dunnettreader + markets-structure   45

Robert S. Taylor - Market Freedom as Antipower (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
Historically, republicans were of different minds about markets: some, such as Rousseau, reviled them, while others, like Adam Smith, praised them. The recent republican resurgence has revived this issue. Classical liberals such as Gerald Gaus contend that neorepublicanism is inherently hostile to markets, while neorepublicans like Richard Dagger and Philip Pettit reject this characterization—though with less enthusiasm than one might expect. I argue here that the right republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent and that republicanism demands such markets for the same reason it requires the rule of law: because both are essential institutions for protecting individuals from arbitrary interference. I reveal how competition restrains—and in the limit, even eradicates— market power and thereby helps us realize "market freedom," i.e., freedom as nondomination in the context of economic exchange. Finally, I show that such freedom necessitates "Anglo-Nordic" economic policies. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
Pettit  capitalism-alternatives  downloaded  markets_in_everything  capitalism-varieties  republicanism  bibliography  political_economy  Rousseau  Smith  market_failure  markets-dependence_on_government  jstor  commerce-doux  freedom  domination  market_fundamentalism  Gaus_Gerald  markets  political_theory  capitalism  article  competition  markets-structure 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Matt Levine - It Costs Money to Sell a Lot of Bonds - Bloomberg View - April 2016
One basic fact about markets is that, if there are 1,000 widgets in the world, and the "fair" price of a widget is $100, and you need to sell 200 widgets in an…
Instapaper  capital_markets  bond_markets  intermediation  markets-structure  liquidity  investment  institutional_investors  market-makers  market-size_of  corporate_finance  equity_markets  from instapaper
april 2016 by dunnettreader
The Tri-Party Repo Market Like You Have Never Seen It Before | Liberty Street Economics - October 2015
They've got a database analytical tool that, like FRED, allows lots of slicing and dicing at all sorts of levels of details - history doesn't extend very far back since until the last 2 decades the repo market was tiny and dominated by a few specialist firms, not the brand-name players
Instapaper  financial_economics  databases  money_market  credit_booms  credit_crunch  bubbles  financial_crisis  shadow_banking  markets-structure  liquidity  bank_runs  from instapaper
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Market liquidity and financial stability - October 2015
Everyone seems to be worried about market liquidity – the ability to buy or sell a large quantity of an asset with little or no price impact. Some observers… Nice overview of which issues ought to be of concern to keep an eye on, and what recent studies by FRBNY have shown
Instapaper  financial_system  financial_regulation  markets-structure  liquidity  financial_stability  equity_markets  corporate_finance  bond_markets  money_market  asset_prices  firesales  intermediation  broker-dealers  market_makers  HFT  from instapaper
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Civility and Formality :: SSRN October 2013
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-57 -- Civility is a distinctive virtue in social and political relations, not an all-embracing one. In this paper, I suggest that civility is also a "chilly" virtue, associated more with formality than with niceness; that is, I argue that its importance is best accounted for on this basis. I pursue the theme of formality in a number of different areas: formality in market relations; formality in political inclusiveness; formality in the willingness to listen and "stay present" for the articulation of views to which is utterly opposed; and formality in democratic deliberations. So defined, civility is not everything and it may need to be balanced against other principles and requirements of politics. But the account I give of its relation to formality enables us to see it in the distinctive importance that it has, even though its importance may not be absolute. -- Pages in PDF File: 22 -- Keywords: civility, disagreement, difference, formality, legal rights, legislation, markets, inclusiveness, toleration -- downloaded pdf to Note
political_philosophy  political_culture  democracy  civic_virtue  commerce-doux  civility-political  manners  markets-structure  tolérance  deliberation-public  inclusion  social_psychology  norms  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Charles A.E. Goodhart, Enrico Perotti - Containing maturity mismatch | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 10 September 2015
In the last century, real estate funding by banks grew steadily. This column argues that the unprecedented expansion of banking in mortgage lending resulted in a high degree of maturity mismatch. The solution to this problem should focus on greater maturity matching, and not using insured deposits. One avenue to do so is by securitising mortgages with little maturity transformation. Another is to create intermediaries providing mortgage loans where the lender shares in the appreciation, while assuming some risk against the occasional bust. -- downloaded as pdf to Note
paper  banking  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  markets-structure  real_estate  mortgages  liquidity  money_market  deposit_insurance  disintermediation  maturity_transformation  securitization  institutional_investors  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke - Make a Bubble, Take a Free Lunch, Break a Bank by :: SSRN - Oct 2012, update May 2015
University of Stuttgart - Institute of Economics and Law -- Standard economics is known to be incapable of integrating the real and the monetary sphere. The ultimate reason is that the whole theoretical edifice is built upon a set of behavioral axioms. Therefore, the formal starting point is moved to structural axioms. This makes it possible to formally track the complete process of value creation and destruction in the asset market and its consequences for the household and business sector. From the set of structural axioms emerge the well-known phenomena of a bubble from free lunches through appreciation to defaults due to a lack of potential next buyers. -- Pages in PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: new framework of concepts, structure-centric, axiom set, profit, rate of interest, liquidity preference, primary market, secondary market, parrot economics, theory of value, valuation price, appreciation, depreciation, net worth, debt/income ratio -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  macroeconomics  financial_system  markets-structure  bubbles  asset_prices  leverage  primary_markets  secondary_markets  liquidity  interest_rates  credit_booms  capital_markets  money_market 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Primary and Secondary Markets by Egmont Kakarot-Handtke :: SSRN - Aug 2011, update March 2015
Also Dec 2012 Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 741 -- University of Stuttgart - Institute of Economics and Law -- This paper swaps the standard behavioral axioms for structural axioms and applies the latter to the analysis of the emergence of secondary markets from the flow part of the economy. Real and nominal residuals at first give rise to the accumulation of the stock of money and the stock of commodities. These stocks constitute the demand and supply side of secondary markets. The pricing in these markets is different from the pricing in the primary markets. Realized appreciation in the secondary markets is different from income or profit. To treat primary and secondary markets alike is therefore a category mistake.-- Pages in PDF File: 26 -- Keywords: new framework of concepts, structure-centric, axiom set, residuals, real and monetary stocks, money, credit, financial saving, nonfinancial saving, net worth, financial profit, nonfinancial profit, retained profit, appreciation, wealth -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  macroeconomics  financial_system  markets  markets-structure  primary_markets  secondary_markets  asset_prices  profit  investment  interest_rates  savings  capital_gains  money  wealth  credit  liquidity  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke - Schumpeter and the Essence of Profit :: SSRN - May 2011, update May 2015
University of Stuttgart - Institute of Economics and Law -- Schumpeter had a clear vision of the developing economy, but he did not formalize it. The quest for a germane formal basis is in the following guided by the general question: what is the minimum set of foundational propositions for a consistent reconstruction of the evolving money economy? We start with three structural axioms. The claim of generality entails that it should be possible to free Schumpeter’s approach from its irksome Walrasian legacy and to give a consistent formal account of the elementary circular flow that served him as a backdrop for the analysis of the entrepreneur-driven market system. -- Pages in PDF File: 28 -- Keywords: new framework of concepts, structure-centric, axiom set, profit, money, credit, structural stress, catching-up process, monopoly -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  economic_history  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Schumpeter  economic_growth  economic_sociology  entrepreneurs  profit  investment  Innovation  creative_destruction  money  markets-structure  monopoly  prices  firms-theory  neoclassical_economics  equilibrium  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Darrell Duffie and Jeremy C. Stein - Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Market Benchmarks (2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2): 191-212.
LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered Rate: a measure of the interest rate at which large banks can borrow from one another on an unsecured basis. LIBOR is often used as a benchmark rate—meaning that the interest rates that consumers and businesses pay on trillions of dollars in loans adjust up and down contractually based on movements in LIBOR. Investors also rely on the difference between LIBOR and various risk-free interest rates as a gauge of stress in the banking system. Benchmarks such as LIBOR therefore play a central role in modern financial markets. Thus, news reports in 2008 revealing widespread manipulation of LIBOR threatened the integrity of this benchmark and lowered trust in financial markets. We begin with a discussion of the economic role of benchmarks in reducing market frictions. We explain how manipulation occurs in practice, and illustrate how benchmark definitions and fixing methods can mitigate manipulation. We then turn to an overall policy approach for reducing the susceptibility of LIBOR to manipulation before focusing on the practical problem of how to make an orderly transition to alternative reference rates without raising undue legal risks. -- didn't download
article  financial_system  financial_regulation  money_market  capital_markets  markets-structure  LIBOR  fraud  business-norms  business_ethics  trust  market_manipulation  accountability 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Bond market liquidity: should we be worried? — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
Our bottom line is this: resilience of intermediaries and resilience of markets are mutually reinforcing. With more resilient institutions, someone is more likely to stand ready to make a market in bonds – both Treasuries and corporates – so long as the rewards are adequate. Since the less liquid a market is, the higher the return to market making will be, the more likely it is that someone will step up to trade when price moves are large. Put another way, better regulation has removed the public subsidy to trading activity that banks and others were able to capture prior to the crisis, so making markets has become more expensive and prices may have to move more than before to attract stabilizing traders. But during those periods when liquidity is particularly valuable, the rewards should exceed these higher capital and liquidity costs. We worry less, not more, because enhanced capital and liquidity requirements are making intermediaries more resilient. Tags: Corporate bonds, Bond market, Liquidity, U.S. Treasury bonds, High-frequency trading, Contagion, Systemic risk -- really good on corporate bonds and links to recent studies on the Treasury market, especially after the flash crash in October 2014 -- downloaded pdf to Note
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  markets-structure  HFT  liquidity  capital_adequacy  banking  broker-dealers  intermediation  corporate_finance  Dodd-Frank  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Bond market liquidity: should we be worried? - August 2015
Very nice analysis -- the point re illiquid corporates can't be made often enough in response to the whining. And the HFT looks like a potentially bigger problem than higher capital requirements pushing the big boys out of the dealer business. The NY Fed and Treasury are constantly monitoring the primary and secondary markets in the only stuff that matters and have tools to improve things if needed.
Pocket  financial_regulation  capital_markets  bond_markets  money_market  capital_adequacy  market-makers  markets-structure  Fed  liquidity  corporate_finance  from pocket
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, et al - Financial transaction taxes in theory and practice | Brookings Institution - June 30, 2015
By: Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Sarah Gault, Bryan Kim, Jim Nunns and Steve Rosenthal -- In response to the financial market crisis and Great Recession, there has been a resurgence of interest in financial transaction taxes (FTTs) around the world. We estimate that a well-designed FTT could raise about $50 billion per year in the United States and would be quite progressive. We discuss the effects of an FTT on various dimensions of financial sector behavior and its ambiguous effects on economic efficiency. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  financial_system  capital_markets  markets-structure  HFT  taxes  financial_economics  financial_transaction_tax  liquidity  market_makers  tax_policy  tax_collection  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Cormac Ó Gráda - Eating People Is Wrong, and Other Essays on Famine, Its Past, and Its Future | Princeton University Press
Famines are becoming smaller and rarer, but optimism about the possibility of a famine-free future must be tempered by the threat of global warming. (...) this wide-ranging book, which provides crucial new perspectives on key questions raised by famines around the globe between the 17thC and 21stC. The book begins with a taboo topic. Ó Gráda argues that cannibalism, while by no means a universal feature of famines and never responsible for more than a tiny proportion of famine deaths, has probably been more common during very severe famines than previously thought. (...) new interpretations of two of the 20thC’s most notorious and controversial famines, the Great Bengal Famine and the Chinese Great Leap Forward Famine. Ó Gráda questions the standard view of the Bengal Famine as a perfect example of market failure, ...primary cause was the unwillingness of colonial rulers to divert food from their war effort. (...) the role played by traders and speculators during famines more generally, invoking evidence from famines in France, Ireland, Finland, Malawi, Niger, and Somalia since the 1600s, and overturning Adam Smith’s claim that government attempts to solve food shortages always cause famines. Cormac Ó Gráda is professor emeritus of economics at University College Dublin. His books include Famine: A Short History and Black '47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory (both Princeton). -- introduction downloaded as pdf to Note
books  economic_history  economic_theory  markets-failure  markets-structure  markets-psychology  famine  agriculture  Ireland  Chinese_history  China-economy  India  British_Empire  imperialism-critique  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Market Trends - OECD Journal - Home page | OECD
‌The articles in Financial Market Trends focus on trends and prospects in the international and major domestic financial markets and structural issues and developments in financial markets and the financial sector. This includes financial market regulation, bond markets and public debt management, insurance and private pensions, as well as financial statistics. -- links to the contents of each issue of the journal
journal  website  paper  financial_system  global_economy  global_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  banking  NBFI  insurance  markets-structure  risk_assessment  risk_management  sovereign_debt  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  institutional_investors  pensions  consumer_protection  equity-corporate  equity_markets  debt  debt-overhang  leverage  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  financial_economics  financial_innovation  financial_system-government_back-stop  bailouts  too-big-to-fail  cross-border  regulation-harmonization  regulation-costs  statistics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Dodd-Frank: Five Years After — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - June 2015
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter, DF), the most sweeping financial regulatory… Very good roundup of the holes that are left, the inability to force a coherent inter-agency approach to key risk regulation areas (e.g. the Financial Stability Oversight couldn't force the SEC to write adequate Money Market Funds reg, making it even worse than before the crisis), and the areas where regs are excessively complex, costly etc -- so they either won't do the job (and regulators will wind up making ad hoc exceptions because they're not workable) or their going to get gamed. Basically comes down to the age-old problem of regulation by institutional form rather than by function. The financial crisis was the best chance we had to rationalize the system, and Paulson had Treasury working on a proposal to do just that, but it got trashed when the financial system blew up and everybody was battling for narrow interests in a crisis atmosphere with inflamed populist politics -- only thing positive was finally getting rid of OCC. I do think they're unnecessarily suspicious of the new consumer protection agency -- given that a full overhaul wasn't possible, somebody needs to be responsible for looking out for consumers, since the main regulators are focused on financial risk issues at the institutional or system level.
Instapaper  US_economy  US_politics  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  Fed  SEC  banking  capital_markets  government_agencies  risk  risk-systemic  risk_management  NBFI  shadow_banking  money_market  institutional_investors  consumer_protection  leverage  capital_adequacy  inter-agency  liquidity  arbitrage  markets-structure  intermediation  financial_instiutions  financial_system-government_back-stop  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew W. Lo - Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance: The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis - 2005 :: SSRN - Journal of Investment Consulting, Forthcoming
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- The battle between proponents of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and champions of behavioral finance has never been more pitched, and there is little consensus as to which side is winning or what the implications are for investment management and consulting. In this article, I review the case for and against the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, and describe a new framework - the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis - in which the traditional models of modern financial economics can co-exist alongside behavioral models in an intellectually consistent manner. Based on evolutionary principles, the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis implies that the degree of market efficiency is related to environmental factors characterizing market ecology such as the number of competitors in the market, the magnitude of profit opportunities available, and the adaptability of the market participants. Many of the examples that behavioralists cite as violations of rationality that are inconsistent with market efficiency - loss aversion, overconfidence, overreaction, mental accounting, and other behavioral biases - are, in fact, consistent with an evolutionary model of individuals adapting to a changing environment via simple heuristics. Despite the qualitative nature of this new paradigm, I show that the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis yields a number of surprisingly concrete applications for both investment managers and consultants. -- Pages in PDF File: 44 Keywords: Efficient markets, behavioral finance, adaptive markets
paper  SSRN  financial_economics  EMH  behavioral_economics  markets-structure  markets-psychology  rationality-economics  rationality-adaptive  efficiency  heuristics  methodology-qualitative  methodology-quantitative  complex_adaptive_systems  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew W. Lo, Thomas J. Brennan - Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses?: An Analytical Framework - Texas Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 7, 2012 :: SSRN
Andrew Lo - Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) *--* Thomas J. Brennan - Northwestern University School of Law. **--** A common theme in the regulation of financial institutions and transactions is leverage constraints. Although such constraints are implemented in various ways — from minimum net capital rules to margin requirements to credit limits — the basic motivation is the same: to limit the potential losses of certain counterparties. However, the emergence of dynamic trading strategies, derivative securities, and other financial innovations poses new challenges to these constraints. We propose a simple analytical framework for specifying leverage constraints that addresses this challenge by explicitly linking the likelihood of financial loss to the behavior of the financial entity under supervision and prevailing market conditions. An immediate implication of this framework is that not all leverage is created equal, and any fixed numerical limit can lead to dramatically different loss probabilities over time and across assets and investment styles. This framework can also be used to investigate the macroprudential policy implications of microprudential regulations through the general-equilibrium impact of leverage constraints on market parameters such as volatility and tail probabilities. -- Pages in PDF File: 36 -- Leverage, Liquidity, Financial Regulation, Capital Requirements, Macroprudential Policies, Net Capital Rules -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  markets-structure  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  leverage  capital_adequacy  liquidity  capital_markets  money_market  derivatives  arbitrage  macroprudential_policies  macroprudential_regulation  risk-systemic  financial_innovation  bank_runs  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
GF&Co - Joshua Rosner - Is the CDS Market Manipulated? - Dec 2014
Appalling details re ISDA procedures for determining credit events. The Determination Committee is stacked with the 10 big banks that are the major dealers and have a huge financial interest in the outcome. Since they explicitly have no duty of care, no duty to disclose information on which they base their votes even to the other committee members, no transparency re the basis on which the Committee makes a determination or how members voted, and can defer decisions for several meetings running, that would allow them to adjust their book. The example of the Caesars default, which was clear as possible in the indenture but was delayed being determined as a credit event by weeks, is instructive re how little investors can rely on the actual facts but are at the mercy of the big banks' totally arbitrary discretion. Other examples include Elliott on the committee that determined the Argentine credit event *caused* by Elliott. The amounts in the CDS of a high profile company can distort company operations and financial structure to game the declaration of a credit event with the participation of some of the very banks that will decide when an event is triggered -- see RadioShack. The entire risk management function that in theory justifies CDS and the positions investors take, has been completely annulled by the interests of the financial institutions who make the market. The ISDA has become effectively a credit rating agency with no regulatory oversight or controls. The potential amounts involved are staggering, making the LIBOR scandal look penny ante.
Scribd  international_finance  derivatives  self-regulation  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  markets-structure  market_manipulation  conflict_of_interest  fiduciaries  corporate_finance  bankruptcy 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Rajiv Sethi: Perspectives on Exchange-Traded Funds - December 2010
Are ETFs good or bad for the market? That was the title of a lively and interesting session at Markets Media's third annual Global Markets Summit last Thursday. The session was organized as an old-fashioned debate between two teams. On one side were David Weild and Harold Bradley (joined later by Robert Litan on video), who argued that heavily traded funds composed of relatively illiquid small-cap stocks were responsible, in part, for the sharp decline in initial public offerings over the past decade, with devastating consequences for capital formation and job creation. Responding to these claims were Bruce Lavine, Adam Patti and Robert Holderith, all representing major sponsors of funds (WisdomTree, IndexIQ and EGShares respectively). The sponsors argued that they are marketing a product that is vastly superior to the traditional open-end fund, provides investors with significant liquidity, transparency and tax advantages, and is rapidly gaining market share precisely because of these benefits. From their perspective, it makes as little sense to blame exchange-traded funds for declining initial public offerings and the sluggish rate of job creation as it does to blame them for hurricanes or influenza epidemics. -- quite interesting discussion especially in comments -- brings in the issue of HFT as well -- liquidity (a mirage), correlation among stocks that looks excessive, reducing ability to diversify, insufficient diversity of trading strategies, disappearance(?) of market makers, general issues re indexing, benchmarkings, small caps markets too thin to support research, information arbitrage to improve valuations etc
capital_markets  markets-structure  liquidity  IPOs  capital_formation  HFT  NBFI  ETFs  institutional_investors  indexing  SMEs 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Rajiv Sethi: The Agent-Based Method - August 2014
It's nice to see some attention being paid to agent-based computational models on economics blogs, but Chris House has managed to misrepresent the methodology so completely that his post is likely to do more harm than good. -- Useful discussion of both DSGE and agent-based modeling approaches plus links. Chris House, for a highly touted "expert", keeps exposing his combination of ignorance and bias ("facts have a conservative bias"!!) Apparently since he already knows what the facts are going to tell him, he doesn't actually have to learn something about which he is ignorant but feels free to spout what "must" be the case. Extraordinary indictment of the upper levels of the economics professoriate. Seth's post is a fine description of what agent-based models are about, and the dilemmas of coming up with criteria for evaluating robustness of research results -- a problem which DSGE papers don't seem to have, apparently because of the agreed upon math and that most of the variables are exogenous chosen by the modeler, and theoretical papers which can be judged on the coherence of their mathematical logic. Links to some agent-based work - Seth himself working on market structure and trading practices (e.g. GFT) within a "market ecology" framework
economic_theory  macroeconomics  economic_models  rationality-economics  markets  markets-structure  ecology  ecology-economic  agent-based_models  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  links 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Rajiv Sethi: On Animal Spirits and Knee-Jerk Reactions | December 2009
Mark Thoma re his trying, when reading Schiller, to overcome a knee-jerk reaction to claims that mass psychology drives markets rather than the reverse. Seth says: I too have the greatest respect for Shiller and consider his 1981 paper on stock price (relative to dividend) volatility to be an absolute classic. But I can't help thinking that too much is being asked of behavioral economics at this time, (..) regularities identified in controlled laboratory experiments with standard subject pools have limited application to environments in which the distribution of behavioral propensities is both endogenous and psychologically rare. This is the case in financial markets (..) Those who enter the profession are unlikely to be psychologically typical, and market conditions determine which behavioral propensities survive and thrive at any point in historical time. If one is to look beyond economics for metaphors and models, why stop at psychology? For financial market behavior, a more appropriate discipline might be evolutionary ecology. This is not a new idea. (..) look at the chapter on "The Ecology of Markets" in Victor Niederhoffer's extraordinary memoir. Or study Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis .. which depends explicitly on the assumption that aggressive financial practices are rapidly replicated during periods of stable growth, eventually becoming so widespread that systemic stability is put at risk. To my mind this reflects an ecological rather than psychological understanding of financial market behavior.
behavioral_economics  financial_economics  financial_system  social_psychology  systems-complex_adaptive  ecology  Minsky  Schiller  animal_spirits  capital_markets  financial_crisis  principal-agent  markets-psychology  markets-structure  contagion 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis - Notions of Order and Process in Hayek: The Significance of Emergence (Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2014) :: SSRN
DOI: 10.1093/cje/beu043 -- King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- This article explores the notions of order and process to which Friedrich Hayek subscribed. It is argued that a satisfactory understanding of Hayek’s conceptions of ‘order’ and ‘process’ — and in particular a clear understanding of those how the two concepts relate to each other in his scheme of thought — requires an appreciation of the ontological categories of ‘emergence’ and ‘emergent properties.’ Ultimately, for Hayek the capacity of liberal market economies to co-ordinate people’s actions in the face of tacit and dispersed knowledge is an emergent property that arises only when people’s interactions are governed by certain sets of rules. This static analysis of the co-ordinative powers of the market as an emergent property of a given system of rules must be supplemented by a dynamic account of the process through which the set of rules in question comes into being. Hayek provides such an account in his account of society as developing through a multi-level evolutionary process. Key implications of Hayek’s accounts of order and process for debates about the co-ordinative powers of free market economies are drawn out. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: Hayek, order, process, emergence, ontology, Austrian economics -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_social_science  social_theory  ontology-social  markets  markets-structure  social_order  emergence  heterodox_economics  Austrian_economics  evolution-social  social_process  coordination  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis - Hayek, Social Theory and the Contrastive Explanation of Socio-Economic Order (2013. Critical Review Vol. 25, Nos. 3-4.) :: SSRN
Lewis, Paul A., Hayek, Social Theory and the Contrastive Explanation of Socio-Economic Order (2013). Critical Review Vol. 25, Nos. 3-4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535073 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2535073 -- King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- Hayek’s later work on the possibility of socio-economic order in decentralized market economies is an exercise in contrastive causal explanation as conceptualized by realist social theorists and philosophers. This interpretation of Hayek’s work lends support to the view that Hayek’s post-1960 writings can be thought of as an example of comparative institutional analysis. It also provides a means of reinforcing Hayek’s own efforts to establish the scientific credentials of his work. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 19 -- Keywords: Hayek, Austrian economics, scientism, ontology, comparative institutional analysis-- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  intellectual_history  20thC  Hayek  Austrian_economics  economic_theory  social_theory  ontology-social  institutional_economics  scientistism  economic_sociology  critical_realism  comparative_economics  markets  markets-structure  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeff Horn - Economic Development in Early Modern France: The Privilege of Liberty, 1650–1820 (release date for hardback mid-Feb 2015) | European history after 1450 | Cambridge University Press
Privilege has long been understood as the constitutional basis of Ancien Régime France, legalising the provision of a variety of rights, powers and exemptions to some, whilst denying them to others. In this fascinating new study however, Jeff Horn reveals that Bourbon officials utilized privilege as an instrument of economic development, freeing some sectors of the economy from pre-existing privileges and regulations, while protecting others. He explores both government policies and the innovations of entrepreneurs, workers, inventors and customers to uncover the lived experience of economic development from the Fronde to the Restoration. He shows how, influenced by Enlightenment thought, the regime increasingly resorted to concepts of liberty to defend privilege as a policy tool. The book offers important new insights into debates about the impact of privilege on early industrialisation, comparative economic development and the outbreak of the French Revolution. **--** 1. Introduction: profits and economic development during the Old Régime *--* 2. Privileged enclaves and the guilds: liberty and regulation *--* 3. The privilege of liberty put to the test: industrial development in Normandy *--* 4. Companies, colonies, and contraband: commercial privileges under the Old Régime *--* 5. Privilege, liberty, and managing the market: trading with the Levant *--* 6. Outside the body politic, essential to the body economic: the privileges of Jews, Protestants and foreign residents *--* 7. Privilege, innovation, and the state: entrepreneurialism and the lessons of the Old Régime *--* 8. The reign of liberty? Privilege after 1789 -- look for pdf of Intro once released
books  find  political_economy  economic_history  political_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  France  privileges-corporate  economic_culture  economic_policy  development  monarchy  profit  entrepreneurs  guilds  trading_companies  trade-policy  regulation  industrialization  industrial_policy  Colbert  Colbertism  urban_development  urban_elites  commerce  commercial_interest  French_government  Huguenots  Jews  colonialism  French_Empire  colonies  corporate_finance  monopolies  Levant  MENA  Ottomans  liberties  liberty  Ancien_régime  Louis_XIV  Louis_XV  Louis_XVI  French_Revolution  French_Revolutionary_Wars  Napoleonic_Wars  Restoration-France  bourgeoisie  haute_bourgeoisie  markets  markets-structure  foreign_trade  foreign_policy  foreigners-resident 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Tom Walker - EconoSpeak: The Hours of Labour and the Problem of Social Cost - Jan 2015
Coase argued that the suggested courses of action in the Pigovian tradition – liability, taxation or regulation – were inappropriate and often undesirable.(..) However, Coase didn't consider the full range of Pigou's examples and analysis. While Coase’s restatement of the problem may have been appropriate to the specific externality problems discussed by Pigou in part II, it entirely overlooked the radically different labour market problem encountered in part III, in which competitive pressure compels an employing firm to inflict harm on both itself and its employees and thus regulatory restraint of the firm (and competing employers) may benefit both. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  economic_sociology  intellectual_history  welfare_economics  institutional_economics  Coase  markets  markets-structure  property_rights  transaction_costs  externalities  competition  Labor_markets  social_costs  cost-benefit  regulation-costs  collective_action  common_good  efficiency  labor_law  wages  labor_standards  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Christopher A. Hartwell - Do (successful) stock exchanges support or hinder institutions in transition economies? | Cogent Economics & Finance Volume 2, Issue 1, 2014 - T&F Online
Department of International Management, Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland -- University of Huddersfield, UK -- A stock exchange and the presence of functioning equity markets are part and parcel of an advanced market-based financial system. Previous research has also established that equity markets function more efficiently in the presence of supporting institutions such as property rights and rule of law. But how do these two aspects of the institutional environment interact? That is, does the performance of a stock exchange support the development of property rights, or can it actually hinder it? Examining monthly data for 21 transition economies over a shifting monthly window from 1989 to 2012, and using a fixed-effects specification with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, I find support for the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between property rights and stock market performance. While a well-functioning stock market may help reinforce property rights through demonstration effects, a stock market that has become “too successful” may entrench interests and lead to property rights-eroding policies. -- downloaded to iPhone
paper  download  financial_system  property_rights  transition_economies  capital_markets  equity_markets  financial_sector_development  emerging_markets  investors  financial_instiutions  political_economy  privatization  markets-structure  oligarchy 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Bank of England | Financial Stability | Bank of England/ECB securitisation discussion paper and responses
Bank of England/ECB securitisation discussion paper and responses -- On the 30 May 2014, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank (ECB) published a discussion paper (see Key Resources) that explained the case for a better functioning securitisation market in the European Union and outlined a range of options that authorities could support to revitalise the market. A broad range of market participants and stakeholders responded to the discussion paper. These responses have been synthesised into a short note, and full responses are published where we have received permission to do so. -- didn't download pdfs
report  capital_markets  securitization  markets-structure  financial_innovation  financial_regulation  financial_sector_development  central_banks  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Peter Lee - Lack of secondary market liquidity exacerbates sell-off | Euromoney magazine - Oct 17 2014
Lack of secondary market liquidity exacerbates sell-off by As equity markets have sold off and investors rushed into risk-free bonds, even supposedly liquid US treasuries have seen prices gapping. As volatility rises and investors focus on grim fundamentals, they see a broken bond-market structure. Amid the market turbulence this week as investors panicked about slowing growth in Europe and around the world, equity markets sold off sharply and panic-buyers drove down 10-year US treasury yields, market sources reported surprisingly thin liquidity, even in benchmark US government bonds. With dealers unwilling to position risk ahead of Fed stress tests and amid heightened regulatory reporting requirements on Volcker rule compliance, even in the supposedly most liquid bond markets prices gapped around.
capital_markets  bond_markets  banking  markets-structure  liquidity  financial_regulation  Volker_Rule  NBFI  shadow_banking  asset_prices  risk-systemic  risk_management  uncertainty  volatility 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Brayden G King and Nicholas A. Pearce - The Contentiousness of Markets: Politics, Social Movements, and Institutional Change in Markets | JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 36 (2010), pp. 249-267
While much of economic sociology focuses on the stabilizing aspects of markets, the social movement perspective emphasizes the role that contentiousness plays in bringing institutional change and innovation to markets. Markets are inherently political, both because of their ties to the regulatory functions of the state and because markets are contested by actors who are dissatisfied with market outcomes and who use the market as a platform for social change. Research in this area focuses on the pathways to market change pursued by social movements, including direct challenges to corporations, the institutionalization of systems of private regulation, and the creation of new market categories through institutional entrepreneurship. Much contentiousness, while initially disruptive, works within the market system by producing innovation and restraining capitalism from destroying the resources it depends on for survival. -- still paywall -- 155 references-- see bibliography on jstor information page
article  jstor  paywall  social_theory  political_sociology  economic_sociology  markets-structure  markets_in_everything  Innovation  social_movements  conflict  political_economy  regulation  capitalism  environment  institutional_change  social_process  change-social  CSR  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  self-regulation  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Nash and Liza Rybak - On Logical Difficulties, Philosophy, and the T.C.E. Explanation of the Firm | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 68, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 339-363
By exploring the implications of the linkage between Knight and Pragmatism, some non-trivial implications can be argued to exist. Specifically, section 2 outlines the T. C. E. literature, and how it exists in an atmosphere mixed with Marshallian competition and Knightian uncertainty. Section 3 then considers the disparate philosophical positions behind the work of Knight and Marshall. Knight's critique of Marshall is seminal, not because of any trivial technical innovations that Knight may have inspired within economic theory, but because Knight grounds his work on a philosophical viewpoint that effectively devastated Hegelian philosophy: American Pragmatism. Section 4 then links together the previous two sections by considering how the T. C. E. literature exhibits a dependency on both Pragmatism and Hegelian philosophy. The non-trivial implications of understanding the T. C. E. literature as a branch of Marshallian economics, which recognises Knightian uncertainty, are developed in section 5. Possible conclusions and a summary of the argument are provided in section 6. -- over 100 references from Kant through the pragmatists, Knight and 20thC economics, variants of neoclassical, and empirical evidence including probability and uncertainty in econometrics with heavy emphasis on theories of the firm, transaction cost analysis, Coase and Williamson, markets and hierarchies-- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  econometrics  probability  risk  certainty  uncertainty  Kant  Hegel  Hegelian  Marshall  transaction_costs  markets  markets-structure  firms-theory  organizations  hierarchy  management  Knight  Coase  Williamson_O  pragmatism  Peirce  Dewey  economic_sociology  economic_culture  evolution-social  competition  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
ESMA website section - Market Infrastructure - Central Counterparties | ESMA
EMIR introduces a harmonised set of organisational, business conduct and prudential requirements for clearing service providers. CCPs interpose themselves between counterparties to a derivative contract, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. In doing so, CCPs become the focal point for derivative transactions thus increasing market transparency and reducing the risks inherent in derivatives markets. National securities regulators are responsible for the authorisation of EU-based CCPs. For each EU-based CCP a college of supervisors will be established made up of relevant national regulators and ESMA. A non-EU CCP needs to be recognised by ESMA to offer clearing services to EU customers. Prior to recognition the EC must adopt an implementing act determining, amongst other issues, that the legal and supervisory arrangements of the relevant non-EU country imposes legally binding requirements which are equivalent to those contained in Title IV of EMIR. For some jurisdictions ESMA has assessed whether non-EU country legislation meets the EMIR standard through ESMA technical advice to the EC on which to base its decision. ESMA does not actively supervise non-EU CCPs, but following recognition defers to the non-EU CCP’s home supervisor to undertake the day-to-day supervision. ESMA’s role in this respect is that of a standard-setter who further clarifies the CCP provisions under EMIR.
website  EU  EU-law  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  international_finance  market_integration  risk-systemic  derivatives  infrastructure-markets  markets-structure  clearing_&_settlement  liability  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  cross-border  law-and-finance 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
ESMA website section - Trade repositories | Esma
Trade repositories (TRs) centrally collect and maintain the records of derivatives. They play a central role in enhancing the transparency of derivative markets and reducing risks to financial stability. Under EMIR, ESMA has direct responsibilities regarding the registration, supervision and recognition of TRs based outside the EU. EU-based TRs need to be authorised, and third country (non-EU) based TRs which are doing business in the EU need to be recognised by ESMA, in order for counterparties to use them for their EMIR reporting requirements. Once registered, the TR will be supervised by ESMA in order to ensure that it complies on an on-going basis with all EMIR requirements, thereby enabling regulators to access to data and details of derivative contracts in order for them to fulfil their respective missions. Besides supervising TRs, ESMA also acts as a standard-setter by further detailing the EMIR provisions regarding TRs.
website  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  derivatives  markets-structure  market_integration  risk-systemic  infrastructure-markets  cross-border 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
ESMA website section - Markets/ Post-trading and Settlement (SFD, CSDR, T2S) | ESMA
ESMA’s main roles in the post-trading area are implementing regulations on the EU’s markets infrastructure (EMIR) and central securities depositories (CSDR), co-ordinating issues such as settlement discipline and Target2-Securities (T2S), and providing information on the Settlement Finality Directive (SFD). **--** Section 1 - Clearing and reporting (EMIR), which covers ** Trade reporting ** Trade repositories (TRs) ** OTC derivatives and clearing obligation. ** Central Counterparties (CCPs) ** Non-financial counterparties (NFCs) ** Third (non-EU) countries **--** Section 2 - Settlement (SFD, CSDR, T2S), which covers ** Central securities depositories regulation (CSDR) ** Settlement Finality Directive (SFD) ** Target2-Securities (T2S)
website  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  capital_markets  money_market  OTC_markets  clearing_&_settlement  markets-structure  infrastructure-markets  payments_systems  cross-border  NBFI  derivatives  equity-corporate  debt  macroprudential_regulation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
ESMA Working Paper 2 - The systemic dimension of hedge fund illiquidity and prime brokerage (June 2014) | ESMA
We analyse the potentially vulnerable and systemically relevant financial intermediation chain established by hedge funds and prime brokers. Our dataset covers the 306 largest global hedge funds and their prime brokers over the period July 2001 to December 2011. The study illustrates that hedge funds and prime brokers act as complementary trading partners in normal times. However, we observe that this form of financial intermediation may be severely impaired in times of market distress. This can be explained by the hoarding of liquid securities by prime brokers who are eager to avert runs by their clients. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  capital_markets  money_market  financial_crisis  liquidity  intermediation  hedge_funds  markets-structure  NBFI  shadow_banking  OTC_markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
ESMA Working Paper 1 - Monitoring the European CDS market through networks: Implications for contagion risks (June 2014) | Esma
Based on a unique data set referencing exposures on single name credit default swaps (CDS) on European reference entities, we study the structure and the topology of the European CDS market and its evolution from 2008 to 2012, resorting to network analysis. The structural features revealed show bilateral CDS exposures describing growing scale-free networks whose highly interconnected hubs constitute both a strength and weakness for the stability of the system. The potential “super spreaders” of financial contagion, identified as the most interconnected participants, consist mostly of banks. For some of them net notional exposures may be particularly large relative to their total common equity. Our findings also point to the importance of some non-dealer/non-bank participants belonging to the shadow banking system. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  derivatives  markets-structure  risk-systemic  networks  networks-financial  capital_markets  NBFI  shadow_banking  OTC_markets  banking 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Trends, risks and vulnerabilities in financial markets - Annual Reports and Working Papers | ESMA
In order to safeguard financial stability it is necessary to identify, at an early stage, trends, potential risks and vulnerabilities stemming from the micro-prudential level, across borders and across sectors. Thereby particular attention is paid to any systemic risk posed by financial market participants, failure of which may impair the operation of the financial system or the real economy. ESMA monitors and assesses such developments in the area of its competence and, where necessary, informs the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the other European Supervisory Authorities and the ESRB on a regular and, as necessary, on an ad hoc basis. In cooperation with the ESRB, ESMA also initiates and coordinates Union-wide stress tests to assess the resilience of financial market participants to adverse market developments, and ensures that an as consistent as possible methodology is applied at the national level to such tests. In order to perform its functions properly, ESMA conducts economic analyses of the markets and the impact of potential market developments. On this basis, ESMA produces annually two reports on risk, trends and vulnerabilities.
report  paper  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  banking  NBFI  capital_markets  money_market  risk-systemic  markets-structure  market_integration  cross-border 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Home -- European Securities and Markets Authority - ESMA [formerly CESR]
ESMA’s mission is to enhance the protection of investors and reinforce stable and well functioning financial markets in the European Union. ESMA, as an independent EU Authority, achieves this mission by building a single rule book for EU financial markets and ensuring its consistent application and supervision across the EU. ESMA contributes to the supervision of financial services firms with a pan-European reach, either through direct supervision or through the active co-ordination of national supervisory activity. -- successor agency as of January 2011 to the Committee of European Securities Regulators
website  government_agencies  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  EU  Europe  capital_markets  financial_regulation  regulation-harmonization  rating_agencies  equity-corporate  derivatives  markets-structure  market_integration  clearing_&_settlement  cross-border  corporate_finance  NBFI  disclosure  accounting  corporate_governance 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
WFE response to IOSCO consultation on market structure -May 2013 | World Federation of Exchanges
Executive Summary - The WFE commends IOSCO for carefully analyzing the issues raised by the growing and disruptive fragmentation and loss of visibility (darkness) in equity markets. The four sensible recommendations in this consultation progress efforts on the part of regulators and exchange operators worldwide to ensure that equity markets continue to serve investors by becoming ever more efficient, transparent and fair. The WFE supports competition and believes that regulators must promote market designs that foster order interaction in a free, transparent and fair competitive environment. Unfortunately, regulations intended to promote competition between and on-exchanges have in recent years been misused to enable the growth of venues designed to avoid competition. The WFE is concerned about the integrity and efficiency of fragmented, complex and dark markets, particularly as it relates to price formation, surveillance, and market resiliency. Market participants are increasingly discouraged from posting competing prices in lit venues, and evidence indicates that spreads are wider than they could be otherwise. Similarly, diminishing transparency and fair access leads to market complexity that makes markets less capable of handling volatility. Finally, the WFE is concerned that a greater share of equities trading occurs away from full regulatory protection offered by regulated exchanges. The WFE calls into question two common practices in fragmented markets. First, retail and institutional orders are systematically segmented toward venues designed to avoid quote competition, where conflicts of interest are unavoidable. Second, fragmented markets increasingly allow participants to step in front of displayed public limit orders on dark venues with little to no price improvement or block trading. The incentive to segment markets and reduce transparency jeopardizes the price discovery process and can adversely impact costs for all investors. The WFE calls attention to the problems that investors and security commissions face in receiving reliable data from OTC equity trading venues. While the WFE believes that the quality of data, and the costs associated with aggregating data should be weighed when changes to market structure are considered, consistent transparency regulations across venues is fundamental to efficient trading and market surveillance.
The WFE supports recent changes made by the security commissions of Canada and Australia in curbing the excesses of OTC equity trading -- didn't download
report  IOSCO  international_organizations  financial_system  financial_regulation  law-and-finance  disclosure  capital_markets  equity-corporate  OTC_markets  competition-financial_sector  market_integration  markets-structure  HFT  self-regulation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader

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