dunnettreader + information-asymmetric   13

Olivier Blanchard & Michael Kremer - Disorganization - Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997)
Under central planning, many firms relied on a single supplier for critical inputs. Transition has led to decentralized bargaining between suppliers and buyers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, bargaining may inefficiently break down, and if chains of production link many specialized producers, output will decline sharply. Mechanisms that mitigate these problems in the West, such as reputation, can only play a limited role in transition. The empirical evidence suggests that output has fallen farthest for the goods with the most complex production process, and that disorganization has been more important in the former Soviet Union than in Central Europe. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
trust  Russia  information-asymmetric  20thC  privatization  industrialization  reputation  Eastern_Europe  risk_management  article  Central_Asia  economic_history  information-markets  transition_economies  supply_chains  manufacturing  downloaded  post-Cold_War 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Scott Aikin - Citizen Skeptic: Cicero’s Academic Republicanism (pages 275–285) | Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences July 2015
ABSTRACT: The skeptical challenge to politics is that if knowledge is in short supply and it is a condition for the proper use of political power, then there is very little just politics. Cicero’s Republicanism is posed as a program for political legitimacy wherein both citizens and their states are far from ideal. The result is a form of what is termed negative conservatism, which shows political gridlock in a more positive light. - Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. He works primarily in epistemology and ancient philosophy. He is the author of Epistemology and the Regress Problem (Routledge 2011) and Evidentialism and the Will to Believe (Bloomsbury 2014), and the co-author (with Robert B. Talisse) of Why We Argue (And How We Should) (Routledge, 2014), Reasonable Atheism (Prometheus Books, 2011), and Pragmatism: A Guide for the Perplexed (Continuum Books, 2008). - downloaded via iPhone to Dbox
ancient_Greece  information-asymmetric  public_choice  downloaded  intellectual_history  checks-and-balances  institutions  decision_theory  ancient_philosophy  scepticism-Academic  constitutionalism  ancient_Rome  article  republicanism  epistemology-social  political_philosophy  Roman_Republic  Cicero  political_culture 
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Stefan Linder, Nicolai J. Foss - Agency Theory :: SSRN April 23, 2013
Stefan Linder, ESSEC Business School -- Nicolai J. Foss, Copenhagen Business School - Department of Strategic Management and Globalization *--* Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from clear assumptions about rationality, contracting and informational conditions, the theory addresses problems of ex ante (“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information asymmetry (“hidden action”), and examines conditions under which various kinds of incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable criticism. -- PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: adverse selection, agency costs, compensation, conflict of interest, contracting, corporate governance, delegation, hidden action, hidden characteristics, incentive intensity, information asymmetry, informativeness, monitoring, moral hazard, motivation, nexus of contracts, pay-for-performance -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  microeconomics  microfoundations  behavioral_economics  incentives  incentives-distortions  agency  agents  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  information-asymmetric  adverse_selection  delegation  moral_psychology  moral_hazard  contracts  principal-agent  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Akerlof, G.A. and Shiller, R.J.: Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. (eBook and Hardcover)
Phishing for Phools therefore strikes a radically new direction in economics, based on the intuitive idea that markets both give and take away. Akerlof and Shiller bring this idea to life through dozens of stories that show how phishing affects everyone, in almost every walk of life. We spend our money up to the limit, and then worry about how to pay the next month’s bills. The financial system soars, then crashes. We are attracted, more than we know, by advertising. Our political system is distorted by money. We pay too much for gym memberships, cars, houses, and credit cards. Drug companies ingeniously market pharmaceuticals that do us little good, and sometimes are downright dangerous. Phishing for Phools explores the central role of manipulation and deception in fascinating detail in each of these areas and many more. It thereby explains a paradox: why, at a time when we are better off than ever before in history, all too many of us are leading lives of quiet desperation. At the same time, the book tells stories of individuals who have stood against economic trickery—and how it can be reduced through greater knowledge, reform, and regulation. -- Intro downloaded pdf to Note
financial_crisis  kindle-available  behavioral_economics  competition  downloaded  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  financial_system  pharma  accountability  books  politics-and-money  marketing  information-asymmetric  markets-dependence_on_government  disclosure  markets-failure  financial_innovation  financial_regulation 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman - Market Efficiency after the Financial Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs :: SSRN - European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 242/2014
Ronald J. Gilson, Stanford Law & Columbia Law; Reinier Kraakman, Harvard Law; both ECGI -- [Financial crisis is said] to have demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (“ECMH”). (..) the ECMH had moved beyond academia, fueling decades of a deregulatory agenda. (..) when economic theory moves from academics to policy, (..) inevitably refashioned to serve the goals of political argument. This happened starkly with the ECMH. It was subject to its own bubble – (..) expanded from a narrow but important academic theory about the informational underpinnings of market prices to a broad ideological preference for market outcomes over even measured regulation. (..) the ECMH addresses informational efficiency, which is a relative, not an absolute measure. This focus on informational efficiency leads to a more focused understanding of what went wrong in 2007-2008. Yet informational efficiency is related to fundamental efficiency (..) Properly framing market efficiency focuses our attention on the frictions that drive a wedge between relative efficiency and efficiency under perfect market conditions. (..) relative efficiency is a diagnostic tool that identifies the information costs and structural barriers that reduce price efficiency which, in turn, provides part of a realistic regulatory strategy. While it will not prevent future crises, improving the mechanisms of market efficiency will make prices more efficient, frictions more transparent, and the influence of politics on public agencies more observable, which may allow us to catch the next problem earlier. PDF File: 87 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  EMH  information-markets  information-asymmetric  efficiency  prices  financial_economics  animal_spirits  behavioral_economics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz -The mythic quest for early warnings — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
Reviews a number of stress indexes developed since the financial crisis -- most show a good way of indicating where we are at any one time, and several may be useful in crisis management for identifying institutions with liquidity vs insolvency problems, but none tell us where we're going **--** Where does this leave us? Our answer is that we have yet another reason to be skeptical of time-varying, discretionary regulatory policy. In an earlier post, we noted that the combination of high information requirements, long transmission lags and significant political resistance made it unlikely time-varying capital requirements will be effective in reducing financial vulnerabilities. Our conclusion then, which we reiterate now, is that the solution is to build a financial system that is safe and resilient all of the time, since we really never know what is coming. That means a regulatory system based on economic function, not legal form, with sufficient capital buffers to guard against all but the very worst possibilities. In the end, a financial system that relies on an early warning indicator of imminent financial collapse seems destined to fail. -- copied to Pocket
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_adequacy  capital_markets  NBFI  information-markets  information-asymmetric  risk  risk-systemic  risk_management  Great_Recession  global_governance  banking  bank_runs  liquidity  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance - May 19, 2011 | Strategic Management Journal, 35 (1): 1-23. :: SSRN
Beiting Cheng, Harvard University - Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School **--** In this paper, we investigate whether superior performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies leads to better access to finance. We hypothesize that better access to finance can be attributed to a) reduced agency costs due to enhanced stakeholder engagement and b) reduced informational asymmetry due to increased transparency. Using a large cross-section of firms, we find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital constraints. Moreover, we provide evidence that both of the hypothesized mechanisms, better stakeholder engagement and transparency around CSR performance, are important in reducing capital constraints. The results are further confirmed using several alternative measures of capital constraints, a paired analysis based on a ratings shock to CSR performance, an instrumental variables and also a simultaneous equations approach. Finally, we show that the relation is driven by both the social and the environmental dimension of CSR. -- Pages in PDF File: 43 -- Keywords: corporate social responsibility, sustainability, capital constraints, ESG (environmental, social, governance) performance -- didn't download
article  SSRN  business_practices  business-norms  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  CSR  environment  sustainability  accounting  accountability  firms-theory  firms-structure  information-asymmetric  disclosure  finance-cost 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » The accidental controversialist: deeper reflections on Thomas Piketty’s “Capital” - April 2014
Using a conventional marginal productivity framework, Piketty provides an explanation of rising inequality based on increases in the gap between the marginal product of capital, which determines the rate of profit (r), and the rate of growth (g). Because capital ownership is so concentrated, a higher profit rate or slower growth rate increases inequality as the incomes of the wealthy grow faster than the overall economy. The conventional character of Piketty’s theoretical thinking rears its head in his policy prescriptions. -- Mainstream economists will assert the conventional story about the profit rate being technologically determined. However, as Piketty occasionally hints, in reality the profit rate is politically and socially determined by factors influencing the distribution of economic and political power. Growth is also influenced by policy and institutional choices. That is the place to push the argument....My prediction is “r minus g” arithmetic will make its way into the curriculum, with the profit rate explained as the marginal product of capital; Chicago School economists will counter the economy has mechanisms limiting prolonged wide divergence of r and g; and Harvard and MIT graduate students will have opportunities to do market failure research arguing the opposite. The net result is economics will be left essentially unchanged and even more difficult to change.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  productivity  capital  labor  technology  inequality  wealth  political_economy  profit  capitalism  institutional_economics  laisser-faire  information-asymmetric  competition  education-higher  economic_culture  sociology_of_knowledge  heterodox_economics  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Bradley Rosser - EconoSpeak: Will Future Fed Policy Be Driven By Behavioral Macroeconomics? - Feb 2014
Re Akerlof identifying himself as a behavioral macroeconomist and Yellen's work with him, the 2% inflation target was from their joint influence 2 decades ago -- Finally, in his presidential address he arguably became more openly behavioral with his emphasis on the role of norms, something that Yellen clearly agreed with him on in some of their joint work on labor markets. He argued that this "missing motivation" underlay why five supposed "neutralities" of macroeconomics do not hold in reality. These are the independence of consumption from current income, the independence of investment from fiancial decisions, that inflation stability can only hold at the natural rate of unemployment, that macro policy is ineffective due to rational expectations, and Ricardian equivalence. Now, several of these were pushed to the side already by the NK DSGE modelers, but some others have continued to be used in such models, with the now-under-attack Euler equation that underlies the first point being an example. My guess is that by now most of those participating in FOMC meetings have already absorbed that these five neutralities do not hold, even if they do not do so by reasoning from people following norms as Akerlof argues and Yellen may argue.
macroeconomics  economic_theory  economic_models  behavioral_economics  Fed  monetary_policy  information-asymmetric  Labor_markets  wages  inflation  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Contents | Yi-Cheng Zhang - The Structure of Information Economy [book chapter drafts]
TOC and links to chapter drafts. Zhang is at Fribourg, a physicist who uses Soros reflexivity insights as part of top level Darwinian inflected theory of NESS - non-equilibrium social sciences.
books  philosophy_of_social_science  economic_theory  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  Soros  reflexivity  information-markets  information-asymmetric  cognition  cognition-social  fallibility  Innovation  marketing  networks-social  supply_chains  equilibrium  networks-information  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Yi-Cheng Zhang :: Broader scopes of the reflexivity principle in the economy - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 -Taylor & Francis Online
pages 446-453 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The reflexivity principle of George Soros – that man's fallible understanding can have reflexivity impacts that shape reality – challenges mainstream economics in a fundamental way. This essay will outline a research program that corroborates the reflexivity principle and extends it to broader economic issues. We shall often use examples of consumer and finance markets, but the implications go beyond these examples. The following eight sections build up our main thesis that reflexivity plays an essential role in understanding the economy. -- see bookmark for his draft book on information economy (Oxford 2014 or 2015) and the project he leads on NESS non-equilibrium social sciences
article  philosophy_of_social_science  economic_theory  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  Soros  reflexivity  information-markets  information-asymmetric  cognition  cognition-social  fallibility  Innovation  marketing  networks-social  supply_chains  equilibrium  networks-information  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader

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