dunnettreader + intellectual_history-distorted   36

History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 3 (October 2011), pp. 358-372 -- Intellectual historians often make empirical claims, but can never know for certain if these claims are right. Uncertainty is thus inevitable for intellectual historians. But accepting uncertainty is not enough: we should also act on it, by trying to reduce and report it. We can reduce uncertainty by amassing valid data from different sources to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations, rather than trying to "prove" an empirical claim by looking for evidence that fits it. Then we should report our degree of certainty in our claims. When we answer empirical questions in intellectual history, we are not telling our readers what happened: we are telling them how strong we think our evidence is—a crucial shift of emphasis. For intellectual historians, then, uncertainty is subjective, as discussed by Keynes and Collingwood; the paper thus explores three differences between subjective and objective uncertainty. Having outlined the theoretical basis of uncertainty, the paper then offers examples from actual research: Noel Malcolm's work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about composition, and David Wootton's work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about beliefs. -- VERY Anti Straussian based on extensive bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  intellectual_history-distorted  philosophy_of_history  hermeneutics  hermeneutics_of_suspicion  Strauss  Straussians  epistemology-history  evidence  coherence  uncertainty  Keynes  Keynes-uncertainty  Collingwood  objectivity  positivism  post-foundational  Cambridge_School  author_intention  reception  audience  bibliography  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Samuel Moyn - The First Historian of Human Rights (2011) | JSTOR - The American Historical Review
Vol. 116, No. 1 (February 2011), pp. 58-79 -- Revisiting Ritter's story of the invention of human rights—as perverse as it was pioneering—affords critical distance from what has become a central historiographical fashion. It is precisely because his narrative constructs the past of human rights for so unfamiliar a project that Ritter provides a more vivid reminder of how easy it still is to devise a field with the goal of crafting a usable past for new imperatives. The deep past out of which human rights are supposed to have sprung provides rich but manipulable material for such enterprises. Ritter's first history is also a salutary reminder of the meanings that the concept of human rights accreted in the postwar era, when they transcended the nation‐state and began to be called in English by their current name. The 1940s, when Ritter wrote, are often forced to play the role of precursor in contemporary narratives—as a kind of failed early version of the post–Cold War 1990s, when human rights as a movement and a framework became visible enough to motivate historians to work on them. Given the Universal Declaration, the chronological focus on the 1940s is understandable. But Ritter provides an inadvertent warning against omitting the conservative and religious sources of human rights in that era, and therefore interpreting it anachronistically. His case powerfully buttresses emerging skepticism about the whole notion of rooting contemporary human rights in the 1940s, let alone earlier, given more recent transformations in the very meaning of the concept, and the unprecedented explosion of a movement based on them. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  post-WWII  Cold_War  IR-realism  IR  religious_history  Christianity  Christian_Democracy  human_rights  anti-capitalism  anti-materialism  communitarian  anti-individualism  international_law  usable_past  historiography-postWWII  United_Nations  post-war_reconstruction  Germany  Europe  theology  rights-legal  conservatism  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Newberry - Joseph Butler on Forgiveness: A Presupposed Theory of Emotion | JSTOR - Journal of the History of Ideas (2001)
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 233-244 -- corrects misreading of Butler's position - not overcoming emotions of resentment but restraining one's actions or forbearance of taking revenge -- and discusses why Butler has been misread -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  Butler  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  theology  forgiveness  moral_sentiments  morality-Christian  emotions  reason-passions  action-theory  agency  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - Legal Realism in Context :: SSRN in Elizabeth Mertz, ed., New Legal Realism, Vol. 1 (Cambridge UP, 2015 Forthcoming)
“We are all realists now,” it is frequently said, yet what legal realism was about remains vigorously debated by legal theorists and historians. The debate continues because the jurists we think of as core legal realists were not members of a group. Karl Llewellyn said this multiple times in his famous essay detailing realism. (..) Contemporary scholars who make assertions about what the legal realists stood for often fail to account for these passages. Legal realism.. is best understood ... in terms of 3 overlapping complexes of ideas that emerged in the late 19thC and had become widespread by the time of Llewellyn’s article. [(1)] that society was changing rapidly while law, understood as a means to achieve social ends, lagged badly behind, producing an urgent need for legal reform. [(2)] the growing refrain among legal academics that newly developing social sciences should be applied to enhance an understanding of the actual facts surrounding law. [(3)] a vocal backlash against judges for impeding reform, including charges that they were importing class bias into their legal decisions, prompting a broader acknowledgement that the background social attitudes of judges play a role in their decisions. These three themes were interpenetrating: the popular dissatisfaction with the failings of law was manifested in criticism of courts, and resort to social science was the favored academic solution. (..) Realism characterized the new modern age of thinking about law, and it ran much earlier and more broadly than is now commonly recognized. -- PDF File: 47 -- Keywords: Legal history, Jurisprudence, law and the humanities, law and the social sciences
chapter  SSRN  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  19thC  20thC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  legal_history  social_sciences  legal_realism  legal_reform  change-social  change-intellectual 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory :: SSRN - William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 56, 2015
Jurisprudence is generally thought to consist of two main classical rival branches — natural law and legal positivism — followed by a bunch of modern schools — legal realism, law and economics, critical theory, legal pragmatism, etc. In this essay I argue that three main branches of jurisprudence have existed, and battled, for centuries, not two, but the third goes unrecognized as such because it has traveled under different labels and the underlying connections have been clouded by various confusions. The core insights and focus of this third branch, what I call “Social Legal Theory,” trace in a continuous thread from Montesquieu, through historical jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, and legal realism, up to the present. This third branch, I argue, provides a contrasting/complementary perspective, in conjunction with natural law and legal positivism, which rounds out the full range of theoretical angles on law: natural law is normative; legal positivism is analytical/conceptual; and social legal theory is empirical. (Among a number of clarifications, I answer the common objection that empirically-grounded theories are not sufficiently theoretical.) The conventional jurisprudential narrative is redrawn in this essay in a way that exposes unseen connections among theoretical schools and brings into focus critical issues about the nature of law that currently are marginalized by natural law and legal positivism. -- Pages in PDF File: 44 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, legal philosophy, law and society, legal realism, legal development, legal history
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal  natural_law  legal_realism  legal_history  sociology_of_law  social_order  social_theory  change-social  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  Montesquieu  pragmatism  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeet Heer - Sex, Economics, and Austerity | The American Prospect - 2013
John Maynard Keynes was the sexiest economist who ever lived. This might seem like half-hearted praise since in our mind’s eye the typical economist appears as… On the decades of right-wing attacks on Keynes and Keynesianism using sexual "immorality" as linked to purported moral failings of Keynes' policy responses from Versailles onward.
article  Instapaper  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  20thC  21stC  Keynes  Keynesianism  economic_history  economic_theory  macroeconomics  Great_Depression  right-wing  neoconservatism  fiscal_policy  budget_deficit  austerity  economics-and-morality  from instapaper
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - That Friedrich von Hayek Was Inconsistent and That Milton Friedman Was Running a Con on His Ideological Allies - August 2015 (replay)
That Friedrich von Hayek Was Inconsistent and That Milton Friedman Was Running a Con on His Ideological Allies Are Not to Their Benefit : Hoisted from the Archives from Two Years Ago
Hayek  Friedman_Milton  intellectual_history-distorted  Pocket  from pocket
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Romer - Solow’s Choice ("After the Phillips Curve" Conference) | August 2015
Several economists, including Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, have commented on how macroeconomics developed in the late 1970s. There are many points on which we… Romer's post us a very useful illustration of how the myths of the New Classical "Revolution" by Lucas and Sargent were formulated and maintained. Even Romer, who has only recently seen the light that the "freshwater" folks are not playing by the rules of scientific inquiry, can still place the "who started it" blame on the "saltwater" folks by singling out Solow’s refusal to accept the starting assumptions of Lucas et al, since he found them (as they have proven to be after 3+decades) prima facia absurd. The text Romer highlights as Solow’s failure to follow "the rules of Science" by being sarcastic, is for anyone who didn't believe the "freshwater" version of history, not appallingly dismissive, but a mild and mostly respectful response to the hysterical attacks that were even at the time demonstrably false (and enormously disrespectful). It's Romer's "critical moment" when the "freshwater" guys left the path of scientific integrity. But it was precisely the extreme denigration and open rejection of the macroeconomic mainstream that the "freshwater" school used as its rhetorical stance in order to launch its attempt to monopolize macroeconomics -- their insistence on their own purity, untainted by mainstream macro. It was exclusive and cultish from the get-go. And though Romer is reporting on his "close reading" of the texts from the conference where the Revolution was announced and Solow pushed back, Romer can't see what he's reading because he filters it all through the myth. Downloaded pdf of conference papers to Note
Instapaper  conference  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  intellectual_history-distorted  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  macroeconomics  economic_theory  neoclassical_economics  Lucas_critique  rational_expectations  Keynesianism  Kuhn  myth  scientific_method  Romer  downloaded  from instapaper
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Michael Kwass, review essay - Reassessing Enlightenment Economics - Reinert's "Translating Empire" | Books & ideas - 25 March 2013
Reviewed: Sophus A. Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. Harvard University Press, 438 pp - Resurrecting the life of John Cary’s Essay on the State of England, a book which travelled all over Europe throughout the 18th century, S.A. Reinert challenges our understanding of Enlightenment economics, while calling for a more nuanced and historically-informed understanding of political economy in general. (..) By resurrecting the life of a text that scholars have dismissed as “mercantilist” and repositioning that work at the center of 18th-century political economy, Reinert challenges our basic understanding of Enlightenment economics, so often reduced to the free-trade doctrines of the physiocrats and Adam Smith. He argues that the diffusion of Cary’s work demonstrates that state-centered approaches to the creation of wealth enjoyed wide resonance at the very moment when discussions of economic policy were expanding beyond state chambers to engage a broader public. Far from being eclipsed by theories of laissez-faire economics, as conventional histories of economic thought would have us believe, such approaches became “the absolute mainstream in Europe” by the late 18th century -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  kindle  18thC  economic_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  political_economy  Enlightenment  economic_theory  mercantilism  laisser-faire  Physiocrats  Smith  British_history  British_foreign_policy  nation-state  economic_growth  development  public_policy  public_goods  government-roles  Italy  Austria  Germany  readership  history_of_book  print_culture  information-intermediaries  networks-information  networks-business  networks-policy  Republic_of_Letters  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Forum - Samuel Moyn's "Christian human rights" - overview page | The Immanent Frame
In 2010, Samuel Moyn published The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, which offered an alternative historical explanation for the origins of human rights. He rejected narratives that viewed human rights as a long-term historical product of the Judeo-Christian tradition, The French Revolution, or Enlightenment rationalism, arguing that human rights as it is now understood began to emerge only during the 1970s. Prior to this, according to Moyn, rights were connected to the nation-state and had nothing to do with an international standard of morality or justice. In addressing critiques of The Last Utopia, Moyn has given considerable attention to the relationship between human rights and religion, conceding that there is, undoubtedly, a relationship between Christianity—Catholicism in particular—and human rights, but arguing that the “death of Christian Europe” by the 1960s “forced a complete reinvention of the meaning of human rights embedded in European identity both formally and really since the war”. Contributors offer their thoughts on Moyn’s article “Personalism, Community, and the Origins of Human Rights,” which became a central focus (see excerpt) in his forthcoming book, Christian Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). Contributors also respond to “Christian Human Rights,” the introductory essay written for this series. -- downloaded pdfs but their footnotes and links don't work, so collected them in Evernote them
books  intellectual_history  narrative-contested  bad_history  intellectual_history-distorted  religious_history  church_history  moral_philosophy  theology  human_rights  natural_rights  medieval_philosophy  Europe-Medieval  Enlightenment  Enlightenment_Project  Enlightenment-ongoing  French_Revolution  IR  Europe  20thC  WWI  WWII  entre_deux_guerres  post-Cold_War  post-colonial  nation-state  genocide  Holocaust  UN  international_law  natural_law  law_of_nations  law_of_the_sea  justice  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  political_culture  democracy  equality  liberty  Christendom  Judeo-Christian  links  Evernote 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alan Jacobs - the three big stories of modernity | TextPatterns July 2015
So far there have been three widely influential stories about the rise of modernity: the Emancipatory, the Protestant, and the Neo-Thomist. (..) all these narrators of modernity see our own age as one in which the consequences of 500-year-old debates conducted by philosophers and theologians are still being played out. I think all of these narratives are wrong. They are wrong because they are the product of scholars in universities who overrate the historical importance and influence of other scholars in universities, and because they neglect ideas that connect more directly with the material world. All of these grands recits should be set aside, and they should not immediately be replaced with others, but with more particular, less sweeping, and more technologically-oriented stories. The technologies that Marshall McLuhan called "the extensions of Man" are infinitely more important for Man's story, for good and for ill, than the debates of the schoolmen and interpreters of the Bible. Instead of grand narratives of the emergence of The Modern we need something far more plural: technological histories of modernity.
Instapaper  cultural_history  cultural_capital  modernity  technology  Tech/Culture  social_theory  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  religious_history  Thomism-21stC  Reformation  Renaissance  Enlightenment  Enlightenment_Project  Enlightenment-ongoing  modernity-emergence  material_culture  economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  colonialism  Military_Revolution  Scientific_Revolution  consumer_revolution  technology-history  historiography  medicine  public_health  public_sphere  public_goods  media  print_culture  history_of_science  history_of_book  history-and-social_sciences  narrative  narrative-contested  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Frederick Schauer - The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 957 (2015)
My aim in this Article is to focus on the history of thinking about law in the context of 3 topics (..) to show that the continuous development of the theory of legal positivism, however useful it may have been or may still be, has possibly caused us to ignore other aspects of what was originally part of the positivist picture. (..)The first of these dimensions is the relationship between legal theory and legal reform. (..) that an account of the nature of law might be developed not simply as an aid to understanding or accurate description, but instead as a way of facilitating reform of law itself or reform of how a society understands the idea of law. Second, legal positivism, at the time of its late 19thC (or perhaps even earlier) origins, was focused on the importance of coercion, force, and sanctions as central components of law. But as with the creation of legal theories for the purpose of legal reform, this emphasis on the coercive side of law has also been banished to a kind of jurisprudential purgatory, for reasons and with consequences that deserve further examination. The third lost element of earlier versions of legal positivism is its focus on judicial decision making and the role of judges. Modern legal positivists, for whom 1961 is all too often the beginning of useful thought about the nature of law, do not, with few exceptions, consider theories of judicial decision making to be a necessary or even important part of the positivist perspective. But it was not always so. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  legal_reform  institutional_change  institutions  judiciary  judicial_review  law_enforcement  criminal_justice  punishment  coercion  authority  obligation  policymaking  political_change  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism-legal  positive_law  positivism  justice  Study_and_Uses  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steven Walt - What Can The History of Jurisprudence Do For Jurisprudence? A Commentary on Schauer's "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 977 (2015)
Walt's response (at least the abstract) appears to prove Schauer's point quite nicely, as if logic and argument by legal theorists takes place in an abstract world where "how did we get here" is universally ignored, despite its possible relevance for "why are we here", "what are we doing here" and "where does it look like we might be headed" -- but Walt devoted 10 pages to his response, so one hopes he has more to justify his position than what comes across as a mix of arrogance (we don't need to learn from history because our theoretical grounding and argumentative methods are self-contained and self-sufficient) and cynicism (history might be interesting, but no way will anybody change what gets them published and tenure) -- out of curiosity as to whether it's really as bad as the abstract makes it sound, downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  positivism  positivism-legal  historiography  legal_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Dan Priel - Toward Classical Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015)
I have two major aims: (1) set the historical record straight(...) Hobbes’s and Bentham’s work that seeks to understand their views on law not by isolating it from the rest of their wide-ranging body of work, but by understanding their jurisprudential work as part of a broader project. (2) My main aim is to contribute to contemporary jurisprudential debates and to suggest that the largely neglected approach of earlier positivists is superior to the view held by most contemporary legal positivists. (...) to what extent it is useful for us to call Hobbes and Bentham “legal positivists.” My answer to this question consists of three interrelated points. The first is that we draw an explicit link between their ideas and the view that (some time later) would come to be known as “positivism,” roughly the view that the methods of the “human sciences” are essentially the same as those of the natural sciences. The second point is that the classical legal positivists’ decisive break with natural law ideas prevalent in their day is to be found exactly here, in their views about metaphysics and nature. The third point is that this aspect of their work has been, in my view regrettably, abandoned by contemporary legal positivists. Though all three points are related, in this Article I will say relatively little about the first point, as I discussed it in greater detail elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski - Positivism(s): A Commentary on Priel's "Toward Classical Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (2015)
Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it insulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor Postema’s phrase from his symposium article. And, in part due to the exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminating the recent history and current state of inquiry. His article demonstrates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurisprudence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this rediscovered path, and I am not sure I always agree with his suggested answers. Any misgivings I have about Priel’s particular approach, however, do not diminish my appreciation; I find even the points of disagreement to be live and meaningful, and that itself is refreshing. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alice Ristroph - Sovereignty and Subversion (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1029 (2015)
Hobbes’s account of law, like his account of punishment, does not fit well into our existing scholarly categories. (..). He was neither a legal positivist nor a natural law theorist, at least not as we usually use these labels. He adopted neither a retributive nor a consequentialist justification of punishment. Yet his account of human interaction, particularly with respect to law and punishment, captures actual experience better than the more familiar alternatives. Moreover, the space for subversion in Hobbes’s theory may make his account more normatively appealing than it has seemed to modern liberals. (...) 3 questions about Hobbesian theory: What is law? What is its relationship to punishment? And what are the implications of Hobbes’s theory for contemporary efforts to describe law or the relationship of law to punishment? The first (..) Hobbes’s legal theory is still so widely mischaracterized, sometimes even by Hobbes scholars, that it is worth returning to his claims. The second question has received much less attention, perhaps because a right to resist punishment seems so discordant with the authoritarian Hobbes we know, or think we know. And the third question has received still less attention, for contemporary jurisprudence scholarship rarely cites anyone who wrote before Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. I hope to show that, in many instances, Hobbes has been misread; even more importantly, I hope to persuade scholars of jurisprudence that what Hobbes actually said is worthy of their engagement. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Hobbes  17thC  political_philosophy  social_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  sovereignty  authority  obligation  punishment  resistance  liberalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Mark C. Murphy - A Commentary on Ristroph’s “Sovereignty and Subversion” | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1055 (2015)
She is correct in rejecting the assimilation of Hobbes’s legal theory to Austin’s, and in noting the strands of Hobbes’s view that disqualify him from counting as any sort of legal positivist. And I agree, on the whole, with her characterization of Hobbes’s account of justified punishment, and that this account has its attractions yet produces some puzzles which Hobbes does not fully resolve. My disagreements are with her second-order characterization of Hobbes’s legal theory. I want to discuss two related areas of disagreement. The first disagreement concerns whether we should assess Hobbes’s account of law in terms of the standards of general descriptive jurisprudence: Ristroph denies that it should be; I disagree. The second concerns whether we should take Hobbes’s treatment of the political as explanatorily prior to the legal to show that Hobbes was in some way apart from the natural law tradition in jurisprudence: Ristroph affirms this; I disagree. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Hobbes  17thC  political_philosophy  social_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  sovereignty  authority  obligation  punishment  resistance  liberalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
John Quiggin - John Locke Against Freedom | Jacobin - June 2015
For classical liberals (often called libertarians in the US context), the founding documents of liberalism are John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government and… (.. conclusion) Received ideas change only slowly, and the standard view of Locke as a defender of liberty is likely to persist for years to come. Still, the reassessment is underway, and the outcome is inevitable. Locke was a theoretical advocate of, and a personal participant in, expropriation and enslavement. His classical liberalism offers no guarantee of freedom to anyone except owners of capitalist private property.
Instapaper  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  US_history  political_philosophy  17thC  18thC  Locke-2_Treatises  Locke-religion  tolerance  property  property_rights  Native_Americans  slavery  American_colonies  Founders  liberalism  liberalism-republicanism_debates  liberty  liberty-negative  political_culture  Board_of_Trade  colonialism  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Peter K. J. Park - Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon 1780-1830 | SUNY Pess 2013
... a penetrating account of a crucial period in the development of philosophy as an academic discipline. (..) a number of European philosophers influenced by Kant began to formulate the history of philosophy as a march of progress from the Greeks to Kant—(..) supplanted existing accounts beginning in Egypt or W. Asia at a time when European interest in Sanskrit and Persian lit was flourishing. Not without debate, these traditions were ultimately deemed outside the scope of philosophy and relegated to the study of religion. Park uncovers this debate and recounts the development of an exclusionary canon of philosophy in the decades of the late 18thC and early 19thC. To what extent was this exclusion of Africa and Asia a result of the scientization of philosophy? To what extent was it a result of racism? (..)the most extensive description available of Gérando’s Histoire comparée des systèmes de philosophie, F. Schlegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy, Ast’s and Rixner’s systematic integration of Africa and Asia into the history of philosophy, and the controversy between Hegel and the theologian Tholuck over “pantheism.” 1. The Kantian School and the Consolidation of Modern Historiography of Philosophy -- 2. The Birth of Comparative History of Philosophy: Joseph-Marie de Gérando’s Histoire comparée des systèmes de philosophie -- 3. India in Friedrich Schlegel’s Comparative History of Philosophy -- 4. The Exclusion of Africa and Asia from the History of Philosophy: The Formation of the Kantian Position -- 5. Systematic Inclusion of Africa and Asia under Absolute Idealism: Friedrich Ast’s and Thaddä Anselm Rixner’s Histories of Philosophy -- 6. Absolute Idealism Reverts to the Kantian Position: Hegel’s Exclusion of Africa and Asia -- 7. The Comparative History of Philosophy in August Tholuck’s Polemic against Hegel -- downloaded excerpt
books  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  philosophy  ancient_Greece  ancient_India  Sanskrit  Persia  religious_history  historiography-18thC  historiography-19thC  Kant  Schlegel  German_Idealism  Hegel  German_scholarship  philohellenism  ancient_history  ancient_religions  history_of_science  biology  racism  Africa  Asia  Enlightenment  comparative_religion  pantheism  philology  teleology  cosmopolitanism  colonialism  comparative_history  comparative_anthropology  philosophical_anthropology  human_nature  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Richard J. Ross, Philip J. Stern - Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism in "Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850", ed. Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (2013) :: SSRN
Richard J. Ross, U. of Illinois College of Law; U. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Dept of History - Philip J. Stern, Duke History Dept -- Legal pluralism occurs when two or more legal orders exert control within a given territory or over a particular social group and yet are not part of a single hierarchical “system” under a coordinating authority. Most historical scholarship on legal pluralism concentrates on its shifting structures in local contexts and on its political and economic implications. By contrast, our essay probes historical actors’ uses of political and religious thought to justify or undermine plural legal regimes in the late 16thC through early 18thC. Historians of early modern political thought preoccupied with the rise of the modern state have lavished attention on ‘centralizing’ discourses, particularly theorists such as Bodin, Hobbes, and Pufendorf represented as champions of sovereignty. Against this tendency, we emphasize how ideological support for plural legal orders could be found in a wide range of intellectual projects. These ranged from debates over the right of resistance and the divine right of rulers, through historical work on the ancient Jewish commonwealth and theological disputes over which precepts “bound conscience,” and finally to writings on political economy and the place of family. -- The central ambition of our article is to provide an alternative historical genealogy for legal scholars of pluralism. Workaday legal pluralism did not struggle against a predominantly hostile intellectual climate. Many discourses supported pluralism. And the most emphatic theorists of a powerful singular sovereign were often responding to intellectual projects that valorized pluralism.
article  books  SSRN  intellectual_history-distorted  legal_history  legal_system  Europe-Early_Modern  16thC  17thC  18thC  nation-state  centralization  central_government  sovereignty  territory  pluralism-legal  pluralism  custom  customary_law  family  state-building  political_economy  political_culture  religious_history  religious_culture  politics-and-religion  law-and-religion  canon_law  church_history  church_courts  Bodin  Hobbes  Pufendorf  natural_law  colonialism  empires  commonwealth  Hebrew_commonwealth  resistance_theory  divine_right  monarchy  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  theology  casuistry  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Scott D. Gerber, review essay - The Republican Revival in American Constitutional Theory | JSTOR: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 985-997
Reviewed work(s): We the People: Foundations by Bruce A. Ackerman; Traces of Self-Government by Frank I. Michelman; Laws Republic; The Partial Constitution by Cass R. Sunstein - 1980s interest in classical republicanism, citizen participation and common good and how to reconcile with a liberalism of private interests and rights -- all 3 authors criticized for (1) excessive reliance on the "least dialogic" institution, the judiciary, as protector an/or promoter of the republican dimension of "liberal republicanism" and (2) a selective misreading of the Founders -- didn't download
article  review  jstor  US_constitution  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  US_politics  judiciary  judicial_review  natural_rights  property_rights  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism-republicanism_debates  liberalism  legal_history  legal_theory  Congress  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Scott J. Shapiro - What is the Internal Point of View? (2006 working paper) :: SSRN
In "The Concept of Law," Hart showed that sanction-centered accounts of every stripe ignored an essential feature of law. This feature he termed the internal point of view. Seen from the internal point of view, the law is not simply sanction-threatening, directing, or predicting, but rather obligation-imposing. Though the internal point of view is perhaps Hart's greatest contribution to jurisprudential theory, this concept is also often and easily misunderstood. This is unfortunate, not only because these misreadings distort Hart's theory, but, more importantly, because they prevent us from appreciating the true infirmities of sanction-centered theories and the compelling reasons why they ought to be rejected. -- The internal point of view is the practical attitude of rule-acceptance - it does not imply that people who accept the rules accept their moral legitimacy, only that they are disposed to guide and evaluate conduct in accordance with the rules. The internal point of view plays four roles in Hart's theory: (1) it specifies a particular type of motivation that someone may take towards to the law; (2) it constitutes one of the main existence conditions for social and legal rules; (3) it accounts for the intelligibility of legal practice and discourse; (4) it provides a naturalistically acceptable semantics for legal statements. Finally, sanction-centered theories are unacceptable for three reasons: (1) they are myopic in that they ignore one of the motivations that people might have for obeying the law; (2) they are unable to account for the existence of legal systems; (3) they cannot account for the intelligibility of legal practice and discourse. --
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  intellectual_history-distorted  20thC  21stC  Hart  positivism-legal  sociology_of_law  legal_system  norms  normativity  obligation  moral_psychology  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  punishment  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter -The Radicalism of Legal Positivism (2010) :: SSRN - Guild Practitioner, 2010
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 303 -- “Legal positivism” is often caricatured by its jurisprudential opponents, as well as by lawyers and legal scholars not immediately interested in jurisprudential inquiry. “Positivist” too often functions now as an “epithet” in legal discourse, equated (wrongly) with “formalism,” the view that judges must apply the law “as written,” regardless of the consequences. Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, and the Critical Legal Studies writers have all contributed in different ways to the sense that "positivism" is either a political conservative or politically sterile position. This essay revisits the actual theory of law developed by positivist philosophers like Bentham, Hart, and Raz, emphasizing why it is, and was, understood by its proponents, to be a radical theory of law, one unfriendly to the status quo and anyone, judge or citizen, who thinks obedience to the law is paramount. To be clear, the leading theorists of legal positivism thought the theory gave the correct account of the nature of law as a social institution; they did not endorse it because of the political conclusions it entailed, and which they supported. Yet these theorists realized that the correct account of the nature of law had radical implications for conventional wisdom about law. We would do well to recapture their wisdom today. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  positivism-legal  conservatism  radicals  Bentham  Hart  Raz  Critical_Legal_Studies  Dworkin  Fuller  natural_rights  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  institutions  institutional_change  reform-legal  formalism-legal  judiciary  sociology_of_law  social_theory  social_order  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Legal Realisms, Old and New :: SSRN (2012 Seegers Lecture in Jurisprudence) - Forthcoming in Valparaiso Law Review (2013)
“Legal Realism” now has sufficient cache that scholars from many different fields and countries compete to claim the mantle of the "Realist program": from political scientists who study judicial behavior, to the "law and society" scholars associated with the Wisconsin New Legal Realism project, to philosophers interested in a naturalized jurisprudence. But what does it mean to be a “legal realist”? What unites the two most famous “old” Legal Realisms — the American and the Scandinavian — with the “new legal realism” invoked, variously, by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, among others? -- I argue that (1) American and Scandinavian Realism have almost nothing in common — indeed, that H.L.A. Hart misunderstood the latter as he did the former, and that the Scandinavians are closer to Hart and even Kelsen than they are to the Americans; (2) all Realists share skepticism about the causal efficacy of legal doctrine in explaining judicial decisions ("the Skeptical Doctrine") (though the Scandinavian skepticism on this score is not at all specific to the legal domain, encompassing all explanation in terms of norms); (3) American Realism almost entirely eschewed social-scientific methods in its defense of the Skeptical Doctrine, contrary to the impression given by much recent work by "new" legal realists; (4) the myth that the American Realists were seriously interested in social science derives mainly from two unrepresentative examples, Underhill Moore's behaviorism and Llewellyn's work with the Cheyenne Indians. -- Keywords: American legal realism, Scandinavian legal realism, Karl Llewellyn, Axel Hagerstrom, Alf Ross, naturalism, H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, judicial behavior
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  legal_theory  legal_realism  social_sciences  anthropology  sociology_of_law  normativity  norms  causation  causation-social  positivism-legal  naturalism  social_process  judiciary  behavioralism  Hart  Kelsen  US_legal_system  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (2005) :: SSRN
U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 72 -- Paul Ricoeur famously dubbed that great triumvirate of late nineteenth - and early twentieth-century thought - Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud - "the school of suspicion," by which he meant those thinkers who taught us to regard with suspicion our conscious understandings and experience, whether the deliverances of ordinary psychological introspection about one's desires.., or the moral categories political leaders and ordinary citizens apply to themselves and the social world they inhabit... "Beneath" or "behind" the surface lay causal forces that explained the conscious phenomena precisely because they laid bare the true meaning of those phenomena -- I shall argue that, in fact, all three of the great practitioners of the hermeneutics of suspicion have suffered at the hands of moralizing interpreters who have resisted the essentially naturalistic thrust of their conception of philosophical practice. As a matter of both textual exegesis and intellectual importance, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud are best read as primarily naturalistic thinkers, that is thinkers who view philosophical inquiry as continuous with a sound empirical understanding of the natural world and the causal forces operative in it. When one understands conscious life naturalistically, in terms of its real causes, one contributes at the same time to a critique of the contents of consciousness: that, in short, is the essence of a hermeneutics of suspicion. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  social_theory  human_nature  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  19thC  20thC  21stC  hermeneutics_of_suspicion  causation-social  psychology  moral_psychology  historical_change  normativity  morality-Nietzche  Marx  Marxist  Freud  motivation  action-theory  naturalism  empiricism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Rhodri Lewis - William Petty's Anthropology: Religion, Colonialism, and the Problem of Human Diversity | JSTOR: Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 261-288
In the late 1670s, William Petty wrote “Of the Scale of Creatures,” an unfinished treatise that reinterprets the scala naturae or “chain of being.” On the strength of its appendix on human anthropology, Petty has been identified as a founding father of modern racism. By reconsidering the history of the work's dissemination and examining the language and assumptions of the “Scale” as a whole, Rhodri Lewis challenges this reading. This essay shows that the “Scale” was virtually unknown until the twentieth century, and that it offers what was then a conventional geo-humoral explanation of human diversity, one quite distinct from modern racialism. It was motivated primarily by Petty's theological concerns and his desire to vindicate the scriptural account of the origins and demographic growth of humankind. - paywall
article  jstor  paywall  intellectual_history  historiography  intellectual_history-distorted  cultural_history  17thC  religious_history  religious_belief  Biblical_authority  Bible-as-history  Petty_William  Great_Chain_of_Being  racism  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic - globalinequality: Limits of neoclassical economics - June 2014
Great summary of the obvious that unfortunately needs to be said -- When people criticize Piketty for elevating a mere economic identity... to a Fundamental Law of Capitalism they show their inability to go back to economics as a social science [and] transcend neoclassical economics. The share of capital income in total income is not only a reflection of the fact that people with a factor of production B have so much, and people with the factor of production A have the rest.. We are basically saying: 20% of people ..claim 1/2 of national output and they do so without having to work. If it were a question of changing the distribution in favor of factor A (donuts) and against factor B (pecan pies), there would be no reason to be concerned. But here you change the distribution in favor of those who do not need to work, and against those that do. You thereby affect the entire social structure of society. This is where social science comes in, and neoclassical economics goes away. The entire 100 years of neoclassical economics [has made us] us forget this key distinction: between having or not having to work for a living. Hence neoclassicists like to treat capital (and labor) as basically the same thing: factors of production: a donut and a pecan pie...Thence also the attempt to treat labor as human capital. We are all capitalists now: a guy who works at Walmart for less than the minimum wage is a capitalist since he is using his human capital; a broker who makes a million in a day is also a capitalist, he just works with a different type of capital.The true social reality was thus entirely hidden. [Picketty returns us to] social science and you ask yourself questions like, would a society where 20% of non-workers earn 70% of total income be okay? What are the values that such a society would promote? (..more political, moral philosophy Qs)
Piketty  19thC  20thC  21stC  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  social_theory  social_sciences  political_economy  social_order  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  economic_history  economic_theory  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  classical_economics  Marx  inequality  distribution-income  capitalism  capital  labor  human_capital  markets_in_everything  class_conflict  economic_culture  political_culture  economic_sociology  bad_economics  memory-group 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Pufendorf - The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature - Online Library of Liberty
Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, trans. Andrew Tooke, ed. Ian Hunter and David Saunders, with Two Discourses and a Commentary by Jean Barbeyrac, trans. David Saunders (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). 5/5/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/888> -- 1717/1735 edition Anglicized political vocabulary from Pufendorf's secular and continental Absolutism even more than Tooke had in 1693. Added some notes from Barbeyrac's 1707 translation to stress religious elements of duties. Original De officiis -- Introduction and Barbeyrac materials extend Hunter's focus on the "civil Enlightenment" that opposed Leibniz's Platonic rationalist metaphysics, the Pufendorf, Thomasius and Huguenot strain erased from intellectual_history by Kant’s metaphysical Enlightenment version of history -- kindle-available -- downloaded pdf to Note
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may 2014 by dunnettreader

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