dunnettreader + interest_groups   28

Jeffrey Edward Green - Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable Envy toward the Superrich (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article aims to correct the widespread imbalance in contemporary liberal thought, which makes explicit appeal to the "least advantaged" without parallel attention to the "most advantaged" as a distinct group in need of regulatory attention. Rawls's influential theory of justice is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this imbalance, but I show how a Rawlsian framework nonetheless provides three justifications for why implementers of liberal justice—above all, legislators—should regulate the economic prospects of a polity's richest citizens: as a heuristic device for ensuring that a system of inequalities not reach a level at which inequalities cease being mutually advantageous, as protection against excessive inequalities threatening civic liberty, and as redress for a liberal society's inability to fully realize fair equality of opportunity with regard to education and politics. Against the objection that such arguments amount to a defense of envy, insofar as they support policies that in certain instances impose economic costs on the most advantaged with negative or neutral economic impact on the rest of society, I attend to Rawls's often overlooked distinction between irrational and reasonable forms of envy, showing that any envy involved in the proposed regulation of the most advantaged falls within this latter category. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
politics-and-money  political_participation  inequality-wealth  regulatory_capture  political_philosophy  political_culture  tax_havens  Early_Republic  inequality  estate_tax  intellectual_history  inheritance  republicanism  Plato-Republic  elites-political_influence  Jefferson  Harrington  crony_capitalism  Europe-Early_Modern  fairness  article  Aristotle  social_capital  social_theory  Rawls  social_democracy  Machiavelli  Plato  inequality-opportunity  jstor  bibliography  ancient_Rome  regulation  justice  liberalism  egalitarian  regulatory_avoidance  interest_groups  legitimacy  deliberative_democracy  political_history  class_conflict  downloaded  education-elites  social_order  elites-self-destructive  Roman_Republic  ancient_Greece  republics-Ancient_v_Modern 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Elena Seghezza - Fiscal capacity and the risk of sovereign debt after the Glorious Revolution: A reinterpretation of the North–Weingast hypothesis (2015) — ScienceDirect
European Journal of Political Economy, June 2015, Vol.38:71–81, doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.12.002
Dept. of Economics, University of Genoa, Via Vivaldi 5, 16126 Genova, Italy
Several explanations have been given to account for the fact that, in contrast to the claim made by North and Weingast (1989), the decline in interest rates on British sovereign debt did not occur until several years after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the decline in the risk premium on Britain's sovereign debt was due to the significant increase in excise duties in the early part of the eighteenth century. This increase was possible for two reasons. On the one hand, with the Glorious Revolution, parliament no longer had reason to fear that the King would strengthen his political power due to the availability of more fiscal revenue. On the other hand, the new excise taxes were borne mostly by the poor, that is a social class not represented in parliament. The delay in reducing the interest rate on British sovereign debt, following the Glorious Revolution, was, therefore, due to the length of time needed to increase and improve the fiscal bureaucracy responsible for the collection of excise duties.
Keywords -- Glorious Revolution Fiscal capacity Sovereign debt Interest rates
article  paywall  political_economy  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  Glorious_Revolution  fiscal-military_state  fiscal_space  tax_policy  tax_collection  bureaucracy  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  interest_groups  inequality  excise  lower_orders  taxes-consumption  landed_interest 
december 2016 by dunnettreader
André Lang - La part maudite du politique chez Machiavel, ou le retour aux origines (2005) - Cairn.info
I - L’anacyclosis révisée
II - Les constitutions à l’épreuve de l’histoire
III - Le retour au principe
IV - Le moment Romuléen et le moment Numéen
V - Le principe comme puissance de régénération
VI - Les exécutions ou l’équivoque politique du retour à l’origine
VII - Brutus ou la part souveraine de la violence des principes
De l’exécution à l’exécutif : conclusion et perspectives
Pour citer cet article

Lang André, « La part maudite du politique chez Machiavel, ou le retour aux origines. », Le Philosophoire 2/2005 (n° 25) , p. 213-230
URL : www.cairn.info/revue-le-philosophoire-2005-2-page-213.htm.
DOI : 10.3917/phoir.025.0213.
Aristotle  class_conflict  political_participation  Pocock  Polybius  corruption  state_of_exception  republicanism  violence  article  norms  dialectic-historical  common_good  political_philosophy  Machiavelli  interest_groups  civic_virtue  downloaded  politics-and-history  mixed_government  historical_change  history_as_examples  cyclical_history  rule_of_law  cycles  republics-Ancient_v_Modern 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Christian Ruby - Le « public » contre le « peuple » : une structure de la modernité (2005) - Cairn.info
Plan de l'article

Philosophie et « public », de nos jours
La constitution moderne de l’opposition « public »/« peuple »
Le statut historique de « public »
La formation et l’agencement des publics
L’importance actuelle de cette référence au « public »
La déprise nécessaire
Pour citer cet article

Ruby Christian, « Le « public » contre le « peuple » : une structure de la modernité. », Le Philosophoire 2/2005 (n° 25) , p. 89-104
URL : www.cairn.info/revue-le-philosophoire-2005-2-page-89.htm.
DOI : 10.3917/phoir.025.0089.
article  public_sphere  public_opinion  representative_institutions  masses-fear_of  political_participation  democracy  media  citizens  parties-transmission_belts  civic_virtue  Habermas  downloaded  interest_groups  consumerism  political_culture  general_will  political_press  solidarity  Dewey  citizenship  political_philosophy  legitimacy  rhetoric-political  modernity  republicanism  mass_culture 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Robert O. Keohane, review - Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1983) | JSTOR
Reviewed Work: The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. -- Journal of Economic Literature
Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 558-560 -- quite positive, but useful on where Olson's theory has blind spots -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  bookshelf  reviews  political_economy  economic_history  economic_growth  interest_groups  collective_action  international_political_economy  institutional_economics  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality  stagnation  rent-seeking  politics-and-money  status  status_quo_bias  social_order  hierarchy  change-social  change-economic  castes  discrimination  inequality  mobility  post-WWII  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Jack A. Goldstone - More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to Relational Fields | JSTOR: Theory and Society, Vol. 33, No. 3/4, (Jun. - Aug., 2004), pp. 333-365
Theory and Society - Special Issue: Current Routes to the Study of Contentious Politics and Social Change -- If social movements are an attempt by "outsiders" to gain leverage within politics, then one might expect the global spread of democracy to reduce social movement activity. This article argues the reverse. Granted, many past social movements, such as women's rights and civil rights, were efforts to empower the disenfranchised. However, this is not typical. Rather, social movements and protest tactics are more often part of a portfolio of efforts by politically active leaders and groups to influence politics. Indeed, as representative governance spreads, with the conviction by all parties that governments should respond to popular choice, then social movements and protest will also spread, as a normal element of democratic politics. Social movements should therefore not be seen as simply a matter of repressed forces fighting states; instead they need to be situated in a dynamic relational field in which the ongoing actions and interests of state actors, allied and counter-movement groups, and the public at large all influence social movement emergence, activity, and outcomes. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  political_sociology  contention  social_movements  change-social  power  power-asymmetric  democracy  political_participation  government-forms  governing_class  elites  grassroots  representative_institutions  reform-political  reform-social  reform-economic  franchise  accountability  interest_groups  voice  civil_liberties  women-rights  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Douglas M. Peers, review - H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833 (2006) JSTOR: The International History Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 605-606
Cambridge University Press -- very enthusiastic review especially re the data Bowen uses, and purportedly will make available - data shows greater economic impact of trading with the East -- Bowen ends with qualified acceptance of "gentlemanly capitalism" thesis
books  reviews  jstor  find  amazon.com  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  British_Empire  East_India_Company  India  imperialism  economic_history  political_economy  financial_system  City  Parliament  interest_groups  UK_Government  UK_government-colonies  UK_economy 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark S. Mizruchi - Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations | JSTOR: Theory and Society, Vol. 33, No. 5 (Oct., 2004), pp. 579-617
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), Berle and Means warned of the concentration of economic power brought on by the rise of the large corporation and the emergence of a powerful class of professional managers, insulated from the pressure not only of stockholders, but of the larger public as well. In the tradition of Thomas Jefferson, Berle and Means warned that the ascendance of management control and unchecked corporate power had potentially serious consequences for the democratic character of the United States. Social scientists who drew on Berle and Means in subsequent decades presented a far more benign interpretation of the rise of managerialism, however. For them, the separation of ownership from control actually led to an increased level of democratization in the society as a whole. Beginning in the late 1960s, sociologists and other social scientists rekindled the debate over ownership and control, culminating in a series of rigorous empirical studies on the nature of corporate power in American society. In recent years, however, sociologists have largely abandoned the topic, ceding it to finance economists, legal scholars, and corporate strategy researchers. In this article, I provide a brief history of the sociological and finance/legal/strategy debates over corporate ownership and control. I discuss some of the similarities between the two streams of thought, and I discuss the reasons that the issue was of such significance sociologically. I then argue that by neglecting this topic in recent years, sociologists have failed to contribute to an understanding of some of the key issues in contemporary business behavior. I provide brief reviews of four loosely developed current perspectives and then present an argument of my own about the changing nature of the U.S. corporate elite over the past three decades. I conclude with a call for sociologists to refocus their attention on an issue that, however fruitfully handled by scholars in other fields, cries out for sociological analysis. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  US_economy  US_politics  political_economy  political_sociology  economic_sociology  law-and-finance  law-and-economics  capitalism  corporations  MNCs  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  shareholder_value  shareholders  principal-agent  management  managerialism  corporate_citizenship  corporate_control_markets  corporate_law  M&A  business-and-politics  business-norms  power  power-asymmetric  status  interest_groups  lobbying  regulation  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Who lobbies most on TTIP? | Corporate Europe Observatory - July 2014
Do you wonder which businesses are pushing most for the proposed EU-US trade deal TTIP? Or where they come from? And who has most access to EU negotiators? CEO’s at-a-glance info-graphics shine a light on the corporate lobby behind the TTIP talks. -- downloaded pdf to Note
Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  big_business  MNCs  interest_groups  trade-agreements  trade-policy  EU_governance  EU-foreign_policy  investor-State_disputes  FDI  agriculture  pharma  IP  regulation-harmonization  civil_society  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter - Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United (Cornell Law Review, Forthcoming) - August 1, 2014 :: SSRN
Leo E. Strine Jr. - Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Yale University -- Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 788 -- One important aspect of Citizens United has been overlooked: the tension between the conservative majority’s view of for-profit corporations, and the theory of for-profit corporations embraced by conservative thinkers. This article explores the tension between these conservative schools of thought and shows that Citizens United may unwittingly strengthen the arguments of conservative corporate theory’s principal rival. Citizens United posits that stockholders of for-profit corporations can constrain corporate political spending and that corporations can legitimately engage in political spending. Conservative corporate theory is premised on the contrary assumptions that stockholders are poorly-positioned to monitor corporate managers for even their fidelity to a profit maximization principle, and that corporate managers have no legitimate ability to reconcile stockholders’ diverse political views. Because stockholders invest in for-profit corporations for financial gain, and not to express political or moral values, conservative corporate theory argues that corporate managers should focus solely on stockholder wealth maximization and non-stockholder constituencies and society should rely upon government regulation to protect against corporate overreaching. Conservative corporate theory’s recognition that corporations lack legitimacy in this area has been strengthened by market developments that Citizens United slighted: that most humans invest in the equity markets through mutual funds under section 401(k) plans, cannot exit these investments as a practical matter, and lack any rational ability to influence how corporations spend in the political process. -- Keywords: Corporate governance, political spending, Citizens United, conservative corporate theory, regulatory externalities, lobbying, profit maximization, constitutional law, election law, labor law
article  SSRN  SCOTUS  legal_history  legal_system  legal_theory  corporate_law  corporate_governance  principal-agent  management  shareholders  shareholder_value  campaign_finance  lobbying  elections  labor_law  US_constitution  constitutional_law  public_policy  interest_groups  oligarchy  rent-seeking  investors  savings  capitalism  capital_markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE -- PARTING COMPANIES: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, COMPANY POWER, AND IMPERIAL MERCANTILISM. (2014). | The Historical Journal, 57, pp 617-638. Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW - University of Kent and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE - Seattle University School of Law --This article revisits the late seventeenth-century histories of two of England's most successful overseas trading monopolies, the East India and Royal African Companies. It offers the first full account of the various enforcement powers and strategies that both companies developed and stresses their unity of purpose in the seventeenth century. It assesses the complex effects that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ had on these powers and strategies, unearthing much new material about the case law for monopoly enforcement in this critical period and revising existing accounts that continue to assert the Revolution's exclusively deregulating effects and that miss crucial subtleties in the case law and related alterations in company behaviour. It asks why the two companies parted company as legal and political entities and offers an explanation that connects the fortunes of both monopoly companies to their public profile and differing constituencies in the English empire and the varying non-European political contexts in which they operated. -- * We warmly thank Michael R. T. Macnair for his indispensable advice and assistance regarding matters of seventeenth-century English law and are grateful to Clive Holmes for encouraging us to look into these issues and to Simon Douglas and Jeffrey Hackney for initial help in doing so. Paul Halliday, Daniel Hulsebosch, and Philip J. Stern provided helpful responses to specific research queries.
article  paywall  find  17thC  British_history  British_politics  economic_history  Glorious_Revolution  mercantilism  monopolies  trading_companies  East_India_Company  Royal_African_Co  colonialism  slavery  piracy  competition  parties  London  legal_history  judiciary  commercial_law  interest_groups  Whig_Junto  Tories  James_II  William_III  Parliament  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  regulation  West_Indies  ports  shipping  trade-policy  entrepôts  exports  imports  luxury_goods  consumers  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
"Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance " by Frank Pasquale | 2008 University of Illinois Law Review 599
Keywords - campaign finance, egalitarianism, political theory, Rawls, deliberative democracy, politics -- Recent advocacy for campaign finance reform has been based on an ideal of the democratic process which is unrealistic and unhelpful. Scholars should instead return to its egalitarian roots. This article examines how deliberative democratic theory became the main justification for campaign finance reform. It exposes the shortcomings of this deliberativist detour and instead models campaign spending as an effort to commodify issue-salience. Given this dominant function of money in politics, a more effective paradigm for reform is equalizing influence. Advocates of campaign regulation should return to the original principles of reformers; not an idealized vision of the democratic process, but pragmatic concerns about moneyed interests acquiring too much influence over the nation's politics. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  political_philosophy  legal_theory  constitutionalism  democracy  political_participation  egalitarian  US_constitution  free_speech  plutocracy  interest_groups  legitimacy  campaign_finance  US_legal_system  SCOTUS  media  corruption  franchise  political_culture  political_economy  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
John Locke, Encouragement of Irish Linen Manufacture (August 1697) - Online Library of Liberty
John Locke, H.B. Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke. In Two Volumes (London: Henry S. King, 1876). Vol. 2 pp. 363-372. 07/16/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2332> -- Available as Facsimile PDF 352 KB This is a facsimile or image-based PDF made from scans of the original book -- Locke’s detailed proposals to encourage the Irish linen industry which was quoted in full in Fox Bourne’s The Life of John Locke (1876), vol. 2, pp. 363-372.
etexts  17thC  intellectual_history  British_history  British_politics  political_economy  Locke  biography  Ireland  Ireland-English_exploitation  industry  agriculture  protectionism  development  interest_groups  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  Irish_Parliament  1690s  Whig_Junto  Board_of_Trade  UK_government-colonies  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Abigail Swingen, review - Sheryllynne Haggerty. "Merely for Money"? Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750-1815 | H-Net Reviews
Haggerty demonstrates that successful merchants in the 18thC British Atlantic world operated in a culture that had socially constructed expectations for their behavior. Those who did not conform to that culture could find themselves left out of it altogether. This is most effectively demonstrated in her chapter on obligation. ...“obligation” did not simply reflect the necessity to pay off a debt. For some larger merchant houses, it meant not calling in debts too quickly especially at times of crisis -- 18thC merchants, although largely self-regulating, expected and desired a certain level of regulation and protection from the British state. This was especially true in terms of overseas and colonial trades. ...merchants felt that the state was “obligated” to protect them, considering the various ways they contributed to the imperial economy. --ultimately one questions how these crises, and the sophisticated ways the merchants responded to them, compared to earlier similar moments of upheaval. Overseas (especially colonial) merchants had formed lobbying groups, both informal and formal, since at least the late17thC, as the work of Alison Olson and Will Pettigrew demonstrates. Because there is little consideration of change over time, however, one does not get a clear sense of the overall significance of the period in question. -- one is left wondering about the broader implications of the ways in which merchants confronted and negotiated with the “formal” empire. The merchants were caught up in a transformative period in the transition to a global capitalist economy. -- high marks for archival work and applying Greif (new institutional_economics) and folks like Hobbit re business concepts
books  reviews  economic_history  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  Atlantic  West_Indies  American_colonies  American_Revolution  slavery  merchants  mercantilism  protectionism  credit  creditors  trade-policy  trade_finance  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  interest_groups  economic_culture  institutional_economics  obligation  business-and-politics  capitalism  globalization  global_economy  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Tom Leng, review - Brodie Waddell. God, Duty and Community in English Economic Life, 1660-1720 (2012) | H-Net Reviews April 2013
In his first book, Brodie Waddell seeks to bring the realm of culture to bear upon the economic life of late Stuart England. This period has tended to be subsumed within the story of how the “moral economy” was vanquished by the market in the 18thC, to the neglect of what Waddell sees as its distinctive econom -- a larger question for historians interested in reconciling the cultural and the economic: what do we do with the concept of “interest”? ...is there a danger of replacing the “undersocialized” caricature of “homo economicus” with economic actors that sociologists would describe as “oversocialized,” the passive bearers of internalized norms and values? Doubtless “religiously inspired archetypes ... left an indelible impression on the economic lives of ordinary people”, but we should not neglect the role of material self-advancement or preservation (and other forms of “acquisitive” behavior—the acquisition of reputation, for example) as a motive force in economic life. ...we need to find a place for “interest,” which, after all, was a concept with which early modern English people were very familiar. -- But a full picture of economic lives and cultures needs to consider the interaction of potentially rival values and those who bore them. And this links back to the changing economic context of the period. Increasing engagement in long-distance markets could encourage farmers or manufacturers to refashion their communal loyalties in a way that undermined neighborly commitments; participation in the emerging stock market might suggest a different scale of economic values to those recounted in this book. -- the volume of printed attacks on various forms of economic immorality might suggest that the confrontation of divergent moral economies was far from uncommon in the period. In which case, does the clash between the market and other moral economies, if not the moral economy, have some explanatory power still?
books  reviews  historiography  change-social  17thC  18thC  British_history  economic_history  economic_culture  interest_groups  community  patriarchy  religious_culture  religion-established  religious_lit  religious_belief  mercantilism  local_government  local_politics  elites  popular_culture  moral_economy  self-interest  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
The new study about oligarchy that's blowing up the Internet, explained - Vox -:April 2014
Who really matters in our democracy — the general public, or wealthy elites? That's the topic of a new study by political scientists Martin Gilens of Princeton and Benjamin Page of Northwestern. The study's been getting lots of attention, because the authors conclude, basically, that the US is a corrupt oligarchy where ordinary voters barely matter. Or as they put it, "economic elites and organized interest groups play a substantial part in affecting public policy, but the general public has little or no independent influence."
US_politics  democracy  oligarchy  plutocracy  inequality  interest_groups  parties  campaign_finance  Congress  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
A bygone age … The unraveling … Faith in institutions by Nicholas Lemann | The Washington Monthly
First, we had too much faith in the ability of people like us, smart and well-intentioned upper-middle-class (defined by family background, not by what the Monthly paid) Washington liberals, to determine what was and wasn’t a genuine social need. Our scorn for interest group liberalism led us to undervalue the process of people organizing themselves and pushing the political system to give them what they wanted from it. Second, we failed to anticipate the way that eliminating all those structures that struck us as outdated—the government bureaucracies, the seniority system in Congress, the old-line interest groups—would almost inevitably wind up working to the advantage of elites more than of the ordinary people on whose behalf we imagined ourselves to be advocating. The frictionless, disintermediated, networked world in which we live today is great for people with money and high-demand skills, not so great for everybody else. It’s a cruel irony of the Monthly’s history that our preferred label for ourselves, neoliberal, has come to denote political regimes maximally friendly to the financial markets. I’ve come to see the merits of the liberal structures I scorned in my younger days.
US_history  20thC  intellectual_history  US_politics  liberalism  neoliberalism  democracy  governing_class  Congress  elections  trust  right-wing  interest_groups  bureaucracy  campaign_finance  elites  plutocracy 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated by John C. Coffee :: SSRN
86 pages -- didn't download -- Several commentators have argued that financial “reform” legislation enacted after a market crash is invariably flawed, results in “quack corporate governance” and “bubble laws,” and should be discouraged. This criticism has been specifically directed at both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. This article presents a rival perspective. Investors, it argues, are naturally dispersed and poorly organized and so constitute a classic “latent group” (in Mancur Olson’s terminology). Such latent groups tend to be dominated by smaller, but more cohesive and better funded special interest groups in the competition to shape legislation and influence regulatory policy. This domination is interrupted, however, by major crises, which encourage “political entrepreneurs” to bear the transaction costs of organizing latent interest groups to take effective action. But such republican triumphs prove temporary, because, after the crisis subsides, the hegemony of the better organized interest groups is restored.

As a result, a persistent cycle that this article calls the “Regulatory Sine Curve” can be observed: the legislative success of the latent investor group is followed by increasingly equivocal implementation of the new legislation, tepid enforcement, and eventual legislative erosion. This article traces that pattern with respect to both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.

This article does not deny that “reform” legislation often contains flaws (as does much deregulatory legislation). But these are usually quickly eliminated in the latter half of the cycle. The greater dilemma is instead whether the problem of systemic risk can be satisfactorily addressed in the presence of the Regulatory Sine Curve.
paper  SSRN  financial_regulation  capital_markets  interest_groups  public_choice  legislation  US_government  financial_crisis  banking  global_governance  international_political_economy  political_economy 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Adam Slez and John Levi Martin - Political Action and Party Formation in the United States Constitutional Convention | JSTOR: American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Feb., 2007), pp. 42-67
Using data on state voting patterns, we examine the positions taken by state delegations on questions that arose over the course of the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787. Whereas existing accounts tend to assume that this type of collective decision making can be understood by linking fixed interests-either material or ideological-to specific, decontextualized propositions, we argue that the meaning of any one issue was dependent upon its position relative to other issues in the overall sequence of questions. Consequently, each decision changed the meaning of future issues, and hence how actors understood where their commonalities of interest lay. Devoted to the task of rebuilding the institutions that constituted the national state, delegates explicitly reshaped the board on which the political game would be played such that patterns of action within the Convention had implications for patterns of action outside of the Convention. As each subsequent decision within the Convention fixed a previous point of contention, it also indirectly determined which issues would become viable points of conflict in the future. By the end of the Convention, even before the first presidential election, state delegations began to arrange themselves in a manner consonant with the outlines of the first party system. This previously unrecognized finding only makes sense, however, in terms of a temporally contextualized model of political action. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  political_history  historical_sociology  game_theory  18thC  Early_Republic  US_constitution  parties  interest_groups  rational_choice  networks-social  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Swedberg - The Changing Picture of Max Weber's Sociology | JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 29 (2003), pp. 283-306
Over the years the secondary literature on Max Weber's sociology has grown enormously, and it is time to raise the following question: Is the picture of his sociology the same today as it was yesterday? In this review I argue that the traditional picture of Weber's sociology has begun to change and that one important factor in this change has to do with the perception of the role that the theme of the economy plays in Weber's life and work. Special attention has recently been paid to Weber's relationship to economics, his economic sociology, and the fact that Weber came from a background of wealthy merchants that he strongly identified with. Several new topics in Weber's sociology are explored that are related to the changing picture of his work. Special attention is also paid to interpretations of Weber that draw on rational choice sociology and an interest-based type of analysis. -- see bibliography on jstor information page -- didn't download
article  jstor  social_theory  intellectual_history  Weber  economic_sociology  economic_culture  rational_choice  interest_groups  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
John Wells and Douglas Wills - Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation: The Jacobite Threat to England's Institutions and Economic Growth | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 418-441
This study provides an empirical test of North and Weingast's theory of British capital-market development after the Glorious Revolution. The evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that institutional innovation in the 1690s led to the dramatic growth in London capital markets, and that threats to these institutions caused financial turmoil. We also find the economic motivation for these innovations to be consistent with the work of Ekelund and Tollison. -- they fell for Whig propaganda
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  17thC  18thC  British_politics  North-Weingast  Jacobites  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  institutional_economics  public_choice  interest_groups  Whigs-oligarchy  Bank_of_England  Tories  Hanoverian_Succession  James_III  monied_interest  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert F. Hébert - Interest Groups, Public Choice and the Economics of Religion | JSTOR: Public Choice, Vol. 142, No. 3/4 (Mar., 2010), pp. 429-436
This article reviews Bob Tollison's conjoint contributions to the burgeoning area of the economics of religion, underscoring his integration of public choice and interestgroup themes into the microeconomic analysis of faith-based organizational architecture, institutional decision making and doctrinal innovation. Beginning with study of the medieval Catholic Church, moving forward to the Protestant Reformation and beyond, it supplies a timeline of developments and the major findings of each phase of his research program. -- hegemonic ambition of public choice school -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  religious_history  sociology_of_religion  economics_of_religion  public_choice  interest_groups  rent-seeking  church_history  Roman_Catholicism  Reformation  Protestants  Counter-Reformation  secularization  organizations  institutional_economics  behavioral_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Issue TOC and Introduction, Nicholas Rogers - Making the English Middle Class, ca. 1700-1850 | JSTOR: Journal of British Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, Oct., 1993
Introduction (pp. 299-304) Nicholas Rogers [downloaded] *--* (1) "A Just and Profitable Commerce": Moral Economy and the Middle Classes in 18thC London (pp. 305-332) Susan E. Brown [questions "aristocratic century" - independent merchants and bourgeoisie in leading charities, urban politics, polite culture etc. Didn't fit a consistent deference pattern; members of middle class could be on all sides of Poor Laws, so Thompson's bipolar moral economy overstates lack of variation in middle and intermediary functions, especially when drawing on civic traditions that didn't depend on aristocracy leadership] *--* (2) Racism, Imperialism, and the Traveler's Gaze in 18thC England (pp. 333-357) Margaret Hunt [unenlightened middle class elements eg freemasonry could be as xenophobic as cosmopolitan; attention to racial, ethnic difference could also be used to stigmatise the poor and set middle class apart] *--* (3) The Masonic Moment; Or, Ritual, Replica, and Credit: John Wilkes, the Macaroni Parson, and the Making of the Middle-Class Mind (pp. 358-395) John Money. *--* (4) "Middle-Class" Domesticity Goes Public: Gender, Class, and Politics from Queen Caroline to Queen Victoria (pp. 396-432) Dror Wahrman [middle class as defenders of family, domesticity, separate spheres only after won political status in 1832 - nobody adopted Hannah More's vision until decades later - use of the term by others or as self identifier is all over the map, even in the same report or work, stabilizing only c 1830s] -- downloaded Rogers pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_history  cultural_history  political_history  political_economy  political_culture  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  urbanization  urban_politics  urban_elites  middle_class  aristocracy  politeness  consumerism  travel  xenophobia  racism  poverty  Poor_Laws  merchants  mercantilism  commercial_interest  interest_groups  corporatism  free_trade  Freemasonry  gender  family  domesticity  moral_economy  creditors  debtors  dissenters  local_government  political_nation  oligarchy  Parliament  anti-Jacobin  Loyalists  American_Revolution  French_Revolution  imperialism  London  status  rank  nouveaux_riches  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Franklin A. Kalinowski - David Hume on the Philosophic Underpinnings of Interest Group Politics | JSTOR: Polity, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 355-374
This article explores Hume's theory of passion and interest, which for him were simply two sides of the same philosophical phenomenon. The significant distinction, the author argues, is that between the violent passions, embodied in short-range private interests, and the calm passions, reflected in long-range public interests. The goal of politics for Hume is then to construct a system in which the calm passions and public interests could be achieved in a society wherein all individuals exercise violent passions by seeking their self interests. The author assesses the implications of this view of Hume for the analysis of the thought of James Madison. -- see Vermeule who disagrees -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  18thC  Hume-politics  Hume-ethics  self-interest  ambition  interest_groups  US_constitution  Madison  downloaded  EF-add  English_constitution 
january 2014 by dunnettreader

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