dunnettreader + investors   59

Psychologists at the Gate: Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2012) | Andrei Shleifer - J of Econ Lit
Shleifer, Andrei. 2012. “Psychologists at the Gate: Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow.” Journal of Economic Literature 50 (4): 1080-1091. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
investors  cognition  neuroscience  reviews  books  credit  cognitive_bias  cognitive_science  financial_regulation  Minsky  risk_assessment  asset_prices  bubbles  creditors  downloaded  financial_system  credit_booms  behavioral_economics  financial_crisis 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer - Salience and Asset Prices (2013) | Andrei Shleifer - Am Econ Rev Papers
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. 2013. “Salience and Asset Prices.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 103 (3): 623-628. -- In Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012a)— henceforth, BGS (2012a)—we described a new approach to choice under risk that we called salience theory. In comparisons of risky lotter- ies, we argued, individuals’ attention is drawn to those payoffs which are most different or salient relative to the average. In making choices, indi- viduals overweight these salient payoffs relative to their objective probabilities. A simple for- malization of such salience-based probability weighting provides an intuitive account of a vari- ety of puzzling evidence in decision theory, such as Allais paradoxes and preference reversals.
Salience theory naturally lends itself to the analysis of the demand for risky assets. After all, risky assets are lotteries evaluated in a context described by the alternative investments avail- able in the market. An asset’s salient payoff is naturally de ned as one most different from the average market payoff in a given state of the world. We present a simple model of inves- tor choice and market equilibrium in which salience in uences the demand for risky assets. This model accounts for several time series and cross-sectional puzzles in nance in an intuitive way, based on its key implication that extreme payoffs receive disproportionate weight in the market valuation of assets. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
downloaded  risk_management  investors  investment  cognitive_bias  behavioral_economics  article  cognition  risk  heuristics  asset_prices 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Pedro Bordalo, Katherine Coffman, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer - “Stereotypes” (Forthcoming 2016) Quarterly Journal of Economics
Citation:
Bordalo, Pedro, Katherine Coffman, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. Forthcoming. “Stereotypes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. -- We present a model of stereotypes based on Kahneman and Tversky’s representative-ness heuristic. A decision maker assesses a target group by overweighting its representative types, defined as the types that occur more frequently in that group than in a baseline ref-erence group. Stereotypes formed in this way contain a “kernel of truth”: they are rooted in true di˙erences between groups. Because stereotypes focus on di˙erences, they cause belief distortions, particularly when groups are similar. Stereotypes are also context dependent: beliefs about a group depend on the characteristics of the reference group. In line with our predictions, beliefs in the lab about abstract groups and beliefs in the field about political groups are context dependent and distorted in the direction of representative types. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
behavioral_economics  cognitive_bias  credit_crunch  financial_system  article  heuristics  bubbles  credit_booms  downloaded  cognition  investors  capital_markets 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer - Diagnostic Expectations and Credit Cycles - WP June 2016 version
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. Working Paper. “Diagnostic Expectations and Credit Cycles”.Abstract
We present a model of credit cycles arising from diagnostic expectations – a belief formation mechanism based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) representativeness heuristic. In this formulation, when forming their beliefs agents overweight future outcomes that have become more likely in light of incoming data. The model reconciles extrapolation and neglect of risk in a unified framework. Diagnostic expectations are forward looking, and as such are immune to the Lucas critique and nest rational expectations as a special case. In our model of credit cycles, credit spreads are excessively volatile, over-react to news, and are subject to predictable reversals. These dynamics can account for several features of credit cycles and macroeconomic volatility
PDF, revised June 2016 -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
financial_system  bubbles  creditors  investors  leverage  credit_crunch  paper  capital_markets  debt_crisis  consumer_demand  debt-overhang  banking  reallocation-labor  demand-side  credit_booms  downloaded  debt-restructuring  reallocation-capital  financial_crisis  investment 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Gennaioli, Nicola, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny - Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Financial Crises (2015) | Andrei Shleifer - pre-pub pdf
We model a financial market in which investor beliefs are shaped by representativeness. Investors overreact to a series of good news, because such a series is representative of a good state. A few bad news do not change investor minds because the good state is still representative, but enough bad news leads to a radical change in beliefs and a financial crisis. The model generates debt over-issuance, "this time is different" beliefs, neglect of tail risks, under- and over-reaction to information, boom-bust cycles, and excess volatility of prices in a unified psychological model of expectations.
Citation
Gennaioli, Nicola, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 2015. "Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Financial Crises." American Economic Review, 105(5): 310-14.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151091
Downloaded pre-pub pdf via iPhone to DBOX
financial_crisis  investors  Minsky  investment  credit_booms  financial_system  downloaded  article  capital_markets 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
D. Georgarakos
Trust, Sociability, and Stock Market Participation
Dimitris Georgarakos1 and
Giacomo Pasini2
1Goethe University Frankfurt and Center for Financial Studies
2Venice University
Review of Finance (2011) 15 (4): 693-725. doi: 10.1093/rof/rfr028 -- This article investigates the importance of both trust and sociability for stock market participation and for differences in stockholding across Europe. We estimate significant effects for the two, and find that sociability can partly balance the discouragement effect on stockholding induced by low regional prevailing trust. We test for exogeneity of trust and sociability indicators using variation in history of political institutions and in frequency of contacts with grandchildren, respectively. Moreover, the effect of trust is stronger in countries with limited participation and low average trust, offering an explanation for the remarkably low stockholding rates of the wealthy living therein. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
trust  sociability  investors  financial_system  article  capital_markets  investment  behavioral_economics  downloaded 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
O Blanchard, J D Ostry, AR Ghosh, M Chamon - Macro effects of capital inflows: Capital type matters | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 26 November 2015
Some scholars view capital inflows as contractionary, but many policymakers view them as expansionary. Evidence supports the policymakers. This column introduces an analytic framework that knits together the two views. For a given policy rate, bond inflows lead to currency appreciation and are contractionary, while non-bond inflows lead to an appreciation but also to a decrease in the cost of borrowing, and thus may be expansionary.
paper  capital_flows  emerging_markets  capital_markets  monetary_policy  interest_rates  FX-rate_management  banking  FDI  portfolio  _investment  investors 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Mike Konczal, J.W. Mason, Amanda Page-Hoongrajok - Ending Short-Termism: An Investment Agenda for Growth - Roosevelt Institute - Nov 2015
The first part of this agenda will directly counter several of the specific trends known to increase short-termism. It will include ideas that are broadly applicable across industries, such as policies to address skyrocketing CEO pay, as well as more targeted solutions. A policy agenda to address corporate short-termism requires a comprehensive approach focused on building countervailing power, which is addressed in the second part of our proposal. The forces that push firms toward shorttermism will persist and find new ways to exert power, but the reforms outlined in this paper embrace wide-scale, long-term changes, such as granting workers power on boards, designed to attract long-term stakeholders. The agenda also includes practical, simple policy changes for regulators.The third part of our agenda contains solutions that point to a new role for the state. Taxes and full employment are two obvious and necessary ways of checking short-termism, and if companies are less interested in investment, government needs to fill in that gap, whether by providing high-speed cable or funding basic research. -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_economy  investment  investors  capital_markets  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  shareholders  short-termism  financial_system  equity_markets  capital_formation  capital_allocation  executive_compensation  debt  buybacks  tax_policy  Labor_markets  labor_share  unions  investment-government  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
J.W. Mason - Understanding Short-Termism: Questions and Consequences - Roosevelt Institute - Nov 2015
addresses the most common objections to the idea that short-termism is a serious problem for the US economy. These objections fall into 3 broad categories: short-termism is not real (because of an apparent increase in business investment), short-termism is not harmful (because increased payouts allocate capital more efficiently), and short-termism is not our problem (because shareholders alone should determine what to do with a corporation’s surplus funds). J.W. Mason provides answers to 12 common questions about short-termism and shareholder payouts. Questions 1 and 2 reflect the first objection, Questions 3 through 7 reflect the second objection, and questions 8 through 12 reflect the third objection. Drawing on the best available data, he concludes that none of these objections hold up under scrutiny.This report is part of the Roosevelt Institute’s comprehensive Rewriting the Rules agenda, which aims to level the playing field and grow the economy. A companion report, “Ending Short-Termism,” develops a policy agenda to respond to this challenge -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_economy  investment  investors  capital_markets  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  shareholders  short-termism  financial_system  equity_markets  capital_formation  capital_allocation  executive_compensation  debt  buybacks  tax_policy  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Guillaume Vuillemey, review - Nicolas Buat, John Law: La dette ou comment s’en débarrasser - La Vie des idées - 8 juillet
Recensé : Nicolas Buat, John Law – La dette ou comment s’en débarrasser, Les Belles Lettres, Collection « Penseurs de la liberté », 2015, 272 p., 21 €.
-- Mots-clés : dette | monnaie | banques | XVIIIe siècle -- John Law a laissé son nom associé à un scandale financier considérable. Nicolas Buat retrace sa vie aventureuse, et ses projets ambitieux pour dynamiser l’économie et éteindre la dette de la France. -- Que l’on cherche à tirer de l’histoire de grands enseignements, ou que l’on se satisfasse d’y contempler une galerie de portraits et de tableaux sans conséquences pour notre temps, on ne peut demeurer indifférent au personnage de John Law. Le récent ouvrage biographique de Nicolas Buat – conservateur en chef des Archives de Paris – nous invite à le redécouvrir. S’il s’inscrit dans une série déjà relativement longue de travaux consacrés à Law (dont le plus connu est certainement le livre d’Edgar Faure, La Banqueroute de Law, paru en 1977), son grand mérite est de nous plonger dans l’atmosphère bouillonnante de la Régence, sans perdre le lecteur dans de trop pointilleuses descriptions du « Système » mis en place entre 1716 et 1720. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  French_language  political_economy  18thC  biography  Law_John  French_government  French_politics  money  monetary_theory  monetary_policy  sovereign_debt  default  Mississippi_Company  bubbles  banking  currency  investors  Regency-France  financial_system  financial_crisis  capital_markets  financial_innovation  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Updating the Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) - OECD
Investment policy reviews are conducted using OECD investment instruments and - since its adoption in 2006 - the Policy Framework for Investment. Using a process of peer examination, the OECD Investment Committee has published investment policy reviews since 1993. Priority countries for review are those showing potential for adherence to the OECD investment instruments. ‌Since the PFI was agreed in 2006, new forces have reshaped the global investment landscape, including the global economic and financial crisis, which started in 2008 and from which many economies have still not recovered, the emergence of new major outward investors within the G20, the spread of global value chains, and signs that pressures for investment protectionism are on the rise. Numerous lessons have also been learnt through the use of the PFI, particularly in developing and emerging economies. The PFI has been updated to reflect these new global economic fundamentals and was released in Paris on 3 June 2015 at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting. 4/6/2015 - More than 25 countries have used the PFI when engaging in investment policy reviews. The experiences of these countries were used as an integral part of the multi-stakeholder update of the PFI which is now complete. -- pdf links for revised PFI and a "background to the uodate" -- downloaded pdf to Note on Action Taken using PFI guidance
report  OECD  OECD_economies  LDCs  emerging_markets  policymaking  public_policy  investment  investors  FDI  value-chains  supply-side  supply_chains  globalization  regulation-harmonization  trade-policy  financial_sector_development  capital_flows  international_political_economy  international_finance  international_organizations  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Reinier Kraakman, Bernard S. Black - A Self Enforcing Model of Corporate Law :: SSRN - Harvard Law Review, vol. 109, pp. 1911-1982, 1996
This paper develops a "self-enforcing" approach to drafting corporate law for emerging capitalist economies, based on a case study: a model statute that we helped to develop for the Russian Federation, which formed the basis for the recently adopted Russian law on joint-stock companies. The paper describes the contextual features of emerging economies that make importing statutes from developed countries inappropriate, including the prevalence of controlled companies and the weakness of institutional, market, cultural, and legal constraints. Against this backdrop, we argue that the best legal strategy for protecting outside investors in emerging economies while simultaneously preserving the discretion of companies to invest is a self-enforcing model of corporate law. The self-enforcing model structures decisionmaking processes to allow large outside shareholders to protect themselves from insider opportunism with minimal resort to legal authority, including the courts. Among the examples of self-regulatory statutory provisions are a mandatory cumulative voting rule for the selection of directors, which assures that minority blockholders in controlled companies have board representation, and dual shareholder- and board-level approval procedures for self-interested transactions. The paper also examines how one can induce voluntary compliance and structure remedies in emerging economies, as well as the implications of the self-enforcing model for the ongoing debate over the efficiency of corporate law in developed economies. -- PDF File: 73 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_governance  investor_protection  investors  capital_markets  emerging_markets  transition_economies  Russia  privatization  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - OECD: Activist Shareholders Are Bad for Investment | Slackwire June 2015
The OECD has just released its new Business and Finance Outlook for 2015. A lot of interesting stuff there. We’ll want to take a closer look at the discussion… Focuses on chapter of report
Instapaper  report  OECD  OECD_economies  investors  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  hedge_funds  investment  asset_prices  asset_stripping  short-termism  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Anne Beatty, Scott Liao - Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Review of the Empirical Literature:: SSRN October 23, 2013
Anne Beatty, Ohio State - Dept of Accounting & Management Information Systems; Scott Liao, U of Toronto, Rotman School of Management -- Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2346752 -- We survey research on financial accounting in the banking industry. After providing a brief background of the micro-economic theories of the economic role of banks, why bank capital is regulated, and how the accounting regime affects banks’ economic decisions, we review three streams of empirical research. Specifically we focus on research examining the relation between bank financial reporting and the valuation and risk assessments of outside equity and debt, the relation between bank financial reporting discretion, regulatory capital and earnings management, and banks’ economic decisions under differing accounting regimes. We provide our views about what we have learned from this research and about what else we would like to know. We also provide some empirical analyses of the various models that have been used to estimate discretion in the loan loss provision. We further discuss the inherent challenges associated with predicting how bank behavior will respond under alternative accounting and regulatory capital regimes.-- PDF File: 121 -- Keywords: financial accounting; bank regulatory capital; information asymmetry -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  banking  disclosure  accounting  capital_adequacy  asset_prices  risk  investors  leverage  incentives  incentives-distortions  balance_sheet  Basle 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lyman Johnson, David Millon - Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries :: SSRN - William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 46, 2005
Lyman Johnson, Washington and Lee U Law School; U of St. Thomas, St. Paul/Minneapolis, MN - School of Law -- David Millon,Washington and Lee U Law School -- For all the recent federal attention to ...corporate officer and director functions, ... state fiduciary duty law makes no distinction between the fiduciary duties of these two groups. (..) The thesis of this article is that corporate officers are fiduciaries because they are agents. (..) drawing on the fiduciary duties of agents for guidance in fashioning modern understandings of corporate officer duties - and differentiating those duties from those of directors - can provide much-needed structure to what otherwise threatens to be an ad hoc enterprise. There are at least 3 benefits of our thesis. (1) state law remains the primary source for establishing the basic framework of corporate governance relations, both through corporate statutes and through judge-made fiduciary duty law. (..) (2) our thesis clarifies immensely why courts can and should more closely scrutinize officer conduct than they now review director performance (..). (3) At a theoretical level, ...our thesis has several implications. (..) we are entering an era when, due to heavier corporate regulation, the entity conception of the firm will be strengthened, as positive law, including agency law, still builds on that understanding of corporate relations. This period follows a span of perhaps 20 years when a highly disaggregated conception of corporate relations - the nexus of contracts theory - has predominated. We also believe that in the policy arguments for and against strong fiduciary duties over the years, virtually no attention has been given to distinguishing whether what is fitting for outside directors in the fiduciary duty area - relatively slack duties - is also fitting for corporate officers. -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  corporate_law  financial_regulation  capital_markets  fiduciaries  principal-agent  agents  duties-legal  officers-&-directors  corporate_governance  shareholders  investors  state_law  federalism  federal_preemption  SEC  SROs  corporate_personhood  directors  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  conflict_of_interest  legal_remedies  law-and-economics  law-and-finance 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Misrepresentation of Earnings by Ilia D. Dichev, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Shivaram Rajgopal :: SSRN June 2, 2015
Ilia D. Dichev, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- John R. Graham, Duke University; NBER -- Campbell R. Harvey, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; NBER -- Shivaram Rajgopal, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- We ask nearly 400 CFOs about the definition and drivers of earnings quality, with a special emphasis on the prevalence and detection of earnings misrepresentation. CFOs believe that the hallmarks of earnings quality are sustainability, absence of one-time items, and backing by actual cash flows. Earnings quality is determined in about equal measure by controllable factors like internal controls and corporate governance, and non-controllable factors like industry membership and macroeconomic conditions. On earnings misrepresentation, CFOs believe that in any given period a remarkable 20% of firms intentionally distort earnings, even though they are adhering to generally accepted accounting principles. The economic magnitude of the misrepresentation is large, averaging about 10% of reported earnings. While most misrepresentation involves earnings overstatement, interestingly, one third of the firms that are misrepresenting performance are low-balling their earnings or reversing a prior intentional overstatement. Finally, CFOs provide a list of red flags that can be used to detect earnings misrepresentation. --"PDF File: 23 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  disclosure  accounting  GAAP  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  business-norms  business-ethics  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  profits  investors  investor_protection  incentives-distortions 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Edward B. Rock - Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance (Jan 2015) :: SSRN - Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and Governance, 2015, Forthcoming
Penn Law School -- chapter examines the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and the role of regulation in encouraging institutional investors to become active stewards. (..) what lessons we can draw from the US experience for the EU’s 2014 proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive.(...) survey how institutional investors themselves are governed and how they organize share voting. (...) 2 central questions: (a) why, over the last 25 years, have institutional investors not fulfilled the optimists’ hopes?; and (b) can the core incentive problems that subvert Institutional Investor activism be cured by regulation? The US experience [substantial deregulation led to only modest increases in shareholder activism], suggests (..) institutional investors’ relative passivity is a fundamental lack of incentives. I examine the disappointing results of the SEC’s long experiment with incentivizing mutual funds to vote their shares (...) the EU efforts are likely to be similarly disappointing. I then examine the important role that hedge funds now play in catalyzing institutional shareholders, and consider some of the risks in relying on such highly incentivized actors. -- PDF File: 26 -- saved to briefcase
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  financial_economics  financial_regulation  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_finance  capital_markets  corporate_control_markets  institutional_investors  shareholders  shareholder_voting  mutual_funds  incentives  activist_investors  investors  hedge_funds  proxies  comparative_law  administrative_law  EU-law  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  fiduciaries  profit_maximization  EU-regulation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Margaret Blair - What must corporate directors do? Maximizing shareholder value versus creating value through team production | Brookings Institution - June 2015
Blair reviews the legal and economic theories behind the share-value maximization norm, and then lays out a theory of corporate law building on the economics of team production. Arguing that the corporate form itself helps solve the team production problem, Blair details five features which distinguish corporations from other organizational forms: 1. Legal personality -- 2. Limited liability -- 3. Transferable shares -- 4. Management under a Board of Directors -- 5. Indefinite existence -- Blair concludes that these five characteristics are all problematic from a principal-agent point of view where shareholders are principals. However, the team production theory makes sense out of these arrangements. This theory provides a rationale for the role of corporate directors consistent with the role that boards of directors historically understood themselves to play: balancing competing interests so the whole organization stays productive. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  shareholder_value  hedge_funds  corporate_law  firms-theory  firms-structure  equity-corporate  equity_markets  investors  long-term_orientation  labor_share  cooperation  coordination  teams  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang - The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism | NBER June 2015
NBER Working Paper No. 21227 -- We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance—the claim that interventions by activist hedge funds have a negative effect on the long-term shareholder value and corporate performance. We subject this claim to a comprehensive empirical investigation, examining a long five-year window following activist interventions, and we find that the claim is not supported by the data. We find no evidence that activist interventions, including the investment-limiting and adversarial interventions that are most resisted and criticized, are followed by short-term gains in performance that come at the expense of long-term performance. We also find no evidence that the initial positive stock-price spike accompanying activist interventions tends to be followed by negative abnormal returns in the long term; to the contrary, the evidence is consistent with the initial spike reflecting correctly the intervention’s long-term consequences. Similarly, we find no evidence for pump-and-dump patterns in which the exit of an activist is followed by abnormal long-term negative returns. Our findings have significant implications for ongoing policy debates.
paper  paywall  corporate_governance  hedge_funds  investors  long-term_orientation  equity-corporate  equity_markets 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Perlstein - Social Capital, Corporate Purpose, and the Revival of American Capitalism | Brookings Institution - January 2014
Since the Great Recession of 2008, corporate profits have more than rebounded, and yet the rest of the American economy has struggled to recover. Widening income inequality and an erosion of social capital and economic trust has deprived capitalism of its moral high ground. The public has lost confidence in big businesses--asking what purpose they serve in society writ large. Pearlstein argues we can begin to restoring the economic and moral legitimacy of American capitalism by reconsidering the purpose of corporations in American life. Despite the current dominance of the theory of “maximizing shareholder value,” this idea has little basis in history or law. Shifting to a more balanced form of capitalism will take time, but some possible steps for reform include: #-# Support investment funds dedicated to long-term horizons, including socially responsible investment funds #-# Recalibrate corporate governance law to allow for more flexible decision making #-# Rebalance capital gains taxes to encourage long-term stock holding by investors #-# Explore regulatory options for financial services, like a financial transaction tax to dampen the influence of short-term trading #-# Encourage a wider range of corporate metrics beyond quarterly earnings guidance #-# Reform shareholder voting rights to foster a sense of stewardship -- didn't download it -- Brookings also has video of Perlstein in Charlie Rose
paper  video  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  corporate_finance  corporate_law  corporate_tax  financial_crisis  investors  institutional_investors  shareholder_value  capital_markets  shareholder_voting  capital_gains  financial_transaction_tax  short-termism  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, George Serafeim - Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional Perspective (revised September 2014) :: SSRN
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* Chapter in Stewardship of the Future, edited by Ed Lawler, Sue Mohrman, and James O’Toole, Greenleaf, 2015. *--* In this paper, we present the two primary functions of corporate reporting (information and transformation) and why currently isolated financial and sustainability reporting are not likely to perform effectively those functions. We describe the concept of integrated reporting and why integrated reporting could be a superior mechanism to perform these functions. Moreover, we discuss, through a series of case studies, what constitutes an effective integrated report (Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company) and the role of regulation in integrated reporting (Anglo-American). -- Pages in PDF File: 21 -- Keywords: corporate reporting, integrated reporting, information, investing, sustainability, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  CSR  sustainability  accounting  disclosure  disclosure-integrated  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  information-markets  investors  risk_management  institutional_change  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Dr. Ahmad Shafaat - What is Riba | Islamic Perspectives
Begun January 2005, slowly adding additional chapters -- This bookmark is for the Introduction -' Planned Contents -- Part I – RIBA IN THE QUR`AN *-* I - The Qur`an And The Authentic Ahadith Do Not Define Riba. *-* II - Riba In Pre-Islamic Arabia. *-* III - Riba In The Qur`an – A Detailed Examination of Relevant Verses [PDF Document] *-* IV - Riba In The Qur`an – A Closer Examination of Some Relevant Issues. *-* V- Usury/Interest In Other Societies. **--** Part II – RIBA IN THE HADITH. *-* VI -Ahadith About Husn al-Qada` *-* VII- Ahadith About Riba – An Overview. *-* VIII -Ahadith About Riba – An Examination Of Their Transmission (Naql) *-* IX- Ahadith About Riba – Making Sense Of Them. *-* Conclusion. -- We can hardly doubt that in the Qur`an riba is some kind of increase in the amount of a loan. But what is its precise nature? The commonly held traditional view is that riba is simply interest, that is, any increase in the loan required by the lender as a condition for advancing the loan. But many commonly held views, when they are scrutinized in the light of three primary sources of Islam – the Qur`an, authentic ahadith, and reason -- turn out to be either fundamentally flawed or harmful oversimplifications. Is the commonly accepted definition of riba one of the exceptions? Unfortunately, not. It turns out that this definition is a harmful oversimplification.
Islam  Islamic_law  Islamic_finance  credit  creditors  investment  investors  risk  risk_premiums  interest_rates  usury  theology  legal_reasoning  Qur'an  Hadith 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Gennaioli Shleifer and Vishny - Money Doctors (2015) | Andrei Shleifer
2015. “Money Doctors.” Journal of Finance 70 (1): 91-114.
Abstract
We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor’s perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average under perform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
investors  risk-mitigation  risk_premiums  risk  liquidity  long-term  article  benchmarks  consumer_demand  institutional_investors  asset_prices  trust  capital_markets  financial_instiutions  risk_management  flight-to-quality  behavioral_economics  investment  management_fees  financial_innovation  downloaded  risk_assessment  asset_management 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Nick Bunker - Mortgage fraud, income growth, and credit supply | Feb 11, 2015 - Washington Center for Equitable Growth
Earlier this year, a new working paper cast doubt on one of the dominant explanations of the reasons for the 2002-2006 housing bubble in the United States—that growth in mortgage credit and income growth uncoupled as credit flowed to areas to with declining income growth. Instead, economists Manuel Adelino of Duke University, Antoinette Schoar of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Felipe Severino of Dartmouth College, argue that the cause of the increase on household debt was a classic speculative mania. But a new paper by economists Atif Mian of Princeton University and Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago questions this view of the debt build-up. The seeming flaws in the dominant narrative that an increase in the supply of credit caused the bubble, they say, can be explained by one thing: mortgage fraud. -- Bunker links to both papers - didn't download but will follow debate via "House of Debt" blog
paper  21stC  US_economy  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  housing  securitization  capital_markets  mortgages  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  asset_prices  bubbles  fraud  GSEs  bankruptcy  debt  investors  yield  risk  credit  rating_agencies  credit_ratings  speculative_finance  EF-add  from instapaper
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Mike Konczal - The 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Did Nothing to Help the Real Economy | Next New Deal January 2015
Pre Obama proposal to reverse part of Bush tax cuts - Berkeley economist Danny Yagan’s fantastic new paper, “Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut” -- He uses a large amount of IRS data on corporate tax returns to compare S-corporations with C-corporations. C-corps are publicly-traded, S-corps are closely held without institutional investors. But they are largely comparable in the range Yagan looks at (between $1 million and $1 billion dollars in size), as they are competing in the same industries and locations. -- S-corps don’t pay a dividend tax and thus didn’t benefit from the big 2003 dividend tax cut, while C-corps do pay them and did benefit. So that allows Yagan to set up S-corps as a control group and see what the effect of the massive dividend tax cut on C-corporations has been. -- [Yagan finds no difference in things we want to encourage] -- The one thing that does increase for C-corps of course, is the disgorgement of cash to shareholders -- an increase in dividends and share buybacks. This shows that these corps are responding to the tax cut; they just happen to be decisions that benefit, well, probably not you. If right now you are worried that too much cash is leaving firms to benefit a handful of investors while the real economy stagnates, suddenly Clinton-era levels of dividend taxation don’t look so bad. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  US_economy  US_politics  21stC  taxes  corporate_finance  corporate_tax  capital  dividends  investment  shareholders  investors  GOP  shareholder_value  tax_policy  tax_reform  supply-side  trickle-down  Obama_administration  Bush_administration  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  1-percent  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Christopher A. Hartwell - Do (successful) stock exchanges support or hinder institutions in transition economies? | Cogent Economics & Finance Volume 2, Issue 1, 2014 - T&F Online
Department of International Management, Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland -- University of Huddersfield, UK -- A stock exchange and the presence of functioning equity markets are part and parcel of an advanced market-based financial system. Previous research has also established that equity markets function more efficiently in the presence of supporting institutions such as property rights and rule of law. But how do these two aspects of the institutional environment interact? That is, does the performance of a stock exchange support the development of property rights, or can it actually hinder it? Examining monthly data for 21 transition economies over a shifting monthly window from 1989 to 2012, and using a fixed-effects specification with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, I find support for the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between property rights and stock market performance. While a well-functioning stock market may help reinforce property rights through demonstration effects, a stock market that has become “too successful” may entrench interests and lead to property rights-eroding policies. -- downloaded to iPhone
paper  download  financial_system  property_rights  transition_economies  capital_markets  equity_markets  financial_sector_development  emerging_markets  investors  financial_instiutions  political_economy  privatization  markets-structure  oligarchy 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Claus Holm, Morten Balling and Thomas Poulsen - Corporate governance ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric information (2014) | T&A Online
Downloaded to iPhone -- Cogent Economics & Finance - Volume 2, Issue 1, 2014 -- Can corporate governance ratings reduce problems of asymmetric information between companies and investors? To answer this question, we set out to examine the information basis for providing such ratings by reviewing corporate governance attributes that are required or recommended in laws, accounting standards, and codes, respectively. After that, we scrutinize and organize the publicly available information on the methodologies actually used by rating providers. However, important details of these methodologies are treated as confidential property, thus we approach the evaluation of corporate governance ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric information in a more general manner. We propose that the rating process may be seen as consisting of two general activities, namely a data reduction phase, and a data weighting, aggregation, and classification phase. Findings based on a Danish data-set suggest that rating providers by selecting relevant attributes in an intelligent way can improve the screening of companies according to governance quality. In contrast, it seems questionable that weighting, aggregation, and classification of corporate governance attributes considerably improve discrimination according to governance quality.
paper  corporate_finance  asymmetric_information  capital_markets  disclosure  investors  risk  asset_prices  corporate_governance  ratings  reputation  EMH  accountability  financial_regulation  self-regulation  norms  business_practices  business-ethics  downloaded 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Eric Rauchway, review - Martin Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks (2014) | TLS Jan 2015
... his analysis, which holds that we knew how to avoid, counter and cure these troubles; we have simply – largely out of wilful ignorance and lack of courage – failed to do more than the barest minimum of what was necessary. Governments, banks and international institutions did “just enough, almost too late” to prevent the worst possible result, which would have been a note-for-note replay of the 1930s including a slide into fascism and world war. But having done no more than avoid world-historic catastrophe, we find ourselves mired in a dim morass of our own making, with no sunlit uplands in sight. Wolf offers a persuasive account that is also clear, though he relies on no single factor but several: hence the title of the book. It took both long-term shifts and a series of shocks to cause a crisis of such magnitude. Our world was born in the end of the Cold War. With capitalism triumphant, the victors liberalized their economies and so did the Communist nations, particularly China. Yet all was not well in this brave new world; international finance and trade threatened the stability of smaller, emerging economies, as the crises of the 1990s demonstrated.
financialization  bad_history  shadow  banking  Pocket  risk  global  economy  money  markets  global_imbalance  keynesian  business_influence  bad_economics  books  financial_regulation  liquidity  deregulation  minsky  investment  economic_growth  reviews  fed  Bank_of_England  great_recession  us_politics  leverage  capital_flows  race-to-the-bottom  business  ethics  political_economy  ecb  rents  uk  central_banks  investors  financial  crisis  financial_system  austerity  capital  economic_theory  us_economy  eurozone 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Narrow Banks Won't Stop Bank Runs — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2014
Banks serve capitalist economies in two ways that are costly to replicate. First, they are experts in providing liquidity both to depositors and to borrowers. For the former, it is deposits and for the latter, lines of credit (such as home equity loans that can be used when the borrower needs the funds). Second, they have expertise both in screening potential borrowers and then in monitoring those to whom they make loans. That is, they specialize in mitigating the information problems that plague all financial transactions.(..) the main point: would narrow banking really eliminate runs? Would it solve the fragility problem its proponents suggest is a consequence of fractional reserve banking? Our short answer to these questions is no. The mutual funds of the narrow banking world would be subject to the same runs. Indeed, recent research highlights that – in the presence of small investors – relatively illiquid mutual funds are more likely to face exit in the event of past bad performance. Thus, in practice, illiquidity plays the same role in a world of mutual funds with many investors as it does in the classic Diamond-Dybvig model of a bank run. And, without deposit insurance, the runs could be both more frequent and more devastating. Even modest declines in confidence, for reasons that are either real or imaginary, could readily turn into panics. (...) After this happened even once, people would simply flock to the narrow banks, and there would be no source of lending. That is, a financial panic in a system with narrow banks would devastate the credit intermediation process. (..) the government’s initial commitment to let the not-so-narrow funds fail in a crisis would not be credible, adding to the funds’ incentive to take on credit and liquidity risk and – contrary to the goals of narrow banking – raising the probability and cost of a future crisis.
financial_system  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  NBFI  FDIC  liquidity  investors 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Kobi Kastiel - Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies — The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation - November 13, 2014
Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation -- Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists has long suggested that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. My Article (..) forthcoming (,..) proposes a different view that is based on an agency problem paradigm, and presents a comprehensive framework for understanding the relationship between concentrated ownership and executive pay. On the theoretical level, the Article shows that controlling shareholders often have incentives to overpay professional managers instead of having an arm’s-length contract with them, and therefore it suggests that compensation practices in a large number of controlled companies may have their own pathologies. (..) controllers may wish to overpay managers in order to maximize their consumption of private benefits, while providing professional managers with a premium for their “loyalty” and for colluding with tunneling activities. (..) aggravated by the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual-class share structures, which distort controllers’ monitoring incentives due to the wedge it creates between controllers’ cash flow rights and control rights. (..) certain controllers, (..) could be “weak” due to their lack of experience, motivation or talent, and thus are more easily captured by professional CEOs.(..) biased due to their longstanding professional and social relationship with professional managers, (..) help explain recent puzzling phenomena such as the overly generous pay patterns in Viacom or other controlled companies, as well as the rise in say-on-pay rules in countries with concentrated ownership (as observed in a recent study by Thomas & Van der Elst). -- links to article
article  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_ownership  corporate_control  principal-agent  asset_stripping  tunneling  conflict_of_interest  executive_compensation  1-percent  investors  shareholders  shareholder_voting  institutional_investors 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson - Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending - Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 101, April 2013, pp. 923-967 :: SSRN (last revised August 2014)
Lucian A. Bebchuk - Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) -- Robert J. Jackson Jr. - Columbia Law School --- The SEC is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the SEC develop rules requiring that public companies disclose their spending on politics. The petition, which was submitted by a committee of ten corporate law professors that we co-chaired, has received unprecedented support, including comment letters from nearly half a million individuals. (...)the petition has also attracted opponents, including prominent members of Congress and business organizations.This Article puts forward a comprehensive, empirically grounded case for the rulemaking advocated in the petition. We present (..) evidence indicating that a substantial amount of corporate spending on politics occurs under investors’ radar screens, and that shareholders have significant interest in receiving information about such spending. We argue that disclosure of corporate political spending is necessary to ensure that such spending is consistent with shareholder interests. We discuss the emergence of voluntary disclosure practices in this area and show why voluntary disclosure is not a substitute for SEC rules. We also provide a framework for the SEC’s design of these rules. Finally, we consider and respond to ten objections that have been raised to disclosure rules of this kind. We show that all of the considered objections, both individually and collectively, provide no basis for opposing rules that would require public companies to disclose their spending on politics. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  US_government  administrative_law  administrative_agencies  financial_system  SEC  disclosure  corporate_law  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  campaign_finance  capital_markets  investors  political_participation  lobbying  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Tobias Adrian and Nellie Liang - Monetary Policy, Financial Conditions, and Financial Stability | Federal Reserve Bank of New York - Staff Reports Number 690 - September 2014
In the conduct of monetary policy, there exists a risk-return trade-off between financial conditions and financial stability, which complements monetary policy’s traditional trade-off between inflation and real activity. The trade-off exists even if monetary policy does not target financial stability considerations independently of its inflation and real activity goals, because risks to future financial stability are increased by the buildup of financial vulnerabilities from persistent accommodative monetary policy when the economy is close to potential. We review monetary policy transmission channels and financial frictions that give rise to this trade-off between financial conditions and financial stability, within a monitoring program across asset markets, banking firms, shadow banking, and the nonfinancial sector. We focus on vulnerabilities that affect monetary policy’s risk-return trade-off, including 1) pricing of risk, 2) leverage, 3) maturity and liquidity mismatch, and
4) interconnectedness and complexity. We also discuss the extent to which structural and time-varying macroprudential policies can counteract the buildup of vulnerabilities, thus mitigating monetary policy’s risk-return trade-off. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  Fed  US_economy  macroeconomics  financial_system  monetary_policy  financial_stability  macroprudential_policies  macroprudential_regulation  money_market  capital_markets  banking  shadow_banking  NBFI  investors  institutional_investors  credit  risk_premiums  leverage  money_supply  monetarism  interest_rates  business_cycles  demand-side  investment  consumer_demand  open_market_operations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Sunanda Sen - The Meltdown of the Global Economy: A Keynes-Minsky Episode? - Working Paper No. 623 | Levy Economics Institute | September 2010
The paper begins with some theoretical concerns relating to factors that could trigger a crisis similar to the global economic crisis that began in 2008. The first concern relates to the deregulated financial institutions and the growing uncertainty that can be witnessed in these liberalized financial markets. The second relates to financial engineering with innovations in these markets, simultaneously providing cushions against risks while generating flows of liquidity that remain beyond the conventional sources of bank credit. Interpreting the role of uncertainty, one can observe the connections between investment and finance, both of which are subject to changes in the state of expectations. The initial formulation can be traced back to Keynes’s General Theory, where liquidity preference is linked to asset prices and new investments. The Keynesian analysis was reformulated in 1986 by Minsky, who introduced the possibility of sourcing external finance through debt, which further adds to the impact of uncertainty. Minsky’s characterization of deregulated financial markets considers the newfangled sources of nonbank credit, especially with the involvement of banks in the securities market under the universal banking model. As for the institutional arrangements that provide for profits on transactions, financial assets bought and sold in the primary market as initial public offerings of stocks are usually transacted later, in the secondary market, where these are no longer backed by physical assets.In the upswing, finance creates a myriad of financial claims and liabilities, and thus becomes increasingly remote from the real economy, while innovations to hedge and insulate assets continue to proliferate in the financial market, especially in the presence of uncertainty. The paper looks especially at the US. This is appended by a stylized account of the turn of events in terms of a theoretical model that highlights the role of uncertainty in the process. -- Associated Program: Monetary Policy and Financial Structure -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  financial_crisis  bubbles  Great_Recession  financial_system  finance_capital  financialization  financial_innovation  banking  financial_regulation  derivatives  risk  risk-systemic  uncertainty  expectations  capital_markets  NBFI  intermediation  speculative_finance  securitization  Glass-Steagal  investment  investors  asset_management  real_economy  real_estate  Keynes  liquidity  Minsky  credit  debt  deleverage  leverage  asset_prices  banking-universal  disintermediation  money_market  Ponzi_finance  IPOs  secondary_markets  fragility  resilience  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Philip Pilkington - Endogenous Money and the Natural Rate of Interest - Working Paper No. 817 | Levy Economics Institute - September 2014
Endogenous Money and the Natural Rate of Interest: The Reemergence of Liquidity Preference and Animal Spirits in the Post-Keynesian Theory of Capital Markets -- Since the beginning of the fall of monetarism in the mid-1980s, mainstream macroeconomics has incorporated many of the principles of post-Keynesian endogenous money theory. This paper argues that the most important critical component of post-Keynesian monetary theory today is its rejection of the “natural rate of interest.” By examining the hidden assumptions of the loanable funds doctrine as it was modified in light of the idea of a natural rate of interest — specifically, its implicit reliance on an “efficient markets hypothesis” view of capital markets — this paper seeks to show that the mainstream view of capital markets is completely at odds with the world of fundamental uncertainty addressed by post-Keynesian economists, a world in which Keynesian liquidity preference and animal spirits rule the roost. This perspective also allows us to shed new light on the debate that has sprung up around the work of Hyman Minsky, calling into question to what extent he rejected the loanable funds view of financial markets. When Minsky’s theories are examined against the backdrop of the natural rate of interest version of the loanable funds theory, it quickly becomes clear that Minsky does not fall into the loanable funds camp. -- Program: Monetary Policy and Financial Structure -- Related Topic(s): Capital markets Financial economics Financial market theory Macroeconomics Monetary economics Monetary theory
paper  economic_theory  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  macroeconomics  monetarism  Post-Keynesian  money  interest_rate-natural  liquidity  capital_markets  EMH  monetary_policy  monetary_theory  banking  NBFI  savings  investment  investors  financial_system  finance_capital  financial_crisis  central_banks  uncertainty  Keynes  Minsky  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
the UNEP Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System | UNEP - Green Economy Initiative
C About

Mobilizing the world’s capital is essential for the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon economy. Today, however, too little capital is supporting the transition, and too much continues to be invested in a high-carbon and resource-intensive, polluting economy. Market participants and others recognize that prevailing rules and incentives governing financial markets can disadvantage long-term, sustainable behavior. Long-term environmental risks are not being effectively counted and green opportunities are inadequately valued. Such distortions can lead to a misallocation of capital and a danger of systemic risks to the economy and the natural environment. The UNEP Inquiry is intended to support such actions by identifying best practice, and exploring financial market policy and regulatory innovations that would support the development of a green financial system. Building on the twin pillars of UNEP’s strong track record through its Green Economy initiative and the UNEP-Finance Initiative, it will assemble the world`s best practice and forward-looking expert knowledge through an advisory council, practitioner dialogue and research. The Inquiry will produce a final options report as well as technical papers throughout its 18-24 month life from January 2014. The Inquiry`s current set up phase will ensure it is designed with guidance from practitioners and experts, and establish a network of world-class advisors and researchers. Engaging with existing initiatives will ensure that it can effectively convene and catalyze broad debate that supports the crystallization of options for advancing a more systematic approach to developing a green financial system. -- summary downloaded pdf to Note
UN  UNEP  green_economy  green_finance  financial_system  international_political_economy  global_governance  financial_regulation  financial_sector_development  financial_innovation  banking  capital_markets  incentives  investment  investors  corporate_finance  public_finance  sustainability  civil_society  risk  insurance  intermediation  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
The 21st Century Investor: Ceres Blueprint for Sustainable Investing — Ceres
Unprecedented risks to the global economy make this a challenging time for the 21st century investor—institutional asset owners and their investment managers—most of which have multi-generational obligations to beneficiaries. Climate change, resource scarcity, population growth, energy demand, ensuring the human rights of workers across global supply chains, and access to fresh water are some of the major issues challenging our ability to build a sustainable economy, one that meets the needs of people today without compromising the needs of future generations. -- This Blueprint is written for the 21st Century investor— institutional asset owners and their investment managers—who need to understand and manage the growing risks posed by climate change, resource scarcity, population growth, human and labor rights, energy demand and access to water—risks that will challenge businesses and affect investment returns in the years and decades to come. -- section of Ceres website devoted to investor related initiatives - proxy voting guides, etc - and corporate and public finance isuues, such as sustainability risk disclosure, listing srandards, Climate Bonds Principles -- downloaded pdf of executive summary of report
report  climate  energy  water  ocean  demography  supply_chains  global_economy  global_governance  sustainability  financial_system  capital_markets  institutional_investors  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  public_finance  investors  disclosure  asset_management  political_economy  international_political_economy  Labor_markets  human_rights  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Steven Maijoor, ESMA Chair, Keynote Speech - IBA Conference on the Globalisation of Investment Funds (Paris June 2014) | ESMA
A keynote address to the International Bar Association's 25th Annual Conference on the Globalisation of Investment Funds. The speech focused on concentrated on potential financial stability risks linked to the phenomenon of "too big to fail" and the fund management industry and also on policy developments affecting the fund management industry. **--* Excerpt -- "Addressing potential systemic risks in asset management will be an important part of our work going forward. As we develop our insights into the risks in the industry, it is clear that asset management has a specific profile that sets it apart from banking and other financial activities. This implies that the lens through which we see stability risks in banking and insurance, might not be the right one for asset management. Our proposal in this debate, therefore, is that in addition to looking at individual institutions, we must include in our analysis the very different types of activities of the asset management sector and their interdependence with systemic risks in the wider financial market." -- downloaded pdf to Note
speech  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  capital_markets  money_market  financial_crisis  liquidity  intermediation  NBFI  shadow_banking  asset_management  banking  insurance  investors  concentration-industry  too-big-to-fail  bailouts  cross-border  regulation-harmonization  contagion  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Green Bond Principles 2014: Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds — Ceres
Green Bonds enable capital-raising and investment for new and existing projects with environmental benefits. Recent activity indicates that the market for Green Bonds is developing rapidly. The Green Bond Principles (GBP) are voluntary process guidelines that recommend transparency and disclosure and promote integrity in the development of the Green Bond market by clarifying the approach for issuance of a Green Bond. The GBP are intended for broad use by the market: they provide issuers guidance on the key components involved in launching a credible Green Bond; they aid investors by ensuring availability of information necessary to evaluate the environmental impact of their Green Bond investments; and they assist underwriters by moving the market towards standard disclosures which will facilitate transactions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
green_economy  green_finance  reform-economic  reform-finance  climate  capital_markets  investors  environment  disclosure  financial_innovation  standards-sustainability  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Network for Sustainable Financial Markets | Home
The Network for Sustainable Financial Markets is an International, non-partisan network of finance sector professionals, academics and others who have an active interest in long-term investing. We believe that the recurring crises recently experienced in our financial markets are not isolated incidents. Rather, this instability is evidence that the financial market system is in need of well thought-out reform so that it can better serve its core purpose of creating long-term sustainable value. Our primary concern today is not that reform efforts will result in the adoption of too much or too little regulation. Rather, we see the greatest peril as inappropriate regulation and governance reforms that fail to address the real causes of financial market instability. While increased transparency, better risk management, additional liquidity and other surface fixes might address the current symptoms, they are not enough to resolve underlying systemic problems. Delay will only make things worse since failure to deal with these deep-rooted design flaws can only mean repetitive, deepening crises with growing economic and social destabilisation. The time to act is now. The Network’s goal is to foster interdisciplinary collaboration on research and advocacy projects between market professionals, academics and other opinion-leaders. We seek to fill the gaps between existing initiatives, to engage on problems which have received attention but have not still been solved and also to involve many more opinion-shapers than has previously been the case. We also intend that the Network be time-limited – our ultimate goal is to embed the Network’s guiding principles into the approaches used by other entities involved in research and public policy, then dissolve. -- connected to Climate Bond Initiative
website  financial_system  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  financial_innovation  financial_sector_development  reform-finance  green_finance  investors  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  banking  international_finance  international_monetary_system  risk-systemic  standards-sustainability  disclosure  accounting 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Sean Kidney - World Bank does a 10yr, AAA $12.06m green retail bond especially for Merrill Lynch Wealth Management clients. Harbinger? | Climate Bonds Initiative - Sep 2, 2014
A new green retail bond (link is external) has been issued by the World Bank in conjunction (link is external)Merrill Lynch Wealth Management (link is external). The bond has 10 year tenor, coupon of 2.32% for the first 5 years which gradually increases to a maximum of 8.82% and is callable after the first year. A very interesting approach, presumably carefully worked out with Merrill Lynch. The World Bank green bond program's credentials are verified by CICERO (link is external). One characteristic that some financial media coverage has been highlighting is that this was the first green bond issued that has a "callable (link is external)" structure. The World Bank does like to try things out in the retail space: in 2011 they issued some retail green bonds through the BoAML network, paying a fixed coupon for the first year that switched to a floating coupon after one year (but weren't callable). Earlier this year they issued another structured bond through BNP Paribas. That bond was linked to an equity index (link is external). All part of working out what will fly in the retail space, so others can then pick and run with successful formats.
financial_innovation  financial_sector_development  capital_markets  World_Bank  investors  sustainability  green_economy  green_finance  reform-economic  reform-finance  climate  links 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: Piketty and the Money View - September 2014
All the empirical material in the book relates to stocks and flows of money. But when he turns to explain the patterns he finds in this data, he does it in terms of physical inputs to physical production. The money wealth present in a country is assumed to correspond to the physical capital goods, somehow converted to a scalar quantity. And the incomes received by wealth owners is assumed to correspond to a physical product somehow attributable to these capital goods. But the production processes that are supposed to explain these shifts are described without any data at all, purely deductively. You would think that if Piketty believed that the share of property income in total income depends on physical production technologies, returns to scale, depreciation, etc., then at least half the book would be taken up with technological history. In fact, of course, these topics are not discussed at all. Terms like “production” and “depreciation” are black boxes, pure mathematical formalism. -- Unfortunately, discussion of the book has been almost entirely about the irrelevant formalism. I think that is why the conversation has been so noisy yet advanced so little. -- the disconnect between the two different Pikettys shows, in a negative way, why what I've been calling the money view is so important. The historical data assembled in Capital in the 21st Century is a magnificent accomplishment and will be drawn on by economic historians for years to come. Many of the concrete observations he makes about this material are original and insightful. But all of this is lost when translated into Piketty's preferred theoretical framework. To make sense of the historical evolution of money payments and claims, we need an approach that takes those payments and claims as objects of study in themselves.
books  Piketty  wealth  capitalism  capital  macroeconomics  economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  money  investment  investors  profit  technology  production  productivity  political_economy  financial_economics  financial_system  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan - Litigating Intellectual Property Rights in Investor-State Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation :: SSRN August 14, 2014
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014-21 - Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-13. **--** Enforcing intellectual property rights abroad is difficult. International treaties have generally not created directly enforceable IP rights. Usually, the protection they confer cannot be directly invoked in national courts. Because of the territorial nature of IP protection, right holders must proceed in local courts based on local laws. Litigating IP rights abroad hence faces several hurdles. International investment law offers some options to overcome these hurdles: -- This article focusses on the investment interface aspect of IP: Compared to domestic proceedings (where international standards usually cannot be invoked), WTO dispute settlement (where right holders have no legal standing), and the protection of property under human rights instruments (where protection is limited to specific human rights standards), investor-state arbitration may be the only forum where right holders can litigate international IP norms such as the TRIPS Agreement. This may have significant effects on the autonomy of host states in responding to public interest concerns (such as access to medicines or reducing smoking) once measures affect IP rights of foreign investors. Reviewing the options for litigating international IP norms in investment disputes, I conclude that most routes pursued by right holders are unlikely to be successful. Ironically, it is only clauses in investment treaties which aim to safeguard flexibilities in the international IP system that are likely to open a door for challenging compliance with international IP obligations in investor-state arbitration. - Number of Pages: 44 - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  global_governance  IP  patents  litigation  property_rights  property-confiscations  investors  FDI  dispute_resolution  arbitration  investor-State_disputes  trade-agreements  investment-bilateral_treaties  public_health  public_goods  nation-state  national_interest  sovereignty  WTO  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Future shape of banking - Time for reformation of banking and banks? (report) | PwC - 2014
Given the current economic climate, in particular the focus on the European Central Banks Comprehensive Assessment and the move to the Single Supervisory Mechanism, a working group from the PwC Response to the economic crisis in Europe (REcCE) network has developed a provocative point of view paper on the future shape and nature of banking services and of “banks” themselves. Future shape of banking outlines four key areas banks need to address in order to remain relevant, as we argue that the future of banking will look very different to what we see today and that while the need for banking services remains – traditional banks need to sharpen their strategic focus and regulators and regulation will also need to adapt.... adding up to a paradigm shift in the banking landscape. -- downloaded pdf to Note
international_political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  banking  financial_regulation  financial_innovation  disintermediation  payments_systems  central_banks  tech  NBFI  liquidity  leverage  investors  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Squarely Rooted - I Wrote Way Too Much About “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” — Medium - July 2014
Very thought provoking re changes in the composition and returns to capital -- Depreciation is the great systemic regulator — absent productivity/technology growth, depreciation is an absolute limit on our ability to accumulate capital ad infinitum. Or is it? Depreciation is a law of the physical world, and therefore a limit on the accumulation of physical capital, which many people intensely associate with “capital” in their minds. But it is extremely important not to do so in this context, as Piketty uses capital synonymously with all wealth. And the nature of capital itself is changing What does this mean? It means that the focus on capital as stuff is fundamentally off-base — capital, at least as defined by Piketty, is at least to some degree detached from stuff. This makes more sense when you look at the Q-ratio of many of today’s most valuable firms [Apple et al]. These are all vastly above not just the current national average but the highest the national average has ever been, and by an astonishing amount. But investors believe that these tech companies, which have rapidly become a vast part of the economy, are worth way, way more than the sum of their parts. -- ... all these claims [against assets] are, on a fundamental level, determined by legal and political systems that are mutable by humans. They are not laws of nature. This is most clear in Piketty’s discussion of “Rhenish capitalism,” specifically in the curious phenomenon of the relatively-low levels of German capital relative to income - which vanishes when you compare book value instead of market value of capital - overwhelmingly a Tobin’s Q issue. -- Land, in fact, may be the key to explaining why the returns to capital decline much more slowly than models with traditional assumptions would predict. If you confuse “capital” as Piketty defines it with “machines,” even subconsciously, this would make much less sense. -- Oh, and one last thing — land doesn’t depreciate.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  investment  profit  capitalism  inequality  rentiers  landowners  capital  wealth  sovereign_wealth_funds  plutocracy  1-percent  capital_markets  investors  manufacturing  technology  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Briffault - The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban (Valparaiso University Law Review, Forthcoming) July 25, 2014 :: SSRN
Columbia Law School -- Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-405 -- Concern about the role of corporate money has been a longstanding theme in American politics. The first permanent federal campaign finance law – the Tillman Act of 1907 – prohibited federally-chartered corporations from making contributions in any election and prohibited all corporations from making contributions in federal elections. Subsequently amended, continued, and strengthened over a century the federal corporate contribution ban is still on the books. Twenty-one states also prohibit corporate contributions to candidates in state elections. SCOTUS sustained the federal corporate contribution ban as recently as 2003 in FEC v. Beaumont, but that decision and the corporate contribution ban today rest on shaky ground. The Roberts Court has demonstrated little respect for either legislated campaign finance restrictions or the Court’s own campaign finance precedents. -- In Citizens United and McCutcheon, the Court emphasized that campaign finance restrictions cannot be justified by the goal of reducing the political power of the wealthy. Although much of the impetus for the corporate contribution ban is public anxiety over corporate wealth and power, the shareholder-protection and anti-circumvention justifications are not triggered by concern about corporate wealth but, rather, reflect other key features of the corporate form – its artificial existence as a legal to achieve ends desired by the individuals who have created it, and the potential for those who control the corporation to exploit shareholders. These two interests work in tandem, with shareholder-protection having greater purchase for multi-shareholder publicly-held entities, and anti-circumvention more relevant for single-shareholder, closely-held or nonprofit corporations. Together, they make the case for the corporate contribution ban for reasons other than the equality-promoting goal that Citizens United and McCutcheon so vehemently rejected. -- another paper beginning to deal with inherent conflict between management and shareholder interests in political spending that puts 2 conservative trends on collision
article  SSRN  SCOTUS  constitutional_law  corporate_law  campaign_finance  elections  corporate_governance  shareholders  shareholder_value  investors  management  principal-agent  capital_markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter - Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United (Cornell Law Review, Forthcoming) - August 1, 2014 :: SSRN
Leo E. Strine Jr. - Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Yale University -- Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 788 -- One important aspect of Citizens United has been overlooked: the tension between the conservative majority’s view of for-profit corporations, and the theory of for-profit corporations embraced by conservative thinkers. This article explores the tension between these conservative schools of thought and shows that Citizens United may unwittingly strengthen the arguments of conservative corporate theory’s principal rival. Citizens United posits that stockholders of for-profit corporations can constrain corporate political spending and that corporations can legitimately engage in political spending. Conservative corporate theory is premised on the contrary assumptions that stockholders are poorly-positioned to monitor corporate managers for even their fidelity to a profit maximization principle, and that corporate managers have no legitimate ability to reconcile stockholders’ diverse political views. Because stockholders invest in for-profit corporations for financial gain, and not to express political or moral values, conservative corporate theory argues that corporate managers should focus solely on stockholder wealth maximization and non-stockholder constituencies and society should rely upon government regulation to protect against corporate overreaching. Conservative corporate theory’s recognition that corporations lack legitimacy in this area has been strengthened by market developments that Citizens United slighted: that most humans invest in the equity markets through mutual funds under section 401(k) plans, cannot exit these investments as a practical matter, and lack any rational ability to influence how corporations spend in the political process. -- Keywords: Corporate governance, political spending, Citizens United, conservative corporate theory, regulatory externalities, lobbying, profit maximization, constitutional law, election law, labor law
article  SSRN  SCOTUS  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  corporate_law  corporate_governance  principal-agent  management  shareholders  shareholder_value  campaign_finance  lobbying  elections  labor_law  US_constitution  constitutional_law  public_policy  interest_groups  oligarchy  rent-seeking  investors  savings  capitalism  capital_markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Steve Denning - The Copernican Revolution In Management - Forbes - July 2013
Today’s hierarchical bureaucracies are so out-of-step with the current marketplace in which power has shifted from seller to buyer that we cannot wait for the results of definitive long-term scientific studies. As Don Tapscott said in this column last week, “The fundamental problem facing all our institutions today, including government, is not related to conjunctural economic changes. It’s not a business cycle that we are going through. It’s not a cyclical change. It’s a secular change. We are at a punctuation point in human history where the industrial age and institutions have finally come to their logical conclusion. They have essentially run out of gas.” The shareholder value theory is thus only a small part of the problem. It is part of a web of obsolete management ideas that no longer fit the 21st Century marketplace. As noted below, other once-sacred truths in management are part of the same failing paradigm. Absorbing even a couple of these fundamental shifts will take time. Absorbing them all, and acquiring the skills and attitudes necessary to implement them, will not be easy or quick. -- large number of links to recent articles, papers etc
globalization  global_economy  business  management  corporate_governance  technology  networks-business  hierarchy  shareholder_value  capital_markets  investors  financialization  Labor_markets  Innovation  capitalism  executive_compensation  1-percent  inequality  links 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Steve Denning - HBR Blows The Lid Off C-Suite Over-Compensation - Forbes - Feb 2012
At the heart of the disaster, according to Desai, is market-based compensation—the idea that the C-Suite and financial managers should be compensated by the issuance of stock. The idea was intended to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders, but the result has been the opposite. According to Desai, the idea is “intellectually flawed” and “a foundational myth.” That’s because in implementing market-based compensation, there is a failure to distinguish results due to sheer luck (beta) from the results due to skill (alpha). Moreover those who should be monitoring compensation—pension funds, mutual funds and foundations—have not only been asleep at the wheel: they have been actively complicit in the debacle. They have “readily outsourced performance evaluation and compensation in order to avoid their obligation to make tough decisions and bring pay into line with performance.” “The combination of a foundational myth and absent monitors over the past 2 decades gave rise to harmful incentives, asymmetrical payoffs and windfall compensation levels… The result has been the creation of perhaps the largest and most pernicious bubble of all: a giant financial incentive bubble.” This in turn results in “the twin crises of American capitalism: repeated governance failures, which lead many to question the stewardship abilities of American managers and investors and rising income inequality.” Even worse, the skewed incentives and huge unearned windfalls have given rise to righteous but unwarranted belief in entitlement: the individuals “now consider themselves entitled to such rewards. Until the financial incentives bubble is popped, we can expect mis-allocations of financial, real and human capital to continue.” -- Desai is pessimistic re reforms - Denning continues with things Desai left out
capitalism  management  executive_compensation  financialization  corporate_governance  capital_markets  shareholders  shareholder_value  investors  norms-business  1-percent  inequality 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Steve Denning - From CEO 'Takers' To CEO 'Makers': The Great Transformation - Forbes - August 2014
CEOs, through the pervasive use of share buybacks, have become takers, not makers. Instead of creating value for their organizations and society, they are extracting value. Pervasive share buybacks are an economic, social and moral disaster: they contribute to loss of shareholder value, crippled capacity to innovate, runaway executive compensation, destruction of jobs, rapidly increasing inequality and sustained economic stagnation. Yet share buybacks have become “an unhealthy corporate obsession,” even “an addiction.” The situation is one of fundamental institutional failure. CEOs are extracting value from their firms. Business schools are teaching them how to do it. Institutional shareholders are complicit in what the CEOs are doing. Regulators pursue individuals but remain indifferent to systemic failure. Rating agencies reward malfeasance. Analysts applaud short-term gains and ignore obvious long-term rot. Politicians stand by and watch. In a great betrayal, the very leaders who should be fixing the system are complicit in its continuance. Unless our society reverses course, it is heading for a cataclysm. The solution to fundamental institutional failure goes beyond passing a few regulations or changing the behavior of a few CEOs. It involves changes in behavior in a whole set of institutions and actors: -- Change won’t happen merely by pointing out that shareholder primacy is a bad idea. Bad ideas don’t die just because they are bad. They hang around until a consensus forms around another idea that is better. Fortunately, a consensus is emerging around a better idea. The idea isn’t new. It’s Peter Drucker’s foundational insight of 1973: the only valid purpose of a firm is to create a customer. It’s through providing value to customers that firms justify their existence. Profits and share price increases are the result, not the goal of a firm’s activities
business  busisness-ethics  norms-business  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  investment  investors  management  financialization  finance_capital  capital_markets  inequality  1-percent  Drucker_Peter  Friedman_Milton  shareholder_value  profit 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Joshua Clover, review essay - Autumn of the Empire [post the Great Recession] | The Los Angeles Review of Books July 2011
Books discussed - Richard Duncan, The Dollar Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures *--* Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence *--* Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times *--* Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing *--*--*--* All three authors are heterodox from view of what passes for informed discourse about economic theory or political economy - by the conclusion of the essay, Giovanni Arrighi's longue-durée of transitions of a succession of capitalist empires becomes the vantage point for discussions of how we got to the Great Recession as well as where we have to start thinking about another way of understanding the geopolitical dynamics of global capitalism (or the global capitalist dynamics of geopolitics) Other TAGGED AUTHORS - Jill Ciment, Paul Krugman, Fernand Braudel, Joseph Schumpeter, John Maynard Keynes, Karl Marx, T.S. Eliot *--* Other TAGGED BOOKS - Reinhardt and Rogoff, This Time It's Different, *--* Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
books  reviews  global_economy  globalization  international_political_economy  financialization  financial_crisis  economic_history  geopolitics  empires  empire-and_business  world_history  world_systems  cycles  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  Genoa  city_states  Dutch_Revolt  Dutch  British_Empire  US-China  US-empire  imperialism  imperial_overreach  trade  trading_companies  production  productivity  capitalism  competition  profit  investment  international_monetary_system  translatio_imperii  Annales  bubbles  labor  off-shoring  investors  American_exceptionalism  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Rajiv Sethi: James Tobin's Hirsch Lecture - May 2010
James Tobin's Fred Hirsch Memorial Lecture "On the Efficiency of the Financial System" was originally published in a 1984 issue of the Lloyds Bank Review, and republished three years later in a collection of his writings. Willem Buiter discussed the essay at some length about a year ago in a provocative post dealing with the regulation of derivatives. Both the original essay and Buiter's discussion of it remain well worth reading today as guides to the broad principles that ought to underlie financial market reform. In his essay, Tobin considers four distinct conceptions of financial market efficiency: [snip of description of 4 types of financial efficiency which is brilliant ] [my summary -- the 1st 2 are price information, where markets eliminate arbitrage opportunities, and fundamental, where markets settle on prices that reflect fundamental values -- the 1st is a weak form of the EMH, which is probably true -portfolio investors can't beat the market - the second is the strong version of EMH, which is obviously false. The 3rd deals with being able to insure against risk, and the 4th type of efficiency is intermediating savings with real capital investment, which the equity markets have virtually nothing to do with (except to facilitate early stage investment by providing exit mechanism) ]
Tobin  financial_system  capital_markets  investors  investment  insurance  efficiency  real_economy  EMH 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
N. Draper - The City of London and Slavery: Evidence from the First Dock Companies, 1795-1800 | JSTOR: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 61, No. 2 (May, 2008), pp. 432-466
Through analysing the composition of the founding shareholders in the West India and London Docks, this article explores the connections between the City of London and the slave economy on the eve of the abolition of the slave trade. It establishes that over one-third of docks investors were active in slave-trading, slave-ownership, or the shipping, trading, finance, and insurance of slave produce. It argues that the slave economy was neither dominant nor marginal, but instead was fully integrated into the City's commercial and financial structure, contributing materially alongside other key sectors to the foundations of the nineteenth-century City. -- huge bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  political_economy  economic_history  17thC  18thC  British_history  British_politics  Atlantic  West_Indies  American_colonies  slavery  abolition  London  ports  trade  merchants  planters  investors  shipping  finance_capital  insurance  City  City_politics  Industrial_Revolution  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
BofA Merrill Lynch Backs Piketty - Business Insider June 2014
Ajay Kapur and his team said this in a lengthy report titled, "Piketty and Plutonomy: The revenge of inequality," outlining the impacts of plutonomists, or the super rich, on investors. The skew toward the super-rich makes looking at averages an incomplete exercise: "When wealth and income are as concentrated as they are, and expected (a la Piketty) to get even more so, examining the 'average' consumer or 'average' investor makes little sense. Examining the fat tail – the behavior of the plutonomists, rather than that of the multitudinous many – is more advantageous to investors. Plutonomists determine and dominate spending and investment decisions and their magnitudes. Any analysis that does not tease out the skewed global income and wealth distribution, but focuses on the average is flawed from the start and is incomplete, as we step into its deeper extremes." "Economic and earnings surprises are linked to their behavior," they write. -- charts show the biggest wealth gains in US have been made mostly among the super rich. -- see Kapur papers from 2005 & 2006 on Plutonomy -- downloaded pdfs to Note
Piketty  US_economy  economic_history  economic_growth  economic_sociology  economic_culture  plutocracy  inequality  investment  investors  profit  finance_capital  wealth  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Suresh Naidu - Capital Eats the World | Jacobin May 2014
A first step could be a multisector model with both a productive sector and an extractive, rent-seeking outlet for investment, so that the rate of return on capital has the potential to be unanchored from the growth of the economy. This model could potentially do a better job of explaining r > g in a world where capital has highly profitable opportunities in rent-seeking ....More fundamentally, a model that started with the financial and firm-level institutions underneath the supply and demand curves for capital, rather than blackboxing them in production and utility functions, could illuminate complementarities among the host of other political demands that would claw back the share taken by capital and lower the amount paid out as profits before the fiscal system gets its take. This is putting meat on what Brad Delong calls the “wedge” between the actual and warranted rate of profit. -- We need even more and even better economics to figure out which of these may get undone via market responses and which won’t, and to think about them jointly with the politics that make each feasible or not. While Piketty’s book diagnoses the problem of capital’s voracious appetite, it would require a different kind of model to take our focus off the nominal quantities registered by state fiscal systems, and instead onto the broader distribution of political power in the world economy.
books  reviews  kindle-available  Piketty  political_economy  economic_theory  heterodox_economics  neoclassical_economics  economic_models  economic_growth  wealth  capital  finance_capital  capitalism  labor  Labor_markets  unemployment  markets_in_everything  tax_havens  investment  investors  savings  inheritance  profit  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  inequality  technology  1-percent  rent-seeking  rentiers  class_conflict  oligarchy  taxes  productivity  corporate_finance  property  property_rights  neoliberalism 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Martin Wolf - AstraZeneca is more than investors’ call - FT.com - May 8 2014
The questions any normal person would ask are three. Would a takeover increase competition? Would it increase investment in life-transforming research? Would assurances given by the bidder about future production and research be credible? The answer to all is “no”. Yet the merger is likely to go ahead, because the only people whose interests count are shareholders, whether they have owned their shares for 10 years or 10 seconds. AstraZeneca can be sold and bought like a sack of potatoes. Does this make sense? Until recently I believed it to be the least bad arrangement. Now I am not so sure, as I shall argue in a conference on Inclusive Capitalism in London later this month. We need to rethink ownership and control of limited liability companies
UK_Government  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  shareholders  investors  Innovation  M&A  pharma  R&D 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: Liquidity Preference and Solidity Preference in the 19th Century - March 2014
Re switch from inverted yield curve over 19thC to current expectations re yield curve -- Once capital is embodied in a particular production process and the organization that carries it out, it tends to evolve into the means of carrying out that organization's intrinsic purposes, instead of the capital's own self-expansion. But for this purpose, the difference doesn't matter; either way, the problem only arises once you have, as Leijonhufvud puts it, "a system 'tempted' by the profitability of long processes to carry an asset stock which turns over more slowly than [wealth owners] would otherwise want." The temptation of long-lived production processes is inescapable in modern economies, and explains the constant search for liquidity. But in the pre-industrial US? I don't think so. Long-lived means of production were much less important, and to the extent they did exist, they weren't an outlet for money-capital. Capital's role in production was to finance stocks of raw materials, goods in process and inventories. ..And even land - the long-lived asset in most settings - was not really an option, since it was abundant. The early US is something like Samuelson's consumption-loan world, where there is no good way to convert command over current goods into future production. So there is excess demand rather than excess supply for long-lasting sources of income. The switch over to positive term premiums comes early in the 20th century. ..consistent with the Leijonhufvud story. Liquidity preference becomes dominant in financial markets only once there has been a decisive shift toward industrial production by long-lived firm using capital-intensive techniques, and once claims on those firms has become a viable outlet for money-capital.
economic_history  US_economy  19thC  20thC  capital_markets  interest_rates  investment  industrialization  liquidity  money_market  profit  trade_finance  investors  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader

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