political economy, examining its historical emergence, triumph and eventual demise. The second part deals with the two ‘materialistic’ schools of capital – the liberal theory of utility and the Marxist theory of labour time – dissecting their structure, strengths and limitations. The third part brings power back in: it analyses the relation between accumulation and sabotage, studies the institutions of the corporation and the state and introduces a new framework – the capitalist mode of power. The final part offers an alternative approach – the theory of capital as power – and illustrates how this approach can shed light on conflict-ridden processes such as corporate merger, stagflation, imperialism and Middle East wars. Pedagogically, the seminar seeks to prepare students toward conducting their own independent re-search. Students are introduced to various electronic data sources, instructed in different methods of analysis and tutored in developing their empirical research skills. As the seminar progresses, these skills are used both to assess various theories and to develop the students’ own theoretical/empirical research projects. -- Keywords: arms accumulation capital capitalism conflict corporation crisis distribution elite energy finance globalization growth imperialism GPE liberalism Marxism military Mumford national interest neoclassical neoliberalism oil ownership peace power profit ruling class security stagflation state stock market technology TNC Veblen violence war -- syllabus and session handouts downloaded pdf to Note
bibliography  syllabus  capital_as_power  international_political_economy  political_economy  economic_theory  liberalism  neoliberalism  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  capital  capitalism  social_theory  power-asymmetric  globalization  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  international_finance  finance_capital  financialization  production  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  inequality  MNCs  corporations  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  corporate_control_markets  economic_growth  economic_models  imperialism  military  military-industrial_complex  IR_theory  ruling_class  class_conflict  energy  energy-markets  MENA  accumulation  accumulation-differential  capital_markets  public_finance  profit  investment  technology  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  capitalism-systemic_crisis  Veblen  Mumford  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Dan Ward -Outrageous Waste—America’s Secret Strategy for Military Deterrence — War Is Boring - April 2014 — Medium
If BLOAT isn't our strategy it *should* be -- What if we spend decades and billions on cancelled and troubled projects, creating the appearance of difficulty and incompetence, in order to deceive our enemies and dissuade them from building advanced jets, tanks and ships? Making the unaffordable status quo appear inevitable creates a strong disincentive to hostile actors, so there is a genuine national benefit to convincing the world advanced weapon systems cannot be built in less than 25 years, even if we could actually do it in 18 months. I like to think this brilliant strategy has a cool codename like Operation BLOAT, short for Budgets Limit Opponent’s Acquisition of Technology. If BLOAT is real—and I hope it is—it explains why Allied pilots never had to engage Taliban pilots in dogfights over Afghanistan and why Al Qaeda never built a fleet of stealth bombers and submarines. In fact, Operation BLOAT ensures the U.S. military will never again face a Soviet-size opponent equipped with a full set of tanks, jets and ships. Any large nation who tries to follow America’s example will have great trouble fielding new gear, particularly if they steal our designs and try to build knock-offs. Meanwhile, smaller nations and assorted terrorist groups won’t even try in the first place.
US_government  US_foreign_policy  military  military-industrial_complex  IR_theory  strategy 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Jack Goldstone - What is ISIS? | NewPopulationBomb - August 13, 2014
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has emerged as the most terrifying and brutal of extreme jihadist groups (and that is against tough competition, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia). Why have such extreme Islamist groups emerged in so many places in recent years? Odd as this may sound, it is not because of the appeal of extreme Islam itself. A study of fighters in Syria by Mironova, Mrie, and Whitt found that most fighters join ISIS and similar groups because (1) they want vengeance against the Assad regime and (2) they found from experience that the Islamist groups take the best care of their fighters — caring for the wounded, supporting them in battle. In situations of social breakdown — which are generally NOT caused by the Islamist groups themselves, but by problems of finances, elite divisions, and popular unrest due to oppressive or arbitrary actions by the state – extremists tend to have major advantages. This has always been the case throughout the history of revolutions: moderates are usually outflanked and outmaneuvered and out-recruited by radicals; so much so that the triumph of radicals over moderates is a staple of academic work on the trajectory of revolutions, from Crane Brinton to my own.
historical_sociology  revolutions  radicals  Iraq  Syria  MENA  Islamist_fundamentalists  US_foreign_policy  global_governance  NATO  military  military_history  alliances  Thirty_Years_War  terrorism  GWOT 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
The Oxford Companion to Military History, ed. Richard Holmes: | Answers.com
The Oxford Companion to Military History, edited by Richard Holmes, Oxford University Press -- A complete overview of military history from classical times to the present, The Oxford Companion to Military History is an essential guide to how the world has been shaped by conflict. Entries on key topics such as intelligence, propaganda, peacekeeping and women in the military, are included, with over 70 maps showing the course of famous battles and campaigns.
books  etexts  military_history  military  war  ancient_history  ancient_Rome  Roman_Empire  medieval_history  Europe-Early_Modern  Military_Revolution  propaganda  maritime_history  IR 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Water Supply Key to Outcome of Conflicts in Iraq and Syria | Mother Jones - July 2014
Partitioning Iraq not just problem of where the oil is but access to water. Isis already has control of important points threatening water for Shia south and has been using water as a weapon -- diverting to cut off some and flood others, like Abu Gharib flooded to forestall Iraqi army trying to take back Fallujah. Water control and collapsing infrastructure part of both government and Isis tactics in Syria. And then are the neighbors like Turkey. With recent droughts getting early taste of climate change impact in next decades.
military  war  Syria  Iraq  water  climate 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Dani Rodrik: The Problem is Authoritarianism, Not Islam - Project Syndicate August 2013
Ultimately, democracy relies on an implicit quid pro quo among contending groups, according to which each agrees to protect the others’ rights in exchange for recognition of its entitlement to govern should it win an election. Constitutional provisions alone cannot ensure such an outcome, for those in power can easily override them. Instead, norms of proper political behavior must become embodied in the polity’s enduring institutions – its political parties, parliaments, and courts – in order to prevent abuse of power. What sustains these norms is the knowledge that undermining them will have consequences that are damaging to all. If I do not protect your rights while in power today, you will have little reason to respect mine when you come to power tomorrow. When an outside force such as the military interrupts this game, either directly or because one of the parties can rely on its intervention, the dynamics of political behavior change irrevocably. A case can be made for military intervention when a country finds itself on the edge of civil war, as Turkey was in 1980 (and as Egypt arguably was in July); but one should not confuse restoring order with restoring democracy. What does not help – and in fact backfires – is for outsiders to view the political crisis of Middle Eastern societies as the result of an Islamist-secularist divide. This perspective plays directly into the hands of authoritarian rulers like Erdoğan,
political_culture  democracy  legitimacy  MENA  Islam  Turkey  Egypt  military  authoritarian  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
A Murdie: The Curvilinear Effects of Civil−Military Conflict on International Crisis Outcome - Armed Forces & Society 2012
Pdf downloaded to Note
Does civil–military conflict harm military effectiveness? Most previous empirical literature on the effects of civil–military conflict has utilized dichotomous indicators of the presence or absence of overall civilian control. However, the extant theoretical literature is clear that mid-levels of civil–military conflict could be good for innovation and overall decision making. In line with these arguments, the author argues that we should not expect all civil–military conflict to harm military effectiveness and, by extension, international crisis bargaining outcome. Instead, some civil–military conflict should have a positive effect on the overall success of the military.

Utilizing new events data that captures the level of civil–military conflict cross nationally from 1990 to 2004, the author examines how civil–military conflict actually has an inverse U-shaped relationship with crisis success. This project also adds to the theoretical literature by examining variations across different degrees of civil–military conflicts, drawing attention to the usefulness of mid-range civil–military “friction.”
IR  military  governance  international_crisis  post-Cold_War  downloaded 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Don't Call It Isolationism - By Gordon Adams | Foreign Policy June 2013
The decision to pull back on massive engagements of military force does not mean force is not going to be used. It just goes underground. In fact, I would argue that today, the U.S. military is way, way out in front in setting the terms for future U.S. global engagement, and in ways that may not suit our national interests.

When the military (especially the ground forces) fail, the military does not shrink, sulking back into the barracks. Arguably, today the U.S. military is more involved than ever overseas, on a global basis, carrying out missions that extend well beyond classic military competencies.
US_foreign_policy  military  diplomacy  international_system  IR  EF-add  US_government  development  GWOT 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
D Herspring: Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture: The Russian and American Cases - 2011 - Public Administration Review - Wiley Online Library
Pdf downloaded to Note
The key problem in civil-military relations in established polities such as Russia and the United States is not civilian control of the military, but rather how to create a symbiotic relationship of “shared responsibility” between senior military officers and civilian leaders. In such a situation, civilian leaders obtain much needed expertise from the military, but ultimately remain in control. The keys to symbiotic civil-military relations are a desire on the part of military officers to work with civilians and civilian respect for military culture. When civilians respect military culture—that is, the military’s (1) devotion to clear executive leadership, (2) commitment to corporate identity, (3) drive to increase professional expertise, and (4) dedication to political responsibility—a system of shared responsibility is likely to emerge. This thesis is elaborated by comparing recent civil-military relations in Russia and the United States.
US_foreign_policy  US_government  military  Russia  post-Cold_War  21stC  governance  downloaded  IR 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
A Murdie: Response to Herspring “Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture” - 2011 - Public Administration Review - Wiley Online Library
Pdf downloaded to Note
Professor Dale R. Herspring argues that civil-military relations should move beyond a preoccupation with civilian control; instead, he says, the focus should be on the degree and nature of conflict within civil-military interactions. This alternative theoretical view adds much to the extant literature and allows future work to concentrate both on a more nuanced account of the effects of civil-military relations and, as Professor Herspring does, on the determinants of a “healthy” degree of civil-military conflict. This piece responds to Professor Herspring’s alternative view, arguing that future work building on his framework could incorporate much from within public administration
US_foreign_policy  US_government  Russia  military  governance  IR  downloaded 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Jon Sumida: Relation of History and Theory in Clausewitz' ON WAR | The Clausewitz Home Page
Reprint from Journal of Military History
Jon Sumida presents a detailed analysis of Carl von Clausewitz's On War and relates it to 20th-century studies of linguistics, philosophy, history and psychology. The main argument is that Clausewitz believed that the imagination of the psychological circumstances of supreme command in war was the prerequisite to the proper consideration of strategic concepts.
19thC  Germany  military  strategy  historiography  EF-add  from instapaper
june 2013 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Hafetz: War Without Strategy | Boston Review
America Still Doesn't Have a Plan to Fight Terrorism

These secret operations are the subject of Mark Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth and Jeremy Scahill’s Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield. The books, both by investigative journalists, provide fresh insights into the ways in which drones are altering the United States’ approach to war and the institutions that wage it. But their biggest contribution is to highlight how drones help to mask the absence of an effective long-term strategy for dealing with terrorism, an absence that President Obama acknowledged in his May 23 speech at the National Defense University even as he defended the drone program’s continued vitality.
GWOT  military  US_foreign_policy 
june 2013 by dunnettreader
Jolyon Howorth: Let Europea Learn to Ride the NATO Bicycle | Stephen M. Walt
NATO is like a bicycle that has only ever been ridden by the United States, with the Europeans bundled behind in the baby seat. Now the United States is urging the Europeans to learn to ride the bicycle themselves. The European response has been that they prefer to design their own, rather different, bicycle. It is smaller, slower, and fitted with large training wheels. It is useful for the sorts of missions CSDP has undertaken, but simply inadequate for serious crisis-management tasks. The Europeans need, sooner or later, to master the adult bike.
US_foreign_policy  EU  NATO  international_system  military 
june 2013 by dunnettreader

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