dunnettreader + intuitions   4

Videos from conference on Herman Cappelen, Philosophy without Intuitions (OUP, 2012) - School of Advanced Study
Knowledge and Intuitions - A one-day conference with papers on Professor Herman Cappelen's recent publication, Philosophy without Intuitions (OUP, 2012), with Professor Brain Weatherson (Michigan), Dr Ana-Sara Malmgren (Stanford), Professor Jonathan Weinberg (Arizona) and Professor Mark Richard (Harvard), with responses from the author.
epistemology  knowledge  conference  analytical_philosophy  lecture  intuitionism  methodology  video  books  intuitions  evidence  belief  cognition  cognitive_bias 
march 2016 by dunnettreader
Jared P. Friedman and Anthony I. Jack - Mapping cognitive structure onto philosophical debate re problems of consciousness, free will and ethics | Minds Online - Sept 2015 - Session 1 - Social Cognition
Mapping cognitive structure onto the landscape of philosophical debate: An empirical framework with relevance to problems of consciousness, free will and ethics -- Department of Philosophy and Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence, Case Western Reserve University -- There are some seemingly intractable questions that have remained at the heart of philosophical discourse since they were first asked. Is the mind distinct from the brain or are we just physical stuff? Are we autonomous agents or merely at the mercy of the causal and mechanistic laws of nature? When, if ever, is it acceptable to sacrifice one for the greater good of many? That these questions have remained at the heart of philosophy for so long, and that their ‘solutions’ (e.g., monism vs. dualism) seem to be incommensurable with each other, strikes us as enigmatic. Might the intractable nature of these and other appropriately identified problems reflect something peculiar about us rather than something peculiar about the way the world is? (...) This account maintains that the difficulties reconciling markedly different philosophical responses to these three questions arise from an unavoidable tension between two anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks, both of which are essential to human understanding. This account is motivated by the observation that both philosophers and non-philosophers experience difficulty in reconciling competing responses to these questions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  conference  cognition  antimonies  consciousness  mind-body  neuroscience  determinism  free_will  naturalism  physicalism  reductionism  causation  moral_philosophy  metaethics  intuitions  brain  experimental_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  James_William  monism  dualism  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Vanessa Carbonell, review - Lisa Tessman, Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews - May 26, 2015
Reviewed by Vanessa Carbonell, University of Cincinnati -- (..) she seeks to show that those impossible actions really were required and that you really did fail -- not in the sense of being to blame, but at least in the sense of having done wrong. (..) she looks to recent work in empirical moral psychology to support her vindicating story. Rather than dismiss people's experience of moral failure as irrational or misguided, Tessman claims that our intuitive moral judgments are largely arational. This chapter contains an overview of the "dual process" model of moral judgment and meticulously annotated discussions of the work of Daniel Kahneman, Joshua Greene, Jonathan Haidt, Jesse Prinz, Tamar Gendler, Philip Tetlock, and many others. Readers unfamiliar with this literature will find it a helpful introduction; readers familiar with and interested in these debates will probably find it overly ambitious. Suppose that we accepted every piece of Tessman's carefully assembled empirical story: that the dual process and social intuitionist models are roughly correct; that experiences of impossible demands are a moral case of Gendler's "alief"; that they involve Greene's "alarm bell" emotions; that moral judgments are what Prinz calls "prescriptive sentiments" or "oughtitudes"; that non-negotiable requirements trade on what Tetlock and colleagues call "sacred values"; etc. (..) It felt in the end like we simply had a lot more cool vocabulary for describing the purported data -- that people have experiences of impossible requirements and moral failure -- but no more reason to think that these experiences ought to be trusted as guides to what the demands of morality really are. -- interesting re overview of work in empirical moral psychology
books  reviews  epistemology-moral  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  ought-can  obligation  moral_sentiments  deontology  consequentialism  responsibility  intuitions  intuitionism  bibliography 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis - Concepts and Conceptual Analysis | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Sep., 2003), pp. 253-282
Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether. -- serves as a lit survey of 20thC analytical_philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  intuitions  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader

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