dunnettreader + intentionality   9

Gordon Park Stevenson - Revamping Action Theory | JSTOR: Behavior and Philosophy, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2004), pp. 427-451
Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, action theorists propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of folk psychological action ascriptions. However, several key doctrinal and methodological features of contemporary action theory are troubling, in particular (i) the insistence that folk psychological kinds like beliefs and desires have neurophysiological correlates, (ii) the assumption that the concept of action is "classical" in structure (making it amenable to definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for its proper application), and (iii) the assumption that deferring to intuitions about the application of the concept of action amidst the context of fantastical thought experiments furnishes an effective method for judging the adequacy of proposed analyses. After consideration of these problems it is argued that action theory needs to be reoriented in a more naturalistic direction, the methods and aims of which are continuous with those of the empirical sciences. The paper concludes with a sketch (and defense) of the methodological foundations of a naturalistic approach to intentional action. -- serves as a lit survey of 1970s and 1980s mostly -- didn't download
article  jstor  analytical_philosophy  concepts  action-theory  intentionality  mind-body  naturalism  lit_survey  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Denis Dutton, review - Francis-Noël Thomas and Mark Turner, Clear and Simple as the Truth: Writing Classic Prose | Philosophy and Literature 21 (1997): 504-507
Every once in a while a book comes along with the power to alter permanently the view of a subject you thought you knew well. For me this year, that book is Clear and Simple as the Truth: Writing Classic Prose, Francis-Noël Thomas and Mark Turner (Princeton University Press, $14.95).....But it is actually a treatise on one particular style, which the authors call classic prose. This is a specifiable kind of writing that can be found in every literate culture, they insist, even if their examples are all European. At the center of the classic style is the nonfiction essay, although it is a style used for fiction as well. They begin with a sentence from La Rochefoucauld: [and compare it with a tortured construction by Johnson in his preface to Shakespeare]. -- It may look easy to write, but that is part of the trick of classic prose. It is efficient and precise, and seems utterly spontaneous. However, that natural sound is not the sound of speech, Thomas and Turner say, it is the sound of writing. Writing such as La Rochefoucauld’s embodies or expresses a certain attitude toward the truth. For Johnson’s sentence, writing “hard and noble,” as they call it, and truth is something that cannot be captured in mere speech, but is rather “the reward of effort.” For the classic style, “Truth is a grace that flees from earnest effort. The language of truth is ideally graceful speech.” -- Dutton describes the attitude towards an equality of conversation and interest in pursuing shared knowledge -while acknowledging limits to access to certainty and foibles of prejudices etc - that underpins the classical style. Very applicable to Bolingbroke
books  reviews  kindle-available  English_lit  French_lit  17thC  18thC  writing  style-philosophy  prose  conversation  epistemology-social  Rochefoucauld  Johnson  classicism  neoclassical  reader_response  intentionality  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Denis Dutton, review - Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation | Philosophy and Literature 16 (1992): 432-37
Delightful Denis Dutton review - Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation (Cambridge University Press, $39.95 hardbound, $11.95 paper) -- presents three lectures by Umberto Eco, with responses by Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler, and Christine Brooke-Rose, a final rejoinder by Eco, and a general introduction by Stefan Collini. The occasion was the Clare Hall Tanner Lectures, and they apparently packed out one of the biggest auditoriums at Cambridge University in 1990. There was more debate, including Frank Kermode, Malcolm Bradbury, and David Lodge, than is included here, and one imagines it was an exciting occasion. -- quite splendid description of debate between Eco and Rorty. Culler who is more open ended than Eco on limits to interpretation turns his guns on the self described American pragmatists, Rorty and Stanley Fish. Needless to say Dutton is reluctant to put Rorty in the same tradition as Dewey - Eco's voracious curiosity and wonder about the world is more in Dewey’s line - and is appalled at labeling Fish a pragmatist. Definitely to buy.
books  reviews  find  amazon.com  lit_crit  literary_theory  hermeneutics  hermeticism  gnostic  interpretivism  deconstruction  reader_response  intentionality  Eco  Rorty  pragmatism 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Vivienne Brown - On Some Problems with Weak Intentionalism for Intellectual History [forum re Bevir's Logic] | JSTOR: History and Theory, Vol. 41, No. 2, May, 2002
This paper argues that the notion of weak intentionalism in Mark Bevir's The Logic of the History of Ideas is incoherent. Bevir's proposal for weak intentionalism as procedural individualism relies on the argument that the object of study for historians of ideas is given by the beliefs that are expressed by individuals (whether authors or readers) since these beliefs constitute the historical meaning of the work for those individuals as historical figures. Historical meanings are thus hermeneutic meanings. In the case of insincere, unconscious, and irrational beliefs, however, the beliefs expressed by individuals are not in fact their actual beliefs, and their actual beliefs are now taken to be those expressed by the works. It thus turns out that it is not the beliefs expressed by individuals that are the object of study for historians but the works themselves, since the overriding requirement for historians of ideas is to "make sense of their material" and it is this requirement that determines whether or not the beliefs are to be construed as expressed by individuals or by the works. But once it is accepted that the beliefs that are the object of study for historians are expressed by the works and not by individuals, the original argument that such beliefs are historical hermeneutic meanings for historical figures no longer applies. The argument for weak intentionalism thus turns out to be incoherent. Bevir's argument fails to establish that the object of study for the history of ideas is external to the works, and the attempted distinction between interpreting a work and reading a text also fails. -- didn't download
article  jstor  social_theory  philosophy_of_history  historiography  philosophy_of_social_science  historicism  intentionality  hermeneutics  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir - Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Power: A Response to Critics [eScholarship] | Rethinking History (2000)
This is Bevir's response to the roundtable of articles on his book, The Logic of the History of Ideas -- Additional Info: This is an electronic version of an article published in Rethinking History© 2000 Copyright Taylor & Francis; Rethinking History is available online at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/13642529.asp -- Keywords:
hermeneutics, intentionality, philosophy, power, rationality, rhetoric
article  eScholarship  intellectual_history  philosophy_of_history  concepts  historical_change  historiography  narrative  White_Hayden  power  Foucault  intentionality  meaning  rhetoric  rhetoric-political  rationality  agency  individualism-methodology  philosophy_of_language  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Eric D. Beinhocker : Reflexivity, complexity, and the nature of social science - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 - Taylor & Francis Online
pages 330-342 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- In 1987, George Soros introduced his concepts of reflexivity and fallibility and has further developed and applied these concepts over subsequent decades. This paper attempts to build on Soros's framework, provide his concepts with a more precise definition, and put them in the context of recent thinking on complex adaptive systems. The paper proposes that systems can be classified along a ‘spectrum of complexity’ and that under specific conditions not only social systems but also natural and artificial systems can be considered ‘complex reflexive.’ The epistemological challenges associated with scientifically understanding a phenomenon stem not from whether its domain is social, natural, or artificial, but where it falls along this spectrum. Reflexive systems present particular challenges; however, evolutionary model-dependent realism provides a bridge between Soros and Popper and a potential path forward for economics.
article  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  epistemology  methodology  complexity  Soros  reflexivity  intentionality  evolution-as-model  Popper  scientific_method  downloaded  EF-add  systems-complex_adaptive  systems-reflexive  systems_theory  economic_theory  economic_models  EMH  rationality-economics  rational_expectations  information-markets  cognition  cognition-social  falsification  neuroscience  uncertainty  laws_of_nature  covering_laws  causation  explanation  prediction 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
George Soros - Fallibility, reflexivity, and the human uncertainty principle - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 - Taylor & Francis Online
Lead article for special issue devoted to Soros and epistemology in social sciences more broadly compared with natural sciences and Popper's version of falsibility in scientific method -- He's making progress in formalizing his theory and putting it in context of other theorists - sees his fallibility and reflexivity combination as major factor in "Knightian uncertainty" - Downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_social_science  philosophy_of_science  epistemology  scientific_method  falsification  deduction  Popper  Soros  uncertainty  economic_theory  economic_models  financial_economics  capital_markets  FX  EMH  rationality-economics  rational_expectations  complexity  equilibrium  reflexivity  ontology-social  free_will  financial_crisis  financial_system  fallibility  downloaded  EF-add  fundamentals  methodology  cognition  agency  intentionality 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Branko Mitrović: Intentionalism, Intentionality, and Reporting Beliefs | JSTOR: History and Theory, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Oct., 2009), pp. 180-198
Downloaded pdf to Note -- The dominant view of twentieth-century analytic philosophy has been that all thinking is always in a language, that languages are vehicles of thought. The same view has been widespread in continental philosophy as well. In recent decades, however, the opposite view—that languages serve merely to express language-independent thought-contents or propositions—has been more widely accepted. The debate has a direct equivalent in the philosophy of history: when historians report the beliefs of historical figures, do they report the sentences or propositions that these historical figures believed to be true or false? In this paper I argue in favor of the latter, intentionalist, view. My arguments center mostly on the problems with translation that are likely to arise when a historian reports the beliefs of historical figures who expressed them in a language other than the one in which the historian is writing. In discussing these problems the paper presents an application of John Searle's theory of intentionality to the philosophy of history.
paper  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  translation  concepts  intentionality  philosophy_of_language  mind  bibliography  Cambridge_School  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
BRANKO MITROVIĆ - ATTRIBUTION OF CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS WITH ANACHRONISM | JSTOR - History and Theory ( Oct 2011)
History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 3 (October 2011), pp. 303-327 -- Many long-standing debates about anachronistic concept-attributions derive from an essentialist understanding of concepts that is often difficult to sustain for metaphysical or epistemological reasons. The intentionalist alternative to essentialism elaborated in this article successfully clarifies and avoids many standard problems with anachronism. -- very interesting bibliography covering post WWII analytic philosophy of social sciences, epistemology, and debates over "meaning" - concepts, intentionality conceptual change etc after logical positivism was dead -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  epistemology-history  historiography  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  intentionality  intentionality-collective  Cambridge_School  belief  downloaded 
august 2013 by dunnettreader

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