dunnettreader + international_finance   129

Bruce Campbell: The Great Transition, Lecture 1 of 4 - Ellen McArthur Lectures 2013, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge
See his 2016 book with CUP - The Great Transition: Climate, Disease and Society in the Medieval World - kindle-available
Lecture schedule
Lecture 1 - The 14th century as tipping point: From one socio-ecological status quo to another
Lecture 2 - The enabling environment: The Medieval Solar Maximum and Latin Christendom's high-medieval efflorescence
Lecture 3 - A precarious balance: Mounting economic vulnerability in an era of increasing climatic instability
Lecture 4 - Disease intervenes: The Black Death and the 'Great Transition' to an alternative socio-ecological equilibrium
video  lecture  economic_history  social_history  environmental_history  disease  Black_Death  medieval_history  12thC  13thC  14thC  15thC  Italy  urbanization  foreign_trade  Mongols  Mamluks  spice_trade  Central_Asia  genetics  weather  agriculture  demography  economic_growth  climate-history  climate_change  Little_Ice_Age  Italy-cities  international_finance 
november 2017 by dunnettreader
Flores-Maciss
What determines when states adopt war taxes to finance the cost of conflict? We address this question with a study of war taxes in the United States between 1789 and 2010. Using logit estimation of the determinants of war taxes, an analysis of roll-call votes on war tax legislation, and a historical case study of the Civil War, we provide evidence that partisan fiscal differences account whether the United States finances its conflicts through war taxes or opts for alternatives such as borrowing or expanding the money supply. Because the fiscal policies implemented to raise the revenues for war have considerable and often enduring redistributive impacts, war finance—in particular, war taxation—becomes a high-stakes political opportunity to advance the fiscal interests of core constituencies. Insofar as the alternatives to taxation shroud the actual costs of war, the findings have important implications for democratic accountability and the conduct of conflict. - Downloaded via iphone
US_history  downloaded  politics-and-money  US_military  deficit_finance  sovereign_debt  business_cycles  international_finance  fiscal_policy  Congress  US_foreign_policy  capital_markets  fiscal-military_state  political_history  article  political_economy  monetary_policy  taxes  US_politics  accountability  financial_system  redistribution  business-and-politics 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Ricardo J. Caballero, Alp Simsek - A Model of Fickle Capital Flows and Retrenchment: Global Liquidity Creation and Reach for Safety and Yield - NBER - October 2016
Gross capital flows are very large and highly cyclical. They are a central aspect of global liquidity creation and destruction. They also exhibit rich internal dynamics that shape fluctuations in domestic liquidity, such as the fickleness of foreign capital inflows and the retrenchment of domestic capital outflows during crises. In this paper we provide a model that builds on these observations to address some of the main questions and concerns in the capital flows literature. Within this model, we find that for symmetric economies, the liquidity provision aspect of capital flows vastly outweighs their fickleness cost, so that taxing capital flows, while could prove useful for a country in isolation, backfires as a global equilibrium outcome. However, if the system is heterogeneous and includes economies with abundant (DM) and with limited (EM) natural domestic liquidity, there can be scenarios when global liquidity uncertainty is high and EM's reach for safety can destabilize DMs, as well as risk-on scenarios in which DM's reach for yield can destabilize EMs.
paper  paywall  NBER  capital_flows  capital_markets  yield  liquidity  emerging_markets  capital_controls  financial_stability  international_finance 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
Iryna Stewen & Mathias Hoffmann - Holes in the Dike: the global savings glut, US house prices & the long shadow of banking deregulation (2015 wp)
Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy with number 112834. -- Abstract -- We explore empirically how capital inflows into the US and financial deregulation within the United States interacted in driving the run-up (and subsequent decline) in US housing prices over the period 1990-2010. To obtain an ex ante measure of financial liberalization, we focus on the history of interstate-banking deregulation during the 1980s, i.e. prior to the large net capital inflows into the US from China and other emerging economies. Our results suggest a long shadow of deregulation: in states that opened their banking markets to out-of-state banks earlier, house prices were more sensitive to capital inflows. We provide evidence that global imbalances were a major positive funding shock for US wide banks: different from local banks, these banks held a geographically diversified portfolio of mortgages which allowed them to tap the global demand for safe assets by issuing private-label safe assets backed by the country-wide US housing market. This, in turn, allowed them to expand mortgage lending and lower interest rates, driving up housing prices. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
banking  financial_crisis  deregulation  US_economy  downloaded  financial_regulation  global_imbalance  capital_markets  post-Cold_War  financial_system  interstate_banking  savings  house_prices  securitization  financial_innovation  interest_rates  mortgages  international_finance  capital_flows  community_banks  paper  21stC  economic_history  competition-interstate  NBFI 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
R. Esteves - The Political Economy of Global Financial Liberalisation in Historical Perspective (2011) Oxford Economic and Social Sciences WP
Abstract
This paper is a first attempt to garner the theory and evidence on the political economy of the first wave of financial liberalisation during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and of its demise after World War I. Not everyone gained from the process of globalisation (of trade, labour, and finance), which brought about important changes in the structure of the economy and the distribution of income in nations across the world. This paper explores how the economic incentives generated by these dislocations translated, through the political system, into choices about openness to foreign capital and financial integration. The period before World War I is remarkable by the almost absence of restrictions on cross-border capital flows, which may explain the little attention it has received in the historical literature, compared to the extensive study of trade protectionism in this period. After the War, many countries experimented with capital controls which varied in nature and intensity and were intensified during the Depression. Despite the attempt made here to reconcile these stylized facts to models of political economy, the analysis requires a better empirical foundation and some suggestions for further research are also proposed. - Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX.
financial_regulation  economic_growth  pre-WWI  20thC  protectionism  downloaded  gold_standard  international_finance  financial_system  trade-policy  trade  19thC  capital_flows  capital_controls  globalization  deregulation  free_trade  paper  economic_history  financial_innovation  political_economy 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Dewatripont, M. and Rochet, J., Tirole, J. - Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis (orig 2010) - Princeton University Press
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, Balancing the Banks draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future.

While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an adaptive prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints.

Offering a global perspective, Balancing the Banks should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.
Downloaded Chapters 1 & 2 to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  capital_markets  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  liquidity  risk_management  incentives-distortions  incentives  international_finance  global_governance  regulatory_arbitrage  regulatory_avoidance  regulation-costs  regulation-enforcement  regulation-harmonization  regulation 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Jean Tirole - Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System (eBook, Paperback 2016 and Hardcover 2002) - Princeton University Press
Written post Asia crisis but eternally applicable - he was focusing on capital flows when it still was heterodoxy -- Once upon a time, economists saw capital account liberalization--the free and unrestricted flow of capital in and out of countries--as unambiguously good. Good for debtor states, good for the world economy. No longer. Spectacular banking and currency crises in recent decades have shattered the consensus. In this remarkably clear and pithy volume, one of Europe's leading economists examines these crises, the reforms being undertaken to prevent them, and how global financial institutions might be restructured to this end. Jean Tirole first analyzes the current views on the crises and on the reform of the international financial architecture. Reform proposals often treat the symptoms rather than the fundamentals, he argues, and sometimes fail to reconcile the objectives of setting effective financing conditions while ensuring that a country "owns" its reform program. A proper identification of market failures is essential to reformulating the mission of an institution such as the IMF, he emphasizes. Next he adapts the basic principles of corporate governance, liquidity provision, and risk management of corporations to the particulars of country borrowing. Building on a "dual- and common-agency perspective," he revisits commonly advocated policies and considers how multilateral organizations can help debtor countries reap enhanced benefits while liberalizing their capital accounts.

Based on the Paolo Baffi Lecture the author delivered at the Bank of Italy, this refreshingly accessible book is teeming with rich insights that researchers, policymakers, and students at all levels will find indispensable. -- downloaded excerpt to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  capital_adequacy  contagion  sovereign_debt  international_monetary_system  international_finance  international_political_economy  IMF  emerging_markets  globalization  global_governance  global_system 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Eggertsson & Summers - How secular stagnation in open economies spreads and how it can be cured | VOX.eu, 22 July 2016
Secular stagnation in the open economies: How it spreads, how it can be cured - Gauti Eggertsson, Lawrence Summers - The secular stagnation hypothesis suggests that low interest rates may be the new normal in years to come. This column argues that this prospect should not only lead to a major rethinking of policy from the perspective of individual economies, but also a major rethinking about monetary and fiscal policy in the international context, the role of international capital flows, and the role of policy coordination across borders. In times of secular stagnation, events such as Brexit or the recent turbulence in Turkey have much larger spillover effects than under normal circumstances. -- Much of previous work, including our own writings (Summers 2014, Eggertsson and Mehotra 2014), focuses on the secular stagnation hypothesis in the context of the US. Our two recent papers, however, written jointly with Neil Mehrotra (Eggertsson et al. 2016a, hereafter EMS) and with Neil Mehrotra and Sanjay Singh (Eggertsson et al. 2016b, hereafter EMSS), highlight the importance of real exchange rates and especially international capital movements in spreading secular stagnation, and the resulting policy spillovers across countries. -- downloaded to Tab S2
paper  downloaded  international_political_economy  international_finance  monetary_policy  central_banks  fiscal_policy  investment  savings  capital_flows  contagion  stagnation  interest_rates 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Stitching together the global financial safety net | Bank Underground - July 2016
https://bankunderground.co.uk/2016/07/22/stitching-together-the-global-financial-safety-net/ - Very useful sketch of the various mechanisms, especially central bank swaps, that were put in place during the early part of the financial crisis that kept liquidity shocks from turning into a global crash - additional mechanism designed since then, with lots of attention on regional arrangements, and a boost to the IMF's capital. Still concerns re holes in the safety net - especially if there's contagion that's region-wide - and concerns that developing economies may not have access to sufficient resources to manage sudden stops. .
Instapaper  global_economy  international_monetary_system  international_finance  financial_crisis  capital_flows  central_banks  IMF  emerging_markets  contagion  from instapaper
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Eggertsson, Mehrotra, Singh & Summers - A Contagious Malady? Open Economy Dimensions of Secular Stagnation | NBER June 2016
Gauti B. Eggertsson, Neil R. Mehrotra, Sanjay R. Singh, Lawrence H. Summers - Conditions of secular stagnation - low interest rates, below target inflation, and sluggish output growth - characterize much of the global economy. We consider an overlapping generations, open economy model of secular stagnation, and examine the effect of capital flows on the transmission of stagnation. In a world with a low natural rate of interest, greater capital integration transmits recessions across countries as opposed to lower interest rates. In a global secular stagnation, expansionary fiscal policy carries positive spillovers implying gains from coordination, and fiscal policy is self-financing. Expansionary monetary policy, by contrast, is beggar-thy-neighbor with output gains in one country coming at the expense of the other. Similarly, we find that competitiveness policies including structural labor market reforms or neomercantilist trade policies are also beggar-thy-neighbor in a global secular stagnation.
economic_theory  interest_rates  stagnation  economic_growth  OECD_economies  paywall  capital_flows  paper  international_finance  global_economy  contagion  monetary_policy  FX-rate_management  international_political_economy  competition-interstate  fiscal_policy  fiscal_multipliers  trade-policy  Labor_markets  austerity  competiveness-labor  wages  labor_standards 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian - Why Did Financial Globalization Disappoint? | IMF Staff Papers - Jan 2009
IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 112–138. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.29; published online 6 January 2009 -- The stylized fact that there is no correlation between long-run economic growth and financial globalization has spawned a recent literature that purports to provide newer evidence and arguments in favor of financial globalization. We review this literature and find it unconvincing. The underlying assumptions in this literature are that developing countries are savings-constrained; that access to foreign finance alleviates this to boost investment and long-run growth; and that insofar as there are problems with financial globalization, these can be remedied through deep institutional reforms. In contrast, we argue that developing economies are as or more likely to be investment- than savings-constrained and that the effect of foreign finance is often to aggravate this investment constraint by appreciating the real exchange rate and reducing profitability and investment opportunities in the traded goods sector, which have adverse long-run growth consequences. It is time for a new paradigm on financial globalization, and one that recognizes that more is not necessarily better. Depending on context and country, the appropriate role of policy will be as often to stem the tide of capital inflows as to encourage them. Policymakers who view their challenges exclusively from the latter perspective risk getting it badly wrong. - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  downloaded  IMF  international_political_economy  international_finance  global_economy  emerging_markets  LDCs  capital_flows  investment  investment-government  development  economic_growth  economic_policy  economic_reform  access_to_finance  capital_controls  FX-misalignment  FX-rate_management  economic_theory  macroeconomics  international_economics  financial_economics  financial_sector_development 
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Pari Passu Closing Ceremonies Quote Parade - Credit Slips - Feb 2016
Lifting the Argentina injunction - the initial rationale(s) and the rationale(s) for what's changed for all the (old and new "me too" players) that changes the calculation of who's entitled to what equitable relief - like, what took so long?
Pocket  international_finance  capital_markets  sovereign_debt  default  international_law  equitable_relief  judiciary  common_law  common_law-equity  transnational_power  from pocket
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Avinash Persaud - A blueprint for overcoming systemic risk | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 20 November 2015
As the recent Financial Stability Board decision on loss-absorbing capital shows, repairing the financial system is still a work in progress. This column reviews the author’s new book on the matter, Reinventing Financial Regulation: A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risks. It argues that financial institutions should be required to put up capital against the mismatch between each type of risk they hold and their natural capacity to hold that type of risk. -- downloaded as pdf to Note
books  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  risk-systemic  risk_shifting  risk_management  risk_assessment  leverage  hedging  capital_adequacy  shadow_banking  liquidity  risk_premiums  firesales  banking  banking-universal  credit_ratings  balance_sheet  international_finance  maturity_transformation  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Marcos Chsmon - Guest Contribution: “Capital Controls in Brazil: Effective” | Ecinbrowser - Sept 2015
Today we are fortunate to present a guest contribution written by Marcos Chamon, Senior Economist in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund,… Surprise, surprise!
Instapaper  international_political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  FX-rate_management  capital_flows  contagion  hot_money  capital_controls  Brazil  from instapaper
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Symposium: The Bailouts of 2007-2009 (Spring 2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 29 No.2
Austan D. Goolsbee and Alan B. Krueger - A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and Restructuring General Motors and Chrysler (pp. 3-24) **--** W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery - The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (pp. 25-52) **--** Charles W. Calomiris and Urooj Khan - An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions (pp. 53-80) **--** Robert McDonald and Anna Paulson - AIG in Hindsight (pp. 81-106) **--** Phillip Swagel - Legal, Political, and Institutional Constraints on the Financial Crisis Policy Response (pp. 107-22) -- available online, didn't download
article  journals-academic  financial_system  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  bailouts  bail-ins  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capital_markets  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  NBFI  securitization  credit_booms  credit_ratings  incentives-distortions  public-private_partnerships  Fannie_Mae  housing  leverage  financial_system-government_back-stop  financial_innovation  firesales  liquidity  asset_prices  Fed  lender-of-last-resort  regulatory_capture  regulatory_avoidance  credit_crunch  bankruptcy  government_agencies  government_finance  global_economy  global_governance  international_finance  international_monetary_system  international_crisis  property_rights  derivatives  clearing_&_settlement  GSEs  bubbles 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Timothy W. Guinnane -A pragmatic approach to external debt: The write-down of Germany’s debts in 1953 | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal -13 August 2015
Greece’s crisis has invited comparisons to the 1953 London Debt Agreement, which ended a long period of German default on external debt. This column suggests that looking back, the 1953 agreement was unnecessarily generous given that Germany’s rapid growth lightened the debt repayment burden. Unfortunately for Greece, the motivations driving the 1953 agreement are nearly entirely absent today. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  sovereign_debt  default  20thC  post-WWII  Germany  international_political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  Greece-Troika  creditors  EU_governance  IMF  international_organizations  structural_adjustment  austerity  economic_growth  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Arvind Subramanian - How the IMF Failed Greece | Project Syndicate August 2015
Grexit should have been on the menu as a realistic option, properly supported with financing the transition, instead of the horrifying unknown for Greece and the Eurozone. Better start planning, since it's likely to come up again, certainly for Greece and possibly other EZ members.
Pocket  Eurozone  Eurocrsis  Greece-Troika  EU_governance  IMF  international_organizations  international_political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  sovereign_debt  from pocket
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Market Trends - OECD Journal - Home page | OECD
‌The articles in Financial Market Trends focus on trends and prospects in the international and major domestic financial markets and structural issues and developments in financial markets and the financial sector. This includes financial market regulation, bond markets and public debt management, insurance and private pensions, as well as financial statistics. -- links to the contents of each issue of the journal
journal  website  paper  financial_system  global_economy  global_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  banking  NBFI  insurance  markets-structure  risk_assessment  risk_management  sovereign_debt  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  institutional_investors  pensions  consumer_protection  equity-corporate  equity_markets  debt  debt-overhang  leverage  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  financial_economics  financial_innovation  financial_system-government_back-stop  bailouts  too-big-to-fail  cross-border  regulation-harmonization  regulation-costs  statistics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Hélène Rey - Dilemma Not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence (2013)
Rey, Hélène, 2013, “Dilemma Not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence” (Kansas City, Missouri: Federal Reserve Bank). -- downloaded pdf to Note
International_economics  international_finance  international_monetary_system  capital_flows  FX  monetary_policy  capital_markets  capital_controls  emerging_markets  downloaded  from notes
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Christian Thimann - The economics of insurance and its borders with general finance | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal 07/17/2015
What is insurance and where does insurance end?’, is a pressing question in international finance as global regulators are still pondering whether there can be systemic risk in insurance. This column argues that the challenge faced by regulators partly stems from terminological confusion between insurance activities and more general financial activities. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  financial_system  insurance  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Erlend W Nier, Tahsin Saadi Sedik - Capital flows, emerging markets and the global financial cycle | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 04 January 2015
Large and volatile capital flows into emerging economies since the Global Financial Crisis have re-invigorated efforts to unearth the determinants of these flows. This column investigates the interplay between global risk aversion (captured by the VIX) and countries’ characteristics. The authors also explore what policies countries should employ to protect themselves against the volatility of capital flows. The findings indicate that capital flows to emerging markets cannot be controlled without incurring substantial costs.
paper  emerging_markets  capital_flows  capital_markets  global_system  international_finance  global_financial_cycle  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  capital_controls  volatility  contagion  risk-systemic 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Anton Korinek - Going against the flow: Dealing with capital flows to emerging markets | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 22 December 2010
Capital flows to emerging markets are controversial territory. This column argues that they create externalities that make the recipient economies more vulnerable to financial fragility and crises. It adds that policymakers can make their economies better off by regulating and discouraging the use of risky forms of external finance – in particular short-term dollar-denominated debts
paper  emerging_markets  capital_flows  capital_markets  global_system  international_finance  global_financial_cycle  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  capital_controls  volatility  contagion  risk-systemic  risk-mitigation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Sáni Zou, et al -Mainstreaming Climate Change into Financial Governance: Rationale and Entry Points | CIGI June 17, 2015
Sáni Zou, Romain Morel, Thomas Spencer, Ian Cochran, and Michel Colombier -- Fixing Climate Governance Policy Brief No. 5 -- Today, the financial sector is exposed to the physical risks associated with climate change and the impact of climate policies. Securing global financial and economic stability and scaling up low-carbon, climate-resilient investments are not conflicting, but rather mutually reinforcing, objectives. The fifth policy brief in the Fixing Climate Governance series argues that while crucial, classic climate policies do not appear sufficient to address the challenges from climate change that the financial sector is facing. Policies affecting and instruments matching the demand side and supply side of finance need to be aligned with climate objectives to efficiently shift investments toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy. Once the link between climate change and the mandates of international financial sector governance and regulatory institutions is understood, the existing tool kits and processes of these institutions — common standards, principles and guidelines with various levels of legal force, country surveillance and technical assistance — present entry points to mainstream climate-related risks and opportunities into their core operations. -- didn't download
paper  green_finance  international_finance  financial_regulation  financial_innovation  risk_assessment  risk_management  climate  investment-socially_responsible  sustainability 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicolas Delalande , review - Wolfgang Streeck, Du temps acheté - La Vie des idées - May 2015
Wolfgang Streeck, Du temps acheté. La crise sans cesse ajournée du capitalisme démocratique, Paris, Gallimard, traduit de l’allemand par Frédéric Joly, 2014 [2013], 400 p., 29 €. -- Ce que la crise a révélé, dit W. Streeck, c’est le divorce consommé de longue main entre la démocratie et le capitalisme. Ce dernier s’est tourné depuis les années 1980 vers les marchés financiers et l’endettement n’a fait que masquer le plus longtemps possible la rupture. Seule issue, selon l’auteur de ce noir diagnostic : la sortie de l’euro. -- downloaded pdf to Note
political_economy  Europe  Eurozone  EU  EU_governance  European_integration  financial_crisis  international_political_economy  international_finance  capitalism-systemic_crisis  sovereign_debt  democracy_deficit  monetary_union  austerity  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Luca Corchia - Europe: Streeck replies to Habermas, and the debate goes on | Reset Dialogues on Civilizations - April 2014
The task of this brief presentation is to “establish a dialogue” with Streeck’s text, attempting to fill the hiatus between the answer and the original question that Habermas’ interpretation intended to pose to those wishing to simply dispose of economic and monetary union, ending up by dismantling the political and cultural integration project that inspired the founding fathers. -- downloaded pdf to Note
political_economy  international_finance  EU  EU_governance  ECB  Greece-Troika  monetary_union  Eurozone  Habermas  Europe-federalism  European_integration  nationalism  nation-state  national_interest  political_press  political_culture  economic_culture  financial_crisis  finance_capital  Great_Recession  democracy_deficit  public_opinion  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Transaction Taxes in Theory and Practice | Brookings Institution - June 30, 2015
By: Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Sarah Gault, Bryan Kim, Jim Nunns and Steve Rosenthal -- In response to the financial market crisis and Great Recession, there has been a resurgence of interest in financial transaction taxes (FTTs) around the world. We estimate that a well-designed FTT could raise about $50 billion per year in the United States and would be quite progressive. We discuss the effects of an FTT on various dimensions of financial sector behavior and its ambiguous effects on economic efficiency. -- their overview sets up lots of strawmen while acknowledging that FTTs are quite common even in money center markets like London, but they've done some estimates of various types of impacts in the paper -- didn't download
paper  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  financial_transaction_tax  liquidity  volatility  transaction_costs  international_finance 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
interfluidity » Greece - July 2015
Steve Randy Waldmann -- his 1st take on what's been going on, and how the Eurozone gives all the power to creditors, which produces a bunch of terribly misaligned incentives -- and what business bankruptcy law guards against
Instapaper  EU  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  Greece-Troika  IMF  bailouts  political_economy  democracy_deficit  austerity  bank_runs  central_banks  lender-of-last-resort  international_organizations  international_finance  creditors  bankruptcy  incentives-distortions  sovereign_debt  default  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Updating the Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) - OECD
Investment policy reviews are conducted using OECD investment instruments and - since its adoption in 2006 - the Policy Framework for Investment. Using a process of peer examination, the OECD Investment Committee has published investment policy reviews since 1993. Priority countries for review are those showing potential for adherence to the OECD investment instruments. ‌Since the PFI was agreed in 2006, new forces have reshaped the global investment landscape, including the global economic and financial crisis, which started in 2008 and from which many economies have still not recovered, the emergence of new major outward investors within the G20, the spread of global value chains, and signs that pressures for investment protectionism are on the rise. Numerous lessons have also been learnt through the use of the PFI, particularly in developing and emerging economies. The PFI has been updated to reflect these new global economic fundamentals and was released in Paris on 3 June 2015 at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting. 4/6/2015 - More than 25 countries have used the PFI when engaging in investment policy reviews. The experiences of these countries were used as an integral part of the multi-stakeholder update of the PFI which is now complete. -- pdf links for revised PFI and a "background to the uodate" -- downloaded pdf to Note on Action Taken using PFI guidance
report  OECD  OECD_economies  LDCs  emerging_markets  policymaking  public_policy  investment  investors  FDI  value-chains  supply-side  supply_chains  globalization  regulation-harmonization  trade-policy  financial_sector_development  capital_flows  international_political_economy  international_finance  international_organizations  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Ashoka Mody - In bad faith | Bruegel.org - July 3 2015
On July 2, the IMF released its analysis of whether Greek debt was sustainable or not. The report said that Greek debt was not sustainable and deep debt relief…
Instapaper  Greece-Troika  Eurozone  IMF  sovereign_debt  international_organizations  international_finance  global_governance  austerity  default  bank_runs  ECB  lender-of-last-resort  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Contribution of Bank Regulation and Fair Value Accounting to Procyclical Leverage by Amir Amel-Zadeh, Mary E. Barth, Wayne R. Landsman :: SSRN ( rev'd June 19, 2015)
Amir Amel-Zadeh, University of Cambridge, Judge Business School; Mary E. Barth, Stanford, Graduate School of Business; Wayne R. Landsman, U of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School -- Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 147 -- Our analytical description of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, leverage is not procyclical. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of US commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks facing a binding regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that do not. Fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage. -- PDF File: 46 -- Keywords: Fair value accounting, procyclicality, leverage, risk-based capital regulation, financial institutions, commercial banks -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  banking  capital_adequacy  leverage  procyclical  countercyclical_policy  macroprudential_regulation  risk  risk_management  asset_prices  firesales  accounting  financial_crisis  bubbles  Basle  international_finance 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Karl Whelan - The Grexit Mechanism: What It Means For The Future Of the Euro | Medium - June 26 2015
Greek crisis exposes cracks in the euro’s design that won’t be fixed by Greece leaving. Despite the euro’s legal status as an irrevocable currency union, the… Nice review of the tangle of economic, political and legal issues -- Default isn't by itself enough to force Grexit, so it's really what political stance the ECB takes, and even with Grexit there are the other members of the Eurozone suffering from similar problems as Greece -- Whelan: In recent years, the single most important factor that has papered over the cracks in the euro has been Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” commitment to preserve the euro. But if whatever-it-takes doesn’t prevent a Greek exit, there would be serious questions about what kind of euro the ECB was actually willing to bother preserving. Worth remembering is that what Draghi actually said was: "Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough." The “within our mandate” bit has provided Draghi with plenty of wiggle room to decide what kind of euro he wants to preserve. It clearly doesn’t have to be one that includes Greece. And there may be others that get jettisoned. Whether this kind of a la carte euro will survive the test of time is highly questionable.
Instapaper  Eurozone  EU  ECB  EU_governance  Europe-federalism  monetary_policy  FX  lender-of-last-resort  Greece  Greece-Troika  IMF  sovereign_debt  banking  bank_runs  austerity  FX-misalignment  Spain  Portugal  Italy  political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Piotr Danisewicz, Dennis Reinhardt and Rhiannon Sowerbutts - On a tight leash: does bank organisational structure matter for macroprudential spillovers? | Bank of England Working Paper No. 524: February 2015
This paper examines whether cross-border spillovers of macroprudential regulation depend on the organisational structure of banks’ foreign affiliates. Our analysis compares the response of foreign banks’ branches versus subsidiaries in the United Kingdom to changes in macroprudential regulations in foreign banks’ home countries. By focusing on branches and subsidiaries of the same banking group, we are able to control for all the factors affecting parent banks’ decisions regarding the lending of their foreign affiliates. We document that there are important differences between the type of regulation and the type of lending. Following a tightening of capital regulation, branches of multinational banks reduce interbank lending growth by 6 percentage points more relative to subsidiaries of the same banking group. Lending to non-banks does not exhibit such differences. A tightening in lending standards or reserve requirements at home does not have differential effects on both interbank and non-bank lending in the United Kingdom. -- didn't download
paper  international_finance  banking  financial_regulation  bank_holding_cos  cross-border  money_market  capital_adequacy 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
GF&Co - Joshua Rosner - Is the CDS Market Manipulated? - Dec 2014
Appalling details re ISDA procedures for determining credit events. The Determination Committee is stacked with the 10 big banks that are the major dealers and have a huge financial interest in the outcome. Since they explicitly have no duty of care, no duty to disclose information on which they base their votes even to the other committee members, no transparency re the basis on which the Committee makes a determination or how members voted, and can defer decisions for several meetings running, that would allow them to adjust their book. The example of the Caesars default, which was clear as possible in the indenture but was delayed being determined as a credit event by weeks, is instructive re how little investors can rely on the actual facts but are at the mercy of the big banks' totally arbitrary discretion. Other examples include Elliott on the committee that determined the Argentine credit event *caused* by Elliott. The amounts in the CDS of a high profile company can distort company operations and financial structure to game the declaration of a credit event with the participation of some of the very banks that will decide when an event is triggered -- see RadioShack. The entire risk management function that in theory justifies CDS and the positions investors take, has been completely annulled by the interests of the financial institutions who make the market. The ISDA has become effectively a credit rating agency with no regulatory oversight or controls. The potential amounts involved are staggering, making the LIBOR scandal look penny ante.
Scribd  international_finance  derivatives  self-regulation  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  markets-structure  market_manipulation  conflict_of_interest  fiduciaries  corporate_finance  bankruptcy 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Eva Botella-Ordinas - La démocratie directe de la Puerta del Sol | La Vie des idées - May 2011
This article written within a week of the events in Spain, with a focus on the debates on the left in Spain re what a "republicanism" entails. Another article at the same time focused more on the history of democracy and various forms of political participation in Spain from the Early Modern era onwards. The follow up in the Fall of 2011 was a series of articles covering political philosophy, political sociology of social movements and more discussion of the history of democracy in Spain, including a response to this analysis of flavors of republicanism by José Luis Martí and Félix Ovejero (mentioned in this article) and another article by Botella-Ordinas with 2 other historians. -- Pourquoi les Espagnols se mobilisent-ils en occupant les places des grandes villes ? Dans ce texte écrit sur le vif, une historienne de la pensée politique ouvre le débat. Elle montre que le mouvement du 15M s’appuie sur l’expérience de pratiques démocratiques autonomes mises en place par les centres sociaux autogérés. Elle signale aussi le fossé grandissant, au sein de la gauche espagnole, entre deux visions du républicanisme et de la participation démocratique. -- Ce texte est précédé d’une chronique écrite par un autre historien de l’Université Autonome de Madrid, Juan Luis Simal, qui permet de replacer les événements de la semaine dernière dans leur contexte. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  political_philosophy  republicanism  Spain  21stC  socialism  parties  social_movements  democracy  democracy_deficit  political_participation  Pettit  Great_Recession  austerity  1-percent  Eurozone  international_finance  political  economy  institutions  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
T. G. Otte, review - Martin Horn, Britain, France, and the Financing of the First World War | JSTOR - The Economic History Review Vol. 56, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 578-579
Gives very high marks to both archival research and analysis - shows governance mechanisms and both cooperation and conflict, which varied over time from early (expectation of a short war) to the latter years when France was done for without external finance. Notes that Horn demolishes one of Niall Ferguson claims - so academic specialists were on to his questionable historiography on the economic policies of British Empire long before he became a joke on macroeconomics. Derives some of the conflict from the very different national objectives for "finance capital" for their respective nations and empires. Doesn't seem to get into the reparations problem. It appears the later part deals some with US loans, but transatlantic isn't a big focus. Also deals with some conflicts over support to specific allies e.g. Russia. Didn't download
books  reviews  jstor  economic_history  20thC  WWI  Britain  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  France  French_Empire  financial_economics  international_finance  money_market  sovereign_debt  Russian_revolution  US_foreign_policy  financial_centers  financial_centers-London  WWI-finance 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Atish R Ghosh, Mahvash Saeed Qureshi, Naotaka Sugawara - Regulating capital flows at both ends | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 30 October 2014
"Capital flows to emerging markets have been very volatile since the global financial crisis. This has kindled debates on whether – and how – to better manage cross-border capital flows. In this column, the authors examine the role of capital account restrictions in both source and recipient countries in taming destabilising capital flows. The results indicate that capital account restrictions at either end can significantly lower the volume of cross-border flows." -- it's an IMF team -- though they look at controls on both ends, and tentatively recommend at least ratcheting up prudential standards in source countries at high parts of the business cycle to reduce pro-cyclical effects of large capital flows to emerging markets and peripheral Europe (good luck with taking away the punch bowl!), just controlling foreign currency denominated lending in recipient countries (especially peripheral Europe) would have made a huge difference to the size of the dilemma of getting out of the debt overhang that's also impaired source country (i.e. German) banks that's made recovery so difficult -- replay of Latin American lost decade during which OECD banks couldn't take the full hit at once, so the problem debts had to be gradually resolved through "growing out of it" and the hot potato game cleared up bank balance sheets gradually through shifting syndicated loans to the vultures in the bond markets -- we've seen this movie before, from Latin American to Asian to Eurozone debt crisis
international_political_economy  international_finance  capital_flows  cross-border  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  emerging_markets  Eurozone  FX  capital_markets  macroprudential_policies  macroprudential_regulation  debt-restructuring  debt_crisis 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs - Consultation Papers and Comments Received (regularly updated) | Tax - OECD
The OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs consults with business and other interested parties through a variety of means to inform its work in the tax area. One important way of obtaining such input is through the release of papers or discussion drafts for public comment. Below is a list of past discussion drafts for comments: -- list with links to papers and comments regularly updated
OECD  OECD_economies  international_political_economy  global_governance  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  governments-information_sharing  fiscal_policy  sovereign_debt  public_finance  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  transparency  cross-border  MNCs  international_organizations  international_finance  website  links  report 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Nitzan - Global Capital: Political Economy of Capitalist Power (YorkU, Graduate Seminar, Fall Term, 2014-15) | bnarchives
The seminar has two related goals: substantive and pedagogical. The substantive purpose is to tackle the question of capital head on. The course explores a spectrum of liberal and Marxist theories, ideologies and dogmas – as well as a radical alternative to these views. The argument is developed theoretically, historically and empirically. The first part of the seminar provides a critical overview of political economy, examining its historical emergence, triumph and eventual demise. The second part deals with the two ‘materialistic’ schools of capital – the liberal theory of utility and the Marxist theory of labour time – dissecting their structure, strengths and limitations. The third part brings power back in: it analyses the relation between accumulation and sabotage, studies the institutions of the corporation and the state and introduces a new framework – the capitalist mode of power. The final part offers an alternative approach – the theory of capital as power – and illustrates how this approach can shed light on conflict-ridden processes such as corporate merger, stagflation, imperialism and Middle East wars. Pedagogically, the seminar seeks to prepare students toward conducting their own independent re-search. Students are introduced to various electronic data sources, instructed in different methods of analysis and tutored in developing their empirical research skills. As the seminar progresses, these skills are used both to assess various theories and to develop the students’ own theoretical/empirical research projects. -- Keywords: arms accumulation capital capitalism conflict corporation crisis distribution elite energy finance globalization growth imperialism GPE liberalism Marxism military Mumford national interest neoclassical neoliberalism oil ownership peace power profit ruling class security stagflation state stock market technology TNC Veblen violence war -- syllabus and session handouts downloaded pdf to Note
bibliography  syllabus  capital_as_power  international_political_economy  political_economy  economic_theory  liberalism  neoliberalism  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  capital  capitalism  social_theory  power-asymmetric  globalization  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  international_finance  finance_capital  financialization  production  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  inequality  MNCs  corporations  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  corporate_control_markets  economic_growth  economic_models  imperialism  military  military-industrial_complex  IR_theory  ruling_class  class_conflict  energy  energy-markets  MENA  accumulation  accumulation-differential  capital_markets  public_finance  profit  investment  technology  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  capitalism-systemic_crisis  Veblen  Mumford  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Hyeng-Joon Park - Korea’s Post-1997 Restructuring: An Analysis of Capital as Power | forthcoming in Review of Radical Political Economics (2015) pp. 1-44 | bnarchives
This paper aims to transcend current debates on Korea’s post-1997 restructuring, which rely on a dichotomy between domestic industrial capital and foreign financial capital, by adopting Nitzan and Bichler’s capital-as-power perspective. Based on this approach, the paper analyzes Korea’s recent political economic restructuring as the latest phase in the evolution of capitalist power and its transformative regimes of capital accumulation. -- Keywords: differential accumulation dominant capital chaebols transnationalization strategic sabotage -- Subjects: BN State & Government, BN Institutions, BN Power, BN International & Global, BN Region - Asia, BN Business Enterprise, BN Value & Price, BN Crisis, BN Production, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Money & Finance, BN Distribution, BN Comparative, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Policy, BN Class, BN Labour, BN Growth -- downloaded from author's blog to Note
article  international_political_economy  capital_as_power  globalization  Korea  East_Asia  20thC  21stC  economic_history  1990s  2000s  2010s  Asian_crisis  Asia_Pacific  international_finance  FDI  finance_capital  financialization  emerging_markets  oligopoly  chaebols  crony_capitalism  industry  production  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalization  accumulation  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  cross-border  trade  productivity-labor_share  class_conflict  labor_share  Labor_markets  unions  violence  economic_growth  sabotage-by_business  business-and-politics  business-norms  power-asymmetric  public_policy  public_goods  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  investment  banking  political_culture  economic_culture  economic_reform  economic_policy  democracy  opposition  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Bichler, Shimshon and Nitzan, Jonathan - The Asymptotes of Power - Real-World Economics Review. No. 60. June 2012. pp. 18-53 | bnarchives
Article workup of earlier conference paper -- This is the latest in a series of articles we have been writing on the current crisis. The purpose of our previous papers was to characterize the crisis. We claimed that it was a 'systemic crisis', and that capitalists were gripped by 'systemic fear'. In this article, we seek to explain why. The problem that capitalists face today, we argue, is not that their power has withered, but, on the contrary, that their power has increased. Indeed, not only has their power increased, it has increased by so much that it might be approaching its asymptote. And since capitalists look not backward to the past but forward to the future, they have good reason to fear that, from now on, the most likely trajectory of this power will be not up, but down. The paper begins by setting up our general framework and key concepts. It continues with a step-by-step deconstruction of key power processes in the United States, attempting to assess how close these processes are to their asymptotes. And it concludes with brief observations about what may lie ahead. -- Keywords: capitalization distribution power, systemic crisis -- Subjects: BN Money & Finance, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Distribution, BN Resistance, BN Power, BN Region - North America, BN Business Enterprise, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Value & Price, BN Class, BN Crisis -- downloaded pdf to Note, also Excel data sheet
article  international_political_economy  capital_as_power  financial_system  international_finance  global_economy  global_system  ruling_class  transnational_elites  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  globalization  power-asymmetric  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  finance_capital  financialization  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  profit  labor_share  risk-systemic  inequality  plutocracy  1-percent  conflict  violence  class_conflict  neoliberalism  corporate_citizenship  systems-complex_adaptive  systems_theory  grassroots  opposition  democracy  democracy_deficit  accumulation  capitalization  US_politics  US_economy  political_economy  political_culture  economic_culture  elites  rebellion  failed_states  property_rights  business-and-politics  business-norms  economic_growth  fear  data  capitalism-systemic_crisis  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Dan Davies - What’s really wrong with bank supervision — Bull Market - October 2014— Medium
Explains what's going on in the ProPublica and This American Life exposé of FRBNY supervision of Goldman. " If you’re a bank CEO, then calling Tim Geithner for a chat — that ought to be OK. Calling Tim Geithner to complain about how your supervisor is treating you — that ought to be a third-rail, relationship-destroying, potential career ender of a call. And it isn’t, and the cultural consequences of that are as damaging as they’re predictable."
international_finance  financial_regulation  banking  regulatory_capture  hierarchy  power-asymmetric  regulation-enforcement 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Bianca De Paoli and Anna Lipinska - Capital Controls: A Normative Analysis | FRBNY Staff Reports Number 600 - February 2013
Countries' concerns about the value of their currency have been studied and documented extensively in the literature. Capital controls can be--and often are--used as a tool to manage exchange rate fluctuations. This paper investigates whether countries can benefit from using such a tool. We develop a welfare-based analysis of whether (or, in fact, how) countries should tax international borrowing. Our results suggest that restricting international capital flows through the use of these taxes can be beneficial for individual countries, although it would limit cross-border pooling of risk. The reason is because, while consumption risk-pooling is important, individual countries also care about domestic output fluctuations. Moreover, the results show that countries decide to restrict the international flow of capital exactly when this flow is crucial to ensure cross-border risk sharing. Our findings point to the possibility of costly "capital control wars" and thus to significant gains from international policy coordination. -- enfin! We're making progress in clearing away the accumulated layers of free market ideology. Not sure about the likelihood of "capital control wars" so have to read the thing to see if their global cross-border risk-pooling ("consumption risk-pooling? ) is a significant "common good" for anybody other than financial institutions or the beneficiaries of windfall surpluses like Saudi petrodollars that need recycling. Downloaded pdf to Note
paper  Fed  international_political_economy  international_finance  global_economy  global_imbalance  global_governance  capital_flows  FX  FX-misalignment  emerging_markets  hot_money  contagion  capital_controls  FDI  debt  macroeconomics  central_banks  FX-rate_management  monetary_policy  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
International Banking Research Network | Home (on NY Fed site)
The International Banking Research Network (IBRN) brings together central bank researchers from around the world to analyze issues pertaining to global banks. It was established in 2012 by Austrian, German, U.S., and U.K. researchers who saw a need for joint analysis of key questions, such as the role of cross-border banking in the transmission of financial shocks. The group has now expanded to include economists and analysts from a broad group of central banks, as well as the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund. -- links to their research work and resources on banking, international finance, regulatory matters. Interesting it's not done under BIS auspices - has both BIS and IMF participation, but not World Bank or Financial Stability Board?
website  international_finance  banking  cross-border  financial_regulation  banking-universal  central_banks  financial_crisis  liquidity  leverage  contagion  shadow_banking  NBFI  capital_markets  money_market  monetary_policy  capital_adequacy 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Coppola Comment: Debt hysteria - September 30, 2014
The global debt glut described in the Geneva 16 report, and the global saving glut described by Bernanke, are the same thing. The authors note that growth has been slowing in developed countries since 1980. Indeed it has - and during that time capital ownership and indebtedness have been increasing in tandem, as we might expect since they are opposite sides of the same coin. The report cites numerous analyses that show high debt levels - public AND private - tending to impede growth as resources that could have been turned to productive investment are spent on debt service. Secular stagnation is as much a consequence of over-indebtedness as it is of excess capital. -- When the private sector is highly indebted, saving can take the form of paying off debt. If the government runs a surplus, therefore, it impedes deleveraging in the private sector, and may even force some sectors (typically the poor) to increase debt. Reducing the sovereign debt not only reduces saving in the private sector, it comes at the price of continued and possibly rising indebtedness. The report rightly notes that transferring debt from the private to the public sector, as the US has done, isn't deleveraging. But transferring it back again isn't deleveraging either. And as transferring it back again is likely only to be possible with extensive sovereign guarantees (the UK's Help to Buy, for example), whose debt is it really, anyway? Reports such as this, that look on debt as a problem and ignore the associated savings, fail to address the real issue. The fact is that households, corporations and governments like to have savings and are terrified of loss. Writing down the debt in which people invest their savings means that people must lose their savings. THIS is the real "shock, horror". This is what people fear when they worry about a catastrophic debt default. This is what the world went to great lengths to prevent in 2008. The problem is not the debt, it is the savings.
global_imbalance  global_economy  international_political_economy  international_finance  savings  investment  institutional_investors  debt  debt-restructuring  debtors  credit  creditors  equity  equity-corporate  sovereign_debt  default  risk  risk-systemic  inflation  austerity  economic_growth  stagnation  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  banking  capital_markets  capital_adequacy  government_finance  leverage  deleverage  property_rights  pensions  interest_rates  Evernote 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Issue TOC - THE RESILIENCY OF THE NATION-STATE IN SCHOLARSHIP AND IN FACT | JSTOR: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 34, No. 3, 2011
Introduction: "Globalization" and the Nation-State in the Modern World-System (pp. 253-258) - Denis O'Hearn and Thomas M. Wilson. *--* Nationalism in a Post-Hegemonic Era (pp. 259-283) - Richard Lachmann. *--* The State of States in International Organizations: From the WHO to the Global Fund (pp. 285-310) - Nitsan Chorev, Tatiana Andia Rey and David Ciplet. *--* On the Study of Social Optics: Foucault, Counter-Surveillance, and the Political Underground in Northern Peru (pp. 311-331) - David Nugent -- lots of interesting bibliography
article  journal  jstor  20thC  21stC  economic_history  political_history  political_economy  international_political_economy  cultural_history  globalization  global_governance  global_economy  global_system  global_history  social_theory  political_sociology  political_culture  political_nation  nation-state  national_ID  elites  elite_culture  MNCs  international_organizations  international_system  international_finance  IR_theory  IR-domestic_politics  hegemony  Foucault  IFIs  world_systems  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan E. Leightner - Asia's Financial Crisis, Speculative Bubbles, and Under-Consumption Theory | JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 385-392
He looks at Asian high savings rates (and global imbalances) in 1990s and returns to Mummery& Hobson theory of under-consumption from late 19thC -- Mummery, A. F., and J. A. Hobson. The Physiology of Industry: Being an Exposure of Certain Fallacies in Existing Theories of Economics. London: J. Murray, 1889, reprint Fairfield, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers -- His doctoral work looks to have focused on comparative growth patterns and importance of balanced growth of social and economic classes in providing consumer demand that pushes new technology and productivity gains -- dangers of inequality and benefits of more equal distribution -- Leightner, Jonathan E. "The Compatibility of Growth and Increased Equality: Evidence from Thailand, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and South Africa." Unpublished part of Ph.D. diss -- short article, didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  political_economy  1990s  Asian_crisis  international_political_economy  international_finance  financial_crisis  consumer_demand  inequality  savings  global_imbalance  economic_growth  economic_theory  19thC  Victorian  demand-side  development  bubbles  speculative_finance  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Alan Moreira, Alexi Savov - Shadow banking and the macroeconomy | vox- 16 September 2014
The prevailing view of shadow banking is that it is all about regulatory arbitrage – evading capital requirements and exploiting ‘too big to fail’. This column focuses instead on the tradeoff between economic growth and financial stability. -- The last 2 decades have seen a dramatic rise in worldwide demand for safe and liquid securities, or money for short. These securities enable the large volume of transactions that course through the modern economy. Yet the supply of truly safe (typically government-backed) assets needed to back them has not kept up. Shadow banking has been making up the difference via money market funds, asset-backed commercial paper, and dealer repurchase agreements. The key feature of these instruments is that they function just as well as traditional money during quiet times, but they abruptly lose their liquidity at the first sign of trouble. -- In our paper, we show that the liquidity expansion enabled by shadow banking leads to a lower cost of capital for firms, greater investment, and a higher level of economic growth. Moreover, during a shadow banking boom, the economy moves up the risk-return frontier, funding riskier but more productive investments. Over time, this process builds up fragility. At the peak of a shadow banking boom, even a modest shock can set off a cascade of adverse events. -- they have a macro model that shows boom permits higher risk but productive investments - but their focus in the "trade-off" is on liquidity, not on maturity transformation, and it was the desire for safe medium to long term assets that fueled the mass production of dreck - too much was going to improperly priced (due to bubble and fraud) not productive -- need to separate money market and capital markets -- which they sort of do on Fed QE, but not on private sector financial manufacturing
international_finance  capital_markets  money_market  financial_crisis  bubbles  liquidity  intermediation  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  Fed  QE  economic_growth  macroeconomics  business_cycles  financial_regulation  too-big-to-fail  financial_system-government_back-stop  lender-of-last-resort  deleverage 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Eyes on Trade: A Deal Only Wall Street Could Love | Public Citizen - December 2013
Last week, US financial regulators took a step toward reining in some of the Wall Street risk-taking that led to the financial crisis by finalizing the Volcker Rule, designed to stop banks from engaging in risky, hedge-fund-like bets for their own profit. But this week, EU and US trade negotiators could move in the opposite direction, pursuing an agenda that could thwart such efforts to re-regulate Wall Street. Negotiators from both sides of the Atlantic are converging in Washington, D.C. this week for a third round of talks on the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA). What is TAFTA? A “trade” deal only in name, TAFTA would require the United States and EU to conform domestic financial laws and regulations, climate policies, food and product safety standards, data privacy protections and other non-trade policies to TAFTA rules. We profiled recently the top ten threats this deal poses to U.S. consumers. One area of particular concern is how TAFTA's expansive agenda implicates regulations to promote financial stability. Here's a synopsis. -- professionally done eviseration with lots of links
US_politics  US_economy  US_foreign_policy  Obama_administration  Congress  trade-policy  trade-agreements  EU  EU-foreign_policy  international_political_economy  global_governance  international_finance  financial_regulation  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  FDI  banking  capital_markets  NBFI  shadow_banking  asset_management  derivatives  leverage  risk-systemic  financial_crisis  central_banks  macroprudential_regulation  too-big-to-fail  regulation-harmonization  cross-border  MNCs  tax_havens  investor-State_disputes  law-and-finance  administrative_law  race-to-the-bottom  lobbying  big_business  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
TTIP: EU proposal will weaken regulation of banks | Corporate Europe Observatory - July 2014
A leaked document shows the EU Commission is spearheading a campaign for the interests of the financial sector at the negotiations with the US on a free trade and investment agreement (TTIP). The result could endanger reforms made since the financial crisis, and invoke another era of risky deregulation. The EU is going for a trade deal with the US that will weaken financial regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. That is the conclusion of Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and SOMO after taking a close look at the leak of a confidential EU proposal tabled at the negotiations by the European Commission in March 2014. The document follows long discussions between the EU and the US about whether the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is to include a specific mechanism on financial regulation. So far, the US has declined, allegedly out of fear that such a mechanism would weaken existing financial regulation and prevent future such reforms. -- downloaded pdf of leaked negotiating document to Note
Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  EU_governance  EU-foreign_policy  financial_regulation  regulation-harmonization  banking  derivatives  NBFI  shadow_banking  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_political_economy  international_finance  trade-agreements  trade-policy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Leaked document shows EU is going for a trade deal that will weaken financial regulation | Corporate Europe Observatory
According to a leaked document, the EU is bent on using the TTIP negotiations with the US to get an agreement on financial regulation that, according to this analysis by Kenneth Haar of Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and Myriam Vander Stichele of The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) will weaken reform and control of the financial sector. If the EU has its way, a final agreement between the EU and the US to establish a free trade and investment agreement the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will weaken regulation and raise obstacles to much needed reform of the financial sector. That is the conclusion after the leak of an EU proposal for so-called “regulatory cooperation” on financial regulation.1 tabled by the EU in March 2014. Regulatory cooperation is a continuous process of ironing out disagreements and differences between the two Parties to ensure agreement on what constitutes legitimate regulation – which in this case, would serve the interests of the financial industry. In the document, the EU suggests a number of mechanisms that will both scale back existing regulation, and prevent future regulation that might contradict the interests of financial corporations from both sides of the Atlantic. The leak follows news that EU negotiators have increased political pressure on the US to accept negotiations on “financial regulatory cooperation", which the US negotiators have so far refused. -- lengthy analysis with tons of links to coverage of the issues in financial press -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_politics  US_economy  US_foreign_policy  Obama_administration  EU  EU_governance  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  financial_system  financial_regulation  international_finance  banking  capital_markets  NBFI  leverage  too-big-to-fail  bailouts  derivatives  lobbying  regulation-harmonization  cross-border  trade-agreements  trade-policy  MNCs  transparency  accountability  civil_society  central_banks  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Sovereign ratings investigation - ESMA’s assessment of governance, conflicts of interest, resourcing adequacy and confidentiality controls (February 2013) | Esma
This report summarises the findings of the ESMA general investigation into sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s which took place between February and October 2013, as indicated in its Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) 2013 Supervision and Policy Work Plan. ESMA describes the observed deficiencies and main concerns while also identifying a number of good practices in the following areas: • the role of senior management and other non-rating functions in the rating process and the actual or potential conflicts of interest which could arise; • the actual or potential conflicts of interests generated by the involvement of sovereign analysts in research and publication activities; • confidentiality of sovereign rating information and controls in place prior to publication of ratings (including IT and access controls to confidential information); • timing of publication of sovereign ratings, including timely disclosure of rating changes; • monitoring of the adequacy and expertise of resources dedicated to sovereign ratings; • preparation of rating committees; and • definitions of roles and responsibilities among different analytical functions. ESMA’s investigation revealed shortcomings in the sovereign ratings process which could pose risks to the quality, independence and integrity of the ratings and of the rating process. As of the date of this document, ESMA has not determined whether any of the observations made in this report constitute serious possibilities of facts likely to constitute infringements of the CRA Regulation. -- didn't download
report  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  international_finance  sovereign_debt  rating_agencies  conflict_of_interest  internal_controls  risk-systemic 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
ESMA website section - Market Infrastructure - Central Counterparties | ESMA
EMIR introduces a harmonised set of organisational, business conduct and prudential requirements for clearing service providers. CCPs interpose themselves between counterparties to a derivative contract, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. In doing so, CCPs become the focal point for derivative transactions thus increasing market transparency and reducing the risks inherent in derivatives markets. National securities regulators are responsible for the authorisation of EU-based CCPs. For each EU-based CCP a college of supervisors will be established made up of relevant national regulators and ESMA. A non-EU CCP needs to be recognised by ESMA to offer clearing services to EU customers. Prior to recognition the EC must adopt an implementing act determining, amongst other issues, that the legal and supervisory arrangements of the relevant non-EU country imposes legally binding requirements which are equivalent to those contained in Title IV of EMIR. For some jurisdictions ESMA has assessed whether non-EU country legislation meets the EMIR standard through ESMA technical advice to the EC on which to base its decision. ESMA does not actively supervise non-EU CCPs, but following recognition defers to the non-EU CCP’s home supervisor to undertake the day-to-day supervision. ESMA’s role in this respect is that of a standard-setter who further clarifies the CCP provisions under EMIR.
website  EU  EU-law  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  international_finance  market_integration  risk-systemic  derivatives  infrastructure-markets  markets-structure  clearing_&_settlement  liability  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  cross-border  law-and-finance 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Network for Sustainable Financial Markets | Home
The Network for Sustainable Financial Markets is an International, non-partisan network of finance sector professionals, academics and others who have an active interest in long-term investing. We believe that the recurring crises recently experienced in our financial markets are not isolated incidents. Rather, this instability is evidence that the financial market system is in need of well thought-out reform so that it can better serve its core purpose of creating long-term sustainable value. Our primary concern today is not that reform efforts will result in the adoption of too much or too little regulation. Rather, we see the greatest peril as inappropriate regulation and governance reforms that fail to address the real causes of financial market instability. While increased transparency, better risk management, additional liquidity and other surface fixes might address the current symptoms, they are not enough to resolve underlying systemic problems. Delay will only make things worse since failure to deal with these deep-rooted design flaws can only mean repetitive, deepening crises with growing economic and social destabilisation. The time to act is now. The Network’s goal is to foster interdisciplinary collaboration on research and advocacy projects between market professionals, academics and other opinion-leaders. We seek to fill the gaps between existing initiatives, to engage on problems which have received attention but have not still been solved and also to involve many more opinion-shapers than has previously been the case. We also intend that the Network be time-limited – our ultimate goal is to embed the Network’s guiding principles into the approaches used by other entities involved in research and public policy, then dissolve. -- connected to Climate Bond Initiative
website  financial_system  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  financial_innovation  financial_sector_development  reform-finance  green_finance  investors  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  banking  international_finance  international_monetary_system  risk-systemic  standards-sustainability  disclosure  accounting 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
WEF's Global Risk Report | Silvia Merler at Bruegel.org - September 2014
Last week, the World Economic Forum (WEF) published its Global Risk Report (GRR) for 2014/15. The report is an exercise conducted by the WEF since 2006, but this year’s issue is particularly interesting because it adopts an historical perspective, offering insights on how the world has changed in respondents’ eyes and concerns. The GRR assesses risks that are global in nature and have the potential to cause significant negative impact across entire countries and industries if they take place over a time frame of up to 10 years. 31 such risks are identified in the report and grouped under five categories – economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological. *-* Economic Risks include fiscal and liquidity crises, failure of a major financial mechanism or institution, oil-price shocks, chronic unemployment and failure of physical infrastructure on which economic activity depends. *-* Environmental Risks encompass both natural disasters and man-made risks such as collapsing ecosystems, freshwater shortages, nuclear accidents and failure to mitigate or adapt to climate change. *-* Geopolitical Risks cover politics, diplomacy, conflict, crime and global governance. These risks range from terrorism, disputes over resources and war to governance being undermined by corruption, organized crime and illicit trade. *-* Societal Risks are intended to capture risks related to social stability – such as severe income disparities, food crises and dysfunctional cities – and public health, such as pandemics, antibiotic-resistant bacteria and the rising burden of chronic disease. *-* Technological Risks covers major risks related to the centrality of information and communication technologies to individuals, businesses and governments (such as cyber attacks, infrastructure disruptions and data loss). -- excellent network chart showing how risks are interrelated within and across categories -- downloaded pdf to Note
report  global_economy  global_governance  global_system  international_political_economy  international_finance  financial_crisis  climate  energy  water  inequality  unemployment  geopolitics  infrastructure  public_health  public_goods  urban_development  urbanization  downloaded 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Katharina Pistor: Creating A Legal Foundation For Finance | The Institute for New Economic Thinking
Katharina Pistor, a grantee of the Institute for New Economic Thinking, professor at Columbia University Law School, and the director of Columbia’s Center on Global Legal Transformation, is developing a Legal Theory of Finance.
In this interview, Pistor focuses in particular on the paradoxical relationship between law and finance. On the one hand, finance needs law to provide credibility. After all, financial assets are contracts, the value of which depends on their legal validation. But on the other hand, changing conditions in the financial world over time necessitate flexibility in law. An overly rigid legal system can render regulation irrelevant if financial innovation ultimately surpasses laws designed for another era. In a worst-case scenario, legal rigidity also can play a role in causing a financial accident. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank legislation represents one response to this challenge. In Europe, the melding of finance and the law is even more complex because policy makers, regulators, and legislators are dealing with 17 different nations, all of which operate with a common currency but in a series of different national jurisdictions with vastly different legal traditions and precedents.
The tension in Europe has become particularly acute in relation to some of the unconventional measures undertaken by the European Central Bank in response to the existential threat to the euro itself - have come under challenge in Germany’s Constitutional Court. Can a national constitutional court effectively invalidate an entire program undertaken by a supranational central bank, which ostensibly is responsible for a common monetary policy? This is one of the issues that Professor Pistor discusses in the exchange below.
video  legal_theory  legal_system  financial_system  financial_regulation  law-and-finance  property_rights  contracts  debt  central_banks  Eurozone  monetary_policy  money  capital_markets  banking  international_political_economy  international_law  international_finance  international_monetary_system 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Fola Adeleke - Investor-State Arbitration and the Public Interest Regulation Theory :: SSRN June 16, 2014
University of the Witwatersrand - School of Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/12. *--* When South Africa decided late last year to terminate a number of bilateral investment agreements with European Union countries, it did so at a time when global regulatory governance has come under scrutiny for their disposition to the domestic economic policies of states and the idea of state sovereignty in the regulation of its own economic affairs is fast declining. The prevailing global regulatory governance regime institutionalizes neo-liberalism which has given birth to various economic institutions and rules including bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The policy interest behind BITs is to some extent the suspension of domestic regulation in the governance of foreign investment. With this suspension in place, the regulatory sphere is filled by a supra-national regime that is rigid and restrains state conduct. In this paper, I intend to apply the emerging legal framework of global administrative law (GAL) to investor state arbitration in order to dispel the resistance towards this dispute settlement mechanism found in BITs for its perceived inability to adequately handle disputes that deal with public interest issues that fall outside standard investment protection but are relevant to the resolution of the investment dispute. I propose the application of domestic law concepts in an international sphere and make the argument that a statutory interpretation based on administrative law principles anchors the BIT regime to the domestic policy space of states and builds up the much needed legitimacy for investor state arbitration. The focus of GAL on the procedural elements of administrative law enables the implementation of substantive norms of liberalized trade which also promotes the rule of law, encourage a broader range of social and economic actors to scrutinize decision making and promote a democratic element in global regulatory governance. This democratic element includes public participation, greater transparency as well as an interpretive approach founded on GAL principles. - Pages in PDF File: 52 -- Keywords: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Global Administrative Law (GAL), Deference, Public Interest, Investment Arbitration - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  South_Africa  EU  global_governance  global_economy  international_political_economy  international_finance  administrative_law  dispute_resolution  arbitration  neoliberalism  treaties  FDI  common_good  investment-bilateral_treaties  democracy  nation-state  national_interest  political_participation  business-and-politics  emerging_markets  investor-State_disputes  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephan W. Schill - The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within :: SSRN June 4, 2014
Max Planck Institute for International Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/02. *--* In reaction to a summary of five different paths for investment law reform made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in June 2013, which focused on institutional reforms of investor-State dispute settlement, the present paper sketches out a sixth path for investment law reform that is based on a system-internal reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a form of public law-based judicial review. It can be reformed, the paper argues, by arbitrators and parties making increasing use of comparative public law methodology that allows them to draw on the experience of more sophisticated systems of public law adjudication at the national and international level without the need for institutional reform to investor-State arbitration. First, the paper points out the benefits of the existing system of investor-State arbitration, in order to show that investor-State arbitration is an institution worth reforming from within. Second, the paper lays out the basic framework to reconceptualize investment law as a system of public law and governance and point out shortcomings in the currently prevailing approaches to understanding investor-State arbitration. Third, the paper indicates the methodological consequences of a reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a public law system of governance, namely the need for arbitrators to make increased use of comparative public law in resolving disputes. Finally, the paper shows how public law ideas and comparative public law methodology can be brought into investment arbitration in its present form and why arbitrators have an interest in conforming to these standards even without fundamental institutional reform. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 - Keywords: investment treaties, international investment law, investor-state arbitration, investment law - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  international_finance  capital_markets  investment  sovereign_debt  investor-State_disputes  FDI  dispute_resolution  arbitration  global_governance  comparative_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  reform-legal  treaties  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
SSRN Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), Fourth Biennial Global Conference
The Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) was held in Bern and hosted by the World Trade Institute (WTI) of the University of Bern, from 10-12 July 2014. You can browse all SIEL Fourth Biennial Global Conference abstracts in the SSRN eLibrary. The Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) is a new organization aimed at academics and academically-minded practitioners and officials in the field of IEL, in all parts of the world. The broad goals and objectives of the organization include: building links and networks between and among IEL academics and academically-minded practitioners and officials; fostering the development of local IEL expertise and IEL organizations where needed; representing the discipline of international economic law as appropriate in global, regional and national fora; and encouraging research, practice, service and teaching in the field of IEL.
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_organizations  development  trade-policy  trade-agreements  WTO  global_governance  international_political_economy  reform-legal  institutional_economics  international_finance  capital_markets  capital_flows  climate  energy  ocean  treaties 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, Lunn - Should We Build More Large Dams? The Actual Costs of Hydropower Megaproject Development (Energy Policy, March 2014, pp.1-14.) :: SSRN
Atif Ansar - University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government -- Bent Flyvbjerg - University of Oxford - Said Business School -- Alexander Budzier - University of Oxford - Saïd Business School.-- Daniel Lunn - University of Oxford - Department of Statistics *--* A brisk building boom of hydropower mega-dams is underway from China to Brazil. Whether benefits of new dams will outweigh costs remains unresolved despite contentious debates. We investigate this question with the “outside view” or “reference class forecasting” based on literature on decision-making under uncertainty in psychology. We find overwhelming evidence that budgets are systematically biased below actual costs of large hydropower dams — excluding inflation, substantial debt servicing, environmental, and social costs. Using the largest and most reliable reference data of its kind and multilevel statistical techniques applied to large dams for the first time, we were successful in fitting parsimonious models to predict cost and schedule overruns. The outside view suggests that in most countries large hydropower dams will be too costly in absolute terms and take too long to build to deliver a positive risk-adjusted return unless suitable risk management measures outlined in this paper can be affordably provided. Policymakers, particularly in developing countries, are advised to prefer agile energy alternatives that can be built over shorter time horizons to energy megaprojects. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 14 - Keywords: Large hydropower dams, Schedule & cost estimates, Cost benefit forecasting, Reference class forecasting, Outside -- didn't download
article  SSRN  development  energy  IFIs  business-and-politics  statistics  social_sciences  methodology-quantitative  decision_theory  international_finance  institutional_economics  business-forecasts 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Future shape of banking - Time for reformation of banking and banks? (report) | PwC - 2014
Given the current economic climate, in particular the focus on the European Central Banks Comprehensive Assessment and the move to the Single Supervisory Mechanism, a working group from the PwC Response to the economic crisis in Europe (REcCE) network has developed a provocative point of view paper on the future shape and nature of banking services and of “banks” themselves. Future shape of banking outlines four key areas banks need to address in order to remain relevant, as we argue that the future of banking will look very different to what we see today and that while the need for banking services remains – traditional banks need to sharpen their strategic focus and regulators and regulation will also need to adapt.... adding up to a paradigm shift in the banking landscape. -- downloaded pdf to Note
international_political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  banking  financial_regulation  financial_innovation  disintermediation  payments_systems  central_banks  tech  NBFI  liquidity  leverage  investors  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Tracy Alloway - RBS slashes US mortgage business - FT.com - May 2014
RBS is shrinking in the US under regulatory pressure from the Fed, with the loss of hundreds of jobs, mainly in mortgage trading, executives told staff on Tuesday. The moves solidify a sharp reversal in strategy from RBS, which built one of the biggest trading floors in the world in Stamford, Connecticut outside New York, but has now dramatically scaled back its ambitions. [New Fed rules] impose tough stress tests on foreign broker-dealers with more than $50bn in assets. -- In spite of the entreaties from Barclays and some officials such as Michel Barnier, the European commissioner, the Fed pushed ahead in March with the rules, including a stricter “leverage ratio”. Barclays argued the application of such a blunt measure of capital was unfair. In one concession that cheered foreign banks, the Fed did grant more time to comply. Typically, banks have been able to measure their capital on a global basis, with equity in one country counting against assets in another. But the Fed is concerned that US subsidiaries of banks with a large trading operation – particularly Barclays and Deutsche – could come unstuck and might come looking for US government support.
international_finance  US_economy  US_government  Fed  financial_regulation  capital_flows  leverage  banking  EU  securitization 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Joseph Cottrell - Pari Passu Saga Series - Argentina — whom do you trust? | FT Alphaville - September 4, 2014
Outlines new ootion for non vulture fund investors -- a plan by Adam Lerrick for restructured bondholders to extricate themselves from the default simply by voting to kick Bank of New York out as their trustee. BNY would, under the plan, give way to another (probably Argentine) bank not subject to US jurisdiction. This bank then wouldn’t be bound by Judge Griesa’s order for payments to go through only with holdouts also being paid, thus allowing bondholders to get their coupons. Nor would there be the jiggery-pokery of swapping New York-law bonds for local-law. That would be this plan (click for PDF): Lerrick has a decade of experience with the terms of Argentine debt, having advised European retail bondholders in the restructuring of 2005. Some might kick themselves for not having thought of a few aspects of this plan. Ironically — for a saga which showed how a dormant piece of dry boilerplate became a powerful weapon of enforcement against a sovereign debtor — it works using standard, boilerplate, trust indenture terms. -- didn't download
capital_markets  emerging_markets  international_finance  international_law  sovereign_debt  US_legal_system  US_judiciary  payments_systems  fiduciaries  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Matthew Klein - BIS says we should follow the money | FT Alphaville - September 2014
Quote "In the case of European banks intermediating US dollar funding, the boundary defined for national income accounting is traversed twice, so that the usual net flows do not capture the activities of the financial intermediaries engaging in the maturity transformation in the mortgage market… If the objective is to gauge credit conditions and overall financial vulnerability, the current account was of very limited use. Rather than the global saving glut, a more plausible culprit for subprime lending in the United States was the global banking glut. / end quote - (The short version of the “global banking glut” theory is that the creation of the euro caused risk premiums in the single currency zone to collapse and encouraged banks to dramatically increase both their leverage and their absolute size. The net effect was excessive credit growth to the US, UK, Spain, Ireland, and Greece.) The paper concludes by making an appeal for changing the way economists think about the relationship between the macroeconomy and the financial system: Quote: "One should not ask what the real side of the equation means for its financial counterpart, but what the financial side means for its real counterpart. The starting point should be what happens in financial asset markets rather than in the goods markets, domestically and internationally. Otherwise, there is a risk that the financial side will be neglected." //end quote -- downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  economic_theory  Great_Recession  Great_Depression  financialization  capital_markets  money_market  banking  capital_flows  international_political_economy  international_finance  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeff Frankel -It Takes More than Two to Tango: Cry, But Not for Argentina, nor for the Holdouts | Jeffrey Frankel’s Blog July 2014
No such debtors’ court or body of law exists at the international level. Ambitious proposals to solve it over the years, such as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism which might be housed at the IMF, have always run into political roadblocks. But incremental steps had been slowly moving the system in the right direction since the 1980s. In the international debt crisis that began in 1982, IMF country adjustment programs went hand in hand with “bailing in” creditor banks through “voluntary” coordinated loan rollovers. After Argentina’s unilateral default in 2001, many borrowers and lenders saw more clearly the need to allow explicitly for less drastic alternatives ahead of time and so incorporated more “Collective Action Clauses”. The incremental steps had created a loose sort of system of debt restructuring. The real danger of the court ruling in the case of the Argentine hold-outs is that, in a parochial instinct to enforce a written contract, it will undermine the possibility of negotiated re-structuring of unsustainable debt burdens in future crises, because free-riding holdouts may be able to prevent it. The court delivered a peculiar interpretation of pari passu -- to mean that creditors who had not agreed to the debt exchange were to be paid 100% of the original claim at the expense of the creditors that had accepted the new bonds. Moreover, the court gave the holdouts a very powerful weapon by holding settlement and clearing institutions in the US and even in Europe responsible for routing any payments of Argentina. Other recent developments have also worked to reverse the progress -- Europe’s handling of the crisis that began with Greece in 2010 was too slow, too optimistic, too reluctant initially to restructure bond-holders, and too enamored of fiscal austerity. The mistakes eventually encompassed even such specific no-nos as a consideration in the Cyprus case of haircutting small bank depositors.
international_finance  international_political_economy  capital_markets  sovereign_debt  IMF  bankruptcy  creditors  Eurozone  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Hyman P. Minsky - Review of Susan Strange, "Casino Capitalism" (1987) | Bard Archive
C Description

A Review of: Susan Strange. Casino Capitalism. Oxford and New York, NY: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 1883-1885, Book Reviews, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXV, Dec. 1987. -- Recommended Citation. - Minsky, Hyman P. Ph.D., "Review of "Casino Capitalism"" (1987). Hyman P. Minsky Archive. Paper 158. - http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hm_archive/158 -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  bookshelf  reviews  Minsky  international_political_economy  international_finance  capitalism  capital_markets  FX  international_economics  international_monetary_system  downloaded 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Kirschner, review - Daniel W. Drezner, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression
Neoliberal bailout good look at evidence re processes and international organizations, but looks like self-interested ad hocery, mostly the Fed flooding the global financial system with liquidity, but the system has not worked in reforming the core problems or strengthening international organizations for future management, especially to avoid crises
books  reviews  international_finance  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  global_governance  international_organizations  IMF  Fed  hegemony 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Olivier Blanchard, Jonathan D Ostry - The multilateral approach to capital controls | vox - 11 December 2012
The IMF recently endorsed capital controls as useful policy responses to certain circumstances. This column explains the logic and the research that underpins the shift
international_finance  international_system  international_economics  international_organizations  capital_flows  emerging_markets  macroeconomics  macroprudential_policies  IMF 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Eduardo Levy Yeyati - Do capital controls work? | vox - 20 January 2011
The global crisis has reignited debate on the desirability of capital controls. This column examines evidence from Argentina and Chile and argues that capital controls can be effective, but that their effectiveness and efficiency varies. It adds that controls need to be considered as part of a macro-prudential toolkit to prevent asset inflation and overvaluation that is costly to revert in the down cycle. - Chile's controls on inward investment was basically a Tobin tax that worked as designed. Argentina has had so many moving parts and different objectives it's a bit of a dog's breakfast
capital_flows  emerging_markets  international_finance  Chile  Latin_America 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Justin Yifu Lin and Kevin Lu - To attract private investment, infrastructure must be a new asset class. - Project Syndicate
....abandoning the view that infrastructure assets fit into the paradigm of traditional asset classes like equity, debt, or real estate. Infrastructure must be redefined as a new asset class, based on several considerations. For starters, there is the public-good element of many infrastructure projects, which demands contingent government obligations like universal coverage levels for basic services. In order to make such projects more appealing to private investors, economic externalities should be internalized, and a link should be established between the internal rate of return, which matters to a commercial investor, and the economic rate of return, which matters to society. Moreover, innovative mechanisms to supply new assets to investors would be needed – and that requires the creativity found and priced by markets. --The new asset class would need its own standardized risk/return profile, accounting, for example, for the political risks that public-sector involvement may imply and for the lower returns from infrastructure relative to traditional private equity. Moreover, the risks associated with the new asset class would change as projects progress from feasibility study to construction to operation, implying that each phase would attract different sources of funding. -- Another important consideration is the considerable technical expertise that infrastructure investments demand, which makes them more complex than most assets. Similarly, a specialized network of actors would be needed to ensure that intermediation of infrastructure transactions is efficient and cost-effective, instead of fragmented and slow, as it is now.
emerging_markets  international_political_economy  international_finance  capital_markets  infrastructure  investment  financial_innovation 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Are We Headed for a Credit Market Crash? | House of Debt April 2014
Charts of my old rule of thumb re potential crashes from excess liquidity sloshing around the world -- This is the picture that worries many. The Greenwood-Hanson model is currently predicting negative excess returns on risky bonds. That is the definition of a bubble — people are buying risky bonds that in expectation will deliver less return than riskless bonds. As you can see, their model predicts negative excess returns prior to the Great Recession as well. This is the exact same graph that Governor Stein showed in one of his speeches
financial_system  bubbles  financial_crisis  QE  Fed  liquidity  debt  capital_markets  interest_rates  international_finance  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Antill, Hou & Sarkar - The Growth of Murky Finance - Liberty Street Economics March 2014
In series on large, complex financial institutions -- By either measure, the financial sector has been a growing part of the economy. It has mostly increased in relative size over the past four decades, interrupted in a major way only by the recent financial crisis (see chart below). On average, the financial sector has accounted for about 50 percent of the asset values of publicly listed firms, but roughly 70 percent of total business sector liabilities. Hence, one reason to worry about the size of this sector is its high representation among private firms that have virtually no transparency.
financial_system  international_finance  banking  shadow_banking  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  leverage  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Larry Neal - Integration of International Capital Markets: Quantitative Evidence from the Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), pp. 219-226
The integration of capital markets is usually tested with an interest rate arbitrage model even though much different financial assets must be compared. This paper compares prices of identical assets that are traded simultaneously in two or more markets. The range, average level, and time series pattern of the differences can be used to infer threshold levels, transaction cost levels, and the efficiency of arbitrage operations, respectively. Examples are given for financial crises from 1745 to 1907, using prices from the London, Amsterdam, Paris, and New York stock exchanges. These show European capital markets to be well integrated by mid-eighteenth century. -- didn't download -- I expect the data is worked into his later books etc
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  capital_markets  18thC  19thC  British_history  capital_flows  FX  financial_crisis  interest_rates  international_finance  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Carol E. Heim and Philip Mirowski - Interest Rates and Crowding-Out During Britain's Industrial Revolution | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 117-139
Available evidence on interest rates and government borrowing during Britain's industrial revolution, while limited, does not support the idea that war spending crowded out private investment. This article demonstrates the importance of using data on net receipts from borrowing, rather than changes in government debt. Weaknesses of the crowding-out model concerning capital markets and investment, openness of the economy, and full employment are identified for the historical case. The case raises broader issues of whether conceptions of saving and investment based in neoclassical supply-constrained models are as appropriate as theories of capital accumulation. -- 1st in series of back and forth articles -- didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  sovereign_debt  crowding_out  capital_markets  fiscal-military_state  Industrial_Revolution  18thC  19thC  British_history  UK_Government  interest_rates  international_finance  capital_flows  savings  investment  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Dani Rodrik - the fundamental lessons about emerging economies that economists have refused to learn. - Project Syndicate Feb 2014
The deeper problem lies with the excessive financialization of the global economy that has occurred since the 1990’s. The policy dilemmas that have resulted – rising inequality, greater volatility, reduced room to manage the real economy – will continue to preoccupy policymakers in the decades ahead. It is true, but unhelpful, to say that governments have only themselves to blame for having recklessly rushed into this wild ride. It is now time to think about how the world can create a saner balance between finance and the real economy
emerging_markets  international_finance  international_political_economy  capital_flows  financial_sector_development  FX  financialization 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
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