dunnettreader + incentives   39

Dewatripont, M. and Rochet, J., Tirole, J. - Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis (orig 2010) - Princeton University Press
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, Balancing the Banks draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future.

While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an adaptive prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints.

Offering a global perspective, Balancing the Banks should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.
Downloaded Chapters 1 & 2 to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  capital_markets  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  liquidity  risk_management  incentives-distortions  incentives  international_finance  global_governance  regulatory_arbitrage  regulatory_avoidance  regulation-costs  regulation-enforcement  regulation-harmonization  regulation 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Ronnie O'Sullivan & the limits of incentives
Ronnie O’Sullivan yesterday gave us a nice example of the limitations of basic economics. He turned down the chance to go for a 147 break because the £10,000…
Instapaper  incentives  incentives-distortions  executive_compensation  game_theory  microeconomics  from instapaper
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Edward Kane - Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks | INET (Dec 2015)
This paper applies Schein’s model of organizational culture to financial firms and their prudential regulators. It identifies a series of hard-to-change cultural norms and assumptions that support go-for-broke risk-taking by megabanks that meets the every-day definition of theft. The problem is not to find new ways to constrain this behavior, but to change the norms that support it by establishing that managers of megabanks owe duties of loyalty, competence, and care directly to taxpayers. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  norms-business  incentives  incentives-distortions  banking  organizations  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Barry Allen - Another New Nietzsche - review of Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness | JSTOR - History and Theory (2003)
Another New Nietzsche
Reviewed Work: Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy by Bernard Williams
Review by: Barry Allen
History and Theory
Vol. 42, No. 3 (Oct., 2003), pp. 363-377
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
incentives  perspectivism  Williams_Bernard  pragmatism  reviews  norms  downloaded  books  Nietzsche  punishment  sub_species_aeternis  genealogy-method  epistemology-social  kindle  Rorty  morality-conventional  biocultural_evolution  certainty  epistemology  moral_philosophy  relativism  truth 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Stefan Linder, Nicolai J. Foss - Agency Theory :: SSRN April 23, 2013
Stefan Linder, ESSEC Business School -- Nicolai J. Foss, Copenhagen Business School - Department of Strategic Management and Globalization *--* Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from clear assumptions about rationality, contracting and informational conditions, the theory addresses problems of ex ante (“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information asymmetry (“hidden action”), and examines conditions under which various kinds of incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable criticism. -- PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: adverse selection, agency costs, compensation, conflict of interest, contracting, corporate governance, delegation, hidden action, hidden characteristics, incentive intensity, information asymmetry, informativeness, monitoring, moral hazard, motivation, nexus of contracts, pay-for-performance -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  microeconomics  microfoundations  behavioral_economics  incentives  incentives-distortions  agency  agents  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  information-asymmetric  adverse_selection  delegation  moral_psychology  moral_hazard  contracts  principal-agent  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Is the Glass Half Empty Or Half Full? : Issues in Managing Water Challenges and Policy Instruments | IMF Staff Discussion Notes No. 15/11, June 08, 2015
Author/Editor: Kalpana Kochhar ; Catherine A. Pattillo ; Yan Sun ; Nujin Suphaphiphat ; Andrew Swiston ; Robert Tchaidze ; Benedict J. Clements ; Stefania Fabrizio ; Valentina Flamini ; Laure Redifer ; Harald Finger -- Summary: This paper examines water challenges, a growing global concern with adverse economic and social consequences, and discusses economic policy instruments. Water subsidies provided through public utilities are estimated at about $456 billion or 0.6 percent of global GDP in 2012. The paper suggests that getting economic incentives right, notably by reforming water pricing, can go a long way towards encouraging more efficient water use and supporting needed investment, while enabling policies that protect the poor. It also discusses pricing reform options and emphasizes an integrated and holistic approach to manage water, going beyond the water sector itself. The IMF can play a helpful role in ensuring that macroeconomic policies are conducive to sound water management. -- Subject(s): Water resources | Economic policy | Subsidies | Water supply | Supply and demand | Policy instruments | Fund role -- paper summary in F&D issue, June 2015 (downloaded to Note) -- didn't download Staff Discussion Note
paper  IMF  water  development  LDCs  emerging_markets  aid  public_finance  economic_policy  economic_reform  economic_sociology  subsidies  sustainability  poverty  access_to_services  utilities  incentives  incentives-distortions  investment  infrastructure  public-private_partnerships  public_goods  downloaded  Aiviq 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Elizabeth Popp Berman - Creating the Market University: How Academic Science Became an Economic Engine | Princeton University Press - 2012, ebook 2015
US universities today serve as economic engines, performing the scientific research that will create new industries, drive economic growth, and keep the US globally competitive. But only a few decades ago, these same universities self-consciously held themselves apart from the world of commerce. Drawing on extensive historical research, EPB shows how the government--influenced by the argument that innovation drives the economy--brought about this transformation. Americans have a long tradition of making heroes out of their inventors. But before the 1960s and '70s neither policymakers nor economists paid much attention to the critical economic role played by innovation. However, during the late 1970s, a confluence of events--industry concern with the perceived deterioration of innovation in the US, a growing body of economic research on innovation's importance, and the stagnation of the larger economy--led to a broad political interest in fostering invention. The policy decisions shaped by this change were diverse, influencing arenas from patents and taxes to pensions and science policy, and encouraged practices that would focus specifically on the economic value of academic science. By the early 1980s, universities were nurturing the rapid growth of areas such as biotech entrepreneurship, patenting, and university-industry research centers. -- She is assistant professor of sociology at the SUNY-Albany. -- downloaded excerpt to Note
books  kindle-available  intellectual_history  economic_history  20thC  21stC  post-WWII  post-Cold_War  US_politics  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  university  research  research-funding  Innovation  innovation-government_policy  R&D  science-and-politics  urban_development  economic_growth  IP  incentives  incentives-distortions  public-private_partnerships  public_goods  market_fundamentalism  public_policy  -priorities  risk_capital  local_government  state_government  state-and-science  education-finance  academia-governance  managerialism  technology  technology-history  commercialization  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Beaudry, Dana Galizia, Franck Portier - The market economy’s stability | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 04 July 2015
Whereas some view the macroeconomy as overall stable and on a smooth long-run growth path, others argue it is unstable with repeated periods of booms and busts. This column suggests that the market economy is inherently unstable and booms and busts arise endogenously as the results of market incentives. Monetary policy is then perhaps not the right tool for addressing macroeconomic fluctuations. Instead, policies aimed at changing the incentives would be more appropriate.
macroeconomics  economic_models  economic_theory  business_cycles  monetary_policy  incentives  macroprudential_policies  non-linear_models  stability  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Anne Beatty, Scott Liao - Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Review of the Empirical Literature:: SSRN October 23, 2013
Anne Beatty, Ohio State - Dept of Accounting & Management Information Systems; Scott Liao, U of Toronto, Rotman School of Management -- Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2346752 -- We survey research on financial accounting in the banking industry. After providing a brief background of the micro-economic theories of the economic role of banks, why bank capital is regulated, and how the accounting regime affects banks’ economic decisions, we review three streams of empirical research. Specifically we focus on research examining the relation between bank financial reporting and the valuation and risk assessments of outside equity and debt, the relation between bank financial reporting discretion, regulatory capital and earnings management, and banks’ economic decisions under differing accounting regimes. We provide our views about what we have learned from this research and about what else we would like to know. We also provide some empirical analyses of the various models that have been used to estimate discretion in the loan loss provision. We further discuss the inherent challenges associated with predicting how bank behavior will respond under alternative accounting and regulatory capital regimes.-- PDF File: 121 -- Keywords: financial accounting; bank regulatory capital; information asymmetry -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  banking  disclosure  accounting  capital_adequacy  asset_prices  risk  investors  leverage  incentives  incentives-distortions  balance_sheet  Basle 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Edward B. Rock - Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance (Jan 2015) :: SSRN - Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and Governance, 2015, Forthcoming
Penn Law School -- chapter examines the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and the role of regulation in encouraging institutional investors to become active stewards. (..) what lessons we can draw from the US experience for the EU’s 2014 proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive.(...) survey how institutional investors themselves are governed and how they organize share voting. (...) 2 central questions: (a) why, over the last 25 years, have institutional investors not fulfilled the optimists’ hopes?; and (b) can the core incentive problems that subvert Institutional Investor activism be cured by regulation? The US experience [substantial deregulation led to only modest increases in shareholder activism], suggests (..) institutional investors’ relative passivity is a fundamental lack of incentives. I examine the disappointing results of the SEC’s long experiment with incentivizing mutual funds to vote their shares (...) the EU efforts are likely to be similarly disappointing. I then examine the important role that hedge funds now play in catalyzing institutional shareholders, and consider some of the risks in relying on such highly incentivized actors. -- PDF File: 26 -- saved to briefcase
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  financial_economics  financial_regulation  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_finance  capital_markets  corporate_control_markets  institutional_investors  shareholders  shareholder_voting  mutual_funds  incentives  activist_investors  investors  hedge_funds  proxies  comparative_law  administrative_law  EU-law  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  fiduciaries  profit_maximization  EU-regulation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Hoffman, P.T.: Why Did Europe Conquer the World? (eBook and Hardcover).
Between 1492 and 1914, Europeans conquered 84% of the globe. But why did Europe rise to the top, when for centuries the Chinese, Japanese, Ottomans, and South Asians were far more advanced? Why didn’t these powers establish global dominance? ...distinguished economic historian Hoffman demonstrates that conventional explanations— eg geography, epidemic disease, and the Industrial Revolution—fail to provide answers. Arguing instead for the pivotal role of economic and political history, Hoffman shows that if variables had been at all different, Europe would not have achieved critical military innovations, and another power could have become master of the world. In vivid detail, he sheds light on the two millennia of economic, political, and historical changes that set European states on a distinctive path of development and military rivalry. Compared to their counterparts in China, Japan, South Asia, and the Middle East, European leaders—whether chiefs, lords, kings, emperors, or prime ministers—had radically different incentives, which drove them to make war. These incentives, which Hoffman explores using an economic model of political costs and financial resources, resulted in astonishingly rapid growth in Europe’s military sector from the Middle Ages on, and produced an insurmountable lead in gunpowder technology. The consequences determined which states established colonial empires or ran the slave trade, and even which economies were the first to industrialize. -- Professor of Business Economics and professor of history at CalTech. His books include Growth in a Traditional Society (PUP), Surviving Large Losses, and Priceless Markets. -- ebook and pbk not yet released --text 200 pgs, data, mideks in appendices ~35 pgs -- downloaded 1st chapter excerpt
books  kindle-available  Great_Divergence  economic_history  political_history  political_culture  military_history  technology  gunpowder  colonialism  imperialism  Europe  Europe-exceptionalism  Europe-Medieval  Europe-Early_Modern  incentives  wars-causes  war  Innovation  technology-adoption  historical_sociology  historical_change  balance_of_power  path-dependency  Tilly  Mann_Michael  state-building  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew W. Lo - The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry | NBER June 2015
NBER Working Paper No. 21267 -- Culture is a potent force in shaping individual and group behavior, yet it has received scant attention in the context of financial risk management and the recent financial crisis. I present a brief overview of the role of culture according to psychologists, sociologists, and economists, and then present a specific framework for analyzing culture in the context of financial practices and institutions in which three questions are answered: (1) What is culture?; (2) Does it matter?; and (3) Can it be changed? I illustrate the utility of this framework by applying it to five concrete situations—Long Term Capital Management; AIG Financial Products; Lehman Brothers and Repo 105; Société Générale’s rogue trader; and the SEC and the Madoff Ponzi scheme—and conclude with a proposal to change culture via “behavioral risk management.” -- check SSRN
paper  paywall  SSRN  financial_instiutions  business_practices  business-norms  risk_management  economic_culture  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  incentives  incentives-distortions  social_psychology  economic_sociology  firms-structure  firms-organization 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
George Serafeim - The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future Research b(revised June 2014) :: SSRN
Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this alternative view better fits actual corporate conduct, I discuss opportunities for future research. Specifically, I call for research on the materiality of environmental and social issues for the future financial performance of corporations, the design of incentive and control systems to guide strategy execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm. -- Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: corporate performance, corporate size, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  global_economy  global_governance  international_political_economy  shareholder_value  shareholders  CSR  disclosure  accountability  accounting  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  incentives  institutional_change  long-term_orientation  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_practices  business_influence  sustainability  MNCs  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  power  power-concentration  concentration-industry  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance - November 23, 2011 :: SSRN - Management Science, Forthcoming
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* We investigate the effect of a corporate culture of sustainability on multiple facets of corporate behavior and performance outcomes. Using a matched sample of 180 companies, we find that corporations that voluntarily adopted environmental and social policies many years ago – termed as High Sustainability companies – exhibit fundamentally different characteristics from a matched sample of firms that adopted almost none of these policies – termed as Low Sustainability companies. In particular, we find that the boards of directors of these companies are more likely to be responsible for sustainability and top executive incentives are more likely to be a function of sustainability metrics. Moreover, they are more likely to have organized procedures for stakeholder engagement, to be more long-term oriented, and to exhibit more measurement and disclosure of nonfinancial information. Finally, we provide evidence that High Sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance. The outperformance is stronger in sectors where the customers are individual consumers instead of companies, companies compete on the basis of brands and reputations, and products significantly depend upon extracting large amounts of natural resources. -- Keywords: sustainability, corporate social responsibility, culture, governance, disclosure, performance -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_finance  CSR  brands  reputation  incentives  sustainability  long-term_orientation  natural_resources  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  executive_compensation  business-norms  profit  disclosure 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Janet L. Yellen, “Behavioral Economics and Economic Policy in the Past and Future” (September 2007 speech) - President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco
Panel on: “Behavioral Economics and Economic Policy in the Past and Future”
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference: “Implications of Behavioral Economics for Economic Policy”, Boston, Massachusetts, September 28, 2007 -- linked to as good literature overview for behavioral_economics and its uses -- downloaded pdf to Note
speech  Yellen  Fed  central_banks  monetary_policy  fiscal_policy  economic_policy  behavioral_economics  economic_theory  economic_sociology  macroeconomics  microfoundations  incentives  incentives-distortions  lit_survey  bibliography  downloaded 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Chuck Marr and Chye-Ching Huang - Obama’s Capital Gains Tax Proposals Would Make Tax Code More Efficient and Fair | Center on Budget and Policy Priorities -Jan 2015
The tax code strongly favors income from capital gains — increases in the value of assets, such as stocks — over income from wages and salaries. These preferences are economically inefficient: they promote tax schemes that convert ordinary income into capital gains and encourage people to hold assets just to escape tax, even if they have better investment opportunities. They are also highly regressive, since capital gains are heavily concentrated at the top of the income scale. The President has proposed to make the tax code more efficient and equitable by reducing one of the biggest subsidies for capital gains (a preferential rate compared to wage and salary income) and largely eliminating another (the ability to avoid capital gains tax completely by holding on to an asset until death). These changes would allow investments to flow to where they are most productive and reduce investment in creating tax avoidance schemes instead of in real economic activity, among other economic benefits. And, because the benefits of the current preferences for capital gains flow overwhelmingly to the top, fully 99 percent of the revenue from the President’s capital gains proposals would come from the top 1 percent of filers, the Treasury Department estimates. -- 7 page report downloaded as pdf to Note
US_economy  US_politics  Obama_administration  taxes  tax_policy  tax_reform  capital  investment  1-percent  inheritance  tax_collection  public_finance  public_policy  trickle-down  incentives  incentives-distortions  distribution-wealth  distribution-income  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Filip Palda, A school in decline: In Chicago, economists honour Gary Becker | Financial Post | November 4, 2014
Too bad. Becker was far superior to his promoters and acolytes - same with Coase. An embarrassingly feeble celebration of the Becker-Friedman-Stigler counter-revolution of outsider genius rebels against "Keynesian hegemony" beginning in the 1950s. The take-away seems to have been that markets are efficient when left alone and that government programs will inevitably be defeated by either regulatory capture or clever, rational, forward-looking agents that will game the system to produce an unintended (often perverse) outcome. Ironically, the only big example chosen to illustrate how Becker's forays into other social sciences flummoxed left-wing by overturning their cherished worldview looks increasingly flimsy - treating criminals as rational calculating economic agents rather than victims of assorted "pathologies." The microeconomist "knows" that the key to behavioral change is to just get the incentives and prices right through adjusting levels and types of punishment or type and amount of policing. Unfortunately for this example of economic imperialism, It's now clear that the enormous increase in crime rates over decades, followed by an equally enormous decline, shows that macro effects of some, yet to be agreed upon, social factors simply swamped any of the micro concerns of Becker's rational calculating agents. That's not to suggest microfoundations were irrelevant, but it increasingly appears that individual behavior was affected by factors of precisely the opposite sort from those that would be involved in rational utility calculations - the environmental poisoning of children's neurological systems, especially in the segregated urban-industrial ghettos into which the black population was forced to live, that reduced the capacity for self-control and rational calculation, and increased impulsive, indeed irrational, aggressive behavior, too often violent crime. And as the amount of poisoning has declined, so too has irrational, impulsive violence. But despite the accumulating evidence of macro factors, we can expect for decades to come that micro textbooks and right-wing economists will be reciting the "lessons" Becker's approach has "taught" for designing social policy. Just as they "know" voluntary unemployment doesn't exist - only that the government must be interfering with the prices and market incentives. Pthew!
20thC  intellectual_history  economic_theory  social_theory  behavioral_economics  microeconomics  microfoundations  incentives  prices  markets_in_everything  crime  criminal_justice  Chicago_School 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Inequality & productivity | Stumbling & Mumbling - Dec 2014
Responding to a snarky tweet from a consetvative re "puff pieces" on inequality which he claims fails to explain why ee should care re economic growth & productivity, Dillow lists a number of mechanisms that might link inequality to polrer macroecinomic performance, with lots of links -- Now, these mechanisms - many of which are discussed more expertly in Sam Bowles' The New Economics of Inequality and Redistribution - will vary in strength from time to time and place to place. (..) But there's one big fact which hints that they might be significant. Productivity growth has been much lower recently than it was in the 80s. This should be puzzling to people like Ryan, because for years they've told us that Thatcherite reforms in the 80s should have boosted productivity growth. So why has it fallen? Might it be that the benefits of those reforms have been offset by the fact that the increased proportion of income going to the 1% depressed productivity through the above mechanisms?
political_economy  economic_growth  onequality  productivity  labor  firm-theory  incentives  neoliberalism  links  books 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
theAIRnet.org - Home
The Academic-Industry Research Network – theAIRnet – is a private, 501(c)(3) not-for-profit research organization devoted to the proposition that a sound understanding of the dynamics of industrial development requires collaboration between academic scholars and industry experts. We engage in up-to-date, in-depth, and incisive research and commentary on issues related to industrial innovation and economic development. Our goal is to understand the ways in which, through innovation, businesses and governments can contribute to equitable and stable economic growth – or what we call “sustainable prosperity”.
website  economic_growth  industry  technology  Innovation  green_economy  development  business  business-and-politics  capitalism  global_economy  public-private_partnerships  public_policy  public_health  public_goods  urban_development  health_care  IP  Labor_markets  wages  unemployment  education-training  sustainability  financial_system  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  CSR  firms-theory  management  plutocracy  MNCs  international_political_economy  human_capital  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  supply_chains  R&D  common_good  1-percent  inequality  working_class  work-life_balance  workforce  regulation  regulation-harmonization  incentives  stagnation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Report: Zoning for Sea-Level Rise | Georgetown Climate Center - December 13, 2012
To help local communities address the increased flooding expected from sea-level rise and more frequent extreme weather events, the Georgetown Climate Center designed a model sea-level rise ordinance to provide local governments with a template for tailoring regulations to meet the needs of their community and its particularized vulnerabilities. To effectively balance all the competing interests in coastal resources in the face of climate threats, local governments will need flexible and robust land-use regulations. Zoning is the most powerful tool that local governments have to preemptively mitigate hazards. Through planning and zoning, local governments can determine what is at risk, what is safe to build, and where it is safe to build. By analyzing vulnerabilities and planning for impacts, local governments can shape landowner expectations and build political support for adaptive measures. Through regulations, local governments can ensure that fewer people and structures are in harm’s way when impacts occur, and that developers site and construct new structures to be more resilient to flooding and other impacts. Below is a link to the executive summary describing this work. -- didn't download
local_government  land_use_planning  property  property-confiscations  property_rights  climate  climate-adaptation  political_economy  regulation  regulation-environment  incentives  ocean  water  coastal_development 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Adaptation Tool Kit: Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Land Use | Georgetown Climate Center
The Adaptation Tool Kit explores 18 different land-use tools that can be used to preemptively respond to the threats posed by sea-level rise to both public and private coastal development and infrastructure, and strives to assist governments in determining which tools to employ to meet their unique socio-economic and political contexts. To this end, the tool kit also provides policymakers with a framework for decision making. Each tool is analyzed by (1) the type of power exercised to implement it (planning, regulatory, spending, or tax and market-based tools); (2) the policy objective that it facilitates (protection, accommodation, planned retreat, or preservation); and (3) the type of existing or potential land uses that the tool can be used to adapt (critical infrastructure, existing development, developable lands, and non-developable lands). A top level analysis of the trade-offs between tools—the economic, environmental, and social costs and benefits, and the legal and administrative feasibility of implementing each tool—is also provided. -- didn't download
local_government  land_use_planning  infrastructure  climate  ocean  coastal_development  regulation-environment  incentives  property_rights  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  law-and-economics  law-and-environment  environment  risk-mitigation  climate-adaptation  technical_assistance  political_economy 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
the UNEP Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System | UNEP - Green Economy Initiative
C About

Mobilizing the world’s capital is essential for the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon economy. Today, however, too little capital is supporting the transition, and too much continues to be invested in a high-carbon and resource-intensive, polluting economy. Market participants and others recognize that prevailing rules and incentives governing financial markets can disadvantage long-term, sustainable behavior. Long-term environmental risks are not being effectively counted and green opportunities are inadequately valued. Such distortions can lead to a misallocation of capital and a danger of systemic risks to the economy and the natural environment. The UNEP Inquiry is intended to support such actions by identifying best practice, and exploring financial market policy and regulatory innovations that would support the development of a green financial system. Building on the twin pillars of UNEP’s strong track record through its Green Economy initiative and the UNEP-Finance Initiative, it will assemble the world`s best practice and forward-looking expert knowledge through an advisory council, practitioner dialogue and research. The Inquiry will produce a final options report as well as technical papers throughout its 18-24 month life from January 2014. The Inquiry`s current set up phase will ensure it is designed with guidance from practitioners and experts, and establish a network of world-class advisors and researchers. Engaging with existing initiatives will ensure that it can effectively convene and catalyze broad debate that supports the crystallization of options for advancing a more systematic approach to developing a green financial system. -- summary downloaded pdf to Note
UN  UNEP  green_economy  green_finance  financial_system  international_political_economy  global_governance  financial_regulation  financial_sector_development  financial_innovation  banking  capital_markets  incentives  investment  investors  corporate_finance  public_finance  sustainability  civil_society  risk  insurance  intermediation  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich - 3-part WaPo Investigation: "Stop and Seize on America's highways" | The Washington Post September 2014
Part 1: In recent years, thousands of people have had cash confiscated by police without being charged with crimes. -- Part 2: One training firm started a private intelligence-sharing network and helped shape law enforcement nationwide. -- Part 3: Motorists caught up in the seizures talk about the experience and the legal battles that sometimes took more than a year. **--** After the terror attacks on 9/11, the government called on police to become the eyes and ears of homeland security on America’s highways. Local officers, county deputies and state troopers were encouraged to act more aggressively in searching for suspicious people, drugs and other contraband. Dept Homeland Security and DOJ spent millions on police training. The effort succeeded, but it had an impact that has been largely hidden from public view: the spread of an aggressive brand of policing that has spurred the seizure of $100s millions in cash from motorists and others not charged with crimes. Thousands of people have been forced to fight legal battles to get their money back. Behind the rise in seizures is a cottage industry of private police-training firms that teach the techniques of “highway interdiction” to departments across the country. One firm created a private intelligence network that enabled police nationwide to share detailed reports about motorists — criminals and the innocent alike — including their Social Security numbers, addresses and identifying tattoos, as well as hunches about which drivers to stop. Many of the reports have been funneled to federal agencies and fusion centers as part of the government’s burgeoning law enforcement intelligence systems — despite warnings from state and federal authorities that the information could violate privacy and constitutional protections. A thriving subculture of road officers on the network now competes to see who can seize the most cash and contraband, describing their exploits in the network’s chat rooms and sharing “trophy shots” of money and drugs. Some police advocate highway interdiction as a way of raising revenue for cash-strapped municipalities.
US_society  US_constitution  US_foreign_policy  US_legal_system  US_politics-race  national_security  judiciary  local_government  state_government  government_finance  police  privacy  networks-information  power-asymmetric  abuse_of_power  public-private_partnerships  crime  criminal_justice  civil_liberties  terrorism  due_process  property-confiscations  intelligence_agencies  militarization-society  incentives  civil_society  governmentality  government_officials  authoritarian  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Forum - “Deirdre McCloskey and Economists’ Ideas about Ideas” (July, 2014) - Online Library of Liberty
Deirdre McClosky is over the halfway point of her 4 volume work on The Bourgeois Era. Two volumes have already appeared, Bourgeois Virtues (2006) and Bourgeois Dignity (2010), and a third is close to appearing [2015]. This Liberty Matters online discussion will assess her progress to date with a Lead Essay by Don Boudreaux and comments by Joel Mokyr and John Nye, and replies to her critics by Deirdre McCloskey. The key issue is to try to explain why “the Great Enrichment” of the past 150 years occurred in northern and western Europe rather than elsewhere, and why sometime in the middle of the 18th century. Other theories have attributed it to the presence of natural resources, the existence of private property and the rule of law, and the right legal and political institutions. McCloskey’s thesis is that a fundamental change in ideas took place which raised the “dignity” of economic activity in the eyes of people to the point where they felt no inhibition in pursuing these activities which improved the situation of both themselves and the customers who bought their products and services.
intellectual_history  cultural_history  economic_history  economic_growth  Medieval  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  Great_Divergence  British_history  Scientific_Revolution  Enlightenment  Scottish_Enlightenment  Industrial_Revolution  bourgeoisie  political_economy  France  Germany  Prussia  China  development  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  legal_history  property  property_rights  commerce  trade  trading_companies  free_trade  improvement  technology  Innovation  agriculture  energy  natural_capital  nature-mastery  transport  capitalism  colonialism  industry  industrialization  social_order  Great_Chain_of_Being  consumers  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  equality  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism  incentives  microeconomics  historical_sociology  historical_change  social_theory  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan D Ostry, Andrew Berg, Charalambos Tsangarides (IMF) - Redistribution, inequality, and sustainable growth | vox , 6 March 2014
New IMF study - Inequality has the potential to undermine growth. However, greater redistribution requires higher tax rates, which reduce incentives to work and save. Moreover, the evidence that inequality is bad for growth might simply reflect the fact that more unequal societies choose to redistribute more, and those efforts are antithetical to growth. This column presents evidence from a new dataset on pre- and post-tax inequality. The authors find that income equality is protective of growth, and that redistributive transfers on average have little if any direct adverse impact on growth.
paper  IMF  economic_history  economic_growth  inequality  redistribution  taxes  incentives  econometrics  economic_sociology  economic_reform  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Stumbling and Mumbling: Hayek on desert - Jan 2005
Elizabeth Anderson does a fine job of demolishing, on Hayekian grounds, the idea that people deserve their incomes. And Tyler Cowen gives an excellent reply. The one thing that’s missing are some direct quotes from Hayek himself. Let me fill the gaps. There’s this from volume II of Law, Legislation and Liberty (p71-72 in my copy): " [The function of the price system] is not so much to reward people for what they have done as to tell them what in their own as well as in general interest they ought to do. …To hold out a sufficient incentive for those movements which are required to maintain a market order, it will often be necessary that the return to people’s efforts do not correspond to recognizable merit…In a spontaneous order the question of whether or not someone has done the ‘right’ thing cannot always be a matter of merit." -- lots of quotes and links
political_philosophy  economic_theory  markets  prices  incentives  meritocracy  fairness  libertarianism  Hayek  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Radek Stefanski - Inferred fossil-fuel subsidies: A new database | vox , 30 May 2014
Dirty little secrets: Inferring fossil-fuel subsidies from patterns in emission intensities -- No comprehensive database of directly measured fossil-fuel subsidies exists at the international or the sub-national level, yet subsidies may be crucial drivers of global carbon emissions. This column describes a novel method for inferring carbon subsidies by examining country-specific patterns in carbon emission-to-output ratios, known as emission intensities. Calculations for 155 nations from 1980-2005 reveal that fossil-fuel price distortions are enormous, increasing, and often hidden. These subsidies contributed importantly to increasing emissions and lower growth.-- Finally, subsidy-like wedges are expensive. Besides massively increasing carbon emissions, the total cost of fossil-fuel wedges amounted to a staggering 3.8% of global GDP in 2010 alone. To put this into the starkest possible perspective, the 2014 IPCC report estimates that climate change will lower global GDP by at most 2% per year in 50 years. By this measure, subsidy-like wedges on fossil fuels are nearly twice as damaging as climate change itself. Worryingly, these wedges are increasing over time. Whilst not all distortions can be eliminated, removing even some of these can help strained government budgets, make a significant (and cheap) contribution to the fight against climate change, and result in higher levels of global GDP.
economic_growth  climate  energy  industrialization  subsidies  government_finance  incentives 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Krista Bondy - The Paradox of Power in CSR: A Case Study on Implementation | JSTOR: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Oct., 2008), pp. 307-323
Although current literature assumes positive outcomes for stakeholders resulting from an increase in power associated with CSR, this research suggests that this increase can lead to conflict within organizations, resulting in almost complete inactivity on CSR. **Methods** A Single in-depth case study, focusing on power as an embedded concept. **Results** Empirical evidence is used to demonstrate how some actors use CSR to improve their own positions within an organization. Resource dependence theory is used to highlight why this may be a more significant concern for CSR. **Conclusions** Increasing power for CSR has the potential to offer actors associated with it increased personal power, and thus can attract opportunistic actors with little interest in realizing the benefits of CSR for the company and its stakeholders. Thus power can be an impediment to furthering CSR strategy and activities at the individual and organizational level.
article  jstor  CSR  incentives  organizations  busisness-ethics  firms-theory  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
interfluidity » “Incentives to produce” are incentives to rig the game - March 2014
Steve Randy Waldman - Suppose, reasonably I think, that ceteris paribus humans prefer to “be good”. That is, we prefer to do work that is productive and engage in behavior that is ethical. Suppose, also reasonably, that a well ordered society depends upon people sometimes making choices opposed to their material interests on ethical or other grounds. Then it is obvious how inequality might be costly. Instead of talking about “incentives to” (produce, extract rents, whatever), we might describe outcome dispersion as a tax on refraining from mercenary behavior. If the difference between economic winners and losers is modest, people of ordinary virtue might refrain from participating in activities they consider corrupt, might even be willing to “blow the whistle”, because the cost of doing so is outweighed by their preference for behaving well. But as outcome dispersion grows, absenting oneself from or even opposing activities that would be personally remunerative but socially undesirable becomes too costly. The required sacrifice eventually overcomes a ceteris paribus preference for virtue. Preventing the misbehavior of large coalitions is a collective action problem. An isolated malcontent or whistleblower is likely to be evicted from the coalition without meaningfully improving behavior, if others choose to “circle the wagon”. Outcome dispersion both increases the costs to individuals of engaging in pro-social behavior, and diminishes the likelihood that bearing those costs will be fruitful, since others will have strong incentives not to follow.
political_economy  international_political_economy  finance_capital  inequality  civic_virtue  rent-seeking  monopolies  intellectual_property  health_care  migration  competition  plutocracy  incentives  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Joseph Henrich - A cultural species: How culture drove human evolution | Science Brief - Am Psychological Assoc Nov 2011
Recognizing the centrality of culture in human life leads to a novel evolutionary theory of status and status psychology. Evolutionary researchers have tended to assume that human status is merely an extension of primate dominance hierarchies. However, because humans are so heavily dependent on an information economy for survival, our species has evolved a second avenue to social status that operates alongside dominance and has its own suite of cognitive and affective processes. -- This work connects with the emotion literature where prior empirical studies had indicated the existence of two facets for the emotion pride—labeled authentic and hubristic pride. Our ongoing efforts suggest that hubristic pride is associated with dominance-status and authentic pride with prestige-status. -- Much empirical work treats status as a uni-dimensional construct, and then unknowingly operationalizes it as either prestige or dominance, or some mix of the two. -- The cultural evolution of norms over tens or hundreds of thousands of years, and their shaping by cultural group selection, may have driven genetic evolution to create a suite of cognitive adaptations we call norm psychology. -- This suite facilitates, among other things, our identification and learning of social norms, our expectation of sanctions for norm violations, and our ability to internalize normative behavior as motivations. This approach also predicts that humans ought to be inclined to “over-imitate” for two different evolutionary reasons, one informational and the other normative. The informational view hypothesizes that people over-imitate because of an evolved reliance on cultural learning to adaptively acquire complex and cognitively-opaque skills, techniques and practices that have been honed, often in nuanced and subtle ways, over generations. However, because individuals should also “over-imitate” because human societies have long been full of arbitrary norms (behaviors) for which the “correct” performance is crucial to one’s reputation (e.g., rituals, etiquette), we expect future investigations to reveal two different kinds of over-imitation. -- The selection pressures created by reputational damage and punishment for norm-violation may also favour norm-internalization. Neuroeconomic studies suggest that social norms are in fact internalized as intrinsic motivations in people’s brains.
biocultural_evolution  social_psychology  norms  status  power  leaders  learning  children  innate_ideas  incentives  behavioral_economics  moral_psychology  emotions  morality-conventional  sociology_of_religion  trust  cooperation  Innovation  tools  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Hruschka DJ and Henrich J (2013) Economic and evolutionary hypotheses for cross-population variation in parochialism | Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Human populations differ reliably in the degree to which people favor family, friends, and community members over strangers and outsiders. In the last decade, researchers have begun to propose several economic and evolutionary hypotheses for these cross-population differences in parochialism. In this paper, we outline major current theories and review recent attempts to test them. We also discuss the key methodological challenges in assessing these diverse economic and evolutionary theories for cross-population differences in parochialism. -- Keywords: parochialism, in-group favoritism, cross-cultural, market integration, religion, institutions, parasite stress, closeness --
Citation: Hruschka DJ and Henrich J (2013) Economic and evolutionary hypotheses for cross-population variation in parochialism. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:559. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00559
culture  anthropology  biocultural_evolution  economic_sociology  behavioral_economics  moral_psychology  sociology_of_religion  incentives  cosmopolitanism  parochialism  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo: Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty (2011) eBook: : Kindle Store
Promotes randomized control trials (RCTs)
Why do the poor borrow to save? Why do they miss out on free life-saving immunizations, but pay for unnecessary drugs? In Poor Economics, Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, two practical visionaries working toward ending world poverty, answer these questions from the ground. In a book the Wall Street Journal called “marvelous, rewarding,” the authors tell how the stress of living on less than 99 cents per day encourages the poor to make questionable decisions that feed—not fight—poverty. The result is a radical rethinking of the economics of poverty that offers a ringside view of the lives of the world’s poorest, and shows that creating a world without poverty begins with understanding the daily decisions facing the poor.
books  kindle-available  poverty  development  economic_models  microeconomics  incentives  behavioral_economics 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
One Nation, Incentivized and Disincentivized - Justin Fox - Harvard Business Review
Compared with other OECD economies, we don't want our citizens to have children, we want them to drive a lot, we want them to get fat etc
Very clever and depressing
OECD_economies  taxes  incentives  US_economy  US_politics  political_economy  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Josh Barro : What's The Best Way To Tax A Superstar? - Business Insider 6-24-13
the traditional way in which economists estimate the economic effects of taxes does not look apt.Normally, economists model labor as something that employees sell to employers. Raise income taxes and you cut the price received by the employee, so he works less. Cut taxes and he works more.A cardiologist might behave exactly like that, doing more procedures if his taxes are cut. But Lady Gaga can't very easily decide to produce twice as many hit songs. She might only have so many good ideas.
US_economy  macroeconomics  microeconomics  taxes  incentives 
june 2013 by dunnettreader

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