dunnettreader + institutional_economics   156

David Ciepley - Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article challenges the liberal, contractual theory of the corporation and argues for replacing it with a political theory of the corporation. Corporations are government-like in their powers, and government grants them both their external "personhood" and their internal governing authority. They are thus not simply private. Yet they are privately organized and financed and therefore not simply public. Corporations transgress all the basic dichotomies that structure liberal treatments of law, economics, and politics: public/private, government/market, privilege/equality, and status/contract. They are "franchise governments" that cannot be satisfactorily assimilated to liberalism. The liberal effort to assimilate them, treating them as contractually constituted associations of private property owners, endows them with rights they ought not have, exacerbates their irresponsibility, and compromises their principal public benefit of generating long-term growth. Instead, corporations need to be placed in a distinct category—neither public nor private, but "corporate"—to be regulated by distinct rules and norms. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
organizations  institutional_economics  corporations  corporate_citizenship  markets-dependence_on_government  article  corporate_control  institutions  management  public-private_gaps  bibliography  social_contract  liberalism  jstor  property_rights  downloaded  corporate_law  political_theory  managerialism  corporate_governance  corporate_personhood  firms-organization  property 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Revisiting the theory of institutional hybridity and diversity developed by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom to cope with the challenge of the "neither states nor markets" institutional domain, this article reconstructs the Ostromian system along the "value heterogeneity-co-productionpolycentricity" axis. It articulates the elements of a theory of value heterogeneity and of the fuzzy boundaries between private and public. It rebuilds the model of co-production, clarifying the ambiguity surrounding a key technical public choice theoretical assumption, and it demonstrates (a) why it should not be confused with the Alchian-Demsetz team production model and (b) how co-production engenders a type of market failure that has been neglected so far. In light of this analysis, the article reconsiders polycentricity, the capstone of the Ostromian system, explaining why polycentricity may be seen as a solution both to this co-production market failure problem and to the problems of social choice in conditions of deep heterogeneity. It also discusses further normative corollaries. - Downloaded via iphone
power  market_failure  political_economy  centralization  power-asymmetric  governance  downloaded  public-private_gaps  bargaining  institutional_economics  commons  article  normativity  accountability  common_good  jstor  political_science  decentralization  public_goods  public_choice  norms 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Elena Seghezza - Fiscal capacity and the risk of sovereign debt after the Glorious Revolution: A reinterpretation of the North–Weingast hypothesis (2015) — ScienceDirect
European Journal of Political Economy, June 2015, Vol.38:71–81, doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.12.002
Dept. of Economics, University of Genoa, Via Vivaldi 5, 16126 Genova, Italy
Several explanations have been given to account for the fact that, in contrast to the claim made by North and Weingast (1989), the decline in interest rates on British sovereign debt did not occur until several years after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the decline in the risk premium on Britain's sovereign debt was due to the significant increase in excise duties in the early part of the eighteenth century. This increase was possible for two reasons. On the one hand, with the Glorious Revolution, parliament no longer had reason to fear that the King would strengthen his political power due to the availability of more fiscal revenue. On the other hand, the new excise taxes were borne mostly by the poor, that is a social class not represented in parliament. The delay in reducing the interest rate on British sovereign debt, following the Glorious Revolution, was, therefore, due to the length of time needed to increase and improve the fiscal bureaucracy responsible for the collection of excise duties.
Keywords -- Glorious Revolution Fiscal capacity Sovereign debt Interest rates
article  paywall  political_economy  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  Glorious_Revolution  fiscal-military_state  fiscal_space  tax_policy  tax_collection  bureaucracy  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  interest_groups  inequality  excise  lower_orders  taxes-consumption  landed_interest 
december 2016 by dunnettreader
Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson
The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution
Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson
The American Economic Review
Vol. 101, No. 7 (DECEMBER 2011), pp. 3286-3307
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
commerce  urbanization  guilds  elites  republicanism  reform-legal  Rhineland  reform-political  Germany  economic_growth  political_economy  reform-economic  jstor  political_history  civil_code  French_Revolution  rule_of_law  institutional_economics  bourgeoisie  aristocracy  trade  article  downloaded  feudalism  economic_history 
september 2016 by dunnettreader
Guido Alfani, Wouter Ryckbosch - Income inequality in pre-industrial Europe | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal 06 November 2015
Thomas Piketty and others have prompted renewed interest in understanding long-term patterns of inequality. This column presents evidence from pre-industrial Europe. Inequality rose even during the success stories of early modern Europe, but it can hardly have been the sole requisite for growth. In both economic history and today’s economic theory, the idea of a universal trade-off between growth and inequality needs to be replaced by stronger attention to social processes and institutional developments. -- brief but extensive lit review of how thinking of economic historians has been evolving -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  early_modern  Europe-Early_Modern  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  economic_growth  inequality  capital_formation  new_institutionalism  institutional_economics  political_economy  state-building  nation-state  human_capital  urbanization  Innovation  Industrial_Revolution  consumer_revolution  consumer_demand  wages  growth-equity_tradeoff  bibliography  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Knowledge and Policy Limits of New Institutional Economics on Development :: SSRN - Dec 2014, Journal of Economic Issues, 2015, Forthcoming
Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law -- New Institutional Economics (NIE) has secured impressive achievements in academia and policy circles. The World Bank and other development organization in the past two decades have expended billions of dollars on efforts to build “good governance” and the “rule of law” informed by the NIE theory that economic development requires supportive political and legal institutions. NIE appears to be the new consensus view of development thinking, supplanting the neo-liberal Washington Consensus (..) This essay elaborates on the barriers that stand in the way of the knowledge and policy goals of NIE. Foremost is the “interconnectedness of society:” cultural, technological, legal, political, and economic activities all affect one another and are affected by one another, often in ways that are subtle and all but invisible; each situation unique in its constellation of social forces and is dynamic, constantly changing in reaction to surrounding influences. (..) I explore the ongoing struggle to identify a shared conception of “institution” — and I explain why this cannot be solved. For reasons I go on to elaborate, NIE scholars also will not be able to get a precise grip on the surrounding institutional influences that affect economic development. (..) NIE scholars today, it turns out, are repeating lessons announced five decades ago in the law and development field. The problems were insuperable then and will remain so. (..) While critical of NIE knowledge and policy objectives, this essay is not negative in orientation. NIE research is illuminating. Greater awareness of the limits will help orient future work in the field in the most fruitful directions. - Pages in PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: economic development, new institutional economics, old institutional economics, legal development, rule of law, legal theory -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  institutional_economics  law-and-economics  institutions  legal_culture  political_culture  institution-building  institutional_change  institutionalization  development  rule_of_law  legal_reform  legal_theory  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali - The Neolithic roots of economic institutions | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 11 September 2015
Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers. -- I.e. Eurasia, not Sub-Saharan Africa
paper  economic_history  pre-historical_people  development  institutional_economics  institutions  state-building  state-roles  agriculture  elites  violence  hierarchy  Sub-Saharan_Africa  geography  geography-and-economics 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert O. Keohane, review - Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1983) | JSTOR
Reviewed Work: The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. -- Journal of Economic Literature
Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 558-560 -- quite positive, but useful on where Olson's theory has blind spots -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  bookshelf  reviews  political_economy  economic_history  economic_growth  interest_groups  collective_action  international_political_economy  institutional_economics  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality  stagnation  rent-seeking  politics-and-money  status  status_quo_bias  social_order  hierarchy  change-social  change-economic  castes  discrimination  inequality  mobility  post-WWII  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Mary Hallward-Driemeier and Lant Pritchett - How Business Is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus Rules(2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3): 121-40
Affiliations World Bank and Harvard - What happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank's firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarize even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating "rules" to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which "deals" of various kinds are possible. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  development  institutional_economics  institutional_capacity  regulation  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  SMEs  World_Bank  doing_business  business_practices  business-norms  business_influence  investment  business-and-politics  business-ethics  FDI  investor_protection  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Timothy Besley - Law, Regulation, and the Business Climate: The Nature and Influence of the World Bank Doing Business Project (2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3): 99-120
Affiliation LSE - The importance of a well-functioning legal and regulatory system in creating an effective market economy is now widely accepted. One flagship project that tries to measure the environment in which businesses operate in countries across the world is the World Bank's Doing Business project, which was launched in 2002. This project gathers quantitative data to compare regulations faced by small and medium-size enterprises across economies and over time. The centerpiece of the project is the annual Doing Business report. It was first published in 2003 with five sets of indicators for 133 economies, and currently includes 11 sets of indicators for 189 economies. The report includes a table that ranks each country in the world according to its scores across the indicators. The Doing Business project has become a major resource for academics, journalists, and policymakers. The project also enjoys a high public profile with close to ten million hits on its website each year. With such interest, it's no surprise that the Doing Business report has come under intense scrutiny. In 2012, following discussions by its board, the World Bank commissioned an independent review panel to evaluate the project, on which I served as a member. In this paper, I first describe how the Doing Business project works and illustrate with some of the key findings of the 2015 report. Next, I address what is valuable about the project, the criticisms of it, and some wider political economy issues illustrated by the report. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  institutional_economics  World_Bank  development  SMEs  doing_business  FDI  investment  investor_protection  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Roger Backhouse, Mauro Boianovsky - Secular Stagnation: The History of a Macroeconomic Heresy :: SSRN - May 5, 2015
Roger Backhouse, University of Birmingham - Department of Economics -- Mauro Boianovsky, Universidade de Brasilia. *--* This paper covers the history of secular stagnation from Alvin's Hansen's AEA Presidential address in 1938 to the recent re-discovery of the idea by Lawrence Summers. It is argued that the story of secular stagnation is more complicated than the simple version usually told: the theory changed in ways that meant that, though its immediate relevance might be less, postwar prosperity left open the possibility that it might one day become relevant. It is also pointed out that the history of the term has never been free of political concerns, and it is suggested that changing conceptions of economic theory played an important role in the fate of secular stagnation -- Pages in PDF File: 36 -- Keywords: secular stagnation, unemployment equilibrium, Keynesian economics, Hansen -' downloaded to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  intellectual_history  economic_history  US_economy  US_politics  20thC  Great_Depression  post-WWII  Keynesianism  stagnation  macroeconomics  institutional_economics  prices  competition  deficit_finance  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Joseph Adelson, review essay - What Caused Capitalism? | Foreign Affairs - May 2015
Once upon a time, smart people thought the world was flat. As globalization took off, economists pointed to spreading market forces that… Includes new Cambridge History of Capitalism, Mokyr Enlightened Economy, Acemoglu and Robinson Why Nations Fail, and Beckert Empire of Cotton -- contrasts tales that are, in broad brush, optimistic and internalist re origins (especially Mokyr) vs pessimistic and externalist (especially Cotton) -- copied to Instapaper
books  reviews  bookshelf  economic_history  capitalism  Great_Divergence  ancient_history  global_economy  global_history  global_system  Europe-Early_Modern  city_states  Italy  Spain  France  British_history  India  US_history  colonialism  imperialism  empires  institutional_economics  technology  development  Scientific_Revolution  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  industrial_policy  US_Civil_War  slavery  property  property_rights  mercantilism  mercantilism-violence  Instapaper  markets  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_growth  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Dietz Vollrath - All Institutions, All the Time? | The Growth Economics Blog - April 2015
Wolfgang Keller and Carol Shiue just released a working paper on “Market Integration as a Mechanism for Growth“. They are looking at growth in Germany during… Discusses a neat paper looking at parts of Germany that followed different patterns of economic development and growth in the 19thC, comparing cities based on (1) degree of market integration (measured by wheat prices) and (2) whether they transformed property relations from feudal to liberal, disbanded guilds, and adopted "equality before the rule of law". The second tended to reflect whether a city was conquered by Napoleon. He first looks at each variable and how the authors define it, what's likely involved in whether it's positive for a given city. He critiques some of their methodology, such as combining legal and socioeconomic indicators into a single weighted index. But his strongest critique is how the authors keep refining their analysis to make "institutional" factors appear highly significant, when the significance is unclear to put it charitably. And the biggest problem where they are likely to find significance, cities conquered by Napoleon, doesn't consider different types of causality that might have been involved, e.g. a city's situation geographically (which affected market integration) and degree of economic development might have been part of why Napoleon focused on those cities to conquer, from which he organized things like supply lines or transport for his armies. It's a continuation of his ongoing critique of what he sees as a fad for institutional explanations that don't actually demonstrate what they say they do -- let alone suggest how institutional development could be replicated. -- copied to Instapaper
economic_history  19thC  Germany  feudalism  capitalism  property_rights  guilds  urban_development  institutional_economics  market_integration  Napoleonic_Wars  Napoleonic_Wars-impact  Instapaper  from instapaper
april 2015 by dunnettreader
George Serafeim - The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future Research b(revised June 2014) :: SSRN
Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this alternative view better fits actual corporate conduct, I discuss opportunities for future research. Specifically, I call for research on the materiality of environmental and social issues for the future financial performance of corporations, the design of incentive and control systems to guide strategy execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm. -- Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: corporate performance, corporate size, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  global_economy  global_governance  international_political_economy  shareholder_value  shareholders  CSR  disclosure  accountability  accounting  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  incentives  institutional_change  long-term_orientation  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_practices  business_influence  sustainability  MNCs  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  power  power-concentration  concentration-industry  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Stanley Fischer - Socialist Economy Reform: Lessons of the First Three Years (May, 1993) | JSTOR - The American Economic Review
Stanley Fischer, The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1993), pp. 390-395 -- snapshot of 1st stage of transition economics and state of debates -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  jstor  economic_history  post-Cold_War  transition_economies  political_economy  economic_theory  economic_culture  economic_reform  institutional_economics  institutional_change  industrial_policy  privatization  trade-policy  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Richard N. Langlois - Knowledge, Consumption, and Endogenous Growth - January 2000 :: SSRN
University of Connecticut - Department of Economics -- working paper for Knowledge, Consumption, and Endogenous Growth. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1. http://ssrn.com/abstract=257785 -- Abstract of article: In neoclassical theory, knowledge generates increasing returns-and therefore growth-because it is a public good that can be costlessly reused once created. In fact, however, much knowledge in the economy is actually tacit and not easily transmitted-and thus not an obvious source of increasing returns. Several writers have responded to this alarming circumstances by affirming hopefully that knowledge today is increasingly codified, general, and abstract-and increasingly less tacit. This paper disputes such a trend. But all is not lost: for knowledge does not have to be codified to be reused and therefore to generate economic growth. -- Abstract of paper adds -- This essay takes a skeptical view of the proposition that we are experiencing greater codification hand in hand with modern technology and economic growth. ... [and] an equally skeptical view ...that only codified knowledge, and never tacit knowledge, can generate economic growth. Knowledge can be externalized and made less idiosyncratic in ways that do not necessarily involve codification. Knowledge is structure. And knowledge can be externalized beyond an individual creator by being imbedded either in machines and other physical technology or in various kinds of social or behavioral structures that I will broadly call institutions. Using a wonderful 1912 essay by Wesley Clair Mitchell as a starting point, I examine, as a kind of case study, the way in which knowledge is embedded and shared in consumption -- an important and neglected aspect of the process of economic growth. -- Pages in PDF 38 -- Keywords: Tacit knowledge, Increasing returns, Growth theory, Knowledge reuse, Codification -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_social_science  institutions  institutional_economics  firms-theory  firms-structure  knowledge  knowledge_economy  know-how  public_goods  epistemology-social  technology  technology_transfer  technology-adoption  economic_growth  economic_sociology  Innovation  increasing_returns  bibliography  consumption  consumers  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review by Andrew W. Lo :: SSRN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- The recent financial crisis has generated many distinct perspectives from various quarters. In this article, I review a diverse set of 21 books on the crisis, 11 written by academics, and 10 written by journalists and one former Treasury Secretary. No single narrative emerges from this broad and often contradictory collection of interpretations, but the sheer variety of conclusions is informative, and underscores the desperate need for the economics profession to establish a single set of facts from which more accurate inferences and narratives can be constructed. -- Pages in PDF File: 41 -- Keywords: Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, Book Review -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  reviews  books  economic_history  21stC  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  regulation-enforcement  rent-seeking  fraud  debt  debtors  housing  securitization  derivatives  bank_runs  banking-universal  Glass-Steagal  risk_management  risk-systemic  financial_economics  global_system  global_imbalance  capital_flows  institutional_investors  institutional_economics  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Stéphanie Novak & Will Slauter - Interview with David Stasavage - Small States, Big Credit? | March 2012 - Books & ideas
Tags : state | political representation | the elite | debt | Italy
-- In States of Credit, David Stasavage explains why city-states were able to create long-term debt as early as the 13th century, whereas territorial states began to do so only in the 16th century. This research has major implications for our understanding of state formation and economic growth. Re his book -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle  economic_history  political_economy  political_culture  sovereign_debt  city_states  13thC  property_rights  property-confiscations  default  representative_institutions  state-building  creditors  North-Weingast  institutional_economics  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Geoffrey Jones - Entrepreneurs, Firms and Global Wealth Since 1850 - March 2013 | SSRN
Modern economic growth diffused from its origins in the North Sea region to elsewhere in western and northern Europe, across the Atlantic, and later to Japan, but struggled to get traction elsewhere. The societal and cultural embeddedness of the new technologies posed significant entrepreneurial challenges. The best equipped to overcome these challenges were often entrepreneurs based in minorities who held significant advantages in capital-raising and trust levels. By the interwar years productive modern business enterprise was emerging across the non-Western world. Often local and Western managerial practices were combined to produce hybrid forms of business enterprise. After 1945 many governmental policies designed to facilitate catch-up ended up crippling these emergent business enterprises without putting effective alternatives in place. The second global economy has provided more opportunities for catch up from the Rest, and has seen the rapid growth of globally competitive businesses in Asia, Latin America and Africa. This is explained not only by institutional reforms, but by new ways for business in the Rest to access knowledge and capital, including returning diaspora, business schools and management consultancies. Smarter state capitalism was also a greater source of international competitive advantage than the state intervention often seen in the past. -- downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  development  industrialization  institutional_economics  19thC  20thC  21stC  post-WWII  competition-interstate  globalization  industrial_policy  emtrepreneurs  diaspora  SMEs  technology_transfer  trust  access_to_finance  modernization_theory  business_history  firms-organization  downloaded  SSRN  Industrial_Revolution 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Anton Perdoncin, review essay - North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders (2009, French 2010) | La Vie des idées - April 2011
Anton Perdoncin, « Misère de l’histoire universelle », La Vie des idées, 20 avril 2011. ISSN : 2105-3030.-- Recensé : Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast, Violence et ordres sociaux, Paris, Gallimard, « Bibliothèque des sciences humaines », 2010, traduit de l’anglais par Myriam Dennehy (éd. originale : 2009). 460 p., 21 €. -- Pourquoi certaines sociétés sont-elles plus violentes que d’autres ? Parcourant 10 000 ans d’histoire, Douglass North et ses coauteurs insistent sur le rôle des institutions dans la pacification des rapports sociaux. Pour Anton Perdoncin, cette théorie élitiste, libérale et européocentriste repose sur une conception erronée de la violence, qui en occulte les aspects proprement politiques. -- see footnotes for interesting bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  kindle-available  social_theory  big_history  North-Weingast  institutional_economics  institutions  change-social  change-economic  elites  violence  social_order  social_sciences-post-WWII  bibliography  downloaded 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis - Hayek, Social Theory and the Contrastive Explanation of Socio-Economic Order (2013. Critical Review Vol. 25, Nos. 3-4.) :: SSRN
Lewis, Paul A., Hayek, Social Theory and the Contrastive Explanation of Socio-Economic Order (2013). Critical Review Vol. 25, Nos. 3-4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535073 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2535073 -- King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- Hayek’s later work on the possibility of socio-economic order in decentralized market economies is an exercise in contrastive causal explanation as conceptualized by realist social theorists and philosophers. This interpretation of Hayek’s work lends support to the view that Hayek’s post-1960 writings can be thought of as an example of comparative institutional analysis. It also provides a means of reinforcing Hayek’s own efforts to establish the scientific credentials of his work. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 19 -- Keywords: Hayek, Austrian economics, scientism, ontology, comparative institutional analysis-- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  intellectual_history  20thC  Hayek  Austrian_economics  economic_theory  social_theory  ontology-social  institutional_economics  scientistism  economic_sociology  critical_realism  comparative_economics  markets  markets-structure  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Special Issue: Microfinance -- AEAweb: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Vol. 7 No.1, Jan 2015
Abstract of introductory article -- Causal evidence on microcredit impacts informs theory, practice, and debates about its effectiveness as a development tool. The six randomized evaluations in this volume use a variety of sampling, data collection, experimental design, and econometric strategies to identify causal effects of expanded access to microcredit on borrowers and/or communities. These methods are deployed across an impressive range of locations—six countries on four continents, urban and rural areas—borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and lender characteristics. Summarizing and interpreting results across studies, we note a consistent pattern of modestly positive, but not transformative, effects. We also discuss directions for future research. -- broad conclusion to be expected contra the hype -- but focus still seems to be on *credit* (with assumptions re micro and SME entrepreneurs and business formation) rather than access to services -- also question whether the former Yugoslavia study really dealt with "micro", likely the sort of labeling of SMEs as micro like Aftab's programs
journals-academic  article  paywall  microfinance  access_to_finance  development  economic_growth  economic_sociology  development-impact  RCT  econometrics  causation  causation-social  financial_sector_development  financial_economics  financial_access  institutional_economics  banking  credit  financial_innovation  SMEs  access_to_services  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Tom Walker - EconoSpeak: The Hours of Labour and the Problem of Social Cost - Jan 2015
Coase argued that the suggested courses of action in the Pigovian tradition – liability, taxation or regulation – were inappropriate and often undesirable.(..) However, Coase didn't consider the full range of Pigou's examples and analysis. While Coase’s restatement of the problem may have been appropriate to the specific externality problems discussed by Pigou in part II, it entirely overlooked the radically different labour market problem encountered in part III, in which competitive pressure compels an employing firm to inflict harm on both itself and its employees and thus regulatory restraint of the firm (and competing employers) may benefit both. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  economic_sociology  intellectual_history  welfare_economics  institutional_economics  Coase  markets  markets-structure  property_rights  transaction_costs  externalities  competition  Labor_markets  social_costs  cost-benefit  regulation-costs  collective_action  common_good  efficiency  labor_law  wages  labor_standards  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » The Federal Reserve and Shared Prosperity: A Guide to the Policy Issues and Institutional Challenges - Jan 2015
The Federal Reserve is a hugely powerful institution whose policies ramify with enormous effect throughout the economy. Its policies impact almost every important aspect of the economy and it is doubtful the US can achieve shared prosperity without the policy cooperation of the Fed. That makes understanding the Federal Reserve, the policy issues and institutional challenges, of critical importance. -- downloaded pdf to Note
economic_theory  economic_sociology  economic_culture  central_banks  institutional_economics  institutional_change  monetary_policy  financial_system  US_economy  US_politics  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic: Can Black Death explain the Industrial Revolution? | globalinequality - Jan 11 2015
re presentation by a young scholar at Santa Fe suggesting that Why England (and Dutch) due to higher wages in Northern Europe post Black Death in contrast with South where non market repression or property arrangements were able to push adjustment costs inti agricultural workers without impact on wage rates. Milanovic compares with other theoretical approaches ie Pomerantz, Acemoglu & Robinson, Robert Allen etc. Link to 2007 paper by Pamuk Milanovic thinks may be 1st work to seriously look at differential impact of Black Death on northern & southern Europe as distinct from the common story if Western vs Central and Eastern Europe.
economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  Black_Death  North-Weingast  landowners  demography  economic_sociology  labor  agriculture  wages  productivity  colonialism  medieval  14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  institutional_economics  capital  capitalism  China  Japan  ancient_Rome  slavery  bibliography 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Ron Harris - (pdf) The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade: The Commenda and the Corporation
The focus of this article is on legal-economic institutions that organized early- modern Eurasian trade. It identifies two such institutions that had divergent dispersion patterns, the corporation and the commenda. The corporation ended up as a uniquely European institution that did not migrate until the era of European colonization. The commenda that originated in Arabia migrated all the way to Western Europe and to China. The article explains their divergent dispersion based on differences in their institutional and geographical environments and on dynamic factors. It claims that institutional analysis errs when it ignores migration of institutions. It provides building blocks for the modeling of institutional migration. -- via Dick Langlois at organizationsandmarkets.com presented at Nov 2014 conference put together by Business History program at Harvard Business School, on the History of Law and Business Enterprise -- downloaded to iPhone
paper  downloaded  economic_history  institutional_economics  legal_history  medieval_history  firms-structure  firms-theory  trade  colonialism  Europe-Early_Modern  China  India  MENA  Islamic_law  business_practices  risk_management  economic_culture  cultural_influence  trade-cultural_transmission  corporate_law  business_history  comparative_economics  Eurasia  business  organizations 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Garicano, Luis and Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban (2014) - Knowledge-based hierarchies: using organizations to understand the economy - LSE Research Online
Via Economic Principals -- We argue that incorporating the decision of how to organize the acquisition, use, and communication of knowledge into economic models is essential to understand a wide variety of economic phenomena. We survey the literature that has used knowledge-based hierarchies to study issues like the evolution of wage inequality, the growth and productivity of firms, economic development, the gains from international trade, as well as offshoring and the formation of international production teams, among many others. We also review the nascent empirical literature that has, so far, confirmed the importance of organizational decisions and many of its more salient implications. - downloaded to iPhone
paper  lit_survey  economic_theory  economic_growth  productivity  inequality  labor  wages  supply_chains  teams  off-shoring  trade  emerging_markets  corporate_finance  development  MNCs  power  power-asymetric  firm-theory  organization  hierarchy  know-how  technology  innovation  superstars  middle_class  working_class  social_stratification  social_theory  institutional_economics  globalization  economy_of_scale  increasing_returns  IP  downloaded 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - My "Sisyphus as Social Democrat: A review of 'John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics', by Richard Parker," ( Grasping Reality...)
One of his series, "Hoisted from the Archives": J. Bradford DeLong (2005), "Sisyphus as Social Democrat: A review of John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics, by Richard Parker," Foreign Affairs May/June 2005. - diwnloaded pdf to iPhone
article  book  review  biography  intellectual_history  20thC  political_economy  economic_sociology  economic_theory  US_economy  US_politics  post-WWII  entre_deux_guerres  Great_Depression  WWII  US_government  US_foreign_policy  Keynesian  institutional_economics  liberalism  social_democracy  Galbraith_JK  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
William M. Dugger and William Waller - Radical Institutionalism: From Technological to Democratic Instrumentalism | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 54, No. 2 (SUMMER 1996), pp. 169-189
This article explains the nature and significance of radical institutionalism. Radical institutionalism does not represent a break with the institutionalist paradigm, but an attempt to move it beyond its outmoded, Ayresian philosophical foundation. Radical institutionalism involves the introduction of three new elements into the contemporary stream of institutionalist works. These three new elements include an emphasis on Veblenian fundamentals, a shift in research interests, and a reconsideration of the philosophical foundations of inquiry. -- useful bibliography of generations of institutionalist theorists -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  intellectual_history  economic_theory  economic_history  institutional_economics  epistemology-social  sociology_of_knowledge  capitalism  corporations  welfare_state  democracy  Veblen  class_conflict  financialization  ruling_class  postmodern  Post-Keynesian  epistemology  critical_realism  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Michael Hudson - Veblen’s Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory - Working Paper No. 729 | Levy Economics Institute - August 2012
As the heirs to classical political economy and the German historical school, the American institutionalists retained rent theory and its corollary idea of unearned income. More than any other institutionalist, Thorstein Veblen emphasized the dynamics of banks financing real estate speculation and Wall Street maneuvering to organize monopolies and trusts. Yet despite the popularity of his writings with the reading public, his contribution has remained isolated from the academic mainstream, and he did not leave behind a “school.” Veblen criticized academic economists for having fallen subject to “trained incapacity” as a result of being turned into factotums to defend rentier interests. Business schools were painting an unrealistic happy-face picture of the economy, teaching financial techniques but leaving out of account the need to reform the economy’s practices and institutions. In emphasizing how financial “predation” was hijacking the economy’s technological potential, Veblen’s vision was as materialist and culturally broad as that of the Marxists, and as dismissive of the status quo. Technological innovation was reducing costs but breeding monopolies as the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sectors joined forces to create a financial symbiosis cemented by political-insider dealings—and a trivialization of economic theory as it seeks to avoid dealing with society’s failure to achieve its technological potential. The fruits of rising productivity were used to finance robber barons who had no better use of their wealth than to reduce great artworks to the status of ownership trophies and achieve leisure-class status by funding business schools and colleges to promote a self-congratulatory but deceptive portrayal of their wealth-grabbing behavior. -- Associated Program: Explorations in Theory and Empirical Analysis -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Veblen  entre_deux_guerres  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  political_economy  classical_economics  neoclassical_economics  marginalists  German_historical_school  professionalization  academia  philanthropy  Gilded_Age  robber_barons  finance_capital  technology  investment  monopolies  speculative_finance  financial_system  financialization  antitrust  history-and-social_sciences  rentiers  rent-seeking  business-and-politics  business-norms  busisness-ethics  business_schools  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
William M. Dugger and William Waller - Radical Institutionalism: From Technological to Democratic Instrumentalism | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 54, No. 2 (SUMMER 1996), pp. 169-189
This article explains the nature and significance of radical institutionalism. Radical institutionalism does not represent a break with the institutionalist paradigm, but an attempt to move it beyond its outmoded, Ayresian philosophical foundation. Radical institutionalism involves the introduction of three new elements into the contemporary stream of institutionalist works. These three new elements include an emphasis on Veblenian fundamentals, a shift in research interests, and a reconsideration of the philosophical foundations of inquiry. -- interesting institutional bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  social_sciences-post-WWII  postmodern  critical_theory  social_theory  political_economy  institutional_economics  evolution-social  epistemology-social  philosophy_of_social_science  Veblen  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Structuralist Response to Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century | INET
New School Economist Lance Taylor released a symposium of literature on Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century in conjunction with the INET-sponsored research project on Economic Sustainability, Distribution and Stability. It includes papers offering a structuralist response to Piketty's explanation of inequality and advancing alternative theories. **--** Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century: Introduction to a Structuralist Symposium - Lance Taylor (The New School) *--* Capitalism, Inequality and Globalization: Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century - Prabhat Patnaik (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi *--* Elasticity of substitution and social conflict: a structuralist note on Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century - Nelson Barbosa-Filho (São Paulo School of Economics) *--* Piketty’s Elasticity of Substitution: A Critique - Gregor Semieniuk (The New School) *--* The Triumph of the Rentier? Thomas Piketty vs. Luigi Pasinetti and John Maynard Keynes - Lance Taylor (The New School -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  Piketty  economic_history  institutional_economics  class_conflict  rentiers  inequality  globalization  capital  capitalism  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
SSRN Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), Fourth Biennial Global Conference
The Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) was held in Bern and hosted by the World Trade Institute (WTI) of the University of Bern, from 10-12 July 2014. You can browse all SIEL Fourth Biennial Global Conference abstracts in the SSRN eLibrary. The Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) is a new organization aimed at academics and academically-minded practitioners and officials in the field of IEL, in all parts of the world. The broad goals and objectives of the organization include: building links and networks between and among IEL academics and academically-minded practitioners and officials; fostering the development of local IEL expertise and IEL organizations where needed; representing the discipline of international economic law as appropriate in global, regional and national fora; and encouraging research, practice, service and teaching in the field of IEL.
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_organizations  development  trade-policy  trade-agreements  WTO  global_governance  international_political_economy  reform-legal  institutional_economics  international_finance  capital_markets  capital_flows  climate  energy  ocean  treaties 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, Lunn - Should We Build More Large Dams? The Actual Costs of Hydropower Megaproject Development (Energy Policy, March 2014, pp.1-14.) :: SSRN
Atif Ansar - University of Oxford - Blavatnik School of Government -- Bent Flyvbjerg - University of Oxford - Said Business School -- Alexander Budzier - University of Oxford - Saïd Business School.-- Daniel Lunn - University of Oxford - Department of Statistics *--* A brisk building boom of hydropower mega-dams is underway from China to Brazil. Whether benefits of new dams will outweigh costs remains unresolved despite contentious debates. We investigate this question with the “outside view” or “reference class forecasting” based on literature on decision-making under uncertainty in psychology. We find overwhelming evidence that budgets are systematically biased below actual costs of large hydropower dams — excluding inflation, substantial debt servicing, environmental, and social costs. Using the largest and most reliable reference data of its kind and multilevel statistical techniques applied to large dams for the first time, we were successful in fitting parsimonious models to predict cost and schedule overruns. The outside view suggests that in most countries large hydropower dams will be too costly in absolute terms and take too long to build to deliver a positive risk-adjusted return unless suitable risk management measures outlined in this paper can be affordably provided. Policymakers, particularly in developing countries, are advised to prefer agile energy alternatives that can be built over shorter time horizons to energy megaprojects. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 14 - Keywords: Large hydropower dams, Schedule & cost estimates, Cost benefit forecasting, Reference class forecasting, Outside -- didn't download
article  SSRN  development  energy  IFIs  business-and-politics  statistics  social_sciences  methodology-quantitative  decision_theory  international_finance  institutional_economics  business-forecasts 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Matias Vernengo - NAKED KEYNESIANISM: Institutions, what institutions? - September 2014
Nice breakdown of theorists of causes of development and underdevelopment and problems of trying to catch up -- So if you believe most heterodox economists institutions are relevant, but not primarily those associated to the supply side; the ones linked to the demand side, in Keynesian fashion are more important than the mainstream admits. Poor countries that arrive late to the process of capitalist development cannot expand demand without limits since the imports of intermediary and capital goods cause recurrent balance of payments crises. The institutions that allow for the expansion of demand, including those that allow for higher wages to expand consumption and to avoid the external constraints, are and have been central to growth and development. The role of the State in creating and promoting the expansion of domestic markets, in the funding of research and development, and in reducing the barriers to balance of payments constraints, both by guarantying access to external markets (sometimes militarily, like in the Opium Wars) and reducing foreign access to domestic ones was crucial in the process of capitalist development. In this view, for example, what China did not have that England did, was not lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, but a rising bourgeoisie (capitalists) that had to compete to provide for a growing domestic market that had acquired a new taste (and hence explained expanding demand) for a set of new goods, like cotton goods from India, or china (porcelain) from… well China, as emphasized by economic historian Maxine Berg among others (for the role of consumption in the Industrial Revolution go here). Or simply put, China did not have a capitalist mode of production (for the concept of mode of production and capitalism go here). Again, I argued that Robert Allen’s view according to which high wages and cheap energy forced British producers to innovate to save labor, leading to technological innovation and growth, and the absence of those conditions in China led to stagnation is limited since it presupposes that firms adopt more productive technologies even without growing demand. -- see links
economic_history  economic_theory  economic_growth  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  development  emerging_markets  Latin_America  Great_Divergence  demand  consumer_demand  British_history  China  institutional_economics  institutional_change  institution-building  institutions  supply-side  demand-side  cultural_history  economic_culture  political_culture  industrialization  Industrial_Revolution  international_political_economy  international_monetary_system  balance_of_payments  state-building  rent-seeking  rentiers  commodities  links 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan L. Silverstein - Paul Homan's "An Appraisal of Institutional Economics": Comment | JSTOR: The American Economic Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1932), pp. 268-269
Silverstein remarks that Homan attempts to differentiate systematic economics a la neoclassical vs systematic economics a la institutional, while at the same time he accurately notes that the Institutionalists are opposed to a systematic economics -- no surprise that what he searches for as the system of institutional economics is indeed a fiction, one he has invented. Silverstein doesn't frame it in quite such snarky terms, but that's the gist.
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  economic_theory  neoclassical_economics  institutional_economics  Veblen 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Paul T. Homan - An Appraisal of Institutional Economics | JSTOR: The American Economic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1932), pp. 10-17
Paper presented at Round Table Conference, December 29, 1931, at forty-fourth annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Washington, D.C. Veblen's attempt to make of economics an evolutionary science has been little developed by other economists. The differentiating characteristics of an institutional economics are hard to find; but some economists have oriented their thinking by a postulated institutional prescription of human conduct in an evolving society, in association with an attack upon the ideology of systematic economic theory. The central concern of this group for economic theory has, however, been in making it relevant to problems of social control. Descriptive studies have constituted the principal recent additions to economic knowledge. Few if any of these can be regarded as integral parts of a differentiated institutional economics. Nor can one find peculiarly institutional contributions to the solution of problems of economic control. The supposed existence of a distinguishable body of economic knowledge or theory properly to be called institutional is an intellectual fiction. -- see also roundtable conference report
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  economic_theory  neoclassical_economics  institutional_economics  Veblen  evolution-social 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Anne Mayhew, review - Laurence Shute, John Maurice Clark: A Social Economics for the Twenty-First Century | EH.Net, H-Net Reviews. November, 1997
[F]rom Clark's earliest work through his post-World War II comments on the formalization of Keynes' work, he sought a "non-euclidean" economics that would be more "scientific" than most economic analysis in fact was. In a 1924, essay on "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," Clark argued that it was "unscientific" to exclude relevant evidence. He wrote: "... comprehensiveness is scientific, even if it involves some sacrifice of other qualities for which science likes to strive" . In a critique of a 1949 essay by Paul Samuelson, Clark repeats the theme by complaining of ... what happens to the Keynesian theory when it is simplified by isolating the central mathematical formula and its corollaries from the context of factors that do not lend themselves to this treatment, and which Keynes handled in 'literary' fashion ... . -- Clark (and his fellow Institutionalists) made major contributions to what was then the "mainstream" of American economics during a period of lively innovation. During the early 1930s Clark had already developed both multiplier and accelerator concepts and he welcomed Keynes' "income-flow analysis." However, in the early 1940s he was worrying--in print and in exchanges with Keynes--that this analysis would be undiscriminatingly applied, and there were problems with sole reliance on deficit spending for stabilization. Clark's concern was a wider variety of stabilization tools--including attention to the legal arrangement of costs--would be required. In his last major work, Competition as A Dynamic Process (1961), Clark returned to some of the issues with which he began his career. Shute stresses that this work was not the "major general treatise" that Clark had once hoped to write, but rather an attempt to develop a practical notion of "workable competition" appropriate for analysis and policy guidance in a dynamic economy. Clark was realist enough to worry that this work would not be well received [inadequate formalism and assumptions they expected from "theory"]
books  reviews  intellectual_history  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  social_sciences-post-WWII  economic_theory  economic_history  institutional_economics  industry  production  investment  costs  labor  Labor_markets  capital  capitalism  business_cycles  Keynes  Keynesianism  macroeconomics  Great_Depression  competition  prices 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW - University of Kent and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE - Seattle University School of Law --This article revisits the late seventeenth-century histories of two of England's most successful overseas trading monopolies, the East India and Royal African Companies. It offers the first full account of the various enforcement powers and strategies that both companies developed and stresses their unity of purpose in the seventeenth century. It assesses the complex effects that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ had on these powers and strategies, unearthing much new material about the case law for monopoly enforcement in this critical period and revising existing accounts that continue to assert the Revolution's exclusively deregulating effects and that miss crucial subtleties in the case law and related alterations in company behaviour. It asks why the two companies parted company as legal and political entities and offers an explanation that connects the fortunes of both monopoly companies to their public profile and differing constituencies in the English empire and the varying non-European political contexts in which they operated. -- * We warmly thank Michael R. T. Macnair for his indispensable advice and assistance regarding matters of seventeenth-century English law and are grateful to Clive Holmes for encouraging us to look into these issues and to Simon Douglas and Jeffrey Hackney for initial help in doing so. Paul Halliday, Daniel Hulsebosch, and Philip J. Stern provided helpful responses to specific research queries.
article  paywall  find  17thC  British_history  British_politics  economic_history  Glorious_Revolution  mercantilism  monopolies  trading_companies  East_India_Company  Royal_African_Co  colonialism  slavery  piracy  competition  parties  London  legal_history  judiciary  commercial_law  interest_groups  Whig_Junto  Tories  James_II  William_III  Parliament  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  regulation  West_Indies  ports  shipping  trade-policy  entrepôts  exports  imports  luxury_goods  consumers  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - The Hamlyn Lectures 2011: The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (2011) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-47 -- The idea in these lectures is to discuss the relation between property and the rule of law in a deeper way than this has been discussed in the past, ...that reflects realistic understanding of how property rights are created and modified. -- our thinking about the rule of law needs to focus on all the ways in which property is non-Lockean in its origin, legal status, and moral force. In the course of doing this, I will be looking at some of the rather naive assumptions underlying the tight connection that has been forged between property rights and the rule of law in neo-liberal political economy. And I will argue that we can abandon or modify some of these naive assumptions about property without compromising the very great importance that is properly attached to the ideal of the rule of law. There are three lectures in all. -- Lecture 1 addresses the alleged contrast between (a) the rule of law and (b) rule by law, and the suggestion that property rights might be privileged under (a). -- in the real world even Lockean property has an inescapable public law dimension. Lecture 2... is about the contrast between formal/procedural and substantive views of the rule of law and the dificulties inherent in identifying respect for private property rights as a substantive dimension of the rule of law. ...given the accordion-like expandability of the category of property, this cannot work to privilege property rights over other legal rights etc. Lecture 3 is a defense of legislation, including regulatory and redistributive legislation in light of the rule of law. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  political_economy  property  property_rights  rule_of_law  regulation  redistribution  Locke-2_Treatises  Hayek  libertarianism  liberty-negative  legislation  property-confiscations  power-asymmetric  social_order  neoliberalism  markets  institutional_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Forum - “Deirdre McCloskey and Economists’ Ideas about Ideas” (July, 2014) - Online Library of Liberty
Deirdre McClosky is over the halfway point of her 4 volume work on The Bourgeois Era. Two volumes have already appeared, Bourgeois Virtues (2006) and Bourgeois Dignity (2010), and a third is close to appearing [2015]. This Liberty Matters online discussion will assess her progress to date with a Lead Essay by Don Boudreaux and comments by Joel Mokyr and John Nye, and replies to her critics by Deirdre McCloskey. The key issue is to try to explain why “the Great Enrichment” of the past 150 years occurred in northern and western Europe rather than elsewhere, and why sometime in the middle of the 18th century. Other theories have attributed it to the presence of natural resources, the existence of private property and the rule of law, and the right legal and political institutions. McCloskey’s thesis is that a fundamental change in ideas took place which raised the “dignity” of economic activity in the eyes of people to the point where they felt no inhibition in pursuing these activities which improved the situation of both themselves and the customers who bought their products and services.
intellectual_history  cultural_history  economic_history  economic_growth  Medieval  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  Great_Divergence  British_history  Scientific_Revolution  Enlightenment  Scottish_Enlightenment  Industrial_Revolution  bourgeoisie  political_economy  France  Germany  Prussia  China  development  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  legal_history  property  property_rights  commerce  trade  trading_companies  free_trade  improvement  technology  Innovation  agriculture  energy  natural_capital  nature-mastery  transport  capitalism  colonialism  industry  industrialization  social_order  Great_Chain_of_Being  consumers  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  equality  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism  incentives  microeconomics  historical_sociology  historical_change  social_theory  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Alfred Marshall - Industry and Trade (Vol 2) [1919] | Google Books
Vol 2 appears to be available only as a commercial ebook (price c $4) - Vol 1 is a full Google Books copy added to my Google_Books library -- Vol 2 looks interesting in his treatment of the English economy from at least the Black Death -- remarks on "mercantilism" and the economic policies of the British government in the mid 18thC (following Adam Smith characterized as"bad" and "selfish") -- Though the bulk of his work was completed before the turn of the 20th century, the global ramifications of World War I prompted him to reconsider his theories on international economics, and in 1919 he published the two-volume Industry and Trade. Here, in Volume II, he discusses. . how monopolies and competition impact prices . trusts and cartels in the American and German economies . the decline of class differences and advantages in industrial systems . unions, co-opts, and business federations . and much more.
books  etexts  Google_Books  economic_history  British_history  UK_economy  Germany  Prussia  mercantilism  merchants  international_political_economy  international_economics  trading_companies  trade-policy  trade  trade-agreements  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  German_unification  monopolies  corporations  corporate_finance  labor  Labor_markets  wages  unions  imperialism  empire-and_business  US_economy  protectionism  Hamilton  Smith  free_trade  laisser-faire  institutional_economics  institution-building  firms-theory  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Issue devoted to 50th Anniversary of Robert Heilbroner's "The Worldly Philosophers" | JSTOR: Social Research, Vol. 71, No. 2, SUMMER 2004
Quite a roundup of contributors -- From Solow on methodology to Haack on philosophy of science and epistemology, Warren Samuels, Jamie Galbraith, and several papers on intellectual_history, including parallels with Polanyi
journal  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_culture  capitalism  macroeconomics  social_sciences  epistemology  rationality-economics  institutional_economics  social_contract  markets  post-WWII  post-Cold_War  bibliography  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Abigail Swingen, review - Sheryllynne Haggerty. "Merely for Money"? Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750-1815 | H-Net Reviews
Haggerty demonstrates that successful merchants in the 18thC British Atlantic world operated in a culture that had socially constructed expectations for their behavior. Those who did not conform to that culture could find themselves left out of it altogether. This is most effectively demonstrated in her chapter on obligation. ...“obligation” did not simply reflect the necessity to pay off a debt. For some larger merchant houses, it meant not calling in debts too quickly especially at times of crisis -- 18thC merchants, although largely self-regulating, expected and desired a certain level of regulation and protection from the British state. This was especially true in terms of overseas and colonial trades. ...merchants felt that the state was “obligated” to protect them, considering the various ways they contributed to the imperial economy. --ultimately one questions how these crises, and the sophisticated ways the merchants responded to them, compared to earlier similar moments of upheaval. Overseas (especially colonial) merchants had formed lobbying groups, both informal and formal, since at least the late17thC, as the work of Alison Olson and Will Pettigrew demonstrates. Because there is little consideration of change over time, however, one does not get a clear sense of the overall significance of the period in question. -- one is left wondering about the broader implications of the ways in which merchants confronted and negotiated with the “formal” empire. The merchants were caught up in a transformative period in the transition to a global capitalist economy. -- high marks for archival work and applying Greif (new institutional_economics) and folks like Hobbit re business concepts
books  reviews  economic_history  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  Atlantic  West_Indies  American_colonies  American_Revolution  slavery  merchants  mercantilism  protectionism  credit  creditors  trade-policy  trade_finance  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  interest_groups  economic_culture  institutional_economics  obligation  business-and-politics  capitalism  globalization  global_economy  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » The accidental controversialist: deeper reflections on Thomas Piketty’s “Capital” - April 2014
Using a conventional marginal productivity framework, Piketty provides an explanation of rising inequality based on increases in the gap between the marginal product of capital, which determines the rate of profit (r), and the rate of growth (g). Because capital ownership is so concentrated, a higher profit rate or slower growth rate increases inequality as the incomes of the wealthy grow faster than the overall economy. The conventional character of Piketty’s theoretical thinking rears its head in his policy prescriptions. -- Mainstream economists will assert the conventional story about the profit rate being technologically determined. However, as Piketty occasionally hints, in reality the profit rate is politically and socially determined by factors influencing the distribution of economic and political power. Growth is also influenced by policy and institutional choices. That is the place to push the argument....My prediction is “r minus g” arithmetic will make its way into the curriculum, with the profit rate explained as the marginal product of capital; Chicago School economists will counter the economy has mechanisms limiting prolonged wide divergence of r and g; and Harvard and MIT graduate students will have opportunities to do market failure research arguing the opposite. The net result is economics will be left essentially unchanged and even more difficult to change.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  productivity  capital  labor  technology  inequality  wealth  political_economy  profit  capitalism  institutional_economics  laisser-faire  information-asymmetric  competition  education-higher  economic_culture  sociology_of_knowledge  heterodox_economics  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Neil Fligstein - Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions | JSTOR: American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Aug., 1996), pp. 656-673
I use the metaphor "markets as politics" to create a sociological view of action in markets. I develop a conceptual view of the social institutions that comprise markets, discuss a sociological model of action in which market participants try to create stable worlds and find social solutions to competition, and discuss how markets and states are intimately linked. From these foundations, I generate propositions about how politics in markets work during various stages of market development--formation, stability, and transformation. At the formation of markets, when actors in firms are trying to create a status hierarchy that enforces noncompetitive forms of competition, political action resembles social movements. In stable markets, incumbent firms defend their positions against challengers and invaders. During periods of market transformation, invaders can reintroduce more fluid social-movement-like conditions. -- cited by more than 100 on jstor -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_theory  institutional_economics  economic_culture  networks-social  networks-business  networks-exchange  status  competition  action-theory  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
William A. Jackson - Capabilities, Culture and Social Structure | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 63, No. 1 (MARCH 2005), pp. 101-124
Sen's capability approach has a culturally specific side, with capabilities influenced by social structures and institutions. Although Sen acknowledges this, he expresses his theory in individualistic terms and makes little allowance for culture or social structure. The present paper draws from recent social theory to discuss how the capability approach could be developed to give an explicit treatment of cultural and structural matters. Capabilities depend not only on entitlements but on institutional roles and personal relations: these can be represented openly if capabilities are disaggregated into individual, social and structural capacities. The three layers interact, and a full analysis of capabilities should consider them all. A stratified method implies that raising entitlements will not on its own be enough to enhance capabilities and that cultural and structural changes will be needed. -- good references -- didn't download
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_theory  economic_sociology  Sen  capabilities  economic_culture  institutional_economics  institution-building  networks  networks-social  structure  structuralist  power  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Eduardo Fernández-Huerga - The Economic Behavior of Human Beings: The Institutional/Post-Keynesian Model | JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep., 2008), pp. 709-726
This paper attempts to present the basic features that would define a model of behavior suited to an institutional and post-Keynesian approach. To facilitate explanation, human behavior is divided into three phases: motivation, cognition and reasoning and decision-making. Motivation appears as a process directed toward the satisfaction of a complex structure of various needs and wants. The role of emotions and the social and cognitive aspects of motivation are recognized. Moreover, it is also recognized that human beings have limited cognitive and rational capacities, and it is accepted that they are potentially creative. Partly as a consequence of that, cognition becomes a social act and knowledge of reality is subject to fundamental uncertainty. Finally, human rationality (or intelligence) is associated with a search for good solutions, and it includes elements of procedural rationality, creativity and emotional rationality. The role of habits and institutions in all these phases is stressed. -- good references -- didn't download
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_theory  economic_sociology  institutional_economics  Post-Keynesian  behavioral_economics  cognition-social  rationality-economics  creativity  uncertainty  motivation  decision_theory  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Ricardo Hausmann - Why technological diffusion does not occur according to economic theory. - Project Syndicate - May 2014
That is why cities, regions, and countries can absorb technology only gradually, generating growth through some recombination of the knowhow that is already in place, maybe with the addition of some component – a bassist to complete a string quartet. But they cannot move from a quartet to a philharmonic orchestra in one fell swoop, because it would require too many missing instruments – and, more important, too many musicians who know how to play them. Progress happens by moving into what the theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman calls the “adjacent possible,” which implies that the best way to find out what is likely to be feasible in a country is to consider what is already there. Politics may indeed impede technological diffusion; but, to a large extent, technology does not diffuse because of the nature of technology itself.
economic_theory  economic_growth  economic_history  institutional_economics  institutional_change  institution-building  development  US_foreign_policy  rent-seeking  elites  oligarchy  technology  capital  labor  knowhow 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » New Book: Restoring Shared Prosperity: a Policy Agenda from Leading Keynesian Economists | Dec 2013
Edited by Thomas I. Palley and Gustav A. Horn. The economic recovery in the US since the Great Recession has remained sub-par and beset by persistent fear it might weaken again. Even if that is avoided, the most likely outcome is continued weak growth, accompanied by high unemployment and historically high levels of income inequality. In Europe, the recovery from the Great Recession has been even worse, with the euro zone beset by an unresolved euro crisis that has already contributed to a double-dip recession in the region. This book offers an alternative agenda for shared prosperity to that on offer from mainstream economists. The thinking is rooted in the Keynesian analytic tradition, which has been substantially vindicated by events. However, pure Keynesian macroeconomic analysis is supplemented by a focus on the institutions and policy interventions needed for an economy to generate productive full employment with contained income inequality. Such a perspective can be termed “structural Keynesianism”. These are critical times and the public deserves an open debate that does not arbitrarily or ideologically lock out alternative perspectives and policy ideas. The book contains a collection of essays that offer a credible policy program for shared prosperity, rooted in a clear narrative that cuts through the economic confusions -- available in free pdf or on amazon.com -- didn't download
books  kindle-available  macroeconomics  Keynesianism  institutional_economics  stagnation  neoliberalism  political_economy  global_system  Labor_markets  inequality  economic_growth  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Paul Pierson - Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics | JSTOR: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 251-267
It is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes as "path dependent." The concept, however, is often employed without careful elaboration. This article conceptualizes path dependence as a social process grounded in a dynamic of "increasing returns." Reviewing recent literature in economics and suggesting extensions to the world of politics, the article demonstrates that increasing returns processes are likely to be prevalent, and that good analytical foundations exist for exploring their, causes and consequences. The investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism: Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life. -- cited by more than 100 jstor articles! -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  methodology  political_change  political_economy  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_economics  contingency  path-dependency  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark M. Blyth - "Any More Bright Ideas?" The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy | JSTOR: Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jan., 1997), pp. 229-250
Review article - (1) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change by Judith Goldstein; Robert Keohane; (2) Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Argentina and Brazil by Kathryn Sikkink -- The renewed interest in ideas as an explanatory category in political economy, particularly among rationalist and historical institutionalists, is flawed. This turn to ideas is theoretically degenerate; it treats ideas as desiderata, catch-all concepts to explain variance, rather than subjects in their own right. The two schools ask what stabilizes and what causes change, not what ideas are and what they do. The ideational turn taken by both rationalist and historical institutionalists is best understood as an ad hoc solution to the inherent weaknesses of their research programs. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  historical_sociology  rational_choice  political_economy  ideas-social_theory  social_process  social_movements  socialization  sociology-process  institutions  institutional_change  institutional_economics  institutionalization  IR_theory  international_organizations  development  Latin_America  political_change  economic_culture  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
James Mahoney - Path Dependence in Historical Sociology | JSTOR: Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Aug., 2000), pp. 507-548
Useful notion if it can be operationalized as something more than "history matters" -- more than 100 references and more than 60 jstor articles cite this article -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  historical_sociology  path-dependency  institutions  institutional_change  institutional_economics  rational_choice  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
John Wells and Douglas Wills - Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation: The Jacobite Threat to England's Institutions and Economic Growth | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 418-441
This study provides an empirical test of North and Weingast's theory of British capital-market development after the Glorious Revolution. The evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that institutional innovation in the 1690s led to the dramatic growth in London capital markets, and that threats to these institutions caused financial turmoil. We also find the economic motivation for these innovations to be consistent with the work of Ekelund and Tollison. -- they fell for Whig propaganda
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  17thC  18thC  British_politics  North-Weingast  Jacobites  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  institutional_economics  public_choice  interest_groups  Whigs-oligarchy  Bank_of_England  Tories  Hanoverian_Succession  James_III  monied_interest  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert F. Hébert - Interest Groups, Public Choice and the Economics of Religion | JSTOR: Public Choice, Vol. 142, No. 3/4 (Mar., 2010), pp. 429-436
This article reviews Bob Tollison's conjoint contributions to the burgeoning area of the economics of religion, underscoring his integration of public choice and interestgroup themes into the microeconomic analysis of faith-based organizational architecture, institutional decision making and doctrinal innovation. Beginning with study of the medieval Catholic Church, moving forward to the Protestant Reformation and beyond, it supplies a timeline of developments and the major findings of each phase of his research program. -- hegemonic ambition of public choice school -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  religious_history  sociology_of_religion  economics_of_religion  public_choice  interest_groups  rent-seeking  church_history  Roman_Catholicism  Reformation  Protestants  Counter-Reformation  secularization  organizations  institutional_economics  behavioral_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh - Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690-1790 | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 906-935
We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690-1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets. -- reasonably up to date bibliography on institutional_economics, behavioral_economics, financial markets (Shleifer et al), emerging markets, economic history of 17thC 18thC 19thC re industrial revolution, crowding_out and public finance -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  political_history  finance_capital  capital_markets  capital_flows  sovereign_debt  17thC  18thC  British_history  Dutch  France  public_finance  taxes  interest_rates  institutional_economics  institutional_change  North-Weingast  constitutionalism  Absolutism  behavioral_economics  emerging_markets  international_finance  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
E. K. Hunt - The Normative Foundations of Social Theory: An Essay on the Criteria Defining Social Economics | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 63, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2005), pp. 423-445
Two views of human nature underlie economic theory and any theory incorporating either view is not social economics. The first view sees human nature as metaphysically or genetically given. This view has difficulty giving differences in the structure and functioning of different societies any importance. The other view asserts that humans are entirely "created" by society. In this view, humans are merely malleable "stuff" which a society molds into "building blocs" appropriate to that society. Hunt argues that social economics lies mid-way between these extremes. Humans are "molded" by the social system of which they are a part, but that socialization is never total because humans are not "malleable stuff." There is a human nature that sometimes resists and occasionally negates socialization. Human nature is a complex set of innate needs and potentialities. Socialization creates "wants" the satisfaction of which may contribute to the satisfaction of the underlying needs, and leads to activities that develop to a certain degree the underlying potentialities. It is the task of social economics to identify those needs and potentialities and to formulate a "vision" of the fully developed human being. Hunt concludes that neoclassical economic theory is not social economics while the theories of Veblen and Marx are social economics.
article  jstor  intellectual_history  economic_theory  social_theory  neoclassical_economics  human_nature  socialization  rational_choice  Marx  Veblen  institutional_economics  capacity_fulfillment  eudaimonia  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Michael Storper - Better Rules or Stronger Communities? On the Social Foundations of Institutional Change and Its Economic Effects | JSTOR: Economic Geography, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 1-25
Huge literature review -- didn't download -- Much of the literature on the impact of institutions on economic development has focused on the tradeoffs between society and community as mutually opposed forms of institutional coordination. On the one hand, sociologists, geographers, and some economists have stressed the positive economic externalities that are associated with the development of associational or group life. Most economists, in contrast, hold that the development of communities may be a second-best solution to the development of formal institutions or even have negative effects, such as the promotion of rent-seeking behavior and principal-agent problems. Societal institutions-such as clear, transparent rules and enforcement mechanisms-are held to be universally positive for development. But there are no real-world cases in which only one of the two exists; society and community are always and everywhere in interaction. This interaction, however, has attracted little attention. In this article, society and community are conceived of as complementary forms of organization whose relative balance and interaction shape the economic potential of every territory. Changes in the balance between community and society take place constantly and affect the medium- and long-run development prospects of every territory. The depth and the speed of change depend on a series of factors, such as starting points in the interaction of society and community, the sources and dynamics of change, and the conflict-solving capacities of the preexisting situation.
article  jstor  economic_history  social_history  social_theory  community  society  social_capital  economic_sociology  economic_growth  development  institution-building  rent-seeking  behavioral_economics  institutional_change  institutional_economics  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Ken Koford: Gould and Multilevel Evolution - JSTOR: Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Spring, 2005), pp. 313-316
Nice little editor's essay - links from Adam Smith to Darwin and to multilevel evolution to eg technology process (Mokyr) and New Institutional Economics (Williamson)
Gould and Multilevel Evolution
Ken Koford
Eastern Economic Journal
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Spring, 2005) (pp. 313-316)
Page Count: 4
intellectual_history  economic_theory  evolution-social  evolutionary_biology  Innovation  institutional_economics  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
David Sloan Wilson & John M. Gowdy - Evolution as a general theoretical framework for economics and public policy | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2013
1st lead article to special issue of same title -- downloaded pdf to Note -- Economic and evolutionary thinking have been entwined throughout their histories, but evolutionary theory does not function as a general theoretical framework for economics and public policy, as it does for the biological sciences. In this lead article for a special issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, we first describe how evolution functions as a general theoretical framework in the biological sciences. Then we consider four reasons why evolution might not need to be consulted for human-related subjects such as economics and public policy. We conclude that these reasons can be valid in particular cases, but they fail for any sizeable human-related subject area. Hence evolution can and should become a general theoretical framework for economics and public policy. The other articles in the special issue help to substantiate this claim.
paper  journal  economic_theory  economic_models  public_policy  social_theory  social_sciences  evolution-social  evolution-as-model  evo_psych  institutions  institutional_economics  organizations  evolutionary_biology  biocultural_evolution  downloaded  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
“Evolution as a General Theoretical Framework for Economics and Public Policy” - Special Issue | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | The Evolution Institute 2013
Special issue editors: David Sloan Wilson, John M. Gowdy, J. Barkley Rosser -- This supplementary issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is based on a collaborative project between the Evolution Institute and the National Evolutionary Synthesis Center that started in 2009 with a NESCent catalysis meeting titled “The Nature of Regulation: How Evolution Can Inform the Regulation of Large-scale Human Social Interactions”. The meeting led to a 2-year project on integrating economic and evolutionary theory. This project used NESCent’s working group rubric to organize three workshops, whose participants were drawn from a larger advisory group. Other outputs of the project include a white paper submitted to the National Science Foundation and a final workshop titled “The Science-to-Narrative Chain”, which examines how to create a new public narrative based on the evolutionary paradigm. Supplemental material can also be found at our online magazine: This View of Life http://www.thisviewoflife.com/
social_sciences  public_policy  economic_theory  evolution-social  evolution-as-model  evo_psych  institutions  institutional_economics  organizations 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Dirk Helbing & Alan Kirman - Rethinking economics using complexity theory | Real-World Economics Review Blog
Link to RWER paper - Downloaded pdf to Note - See comment to post attacking Complexity Theory that remains attached to a physical world metaphor rather than information flows (including faulty info) and varieties of reactions reflecting different sorts of individuals, institutions and their types of connections

Abstract - In this paper we argue that if we want to find a more satisfactory approach to tackling the major socio-economic problems we are facing, we need to thoroughly rethink the basic assumptions of macroeconomics and financial theory. Making minor modifications to the standard models to remove "imperfections" is not enough, the whole framework needs to be revisited. Let us here enumerate some of the standard assumptions and postulates of economic theory. [List of 7 standard assumptions]
economic_theory  economic_models  complexity  risk  information  institutions  institutional_economics  financial_system  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
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