dunnettreader + legal_reasoning   28

Jack Balkin - Protestant Constitutionalism: A Series of Footnotes to Sanford Levinson | Balkinization: - September 2010
little essay written in honor of my dear friend Sandy Levinson, on the occasion of the Lifetime Achievement Award he received from the Law and Courts section at the American Political Science Association convention -- One of Sandy's most fruitful ideas is constitutional protestantism, the idea that each citizen has the right to decide for him or herself what the Constitution means. Sandy stated this idea prominently in an article in the Tulane Law Review in 1987, noting the importance of Attorney General Edwin Meese's arguments that the decisions of the Supreme Court bind only the parties before the court. -- The idea is developed more fully in Sandy's great 1988 book, Constitutional Faith, in which he distinguishes between constitutional protestantism and constitutional catholicism. Constitutional catholicism stands for the view that a certain group of professional or learned authorities has the last word on interpretation, while protestantism, as we have seen, invites all believers to offer their views on the meaning of scripture. Sandy gives both positions their due, but he is essentially a constitutional protestant. -- Protestant constitutionalism leads almost inevitably to the study of social organization and culture. Once you acknowledge that many individuals have different views about the Constitution, you must also acknowledge that these individuals, like good protestants, do not simply keep to themselves. They create congregations. They form groups of like-minded believers and go out into the world and try to convert others. Thus, a focus on protestant constitutionalism leads naturally to a focus on social movements and political parties as engines of constitutional change. -- downloaded page as pdf to Note
US_constitution  US_politics  political_culture  legal_culture  legal_history  legal_reasoning  change-social  change-intellectual  constitutional_law  constitutional_regime  social_movements  Protestants  schisms  sola_scriptura  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - Legal Realism in Context :: SSRN in Elizabeth Mertz, ed., New Legal Realism, Vol. 1 (Cambridge UP, 2015 Forthcoming)
“We are all realists now,” it is frequently said, yet what legal realism was about remains vigorously debated by legal theorists and historians. The debate continues because the jurists we think of as core legal realists were not members of a group. Karl Llewellyn said this multiple times in his famous essay detailing realism. (..) Contemporary scholars who make assertions about what the legal realists stood for often fail to account for these passages. Legal realism.. is best understood ... in terms of 3 overlapping complexes of ideas that emerged in the late 19thC and had become widespread by the time of Llewellyn’s article. [(1)] that society was changing rapidly while law, understood as a means to achieve social ends, lagged badly behind, producing an urgent need for legal reform. [(2)] the growing refrain among legal academics that newly developing social sciences should be applied to enhance an understanding of the actual facts surrounding law. [(3)] a vocal backlash against judges for impeding reform, including charges that they were importing class bias into their legal decisions, prompting a broader acknowledgement that the background social attitudes of judges play a role in their decisions. These three themes were interpenetrating: the popular dissatisfaction with the failings of law was manifested in criticism of courts, and resort to social science was the favored academic solution. (..) Realism characterized the new modern age of thinking about law, and it ran much earlier and more broadly than is now commonly recognized. -- PDF File: 47 -- Keywords: Legal history, Jurisprudence, law and the humanities, law and the social sciences
chapter  SSRN  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  19thC  20thC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  legal_history  social_sciences  legal_realism  legal_reform  change-social  change-intellectual 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory :: SSRN - William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 56, 2015
Jurisprudence is generally thought to consist of two main classical rival branches — natural law and legal positivism — followed by a bunch of modern schools — legal realism, law and economics, critical theory, legal pragmatism, etc. In this essay I argue that three main branches of jurisprudence have existed, and battled, for centuries, not two, but the third goes unrecognized as such because it has traveled under different labels and the underlying connections have been clouded by various confusions. The core insights and focus of this third branch, what I call “Social Legal Theory,” trace in a continuous thread from Montesquieu, through historical jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, and legal realism, up to the present. This third branch, I argue, provides a contrasting/complementary perspective, in conjunction with natural law and legal positivism, which rounds out the full range of theoretical angles on law: natural law is normative; legal positivism is analytical/conceptual; and social legal theory is empirical. (Among a number of clarifications, I answer the common objection that empirically-grounded theories are not sufficiently theoretical.) The conventional jurisprudential narrative is redrawn in this essay in a way that exposes unseen connections among theoretical schools and brings into focus critical issues about the nature of law that currently are marginalized by natural law and legal positivism. -- Pages in PDF File: 44 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, legal philosophy, law and society, legal realism, legal development, legal history
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal  natural_law  legal_realism  legal_history  sociology_of_law  social_order  social_theory  change-social  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  Montesquieu  pragmatism  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling "Citizens United" with Corporate Law History :: SSRN - Notre Dame Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming (rev'd March 2015)
Leo E. Strine Jr., Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; Penn Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz -- Citizens United has been the subject of a great deal of commentary, but one important aspect of the decision that has not been explored in detail is the historical basis for Justice Scalia’s claims in his concurring opinion that the majority holding is consistent with originalism. In this article, we engage in a deep inquiry into the historical understanding of the rights of the business corporation as of 1791 and 1868 — two periods relevant to an originalist analysis of the First Amendment. Based on the historical record, Citizens United is far more original than originalist, and if the decision is to be justified, it has to be on jurisprudential grounds originalists traditionally disclaim as illegitimate. -- PDF File: 94 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, constitutional interpretation, original intent, original understanding, originalism, election law, campaign finance reform, corporate personhood, general corporation statutes, political speech, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  US_constitution  constitutional_law  originalism  free_speech  civil_liberties  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  elections  campaign_finance  politics-and-money  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew S. Gold, Paul B. Miller, eds. -- Introduction: Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford UP 2014) :: SSRN
Andrew S. Gold, DePaul University, College of Law and Paul B. Miller, McGill University Faculty of Law -- This Introduction outlines core questions of fiduciary law theory and provides thematic discussion of the contributions to the volume. The volume includes chapters by Richard Brooks, Hanoch Dagan, Evan Criddle, Deborah DeMott, Avihay Dorfman, Justice James Edelman, Evan Fox-Decent, Tamar Frankel, Joshua Getzler, Andrew Gold, Michele Graziadei, Sharon Hannes, Genevieve Helleringer, Ethan Leib, Daniel Markovits, Paul Miller, Irit Samet, Robert Sitkoff, Henry Smith, and Lionel Smith. -- PDF File: 17 -- Keywords: Philosophy of Law, Legal Theory, Philosophy of Private Law, Private Law Theory, Fiduciary Law, Fiduciary Relationships, Fiduciary Duties, Fiduciary Remedies, Duty of Loyalty, Duty of Care, Duty of Candour -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  fiduciaries  principal-agent  agents  duties-legal  rights-legal  trust  trusts  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  conflict_of_interest  legal_remedies  law-and-economics  law-and-finance  Roman_law  civil_law  common_law  property  inheritance  family_law  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert H. Sitkoff - An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law :: SSRN - Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds. (Oxford UP, 2014
Harvard Law -- In consequence of this common economic structure [agency problem], there is a common doctrinal structure that cuts across the application of fiduciary principles in different contexts. However, (..) the particulars of fiduciary obligation vary in accordance with the particulars of the agency problem in the fiduciary relationship at issue. This explains (1) the purported elusiveness of fiduciary doctrine and (2) why courts apply fiduciary law both categorically, such as to trustees and (legal) agents, as well as ad hoc to relationships involving a position of trust and confidence that gives rise to an agency problem. (...) a functional distinction between primary and subsidiary fiduciary rules. In all fiduciary relationships we find general duties of loyalty and care, typically phrased as standards, (..) we also find specific subsidiary fiduciary duties, often phrased as rules, that elaborate on the application of loyalty and care to commonly recurring circumstances in the particular form of fiduciary relationship. (..) the puzzle of why fiduciary law includes mandatory rules that cannot be waived in a relationship deemed fiduciary. Committed economic contractarians, such as Easterbrook and Fischel, have had difficulty in explaining why the parties to a fiduciary relationship do not have complete freedom of contract. The answer is that the mandatory core of fiduciary law serves a cautionary and protective function within the fiduciary relationship as well as an external categorization function that clarifies rights for third parties. -- PDF File: 14 -- Keywords: fiduciary, agency, trust, loyalty, care, prudence, agency costs, duty
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  fiduciaries  agents  principal-agent  freedom_of_contract  trust  trusts  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  conflict_of_interest  legal_reasoning  rights-legal  duties-legal  common_law 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams, eds. - Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction :: SSRN - (Edward Elgar 2013)
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, both University of Chicago Law School -- University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 704 -- This introduction, prepared for an edited volume, offers some observations on the importance — indeed, inescapability — of fairness concerns in law and economics. The relationship between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually cast as an adversarial one. Rational choice economics typically describes human behavior as motivated by simple self-interest, rather than by concerns of morality, justice, or fairness. But we have found that the connections between concepts of fairness and the economic analysis of law are robust and diverse. After discussing some of these linkages, we describe the organization and content of the volume we have compiled. In it, economics engages with fairness, challenging the idea that the two concepts are alien to each other. -- PDF File: 18 -- Keywords: fairness, law and economics -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  fairness  efficiency  welfare_economics  self-interest  altruism  microeconomics  policymaking  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  utility  status_quo_bias  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lawrence B. Solum - Originalism and Constitutional Construction by :: SSRN - 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453 (2013)
Georgetown University Law Center -- Constitutional interpretation is the activity that discovers the communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. Constitutional construction is the activity that determines the legal effect given the text, including doctrines of constitutional law and decisions of constitutional cases or issues by judges and other officials. The interpretation-construction distinction, frequently invoked by contemporary constitutional theorists and rooted in American legal theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, marks the difference between these two activities. (..) Part I of this Article situates the idea of constitutional construction in the context of contemporary debates about originalism and among originalists. Part II argues that the interpretation-construction distinction provides conceptual clarity and answers a variety of objections to the distinction itself and the use of the terms “interpretation” and “construction” to express the distinction. Part III advances the claim that construction is ubiquitous; Part IV makes the case for the ineliminability of the construction zone. Part V discusses the relationship between constitutional construction and debates about originalism and living constitutionalism. A conclusion follows. -- PDF File: 85 -- Keywords: constitution, interpretation, construction, interpretation-construction distinction, vagueness, ambiguity, original methods, deference, constraint -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  constitutional_law  US_constitution  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  originalism 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicola Lacey - Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 919 (2015)
A cri de coeur for putting legal theory and history back together with social theory and empirical social sciences,. -- In the early part of my career, legal history and the history of legal ideas were closed books to me, as I made my way in a field of criminal law scholarship dominated by doctrinal scholarship and by concept-focused philosophical analysis of the foundations of criminal law. These 2 very different paradigms have 1 big thing in common: They tend to proceed as if the main intellectual task is to unearth the deep logic of existing legal doctrines, not infrequently going so far as to read them back onto history, as if things could never have been other than they are. (..)I have increasingly found myself turning to historical resources (1) [to examine] the contingency of particular legal arrangements, and (2) ...to develop causal and other theses about the dynamics which shape them and hence about the role and quality of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies. So, in a sense, I have been using history in support of an analysis driven primarily by the social sciences. (..) it is no accident that all of the great social theorists, from Marx to Foucault via Weber, Durkheim, and Elias, ..have incorporated significant historical elements into their interpretations .... Indeed, without the diachronic perspective provided by history (or the perspective offered by comparative study) we could have no critical purchase on social theory’s characterizations of or causal hypotheses about the dynamics of social systems. Hence, (...) my boundless gratitude to the historians whose meticulous research makes this sort of interpretive social theory possible). -- Lacey is not over-dramatizing -- see the "commentary" from a "legal philosopher" who believes the normative basis of criminal responsibility can be investigated as timeless "moral truths". -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_change  philosophy_of_law  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_social_science  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  morality-conventional  morality-objective  criminal_justice  responsibility  mind  human_nature  norms  power-asymmetric  power-symbolic  power  Neoplatonism  neo-Kantian  a_priori  historiography  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  moral_philosophy  evidence  mental_health  social_order  epistemology  epistemology-moral  change-social  change-intellectual  comparative_law  comparative_anthropology  civil_liberties  women-rights  women-property  rights-legal  rights-political  access_to_services  discrimination  legal_culture  legal_system  legal_reasoning  Foucault  Marx  Weber  Durkheim  metaethics  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Gerald J. Postema - Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 869 (2015)
Renaissance jurisprudence strove to be a sociable science. Following Ulpian’s lead, it refused to relegate jurisprudence either to pure speculation or to mere practice. Jurisprudence was a science, a matter of knowledge and of theoretical understanding, not merely an applied art or practice of prudence innocent of theory. It was regarded as the very heart of theoretical studies, drawing to itself all that the traditional sciences of theology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, as well as the newly emerging humanist sciences of philology and hermeneutics, had to offer. No less resolutely, however, it refused to abandon its foothold in the life of practice. (..) Rather than reject philosophical reflection, (..) Renaissance jurists sought to locate it in concrete human life and experience. (..) Philosophy.., was most true to its vocation, and was most engaged in human life, when its reflections were anchored in the social life acknowledged, comprehended, and informed by and informing law. Jurisprudence, vera philosophia, was ...the point at which the theoretical and the practical intersected (..) at its “sociable” best sought to integrate them. Analytic jurisprudence began as self-consciously, even militantly, “unsociable,” and its matured and much-sophisticated descendant, fin de siècle analytic legal philosophy, remained largely if not exclusively so. (..) It may be time, in this period of self-conscious attention to jurisprudential method, to press beyond the current limits of this debate over method to a reassessment of the ambitions of jurisprudence and of philosophy’s role in it. (..) my aim is not critical but constructive. (..) to recover something of the ideal of jurisprudence as a sociable science, to retrieve as much as our disenchanted age can be challenged to embrace, or at least to entertain, of the ambition of jurisprudence as vera philosophia. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  Renaissance  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  common_law  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  norms  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  change-social  change-intellectual  social_order  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  pragmatism  Peirce  continuity  historical_change  methodology-qualitative  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Charles Barzun and Dan Priel - Jurisprudence and (Its) History - Symposium Introduction | Virginia Law Review 101 Va. L. Rev. 849 (2015)
Whereas legal philosophers offer “analyses” that aim to be general, abstract, and timeless, legal historians offer “thick descriptions” of what is particular, concrete, and time-bound. But surface appearances can deceive. Perhaps unlike other areas of philosophy, the subject matter of jurisprudence is at least partially (if not entirely) a social phenomenon. Courts, legislatures, judicial orders, and statutes are the products of human efforts, both collective and individual, and they only exist as legislatures, courts, and the like insofar as they possess the meaning they do in the eyes of at least some social group. For this reason, legal philosophers since at least H.L.A. Hart have recognized their task to be a “hermeneutic” one—one which aims to discern or make explicit the “self-understanding” of legal actors. At the same time, legal historians aim not simply to record legal rules that existed at some given point in history, but to unearth the meaning that actual people—judges, lawyers, politicians, and ordinary citizens—have attached to law. When they do so, they might be seen as uncovering evidence of those same “self-understandings” that philosophers claim constitute law. Perhaps, then, philosophical and historical inquiries about law do not differ so radically from each other after all. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_language  ordinary_language_philosophy  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  intellectual_history  historiography  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  constitutional_law  Founders  originalism  contextualism  change-social  change-economic  change-intellectual  norms  hermeneutics  positivism-legal  philosophy_of_history  institutional_change  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
John Mikhail - The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers :: SSRN - Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, 2015 (rev'd June 11 2015)
Georgetown University Law Center -- The main purpose of this Article is to begin to recover and elucidate the core textual basis of a progressive approach to constitutional law, which appears to have been embraced in essential respects by many influential figures, including Wilson, Hamilton, Marshall, and the two Roosevelts, and which rests on an implied power to promote the general welfare. To pursue this objective, the Article relies on two strange bedfellows: the law of corporations and the philosopher Paul Grice. An ordinary language philosopher like Grice, (..) might seem like an unlikely ally to enlist in this endeavor. (..) underestimating the significance of Grice’s ideas for constitutional law would be a mistake. Plausibly interpreted, the Constitution vests an implied power in the Government of the United States to promote the general welfare, and Grice’s distinction between semantic and pragmatic implication is a helpful means of understanding why. After a general introduction, the Article first summarizes some key aspects of Grice’s philosophy of language and then briefly illustrates their relevance for constitutional law. The remainder of the Article is then devoted to explaining how, along with a relatively simple principle in the law of corporations, according to which a legal corporation is implicitly vested with the power to fulfill its purposes, Grice’s distinction between semantic and pragmatic implication helps to illuminate a thorny problem of enduring interest: What powers does the Constitution vest in the Government of the United States? -- Pages in PDF File: 41 -- Keywords: James Wilson, Charles Beard, James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, Paul Grice, constitution, implication, implicature, entailment, semantics, pragmatics, implied powers, enumerated powers, preamble, vesting clause, necessary and proper clause, sweeping clause, tenth amendment, originalism -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_language  ordinary_language_philosophy  legal_reasoning  constitutional_law  US_constitution  US_history  federalism  US_government  US_legal_system  originalism  common_good  commonwealth  progressivism  Founders  Madison  Morris_Gouverneur  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Deborah Hellman, Commentary on Mikhail's "The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1105 (2015)
Mikhail uses these insights about language and communication to say something about constitutional interpretation. But that is where the trouble begins. While Mikhail offers a masterful textual analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, I am not convinced that his analysis demonstrates its meaning, and if it does, I fear that Mikhail’s efforts yield the perverse consequence of delegitimizing the very document he is at great pains to enlarge. In what follows, I raise three worries about Mikhail’s analysis. First, a constitution is not a conversation between its drafters and some other people and, as a result, it is unclear whether the Gricean paradigm has anything useful to say about constitutional interpretation. Second, it is far from clear what a constitution is for and consequently there are unlikely to be accepted conventions about how to interpret the meaning of statements within them. Third, Mikhail’s article presents evidence that the Constitution’s drafters were strategic and crafty. But if the drafters are violating the cooperative principle Grice identified, this fact calls into doubt the significance of the ratification of the Constitution from which that document, purportedly, derives its legitimacy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  constitutional_law  philosophy_of_language  philosophy_of_law  Founders  legitimacy  US_constitution  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence? :: SSRN - Nov 2008
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-35 -- General jurisprudence purports to consider law in general. But to break out of the arid abstractions of analytic legal philosophy, it may be worth also giving some jurisprudential consideration to the distinctive features of law in the context of a particular kind of political system. This paper considers the jurisprudence of law in a modern democracy. It explores a suggestion (made by Ronald Dworkin and others) that legal positivism might be a theory particularly apt for a democracy. And it explores the meaning and significance for democratic political theory of ideas like the generality of law, the separation of law and morality, the sources thesis, and law's public orientation. At the very end, the paper also considers Jean-Jacques Rousseau's view that the word "law" should be confined to measures that are applicable to all, made by all, and enacted in the spirit of a general will. -- Pages in PDF File: 5 -- Keywords: analytic legal philosophy, democracy, Hart, jurisprudence, legal positivism, Rousseau, separation of law and morality, sources of law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  government-forms  democracy  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  Hart  general_will  moral_philosophy  Dworkin  lawmaker  politics-and-religion  legal_reasoning  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Thomas Colby and Peter J. Smith - The Return of Lochner :: SSRN - April 2015 - Cornell Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 527, 2015
Both at GW Law School - For a very long time, it has been an article of faith among liberals and conservatives alike that Lochner v. New York was obviously and irredeemably wrong. Lochner is one of only a few cases that constitute our “anticanon,” universally reviled by the legal community as the “worst of the worst.” (..) conservatives are ready, once again, to embrace Lochner — although perhaps not in name — by recommitting to some form of robust judicial protection for economic rights. (...) this impending change has been greatly facilitated by important modifications to the theory of originalism, which has served for nearly a half century as the intellectual framework for conservative legal thought (..) and it has now evolved to the point where it can plausibly accommodate claims that the Constitution protects economic liberty. (..) how legal movements evolve generally. Sometimes the courts change the doctrine, and the theorists scramble to keep up. This is, roughly speaking, what happened with liberal legal thought in the second half of the 20thC. Just when liberal legal theorists, reeling from the Lochner era, had settled on the view that the courts should exercise judicial review very sparingly — and perhaps never to enforce rights not specifically identified in the Constitution — the liberal Court began to exercise judicial review more frequently and aggressively, often to protect rights not clearly identified in the Constitution. Liberal theorists then struggled for years to develop an account of the appropriate judicial role that condemned Lochner but legitimized later cases protecting fundamental rights and vulnerable minorities. Modern conservative legal thought seems to be following the opposite progression: the theorists lead, the opinion leaders gradually sign on, and judges eventually follow. — conservatives have patiently waited for the theory to come together — for the blueprints to be drawn — before moving forward. But the plans are now largely ready, and we expect that it will not be long before the bulldozers break ground. - 77 pages saved to SSRN briefcase
article  SSRN  SCOTUS  libertarianism  US_constitution  US_legal_system  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  constitutional_law  civil_liberties  liberty-negative  laisser-faire  freedom_of_contract  freedom_of_conscience  equality  judicial_review 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jack Balkin - Bye, Bye, Glucksberg | Balkinization - June 2015
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Obergefell unceremoniously overrules Washington v. Glucksburg without saying so directly, as the Chief Justice well understands: "It is revealing that the majority’s position requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive due process." A little translation is in order here. Glucksberg is not, in fact, the leading modern case on substantive due process and implied fundamental rights. That would be Griswold or Eisenstadt (as reinterpreted by later courts), or (shudder!) Roe, or Casey or Lawrence, or now, Obergefell. Rather, Glucksberg is the case that people opposed to implied fundamental rights wish were the leading case and regularly cite as if it were the leading case that applied to every such question. Chief Justice Rehnquist--no fan of implied fundamental rights himself--wrote Glucksberg in 1997 precisely to lay down a marker so that federal judges would stop trying to imply fundamental rights. He didn't succeed.
Instapaper  SCOTUS  US_constitution  constitutional_law  due_process  rights-legal  conservative_legal_challenges  equality  precedent  Roberts_Court  legal_reasoning  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jack Balkin - Obergefell and Tradition | Balkinization - June 2015
It is tempting to identify the dissenters with Burke, and view Kennedy as opposed to Burkeanism. Certainly the dissenters would like to brand Kennedy as a revolutionary or Jacobin, heedlessly destroying a valued institution at the center of society. But this is a caricature of what Kennedy is actually doing in his opinion. Kennedy's use of tradition is also Burkean in its own way. He simply emphasizes different features of Burke's thought. In particular Kennedy emphasizes change through respect for tradition that results from discussion and lived experience--as opposed to change that occurs through violence and revolutionary upheaval. Kennedy emphasizes the natural evolution and growth of previous commitments through debate, contestation and social practice. Our commitments evolve as they we apply them to changed factual circumstances and our wisdom grows through encountering those changed circumstances in practical terms. We can have greater confidence in our judgments achieved in this way because, unlike previous generations, we have the benefit of their experience, while they do not have the benefit of ours.
Instapaper  US_constitution  SCOTUS  constitutional_law  tradition  Burke  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  rights-legal  legal_reasoning  marriage  family  family_law  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Dr. Ahmad Shafaat - What is Riba | Islamic Perspectives
Begun January 2005, slowly adding additional chapters -- This bookmark is for the Introduction -' Planned Contents -- Part I – RIBA IN THE QUR`AN *-* I - The Qur`an And The Authentic Ahadith Do Not Define Riba. *-* II - Riba In Pre-Islamic Arabia. *-* III - Riba In The Qur`an – A Detailed Examination of Relevant Verses [PDF Document] *-* IV - Riba In The Qur`an – A Closer Examination of Some Relevant Issues. *-* V- Usury/Interest In Other Societies. **--** Part II – RIBA IN THE HADITH. *-* VI -Ahadith About Husn al-Qada` *-* VII- Ahadith About Riba – An Overview. *-* VIII -Ahadith About Riba – An Examination Of Their Transmission (Naql) *-* IX- Ahadith About Riba – Making Sense Of Them. *-* Conclusion. -- We can hardly doubt that in the Qur`an riba is some kind of increase in the amount of a loan. But what is its precise nature? The commonly held traditional view is that riba is simply interest, that is, any increase in the loan required by the lender as a condition for advancing the loan. But many commonly held views, when they are scrutinized in the light of three primary sources of Islam – the Qur`an, authentic ahadith, and reason -- turn out to be either fundamentally flawed or harmful oversimplifications. Is the commonly accepted definition of riba one of the exceptions? Unfortunately, not. It turns out that this definition is a harmful oversimplification.
Islam  Islamic_law  Islamic_finance  credit  creditors  investment  investors  risk  risk_premiums  interest_rates  usury  theology  legal_reasoning  Qur'an  Hadith 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Emmanuelle de Champs - Enlightenment and Utility: Bentham in French, Bentham in France (to be released March 2015) | Ideas in Context series | Cambridge University Press
Jeremy Bentham (..) was a seminal figure in the history of modern political thought. This lively monograph presents the numerous French connections of an emblematic British thinker. (..) Placing Bentham's thought in the context of the French-language Enlightenment through to the post-Revolutionary era, (..) the case for a historical study of 'Global Bentham'. Examining previously unpublished sources, she traces the circulation of Bentham's letters, friends, manuscripts, and books in the French-speaking world. (..) transnational intellectual history reveals how utilitarianism, as a doctrine, was both the product of, and a contribution to, French-language political thought at a key time(..). The debates (re) utilitarianism in France cast new light on the making of modern Liberalism. **--** Intro **--** Part I. An Englishman in the Republic of Letters: 1. Languages of Enlightenment *-* 2. Satire and polemics *-* 3. Defining utilitarianism: private connections and correspondence **--** Part II. 'Projet d'un corps de loix complet' and the Reform of Jurisprudence in Europe: 4. The Genesis of Projet *-* 5. Projet in Enlightenment legal thought *-* 6. The politics of legal reform **--** Part III. Reflections for the Revolution in France: 7. Frenchmen and Francophiles: Lord Lansdowne's network *-* 8. British expertise for French legislators *-* 9. Utility, rights and revolution: missed encounters? **--** Part IV. Utile Dulcis? Bentham in Paris, 1802: 10. Dumont's editorship: from the Bibliothèque Britannique to Traités de législation civile et pénale *-* 11. A mixed reception *-* 12. Autumn 1802: Bentham in Paris **--** Part V. Liberty, Utility and Rights (1815–1832): 13. 'For one disciple in this country, I have 50 at least in France' *-* 14. Utilitarian arguments in French politics *-* 15. A Utilitarian moment? French liberals and utilitarianism *-* Epilogue: Bentham in the July Revolution *-* Conclusion -- marketing materials not yet available
books  find  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_economy  legal_theory  18thC  19thC  British_history  France  French_Enlightenment  Enlightenment  Bentham  utilitarianism  utility  reform-political  reform-social  reform-legal  reform-economic  jurisprudence  civil_code  Republic_of_Letters  networks-policy  networks-information  Anglo-French  British_foreign_policy  diplomats  diplomacy-environment  francophile  Landsdowne_Marquis_of  faction  British_politics  patrons  patronage  elite_culture  cross-border  cultural_history  cultural_influence  technical_assistance  criminal_justice  liberalism  rights-legal  rights-political  civil_law  civil_liberties  civil_society  French_Revolutionary_Wars  Peace_of_Amiens  Napoleonic_Wars  Restoration-France  bourgeoisie  July_Monarchy  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - What is Law? :: SSRN - Jan 2015
Brian Z. Tamanaha -- Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-01-01 -- Theorists who tackle “What is law?” usually acknowledge the difficulty of the question, then, with hardly a pause, launch into their proposed answer. Instead, focusing on three main categories of concepts of law, I examine in detail why previous attempts have failed to achieve a consensus. Several factors have contributed. One source of disagreement involves clashes among intuitions about law. Further problems are created by the narrowness of functional analysis, on which nearly all concepts of law are based. Confusion also arises because law shares basic characteristics with many social institutions, as I show drawing on insights from the philosophy of society. Theorists also typically fail to recognize two distinct orientations of law, and multiple forms of law, which singular concepts of law cannot accommodate. Finally, variability and change owing to the social-historical nature of law defeats efforts of legal philosophers to identify essential features and universally true concepts of law. At the conclusion I present a way of understanding law that emerges out of the lessons learned from past unsuccessful efforts. -- topic headings in the essay: Three Categories of the Concept of Law; Pivotal Role of Intuitions About Law; Over-Inclusiveness of Functionalism; Under-Inclusiveness of Functionalism; Why Functionalism Cannot Answer ‘What is Law?’; Error of Conflating ‘Rule System’ and ‘Legal System’; Law as Part of the Institutional Substrate of Society; State Law’s Two Orientations; Coexisting Multiple Legal Forms; Necessary and Essential Features Or Typical Features; Universal Application Versus Universal Truth; What is Law -- No. Pages: 49 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, philosophy of law, law and society, legal anthropology, legal sociology, legal history, and comparative law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_culture  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  legal_validity  functionalism  institutions  institutional_change  social_order  universalism  normativity  norms  custom  customary_law  sociology_of_law  comparative_law  concepts  concepts-change  rule_of_law  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Scott Hershovitz - The End of Jurisprudence :: SSRN - Oct 2014
Via Brian Tamanaha -- Scott Hershovitz, University of Michigan Law School -- Yale Law Journal, Forthcoming -- For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the Hart-Dworkin debate. The debate starts from the premise that our legal practices generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal, and the question at issue is how their content is determined. Positivists say that their content is determined ultimately or exclusively by social facts. Anti-positivists say that moral facts must play a part in determining their content. In this Essay, I argue that the debate rests on a mistake. Our legal practices do not generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal. At best, they generate moral rights and obligations, some of which we label legal. I defend this view by drawing analogies with other normative practices, like making promises, posting rules, and playing games. And I try to explain why it looks like legal practices generate distinctively legal rights and obligations even though they do not. I conclude with some thoughts about the questions jurisprudence should pursue in the wake of the Hart-Dworkin debate. -- Number of Pages: 63 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Hart-Dworkin Debate, legal positivism, anti-positivism, philosophy of law
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  Hart  Dworkin  judiciary  legal_theory  legal_culture  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  sociology_of_law  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  morality-objective  legal_validity  rights-political  rights-legal  natural_law  Wittgenstein  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Law's Evolution and Law as Custom by William A. Edmundson :: SSRN
William A. Edmundson, Georgia State University College of Law -- 51 San Diego L. Rev. (December 2014, Forthcoming). -- Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-15 -- Legal discourse centrally involves a family of normative expressions – “obligation,” “right,” “permission,” and so on – whose surface grammar parallels that of moral discourse. Is the normativity of legal discourse then a moral normativity? Or is it a distinct type of normativity altogether? (..) Custom is among the sources of law. That much is agreed. But custom can also be law, independently of promulgation, or so many believe. (..) Insofar as a customary norm is (or becomes) a legal norm, does it manifest (or acquire) a different kind of normativity? Or does its original normativity contribute to the normativity of law? Another set of questions has to do with custom as a condition of legal validity. [Different positions of Kelsen and Hart] I will explore the hypothesis that every legally normative utterance resolves into one expressing (a) custom-implicating moral normativity, (b) custom-extending moral normativity, or (c) normativity “in the manifesto sense” (to enlist a phrase of Joel Feinberg’s). If this is correct, there is no such thing as a distinctively legal brand of normativity. -- No. Pages: 30 -- Keywords: legal theory, legal philosophy, philosophy of law, normativity, norm, custom, validity, moral, desuetudo, moral philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_culture  sociology_of_law  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  morality-objective  legal_validity  norms  custom  customary_law  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Roger Cotterrell - Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy :: SSRN - January 24, 2014
Via Brian Tamanaha -- Roger Cotterrell, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law -- Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, Forthcoming - Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 169/2014 -- The aim of this paper is to describe and defend jurisprudence as an enterprise of theorising about law that is distinct from what is now understood as legal philosophy in the Anglophone world. Jurisprudence must draw on legal philosophy but also from many other resources. It should be an open quest for juristically (rather than philosophically) significant insights about law. Its purpose is to inform and guide the juristic task of making organised social regulation a valuable practice, rooted and effective in the specific contexts and historical conditions in which it exists but also aimed at serving demands for justice and security through regulation, as these perennial values are understood in their time and place, and as they might be further clarified and reconciled as legal ideals. - Number of Pages: 18 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence; legal philosophy; contemporary legal positivism; universalism; legal naturalism; law in context; socio-legal perspectives; bricolage; jurists. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  judiciary  legal_theory  legal_culture  justice  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  universalism  natural_law  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Stephan W. Schill - The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within :: SSRN June 4, 2014
Max Planck Institute for International Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/02. *--* In reaction to a summary of five different paths for investment law reform made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in June 2013, which focused on institutional reforms of investor-State dispute settlement, the present paper sketches out a sixth path for investment law reform that is based on a system-internal reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a form of public law-based judicial review. It can be reformed, the paper argues, by arbitrators and parties making increasing use of comparative public law methodology that allows them to draw on the experience of more sophisticated systems of public law adjudication at the national and international level without the need for institutional reform to investor-State arbitration. First, the paper points out the benefits of the existing system of investor-State arbitration, in order to show that investor-State arbitration is an institution worth reforming from within. Second, the paper lays out the basic framework to reconceptualize investment law as a system of public law and governance and point out shortcomings in the currently prevailing approaches to understanding investor-State arbitration. Third, the paper indicates the methodological consequences of a reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a public law system of governance, namely the need for arbitrators to make increased use of comparative public law in resolving disputes. Finally, the paper shows how public law ideas and comparative public law methodology can be brought into investment arbitration in its present form and why arbitrators have an interest in conforming to these standards even without fundamental institutional reform. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 - Keywords: investment treaties, international investment law, investor-state arbitration, investment law - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  international_finance  capital_markets  investment  sovereign_debt  investor-State_disputes  FDI  dispute_resolution  arbitration  global_governance  comparative_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  reform-legal  treaties  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Francis Joseph Mootz - Hermeneutics and Law (June 30, 2014) in The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics (Eds. Naill Keane and Chris Lawn, 2015) :: SSRN
University of the Pacific - McGeorge School of Law -- This chapter will appear in a forthcoming book on hermeneutics. After providing a hermeneutical phenomenology of legal practice that locates legal interpretation at the center of the rule of law, the chapter considers three important hermeneutical themes: (1) the critical distinction between a legal historian writing aboout a law in the past and a judge deciding a case according to the law; (2) the reinvigoration of the natural law tradition against the reductive characteristics of legal positivism by construing human nature as hermeneutical; and. (3) the role of philosophical hermeneutics in grounding critical legal theory rather than serving as a quiescent acceptance of the status quo, as elaborated by reconsidering the famous exchanges between Gadamer, Ricoeur and Habermas. -- I argue that these three important themes are sufficient to underwrite Gadamer's famous assertion that legal practice has exemplary status for hermeneutical theory. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  historiography  lit_crit  critical_theory  legal_reasoning  judiciary  precedent  hermeneutics  natural_law  positivism-legal  legal_realism  rhetoric-writing  human_nature  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  Gadamer  Habermas  Ricoeur  Heidegger  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Paskey - The Law is Made of Stories: Erasing the False Dichotomy between Stories and Legal Rules (May 30, 2014) :: SSRN
SUNY Buffalo Law School -- Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JALWD, vol. 11 (Fall 2014, Forthcoming) - SUNY Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-031 -- When lawyers think of legal analysis, they think chiefly of logic and reason. Stories are secondary. As Michael Smith explains, our legal system “is not founded on narrative reasoning” but on “a commitment to the rule of law.” The article suggests that this dichotomy between “rule-based reasoning” and “narrative reasoning” is false, and that narrative and stories are central to legal reasoning, including rule-based reasoning. In doing so, the article uses literary narrative theory to show that every governing legal rule has the structure of a “stock story”: the elements of the rule correspond to elements of a story. It follows that lawyers do not rely on stories simply because they are persuasive. They do so because a story is literally embedded in the structure of governing rules, and those rules can be satisfied only by telling a story. Thus, many analytical moves we label “rule-based reasoning” can be understood as a type of narrative reasoning, in which a client’s story is compared to and contrasted with the stock story embedded in the rule. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  narrative  legal_reasoning  logic  precedent  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, vol. 2 of 2 (Books 3 & 4) (1893 ed with selected notes from prior editors ) - Online Library of Liberty
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In Two Volumes. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893). 07/17/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2142> -- A two volume edition of the classic work on English law by Blackstone. This edition is interesting because it includes the commentaries of at least 5 previous editors of Blackstone’s work along with additional notes by Sharswood, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Vol. 2 contains Book III on Private Wrongs, and Book IV on Pubic Wrongs. -- downloaded mobi version of book scan OCR
books  etexts  common_law  British_history  18thC  legal_system  legal_history  legal_reasoning 
july 2014 by dunnettreader

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