dunnettreader + legal_theory   109

(107) NOW Published: How Hume
How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity  without Debating Moral Realism, Clarendon Press (2016)
Front matter including both overview TOC and very detailed TOC plus introductory chapter -- He explains in the intro how both Hume and Kant (via Rousseau) pursued "moral constructivist" approaches using a (modified) "natural law" framework - after Hume had successfully attacked weaknesses in traditional approach to natural law. Notes that "justice" traditionally one of the 2 branches of moral philosophy (the other ethics). He's especially concerned with failure of "business ethics " as cause of financial crisis and Great Recession - but "business ethics" meaningless without a framework of "Justice." His target audience includes lawyers and legal/jurisprudence students and scholars - he thinks legal positivism and legal realism has run out of steam. He returns to accountancy standards in final chapter. -- pdf is the same material as kindle sample -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
books  legal_system  constructivism  morality-objective  justice  legal_theory  norms  accountability  legal_realism  18thC  norms-business  downloaded  moral_sentiments  moral_economy  jurisprudence  morality-conventional  legal_positivism  accounting  moral_realism  moral_psychology  Hume  kindle-available  natural_law  moral_philosophy  morality  Kant 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Eric Nelson - “From Selden to Mendelssohn: Hebraism and Religious Freedom” (2013) | in Skinner & van Gelderen, Freedom and the Construction of Europe - CUP
Nelson E. “From Selden to Mendelssohn: Hebraism and Religious Freedom”. In: Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen , eds., Freedom and the Construction of Europe: New Perspectives on Philosophical, Religious, and Political Controversies. Cambridge University Press ; 2013. - scan of chapter -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  chapter  political_philosophy  political_history  politics-and-religion  17thC  18thC  freedom_of_conscience  tolerance  secularism  secularization  Church-and-State  Erastianism  Hebrew_commonwealth  Selden  Mendelssohn  legal_history  legal_theory  constitutional_regime  downloaded 
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Philip Pettit - The Birth of Ethics - 2014-2015 Lecture Series | Tanner Lectures
Philip Pettit
The Birth of Ethics
Lecture I: From Language to Commitment
With commentary by Michael Tomasello
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
Lecture II: From Commitment to Responsibility
With commentary by Pamela Hieronymi and Richard Moran
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
-- Seminar and Discussion with the three commentators
Thursday, April 9, 2015
lecture  intellectual_history  responsibility  human_nature  liberty  political_philosophy  constructivism  moral_philosophy  social_theory  legal_theory  community  philosophy_of_language  receprocity  video  obligation 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Geoffrey M. Hodgson - Conceptualizing Capitalism (summary) - Books & ideas - May 2015
Conceptualizing Capitalism: How the Misuse of Key Concepts Impedes our Understanding of Modern Economies -- One of the most commonly used concepts in modern humanities and social sciences, capitalism is also one of the most misunderstood. Away from politically biased takes on the subject, Geoffrey M. Hodgson proposes a new, law-based framework for understanding capitalism. Downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle-available  intellectual_history  economic_theory  economic_models  economic_sociology  political_economy  legal_theory  philosophy_of_social_science  capitalism  downloaded 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Brian Tierney - Kant on Property: The Problem of Permissive Law | JSTOR - Journal of the History of Ideas (2001)
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 301-312 -- a bit in the weeds, looking at the structure of his different types of law-giving in the 2nd critique and the natural law in the Philosophy of Right -- didn't download
article  jstor  intellectual_history  18thC  legal_theory  natural_law  Kant  Kant-ethics  Kant-politics  political_philosophy  property  property_rights 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - Legal Realism in Context :: SSRN in Elizabeth Mertz, ed., New Legal Realism, Vol. 1 (Cambridge UP, 2015 Forthcoming)
“We are all realists now,” it is frequently said, yet what legal realism was about remains vigorously debated by legal theorists and historians. The debate continues because the jurists we think of as core legal realists were not members of a group. Karl Llewellyn said this multiple times in his famous essay detailing realism. (..) Contemporary scholars who make assertions about what the legal realists stood for often fail to account for these passages. Legal realism.. is best understood ... in terms of 3 overlapping complexes of ideas that emerged in the late 19thC and had become widespread by the time of Llewellyn’s article. [(1)] that society was changing rapidly while law, understood as a means to achieve social ends, lagged badly behind, producing an urgent need for legal reform. [(2)] the growing refrain among legal academics that newly developing social sciences should be applied to enhance an understanding of the actual facts surrounding law. [(3)] a vocal backlash against judges for impeding reform, including charges that they were importing class bias into their legal decisions, prompting a broader acknowledgement that the background social attitudes of judges play a role in their decisions. These three themes were interpenetrating: the popular dissatisfaction with the failings of law was manifested in criticism of courts, and resort to social science was the favored academic solution. (..) Realism characterized the new modern age of thinking about law, and it ran much earlier and more broadly than is now commonly recognized. -- PDF File: 47 -- Keywords: Legal history, Jurisprudence, law and the humanities, law and the social sciences
chapter  SSRN  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  19thC  20thC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  legal_history  social_sciences  legal_realism  legal_reform  change-social  change-intellectual 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory :: SSRN - William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 56, 2015
Jurisprudence is generally thought to consist of two main classical rival branches — natural law and legal positivism — followed by a bunch of modern schools — legal realism, law and economics, critical theory, legal pragmatism, etc. In this essay I argue that three main branches of jurisprudence have existed, and battled, for centuries, not two, but the third goes unrecognized as such because it has traveled under different labels and the underlying connections have been clouded by various confusions. The core insights and focus of this third branch, what I call “Social Legal Theory,” trace in a continuous thread from Montesquieu, through historical jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, and legal realism, up to the present. This third branch, I argue, provides a contrasting/complementary perspective, in conjunction with natural law and legal positivism, which rounds out the full range of theoretical angles on law: natural law is normative; legal positivism is analytical/conceptual; and social legal theory is empirical. (Among a number of clarifications, I answer the common objection that empirically-grounded theories are not sufficiently theoretical.) The conventional jurisprudential narrative is redrawn in this essay in a way that exposes unseen connections among theoretical schools and brings into focus critical issues about the nature of law that currently are marginalized by natural law and legal positivism. -- Pages in PDF File: 44 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, legal philosophy, law and society, legal realism, legal development, legal history
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal  natural_law  legal_realism  legal_history  sociology_of_law  social_order  social_theory  change-social  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  Montesquieu  pragmatism  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Knowledge and Policy Limits of New Institutional Economics on Development :: SSRN - Dec 2014, Journal of Economic Issues, 2015, Forthcoming
Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law -- New Institutional Economics (NIE) has secured impressive achievements in academia and policy circles. The World Bank and other development organization in the past two decades have expended billions of dollars on efforts to build “good governance” and the “rule of law” informed by the NIE theory that economic development requires supportive political and legal institutions. NIE appears to be the new consensus view of development thinking, supplanting the neo-liberal Washington Consensus (..) This essay elaborates on the barriers that stand in the way of the knowledge and policy goals of NIE. Foremost is the “interconnectedness of society:” cultural, technological, legal, political, and economic activities all affect one another and are affected by one another, often in ways that are subtle and all but invisible; each situation unique in its constellation of social forces and is dynamic, constantly changing in reaction to surrounding influences. (..) I explore the ongoing struggle to identify a shared conception of “institution” — and I explain why this cannot be solved. For reasons I go on to elaborate, NIE scholars also will not be able to get a precise grip on the surrounding institutional influences that affect economic development. (..) NIE scholars today, it turns out, are repeating lessons announced five decades ago in the law and development field. The problems were insuperable then and will remain so. (..) While critical of NIE knowledge and policy objectives, this essay is not negative in orientation. NIE research is illuminating. Greater awareness of the limits will help orient future work in the field in the most fruitful directions. - Pages in PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: economic development, new institutional economics, old institutional economics, legal development, rule of law, legal theory -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  institutional_economics  law-and-economics  institutions  legal_culture  political_culture  institution-building  institutional_change  institutionalization  development  rule_of_law  legal_reform  legal_theory  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Josh Chafetz - Democracy’s Privileged Few: Legislative Privilege and Democratic Norms in the British and American Constitutions | Yale University Press - 2011
This book is the first to compare the freedoms and protections of members of the United States Congress with those of Britain’s Parliament. Placing legislative privilege in historical context, Josh Chafetz explores how and why legislators in Britain and America have been granted special privileges in five areas: jurisdictional conflicts between the courts and the legislative houses, freedom of speech, freedom from civil arrest, contested elections, and the disciplinary powers of the houses. Legislative privilege is a crucial component of the relationship between a representative body and the other participants in government, including the people. In recounting and analyzing the remarkable story of how parliamentary government emerged and evolved in Britain and how it crossed the Atlantic, Chafetz illuminates a variety of important constitutional issues, including the separation of powers, the nature of representation, and the difference between written and unwritten constitutionalism. This book will inspire in readers a much greater appreciation for the rise and triumph of democracy. -- see kindle sample
books  kindle-available  political_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  constitutions  constitutional_law  constitutional_regime  democracy  checks-and-balances  separation-of-powers  representative_institutions  political_participation  UK_Government  British_history  British_politics  British_Empire-constitutional_structure  American_colonies  US_constitution  Congress  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  House_of_Commons  House_of_Lords  House_of_Representatives  constituencies  judiciary  judicial_review  exec_branch  monarchy  monarchical_republic  MPs  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_culture  legitimacy  Founders  Madison  Blackstone  Mill  prerogative  bill_of_rights  bills_of_attainder  elections-disputed  Bolingbroke 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling "Citizens United" with Corporate Law History :: SSRN - Notre Dame Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming (rev'd March 2015)
Leo E. Strine Jr., Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; Penn Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz -- Citizens United has been the subject of a great deal of commentary, but one important aspect of the decision that has not been explored in detail is the historical basis for Justice Scalia’s claims in his concurring opinion that the majority holding is consistent with originalism. In this article, we engage in a deep inquiry into the historical understanding of the rights of the business corporation as of 1791 and 1868 — two periods relevant to an originalist analysis of the First Amendment. Based on the historical record, Citizens United is far more original than originalist, and if the decision is to be justified, it has to be on jurisprudential grounds originalists traditionally disclaim as illegitimate. -- PDF File: 94 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, constitutional interpretation, original intent, original understanding, originalism, election law, campaign finance reform, corporate personhood, general corporation statutes, political speech, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  US_constitution  constitutional_law  originalism  free_speech  civil_liberties  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  elections  campaign_finance  politics-and-money  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew S. Gold, Paul B. Miller, eds. -- Introduction: Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford UP 2014) :: SSRN
Andrew S. Gold, DePaul University, College of Law and Paul B. Miller, McGill University Faculty of Law -- This Introduction outlines core questions of fiduciary law theory and provides thematic discussion of the contributions to the volume. The volume includes chapters by Richard Brooks, Hanoch Dagan, Evan Criddle, Deborah DeMott, Avihay Dorfman, Justice James Edelman, Evan Fox-Decent, Tamar Frankel, Joshua Getzler, Andrew Gold, Michele Graziadei, Sharon Hannes, Genevieve Helleringer, Ethan Leib, Daniel Markovits, Paul Miller, Irit Samet, Robert Sitkoff, Henry Smith, and Lionel Smith. -- PDF File: 17 -- Keywords: Philosophy of Law, Legal Theory, Philosophy of Private Law, Private Law Theory, Fiduciary Law, Fiduciary Relationships, Fiduciary Duties, Fiduciary Remedies, Duty of Loyalty, Duty of Care, Duty of Candour -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  fiduciaries  principal-agent  agents  duties-legal  rights-legal  trust  trusts  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  conflict_of_interest  legal_remedies  law-and-economics  law-and-finance  Roman_law  civil_law  common_law  property  inheritance  family_law  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams, eds. - Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction :: SSRN - (Edward Elgar 2013)
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, both University of Chicago Law School -- University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 704 -- This introduction, prepared for an edited volume, offers some observations on the importance — indeed, inescapability — of fairness concerns in law and economics. The relationship between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually cast as an adversarial one. Rational choice economics typically describes human behavior as motivated by simple self-interest, rather than by concerns of morality, justice, or fairness. But we have found that the connections between concepts of fairness and the economic analysis of law are robust and diverse. After discussing some of these linkages, we describe the organization and content of the volume we have compiled. In it, economics engages with fairness, challenging the idea that the two concepts are alien to each other. -- PDF File: 18 -- Keywords: fairness, law and economics -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  fairness  efficiency  welfare_economics  self-interest  altruism  microeconomics  policymaking  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  utility  status_quo_bias  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lawrence B. Solum - Originalism and Constitutional Construction by :: SSRN - 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453 (2013)
Georgetown University Law Center -- Constitutional interpretation is the activity that discovers the communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. Constitutional construction is the activity that determines the legal effect given the text, including doctrines of constitutional law and decisions of constitutional cases or issues by judges and other officials. The interpretation-construction distinction, frequently invoked by contemporary constitutional theorists and rooted in American legal theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, marks the difference between these two activities. (..) Part I of this Article situates the idea of constitutional construction in the context of contemporary debates about originalism and among originalists. Part II argues that the interpretation-construction distinction provides conceptual clarity and answers a variety of objections to the distinction itself and the use of the terms “interpretation” and “construction” to express the distinction. Part III advances the claim that construction is ubiquitous; Part IV makes the case for the ineliminability of the construction zone. Part V discusses the relationship between constitutional construction and debates about originalism and living constitutionalism. A conclusion follows. -- PDF File: 85 -- Keywords: constitution, interpretation, construction, interpretation-construction distinction, vagueness, ambiguity, original methods, deference, constraint -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  constitutional_law  US_constitution  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  originalism 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicola Lacey - Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 919 (2015)
A cri de coeur for putting legal theory and history back together with social theory and empirical social sciences,. -- In the early part of my career, legal history and the history of legal ideas were closed books to me, as I made my way in a field of criminal law scholarship dominated by doctrinal scholarship and by concept-focused philosophical analysis of the foundations of criminal law. These 2 very different paradigms have 1 big thing in common: They tend to proceed as if the main intellectual task is to unearth the deep logic of existing legal doctrines, not infrequently going so far as to read them back onto history, as if things could never have been other than they are. (..)I have increasingly found myself turning to historical resources (1) [to examine] the contingency of particular legal arrangements, and (2) ...to develop causal and other theses about the dynamics which shape them and hence about the role and quality of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies. So, in a sense, I have been using history in support of an analysis driven primarily by the social sciences. (..) it is no accident that all of the great social theorists, from Marx to Foucault via Weber, Durkheim, and Elias, ..have incorporated significant historical elements into their interpretations .... Indeed, without the diachronic perspective provided by history (or the perspective offered by comparative study) we could have no critical purchase on social theory’s characterizations of or causal hypotheses about the dynamics of social systems. Hence, (...) my boundless gratitude to the historians whose meticulous research makes this sort of interpretive social theory possible). -- Lacey is not over-dramatizing -- see the "commentary" from a "legal philosopher" who believes the normative basis of criminal responsibility can be investigated as timeless "moral truths". -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_change  philosophy_of_law  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_social_science  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  morality-conventional  morality-objective  criminal_justice  responsibility  mind  human_nature  norms  power-asymmetric  power-symbolic  power  Neoplatonism  neo-Kantian  a_priori  historiography  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  moral_philosophy  evidence  mental_health  social_order  epistemology  epistemology-moral  change-social  change-intellectual  comparative_law  comparative_anthropology  civil_liberties  women-rights  women-property  rights-legal  rights-political  access_to_services  discrimination  legal_culture  legal_system  legal_reasoning  Foucault  Marx  Weber  Durkheim  metaethics  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Frederick Schauer - The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 957 (2015)
My aim in this Article is to focus on the history of thinking about law in the context of 3 topics (..) to show that the continuous development of the theory of legal positivism, however useful it may have been or may still be, has possibly caused us to ignore other aspects of what was originally part of the positivist picture. (..)The first of these dimensions is the relationship between legal theory and legal reform. (..) that an account of the nature of law might be developed not simply as an aid to understanding or accurate description, but instead as a way of facilitating reform of law itself or reform of how a society understands the idea of law. Second, legal positivism, at the time of its late 19thC (or perhaps even earlier) origins, was focused on the importance of coercion, force, and sanctions as central components of law. But as with the creation of legal theories for the purpose of legal reform, this emphasis on the coercive side of law has also been banished to a kind of jurisprudential purgatory, for reasons and with consequences that deserve further examination. The third lost element of earlier versions of legal positivism is its focus on judicial decision making and the role of judges. Modern legal positivists, for whom 1961 is all too often the beginning of useful thought about the nature of law, do not, with few exceptions, consider theories of judicial decision making to be a necessary or even important part of the positivist perspective. But it was not always so. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  legal_reform  institutional_change  institutions  judiciary  judicial_review  law_enforcement  criminal_justice  punishment  coercion  authority  obligation  policymaking  political_change  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism-legal  positive_law  positivism  justice  Study_and_Uses  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steven Walt - What Can The History of Jurisprudence Do For Jurisprudence? A Commentary on Schauer's "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 977 (2015)
Walt's response (at least the abstract) appears to prove Schauer's point quite nicely, as if logic and argument by legal theorists takes place in an abstract world where "how did we get here" is universally ignored, despite its possible relevance for "why are we here", "what are we doing here" and "where does it look like we might be headed" -- but Walt devoted 10 pages to his response, so one hopes he has more to justify his position than what comes across as a mix of arrogance (we don't need to learn from history because our theoretical grounding and argumentative methods are self-contained and self-sufficient) and cynicism (history might be interesting, but no way will anybody change what gets them published and tenure) -- out of curiosity as to whether it's really as bad as the abstract makes it sound, downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  positivism  positivism-legal  historiography  legal_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Luban - Time-Mindedness and Jurisprudence: A Commentary on Postema's "Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 903 (2015)
Postema offers two general programmatic suggestions for jurisprudence besides greater historical consciousness: sociability and synechism. Sociability, has two dimensions. First, it means interdisciplinarity—a continual dialogue with the study of legal phenomena by the sciences, humanities, and even theology. Second, it means embedding jurisprudence in general philosophy, ... [Sellars]: “not only ‘cabbages and kings’, but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death.” Synechism is a less familiar idea, drawn from the philosophy of C.S. Peirce. It is the commitment to seek continuity among phenomena. Peirce was metaphysically committed to the existence of actual continua everywhere in nature, history, and human psychology. So synechism will impose a certain demand on all systematic studies, namely discerning those continua.(..) a certain kind of historiography: The historian’s job is to unearth continuities between past and present rather than studying ruptures. This, it seems to me, is a contestable commitment that rules out a great deal of important historical work. Peirce understood synechism to imply that ideas are intrinsically temporal and historical phenomena. Although Postema does not endorse this general thesis, he does argue for a special case of it, namely that law is “intrinsically temporal.” This conclusion is central to his argument against the possibility of time-slice legal systems. It, too, is contestable; but, I shall suggest, Postema can reach his conclusion on grounds other than synechism, and I agree with him about law’s intrinsic temporality. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  pragmatism  historiography  historical_change  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  analytical_philosophy  legal_history  continuity  change-social  change-intellectual  intellectual_history  Peirce  social_sciences  legal_culture  legal_realism  philosophy_of_history  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Gerald J. Postema - Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 869 (2015)
Renaissance jurisprudence strove to be a sociable science. Following Ulpian’s lead, it refused to relegate jurisprudence either to pure speculation or to mere practice. Jurisprudence was a science, a matter of knowledge and of theoretical understanding, not merely an applied art or practice of prudence innocent of theory. It was regarded as the very heart of theoretical studies, drawing to itself all that the traditional sciences of theology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, as well as the newly emerging humanist sciences of philology and hermeneutics, had to offer. No less resolutely, however, it refused to abandon its foothold in the life of practice. (..) Rather than reject philosophical reflection, (..) Renaissance jurists sought to locate it in concrete human life and experience. (..) Philosophy.., was most true to its vocation, and was most engaged in human life, when its reflections were anchored in the social life acknowledged, comprehended, and informed by and informing law. Jurisprudence, vera philosophia, was ...the point at which the theoretical and the practical intersected (..) at its “sociable” best sought to integrate them. Analytic jurisprudence began as self-consciously, even militantly, “unsociable,” and its matured and much-sophisticated descendant, fin de siècle analytic legal philosophy, remained largely if not exclusively so. (..) It may be time, in this period of self-conscious attention to jurisprudential method, to press beyond the current limits of this debate over method to a reassessment of the ambitions of jurisprudence and of philosophy’s role in it. (..) my aim is not critical but constructive. (..) to recover something of the ideal of jurisprudence as a sociable science, to retrieve as much as our disenchanted age can be challenged to embrace, or at least to entertain, of the ambition of jurisprudence as vera philosophia. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  Renaissance  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  common_law  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  norms  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  change-social  change-intellectual  social_order  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  pragmatism  Peirce  continuity  historical_change  methodology-qualitative  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Charles Barzun and Dan Priel - Jurisprudence and (Its) History - Symposium Introduction | Virginia Law Review 101 Va. L. Rev. 849 (2015)
Whereas legal philosophers offer “analyses” that aim to be general, abstract, and timeless, legal historians offer “thick descriptions” of what is particular, concrete, and time-bound. But surface appearances can deceive. Perhaps unlike other areas of philosophy, the subject matter of jurisprudence is at least partially (if not entirely) a social phenomenon. Courts, legislatures, judicial orders, and statutes are the products of human efforts, both collective and individual, and they only exist as legislatures, courts, and the like insofar as they possess the meaning they do in the eyes of at least some social group. For this reason, legal philosophers since at least H.L.A. Hart have recognized their task to be a “hermeneutic” one—one which aims to discern or make explicit the “self-understanding” of legal actors. At the same time, legal historians aim not simply to record legal rules that existed at some given point in history, but to unearth the meaning that actual people—judges, lawyers, politicians, and ordinary citizens—have attached to law. When they do so, they might be seen as uncovering evidence of those same “self-understandings” that philosophers claim constitute law. Perhaps, then, philosophical and historical inquiries about law do not differ so radically from each other after all. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_language  ordinary_language_philosophy  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  intellectual_history  historiography  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  constitutional_law  Founders  originalism  contextualism  change-social  change-economic  change-intellectual  norms  hermeneutics  positivism-legal  philosophy_of_history  institutional_change  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Deborah Hellman, Commentary on Mikhail's "The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1105 (2015)
Mikhail uses these insights about language and communication to say something about constitutional interpretation. But that is where the trouble begins. While Mikhail offers a masterful textual analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, I am not convinced that his analysis demonstrates its meaning, and if it does, I fear that Mikhail’s efforts yield the perverse consequence of delegitimizing the very document he is at great pains to enlarge. In what follows, I raise three worries about Mikhail’s analysis. First, a constitution is not a conversation between its drafters and some other people and, as a result, it is unclear whether the Gricean paradigm has anything useful to say about constitutional interpretation. Second, it is far from clear what a constitution is for and consequently there are unlikely to be accepted conventions about how to interpret the meaning of statements within them. Third, Mikhail’s article presents evidence that the Constitution’s drafters were strategic and crafty. But if the drafters are violating the cooperative principle Grice identified, this fact calls into doubt the significance of the ratification of the Constitution from which that document, purportedly, derives its legitimacy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  constitutional_law  philosophy_of_language  philosophy_of_law  Founders  legitimacy  US_constitution  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence? :: SSRN - Nov 2008
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-35 -- General jurisprudence purports to consider law in general. But to break out of the arid abstractions of analytic legal philosophy, it may be worth also giving some jurisprudential consideration to the distinctive features of law in the context of a particular kind of political system. This paper considers the jurisprudence of law in a modern democracy. It explores a suggestion (made by Ronald Dworkin and others) that legal positivism might be a theory particularly apt for a democracy. And it explores the meaning and significance for democratic political theory of ideas like the generality of law, the separation of law and morality, the sources thesis, and law's public orientation. At the very end, the paper also considers Jean-Jacques Rousseau's view that the word "law" should be confined to measures that are applicable to all, made by all, and enacted in the spirit of a general will. -- Pages in PDF File: 5 -- Keywords: analytic legal philosophy, democracy, Hart, jurisprudence, legal positivism, Rousseau, separation of law and morality, sources of law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  government-forms  democracy  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  Hart  general_will  moral_philosophy  Dworkin  lawmaker  politics-and-religion  legal_reasoning  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Ius Gentium: A Defense of Gentili's Equation of the Law of Nations and the Law of Nature :: SSRN November 2008
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-34 -- The relation between the law of nature and the law of nations (ius gnetium) remains unclear. This paper examines Gentili's apparent equation of the two, and it considers more generally how abstract natural law reasoning might be improved by the sort of empirical/comparative law reasoning (as we would call it) that thinkers like Gentili, Grotius and others engaged in when they tried to determine what natural law teaches us about the regulation of war. -- Pages in PDF File: 17 -- Keywords: Gentili, ius gentium, law of nations, laws of war, moral reasoning, natural law, positive law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  Roman_law  natural_law  international_law  positivism-legal  positive_law  moral_philosophy  comparative_law  17thC  18thC  Europe-Early_Modern  Grotius  gentility  law_of_the_sea  law_of_nations  ius_gentium  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - What do the Philosophers Have against Dignity? (Nov 2014) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-59 -- Among analytic philosophers, there is considerable antipathy towards the concept of human dignity. It is not always expressed, but the impression is conveyed that this is a rather disreputable idea and that its trumpeting in legal and political theory is to be deplored. The present paper tries to get to grips with the sources of this antipathy. Is it based on the unclarity of the concept, its religious overtones, its speciesism, or its redundancy as a moral idea. The paper makes a case for dignity as a status-concept -- denoting a particular sort of moral/legal status that all humans have. -- Pages in PDF File: 23 -- Keywords: definition, dignity, foundationalism, human dignity, religion, rights -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  dignity  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  status  human_rights  foundationalism  politics-and-religion  natural_law  natural_rights  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron -Judicial Review and Judicial Supremacy (Nov 2014) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-57 -- This paper attempts to identify a particular constitutional evil -- namely, judicial supremacy -- and to distinguish the objection to judicial supremacy from the broader case that can be made against judicial review. Even if one supports judicial review, one ought to have misgivings about the prospect of judicial supremacy. The paper associates judicial supremacy with three distinct tendencies in constitutional politics: (1) the temptation of courts to develop and pursue a general program (of policy and principle of their own) rather than just to intervene on a piecemeal basis; (2) the tendency of the highest court to become not only supreme but sovereign, by taking on a position of something like broad sovereignty within the constitutional scheme (thus confirming Thomas Hobbes in his conviction that the rule of law cannot be applied at the highest level of political authority in a state because any attempt to apply it just replicates sovereignty at a higher level)); (3) the tendency of courts to portray themselves as entitled to "speak before all others" for those who made the constitution, to take on the mantle of pouvoir constituant and to amend or change the understanding of the constitution when that is deemed necessary. -- Pages in PDF File: 44 -- Keywords: constitutions, Hobbes, judicial review, judicial supremacy, judges, judiciary, popular constitutionalism, rule of law, Sieyes, sovereignty -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  government-forms  Hobbes  Sieyes  sovereignty  authority  democracy  accountability  constitutions  constitutionalism  judicial_review  judiciary  conflict  public_policy  public_opinion  change-social  political_change  policymaking  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - The Rule of Law in Public Law (September 2014) :: SSRN - Cambridge Companion to Public Law, Forthcoming
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-40 -- This paper explores the possibility of a conception of the rule of law that is oriented specifically to public law. It is not a conception of the rule of law that privileges private law rights (like rights of property) nor is it an abstract or anodyne conception that is supposed to apply to all areas of governance indiscriminately. Instead this is an account of the rule of law that takes the mission of public administration seriously and seeks to establish it on a footing of legality rather than managerialism, while at the same time acknowledging that sometimes private interests have to give way to the interests of the public. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 19 -- Keywords: Dicey, discretion, public law, public administration, rule of law -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  public_law  administrative_law  rule_of_law  discretion  managerialism  public_interest  public_goods  rights-legal  constitutional_law  property_rights  property-confiscations  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Public Rule of Law (keynote address) :: SSRN September 2014
Inaugural Conference of International Society for Public Law, June 2014 -- NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-41 -- This paper was delivered as the keynote address at the inaugural conference of the International Society for Public Law, in the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence, on 26 June, 2014. It develops an understanding of public law that takes seriously both the idea of public governance and the idea of individual parties as members of the public. And it outlines an understanding of the rule of law that matches these public-spirited conceptions. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 -- Keywords: private property, public administration, public law, republicanism, rule of law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  common_good  public_law  public_goods  government-roles  administrative_law  administrative_agencies  government_agencies  property  property_rights  republicanism  rule_of_law  political_participation  governance  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Thomas Colby and Peter J. Smith - The Return of Lochner :: SSRN - April 2015 - Cornell Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 527, 2015
Both at GW Law School - For a very long time, it has been an article of faith among liberals and conservatives alike that Lochner v. New York was obviously and irredeemably wrong. Lochner is one of only a few cases that constitute our “anticanon,” universally reviled by the legal community as the “worst of the worst.” (..) conservatives are ready, once again, to embrace Lochner — although perhaps not in name — by recommitting to some form of robust judicial protection for economic rights. (...) this impending change has been greatly facilitated by important modifications to the theory of originalism, which has served for nearly a half century as the intellectual framework for conservative legal thought (..) and it has now evolved to the point where it can plausibly accommodate claims that the Constitution protects economic liberty. (..) how legal movements evolve generally. Sometimes the courts change the doctrine, and the theorists scramble to keep up. This is, roughly speaking, what happened with liberal legal thought in the second half of the 20thC. Just when liberal legal theorists, reeling from the Lochner era, had settled on the view that the courts should exercise judicial review very sparingly — and perhaps never to enforce rights not specifically identified in the Constitution — the liberal Court began to exercise judicial review more frequently and aggressively, often to protect rights not clearly identified in the Constitution. Liberal theorists then struggled for years to develop an account of the appropriate judicial role that condemned Lochner but legitimized later cases protecting fundamental rights and vulnerable minorities. Modern conservative legal thought seems to be following the opposite progression: the theorists lead, the opinion leaders gradually sign on, and judges eventually follow. — conservatives have patiently waited for the theory to come together — for the blueprints to be drawn — before moving forward. But the plans are now largely ready, and we expect that it will not be long before the bulldozers break ground. - 77 pages saved to SSRN briefcase
article  SSRN  SCOTUS  libertarianism  US_constitution  US_legal_system  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  constitutional_law  civil_liberties  liberty-negative  laisser-faire  freedom_of_contract  freedom_of_conscience  equality  judicial_review 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Thomas Grillot & Jean-Claude Monod - Interview with Bruce Ackerman - Reconstructing Citizenship for the 21stC | March 2012 - Books & ideas
Also translated into French -- Tags : liberalism | youth | elections | journalism | Constitution | citizenship | deliberation -- A world-famous legal scholar, Bruce Ackerman wants to reinvigorate citizenship in today’s democracies. Here, he reexamines the intellectual foundations of his work, and some of the pragmatic applications he designed with others. His principle is to always consider how the state intervenes in the autobiography of every man. -- downloaded pdf to Note
political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  liberalism  liberal_democracy  legal_theory  constitutional_law  constitutionalism  government-forms  elections  political_participation  political_culture  governmentality  deliberation-public  state-roles  power  power-asymmetric  downloaded  from instapaper
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Emmanuelle de Champs - Enlightenment and Utility: Bentham in French, Bentham in France (to be released March 2015) | Ideas in Context series | Cambridge University Press
Jeremy Bentham (..) was a seminal figure in the history of modern political thought. This lively monograph presents the numerous French connections of an emblematic British thinker. (..) Placing Bentham's thought in the context of the French-language Enlightenment through to the post-Revolutionary era, (..) the case for a historical study of 'Global Bentham'. Examining previously unpublished sources, she traces the circulation of Bentham's letters, friends, manuscripts, and books in the French-speaking world. (..) transnational intellectual history reveals how utilitarianism, as a doctrine, was both the product of, and a contribution to, French-language political thought at a key time(..). The debates (re) utilitarianism in France cast new light on the making of modern Liberalism. **--** Intro **--** Part I. An Englishman in the Republic of Letters: 1. Languages of Enlightenment *-* 2. Satire and polemics *-* 3. Defining utilitarianism: private connections and correspondence **--** Part II. 'Projet d'un corps de loix complet' and the Reform of Jurisprudence in Europe: 4. The Genesis of Projet *-* 5. Projet in Enlightenment legal thought *-* 6. The politics of legal reform **--** Part III. Reflections for the Revolution in France: 7. Frenchmen and Francophiles: Lord Lansdowne's network *-* 8. British expertise for French legislators *-* 9. Utility, rights and revolution: missed encounters? **--** Part IV. Utile Dulcis? Bentham in Paris, 1802: 10. Dumont's editorship: from the Bibliothèque Britannique to Traités de législation civile et pénale *-* 11. A mixed reception *-* 12. Autumn 1802: Bentham in Paris **--** Part V. Liberty, Utility and Rights (1815–1832): 13. 'For one disciple in this country, I have 50 at least in France' *-* 14. Utilitarian arguments in French politics *-* 15. A Utilitarian moment? French liberals and utilitarianism *-* Epilogue: Bentham in the July Revolution *-* Conclusion -- marketing materials not yet available
books  find  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_economy  legal_theory  18thC  19thC  British_history  France  French_Enlightenment  Enlightenment  Bentham  utilitarianism  utility  reform-political  reform-social  reform-legal  reform-economic  jurisprudence  civil_code  Republic_of_Letters  networks-policy  networks-information  Anglo-French  British_foreign_policy  diplomats  diplomacy-environment  francophile  Landsdowne_Marquis_of  faction  British_politics  patrons  patronage  elite_culture  cross-border  cultural_history  cultural_influence  technical_assistance  criminal_justice  liberalism  rights-legal  rights-political  civil_law  civil_liberties  civil_society  French_Revolutionary_Wars  Peace_of_Amiens  Napoleonic_Wars  Restoration-France  bourgeoisie  July_Monarchy  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - What is Law? :: SSRN - Jan 2015
Brian Z. Tamanaha -- Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-01-01 -- Theorists who tackle “What is law?” usually acknowledge the difficulty of the question, then, with hardly a pause, launch into their proposed answer. Instead, focusing on three main categories of concepts of law, I examine in detail why previous attempts have failed to achieve a consensus. Several factors have contributed. One source of disagreement involves clashes among intuitions about law. Further problems are created by the narrowness of functional analysis, on which nearly all concepts of law are based. Confusion also arises because law shares basic characteristics with many social institutions, as I show drawing on insights from the philosophy of society. Theorists also typically fail to recognize two distinct orientations of law, and multiple forms of law, which singular concepts of law cannot accommodate. Finally, variability and change owing to the social-historical nature of law defeats efforts of legal philosophers to identify essential features and universally true concepts of law. At the conclusion I present a way of understanding law that emerges out of the lessons learned from past unsuccessful efforts. -- topic headings in the essay: Three Categories of the Concept of Law; Pivotal Role of Intuitions About Law; Over-Inclusiveness of Functionalism; Under-Inclusiveness of Functionalism; Why Functionalism Cannot Answer ‘What is Law?’; Error of Conflating ‘Rule System’ and ‘Legal System’; Law as Part of the Institutional Substrate of Society; State Law’s Two Orientations; Coexisting Multiple Legal Forms; Necessary and Essential Features Or Typical Features; Universal Application Versus Universal Truth; What is Law -- No. Pages: 49 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, philosophy of law, law and society, legal anthropology, legal sociology, legal history, and comparative law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_culture  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  legal_validity  functionalism  institutions  institutional_change  social_order  universalism  normativity  norms  custom  customary_law  sociology_of_law  comparative_law  concepts  concepts-change  rule_of_law  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Scott Hershovitz - The End of Jurisprudence :: SSRN - Oct 2014
Via Brian Tamanaha -- Scott Hershovitz, University of Michigan Law School -- Yale Law Journal, Forthcoming -- For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-Dworkin debate. The debate starts from the premise that our legal practices generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal, and the question at issue is how their content is determined. Positivists say that their content is determined ultimately or exclusively by social facts. Anti-positivists say that moral facts must play a part in determining their content. In this Essay, I argue that the debate rests on a mistake. Our legal practices do not generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal. At best, they generate moral rights and obligations, some of which we label legal. I defend this view by drawing analogies with other normative practices, like making promises, posting rules, and playing games. And I try to explain why it looks like legal practices generate distinctively legal rights and obligations even though they do not. I conclude with some thoughts about the questions jurisprudence should pursue in the wake of the Hart-Dworkin debate. -- Number of Pages: 63 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Hart-Dworkin Debate, legal positivism, anti-positivism, philosophy of law
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  Hart  Dworkin  judiciary  legal_theory  legal_culture  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  sociology_of_law  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  morality-objective  legal_validity  rights-political  rights-legal  natural_law  Wittgenstein  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Law's Evolution and Law as Custom by William A. Edmundson :: SSRN
William A. Edmundson, Georgia State University College of Law -- 51 San Diego L. Rev. (December 2014, Forthcoming). -- Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-15 -- Legal discourse centrally involves a family of normative expressions – “obligation,” “right,” “permission,” and so on – whose surface grammar parallels that of moral discourse. Is the normativity of legal discourse then a moral normativity? Or is it a distinct type of normativity altogether? (..) Custom is among the sources of law. That much is agreed. But custom can also be law, independently of promulgation, or so many believe. (..) Insofar as a customary norm is (or becomes) a legal norm, does it manifest (or acquire) a different kind of normativity? Or does its original normativity contribute to the normativity of law? Another set of questions has to do with custom as a condition of legal validity. [Different positions of Kelsen and Hart] I will explore the hypothesis that every legally normative utterance resolves into one expressing (a) custom-implicating moral normativity, (b) custom-extending moral normativity, or (c) normativity “in the manifesto sense” (to enlist a phrase of Joel Feinberg’s). If this is correct, there is no such thing as a distinctively legal brand of normativity. -- No. Pages: 30 -- Keywords: legal theory, legal philosophy, philosophy of law, normativity, norm, custom, validity, moral, desuetudo, moral philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_culture  sociology_of_law  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  morality-objective  legal_validity  norms  custom  customary_law  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Roger Cotterrell - Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy :: SSRN - January 24, 2014
Via Brian Tamanaha -- Roger Cotterrell, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law -- Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, Forthcoming - Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 169/2014 -- The aim of this paper is to describe and defend jurisprudence as an enterprise of theorising about law that is distinct from what is now understood as legal philosophy in the Anglophone world. Jurisprudence must draw on legal philosophy but also from many other resources. It should be an open quest for juristically (rather than philosophically) significant insights about law. Its purpose is to inform and guide the juristic task of making organised social regulation a valuable practice, rooted and effective in the specific contexts and historical conditions in which it exists but also aimed at serving demands for justice and security through regulation, as these perennial values are understood in their time and place, and as they might be further clarified and reconciled as legal ideals. - Number of Pages: 18 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence; legal philosophy; contemporary legal positivism; universalism; legal naturalism; law in context; socio-legal perspectives; bricolage; jurists. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  judiciary  legal_theory  legal_culture  justice  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  universalism  natural_law  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Tamanaha - Balkinization: Whither Jurisprudence? - Jan 2015
Scott Hershovitz's "The End of Jurisprudence" is a terrific article. [Downloaded from SSRN] For the past four decades, he asserts, "jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-Dworkin debate," and it is time to move on. -- "The time has come for jurisprudence to drop the metaphysics and take up morals. The question that jurisprudence should aim to answer is how our legal practices affect our moral rights, obligations, privileges, and powers. The metaphysical question posed in the Hart-Dworkin debate was a distraction; we have no good reason to think that our legal practices generate a distinctively legal domain of normativity, or quasi-normativity, whose metaphysics we must unravel. But the moral question is vital; it is contested everyday, in court and out, with serious consequences for peoples’ lives." (..) Though I agree this deserves attention, I do not agree that jurisprudence has or requires a particular end, whether this one or any other. The field thrives best when jurisprudence scholars pursue many different intellectual projects. In my view, jurisprudence remains vital by focusing on important legal phenomena and by drawing from other disciplines for insights. On that note, I offer my draft essay "What is Law?" [Downloaded from SSRN, as well as 2014 article by Roger Cotterrell]
philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  judiciary  legal_theory  legal_realism  normativity  moral_philosophy  norms  morality-conventional  obligation  Hart  Dworkin 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
- DAVID LEWIS JONES - British Parliaments and Assemblies: A Bibliography of Printed Materials (2009) Parliamentary History - Wiley Online Library
Each section a pdf downloaded to Note - combined, c 25,000 entries *--* Section 1: Preface, Introduction, The Westminster Parliament 1-4005. **--** Section 2: The Medieval Parliament 4006-4728 **--** Section 3: Tudor Parliaments 4729-5064 **--* Section 4: Stuart Parliaments 5063-6805 **--** Section 5: The Unreformed Parliament 1714-1832 6806-9589. **--** Section 6: The Reformed Parliament 1832-1918 9590-15067 **--** Section 7: Parliament 1918-2009 15068-21582. **--** Section 8: The Judicial House of Lords 21583-21835. -- The Palace of Westminster 21836-22457. -- The Irish Parliament 22458-23264 -- The Scottish Parliament (to 1707) 23265-23482 -- The New Devolved Assemblies 23483-23686 -- The Scottish Parliament (1999-) 23687-24251 -- Northern Ireland 24252-24563 -- The National Assembly for Wales 24537-24963 -- Minor Assemblies
bibliography  historiography  Medieval  medieval_history  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  political_culture  political_philosophy  political_economy  political_history  politics-and-religion  political_participation  political_press  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  British_history  British_politics  Britain  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  English_constitution  British_Empire-constitutional_structure  monarchy  monarchy-proprietary  monarchical_republic  limited_monarchy  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  House_of_Commons  House_of_Lords  sovereignty  government-forms  governing_class  government_finance  government_officials  Scotland  Ireland  Ireland-English_exploitation  elites  elite_culture  common_law  rule_of_law  1690s  1700s  1707_Union  1680s  Glorious_Revolution  Glorious_Revolution-Scotland  English_Civil_War  Three_Kingdoms  composite_monarchies  Absolutism  ancient_constitution  religion-established  Church_of_England  Reformation  reform-legal  reform-political  elections  franchise  state-building  opposition  parties  pa 
december 2014 by dunnettreader
Recommended Reading Lists | A Common Word Between Us and You
More often than not, one’s understanding of a religion comes from sources which are either prejudiced or which do not have an authentic understanding of the religion. To really understand a religion, one must be able to view it as its adherents do. One should be able to enter the particular world-view of the religion and see through its eyes. This will enable us to understand the particular values, attitudes and behaviors that the particular religion recommends for its followers. It is in this light that a number of prominent Muslim and Christian scholars have kindly compiled recommended reading lists. Some of the reading lists have been compiled according to levels, others according to categories, while others remain as one list. It is hoped these lists will serve as a guide, lighting the way to a better understanding of each others Tradition. **--** Muslim Scholars -- Prof. Seyyed Hossein Nasr. -- Sheikh Ali Goma’a. -- Prof. Timothy Winter -- Dr. Joseph Lumbard. **--** Christian Scholars -- Dr. Mirolslav Volf -- Reverend William Sachs -- Dr Nicholas Adams -- Roland Schatz -- downloaded pdfs to Note
comparative_religion  religious_history  religious_culture  theology  Christianity  Islam  Islamic_civilization  Islam-Greek_philosophy  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  bibliography  downloaded 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Daniel Woolf, review - Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640 (2006) | JSTOR: The International History Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 598-600
Cambridge University Press -- Looks well done - Woolf gives high marks for linking the interest of various players, including monarchs, with shifting ideologies and challenges of articulating a legal system that made sense with English ambitions, relations with other European colonial enterprises, and England's peculiar legal framework and its interactions with government - e.g. why the most elaborated jurisprudence, the Spanish, didn't fit with Fortescue commonwealth style thought and ticklish question of "conquest" -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  jstor  find  political_history  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  political_philosophy  international_law  16thC  17thC  Elizabeth  James_I  Charles_I  colonialism  British_politics  British_history  trading_companies  balance_of_power  maritime_history  common_law  Roman_law  dominion  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Katharina Pistor: Creating A Legal Foundation For Finance | The Institute for New Economic Thinking
Katharina Pistor, a grantee of the Institute for New Economic Thinking, professor at Columbia University Law School, and the director of Columbia’s Center on Global Legal Transformation, is developing a Legal Theory of Finance.
In this interview, Pistor focuses in particular on the paradoxical relationship between law and finance. On the one hand, finance needs law to provide credibility. After all, financial assets are contracts, the value of which depends on their legal validation. But on the other hand, changing conditions in the financial world over time necessitate flexibility in law. An overly rigid legal system can render regulation irrelevant if financial innovation ultimately surpasses laws designed for another era. In a worst-case scenario, legal rigidity also can play a role in causing a financial accident. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank legislation represents one response to this challenge. In Europe, the melding of finance and the law is even more complex because policy makers, regulators, and legislators are dealing with 17 different nations, all of which operate with a common currency but in a series of different national jurisdictions with vastly different legal traditions and precedents.
The tension in Europe has become particularly acute in relation to some of the unconventional measures undertaken by the European Central Bank in response to the existential threat to the euro itself - have come under challenge in Germany’s Constitutional Court. Can a national constitutional court effectively invalidate an entire program undertaken by a supranational central bank, which ostensibly is responsible for a common monetary policy? This is one of the issues that Professor Pistor discusses in the exchange below.
video  legal_theory  legal_system  financial_system  financial_regulation  law-and-finance  property_rights  contracts  debt  central_banks  Eurozone  monetary_policy  money  capital_markets  banking  international_political_economy  international_law  international_finance  international_monetary_system 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Gregory Shaffer - How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State :: SSRN August 14, 2014
University of California, Irvine - School of Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/29. *--* The World Trade Organization (WTO) arguably shapes regulatory governance in more countries to a greater extent than any other international organization. This chapter provides a new framework for assessing the broader regulatory implications of the WTO within nation states, as opposed to viewing the WTO as a form of global governance above the nation state. It first examines seven types of changes required for national law and legal practice, which affect how the state raises revenue, how the state spends it, and the principles the state applies to regulation. The chapter then assesses four broader dimensions of regulatory change catalyzed by WTO rules: (i) changes in the boundary between the market and the state (involving concomitantly market liberalization and growth of the administrative state); (ii) changes in the relative authority of institutions within the state (promoting bureaucratized and judicialized governance); (iii) changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation (such as the role of lawyers); and (iv) changes in normative frames and accountability mechanisms for national regulation (which are trade liberal and transnational in scope). In practice, these four dimensions of change interact and build on each other. The chapter presents what we know to date and a framework for conducting further empirical study. - Number of Pages: 43 -- Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, Regulation, Regulatory governance, Market liberalization - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  global_governance  WTO  regulation  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  technocracy  accountability  public_policy  legal_culture  legal_theory  lawyers  political_participation  business-and-politics  norms-business  markets_in_everything  markets  neoliberalism  free_trade  democracy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephan W. Schill - The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within :: SSRN June 4, 2014
Max Planck Institute for International Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/02. *--* In reaction to a summary of five different paths for investment law reform made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in June 2013, which focused on institutional reforms of investor-State dispute settlement, the present paper sketches out a sixth path for investment law reform that is based on a system-internal reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a form of public law-based judicial review. It can be reformed, the paper argues, by arbitrators and parties making increasing use of comparative public law methodology that allows them to draw on the experience of more sophisticated systems of public law adjudication at the national and international level without the need for institutional reform to investor-State arbitration. First, the paper points out the benefits of the existing system of investor-State arbitration, in order to show that investor-State arbitration is an institution worth reforming from within. Second, the paper lays out the basic framework to reconceptualize investment law as a system of public law and governance and point out shortcomings in the currently prevailing approaches to understanding investor-State arbitration. Third, the paper indicates the methodological consequences of a reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a public law system of governance, namely the need for arbitrators to make increased use of comparative public law in resolving disputes. Finally, the paper shows how public law ideas and comparative public law methodology can be brought into investment arbitration in its present form and why arbitrators have an interest in conforming to these standards even without fundamental institutional reform. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 - Keywords: investment treaties, international investment law, investor-state arbitration, investment law - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  international_finance  capital_markets  investment  sovereign_debt  investor-State_disputes  FDI  dispute_resolution  arbitration  global_governance  comparative_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  reform-legal  treaties  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Graber, review - Danielle Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace -- Balkinization - September 2014
Citron‘s HCiC redefines as criminal behavior the repeated threats, insults, and gross violations of basic privacy norms on the internet that too many people, police in particular, regard as juvenile behavior. ...a pathbreaking study of how cultural tolerance of bullying and harassment on the internet is threatening to turn the most important contemporary forum for ideas into masculine Wild West where respect and common decency are signs of weakness rather than basic norms of conduct. HciC offers a remarkably thorough survey of the depressing state of the internet for women. The first chapters detail how women are repeatedly attacked on the internet, ... Harassment and bullying have the same impact on the internet as elsewhere. Women participate less in cyberspace, they become more generally fearful, and they lose employment and other opportunities when persons attempt to research their background in cyberspace. The second set of chapters detail problems with present efforts to stop hate crimes on the internet. The first problem is .. anonymity makes attackers difficult to identify. The second are police attitudes. Finally, laws regulating bullying, harassment and stalking were not drafted with the internet in mind. -- The last set of chapters focus on legal and social solutions to the problem of hate crimes on the internet. -- HCiC has the same ambitions as Sexual Harassment of Working Women, but its different is for more successful. McKinnon has always believed Americans need theory to understand what is wrong with sexual harassment. Citron’s assumption is that all Americans need is common sense - people should not urge that women be murdered and raped, post nude photographs of ex-girl friends on revenge porn sites, or spread malicious gossip. -- The debate over HCiC will focus on the First Amendment rights of cyberbullies, but ...the book defines constitutional rights too broadly rather than too narrowly. HciC endorses a populist understanding of the internet in which “All information should be free.” ... why Citron struggles drawing boundaries between posting nude pictures of ex-girlfriends on revenge porn websites and posting other information about ex-girlfriends on various websites that may be constitutionally protected.
books  reviews  Internet  legal_system  legal_theory  privacy  women-rights  free_speech  reform-legal  reform-social  feminism  violence 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter - Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United (Cornell Law Review, Forthcoming) - August 1, 2014 :: SSRN
Leo E. Strine Jr. - Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Yale University -- Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 788 -- One important aspect of Citizens United has been overlooked: the tension between the conservative majority’s view of for-profit corporations, and the theory of for-profit corporations embraced by conservative thinkers. This article explores the tension between these conservative schools of thought and shows that Citizens United may unwittingly strengthen the arguments of conservative corporate theory’s principal rival. Citizens United posits that stockholders of for-profit corporations can constrain corporate political spending and that corporations can legitimately engage in political spending. Conservative corporate theory is premised on the contrary assumptions that stockholders are poorly-positioned to monitor corporate managers for even their fidelity to a profit maximization principle, and that corporate managers have no legitimate ability to reconcile stockholders’ diverse political views. Because stockholders invest in for-profit corporations for financial gain, and not to express political or moral values, conservative corporate theory argues that corporate managers should focus solely on stockholder wealth maximization and non-stockholder constituencies and society should rely upon government regulation to protect against corporate overreaching. Conservative corporate theory’s recognition that corporations lack legitimacy in this area has been strengthened by market developments that Citizens United slighted: that most humans invest in the equity markets through mutual funds under section 401(k) plans, cannot exit these investments as a practical matter, and lack any rational ability to influence how corporations spend in the political process. -- Keywords: Corporate governance, political spending, Citizens United, conservative corporate theory, regulatory externalities, lobbying, profit maximization, constitutional law, election law, labor law
article  SSRN  SCOTUS  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  corporate_law  corporate_governance  principal-agent  management  shareholders  shareholder_value  campaign_finance  lobbying  elections  labor_law  US_constitution  constitutional_law  public_policy  interest_groups  oligarchy  rent-seeking  investors  savings  capitalism  capital_markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Hugo Grotius -- The Enhanced Edition of "The Rights of War and Peace" (1625) [etext edition 2014] - Online Library of Liberty
Hugo Grotius, The Enhanced Edition of The Rights of War and Peace (1625) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2014). 08/28/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2637> -- This “Enhanced Edition” of Grotius’s famous work on the law of war does not contain the entire text of the Rights of War and Peace as it a very long 3 volume work. It comprises some Supplemantary Material including two introductions to different editions of his book, a biographical essay by his 18th century translator (Barbeyrac), and the “Liberty Matters” online discussion forum on Grotius’s views. This is followed by Grotius’s “Preliminary Discourse” on natural law and a selection of chapters from the book which deal with the nature of war, when it is just to go to war, when it is unjust to go war, and how war might be moderated once it has been declared. This Enhanced Edition is only available in PDF, epub, and Kindle ebook formats -- Liberty Fund's edition is based upon that of the Jean Barbeyrac and also includes the "Prolegomena" to the first edition of Rights of War and Peace (1625); and an Introduction by the historian of political thought Richard Tuck.
books  etexts  Liberty_Fund  downloaded  17thC  intellectual_history  natural_law  IR_theory  legal_theory  legal_history  international_law  natural_rights  political_philosophy  just_war  Barbeyrac 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Francis Joseph Mootz - Hermeneutics and Law (June 30, 2014) in The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics (Eds. Naill Keane and Chris Lawn, 2015) :: SSRN
University of the Pacific - McGeorge School of Law -- This chapter will appear in a forthcoming book on hermeneutics. After providing a hermeneutical phenomenology of legal practice that locates legal interpretation at the center of the rule of law, the chapter considers three important hermeneutical themes: (1) the critical distinction between a legal historian writing aboout a law in the past and a judge deciding a case according to the law; (2) the reinvigoration of the natural law tradition against the reductive characteristics of legal positivism by construing human nature as hermeneutical; and. (3) the role of philosophical hermeneutics in grounding critical legal theory rather than serving as a quiescent acceptance of the status quo, as elaborated by reconsidering the famous exchanges between Gadamer, Ricoeur and Habermas. -- I argue that these three important themes are sufficient to underwrite Gadamer's famous assertion that legal practice has exemplary status for hermeneutical theory. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  historiography  lit_crit  critical_theory  legal_reasoning  judiciary  precedent  hermeneutics  natural_law  positivism-legal  legal_realism  rhetoric-writing  human_nature  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  Gadamer  Habermas  Ricoeur  Heidegger  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Paskey - The Law is Made of Stories: Erasing the False Dichotomy between Stories and Legal Rules (May 30, 2014) :: SSRN
SUNY Buffalo Law School -- Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JALWD, vol. 11 (Fall 2014, Forthcoming) - SUNY Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-031 -- When lawyers think of legal analysis, they think chiefly of logic and reason. Stories are secondary. As Michael Smith explains, our legal system “is not founded on narrative reasoning” but on “a commitment to the rule of law.” The article suggests that this dichotomy between “rule-based reasoning” and “narrative reasoning” is false, and that narrative and stories are central to legal reasoning, including rule-based reasoning. In doing so, the article uses literary narrative theory to show that every governing legal rule has the structure of a “stock story”: the elements of the rule correspond to elements of a story. It follows that lawyers do not rely on stories simply because they are persuasive. They do so because a story is literally embedded in the structure of governing rules, and those rules can be satisfied only by telling a story. Thus, many analytical moves we label “rule-based reasoning” can be understood as a type of narrative reasoning, in which a client’s story is compared to and contrasted with the stock story embedded in the rule. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  narrative  legal_reasoning  logic  precedent  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Three Ways of Explaining the Rise of “Law and Economics,” and Also, One Way (Guest Post by Sara Mayeux) | s-usih.org
So, how did law and economics go from an oddball preoccupation of a few Chicago professors to one of the dominant intellectual frameworks for thinking and talking about law? Here are three recent accounts, each emphasizing a different causal mechanism: the two chapters on law and economics in Steven Teles’s book The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement; the discussion of law and economics in Rodgers’s Age of Fracture; and Brad Snyder’s recent article “The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint.”
intellectual_history  20thC  US_legal_system  legal_theory  law-and-economics  judiciary  postmodern  neoliberalism  conservatism  right-wing  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Mary L. Dudziak - The Future as a Concept in National Security Law :: SSRN August 18, 2014
Emory University School of Law; Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences -- Pepperdine Law Review, Forthcoming - symposium The Future of National Security Law -- The essays in this issue share a common premise: that the future matters to legal policy, and that law must take the future into account. But what conception of the future do national security lawyers have in mind? The future is, in an absolute sense, unknowable. Yet human action is premised on ideas about the future, political scientist Harold Lasswell wrote in his classic work The Garrison State. The ideas about the future that guide social scientific work are rational predictions, he suggested. If law is premised on ideas about something unknowable, something that can, at best, be a prediction, then it seems important to examine what those ideas, assumptions and predictions are. This essay examines future-thinking in prominent works related to national security, including the ideas that the future is peacetime, a long war, a “next attack,” and the future as a postwar. Drawing from scholarship on historical memory and conceptions of temporality, this essay argues that understandings of the future depend on more than the rational empirical predictions that Lasswell had in mind. The future is a cultural construct that depends in part on the way we remember the past. It does not exist apart from the politics and values that inform our perceptions. The future does not unfold on its own. We produce our future through both our acts and our imaginations. Culture matters deeply in this context, for the future we imagine is a well-spring of law. -Keywords: national security, war, wartime, long war, terrorism, peace, future, temporality, historical memory, 9/11, history - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  legal_theory  legal_culture  national_security  war  terrorism  memory-group  memory_studies  uncertainty  prediction  future  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Review Essay: Legal Thought in Enlightenment's Wake by Jeffrey A. Pojanowski :: SSRN - 4 Jurisprudence, 2013, Forthcoming
Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 12-80 -- This review essay considers Steven D. Smith’s most recent book, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse. Rather than focusing on the book’s argument about the practices and pathologies of the public square, this essay uses Smith’s chapter on scientific thought as a platform for exploring connections between Disenchantment and Smith’s prior work in legal theory. The catalyst for these reflections is Scandinavian legal realism. Considering these elements together sheds light on both the limits and virtues of central ideas about legal obligation and authority in contemporary jurisprudence. Such perspective points to a broader argument that jurisprudential debates about methodology and concepts may be as much about how we read the universe as they are about how we understand law. -- Keywords: jurisprudence, legal theory, obligation, authority, conceptual analysis, legal positivism
books  reviews  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  obligation  secularism  secularization  legal_realism  authority  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  legal_culture  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Steven D. Smith, review essay - Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom? | JSTOR: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 122, No. 7 (May, 2009), pp. 1869-1907
Reviewed work(s): Religion and the Constitution — Volume 2: Establishment and Fairness by Kent Greenawalt -- Smith claims a millennium of tradition re church and state is unraveling (a la MacIntyre decadent tradition) and US policy and jurisprudence tends to ignore erosion of their fundamental justifications -- starts with Pope Gregory and Henry IV and investiture controversy -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  article  jstor  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  theology  religion-established  religious_culture  religious_history  church_history  civil_liberties  freedom_of_conscience  tolerance  pluralism  secularism  US_constitution  bill_of_rights  legal_theory  philosophy_of_law  medieval_history  Papacy  Reformation  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Scott D. Gerber, review essay - The Republican Revival in American Constitutional Theory | JSTOR: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 985-997
Reviewed work(s): We the People: Foundations by Bruce A. Ackerman; Traces of Self-Government by Frank I. Michelman; Laws Republic; The Partial Constitution by Cass R. Sunstein - 1980s interest in classical republicanism, citizen participation and common good and how to reconcile with a liberalism of private interests and rights -- all 3 authors criticized for (1) excessive reliance on the "least dialogic" institution, the judiciary, as protector an/or promoter of the republican dimension of "liberal republicanism" and (2) a selective misreading of the Founders -- didn't download
article  review  jstor  US_constitution  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  US_politics  judiciary  judicial_review  natural_rights  property_rights  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism-republicanism_debates  liberalism  legal_history  legal_theory  Congress  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
"SECULARIZATION, LEGAL INDETERMINACY, AND HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE THEORY O" by Mark C. Modak-Truran
Mark C. Modak-Truran, Mississippi College School of Law -- The unexpected vitality of religion has motivated scholars in many fields like anthropology, sociology, political science, international relations, and philosophy to revisit their assumptions about the supposed secularization of their disciplines. The secularization of law arguably constitutes the most widely-held but least-examined assumption in contemporary legal theory. Legal scholars and philosophers have surprisingly ignored one exception—Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of law. Relying on Max Weber's social theory, Habermas argues that the rationalization of society (i.e., secularization) has eliminated religious and metaphysical justifications for law and has differentiated law from politics and morality so that law must be legitimated in a seemingly paradoxical manner: by its legality. Habermas claims that legality can legitimate the law based on the discourse principle in the discourse of justification by voluntary, intersubjective agreement among all those affected and that the law can be impartially applied in the discourse of application via the principle of appropriateness without judges relying on personal moral, political, or religious convictions. At the same time, Habermas recognizes that the law is indeterminate so that strong legal formalism no longer maintains the secularization of law. The failure of Habermas’s discourse theory of law represents a watershed moment for contemporary legal theory. Contemporary legal theory needs to comprehend that the widespread acceptance of legal indeterminacy calls into question current conceptions of the secularization of law and arguably demarcates the desecularization of the law. -- Mark C. Modak-Truran. "SECULARIZATION, LEGAL INDETERMINACY, AND HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW" 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 73 (2007). -- downloaded pdf to Note
philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  social_theory  legitimacy  foundationalism  legal_indeterminancy  legal_theory  discourse-political_theory  discourse_ethics  Habermas  secularism  post-secular  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
"BEYOND THEOCRACY AND SECULARISM (PART I): TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM FOR LA" by Mark C. Modak-Truran
To move beyond theocracy (pre-modern) and secularism (modern), this article closes by identifying the trajectory for a new constructive postmodern paradigm that embraces legal indeterminacy and secularizing the text of the law but argues that a plurality of religious convictions implicitly legitimates and thereby desecularizes the law. Desecularizing the law does not result in the imposition of the religion of the ruler (theocracy) in a pluralistic democratic society. Rather, the constructive postmodern paradigm of law and religion allows for the religious pluralism in society to provide a plurality of religious ontologies that implicitly legitimate the law and close the ontological gap between legal theory and legal practice. -- Mark C. Modak-Truran. "BEYOND THEOCRACY AND SECULARISM (PART I): TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM FOR LAW AND RELIGION" Mississippi College Law Review 27.1 (2008): 159-233. -- downloaded pdf to Note
philosophy_of_law  ontology  ontology-social  social_theory  foundationalism  moral_philosophy  secularism  secular_humanism  post-secular  postmodern  legal_indeterminancy  values  pluralism  legal_theory  legal_culture  political-theology  politics-and-religion  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
"PROLEGOMENA TO A PROCESS THEORY OF NATURAL LAW" by Mark C. Modak-Truran
Mark C. Modak-Truran, Mississippi College School of Law -- Two contemporary quandaries in legal theory provide an occasion for a revival of interest in natural law theories of law. First, the debate about legal indeterminacy has made it clear that law cannot function autonomously—as a self-contained set of rules—but requires a normative justification of judges’ decisions in hard cases. In addition, Steven D. Smith has persuasively argued that there is an "ontological gap" between the practice of law, which presupposes a classical or religious ontology, and legal theory, which presupposes a scientific ontology (i.e., scientific materialism) that rejects religious ontology. This article demonstrates how the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and the radical empiricism of William James support a new process theory of natural law. Under this theory, judges resolve legal indeterminacy by determining what maximizes the telos beauty—in accordance with the circumstances of the case and the social perfection possible within that society—rather than by relying on fixed, antiquated natural laws. Process natural law also closes the ontological gap by providing an ontology that unifies the moral insights of religion with the insights of modern science. -- Mark C. Modak-Truran. "PROLEGOMENA TO A PROCESS THEORY OF NATURAL LAW" HANDBOOK OF WHITEHEADIAN PROCESS THOUGHT (1st ed). Ed. Michel Weber and Will Desmond. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008. 507-536. -- downloaded pdf to Note
philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  legal_history  legal_theory  natural_law  foundationalism  anti-foundationalism  social_theory  process_theology  laws_of_nature  divine_command  divine_right  legitimacy  authority  Whitehead  James_William  moral_philosophy  materialism  reductionism  science-and-religion  theology  ancient_philosophy  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  pragmatism  legal_indeterminancy  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - The Decline of Natural Right [chapter] (2009) :: SSRN in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF NINETEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY, Allen Wood and Songsuk Susan Hahn, eds., Cambridge University Press
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-38 -- What happened to the doctrine of natural right in the 19thC? We know that it flourished in the 17thC and 18thC. We know that something like it - the doctrine of human rights and new forms of social contract theory - flourished again in the second half of the 20thC and continues to flourish in the 21stC. In between there was a period of decline and hibernation - ... in which to invoke natural right was always to invite intellectual ridicule and accusations of political irresponsibility. Thus article asks: How far can the decline of natural right in the 19thC be attributed to the reaction against the revolution in France? How far it was the effect of independent streams of thought, like positivism and historicism? Why was radical thought so ambivalent about natural right throughout the 19thC, and why was socialist thought in particular inclined to turn its back on it? As a framework for thought, natural right suffered a radical decline in the social and political sciences. But things were not so clear in jurisprudence, and natural right lived on to a much riper old age in the writings of some prominent economists. What is it about this theory that allowed it to survive in these environments, when so much of the rest of intellectual endeavor in the 19thC was toxic or inhospitable to it. Finally, I shall ask how far American thought represents an exception to all of this. Why and to what extent did the doctrine survive as a way of thinking in the United States, long after it had lost its credibility elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_social_science  natural_law  natural_rights  human_rights  counter-revolution  historicism  positivism  legal_theory  nationalism  national_interest  conservatism  socialism  social_contract  relativism  revolutions  1848_revolutions  French_Revolution  anticlerical  Bentham  Burke  Hume  Jefferson  Kant  Locke  Marx  Mill  Savigny  Spencer_Herbert  George_Henry  US_society  American_exceptionalism  liberalism  social_theory  social_sciences  Social_Darwinism  social_order  mass_culture  political_participation  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter, Michael Weisberg - Why Evolutionary Biology is (so Far) Irrelevant to Law (2007, last revised 2014) :: SSRN
U of Texas Law, Law & Econ Research Paper No. 81 -- U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 89 -- We argue that as the actual science stands today, evolutionary biology offers nothing to help with questions about legal regulation of behavior. -- Evolutionary accounts are etiological accounts of how a trait evolved. [A]n account of causal etiology could be relevant to law if (1) the account of causal etiology is scientifically well-confirmed, and (2) there is an explanation of how the well-confirmed etiology bears on questions of development (the Environmental Gap Objection). ....the accounts of causal etiology that might be relevant are not remotely well-confirmed by scientific standards. We argue, in particular, that (a) evolutionary psychology is not entitled to assume selectionist accounts of human behaviors, (b) the assumptions necessary for the selectionist accounts to be true are not warranted by standard criteria for theory choice, and (c) only confusions about levels of explanation of human behavior create the appearance that understanding the biology of behavior is important. We also note that no response to the Environmental Gap Objection has been proffered. In the concluding section of the article, we turn directly to the work of Prof Owen Jones, a leading proponent of the relevance of evolutionary biology to law, and show that he does not come to terms with any of the fundamental problems identified in this article. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  legal_theory  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_social_science  evolution-social  evolutionary_biology  evo_psych  causation-social  causation-evolutionary  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Alex Langlinais, Brian Leiter - The Methodology of Legal Philosophy [chapter] (2013) :: SSRN - H. Cappelen, T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Forthcoming
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 407 -- This is the revised and penultimate version of this paper. The essay surveys issues about philosophical methodology as they arise in general jurisprudence. Certainly in the Anglophone world and increasingly outside it, H.L.A. Hart’s 1961 book The Concept of Law has dominated the discussion. ...methodological debates typically scrutinize either one of two (related) ... claims in Hart’s classic work. The first is that his theory is both general and descriptive (Hart 1994: 239). The second is that his theory is an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology (Hart 1994: vi). We explicate both ideas, arguing, in particular, that (1) Hart aims to give an essentialist analysis of law and legal systems (a point clearest in those who follow him like J. Raz, J. Dickson and [though less of a follower] S. Shapiro), and (2) we can make sense of the linking of linguistic (and conceptual) analysis and descriptive sociology if we understand "law" as a constructed bit of "social reality" in something like John Searle's sense. The ensuing methodological debates in legal philosophy can then be understood as arguing against either linguistic or conceptual analysis (naturalists like B. Leiter), or against the idea of a purely descriptive jurisprudence (in different ways, J. Finnis, S. Perry, M. Murphy, L. Murphy, R. Dworkin). -- Keywords: H.L.A. Hart, methodology, descriptive jurisprudence, conceptual analysis, John Searle, legal philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  methodology  legal_theory  intellectual_history  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_law  concepts  constructivism  Hart  Raz  Dworkin  Finnis  Searle  natural_law  naturalism  positivism-legal  legal_realism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Naturalized Jurisprudence and American Legal Realism Revisited (2011 book symposium) :: SSRN - Law and Philosophy, 2011
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 352 -- This is my reply to critics in a symposium issue of the journal Law & Philosophy (2011) devoted to my 2007 book NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. The critics to whom I respond are: Julie Dickson (Oxford University), Michael Steven Green (College of William & Mary), and Mark Greenberg (University of California, Los Angeles). -- Keywords: legal realism, naturalism, jurisprudence, methodology -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_realism  positivism-legal  naturalism  methodology  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Legal Realisms, Old and New :: SSRN (2012 Seegers Lecture in Jurisprudence) - Forthcoming in Valparaiso Law Review (2013)
“Legal Realism” now has sufficient cache that scholars from many different fields and countries compete to claim the mantle of the "Realist program": from political scientists who study judicial behavior, to the "law and society" scholars associated with the Wisconsin New Legal Realism project, to philosophers interested in a naturalized jurisprudence. But what does it mean to be a “legal realist”? What unites the two most famous “old” Legal Realisms — the American and the Scandinavian — with the “new legal realism” invoked, variously, by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, among others? -- I argue that (1) American and Scandinavian Realism have almost nothing in common — indeed, that H.L.A. Hart misunderstood the latter as he did the former, and that the Scandinavians are closer to Hart and even Kelsen than they are to the Americans; (2) all Realists share skepticism about the causal efficacy of legal doctrine in explaining judicial decisions ("the Skeptical Doctrine") (though the Scandinavian skepticism on this score is not at all specific to the legal domain, encompassing all explanation in terms of norms); (3) American Realism almost entirely eschewed social-scientific methods in its defense of the Skeptical Doctrine, contrary to the impression given by much recent work by "new" legal realists; (4) the myth that the American Realists were seriously interested in social science derives mainly from two unrepresentative examples, Underhill Moore's behaviorism and Llewellyn's work with the Cheyenne Indians. -- Keywords: American legal realism, Scandinavian legal realism, Karl Llewellyn, Axel Hagerstrom, Alf Ross, naturalism, H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, judicial behavior
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  legal_theory  legal_realism  social_sciences  anthropology  sociology_of_law  normativity  norms  causation  causation-social  positivism-legal  naturalism  social_process  judiciary  behavioralism  Hart  Kelsen  US_legal_system  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - American Legal Realism (2002) :: SSRN
Heavily cited -- U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 42 -- This essay sets out the main elements of the revisionary and philosophical interpretation of the jurisprudence of American Legal Realism that I have developed in a series of articles over the last decade. This reading emphasizes the commitment of all the Realists to a core descriptive claim about adjudication (judges respond primarily to the underlying facts of the cases, rather than to legal rules and reasons); shows how the Realists divide in to two camps over the correct interpretation of this "core" claim (the Idiosncyrasy Wing of Frank, and the Sociological Wing of Llewellyn, Oliphant, Moore, Green, and the vast majority of Realists); demonstrates the connection of the Sociological Wing of Realism to the Realist project of law reform, including the work of the American Law Institute; examines and distinguishes the Realist arguments for the indeterminacy of law from Critical Legal Studies arguments; and shows how the Realists lay the foundation for the program of a "naturalized" jurisprudence, in opposition to the dominant "conceptual" jurisprudence of Anglophone legal philosophy. The revisionary reading also debunks certain popular myths about Legal Realism, like the following: the Realists believed "what the judge ate for breakfast determines the decision"; a critique of the public/private distinction was a central part of Realist jurisprudence; and the Realists were committed to an incoherent form of rule-skepticism. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_realism  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  sociology_of_law  reform-legal  naturalism  concepts  analytical_philosophy  Anglo-American  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Scott J. Shapiro - The "Hart-Dworkin" Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed (2007) :: SSRN
Scott J. Shapiro, Yale University - Law School -- U of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 77 -- Since the appearance in 1967 of "The Model of Rules I," Ronald Dworkin's seminal critique of H.L.A. Hart's theory of legal positivism, countless books and articles have been written either defending Hart against Dworkin's objections or defending Dworkin against Hart's defenders. My purpose in this essay is not to declare an ultimate victor; rather it is to identify precisely the core issue around which the debate is organized. -- I think that there is an important unity to the Hart-Dworkin debate that can be described in a relatively straightforward manner. I suggest that the debate is organized around one of the most profound issues in the philosophy of law, namely, the relation between legality and morality. Dworkin's basic strategy throughout the course of the debate has been to argue that, in one form or another, legality is ultimately determined not by social facts alone, but by moral facts as well. This contention directly challenges, and threatens to undermine, the positivist picture about the nature of law.... The Hart-Dworkin debate, ... I describe how Dworkin modified his critique to circumvent the responses of Hart's followers, thereby inaugurating a new phase in the debate. Virtually no attention, however, has been paid to this latter challenge, which is especially surprising given that none of the previous positivistic defenses are helpful against it. I then sketch out a possible response positivists might offer to this extremely powerful objection. -- No of Pages: 55 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, Hart, Dworkin, Legal Positivism, Natural Law, Interpretation -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  legal_theory  legal_realism  positivism-legal  positive_law  natural_law  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  sociology_of_law  Dworkin  Hart  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis :: SSRN - American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 56, pp. 45-57, 2011 (last revised 2012 )
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-13 -- Gustav Radbruch, in well-known work that appeared just after World War II, put forward a formula that stated that state-promulgated rules that are sufficiently unjust lose their status as valid law. Radbruch’s Formula has generally been understood as a claim about the nature of law, and recent variations of Radbruch’s Formula, like Robert Alexy’s “claim to correctness,” have similarly been characterized as offering a truth about the nature of law. Additionally, both Radbruch’s and Alexy’s theories have been presented as criticisms of, and alternatives to, legal positivism. An alternative understanding of the Formula (and its modern variations) is as (mere) prescriptions for judicial decision-making, and thus compatible with a variety of different conceptual theories of the nature of law, including legal positivism. This article shows the difficulties of understanding Radbruch’s Formula as it was presented and conventionally understood. In particular, the article focuses on the way that seeing the Formula as a claim about the nature of law leads to outcomes inconsistent with the basic reasons for the Formula. -- Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Radbruch's Formula, Robert Alexy, Conceptual Analysis
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  positivism-legal  natural_law  concepts  legal_theory  norms 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, vol. 1 of 2 ( Books 1 & 2) (1893 ed with selected notes from prior editors) - Online Library of Liberty
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In Two Volumes. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893). Vol. 1 – Books I & II. 07/17/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2140> -- A two volume edition of the classic work on English law by Blackstone. This edition is interesting because it includes the commentaries of at least 5 previous editors of Blackstone’s work along with additional notes by Sharswood, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Vol. 1 contains the Introduction to the Study of the Laws of England, Book I Of the Rights of Persons, and Book II The Rights of Things. -- downloaded mobi version of book scan OCR
books  etexts  18thC  19thC  British_history  English_constitution  common_law  judiciary  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  Blackstone  property  property_rights  rights-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Raz on Necessity (last revised 2009 ) :: SSRN - Law and Philosophy, vol. 22, pp. 537-559 (2003)
The article uses Joseph Raz's work as the starting point for a general discussion of the role of necessity and essence in jurisprudence. Analytical legal theorists commonly assert (or assume) that they are offering conceptual truths, claims regarding attributes necessarily true of all legal systems. Is it tenable to speak about necessary truths with a humanly created institution like law? Upon closer investigation, the use of necessary truths in writers like Raz and Jules Coleman clearly differs from the way such terms are used in classical metaphysics, and even in contemporary discussions of natural kind terms. Nonetheless, theorists making conceptual statements regarding law are making significant and ambitious claims that need to be defended - for example, against naturalists like Brian Leiter, who doubt the value of conceptual analysis, and normative theorists like Stephen Perry, who argue that assertions about the nature of law require value-laden moral and political choices between tenable alternatives. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  modal_logic  possible_worlds  universalism  universals  natural_kinds  natural_law  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  morality-conventional  normativity  essence  naturalism  legal_realism  philosophy_of_language  Raz  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence between Law and Morality (last revised 2011) :: SSRN - Ratio Juris, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 194-211, June 2008
There is an ongoing debate in the philosophical and jurisprudential literature regarding the nature and possibility of Contract theory. On one hand are those who argue (or assume) that there is, or should be, a single, general, universal theory of Contract Law, one applicable to all jurisdictions and all times. On the other hand are those who assert that Contract theory should be localized to particular times and places, perhaps even with different theories for different types of agreements. This article considers one facet of this debate: evaluating the relevance of the fact that the remedies available for breach of contract can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. This wide variation in remedies for breach of a (contractual) promise is one central difference between promises in morality and enforceable agreements in law. The article asserts that variation of remedies strongly supports the conclusion that there is (and can be) no general, universal theory of Contract Law. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  morality-objective  natural_law  contracts  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism :: SSRN - Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 5, Aug. 2000
The nature and location of the disagreement(s) between legal positivism and natural law theory has often been unclear, in large part because of the way each approach has been misunderstood by advocates for the other side. Many commentators assume that the two approaches disagree about whether immoral rules can have the status of law, but there is little evidence to support this view. Natural law theorists from Aquinas to Finnis have allowed that immoral rules are law (can have legal status), only that they are not law in its fullest sense (because such laws do not create moral obligations to obey them). The article concludes that the debate between natural law and legal positivism is joined elsewhere: regarding the meta-theoretical question of whether it is possible and valuable to have a morally neutral theory of law. Legal positivists advocate morally neutral theories, while natural law theorists like Finnis expressly or implicitly argue for a pervasively moral-evaluative theory of law, arguing that one can only understand a reason-giving practice like law against the background of what it would mean to give a good (legitimate, moral-obligation-creating) reason for action. A variation of the same argument is that one can only understand law within a (teleological) theory that gives a place for the moral ideal (justice) to which law strives. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_history  intellectual_history  natural_law  positivism-legal  positive_law  Aquinas  moral_philosophy  values  obligation  reasons  reasons-externalism  action-theory  justice  legitimacy  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Legal Positivism (posted 2003) :: SSRN - BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson, eds., Blackwell, 2005
This article tries to present the jurisprudential school of thought, legal positivism, within a larger context than is usual in contemporary English-language discussions of that approach: (1) showing the intellectual and political contexts in which the movement began; (2) emphasizing the variety of theories that fit under that label (e.g., how the Kelsenian tradition varies significantly from the Hartian tradition); and (3) discussing how the future development of legal positivism will depend on its discussion of wider theoretical issues (e.g., the proper approach to social theory, and the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy). The article also summarizes the main criticisms of legal positivism, and gives an overview of the internal debate of inclusive legal positivism versus exclusive legal positivism. Note: This is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Germany  Anglo-American  positivism-legal  Kelsen  Hart  social_theory  sociology_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Michael Steven Green - Kelsen, Quietism, and the Rule of Recognition (2008 last revised 2011) :: SSRN
Research paper to appear in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Matthew D. Adler, Kenneth E. Himma eds., Oxford University Press, -- Sometimes the fact that something is the law can be justified by the law. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley is the law because it was enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. But eventually legal justification of law ends. The ultimate criteria of validity cannot themselves be justified by law. According to H.L.A. Hart, justification of these ultimate criteria is still available, by reference to social facts concerning official acceptance - facts about what Hart calls the "rule of recognition" for the system. Drawing upon criticisms of sociological accounts of the law that can be found in the writings of Hans Kelsen, I argue in this essay that Hart's approach cannot account for statements about the law that assert the independence of legal validity from rule of recognition facts. I offer as an alternative a legal quietist approach, which can account for such statements. For the quietist, legal justification exhausts the possible justification for law. If our judgments about the law are fundamental, in the sense that they cannot be justified by other judgments about the law, then they have no justification (which is not to say that they should be abandoned). I argue that legal quietism is exemplified - if somewhat imperfectly - in Kelsen's writings, and I end the essay by exploring some difficulties that the quietist approach must face. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  20thC  Germany  Anglo-American  legal_theory  positivism-legal  Hart  Kelsen  social_theory  sociology_of_law  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
"Legal Realism as Theory of Law" by Michael Steven Green
Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1915 (2005), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol46/iss6/2 -- top of "downloaded" on bepress "Jurisprudence Commons" section -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  legal_theory  legal_history  legal_realism  philosophy_of_social_science  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Josephine Sandler Nelson - "CORPORATE CONSPIRACY: HOW NOT CALLING A CONSPIRACY A CONSPIRACY IS WARPING THE LAW ON CORPORATE WRONGDOING" | Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 24.2 (2015) - bepress
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine immunizes an enterprise and its agents from conspiracy prosecution based on the legal fiction that an enterprise and its agents are a single actor incapable of the meeting of two minds to form a conspiracy. The doctrine, however, misplaces incentives in contravention of agency law, criminal law, tort law, and public policy. As a result, harmful behavior is ordered and performed without consequences, and the victims of the behavior suffer without appropriate remedy. Especially in the wake of the financial crisis, prosecutors and the public are searching for new tools. The most obvious and tested tool would be to roll back the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. In the absence of this solution, frustration with applying the doctrine has led to over-reliance on alternative methods of holding agents of enterprises responsible for their actions -- piercing the corporate veil, responsible corporate officer doctrine, and unusual approaches such as denying “retroactive” imposition of the corporate veil and adopting “reverse” piercings of the corporate veil. But these doctrines were fundamentally developed in and adapted to other circumstances. They do not take into account the coordination of actions within an enterprise and the unique nature of conspiracy that fall—and should fall—into the heart of behavior that would trigger liability if not for the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Using alternative doctrines to impose liability on behavior that would otherwise be recognized as intracorporate conspiracy results in inconsistent decisions and disproportionate awards. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  legal_theory  corporations  corporate_law  liability  accountability  crime  criminal_justice  financial_regulation  torts  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Danielle Keats Citron and Frank A. Pasquale - "The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions" | 89 Washington Law Review 1 (2014)
Both at University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law -- Keywords - Big Data, predictions, artificial intelligence -- Big Data is increasingly mined to rank and rate individuals. Predictive algorithms assess whether we are good credit risks, desirable employees, reliable tenants, valuable customers—or deadbeats, shirkers, menaces, and “wastes of time.” Crucial opportunities are on the line, including the ability to obtain loans, work, housing, and insurance. Though automated scoring is pervasive and consequential, it is also opaque and lacking oversight. In one area where regulation does prevail—credit—the law focuses on credit history, not the derivation of scores from data. Procedural regularity is essential for those stigmatized by “artificially intelligent” scoring systems. The American due process tradition should inform basic safeguards. Regulators should be able to test scoring systems to ensure their fairness and accuracy. Individuals should be granted meaningful opportunities to challenge adverse decisions based on scores miscategorizing them. Without such protections in place, systems could launder biased and arbitrary data into powerfully stigmatizing scores. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  legal_theory  US_constitution  civil_liberties  due_process  big_data  financial_innovation  privacy  reputation  inequality  financial_regulation  algorithms  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
"Toward an Ecology of Intellectual Property: Lessons from Environmental" by Frank Pasquale | 8 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 78 (2006)
Keywords -- copyright, intellectual property, environmental, economics -- The fair use defense in copyright law shields an intellectual commons of protected uses of copyrighted material from infringement actions. In determining whether a given use is fair, courts must assess the new use's potential effect on the market for the copyrighted work. Fair use jurisprudence too often fails to address the complementary, network, and long-range effects of new technologies on the market for copyrighted works. These effects parallel the indirect, direct, and option values of biodiversity recently recognized by environmental economists. Their sophisticated methods for valuing natural resources in tangible commons can inform legal efforts to address the intellectual commons' effect on the market for copyrighted works. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  legal_theory  IP  copyright  Internet  political_economy  economic_theory  environment  commons  property  property_rights  networks-information  technology  valuation  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
"Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance " by Frank Pasquale | 2008 University of Illinois Law Review 599
Keywords - campaign finance, egalitarianism, political theory, Rawls, deliberative democracy, politics -- Recent advocacy for campaign finance reform has been based on an ideal of the democratic process which is unrealistic and unhelpful. Scholars should instead return to its egalitarian roots. This article examines how deliberative democratic theory became the main justification for campaign finance reform. It exposes the shortcomings of this deliberativist detour and instead models campaign spending as an effort to commodify issue-salience. Given this dominant function of money in politics, a more effective paradigm for reform is equalizing influence. Advocates of campaign regulation should return to the original principles of reformers; not an idealized vision of the democratic process, but pragmatic concerns about moneyed interests acquiring too much influence over the nation's politics. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  political_philosophy  legal_theory  constitutionalism  democracy  political_participation  egalitarian  US_constitution  free_speech  plutocracy  interest_groups  legitimacy  campaign_finance  US_legal_system  SCOTUS  media  corruption  franchise  political_culture  political_economy  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages 1881] trans. and ed. Frederic William Maitland ( 1900) - Online Library of Liberty
Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, translated with an Introduction by Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900). 07/16/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2562> -- image scan -' translation by F.W. Maitland of part of vol. 3 of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (1881) entitled “Die publicistischen Lehren des Mittelalters.” It is a short history of the evolution of modern political thought which emerged during the Middle Ages -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  medieval_history  medieval_philosophy  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  Europe-Early_Modern  historiography-19thC  Germany  historicism  legal_history  legal_theory  nation-state  authority  government-forms 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard, vol. III of 3 - Online Library of Liberty
Sir Edward Coke, The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). Vol. 3. 07/13/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/913> -- Vol. 3 of a 3 vol. set of The Selected Writings. This volume contains Coke’s speech in Parliament (inlcuding the Petiton of Right), a number of official acts related to Coke’s career, and other matters. -- also extensive bibliography, including on people and events, relevant to Coke’s career and thought -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  16thC  17thC  British_history  British_politics  Coke  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  Anglo-Saxons  ancient_constitution  common_law  English_constitution  Parliament  monarchy  judiciary  Absolutism  Elizabeth  James_I  Charles_I  Petition_of_Right  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard, Vol. 2 of 3 - Online Library of Liberty
Sir Edward Coke, The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). Vol. 2. 07/13/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/912> -- Vol. 2 of a 3 vol. set of The Selected Writings. This volume contains Coke’s Speech at Norwich, excerpts from the small treatises, and excerpts from the 4 parts of the Institutes. - includes Coke on Littleton, topics such as heresy and treason -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  16thC  17thC  Coke  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  common_law  English_constitution  ancient_constitution  Anglo-Saxons  Parliament  monarchy  judiciary  lawyers  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jean Louis De Lolme, The Constitution of England; Or, an Account of the English Government, ed. David Lieberman - Online Library of Liberty
Jean Louis De Lolme, The Constitution of England; Or, an Account of the English Government, edited and with an Introduction by David Lieberman (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007). 07/13/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2089> -- The Constitution of England is one of the most distinguished eighteenth-century treatises on English political liberty. In the vein of Charles Louis Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748) and William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769), De Lolme’s account of the English system of government exercised an extensive influence on political debate in Britain, on constitutional design in the United States during the Founding era, and on the growth of liberal political thought throughout the nineteenth century. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  18thC  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  British_history  British_politics  English_constitution  constitutionalism  Anglo-American  legal_history  legal_theory  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern [1947] - Online Library of Liberty
Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 07/12/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2145> -- Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern explores the very roots of liberty by examining the development of modern constitutionalism from its ancient and medieval origins. Derived from a series of lectures delivered by Charles Howard McIlwain at Cornell University in the 1938–39 academic year, these lectures provide a useful introduction to the development of modern constitutional forms. -- Introduction states the "problem" beginning with Bolingbroke's definition of the Septennial Act and Whig abandonment of Revolution Principles, and Burke, Paine, arbitrary government and written constitutions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  political_philosophy  political_history  political_culture  government-forms  constitutionalism  English_constitution  US_constitution  French_Revolution  American_Revolution  legal_system  legal_history  legal_theory  judiciary  checks-and-balances  separation-of-powers  Absolutism  representative_institutions  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  medieval_history  feudalism  monarchy  limited_monarchy  resistance_theory  social_contract  public_opinion  political_participation  reform-political  reform-legal  Bolingbroke  Revolution_Principles  Whigs-oligarchy  Whigs-opposition  Burke  Paine  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law, ed. Ellis Sandoz, - Online Library of Liberty
Ellis Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law, edited and with an Introduction by Ellis Sandoz (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 07/12/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2180> -- This is a critical collection of essays on the origin and nature of the idea of liberty. The authors explore the development of English ideas of liberty and the relationship those ideas hold to modern conceptions of rule of law. The essays address early medieval developments, encompassing such seminal issues as the common-law mind of the sixteenth century under the Tudor monarchs, the struggle for power and authority between the Stuart kings and Parliament in the seventeenth century, and the role of the ancient constitution in the momentous legal and constitutional debate that occurred between the Glorious Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence. Authors -- Corinne Comstock Weston - John Phillip Reid - Paul Christianson - Christopher W. Brooks - James Clarke Holt - Editor: Ellis Sandoz -- a lot of historiography discussion of legal history, politics and political philosophy - interesting to see their take on Pocock - original publication date 1993, so bibliography will be a bit dated and the articles won't reflect all the waves of revisionism but important place to start -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  legal_history  legal_theory  political_philosophy  Anglo-American  16thC  17thC  18thC  English_constitution  ancient_constitution  Anglo-Saxons  Norman_Conquest  Magna_Carta  Tudor  Elizabeth  James_I  Charles_I  Charles_II  James_II  William_III  Hanoverian_Succession  common_law  lawyers  judiciary  rule_of_law  British_history  British_politics  Atlantic  American_colonies  government-forms  mixed_government  Absolutism  republicanism  limited_monarchy  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  citizens  legitimacy  authority  resistance_theory  Patriot_King  civil_liberties  civic_humanism  liberty  taxes  property  petitions  Petition_of_Right  House_of_Commons  House_of_Lords  checks-and-balances  separation-of-powers  franchise  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law: Or, the Laws of Nature and Nations [1737] with Supplements and a Discourse by George Turnbull trans., eds. Thomas Albert and Peter Schröder - Online Library of Liberty
Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law: Or, the Laws of Nature and Nations, with Supplements and a Discourse by George Turnbull. Translated from the Latin by George Turnbull, edited with an Introduction by Thomas Albert and Peter Schröder (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 07/11/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2305> -- The natural law theory of Johann Gottlieb Heineccius was one of the most influential to emerge from the early German Enlightenment. Heineccius continued and, in important respects, modified the ideas of his predecessors, Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius. He developed distinctive views on central questions such as the freedom of the human will and the natural foundation of moral obligation, which also sharply distinguished him from his contemporary Christian Wolff. The Liberty Fund edition is based on the translation by the Scottish moral philosopher George Turnbull (1698–1748). It includes Turnbull’s extensive comments on Heineccius’s text, as well as his substantial Discourse upon the Nature and Origin of Moral and Civil Laws. These elements make the work into one of the most extraordinary encounters between Protestant natural law theory and neo-republican civic humanism. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  18thC  intellectual_history  Enlightenment  Scottish_Enlightenment  Germany  Heineccius  Pufendorf  Thomasius  Wolff  Turnbull_George  natural_law  international_law  legal_theory  legal_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  human_nature  obligation  free_will  state-of-nature  government-forms  authority  legitimacy  natural_rights  natural_religion  civic_humanism  civic_virtue  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
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