dunnettreader + firms-theory   44

The Coordinated Activity Theory of the Firm by Peter Dorman :: SSRN
Abstract
This paper proceeds from the assumption that economies are characterized by a high degree of interactive nonconvexity in most activities and at most scales. The consequence is nonconvex production and preference sets and the corresponding inefficiency of myopic algorithms. One application of this perspective is the theory of the firm. Conventional theories explain the existence, boundaries and internal organization of firms on the basis of contracting costs that impede the otherwise optimizing properties of market decentralization. I propose instead an approach in which the motive for organizing production within rather than between institutions is to internalize nonconvexities, thereby obtaining the benefit of explicitly coordinated plans. A useful device for representing this problem is the profit landscape, understood to be nonconvex in the sense that fitness landscapes are in evolutionary theory. Firms face three types of challenges, optimizing with respect to a particular profit hill (the problem analyzed in standard microeconomics), selecting a desirable hill, and achieving flexibility to transition between hills in the face of environmental change. These entail tradeoffs, which are reflected in the diversity of personnel, organizational, and innovation strategies observed in actual enterprises. While the use of the landscape metaphor in coordinated activity theory resembles a similar deployment in evolutionary economics, the two approaches differ in the questions they ask and the units of observation and analysis they employ. The applicability of the coordinated activity model is underscored by its congruence with the bulk of management literature, which can be understood more readily in terms of hill-selection than, or in addition to, the hill-climbing paradigm of conventional economics. In this sense, the existing management literature already provides a body of empirical and applied support for coordinated activity theory, although not generally for the socially-founded objectives of economics.

Keywords: theory of the firm, evolutionary economics, nonconvexities
firms-theory  downloaded  SSRN  firms-organization  firms-structure 
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Oliver Hart and the Poetry of Economic Theory -
At this year’s annual ASSA meeting, Stigler Center Director Luigi Zingales delivered a lecture honoring Oliver Hart, winner of the 2016 Nobel Prize for…
firms-theory  firms-structure  incentives-distortions  human_capital  organizations  microeconomics  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Edward Kane - Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks | INET (Dec 2015)
This paper applies Schein’s model of organizational culture to financial firms and their prudential regulators. It identifies a series of hard-to-change cultural norms and assumptions that support go-for-broke risk-taking by megabanks that meets the every-day definition of theft. The problem is not to find new ways to constrain this behavior, but to change the norms that support it by establishing that managers of megabanks owe duties of loyalty, competence, and care directly to taxpayers. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  norms-business  incentives  incentives-distortions  banking  organizations  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke - Schumpeter and the Essence of Profit :: SSRN - May 2011, update May 2015
University of Stuttgart - Institute of Economics and Law -- Schumpeter had a clear vision of the developing economy, but he did not formalize it. The quest for a germane formal basis is in the following guided by the general question: what is the minimum set of foundational propositions for a consistent reconstruction of the evolving money economy? We start with three structural axioms. The claim of generality entails that it should be possible to free Schumpeter’s approach from its irksome Walrasian legacy and to give a consistent formal account of the elementary circular flow that served him as a backdrop for the analysis of the entrepreneur-driven market system. -- Pages in PDF File: 28 -- Keywords: new framework of concepts, structure-centric, axiom set, profit, money, credit, structural stress, catching-up process, monopoly -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  economic_history  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Schumpeter  economic_growth  economic_sociology  entrepreneurs  profit  investment  Innovation  creative_destruction  money  markets-structure  monopoly  prices  firms-theory  neoclassical_economics  equilibrium  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Margaret Blair - What must corporate directors do? Maximizing shareholder value versus creating value through team production | Brookings Institution - June 2015
Blair reviews the legal and economic theories behind the share-value maximization norm, and then lays out a theory of corporate law building on the economics of team production. Arguing that the corporate form itself helps solve the team production problem, Blair details five features which distinguish corporations from other organizational forms: 1. Legal personality -- 2. Limited liability -- 3. Transferable shares -- 4. Management under a Board of Directors -- 5. Indefinite existence -- Blair concludes that these five characteristics are all problematic from a principal-agent point of view where shareholders are principals. However, the team production theory makes sense out of these arrangements. This theory provides a rationale for the role of corporate directors consistent with the role that boards of directors historically understood themselves to play: balancing competing interests so the whole organization stays productive. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  shareholder_value  hedge_funds  corporate_law  firms-theory  firms-structure  equity-corporate  equity_markets  investors  long-term_orientation  labor_share  cooperation  coordination  teams  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
George Serafeim - The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future Research b(revised June 2014) :: SSRN
Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this alternative view better fits actual corporate conduct, I discuss opportunities for future research. Specifically, I call for research on the materiality of environmental and social issues for the future financial performance of corporations, the design of incentive and control systems to guide strategy execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm. -- Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: corporate performance, corporate size, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  global_economy  global_governance  international_political_economy  shareholder_value  shareholders  CSR  disclosure  accountability  accounting  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  incentives  institutional_change  long-term_orientation  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_practices  business_influence  sustainability  MNCs  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  power  power-concentration  concentration-industry  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance - May 19, 2011 | Strategic Management Journal, 35 (1): 1-23. :: SSRN
Beiting Cheng, Harvard University - Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School **--** In this paper, we investigate whether superior performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies leads to better access to finance. We hypothesize that better access to finance can be attributed to a) reduced agency costs due to enhanced stakeholder engagement and b) reduced informational asymmetry due to increased transparency. Using a large cross-section of firms, we find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital constraints. Moreover, we provide evidence that both of the hypothesized mechanisms, better stakeholder engagement and transparency around CSR performance, are important in reducing capital constraints. The results are further confirmed using several alternative measures of capital constraints, a paired analysis based on a ratings shock to CSR performance, an instrumental variables and also a simultaneous equations approach. Finally, we show that the relation is driven by both the social and the environmental dimension of CSR. -- Pages in PDF File: 43 -- Keywords: corporate social responsibility, sustainability, capital constraints, ESG (environmental, social, governance) performance -- didn't download
article  SSRN  business_practices  business-norms  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  CSR  environment  sustainability  accounting  accountability  firms-theory  firms-structure  information-asymmetric  disclosure  finance-cost 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance - November 23, 2011 :: SSRN - Management Science, Forthcoming
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* We investigate the effect of a corporate culture of sustainability on multiple facets of corporate behavior and performance outcomes. Using a matched sample of 180 companies, we find that corporations that voluntarily adopted environmental and social policies many years ago – termed as High Sustainability companies – exhibit fundamentally different characteristics from a matched sample of firms that adopted almost none of these policies – termed as Low Sustainability companies. In particular, we find that the boards of directors of these companies are more likely to be responsible for sustainability and top executive incentives are more likely to be a function of sustainability metrics. Moreover, they are more likely to have organized procedures for stakeholder engagement, to be more long-term oriented, and to exhibit more measurement and disclosure of nonfinancial information. Finally, we provide evidence that High Sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance. The outperformance is stronger in sectors where the customers are individual consumers instead of companies, companies compete on the basis of brands and reputations, and products significantly depend upon extracting large amounts of natural resources. -- Keywords: sustainability, corporate social responsibility, culture, governance, disclosure, performance -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_finance  CSR  brands  reputation  incentives  sustainability  long-term_orientation  natural_resources  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  executive_compensation  business-norms  profit  disclosure 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Richard N. Langlois - Knowledge, Consumption, and Endogenous Growth - January 2000 :: SSRN
University of Connecticut - Department of Economics -- working paper for Knowledge, Consumption, and Endogenous Growth. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1. http://ssrn.com/abstract=257785 -- Abstract of article: In neoclassical theory, knowledge generates increasing returns-and therefore growth-because it is a public good that can be costlessly reused once created. In fact, however, much knowledge in the economy is actually tacit and not easily transmitted-and thus not an obvious source of increasing returns. Several writers have responded to this alarming circumstances by affirming hopefully that knowledge today is increasingly codified, general, and abstract-and increasingly less tacit. This paper disputes such a trend. But all is not lost: for knowledge does not have to be codified to be reused and therefore to generate economic growth. -- Abstract of paper adds -- This essay takes a skeptical view of the proposition that we are experiencing greater codification hand in hand with modern technology and economic growth. ... [and] an equally skeptical view ...that only codified knowledge, and never tacit knowledge, can generate economic growth. Knowledge can be externalized and made less idiosyncratic in ways that do not necessarily involve codification. Knowledge is structure. And knowledge can be externalized beyond an individual creator by being imbedded either in machines and other physical technology or in various kinds of social or behavioral structures that I will broadly call institutions. Using a wonderful 1912 essay by Wesley Clair Mitchell as a starting point, I examine, as a kind of case study, the way in which knowledge is embedded and shared in consumption -- an important and neglected aspect of the process of economic growth. -- Pages in PDF 38 -- Keywords: Tacit knowledge, Increasing returns, Growth theory, Knowledge reuse, Codification -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_social_science  institutions  institutional_economics  firms-theory  firms-structure  knowledge  knowledge_economy  know-how  public_goods  epistemology-social  technology  technology_transfer  technology-adoption  economic_growth  economic_sociology  Innovation  increasing_returns  bibliography  consumption  consumers  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Ron Harris - (pdf) The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade: The Commenda and the Corporation
The focus of this article is on legal-economic institutions that organized early- modern Eurasian trade. It identifies two such institutions that had divergent dispersion patterns, the corporation and the commenda. The corporation ended up as a uniquely European institution that did not migrate until the era of European colonization. The commenda that originated in Arabia migrated all the way to Western Europe and to China. The article explains their divergent dispersion based on differences in their institutional and geographical environments and on dynamic factors. It claims that institutional analysis errs when it ignores migration of institutions. It provides building blocks for the modeling of institutional migration. -- via Dick Langlois at organizationsandmarkets.com presented at Nov 2014 conference put together by Business History program at Harvard Business School, on the History of Law and Business Enterprise -- downloaded to iPhone
paper  downloaded  economic_history  institutional_economics  legal_history  medieval_history  firms-structure  firms-theory  trade  colonialism  Europe-Early_Modern  China  India  MENA  Islamic_law  business_practices  risk_management  economic_culture  cultural_influence  trade-cultural_transmission  corporate_law  business_history  comparative_economics  Eurasia  business  organizations 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Stephen Nash and Liza Rybak - On Logical Difficulties, Philosophy, and the T.C.E. Explanation of the Firm | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 68, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 339-363
By exploring the implications of the linkage between Knight and Pragmatism, some non-trivial implications can be argued to exist. Specifically, section 2 outlines the T. C. E. literature, and how it exists in an atmosphere mixed with Marshallian competition and Knightian uncertainty. Section 3 then considers the disparate philosophical positions behind the work of Knight and Marshall. Knight's critique of Marshall is seminal, not because of any trivial technical innovations that Knight may have inspired within economic theory, but because Knight grounds his work on a philosophical viewpoint that effectively devastated Hegelian philosophy: American Pragmatism. Section 4 then links together the previous two sections by considering how the T. C. E. literature exhibits a dependency on both Pragmatism and Hegelian philosophy. The non-trivial implications of understanding the T. C. E. literature as a branch of Marshallian economics, which recognises Knightian uncertainty, are developed in section 5. Possible conclusions and a summary of the argument are provided in section 6. -- over 100 references from Kant through the pragmatists, Knight and 20thC economics, variants of neoclassical, and empirical evidence including probability and uncertainty in econometrics with heavy emphasis on theories of the firm, transaction cost analysis, Coase and Williamson, markets and hierarchies-- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  econometrics  probability  risk  certainty  uncertainty  Kant  Hegel  Hegelian  Marshall  transaction_costs  markets  markets-structure  firms-theory  organizations  hierarchy  management  Knight  Coase  Williamson_O  pragmatism  Peirce  Dewey  economic_sociology  economic_culture  evolution-social  competition  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
theAIRnet.org - Home
The Academic-Industry Research Network – theAIRnet – is a private, 501(c)(3) not-for-profit research organization devoted to the proposition that a sound understanding of the dynamics of industrial development requires collaboration between academic scholars and industry experts. We engage in up-to-date, in-depth, and incisive research and commentary on issues related to industrial innovation and economic development. Our goal is to understand the ways in which, through innovation, businesses and governments can contribute to equitable and stable economic growth – or what we call “sustainable prosperity”.
website  economic_growth  industry  technology  Innovation  green_economy  development  business  business-and-politics  capitalism  global_economy  public-private_partnerships  public_policy  public_health  public_goods  urban_development  health_care  IP  Labor_markets  wages  unemployment  education-training  sustainability  financial_system  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  CSR  firms-theory  management  plutocracy  MNCs  international_political_economy  human_capital  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  supply_chains  R&D  common_good  1-percent  inequality  working_class  work-life_balance  workforce  regulation  regulation-harmonization  incentives  stagnation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Whatever Happened to Corporate Stewardship? - Rick Wartzman - Harvard Business Review
Rick Wartzman is the executive director of the Drucker Institute at Claremont Graduate University. Author or editor of five books, he is currently writing one about how the social contract between employer and employee in America has changed since the end of World War II -- In November 1956, Time magazine explored a phenomenon that went by various names: “capitalism with a conscience,” “enlightened conservatism,” “people’s capitalism,” and, most popularly, “The New Conservatism.” No matter which label one preferred, the basic concept was clear: Business leaders were demonstrating an ever increasing willingness, in the words of the story, to “shoulder a host of new responsibilities” and “judge their actions, not only from the standpoint of profit and loss” in their financial results “but of profit and loss to the community.” -- It is easy to overly romanticize 1950s corporate America. People of color faced terrible workplace discrimination at that time, as did women. Late in the decade, many big companies hardened their stance against organized labor, hastening its steep decline. Business culture could be rigid and stifling. Fear of communism and socialism, as much as altruism, was often at the root of corporate generosity. But for all the faults of that period, an ethos has been lost. The University of Michigan’s Mark Mizruchi, in his book The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite, describes it as “concern for the well-being of the broader society.” Notably, Mizruchi points to the 1956 Time article as a good representative of the ideas that then “dominated in the corporate discourse.”
CSR  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  shareholders  elites  elite_culture  labor  labor_history  post-WWII  neoliberalism  unions  US_history  US_economy  norms-business  business_cycles  business  business-and-politics  firms-theory  tax_havens 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Alfred Marshall - Industry and Trade (Vol 2) [1919] | Google Books
Vol 2 appears to be available only as a commercial ebook (price c $4) - Vol 1 is a full Google Books copy added to my Google_Books library -- Vol 2 looks interesting in his treatment of the English economy from at least the Black Death -- remarks on "mercantilism" and the economic policies of the British government in the mid 18thC (following Adam Smith characterized as"bad" and "selfish") -- Though the bulk of his work was completed before the turn of the 20th century, the global ramifications of World War I prompted him to reconsider his theories on international economics, and in 1919 he published the two-volume Industry and Trade. Here, in Volume II, he discusses. . how monopolies and competition impact prices . trusts and cartels in the American and German economies . the decline of class differences and advantages in industrial systems . unions, co-opts, and business federations . and much more.
books  etexts  Google_Books  economic_history  British_history  UK_economy  Germany  Prussia  mercantilism  merchants  international_political_economy  international_economics  trading_companies  trade-policy  trade  trade-agreements  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  German_unification  monopolies  corporations  corporate_finance  labor  Labor_markets  wages  unions  imperialism  empire-and_business  US_economy  protectionism  Hamilton  Smith  free_trade  laisser-faire  institutional_economics  institution-building  firms-theory  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Jesus Felipe, John S.L. McCombie - The Aggregate Production Function And The Measurement Of Technical Change (2013) - Edward Elgar Publishing
Prologue: ‘Not Even Wrong’ *-* Introduction 1. Some Problems with the APF *-* 2. The APF: Behavioural Relationship or Accounting Identity? *-* 3. Simulation Studies, the APF and the Accounting Identity *-* 4. ‘Are There Laws of Production?’ The Work of Cobb and Douglas and its Early Reception *-* 5. Solow’s ‘Technical Change and the APF’, and the Accounting Identity *-* 6. What does Total Factor Productivity Actually Measure? Further Observations on the Solow Model *-* 7. Why Are Some Countries Richer than Others? A Sceptical View of Mankiw–Romer–Weil’s Test of the Neoclassical Growth Model *-* 8. Some Problems with the Neoclassical Dual-Sector Growth Model *-* 9. Is Capital Special? The Role of the Growth of Capital and its Externality Effect in Economic Growth *-* 10. Problems Posed by the Accounting Identity for the Estimation of the Degree of Market Power and the Mark-up *-* 11. Are Estimates of Labour Demand Functions Mere Statistical Artefacts? *-* 12. Why Have the Criticisms of the APF Generally Been Ignored? On Further Misunderstandings and Misinterpretations of the Implications of the Accounting Identity --- Felipe and McCombie have gathered all of the compelling arguments denying the existence of APFs and showing that econometric estimates based on these fail to measure what they purport to quantify: they are artefacts. Their critique, which ought to be read by any economist doing empirical work, is destructive of nearly all that is important to mainstream economics: NAIRU and potential output measures, measures of wage elasticities, of output elasticities and of total factor productivity growth.– Marc Lavoie, University of Ottawa, Canada
books  kindle-available  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  productivity  capital  labor  technology  prices  firms-theory  economic_growth  econometrics 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Irving Fisher's 1918 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association (Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality...) - May 2014
Irving Fisher: Economists in Public Service: Annual Address of the President: Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, Supplement, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Mar., 1919), pp. 5-21 Published by: American Economic Association. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1813978 -- full text at Brad -- didn't download
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  WWI  entre_deux_guerres  capitalism  democracy  democratic_peace_theory  Germany  nationalism  protectionism  free_trade  labor  wages  inequality  inheritance  profit  entrepreneurs  health_care  social_order  social_insurance  economic_theory  economic_culture  economic_reform  finance_capital  firms-theory  management  managerialism  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Krista Bondy - The Paradox of Power in CSR: A Case Study on Implementation | JSTOR: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Oct., 2008), pp. 307-323
Although current literature assumes positive outcomes for stakeholders resulting from an increase in power associated with CSR, this research suggests that this increase can lead to conflict within organizations, resulting in almost complete inactivity on CSR. **Methods** A Single in-depth case study, focusing on power as an embedded concept. **Results** Empirical evidence is used to demonstrate how some actors use CSR to improve their own positions within an organization. Resource dependence theory is used to highlight why this may be a more significant concern for CSR. **Conclusions** Increasing power for CSR has the potential to offer actors associated with it increased personal power, and thus can attract opportunistic actors with little interest in realizing the benefits of CSR for the company and its stakeholders. Thus power can be an impediment to furthering CSR strategy and activities at the individual and organizational level.
article  jstor  CSR  incentives  organizations  busisness-ethics  firms-theory  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Heterodox Economics - Readings | HMiRN
Extensive list of books, chapters, journal articles, periodically updated since 2011 -- Contents --
1. History and Methodology of Heterodox Microeconomics
2. Critiques of Mainstream Microeconomics
3. Principles of Heterodox Microeconomic Theory
4. Theory of the Business Enterprise
5. Structure of Production and Costs of the Business Enterprise
6. Costing, Pricing, and Prices
7. Investment, Finance, and Employment
8. Households, Consumption, and Market Demand
9. Industry and Market
10. Competition
11. Corporate Governance, Market Governance, and Market Regulation
12. Social Welfare
13. Heterodox Microfoundations and Modeling the Economy
bibliography  economic_theory  economic_history  economic_models  economic_sociology  firms-theory  Labor_markets  capital  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  M&A  regulation  consumers  consumer_demand  monopolies  finance_capital  taxes  competition  investment  prices  wages  heterodox_economics  microeconomics  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Sheen S. Levine and Robert Kurzban - Explaining Clustering in Social Networks: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Cascading Benefits | JSTOR: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2/3 (Mar. - May, 2006), pp. 173-187
Individual and organizational actors enter into a large number of relationships that include benefiting others without ensuring the equality of reciprocal benefits. We suggest that actors have evolved mechanisms that guide them in the choice of exchange partners, even without conscious calculation or bookkeeping of gain and loss. One such mechanism directs actors to membership in clusters, which are homogenous groups of actors densely connected among themselves and only loosely connected to other groups. We suggest that clusters offer network externalities, which are not possible in sparse networks, thus conferring cascading benefits on the actors contained in those clusters. Using this logic, one can understand the omnipresence of clustering in social networks of individuals and firms. We review the benefits and challenges associated with clustering and use the logic of cascading benefits to derive empirical predictions. -- see bibliography on jstor information page -- didn't download
article  jstor  social_theory  networks-social  networks-business  networks-architecture  reciprocity  firms-theory  organizations  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Antonio Capaldo - Network Structure and Innovation: The Leveraging of a Dual Network as a Distinctive Relational Capability | JSTOR: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Jun., 2007), pp. 585-608
This paper employs comparative longitudinal case study research to investigate why and how strong dyadic interfirm ties and two alternative network architectures (a 'strong ties network' and a 'dual network') impact the innovative capability of the lead firm in an alliance network. I answer these intrinsically cross-level research questions by examining how three design-intensive furnishings manufacturers managed their networks of joint-design alliances with consulting industrial design firms over more than 30 years. Initially, in order to explore the sample lead firms' alliance behavior, I advance an operationalization of interorganizational tie strength. Next, I unveil the strengths of strong ties and the weaknesses of a strong ties network. Finally, I show that the ability to integrate a large periphery of heterogeneous weak ties and a core of strong ties is a distinctive lead firm's relational capability, one that provides fertile ground for leading firms in knowledge-intensive alliance networks to gain competitive advantages whose sustainability is primarily based on the dynamic innovative capability resulting from leveraging a dual network architecture. -- see bibliography on jstor information page -- didn't download
article  jstor  firms-theory  networks-social  networks-business  networks-architecture  Innovation  coordinator  alliances  competition  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Ulf Henning Richter - Liberal Thought in Reasoning on CSR | JSTOR: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 625-649
In this article, I argue that conventional reasoning on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is based on the assumption of a liberal market economy in the context of a nation state. I build on the study of Scherer and Palazzo (Acad Manage Rev 32(4):1096-1120, 2007), developing a number of criteria to identify elements of liberal philosophy in the ongoing CSR debate. I discuss their occurrence in the CSR literature in detail and reflect on the implications, taking into account the emerging political reading of the firm. I conclude that the apolitical framework in the mainstream CSR literature has to be overcome since it does not reflect recent changes in the socio-economic conditions for economic actors in a globalizing world. -- over 200 references -- didn't download
article  jstor  international_political_economy  globalization  global_system  corporations  corporate_governance  CSR  nation-state  corporate_citizenship  firms-theory  regulation  accountability  business-and-politics  externalities  capitalism  political_economy  economic_sociology  management  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark J. Roe - Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics | JSTOR: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 3 (Jan., 1996), pp. 641-668
Adds chaos theory for accidental starting position, path dependency, to standard Social Darwinism of law and economics evolutionary model. Heavily cited for a decade and still showing up in corporate governance. Not clear how he deals with "efficiency" as the evolutionary fitness test, and impacts of judiciary, regulations, lobbying on both efficiency and survival. -- didn't download
article  jstor  legal_theory  social_theory  evolution-social  corporate_governance  firms-theory  Social_Darwinism  chaos_theory  path-dependency  rational_choice  efficiency  behavioral_economics  law-and-economics  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
A Multiple Network Approach to Corporate Governance - Fausto Bonacina, Marco D'Errico, Enrico Moretto, Silvana Stefani, Anna Torriero (Submitted on 17 Jan 2014)
A Multiple Network Approach to Corporate Governance
Fausto Bonacina, Marco D'Errico, Enrico Moretto, Silvana Stefani, Anna Torriero
(Submitted on 17 Jan 2014)

In this work, we consider Corporate Governance ties among companies from a multiple network perspective. Such a structurenaturally arises from the close interrelation between the Shareholding Network and the Board of Directors network. Inorder to capture the simultaneous effects on both networks on Corporate Governance, we propose to model the Corporate Governance multiple network structure via tensor analysis. In particular, we consider the TOPHITS model, based on the PARAFAC tensor decomposition, to show that tensor techniques can be successfully applied in this context. After providing some empirical results from the Italian financial market in the univariate case, we will show that a tensor-based multiple network approach can reveal important information. -- downloaded pdf to Note -- interesting discussion of how to analyze networks where edges may represent multiple types of relations, how to adjust weights, how centrality emerges etc
paper  arxiv  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  shareholders  management  networks  networks-business  firms-theory  Italy  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Why free markets die: An evolutionary perspective - Eduardo Viegas, Stuart P. Cockburn, Henrik Jeldtoft Jensen, Geoffrey B. West -Jan 2014
Why free markets die: An evolutionary perspective -- Eduardo Viegas, Stuart P. Cockburn, Henrik Jeldtoft Jensen, Geoffrey B. West (Submitted on 21 Jan 2014) -- downloaded pdf to Note -- Company mergers and acquisitions are often perceived to act as catalysts for corporate growth in free markets systems: it is conventional wisdom that those activities lead to better and more efficient markets. However, the broad adoption of this perception into corporate strategy is prone to result in a less diverse and more unstable environment, dominated by either very large or very small niche entities. We show here that ancestry, i.e. the cumulative history of mergers, is the key characteristic that encapsulates the diverse range of drivers behind mergers and acquisitions, across a range of industries and geographies. A long-term growth analysis reveals that entities which have been party to fewer mergers tend to grow faster than more highly acquisitive businesses.
paper  arxiv  business  firms-theory  M&A  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Quote of the day #3 | Real-World Economics Review Blog
Ronald Coase asks the big question in his 1937 paper “The Nature of the Firm”:

“Within a firm, … market transactions are eliminated and in place of … exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator who directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production, Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?” . ?.....The problem is this: orthodox theory assumes that people react instantaneously, rationally, and completely to information they receive in the marketplace. This reaction takes the form of instantaneous adjustments in resource use and so on, and the vehicle transmitting the necessary information is the price structure of the political economy in question. I hope you can see how fraught this is. Not only do prices convert all the information needed for instant adjustment, but they change simultaneously to reflect said adjustment. This, to put it bluntly, requires nothing short of an immaculate and omniscient ability on the part of everyone involved.

To make this work we need to suspend our critical faculties and allow the information being acted upon to include an aspect that reflects its own refection of the information being acted upon. For everyone. All at the same time.

Don’t think about it too hard, your head will explode. Only economists are equipped to think in such contorted and unreal ways.
economic_history  economic_models  neoclassical_economics  firms-theory  equilibrium  prices  information-markets 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Daniel Little Why the corporation? « Understanding Society Sept 2012
Recently I posted about C. Wright Mills and his analysis of power elites in America (post). A major theme in Mills’s book is the new power associated with the American corporation following World War II. Charles Perrow’s Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism (2002) offers an historical account of how this system of power came into being. Perrow is a historical sociologist, and he focuses his analysis on the structural features of the organizations he considers; the historical and social factors that favored the emergence of these kinds of organizations; and the role that they now play within the complex social and political system of modern America.
books  kindle-available  reviews  economic_history  social_history  US_economy  US_politics  US_history  19thC  20thC  business  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capitalism  capital  firms-theory  organizations  profit  infrastructure  historical_sociology  political_economy  EF-add 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
Eileen Appelbaum, Rose Batt, Ian Clark - Financial Capitalism and Employment Relations: Evidence from Breach of Trust and Implicit Contracts in Private Equity Buyouts - 2013 - | Wiley Online Library
British Journal of Industrial Relations
Across Boundaries: The Global Challenges Facing Workers and Employment Research 50th Anniversary Special Issue
Volume 51, Issue 3, pages 498–518, September 2

An increasing share of the economy is organized around financial capitalism, where capital market actors actively manage their claims on wealth creation and distribution to maximize shareholder value. Drawing on four case studies of private equity buyouts, we challenge agency theory interpretations that they are ‘welfare neutral’ and show that an alternative source of shareholder value is breach of trust and implicit contracts. We show why management and employment relations scholars need to investigate the mechanisms of financial capitalism to provide a more accurate analysis of the emergence of new forms of class relations and to help us move beyond the limits of the varieties of capitalism approach to comparative institutional analysis.
article  Wiley  21stC  finance_capital  financialization  private_equity  firms-theory  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  Labor_markets  labor 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Noel D. Johnson: Banking on the King: The Evolution of the Royal Revenue Farms in Old Regime France (2006)
JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 963-991-- downloaded pdf to Note -- The writing and allocation of French tax farm contracts changed dramatically after the Fronde (1648-1653): they were gradually transformed from small, competitively auctioned, units into a large cartel known as the Company of General Farms. Surprisingly, the crown's revenues increased. I present a transaction cost argument to explain the behavior of tax farm lease prices as tax farming changed during the seventeenth century. Cartelization of tax farms lowered costs faced by the crown. The tax farm system's evolution offers insights into how organizations evolve to protect their property rights in the absence of well functioning representative institutions.
article  jstor  economic_history  political_history  institutional_economics  economic_sociology  17thC  18thC  France  state-building  public_finance  taxes  property_rights  firms-theory  institutions  Absolutism  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Neil Fligstein and Luke Dauter: The Sociology of Markets (2007)
JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33 (2007), pp. 105-128 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The sociology of markets has been one of the most vibrant fields in sociology in the past 25 years. There is a great deal of agreement that markets are social structures characterized by extensive social relationships between firms, workers, suppliers, customers, and governments. But, like in many sociological literatures, the theory camps that have formed often seem to speak by each other. We show that some of the disagreement between theory camps is due to differences in conceptual language, and other disagreements stem from the fact that theory camps ignore the concepts in other theory camps, thereby making their theories less complete. We end by considering deeper controversies in the literature that seem open both to new conceptualization and further empirical research.
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_sociology  institutional_economics  markets  networks  culture  fields  firms-theory  lit_survey  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Greta R. Krippner and Anthony S. Alvarez: Embeddedness and the Intellectual Projects of Economic Sociology (2007)
JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33 (2007), pp. 219-240 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- In this review, we explore how the concept of embeddedness has shaped—and been shaped by—the evolution of the subfield of economic sociology. Although embeddedness is often taken as a conceptual umbrella for a single, if eclectic, approach to the sociological study of the economy, we argue that in fact the concept references two distinct intellectual projects. One project, following from Granovetter's (1985) well-known programmatic statement, attempts to discern the relational bases of social action in economic contexts. Another project, drawing from Polanyi's [1944 (2001), 1957, 1977] social theory, concerns the integration of the economy into broader social systems. Critically, these two formulations of embeddedness involve different views of the relationship between the economic and the social. The implication is that the obstacles to theoretical integration in economic sociology, while not insurmountable, are greater than is typically acknowledged.
article  jstor  social_theory  lit_survey  economic_sociology  historical_sociology  institutional_economics  markets  firms-theory  networks  social_sciences-post-WWII  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Peter Levin: Culture and Markets: How Economic Sociology Conceptualizes Culture (2008)
JSTOR: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 619 (Sep., 2008), pp. 114-129 --- Current ways of addressing culture in the sociology of markets are incomplete. One approach treats culture as constitutive of markets (markets are culture), while the other treats culture as something affecting markets (markets have culture). This division corresponds to markets that are more or less "settled." The author outlines the history and shortcomings of this duality and proposes a more dimensional approach to culture and markets that more fully integrates culture into economic sociology.
article  jstor  social_theory  culture  markets  firms-theory  economic_sociology  economic_culture  political_economy  Weber  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Gibbons, R. and Roberts, J., eds.: The Handbook of Organizational Economics. | Princeton University Press
Downloaded Introduction - pdf to Note -- In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. This landmark book assembles the leading figures in organizational economics to present the first comprehensive view of both the current state of research in this fast-emerging field and where it might be headed.The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
books  firms-theory  business  corporate_governance  economic_models  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Estates of Mind - Antitrust and patent policy has reversed FDR's competition policies Barry C. Lynn | The Washington Monthly July 2013
Nice history of the FDR antitrust approach that focused on technology monopolies and the post Reagan reversal of antitrust and patent policy that had enforced technological competition and new entrants. Alfred Chandler last work c 2000 goes into the impact of forcing eg Bell Labs to license their technology at a low price. In a return to pre New Deal industrial structure, tge Monsantos, big Pharma and Googles are acquiring small ventures and competitors to lock in monopoly positions and keep innovation in house, where it will be developed only if it doesn't disturb business model. GE under Welch in 1st decade after Reagan closed down antitrust is a great cautionary tale. Attacks Mandel for claiming US corporations have to be giants to have staying power in global arena (the Schumpter monopoly justification). Also thinks Cowen's Great Stagnation is symptom of screwed up intellectual property system, not cause of decline in investment opportunity and economic growth. And our trade treaties are seriously messed up, reversing the logic of the US building and maintaining an international commons.
US_economy  economic_history  20thC  competition  technology  intellectual_property  political_economy  Schumpter  business  firms-theory  economic_growth  international_political_economy  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Erkan Gürpınar: Notes on Institutional Complementarities and Organizational Forms | Dipartimento di Economia Politica
Downloaded pdf to Note

This paper analyses the concept of organizational forms, and derives some implications for the economics of production organization. To this end, after pointing out the role of knowledge in the organization of production, we discuss the theories based on technology (new institutional economics) and property rights (so-called radical school). When the effect of property rights is not taken into account, technology alone entails unique solution to the problem of production organization. After ruling out this technologically deterministic argument, by recourse to a simple model, we study the complementarities between these two domains. Finally, we derive some implications: (a) the asymmetry between the characteristics of labour and capital under the existing property relations, (b) the importance of workers’ preferences for different ways of production organization. In so doing, we show that efficiency driven arguments on the relative success of different organizational forms may be misleading. Hence, we argue that, change in production organization should be described not as a linear path, but rather as a branching tree.
firms-theory  property  institutional_economics  technology  Labor_markets  capital  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Erkan Gürpınar: Organizational Forms in the Knowledge Economy: A Comparative Institutional Analysis | Dipartimento di Economia Politica
This paper attempts to provide an analytical framework to analyze organizational forms in the knowledge economy. We first outline some historical trends that have transformed the organization of production over the last few decades. We show that this transformation has taken place not only in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime, but also in technology. Finally, by recourse to a formal model, we study the determinants of the distribution of alternative institutional arrangements in this new environment. We argue that organizational ecology is mainly determined by knowledge network effects, and complementarities between IPRs and technology.
institutional_economics  technology  intellectual_property  networks  firms-theory  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Peter Radford: Some thoughts on economics | Real-World Economics Review Blog August 2013
Tracks history from interwar years of neoclassical theory not able to deal with theory of the firm - Coase, Williamson, asymetrique information, etc

Radford approach focuses on information (primary - order and efficiency vs secondary - ad hoc, creative) within an energy-entropy framework

Robert Locke comment - see Nietzsche’s Appolonian vs Dionysian
economic_history  20thC  economic_models  neoclassical_economics  business  firms-theory  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader

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