dunnettreader + markets   62

Robert S. Taylor - Market Freedom as Antipower (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
Historically, republicans were of different minds about markets: some, such as Rousseau, reviled them, while others, like Adam Smith, praised them. The recent republican resurgence has revived this issue. Classical liberals such as Gerald Gaus contend that neorepublicanism is inherently hostile to markets, while neorepublicans like Richard Dagger and Philip Pettit reject this characterization—though with less enthusiasm than one might expect. I argue here that the right republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent and that republicanism demands such markets for the same reason it requires the rule of law: because both are essential institutions for protecting individuals from arbitrary interference. I reveal how competition restrains—and in the limit, even eradicates— market power and thereby helps us realize "market freedom," i.e., freedom as nondomination in the context of economic exchange. Finally, I show that such freedom necessitates "Anglo-Nordic" economic policies. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
Pettit  capitalism-alternatives  downloaded  markets_in_everything  capitalism-varieties  republicanism  bibliography  political_economy  Rousseau  Smith  market_failure  markets-dependence_on_government  jstor  commerce-doux  freedom  domination  market_fundamentalism  Gaus_Gerald  markets  political_theory  capitalism  article  competition  markets-structure 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Lemin Wu - Home - If Not Malthusian, Then Why? A Darwinian Explanation of the Malthusian Trap (July 2015)
His site with links to other work, CV etc - This paper shows that the Malthusian mechanism alone cannot explain the pre-industrial stagnation of living standards. Improvement in luxury technology, if faster than improvement in subsistence technology, would have kept living standards growing. The Malthusian trap is essentially a puzzle of balanced growth between the luxury sector and the subsistence sector. The author argues that balanced growth is caused by group selection in the form of biased migration. It is proven that a tiny bit of bias in migration can suppress a strong growth tendency. The theory re-explains the Malthusian trap and the prosperity of ancient market economies such as Rome and Sung. It also suggests a new set of factors triggering modern economic growth. - work up of his dissertation at Berkeley -- downloaded via Air, attached to Evernote
paper  economic_history  economic_growth  ancient_Rome  Chinese_history  Sung_dynasty  ancient_China  Malthusian_trap  demography  technology  agriculture  markets  elites  luxury  standard-of-living  migration  downloaded 
september 2016 by dunnettreader
Robert Waldmann - DeLong on Hayek, Smith, and Smith - May 2016
Brad answers a question raised by Noah with thoughts on Friedrich and Adam. I totally lost all self control in his comments section and waste even more pixels…
Instapaper  economic_theory  macroeconomics  markets  market_fundamentalism  Hayek  Friedman_Milton  Keynes  Smith  emergence  knowledge  information-markets  prices  Popper  from instapaper
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Primary and Secondary Markets by Egmont Kakarot-Handtke :: SSRN - Aug 2011, update March 2015
Also Dec 2012 Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 741 -- University of Stuttgart - Institute of Economics and Law -- This paper swaps the standard behavioral axioms for structural axioms and applies the latter to the analysis of the emergence of secondary markets from the flow part of the economy. Real and nominal residuals at first give rise to the accumulation of the stock of money and the stock of commodities. These stocks constitute the demand and supply side of secondary markets. The pricing in these markets is different from the pricing in the primary markets. Realized appreciation in the secondary markets is different from income or profit. To treat primary and secondary markets alike is therefore a category mistake.-- Pages in PDF File: 26 -- Keywords: new framework of concepts, structure-centric, axiom set, residuals, real and monetary stocks, money, credit, financial saving, nonfinancial saving, net worth, financial profit, nonfinancial profit, retained profit, appreciation, wealth -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  macroeconomics  financial_system  markets  markets-structure  primary_markets  secondary_markets  asset_prices  profit  investment  interest_rates  savings  capital_gains  money  wealth  credit  liquidity  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Joseph Adelson, review essay - What Caused Capitalism? | Foreign Affairs - May 2015
Once upon a time, smart people thought the world was flat. As globalization took off, economists pointed to spreading market forces that… Includes new Cambridge History of Capitalism, Mokyr Enlightened Economy, Acemoglu and Robinson Why Nations Fail, and Beckert Empire of Cotton -- contrasts tales that are, in broad brush, optimistic and internalist re origins (especially Mokyr) vs pessimistic and externalist (especially Cotton) -- copied to Instapaper
books  reviews  bookshelf  economic_history  capitalism  Great_Divergence  ancient_history  global_economy  global_history  global_system  Europe-Early_Modern  city_states  Italy  Spain  France  British_history  India  US_history  colonialism  imperialism  empires  institutional_economics  technology  development  Scientific_Revolution  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  industrial_policy  US_Civil_War  slavery  property  property_rights  mercantilism  mercantilism-violence  Instapaper  markets  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_growth  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
F.A. Hayek - Individualism and Economic Order - Books | Mises Institute
If you are looking to acquaint yourself with F.A. Hayek's perspective on economic theory — beyond his business cycle and monetary studies of the inter-war years — this is the best source. The collection appeared in 1947, before he moved on toward broader cultural and social investigations. It contains his most profound work on the liberal economic order, and his most penetrating reflections on economic phenomena -- published U of Chicago 1958 -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  intellectual_history  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  Austrian_economics  Hayek  social_theory  economic_theory  liberalism  socialism  communism  fascism  individualism  capitalism  market_fundamentalism  markets  prices  coordination  coordination-governments  political_economy  political_philosophy  downloaded 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Rajiv Sethi: The Agent-Based Method - August 2014
It's nice to see some attention being paid to agent-based computational models on economics blogs, but Chris House has managed to misrepresent the methodology so completely that his post is likely to do more harm than good. -- Useful discussion of both DSGE and agent-based modeling approaches plus links. Chris House, for a highly touted "expert", keeps exposing his combination of ignorance and bias ("facts have a conservative bias"!!) Apparently since he already knows what the facts are going to tell him, he doesn't actually have to learn something about which he is ignorant but feels free to spout what "must" be the case. Extraordinary indictment of the upper levels of the economics professoriate. Seth's post is a fine description of what agent-based models are about, and the dilemmas of coming up with criteria for evaluating robustness of research results -- a problem which DSGE papers don't seem to have, apparently because of the agreed upon math and that most of the variables are exogenous chosen by the modeler, and theoretical papers which can be judged on the coherence of their mathematical logic. Links to some agent-based work - Seth himself working on market structure and trading practices (e.g. GFT) within a "market ecology" framework
economic_theory  macroeconomics  economic_models  rationality-economics  markets  markets-structure  ecology  ecology-economic  agent-based_models  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  links 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis - Notions of Order and Process in Hayek: The Significance of Emergence (Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2014) :: SSRN
DOI: 10.1093/cje/beu043 -- King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- This article explores the notions of order and process to which Friedrich Hayek subscribed. It is argued that a satisfactory understanding of Hayek’s conceptions of ‘order’ and ‘process’ — and in particular a clear understanding of those how the two concepts relate to each other in his scheme of thought — requires an appreciation of the ontological categories of ‘emergence’ and ‘emergent properties.’ Ultimately, for Hayek the capacity of liberal market economies to co-ordinate people’s actions in the face of tacit and dispersed knowledge is an emergent property that arises only when people’s interactions are governed by certain sets of rules. This static analysis of the co-ordinative powers of the market as an emergent property of a given system of rules must be supplemented by a dynamic account of the process through which the set of rules in question comes into being. Hayek provides such an account in his account of society as developing through a multi-level evolutionary process. Key implications of Hayek’s accounts of order and process for debates about the co-ordinative powers of free market economies are drawn out. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: Hayek, order, process, emergence, ontology, Austrian economics -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_social_science  social_theory  ontology-social  markets  markets-structure  social_order  emergence  heterodox_economics  Austrian_economics  evolution-social  social_process  coordination  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis, review essay - Varieties of Emergence: Minds, Markets and Novelty (STUDIES IN EMERGENT ORDER, VOL 4 (2011): 170-192) :: SSRN
King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- This paper is an essay review of Richard Wagner's book, 'Mind, Society and Human Action'. It focuses on the ontological presuppositions of Wagner's account of of the social world (that is, on what Wanger's account presupposes about the nature of social reality). Issue discussed include the following: the nature of emergence and emergent properties; spontaneous order, and the shortcomings of Walrasian general equilibrium theory in modelling it; the significance of the impact of social interaction on peolpe's preferences and dispositions; and the role of novelty and innovation in Wagner's account of the market process. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 23 -- Keywords: Emergence, complexity, Austrian Economics, ontology, spontaneous order, novelty -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  review  SSRN  philosophy_of_social_science  social_theory  ontology-social  mind  social_order  social_process  preferences  emergence  equilibrium  heterodox_economics  Innovation  complexity  economic_models  utility  behavioral_economics  markets-psychology  markets  methodology  methodology-qualitative  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis - Hayek, Social Theory and the Contrastive Explanation of Socio-Economic Order (2013. Critical Review Vol. 25, Nos. 3-4.) :: SSRN
Lewis, Paul A., Hayek, Social Theory and the Contrastive Explanation of Socio-Economic Order (2013). Critical Review Vol. 25, Nos. 3-4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535073 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2535073 -- King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- Hayek’s later work on the possibility of socio-economic order in decentralized market economies is an exercise in contrastive causal explanation as conceptualized by realist social theorists and philosophers. This interpretation of Hayek’s work lends support to the view that Hayek’s post-1960 writings can be thought of as an example of comparative institutional analysis. It also provides a means of reinforcing Hayek’s own efforts to establish the scientific credentials of his work. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 19 -- Keywords: Hayek, Austrian economics, scientism, ontology, comparative institutional analysis-- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  intellectual_history  20thC  Hayek  Austrian_economics  economic_theory  social_theory  ontology-social  institutional_economics  scientistism  economic_sociology  critical_realism  comparative_economics  markets  markets-structure  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeff Horn - Economic Development in Early Modern France: The Privilege of Liberty, 1650–1820 (release date for hardback mid-Feb 2015) | European history after 1450 | Cambridge University Press
Privilege has long been understood as the constitutional basis of Ancien Régime France, legalising the provision of a variety of rights, powers and exemptions to some, whilst denying them to others. In this fascinating new study however, Jeff Horn reveals that Bourbon officials utilized privilege as an instrument of economic development, freeing some sectors of the economy from pre-existing privileges and regulations, while protecting others. He explores both government policies and the innovations of entrepreneurs, workers, inventors and customers to uncover the lived experience of economic development from the Fronde to the Restoration. He shows how, influenced by Enlightenment thought, the regime increasingly resorted to concepts of liberty to defend privilege as a policy tool. The book offers important new insights into debates about the impact of privilege on early industrialisation, comparative economic development and the outbreak of the French Revolution. **--** 1. Introduction: profits and economic development during the Old Régime *--* 2. Privileged enclaves and the guilds: liberty and regulation *--* 3. The privilege of liberty put to the test: industrial development in Normandy *--* 4. Companies, colonies, and contraband: commercial privileges under the Old Régime *--* 5. Privilege, liberty, and managing the market: trading with the Levant *--* 6. Outside the body politic, essential to the body economic: the privileges of Jews, Protestants and foreign residents *--* 7. Privilege, innovation, and the state: entrepreneurialism and the lessons of the Old Régime *--* 8. The reign of liberty? Privilege after 1789 -- look for pdf of Intro once released
books  find  political_economy  economic_history  political_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  France  privileges-corporate  economic_culture  economic_policy  development  monarchy  profit  entrepreneurs  guilds  trading_companies  trade-policy  regulation  industrialization  industrial_policy  Colbert  Colbertism  urban_development  urban_elites  commerce  commercial_interest  French_government  Huguenots  Jews  colonialism  French_Empire  colonies  corporate_finance  monopolies  Levant  MENA  Ottomans  liberties  liberty  Ancien_régime  Louis_XIV  Louis_XV  Louis_XVI  French_Revolution  French_Revolutionary_Wars  Napoleonic_Wars  Restoration-France  bourgeoisie  haute_bourgeoisie  markets  markets-structure  foreign_trade  foreign_policy  foreigners-resident 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Tom Walker - EconoSpeak: The Hours of Labour and the Problem of Social Cost - Jan 2015
Coase argued that the suggested courses of action in the Pigovian tradition – liability, taxation or regulation – were inappropriate and often undesirable.(..) However, Coase didn't consider the full range of Pigou's examples and analysis. While Coase’s restatement of the problem may have been appropriate to the specific externality problems discussed by Pigou in part II, it entirely overlooked the radically different labour market problem encountered in part III, in which competitive pressure compels an employing firm to inflict harm on both itself and its employees and thus regulatory restraint of the firm (and competing employers) may benefit both. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  economic_sociology  intellectual_history  welfare_economics  institutional_economics  Coase  markets  markets-structure  property_rights  transaction_costs  externalities  competition  Labor_markets  social_costs  cost-benefit  regulation-costs  collective_action  common_good  efficiency  labor_law  wages  labor_standards  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Eric Rauchway, review - Martin Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks (2014) | TLS Jan 2015
... his analysis, which holds that we knew how to avoid, counter and cure these troubles; we have simply – largely out of wilful ignorance and lack of courage – failed to do more than the barest minimum of what was necessary. Governments, banks and international institutions did “just enough, almost too late” to prevent the worst possible result, which would have been a note-for-note replay of the 1930s including a slide into fascism and world war. But having done no more than avoid world-historic catastrophe, we find ourselves mired in a dim morass of our own making, with no sunlit uplands in sight. Wolf offers a persuasive account that is also clear, though he relies on no single factor but several: hence the title of the book. It took both long-term shifts and a series of shocks to cause a crisis of such magnitude. Our world was born in the end of the Cold War. With capitalism triumphant, the victors liberalized their economies and so did the Communist nations, particularly China. Yet all was not well in this brave new world; international finance and trade threatened the stability of smaller, emerging economies, as the crises of the 1990s demonstrated.
financialization  bad_history  shadow  banking  Pocket  risk  global  economy  money  markets  global_imbalance  keynesian  business_influence  bad_economics  books  financial_regulation  liquidity  deregulation  minsky  investment  economic_growth  reviews  fed  Bank_of_England  great_recession  us_politics  leverage  capital_flows  race-to-the-bottom  business  ethics  political_economy  ecb  rents  uk  central_banks  investors  financial  crisis  financial_system  austerity  capital  economic_theory  us_economy  eurozone 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
The Impact of Financial Market Volatility on Emerging Market Economies - Sangyup Choi PhD advisee of Roger Farmer
To understand why an increase in the VIX has a much larger impact on output fluctuations in emerging market economies than on the U.S. economy, I build a small open economy model with credit market imperfections. The model incorporates a portfolio decision by international investors and an increase in the VIX makes these investors withdraw their funds from emerging markets. In Sam’s theory, VIX shocks, in a world of integrated capital markets, cause investors to pull their money from emerging markets. Because emerging market economies have poorly developed credit markets, the sudden outflow of cash causes domestic firms to cut back on production and lay off workers.
uncertainty  global  governance  economic_theory  capital  markets  us_economy  financial_system  economy  emerging  Pocket 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Dan Davies -- Bedtime for market efficiency — Bull Market — Medium - October 2014
The temptation will be to try and avoid going “cold turkey” on efficient markets, by reducing the overarching claims, but hanging on to the general story that markets are “broadly efficient”. This won’t do either. Even with respect to some of the most liquid markets in the world (S&P500 equities) and with respect to the so-called “weak form” — the hypothesis that there is no information in the past history of share prices which can be used to predict the future -- it doesn’t work. This has been known to specialist financial econometricians for about 20 years now (“A Non-Random Walk Down Wall Street” by Lo & McKinlay was first published in 1999, summarising literature that had been in existence since the early 90s). Momentum effects exist and can’t be rationalised away as statistical noise; fund companies like AQR have been offering funds based on them, and generally outperforming, for ages. And when you get to anything stronger than the very-weak form versions, the performance is really quite embarrassing. Robert Shiller’s share of the Nobel Prize was for noticing that securities prices are, in general, much too volatile to make sense as forecasts of anything in the real world. DeLong, Summers, Shleifer & Waldmann have shown that there is no real theoretical basis to the idea that “traders competing against each other make markets efficient” — it’s just as likely that they create meaningless volatility. Market prices aren’t totally informative, as they are in some sense a weighted average of the views of a large group of well-resourced and intelligent people with an incentive to get things right. But nobody would build a theory of politics around the infallibility of opinion polls.
economic_theory  economic_models  EMH  markets  capital_markets 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Nash and Liza Rybak - On Logical Difficulties, Philosophy, and the T.C.E. Explanation of the Firm | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 68, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 339-363
By exploring the implications of the linkage between Knight and Pragmatism, some non-trivial implications can be argued to exist. Specifically, section 2 outlines the T. C. E. literature, and how it exists in an atmosphere mixed with Marshallian competition and Knightian uncertainty. Section 3 then considers the disparate philosophical positions behind the work of Knight and Marshall. Knight's critique of Marshall is seminal, not because of any trivial technical innovations that Knight may have inspired within economic theory, but because Knight grounds his work on a philosophical viewpoint that effectively devastated Hegelian philosophy: American Pragmatism. Section 4 then links together the previous two sections by considering how the T. C. E. literature exhibits a dependency on both Pragmatism and Hegelian philosophy. The non-trivial implications of understanding the T. C. E. literature as a branch of Marshallian economics, which recognises Knightian uncertainty, are developed in section 5. Possible conclusions and a summary of the argument are provided in section 6. -- over 100 references from Kant through the pragmatists, Knight and 20thC economics, variants of neoclassical, and empirical evidence including probability and uncertainty in econometrics with heavy emphasis on theories of the firm, transaction cost analysis, Coase and Williamson, markets and hierarchies-- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  econometrics  probability  risk  certainty  uncertainty  Kant  Hegel  Hegelian  Marshall  transaction_costs  markets  markets-structure  firms-theory  organizations  hierarchy  management  Knight  Coase  Williamson_O  pragmatism  Peirce  Dewey  economic_sociology  economic_culture  evolution-social  competition  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Neva Goodwin - How we got here: Adam Smith minus Karl Marx; Keynes tortured by Samuelson (RWER paper) | Real-World Economics Review Blog
C in the second half of that century the field developed almost as though no one aside from Ricardo had ever thought about macro issues until Keynes came along, to prescribe how to get out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. From the point of view of those who began to call themselves neoclassical economists there were some problems with Keynes’ prescriptions. Politically, Keynes was on what came to be the losing side, in his conviction of the importance of government’s role in stabilizing economies. Methodologically as well his approach did not fit the Procrustean bed on which Paul Samuelson laid the thinkers he worked over to come up with his Principles texts. The bits that hung over the bed and had to be chopped off included a belief in the probability of market failures. The bits that were too short and had to be stretched to fit Samuelson’s passion for the tidiness and precision of mathematics were any ideas that could not easily be described in formal models.Thus, if the skeleton of 20th century microeconomics was Adam Smith minus Karl Marx, that of macroeconomics was Keynes tortured by Samuelson. -- downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  intellectual_history  economic_theory  18thC  19thC  20thC  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  political_economy  distribution-income  wealth  markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Gregory Shaffer - How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State :: SSRN August 14, 2014
University of California, Irvine - School of Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/29. *--* The World Trade Organization (WTO) arguably shapes regulatory governance in more countries to a greater extent than any other international organization. This chapter provides a new framework for assessing the broader regulatory implications of the WTO within nation states, as opposed to viewing the WTO as a form of global governance above the nation state. It first examines seven types of changes required for national law and legal practice, which affect how the state raises revenue, how the state spends it, and the principles the state applies to regulation. The chapter then assesses four broader dimensions of regulatory change catalyzed by WTO rules: (i) changes in the boundary between the market and the state (involving concomitantly market liberalization and growth of the administrative state); (ii) changes in the relative authority of institutions within the state (promoting bureaucratized and judicialized governance); (iii) changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation (such as the role of lawyers); and (iv) changes in normative frames and accountability mechanisms for national regulation (which are trade liberal and transnational in scope). In practice, these four dimensions of change interact and build on each other. The chapter presents what we know to date and a framework for conducting further empirical study. - Number of Pages: 43 -- Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, Regulation, Regulatory governance, Market liberalization - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  global_governance  WTO  regulation  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  technocracy  accountability  public_policy  legal_culture  legal_theory  lawyers  political_participation  business-and-politics  norms-business  markets_in_everything  markets  neoliberalism  free_trade  democracy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Destutt de Tracy, “Of Society” (1817) - The Best of the OLL no. 65: |Online Library of Liberty
Antoine Louis Claude, Comte Destutt de Tracy, The Best of the OLL No. 65: Destutt de Tracy, “Of Society” (1817) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2014). 08/23/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2635> -- This is part of “The Best of the Online Library of Liberty” which is a collection of some of the most important material in the OLL. A thematic list with links to HTML versions of the texts is available here. This extract comes from Destutt de Tracy’s Treatise on Political Economy (1817) which so impressed Thomas Jefferson that he had it translated into English and published in America. Here he argues that commerce, or voluntary exchanges, is the glue which binds society together.
books  etexts  18thC  19thC  intellectual_history  France  social_theory  science_of_man  political_economy  commerce-doux  markets 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Friedrich August von Hayek - Prize Lecture: The Pretence of Knowledge -- Nobel Prize 1974
MLA style: "Friedrich August von Hayek - Prize Lecture: The Pretence of Knowledge". Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Web. 9 Aug 2014. <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html> -- uses stagflation to attack demand side theories with a hint of liquidationism -- more interesting is his take on Popper and limits to positivism and quantitative methodologies -- can theirize certain patterns and examine empirical evidence re those patterns, but can't predict quantitative outcomes -- though stresses complexity, seems to be an issue of incomplete data (by definition inaccessible since it's in the heads of masses of heterogeneous agents reacting to their own, constantly changing, limited information) rather than emergent properties and complexity dynamics
intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  social_sciences-post-WWII  economic_theory  markets  information-markets  Labor_markets  unemployment  inflation  economic_policy  demand  empiricism  uncertainty  epistemology  positivism  quantitative_methods  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  Popper  Hayek  determinism  emergence  equilibrium  complexity  EF-add  scientism  scientific_method  sociology_of_knowledge 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Hayek on Prediction in the Social Sciences | Social Democracy for the 21st Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective: August 2014
Lord Keynes looking at Hayek's 1974 Nobel lecture -- If Hayek is saying here that the natural sciences could exactly predict everything about the game given enough information (including presumably the brain states of human players), then he is committed to the view that the world is completely deterministic, and that our uncertainty about it is merely epistemic and caused by the insuperable difficulties of gathering enough information for calculations. In contrast to this, Post Keynesians emphasise the ontological nature of uncertainty, and this commits them to a philosophical position quite different from that of Hayek. The notion of “spontaneous ordering forces” that bring order to markets (like Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor) seems overrated too. “Spontaneous ordering forces” must be understood as emergent properties. That complex social and economic systems can display emergent properties that result in greater stability is not in doubt, but other emergent properties (e.g., the outcome of the paradox of thrift or distress selling in a market crash) can also be highly deleterious and destabilising. Hayek badly neglected such destabilising forces in his rhetoric about markets. -- see bookmark for html of lecture on Nobel Prize site
20thC  intellectual_history  economic_theory  macroeconomics  microeconomics  markets  information-markets  equilibrium  emergence  laisser-faire  Hayek  uncertainty  probability  determinism  Post-Keynesian  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  scientism  scientific_method  scientific_culture  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Secularism and the Limits of Community (2010) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-88 -- This paper addresses two issues: (1) the use of religious considerations in social and political argument; and (2) the validation of the claims of community against markets and other aspects of globalization. It argues that we should be very wary of the association of (1) with (2), and the use of (1) to reinforce (2). The claims of community in the modern world are often exclusionary (the word commonly associated with community is "gated") and hostile to the rights of the poor, the homeless, the outcast, and so on. The logic of community in the modern world is a logic that reinforces market exclusion and the disparagement of the claims of the poor. If religious considerations are to be used to uphold those claims and to mitigate exclusion, they need to be oriented directly to that task, and to be pursued in ways that by-pass the antithetical claims of community. Religious considerations are at their most powerful in politics - and are most usefully disconcerting - when they challenge the logic of community. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  political_economy  globalization  inequality  exclusion  markets  markets_in_everything  community  communitarian  politics-and-religion  Rawls  human_rights  rights-legal  protectionism  poverty  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - The Hamlyn Lectures 2011: The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (2011) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-47 -- The idea in these lectures is to discuss the relation between property and the rule of law in a deeper way than this has been discussed in the past, ...that reflects realistic understanding of how property rights are created and modified. -- our thinking about the rule of law needs to focus on all the ways in which property is non-Lockean in its origin, legal status, and moral force. In the course of doing this, I will be looking at some of the rather naive assumptions underlying the tight connection that has been forged between property rights and the rule of law in neo-liberal political economy. And I will argue that we can abandon or modify some of these naive assumptions about property without compromising the very great importance that is properly attached to the ideal of the rule of law. There are three lectures in all. -- Lecture 1 addresses the alleged contrast between (a) the rule of law and (b) rule by law, and the suggestion that property rights might be privileged under (a). -- in the real world even Lockean property has an inescapable public law dimension. Lecture 2... is about the contrast between formal/procedural and substantive views of the rule of law and the dificulties inherent in identifying respect for private property rights as a substantive dimension of the rule of law. ...given the accordion-like expandability of the category of property, this cannot work to privilege property rights over other legal rights etc. Lecture 3 is a defense of legislation, including regulatory and redistributive legislation in light of the rule of law. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  political_economy  property  property_rights  rule_of_law  regulation  redistribution  Locke-2_Treatises  Hayek  libertarianism  liberty-negative  legislation  property-confiscations  power-asymmetric  social_order  neoliberalism  markets  institutional_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Bert De Munck - Conventions, the Great Transformation and Actor Network Theory | JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 37, No. 4 (142) (2012), pp. 44-54
This article proceeds from the field of tension between the synchronical approach of the economics of convention and the diachronical approach of economic anthropology (in the tradition of Karl Polanyi). It is argued that the economics of convention remain problematic to historians in that they fail to capture the long term transformations traditionally referred to as the emergence of modernity and the coming about of homo economicus. As a possible solution, the use of concepts and insights from Actor Network Theory is proposed. While this cluster of theories enables an historical perspective without considering modernity as a natural process, it confronts changing relationships between subjects, objects and cultural systems of meaning head on. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_sociology  economic_culture  markets  conventions  regulation  structure  microfoundations  historical_sociology  modernity  capitalism  synchronic  dyachronic  anthropology  Polanyi_Karl  Actor_Network_Theory  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
András Körösényi - Monopolistic Competition, Auction and Authorization. A Schumpeterian View of Leadership and the Political Market | JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 37, No. 1 (139) (2012), pp. 57-72
The market analogy of democracy played a central role in one of the leading versions of democratic theory in the last fifty years, in the so-called "elite" or "competitive" theory of democracy. In the present paper, I first clarify that the dominant school of the market analogy (Downs and his followers) turned its back on the approach of the originator of the analogy, Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter argued that both economic and political competition -due to the activity of entrepreneurs -are necessarily monopolistic and destroy equilibrium. Second, I show how followers of the Schumpeterian market analogy improved upon it by using the concept of natural monopolies and making it conform to the characteristics of politics, while further distancing themselves from Downsian interpretation and the dominant Public Choice approach. Finally, I demonstrate a normative implication of monopolistic competition, namely its consequences for the concept of "agency loss". -- looks good re post WWII social sciences -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  political_science  markets  competition  competition-political  parties  democracy  elites  political_culture  political_participation  monopolies  Schumpter  neoclassical_economics  public_choice  equilibrium  social_order  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Claude Diebolt - The Stakes of Cliometrics in Ancient History | JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 36, No. 3 (137) (2011), pp. 350-361
C According to Finley, markets and economic motivations played little, if any, role in ancient economies. Status and civic ideology governed the allocation of scarce resources. Hence, the application of economic theory to the ancient economy was at best a futile exercise and at worst a source of grave misunderstandings. Temin's contributions lead to other conclusions and, as in the myth of Sisyphus, the boulder seems again to be at the bottom of the hill! My feeling is that the Gordian knot remains the same now as over the past decades: should cliometrics be used in the social sciences/humanities in general, and ancient history especially? -- didn't download
article  jstor  ancient_history  ancient_Greece  ancient_Rome  economic_history  markets  capitalism  cliometrics 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Kurtuluş Gemici - Uncertainty, the problem of order, and markets: a critique of Beckert, "Theory and Society", May 2009 | JSTOR: Theory and Society, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 107-118
Jens Beckert's 2009 article on the constitution and dynamics of markets is a bold attempt to define a novel research agenda. Deeming uncertainty and coordination essential for the constitution of social action in markets, Beckert proposes a framework centered on the resolution of three coordination problems: valuation, cooperation, and competition. The empirical study of these three coordination problems has the potential to contribute considerably to the sociological analysis of markets. However, the assertion that such a theoretical vantage point can explain the constitution and dynamics of markets is not compelling because it (1) conflates social interaction with social structures, (2) fails to address power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures, and (3) neglects the historically contingent and socially contested nature of markets themselves. The present article shows that these three pitfalls are the result of starting from the problem of order and building upon uncertainty as the basis of action in markets, lending the suggested framework a methodologically individualist bent. Therefore, Beckert's suggested framework is in danger of mystifying the very power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures that are at the heart of the constitution and dynamics of markets. -- paywall -- see bibliography on jstor information page
article  jstor  paywall  economic_sociology  markets  institutions  networks-exchange  networks-information  networks-business  action-social  power  microfoundations  agency-structure  bibliography 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Warren J. Samuels - Markets and Their Social Construction | JSTOR: Social Research, Vol. 71, No. 2 (SUMMER 2004), pp. 357-370
In the special Heilbroner issue - Samuels says it's a model, not a theory he's presenting -- short but looks handy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_theory  economic_models  markets  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Issue devoted to 50th Anniversary of Robert Heilbroner's "The Worldly Philosophers" | JSTOR: Social Research, Vol. 71, No. 2, SUMMER 2004
Quite a roundup of contributors -- From Solow on methodology to Haack on philosophy of science and epistemology, Warren Samuels, Jamie Galbraith, and several papers on intellectual_history, including parallels with Polanyi
journal  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_culture  capitalism  macroeconomics  social_sciences  epistemology  rationality-economics  institutional_economics  social_contract  markets  post-WWII  post-Cold_War  bibliography  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Stumbling and Mumbling: Hayek on desert - Jan 2005
Elizabeth Anderson does a fine job of demolishing, on Hayekian grounds, the idea that people deserve their incomes. And Tyler Cowen gives an excellent reply. The one thing that’s missing are some direct quotes from Hayek himself. Let me fill the gaps. There’s this from volume II of Law, Legislation and Liberty (p71-72 in my copy): " [The function of the price system] is not so much to reward people for what they have done as to tell them what in their own as well as in general interest they ought to do. …To hold out a sufficient incentive for those movements which are required to maintain a market order, it will often be necessary that the return to people’s efforts do not correspond to recognizable merit…In a spontaneous order the question of whether or not someone has done the ‘right’ thing cannot always be a matter of merit." -- lots of quotes and links
political_philosophy  economic_theory  markets  prices  incentives  meritocracy  fairness  libertarianism  Hayek  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Steve Randy Waldman - interfluidity » Should markets clear? - May 2014
Microeconomic analysis, whenever it escapes the elegance of theorem and proof and is applied to the actual world, always makes assumptions about the macroeconomy. One very common assumption microeconomists frequently forget that they are making is an assumption of rough distributional equality. Once that goes away, even such basic conclusions like “markets should clear” go away as well.
economic_theory  economic_models  microeconomics  markets  inequality  efficiency  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Marx Myths & Legends - website
Series of serious essays, including on relations to other thinkers (e.g. Hegel) and how Marx was contested and distorted by both enemies and friends in 20thC -- We believe that what Marx had to say remains of considerable relevance to an understanding of problems we face today, but that a reading of Marx now must maintain a critical caution which does not merely reproduce received ideas- positive or negative- about Marx’s work. The distortion and questionable interpretation of Marx’s work is in many senses a direct result of his great success. ... Interpretation of Marx has thus been driven by a number of historical factors, and any attempts to gain, for example, a “scholarly” understanding have necessarily been secondary. ... To set against the distortions we cannot raise up a singular, uncontradictory Marx, abstracted from history and ultimately separable from everything that comes within “Marxism”, yet it remains that there is much in that received wisdom about Marx that is refutable, or at least rendered distinctly questionable, with a little attention to the textual and historical evidence.
intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  political_economy  social_theory  Marx  Hegel  Hegelian  Hegelians-French  Marxist  historiography-19thC  capitalism  capital  labor  Industrial_Revolution  industry  technology  ideology  property  legal_system  bourgeoisie  working_class  elites  money  markets  website  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Dieter Bögenhold - Social Network Analysis and the Sociology of Economics: Filling a Blind Spot with the Idea of Social Embeddedness | JSTOR: The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 72, No. 2 (APRIL, 2013), pp. 293-318
Today, social networks analysis has become a cross-disciplinary subject with applications in diverse fields of social and economic life. Different network designs provide different opportunities to communicate, to receive information, and to create different structures of cultural capital. Network analysis explores modes and contents of exchanges between different agents when symbols, emotions, or goods and services are exchanged. The message of the article is that social network analysis provides a tool to foster the understanding of social dynamics, which enhances recent debate on a micro-macro gap and on limitations of the cognitive and explanatory potential of economics. -- paywall -- large references list quite interesting
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_theory  economic_sociology  networks-social  structure  social_order  social_capital  cultural_capital  symbolic_interaction  markets  microfoundations  rationality-economics  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir and Frank Trentmann - Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas, Practices, and Governance [eScholarship] (2004)
This article has been accepted for publication in Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas and Politics in the Modern World following peer review. The definitive copyedited, typeset version (Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas and Politics in the Modern World, and: Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (review) Journal of World History - Volume 16, Number 4, December 2005, pp. 505-515) is available online at: muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_world_hist -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  eScholarship  economic_history  economic_sociology  economic_culture  political_economy  historiography  markets  trade  capital_flows  investment  imperialism  ideology  ideas-social_theory  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Dirk Matten and Andrew Crane - Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization | JSTOR: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 166-179
We critically examine the content of contemporary understandings of corporate citizenship and locate them within the extant body of research dealing with business-society relations. Our main purpose is to realize a theoretically informed definition of corporate citizenship that is descriptively robust and conceptually distinct from existing concepts in the literature. Specifically, our extended perspective exposes the element of "citizenship" and conceptualizes corporate citizenship as the administration of a bundle of individual citizenship rights--social, civil, and political--conventionally granted and protected by governments. -- cited by more than 35 in jstor -- didn't download
article  jstor  political_philosophy  political_economy  liberalism  markets  nation-state  civil_society  business  business-and-politics  corporate_citizenship  CSR  civil_liberties  privatization  legal_system  international_political_economy  globalization  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Gowdy et al - Economic cosmology and the evolutionary challenge | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Special Issue 2013
2nd lead articl5 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The intellectual histories of economics and evolutionary biology are closely intertwined because both subjects deal with living, complex, evolving systems. Because the subject matter is similar, contemporary evolutionary thought has much to offer to economics. In recent decades theoretical biology has progressed faster than economics in understanding phenomena like hierarchical processes, cooperative behavior, and selection processes in evolutionary change. This paper discusses three very old “cosmologies” in Western thought, how these play out in economic theory, and how evolutionary biology can help evaluate their validity and policy relevance. These cosmologies are: (1) “natural man” as a rational, self-sufficient, egotistical individual, (2) competition among individuals can lead to a well-functioning society, and (3) there exists an ideal optimal state of nature. These correspond to Colander et al. (2004) “holy trinity of orthodox economics”, rationality, greed, and equilibrium. It is argued below that current breakthroughs in evolutionary biology and neuroscience can help economics go beyond these simple cosmologies.

They equate Pope’s Essay (self love and social are the same) with Mandeville Fable of the Bees
paper  journal  intellectual_history  ancient_philosophy  Western_civ  natural_law  cosmology  Providence  self-interest  competition  markets  economic_theory  economic_sociology  economic_culture  evolution-social  biocultural_evolution  evo_psych  evolution-as-model  reason  rationality-economics  rational_choice  downloaded  EF-add  equilibrium  complexity  Smith  Pope  Mandeville 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Neil Fligstein: The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies: 9780691102542: Amazon.com: Books
Winner of the 2003 Distinguished Book Award "Until the appearance of Fligstein's new book . . . no one has attempted to integrate economic sociology into a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive approach for the study of market capitalism. This book, therefore, sets a standard for other books that will follow in the coming decades. By all measures, it is an impressive book that deserves careful reading by everyone interested in the analysis of capitalist economies."--Gary G. Hamilton, American Journal of Sociology "This is an important book. It . . . will undoubtedly redirect research attention and encourage new work on the rules and politics that structure market relations. This book pushes us forward and suggests a rich vein waiting to be mined."--Mitchel Y. Abolafia, Administrative Science Quarterly
books  economic_sociology  economic_culture  capitalism  markets 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
Christiane Eisenberg: Embedding Markets in Temporal Structures: A Challenge to Economic Sociology and History (2011)
JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 36, No. 3 (137) (2011), pp. 55-78 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The essay examines from a historian's point of view the approaches to the analysis of market exchange in new economic sociology and explores in which way sociology and history can cooperate in embedding markets in temporal structures. In a first step the author sharply criticises the favourable reception given to Karl Polanyi's work ``The Great Transformation'' in the field of new economic sociology. In particular she discusses the narrowing of research perspectives and its negative side effects on the sociology of markets. There then follows a second step: in order to find a linking point for interdisciplinary cooperation, beginning with the current state of historical research, the author makes several considerations on the significance of temporal structures and the time factor in general in analysing markets and market societies.
article  jstor  economic_history  economic_sociology  historical_sociology  social_theory  lit_survey  markets  capitalism  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Neil Fligstein and Luke Dauter: The Sociology of Markets (2007)
JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33 (2007), pp. 105-128 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The sociology of markets has been one of the most vibrant fields in sociology in the past 25 years. There is a great deal of agreement that markets are social structures characterized by extensive social relationships between firms, workers, suppliers, customers, and governments. But, like in many sociological literatures, the theory camps that have formed often seem to speak by each other. We show that some of the disagreement between theory camps is due to differences in conceptual language, and other disagreements stem from the fact that theory camps ignore the concepts in other theory camps, thereby making their theories less complete. We end by considering deeper controversies in the literature that seem open both to new conceptualization and further empirical research.
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_sociology  institutional_economics  markets  networks  culture  fields  firms-theory  lit_survey  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Jens Beckert: The social order of markets (2009)
JSTOR: Theory and Society, Vol. 38, No. 3 (May 2009), pp. 245-269 -- In this article I develop a proposal for the theoretical vantage point of the sociology of markets, focusing on the problem of the social order of markets. The initial premise is that markets are highly demanding arenas of social interaction, which can only operate if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved. I define these coordination problems as the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation problem. I argue that these problems can only be resolved based on stable reciprocal expectations on the part of market actors, which have their basis in the socio-structural, institutional and cultural embedding of markets. The sociology of markets aims to investigate how market action is structured by these macrostructures and to examine their dynamic processes of change. While the focus of economic sociology has been primarily on the stability of markets and the reproduction of firms, the conceptualization developed here brings change and profit motives more forcefully into the analysis. It also differs from the focus of the new economic sociology on the supply side of markets, by emphasizing the role of demand for the order of markets, especially in the discussion of the problems of valuation and cooperation.
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_sociology  capitalism  markets  networks  institutions  economic_culture  lit_survey  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Peter Levin: Culture and Markets: How Economic Sociology Conceptualizes Culture (2008)
JSTOR: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 619 (Sep., 2008), pp. 114-129 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- Current ways of addressing culture in the sociology of markets are incomplete. One approach treats culture as constitutive of markets (markets are culture), while the other treats culture as something affecting markets (markets have culture). This division corresponds to markets that are more or less "settled." The author outlines the history and shortcomings of this duality and proposes a more dimensional approach to culture and markets that more fully integrates culture into economic sociology.
article  js  social_theory  economic_sociology  institutional_economics  markets  networks  culture  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Greta R. Krippner and Anthony S. Alvarez: Embeddedness and the Intellectual Projects of Economic Sociology (2007)
JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33 (2007), pp. 219-240 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- In this review, we explore how the concept of embeddedness has shaped—and been shaped by—the evolution of the subfield of economic sociology. Although embeddedness is often taken as a conceptual umbrella for a single, if eclectic, approach to the sociological study of the economy, we argue that in fact the concept references two distinct intellectual projects. One project, following from Granovetter's (1985) well-known programmatic statement, attempts to discern the relational bases of social action in economic contexts. Another project, drawing from Polanyi's [1944 (2001), 1957, 1977] social theory, concerns the integration of the economy into broader social systems. Critically, these two formulations of embeddedness involve different views of the relationship between the economic and the social. The implication is that the obstacles to theoretical integration in economic sociology, while not insurmountable, are greater than is typically acknowledged.
article  jstor  social_theory  lit_survey  economic_sociology  historical_sociology  institutional_economics  markets  firms-theory  networks  social_sciences-post-WWII  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Bruce G. Carruthers and Jeong-Chul Kim: The Sociology of Finance (2011)
JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 37 (2011), pp. 239-259 -- paywall but jstor has the full list of references cited -- The economic crisis of 2008-2010 stimulated an already growing sociological interest in finance. Before the crisis, disintermediation and securitization changed how the U.S. financial system operated, as bank operations shifted from the traditional originate-and-hold model to originate-and-distribute. During the 1980s and 1990s, the overall size and profitability of the financial system grew as deregulation unleashed financial innovation and reorganization. Global shifts toward capital market integration and liberalization created greater global interdependence. Households in the years before the crisis also altered their relationship to the financial system, increasing debt loads and overall exposure to the stock market. Research reveals the importance of politics for many financial market developments, various implications for corporate governance, the continuing significance of social factors within finance, and the role of theoretical and material devices in shaping financial practices. Key directions for future research focus on finance in relation to social inequality, informal sectors, valuation, and social networks.
article  jstor  lit_survey  economic_sociology  financial_system  financialization  financial_crisis  finance_capital  markets  networks  corporate_governance  political_economy  capital_markets  globalization  politics-and-money  disintermediation  securitization  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger: Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies of Financial Markets (2002)
JSTOR: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 107, No. 4 (January 2002), pp. 905-950 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- very heavily cited -- references and footnotes indicate research placed in theory, concepts and method debates -- Using participant‐observation data, interviews, and trading transcripts drawn from interbank currency trading in global investment banks, this article examines regular patterns of integration that characterize the global social system embedded in economic transactions. To interpret these patterns, which are global in scope but microsocial in character, this article uses the term “global microstructures.” Features of the interaction order, loosely defined, have become constitutive of and implanted in processes that have global breadth. This study draws on Schutz in the development of the concept of temporal coordination as the basis for the level of intersubjectivity discerned in global markets. This article contributes to economic sociology through the analysis of cambist (i.e., trading) markets, which are distinguished from producer markets, and by positing a form of market coordination that supplements relational or network forms of coordination.
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_sociology  institutional_economics  markets  networks  sociology_of_knowledge  financial_system  globalization  capital_markets  FX  money_market  20thC  21stC  lit_survey  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Jürgen Kädtler: Financialisation of Capitalist Economies — Bargaining on Conventional Economic Rationalities (2011)
JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 36, No. 4 (138) (2011), pp. 169-191 -- Special Issue: Conventions and Institutions from a Historical Perspective -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The paper deals with financialisation of capitalist economies since the 1990s drawing on a conventional concept of economic rationalities. It is argued that financial rationality is not the mere outcome of relations of power rooted elsewhere but a power resource on its own. It is analysed as one type of bounded rationality among others, the recent predominance of which traces back mainly to a paradigmatic shift in economics. However predominance does not mean unambiguousness. It is demonstrated that financial rationality on the level of companies or companies' strategies always has to be interpreted and specified in the perspective of other rationalities. And effective financialised strategies are always the outcome of bargaining between social actors bringing into play various interests, power resources, and rationalities. The financial and economic crisis since 2007 is perceived as symptomatic for a new kind of systemic instabilities caused by the predominance of financial rationality.
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_sociology  historical_sociology  institutional_economics  markets  financial_system  financialization  rationality-economics  power  financial_crisis  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Vincent Barnett: The Russian "Obshchina" as an Economic Institution (2004)
JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1037-1039 -- comment re Anton Oleinik article on network capitalism and Russia -- see Anton Oleinik response to Barrett comment
article  jstor  economic_history  institutional_economics  networks  capitalism  markets  Russia  Russian_economy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Anton Oleinik: On Universal versus Specific Categories of Network Capitalism: A Reply to V. Barnett's Note (2004)
JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1040-1046 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- see earlier article on network capitalism and later article on distrust and Russian "market economy"
article  jstor  social_theory  political_economy  networks  capitalism  markets  institutional_economics  economic_history  19thC  20thC  21stC  Russia  Russian_economy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Randall Collins: Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization (1980)
JSTOR: American Sociological Review, Vol. 45, No. 6 (Dec., 1980), pp. 925-942 ...... Downloaded pdf to Note......In Kieran Healy course..... A systematic formulation is given of Weber's theory of the origins of large-scale capitalism, based upon the lectures given just before his death. This last theory is predominantly institutional, unlike the emphasis upon religious ideas and motivations in his early Protestant Ethic thesis, and unlike his analyses of the world religions. Weber's institutional theory involves a sequence of causal conditions. The outcome of the sequence is capitalism characterized by the entrepreneurial organization of capital, rationalized technology, free labor, and unrestrained markets. Intermediate conditions are a calculable legal system and an economic ethic combining universal commercialization with the moderate pursuit of repetitive gains. These conditions are fostered by the bureaucratic state and by legal citizenship, and more remotely by a complex of administrative, military, and religious factors. The overall pattern is one in which numerous elements must be balanced in continuous conflict if economic development is to take place. Weber derived much of this scheme in explicit confrontation with Marxism. His conflict theory criticizes as well as deepens and extends a number of Marxian themes, including a theory of international capitalism which both criticizes and complements Wallerstein's theory of the world system.
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Germany  economic_growth  development  economic_sociology  international_political_economy  social_theory  institutions  Weber  Marx  capitalism  legal_system  bureaucracy  markets  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Peter Levin: Culture and Markets: How Economic Sociology Conceptualizes Culture (2008)
JSTOR: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 619 (Sep., 2008), pp. 114-129 --- Current ways of addressing culture in the sociology of markets are incomplete. One approach treats culture as constitutive of markets (markets are culture), while the other treats culture as something affecting markets (markets have culture). This division corresponds to markets that are more or less "settled." The author outlines the history and shortcomings of this duality and proposes a more dimensional approach to culture and markets that more fully integrates culture into economic sociology.
article  jstor  social_theory  culture  markets  firms-theory  economic_sociology  economic_culture  political_economy  Weber  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Daniel Finn: The moral ecology of markets: on the failure of the amoral defense of markets | T & F Online
Review of Social Economy
Volume 61, Issue 2, 2003, pages 135- 162
Available online: 04 Jun 2010
DOI: 10.1080/0034676032000098192

Many economists have defended capitalism; most have tried to do so within the self-imposed methodological constraint that economists should employ only empirical arguments, not normative ones. This essay examines three classic amoral defenses of capitalism—by Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, and Friedrich Hayek—and argues that each fails on its own terms, since each implicitly incorporates moral presumptions essential to the author's argument. Constructively, the essay proposes that no one can adequately endorse (or critique) markets without making a moral evaluation of their context—their “moral ecology.” Four issues are identified as necessarily addressed in every adequate evaluation of markets. The essay does not endorse any one position on these elements, but argues instead that seemingly incommensurable standpoints on markets—ranging from Marxist to libertarian—actually represent positions on the these four basic issues.

Downloaded pdf to Note
article  political_economy  markets  liberalism  libertarianism  conservatism  Hayek  moral_philosophy  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Comparing J.M. Keynes’s and F. Von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as it Relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept Versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, Volume 19, No.3, July-September 2011, pp.1-20 

J.M. Keynes and F. von Hayek had completely different views about the meaning of the term “uncertainty” as it was related to the concept of knowledge. Keynes viewed uncertainty through his concept of the weight of the argument, V, (a logical operator) and weight of the evidence, w (a mathematical variable). Uncertainty, U, is an inverse function of w so that one can write U=f (w). The existence of complete, relevant knowledge requires that w=1, where w is defined on the closed unit interval [0,1]. A degree of uncertainty occurs if w<1. A w<1 means that the relevant knowledge is not just incomplete but is missing and/or not available to any decision maker. A w=0 means that there is no relevant knowledge. Keynes viewed the case of 0 Hayek’s definition of uncertainty is that relevant knowledge is completely dispersed into small or tiny bits and pieces. All of the total information/knowledge is divided up among the set of decision makers. However, this dispersed knowledge, while scattered, is complete. Market prices concentrate this dispersed knowledge into a form that alert, savvy, knowledgeable entrepreneurs can understand and act on efficiently. Market prices concentrate the relevant knowledge so that uncertainty is eliminated for savvy, smart, alert entrepreneurs. This is equivalent to arguing that w =1 for alert entrepreneurs. 

Keynes’s and Hayek’s definitions of uncertainty directly conflict with each other. Keynes argues that, especially in the case of producer goods, w, while w is not equal to 0, is little, flimsy, vague, ambiguous, small, fluctuating,and tiny. The prices of producer good DO NOT concentrate the knowledge so that savvy, alert entrepreneurs can act on it efficiently. Hayek argues that they do. The conflict over the meaning of uncertainty is insurmountable. The Hayekian outcome is not possible in a world of Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty.

Downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  intellectual_history  political_economy  20thC  capitalism  economic_models  uncertainty  Keynes  Hayek  markets  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Competition for Attention by Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer :: SSRN May 2013
SSRN briefcase NBER $
Abstract:     
 We present a model of market competition and product differentiation in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. With salience, strategic positioning of each product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit “commoditized” price salient equilibria, while others exhibit “de-commoditized” quality salient equilibria. When the cost of producing quality changes, innovation can lead to a radical change in markets. In the context of financial innovation, the model generates the well documented phenomenon of “reaching for yield”.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Bordalo, Pedro, Gennaioli, Nicola and Shleifer, Andrei, Competition for Attention (May 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19076. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2269529
markets  Innovation  competition  financial_system  capital_markets  behavioral_economics  financial_crisis  financialization  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader

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