dunnettreader + financial_regulation   243

Lords of Misrule | Matt Stoller - The Baffler - Sept 2017
In 1937, future Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson gave a toast at the New York State Bar Association on the civic responsibilities of the legal profession.…
Evernote  legal_culture  corporate_law  legal_system  US_politics  US_legal_system  US_government  white-collar_crime  criminal_justice  DOJ  fraud  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  SEC  antitrust  Obama_administration  accountability  from instapaper
september 2017 by dunnettreader
Understanding the Surge in Commercial Real Estate Lending - Economic Brief, August 2017 | Richmond FRB
HELEN FESSENDEN AND CATHERINE MUETHING
U.S. banks have increased their commercial real estate (CRE) lending significantly in the past five years. Economists and regulators note that some positive factors are driving this trend, but they also see potential risks. Analysts at the Richmond Fed have found that some banks could be especially vulnerable if economic conditions deteriorate. These include institutions that are in certain major urban areas and have high concentrations of CRE loans, rapid CRE loan growth, and heavy reliance on "noncore" (or illiquid) funding. But the analysts also conclude that, overall, banks' CRE exposures do not appear to be as elevated as they were before the Great Recession.
commercial_real_estate  liquidity  risk_management  credit_booms  leverage  mortgages  financial_regulation  real_estate  Great_Recession  business_cycles  financial_crisis  Evernote  banking 
august 2017 by dunnettreader
Reading: Barry Eichengreen (2011): Economic History and Economic Policy via Brad DeLong
Barry Eichengreen (2011): Economic History and Economic Policy - EHA Presidential Address 2011
As you read, formulate your answers to the following questions:
1. What does Eichengreen think are the uses of history, as shown in the use of history in trying to understand the macroeconomic crisis that began in 2008?
2.What does Eichengreen think are the abuses of history, as shown in the use of history in trying to understand the macroeconomic crisis that began in 2008?
3.What rules and approaches does Eichengreen arrive it for future people trying to use history better?
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
monetary_policy  historiography-postWWII  QE  fiscal_policy  unemployment  historiography-19thC  economic_history  economic_policy  Keynesianism  speech  FX-rate_management  downloaded  central_banks  Great_Depression  historiography  FX  austerity  financial_system  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  Minsky  historiography-20thC  FX-misalignment  Great_Recession  inflation 
january 2017 by dunnettreader
The Leverage Ratchet Effect by Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, Paul C. Pfleiderer (October 2016) :: SSRN
Anat R. Admati, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Peter M. DeMarzo. Stanford Graduate School of Business, NBER; Martin F. Hellwig, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, U. of Bonn - Dep of Econ; Paul C. Pfleiderer, Stanford Graduate School of Business -- Max Planck - Collective Goods Bonn 2013/13
credit_booms  recapitalization  corporate_finance  debt-overhang  debt-seniority  leverage  banking  financial_crisis  debt-restructuring  downloaded  capital_markets  financial_regulation  equity-corporate  paper  debt 
november 2016 by dunnettreader
Gary Gorton
Mobile Collateral versus Immobile Collateral
Gary Gorton, Tyler Muir
NBER Working Paper No. 22619
Issued in September 2016
NBER Program(s):   AP   CF   DAE   EFG   ME
In the face of the Lucas Critique, economic history can be used to evaluate policy. We use the experience of the U.S. National Banking Era to evaluate the most important bank regulation to emerge from the financial crisis, the Bank for International Settlement's liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) which requires that (net) short-term (uninsured) bank debt (e.g. repo) be backed one-for-one with U.S. Treasuries (or other high quality bonds). The rule is narrow banking. The experience of the U.S. National Banking Era, which also required that bank short-term debt be backed by Treasury debt one-for-one, suggests that the LCR is unlikely to reduce financial fragility and may increase it.
NBFI  NBER  financial_stability  risk_management  collateral  financial_economics  capital_markets  bad_regulation  leverage  financial_system  risk-systemic  paywall  money_market  banking  paper  financial_regulation  BIS 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
Psychologists at the Gate: Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2012) | Andrei Shleifer - J of Econ Lit
Shleifer, Andrei. 2012. “Psychologists at the Gate: Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow.” Journal of Economic Literature 50 (4): 1080-1091. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
investors  cognition  neuroscience  reviews  books  credit  cognitive_bias  cognitive_science  financial_regulation  Minsky  risk_assessment  asset_prices  bubbles  creditors  downloaded  financial_system  credit_booms  behavioral_economics  financial_crisis 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Iryna Stewen & Mathias Hoffmann - Holes in the Dike: the global savings glut, US house prices & the long shadow of banking deregulation (2015 wp)
Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy with number 112834. -- Abstract -- We explore empirically how capital inflows into the US and financial deregulation within the United States interacted in driving the run-up (and subsequent decline) in US housing prices over the period 1990-2010. To obtain an ex ante measure of financial liberalization, we focus on the history of interstate-banking deregulation during the 1980s, i.e. prior to the large net capital inflows into the US from China and other emerging economies. Our results suggest a long shadow of deregulation: in states that opened their banking markets to out-of-state banks earlier, house prices were more sensitive to capital inflows. We provide evidence that global imbalances were a major positive funding shock for US wide banks: different from local banks, these banks held a geographically diversified portfolio of mortgages which allowed them to tap the global demand for safe assets by issuing private-label safe assets backed by the country-wide US housing market. This, in turn, allowed them to expand mortgage lending and lower interest rates, driving up housing prices. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
banking  financial_crisis  deregulation  US_economy  downloaded  financial_regulation  global_imbalance  capital_markets  post-Cold_War  financial_system  interstate_banking  savings  house_prices  securitization  financial_innovation  interest_rates  mortgages  international_finance  capital_flows  community_banks  paper  21stC  economic_history  competition-interstate  NBFI 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
R. Esteves - The Political Economy of Global Financial Liberalisation in Historical Perspective (2011) Oxford Economic and Social Sciences WP
Abstract
This paper is a first attempt to garner the theory and evidence on the political economy of the first wave of financial liberalisation during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and of its demise after World War I. Not everyone gained from the process of globalisation (of trade, labour, and finance), which brought about important changes in the structure of the economy and the distribution of income in nations across the world. This paper explores how the economic incentives generated by these dislocations translated, through the political system, into choices about openness to foreign capital and financial integration. The period before World War I is remarkable by the almost absence of restrictions on cross-border capital flows, which may explain the little attention it has received in the historical literature, compared to the extensive study of trade protectionism in this period. After the War, many countries experimented with capital controls which varied in nature and intensity and were intensified during the Depression. Despite the attempt made here to reconcile these stylized facts to models of political economy, the analysis requires a better empirical foundation and some suggestions for further research are also proposed. - Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX.
financial_regulation  economic_growth  pre-WWI  20thC  protectionism  downloaded  gold_standard  international_finance  financial_system  trade-policy  trade  19thC  capital_flows  capital_controls  globalization  deregulation  free_trade  paper  economic_history  financial_innovation  political_economy 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Dewatripont, M. and Rochet, J., Tirole, J. - Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis (orig 2010) - Princeton University Press
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, Balancing the Banks draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future.

While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an adaptive prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints.

Offering a global perspective, Balancing the Banks should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.
Downloaded Chapters 1 & 2 to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  capital_markets  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  liquidity  risk_management  incentives-distortions  incentives  international_finance  global_governance  regulatory_arbitrage  regulatory_avoidance  regulation-costs  regulation-enforcement  regulation-harmonization  regulation 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Jean Tirole - Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System (eBook, Paperback 2016 and Hardcover 2002) - Princeton University Press
Written post Asia crisis but eternally applicable - he was focusing on capital flows when it still was heterodoxy -- Once upon a time, economists saw capital account liberalization--the free and unrestricted flow of capital in and out of countries--as unambiguously good. Good for debtor states, good for the world economy. No longer. Spectacular banking and currency crises in recent decades have shattered the consensus. In this remarkably clear and pithy volume, one of Europe's leading economists examines these crises, the reforms being undertaken to prevent them, and how global financial institutions might be restructured to this end. Jean Tirole first analyzes the current views on the crises and on the reform of the international financial architecture. Reform proposals often treat the symptoms rather than the fundamentals, he argues, and sometimes fail to reconcile the objectives of setting effective financing conditions while ensuring that a country "owns" its reform program. A proper identification of market failures is essential to reformulating the mission of an institution such as the IMF, he emphasizes. Next he adapts the basic principles of corporate governance, liquidity provision, and risk management of corporations to the particulars of country borrowing. Building on a "dual- and common-agency perspective," he revisits commonly advocated policies and considers how multilateral organizations can help debtor countries reap enhanced benefits while liberalizing their capital accounts.

Based on the Paolo Baffi Lecture the author delivered at the Bank of Italy, this refreshingly accessible book is teeming with rich insights that researchers, policymakers, and students at all levels will find indispensable. -- downloaded excerpt to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  capital_adequacy  contagion  sovereign_debt  international_monetary_system  international_finance  international_political_economy  IMF  emerging_markets  globalization  global_governance  global_system 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
J Oldfather, S Gissler & D Ruffino - Bank Complexity: Is Size Everything? | FRB: FEDS Notes: July 2016
Jeremy Oldfather, Stefan Gissler, and Doriana Ruffino - Can we measure the complexity of large banks by comparing their balance sheets? The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) acknowledges that we cannot, but it stops short of defining alternative non-balance-sheet measures.1 In this note, we propose a network-based analysis to study the structural complexity of banks through publicly available data on the structure of large U.S. banks. We show that our analysis is also informative more broadly for tailoring bank resolution plans. - interesting use of network graphs - downloaded to Tab S2
paper  Fed  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_adequacy  banking-universal  bank_holding_cos  networks-architecture  networks-financial  risk_management  complexity  downloaded 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Matt Levine - LendingClub's Troubles Bring Back Bad Memories - Bloomberg View - May 2016
Renaud Laplanche with, awkwardly, a hammer. Photographer: Slaven Vlasic/Getty Images for Tribeca Film Festival Print Wall Street Matt Levine is a Bloomberg View…
Instapaper  financial_regulation  banking  securitization  disintermediation  lending_standards  consumer_protection  credit  from instapaper
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Perry Mehring - Shadow banking’s enduring perils - INET - May 2016
In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, most people thought that shadow banking was all in the past, and good riddance! Today, however, it is…
Instapaper  financial_system  capital_markets  money_market  shadow_banking  banking  leverage  financial_regulation  from instapaper
may 2016 by dunnettreader
What It's Worth - Building a Strong Financial Future
Americans everywhere struggle to build strong financial futures for themselves and their families. The new book, What It's Worth, provides a roadmap for what families, communities and our nation can do to move forward on the path to financial well-being.
Collection of essays by people working on financial inclusion, asset-building etc. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
gig_economy  education-finance  philanthropy  credit  usury  financial_innovation  US_society  inequality-wealth  local_government  pensions  corporate_citizenship  mobility  banking  wages  health_care  access_to_finance  housing  financial_regulation  report  social_entrepreneurs  poverty  downloaded  welfare  US_economy  US_politics  families  mortgages  segregation  inequality  NBFI  unemployment  US_government 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Edward Kane - Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks | INET (Dec 2015)
This paper applies Schein’s model of organizational culture to financial firms and their prudential regulators. It identifies a series of hard-to-change cultural norms and assumptions that support go-for-broke risk-taking by megabanks that meets the every-day definition of theft. The problem is not to find new ways to constrain this behavior, but to change the norms that support it by establishing that managers of megabanks owe duties of loyalty, competence, and care directly to taxpayers. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  norms-business  incentives  incentives-distortions  banking  organizations  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Paydaynomics — The Paydaynomist - Medium Jan 2016
The magic (money) roundaboutIn our second post we thought it would be constructive to put up a very simplified description of the economics of a payday lender…
Instapaper  access_to_finance  microfinance  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  financial_regulation  banking  credit  from instapaper
january 2016 by dunnettreader
A disrupters view on UK payday — The Paydaynomist - Medium Jan 2016
A disrupters view on UK paydayWe’d love to do it and you know you’ve always had it comingThis is our maiden post. It’s our birth story explaining why we, as two…
Instapaper  access_to_finance  UK_economy  UK_Government  financial_regulation  banking  credit  microfinance  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  from instapaper
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Avinash Persaud - A blueprint for overcoming systemic risk | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 20 November 2015
As the recent Financial Stability Board decision on loss-absorbing capital shows, repairing the financial system is still a work in progress. This column reviews the author’s new book on the matter, Reinventing Financial Regulation: A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risks. It argues that financial institutions should be required to put up capital against the mismatch between each type of risk they hold and their natural capacity to hold that type of risk. -- downloaded as pdf to Note
books  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  risk-systemic  risk_shifting  risk_management  risk_assessment  leverage  hedging  capital_adequacy  shadow_banking  liquidity  risk_premiums  firesales  banking  banking-universal  credit_ratings  balance_sheet  international_finance  maturity_transformation  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Market liquidity and financial stability - October 2015
Everyone seems to be worried about market liquidity – the ability to buy or sell a large quantity of an asset with little or no price impact. Some observers… Nice overview of which issues ought to be of concern to keep an eye on, and what recent studies by FRBNY have shown
Instapaper  financial_system  financial_regulation  markets-structure  liquidity  financial_stability  equity_markets  corporate_finance  bond_markets  money_market  asset_prices  firesales  intermediation  broker-dealers  market_makers  HFT  from instapaper
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Mike Koczal - Four Ways of Looking at a TBTF Subsidy: A Reply to Dean Baker - October 2015
The discussion over a Too Big To Fail (TBTF) subsidy, where the largest banks are able to borrow more cheaply as the result of potential future bailouts, is…
Instapaper  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  TBTF  Dodd-Frank  bailouts  US_politics  from instapaper
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert Kosowski, Juha Joenväärä - Regulation and fund performance: New evidence | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 14 September 2015
In the aftermath of the Global Crisis, there have been many regulatory initiatives targeting financial institutions, especially investment funds. This column sheds light on the costs and benefits of increased financial regulation. The findings show that the indirect cost of regulation of alternative funds such as UCITS is around 2% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted returns. Policymakers should therefore carefully consider the effect of higher liquidity requirements on the returns that alternative investment funds can generate.
paper  financial_regulation  institutional_investors  NBFI 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Charles A.E. Goodhart, Enrico Perotti - Containing maturity mismatch | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 10 September 2015
In the last century, real estate funding by banks grew steadily. This column argues that the unprecedented expansion of banking in mortgage lending resulted in a high degree of maturity mismatch. The solution to this problem should focus on greater maturity matching, and not using insured deposits. One avenue to do so is by securitising mortgages with little maturity transformation. Another is to create intermediaries providing mortgage loans where the lender shares in the appreciation, while assuming some risk against the occasional bust. -- downloaded as pdf to Note
paper  banking  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  markets-structure  real_estate  mortgages  liquidity  money_market  deposit_insurance  disintermediation  maturity_transformation  securitization  institutional_investors  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Richard Thayer - Keynes's 'beauty contest' | The University of Chicago Booth School of Business - Sept 2015
Many other economists who supported the efficient-markets hypothesis (EMH) have been surprised by recent history, but there is one man who would not have been “shocked”: John Maynard Keynes.
capital_markets  Keynes  speculative_finance  asset_prices  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  EMH  behavioral_economics  bubbles  Instapaper  from instapaper
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Ben S. Bernanke, review - Charles P. Kindleberger, Jean-Pierre Laffargue eds, Financial Crises: Theory, History, and Policy | JSTOR Journal of Economic Literature (1983)
Journal of Economic Literature 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 574-575 -- delicious in retrospect -- he dings Minsky for inadequate formalism and thinks respondents showed data that punched holes in his approach,. He softly gives the nod to Solow’s defense of Lender of Last Resort as against Friedman and Harry Johnson that all you need is well run monetary policy. Though Solow also stressed the need to guard against people exploiting the implicit guarantee. Ben should have drawn a few stronger lessons before the financial crisis produced its Minsky moment, in part because Greenspan thought the market would provide the discipline Solow saw as necessary, and Ben became LLR for the globe. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  Minsky  Kindleberger  Solow  Friedman_Milton  Bernanke  central_banks  credit_booms  business_cycles  lender-of-last-resort  bubbles  financial_system-government_back-stop  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Darrell Duffie and Jeremy C. Stein - Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Market Benchmarks (2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2): 191-212.
LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered Rate: a measure of the interest rate at which large banks can borrow from one another on an unsecured basis. LIBOR is often used as a benchmark rate—meaning that the interest rates that consumers and businesses pay on trillions of dollars in loans adjust up and down contractually based on movements in LIBOR. Investors also rely on the difference between LIBOR and various risk-free interest rates as a gauge of stress in the banking system. Benchmarks such as LIBOR therefore play a central role in modern financial markets. Thus, news reports in 2008 revealing widespread manipulation of LIBOR threatened the integrity of this benchmark and lowered trust in financial markets. We begin with a discussion of the economic role of benchmarks in reducing market frictions. We explain how manipulation occurs in practice, and illustrate how benchmark definitions and fixing methods can mitigate manipulation. We then turn to an overall policy approach for reducing the susceptibility of LIBOR to manipulation before focusing on the practical problem of how to make an orderly transition to alternative reference rates without raising undue legal risks. -- didn't download
article  financial_system  financial_regulation  money_market  capital_markets  markets-structure  LIBOR  fraud  business-norms  business_ethics  trust  market_manipulation  accountability 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
R Böhme, N Christin, B Edelman & T Moore - Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance (2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2): 213-38.
Bitcoin is an online communication protocol that facilitates the use of a virtual currency, including electronic payments. Bitcoin's rules were designed by engineers with no apparent influence from lawyers or regulators. Bitcoin is built on a transaction log that is distributed across a network of participating computers. It includes mechanisms to reward honest participation, to bootstrap acceptance by early adopters, and to guard against concentrations of power. Bitcoin's design allows for irreversible transactions, a prescribed path of money creation over time, and a public transaction history. Anyone can create a Bitcoin account, without charge and without any centralized vetting procedure—or even a requirement to provide a real name. Collectively, these rules yield a system that is understood to be more flexible, more private, and less amenable to regulatory oversight than other forms of payment—though as we discuss, all these benefits face important limits. Bitcoin is of interest to economists as a virtual currency with potential to disrupt existing payment systems and perhaps even monetary systems. This article presents the platform's design principles and properties for a nontechnical audience; reviews its past, present, and future uses; and points out risks and regulatory issues as Bitcoin interacts with the conventional financial system and the real economy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  Bitcoin  blockchain  payments_systems  financial_system  financial_regulation  monetary_policy  money  money_supply  asset_prices  financial_innovation  macroeconomic_policy  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Akerlof, G.A. and Shiller, R.J.: Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. (eBook and Hardcover)
Phishing for Phools therefore strikes a radically new direction in economics, based on the intuitive idea that markets both give and take away. Akerlof and Shiller bring this idea to life through dozens of stories that show how phishing affects everyone, in almost every walk of life. We spend our money up to the limit, and then worry about how to pay the next month’s bills. The financial system soars, then crashes. We are attracted, more than we know, by advertising. Our political system is distorted by money. We pay too much for gym memberships, cars, houses, and credit cards. Drug companies ingeniously market pharmaceuticals that do us little good, and sometimes are downright dangerous. Phishing for Phools explores the central role of manipulation and deception in fascinating detail in each of these areas and many more. It thereby explains a paradox: why, at a time when we are better off than ever before in history, all too many of us are leading lives of quiet desperation. At the same time, the book tells stories of individuals who have stood against economic trickery—and how it can be reduced through greater knowledge, reform, and regulation. -- Intro downloaded pdf to Note
financial_crisis  kindle-available  behavioral_economics  competition  downloaded  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  financial_system  pharma  accountability  books  politics-and-money  marketing  information-asymmetric  markets-dependence_on_government  disclosure  markets-failure  financial_innovation  financial_regulation 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Bond market liquidity: should we be worried? — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
Our bottom line is this: resilience of intermediaries and resilience of markets are mutually reinforcing. With more resilient institutions, someone is more likely to stand ready to make a market in bonds – both Treasuries and corporates – so long as the rewards are adequate. Since the less liquid a market is, the higher the return to market making will be, the more likely it is that someone will step up to trade when price moves are large. Put another way, better regulation has removed the public subsidy to trading activity that banks and others were able to capture prior to the crisis, so making markets has become more expensive and prices may have to move more than before to attract stabilizing traders. But during those periods when liquidity is particularly valuable, the rewards should exceed these higher capital and liquidity costs. We worry less, not more, because enhanced capital and liquidity requirements are making intermediaries more resilient. Tags: Corporate bonds, Bond market, Liquidity, U.S. Treasury bonds, High-frequency trading, Contagion, Systemic risk -- really good on corporate bonds and links to recent studies on the Treasury market, especially after the flash crash in October 2014 -- downloaded pdf to Note
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  markets-structure  HFT  liquidity  capital_adequacy  banking  broker-dealers  intermediation  corporate_finance  Dodd-Frank  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Bond market liquidity: should we be worried? - August 2015
Very nice analysis -- the point re illiquid corporates can't be made often enough in response to the whining. And the HFT looks like a potentially bigger problem than higher capital requirements pushing the big boys out of the dealer business. The NY Fed and Treasury are constantly monitoring the primary and secondary markets in the only stuff that matters and have tools to improve things if needed.
Pocket  financial_regulation  capital_markets  bond_markets  money_market  capital_adequacy  market-makers  markets-structure  Fed  liquidity  corporate_finance  from pocket
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Market Trends - OECD Journal - Home page | OECD
‌The articles in Financial Market Trends focus on trends and prospects in the international and major domestic financial markets and structural issues and developments in financial markets and the financial sector. This includes financial market regulation, bond markets and public debt management, insurance and private pensions, as well as financial statistics. -- links to the contents of each issue of the journal
journal  website  paper  financial_system  global_economy  global_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  banking  NBFI  insurance  markets-structure  risk_assessment  risk_management  sovereign_debt  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  institutional_investors  pensions  consumer_protection  equity-corporate  equity_markets  debt  debt-overhang  leverage  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  financial_economics  financial_innovation  financial_system-government_back-stop  bailouts  too-big-to-fail  cross-border  regulation-harmonization  regulation-costs  statistics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Christian Thimann - The economics of insurance and its borders with general finance | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal 07/17/2015
What is insurance and where does insurance end?’, is a pressing question in international finance as global regulators are still pondering whether there can be systemic risk in insurance. This column argues that the challenge faced by regulators partly stems from terminological confusion between insurance activities and more general financial activities. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  financial_system  insurance  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Hans Degryse, Liping Lu, Steven Ongena - Informal or formal financing: First evidence on co-funding of Chinese firms | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 21 August 2013
Non-bank financing originating in the shadow banking system has increasingly become an issue for policymakers. This column argues that informal financing has, in fact, been an essential element of corporate performance in China. Through reviewing the interaction between informal and formal financing, evidence suggests that informal financing simultaneously granted with formal financing (co-funding) is helpful for growth, especially for small firms. -- informal financing may complement the use of formal financing, so that co-funding can better enhance firm growth. We conclude that the informal credit market should not be simply repressed as it may co-exist with the formal banking system and supports firm growth in a proper way. As the risks in the shadow banking system has not been regulated properly in China, it is high time that the Chinese regulators curtail the risks and channel the non-bank lending into a proper track in order to avoid a debt crisis. Informal financiers could then still continue to be a vital player in the Chinese credit market and sustain the high economic growth.
paper  China-economy  shadow_banking  NBFI  intermediation  information-intermediaries  access_to_finance  economic_growth  corporate_finance  financial_regulation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jakob de Haan, Dirk Schoenmaker -Teaching finance after the crisis | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 06 July 2015
The financial crisis brought with it many challenges, both to prevailing disciplinary tenets, and for research and policy more generally. This column outlines the lessons that can be drawn from the financial crisis – issues like financial market failures, macro-prudential policy, structural changes of the financial system, and the European banking union. It argues for the inclusion of these topics in curricula for the next generation of finance students
financial_economics  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  EMH  information-markets  macroprudential_policies  cross-border  European_integration  ECB  banking  business_cycles  Minsky 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Sven Langedijk,et al - The corporate debt bias and the cost of banking crises | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 04 July 2015
Sven Langedijk, Gaëtan Nicodème, Andrea Pagano, Alessandro Rossi --Strengthening the banking sector through higher equity capital is one of the key elements of policies aiming to reduce the probability of crises. However, the ‘corporate debt bias’ – the tendency of corporate tax systems to favour debt over equity – is at odds with this objective. This column estimates the benefits for financial stability of eliminating the corporate debt bias. Fully removing the debt bias is estimated to reduce potential public finance losses by between 25 and 55% for the six large EU countries sampled.
paper  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  capital_adequacy  debt  corporate_finance  leverage  tax_policy  interest_rates  equity-corporate  EU 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Sáni Zou, et al -Mainstreaming Climate Change into Financial Governance: Rationale and Entry Points | CIGI June 17, 2015
Sáni Zou, Romain Morel, Thomas Spencer, Ian Cochran, and Michel Colombier -- Fixing Climate Governance Policy Brief No. 5 -- Today, the financial sector is exposed to the physical risks associated with climate change and the impact of climate policies. Securing global financial and economic stability and scaling up low-carbon, climate-resilient investments are not conflicting, but rather mutually reinforcing, objectives. The fifth policy brief in the Fixing Climate Governance series argues that while crucial, classic climate policies do not appear sufficient to address the challenges from climate change that the financial sector is facing. Policies affecting and instruments matching the demand side and supply side of finance need to be aligned with climate objectives to efficiently shift investments toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy. Once the link between climate change and the mandates of international financial sector governance and regulatory institutions is understood, the existing tool kits and processes of these institutions — common standards, principles and guidelines with various levels of legal force, country surveillance and technical assistance — present entry points to mainstream climate-related risks and opportunities into their core operations. -- didn't download
paper  green_finance  international_finance  financial_regulation  financial_innovation  risk_assessment  risk_management  climate  investment-socially_responsible  sustainability 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Marc Fovargue-Davies - Anglo-Saxon Capitalism in Crisis? Models of Liberal Capitalism and the Preconditions for Financial Stability :: SSRN (rev'd September 2011) Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 422
Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Birkbeck College - Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology; Cambridge - Social and Political Sciences -- Marc Fovargue-Davies, U of London - The London Centre for Corporate Governance & Ethics -- The return to economic liberalism in the Anglo-Saxon world was motivated by the apparent failure of Keynesian economic management to control the stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this context, the theories of economic liberalism, championed by Friederich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and the Chicago School economists, provided an alternative. However, the divergent experience of the US, UK, Canada and Australia reveals two distinct ‘varieties’ of economic liberalism: the ‘neo-classical’ incarnation, which describes American and British liberal capitalism, and the more ‘balanced’ economic liberalism that evolved in Canada and Australia. In large part, these were a product of the way that liberal economic theory was understood and translated into policy, which in turn shaped the evolving relationship between the state and the private sector and the relative position of the financial sector within the broader economic system. Together, these determined the nature and extent of financial market regulation and the system’s relative stability during the 2008 crisis. -- PDF File: 61 -- Keywords: Corporate governance, Regulation, Financial market instability, Liberal capitalism, Varieties of capitalism -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_history  20thC  21stC  post-WWII  post-Cold_War  US_politics  UK_politics  political_economy  political_culture  ideology  neoliberalism  economic_theory  economic_sociology  business_practices  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_influence  Keynesianism  neoclassical_economics  Austrian_economics  Chicago_School  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalism-varieties  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  capital_as_power  financialization  finance_capital  financial_regulation  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  policymaking  trickle-down  Canada  Australia  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Transaction Taxes in Theory and Practice | Brookings Institution - June 30, 2015
By: Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Sarah Gault, Bryan Kim, Jim Nunns and Steve Rosenthal -- In response to the financial market crisis and Great Recession, there has been a resurgence of interest in financial transaction taxes (FTTs) around the world. We estimate that a well-designed FTT could raise about $50 billion per year in the United States and would be quite progressive. We discuss the effects of an FTT on various dimensions of financial sector behavior and its ambiguous effects on economic efficiency. -- their overview sets up lots of strawmen while acknowledging that FTTs are quite common even in money center markets like London, but they've done some estimates of various types of impacts in the paper -- didn't download
paper  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  financial_transaction_tax  liquidity  volatility  transaction_costs  international_finance 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Frederick Tung -Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance:: SSRN - UCLA Law Review, Vol. 57, 2009 (rev'd 2012)
Boston University School of Law --:The influence of banks and other private lenders pervades public companies. From the first day of a lending arrangement, loan covenants and built-in contingency provisions affect managerial decision making. Conventional corporate governance analysis has been slow to notice or account for this lender influence. Corporate governance discourse has traditionally focused only on corporate law arrangements. The few existing accounts of creditors' influence over firm managers emphasize the drastic actions creditors take in extreme cases - when a firm is in serious trouble - but in fact, private lender influence is a routine feature of corporate governance even absent financial distress. (..) I explain the regularity of lender influence on managerial decision making - "lender governance" - comparing this routine influence to conventional governance arrangements and boards of directors in particular. I show that the extent of private lender influence rivals that of conventional governance mechanisms, and I discuss the doctrinal and policy implications of this unsung influence. Accounting for lender governance requires a new examination of corporate fiduciary duties, debtor-creditor laws, and the regulatory reform proposals that have emerged to address the current financial crisis. I also discuss the implications of private lender influence for future corporate governance research. -- PDF File: 69 -- lender governance, corporate governance, covenants, credit agreement, private lender, private debt, creditor, financial regulation, financial crisis -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  creditors  banking  relationship_lending  financial_regulation  corporate_law  capital_markets  commercial_law  debtors  debtor-creditor  debt-restructuring  financial_crisis  finance_capital  corporate_control 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Contribution of Bank Regulation and Fair Value Accounting to Procyclical Leverage by Amir Amel-Zadeh, Mary E. Barth, Wayne R. Landsman :: SSRN ( rev'd June 19, 2015)
Amir Amel-Zadeh, University of Cambridge, Judge Business School; Mary E. Barth, Stanford, Graduate School of Business; Wayne R. Landsman, U of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School -- Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 147 -- Our analytical description of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, leverage is not procyclical. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of US commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks facing a binding regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that do not. Fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage. -- PDF File: 46 -- Keywords: Fair value accounting, procyclicality, leverage, risk-based capital regulation, financial institutions, commercial banks -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  banking  capital_adequacy  leverage  procyclical  countercyclical_policy  macroprudential_regulation  risk  risk_management  asset_prices  firesales  accounting  financial_crisis  bubbles  Basle  international_finance 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Anne Beatty, Scott Liao - Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Review of the Empirical Literature:: SSRN October 23, 2013
Anne Beatty, Ohio State - Dept of Accounting & Management Information Systems; Scott Liao, U of Toronto, Rotman School of Management -- Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2346752 -- We survey research on financial accounting in the banking industry. After providing a brief background of the micro-economic theories of the economic role of banks, why bank capital is regulated, and how the accounting regime affects banks’ economic decisions, we review three streams of empirical research. Specifically we focus on research examining the relation between bank financial reporting and the valuation and risk assessments of outside equity and debt, the relation between bank financial reporting discretion, regulatory capital and earnings management, and banks’ economic decisions under differing accounting regimes. We provide our views about what we have learned from this research and about what else we would like to know. We also provide some empirical analyses of the various models that have been used to estimate discretion in the loan loss provision. We further discuss the inherent challenges associated with predicting how bank behavior will respond under alternative accounting and regulatory capital regimes.-- PDF File: 121 -- Keywords: financial accounting; bank regulatory capital; information asymmetry -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  banking  disclosure  accounting  capital_adequacy  asset_prices  risk  investors  leverage  incentives  incentives-distortions  balance_sheet  Basle 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lyman Johnson, David Millon - Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries :: SSRN - William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 46, 2005
Lyman Johnson, Washington and Lee U Law School; U of St. Thomas, St. Paul/Minneapolis, MN - School of Law -- David Millon,Washington and Lee U Law School -- For all the recent federal attention to ...corporate officer and director functions, ... state fiduciary duty law makes no distinction between the fiduciary duties of these two groups. (..) The thesis of this article is that corporate officers are fiduciaries because they are agents. (..) drawing on the fiduciary duties of agents for guidance in fashioning modern understandings of corporate officer duties - and differentiating those duties from those of directors - can provide much-needed structure to what otherwise threatens to be an ad hoc enterprise. There are at least 3 benefits of our thesis. (1) state law remains the primary source for establishing the basic framework of corporate governance relations, both through corporate statutes and through judge-made fiduciary duty law. (..) (2) our thesis clarifies immensely why courts can and should more closely scrutinize officer conduct than they now review director performance (..). (3) At a theoretical level, ...our thesis has several implications. (..) we are entering an era when, due to heavier corporate regulation, the entity conception of the firm will be strengthened, as positive law, including agency law, still builds on that understanding of corporate relations. This period follows a span of perhaps 20 years when a highly disaggregated conception of corporate relations - the nexus of contracts theory - has predominated. We also believe that in the policy arguments for and against strong fiduciary duties over the years, virtually no attention has been given to distinguishing whether what is fitting for outside directors in the fiduciary duty area - relatively slack duties - is also fitting for corporate officers. -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  corporate_law  financial_regulation  capital_markets  fiduciaries  principal-agent  agents  duties-legal  officers-&-directors  corporate_governance  shareholders  investors  state_law  federalism  federal_preemption  SEC  SROs  corporate_personhood  directors  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  conflict_of_interest  legal_remedies  law-and-economics  law-and-finance 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Misrepresentation of Earnings by Ilia D. Dichev, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Shivaram Rajgopal :: SSRN June 2, 2015
Ilia D. Dichev, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- John R. Graham, Duke University; NBER -- Campbell R. Harvey, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; NBER -- Shivaram Rajgopal, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- We ask nearly 400 CFOs about the definition and drivers of earnings quality, with a special emphasis on the prevalence and detection of earnings misrepresentation. CFOs believe that the hallmarks of earnings quality are sustainability, absence of one-time items, and backing by actual cash flows. Earnings quality is determined in about equal measure by controllable factors like internal controls and corporate governance, and non-controllable factors like industry membership and macroeconomic conditions. On earnings misrepresentation, CFOs believe that in any given period a remarkable 20% of firms intentionally distort earnings, even though they are adhering to generally accepted accounting principles. The economic magnitude of the misrepresentation is large, averaging about 10% of reported earnings. While most misrepresentation involves earnings overstatement, interestingly, one third of the firms that are misrepresenting performance are low-balling their earnings or reversing a prior intentional overstatement. Finally, CFOs provide a list of red flags that can be used to detect earnings misrepresentation. --"PDF File: 23 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  disclosure  accounting  GAAP  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  business-norms  business-ethics  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  profits  investors  investor_protection  incentives-distortions 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Edward B. Rock - Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance (Jan 2015) :: SSRN - Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and Governance, 2015, Forthcoming
Penn Law School -- chapter examines the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and the role of regulation in encouraging institutional investors to become active stewards. (..) what lessons we can draw from the US experience for the EU’s 2014 proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive.(...) survey how institutional investors themselves are governed and how they organize share voting. (...) 2 central questions: (a) why, over the last 25 years, have institutional investors not fulfilled the optimists’ hopes?; and (b) can the core incentive problems that subvert Institutional Investor activism be cured by regulation? The US experience [substantial deregulation led to only modest increases in shareholder activism], suggests (..) institutional investors’ relative passivity is a fundamental lack of incentives. I examine the disappointing results of the SEC’s long experiment with incentivizing mutual funds to vote their shares (...) the EU efforts are likely to be similarly disappointing. I then examine the important role that hedge funds now play in catalyzing institutional shareholders, and consider some of the risks in relying on such highly incentivized actors. -- PDF File: 26 -- saved to briefcase
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  financial_economics  financial_regulation  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_finance  capital_markets  corporate_control_markets  institutional_investors  shareholders  shareholder_voting  mutual_funds  incentives  activist_investors  investors  hedge_funds  proxies  comparative_law  administrative_law  EU-law  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  fiduciaries  profit_maximization  EU-regulation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman - Market Efficiency after the Financial Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs :: SSRN - European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 242/2014
Ronald J. Gilson, Stanford Law & Columbia Law; Reinier Kraakman, Harvard Law; both ECGI -- [Financial crisis is said] to have demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (“ECMH”). (..) the ECMH had moved beyond academia, fueling decades of a deregulatory agenda. (..) when economic theory moves from academics to policy, (..) inevitably refashioned to serve the goals of political argument. This happened starkly with the ECMH. It was subject to its own bubble – (..) expanded from a narrow but important academic theory about the informational underpinnings of market prices to a broad ideological preference for market outcomes over even measured regulation. (..) the ECMH addresses informational efficiency, which is a relative, not an absolute measure. This focus on informational efficiency leads to a more focused understanding of what went wrong in 2007-2008. Yet informational efficiency is related to fundamental efficiency (..) Properly framing market efficiency focuses our attention on the frictions that drive a wedge between relative efficiency and efficiency under perfect market conditions. (..) relative efficiency is a diagnostic tool that identifies the information costs and structural barriers that reduce price efficiency which, in turn, provides part of a realistic regulatory strategy. While it will not prevent future crises, improving the mechanisms of market efficiency will make prices more efficient, frictions more transparent, and the influence of politics on public agencies more observable, which may allow us to catch the next problem earlier. PDF File: 87 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  EMH  information-markets  information-asymmetric  efficiency  prices  financial_economics  animal_spirits  behavioral_economics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Dodd-Frank: Five Years After — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - June 2015
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter, DF), the most sweeping financial regulatory… Very good roundup of the holes that are left, the inability to force a coherent inter-agency approach to key risk regulation areas (e.g. the Financial Stability Oversight couldn't force the SEC to write adequate Money Market Funds reg, making it even worse than before the crisis), and the areas where regs are excessively complex, costly etc -- so they either won't do the job (and regulators will wind up making ad hoc exceptions because they're not workable) or their going to get gamed. Basically comes down to the age-old problem of regulation by institutional form rather than by function. The financial crisis was the best chance we had to rationalize the system, and Paulson had Treasury working on a proposal to do just that, but it got trashed when the financial system blew up and everybody was battling for narrow interests in a crisis atmosphere with inflamed populist politics -- only thing positive was finally getting rid of OCC. I do think they're unnecessarily suspicious of the new consumer protection agency -- given that a full overhaul wasn't possible, somebody needs to be responsible for looking out for consumers, since the main regulators are focused on financial risk issues at the institutional or system level.
Instapaper  US_economy  US_politics  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  Fed  SEC  banking  capital_markets  government_agencies  risk  risk-systemic  risk_management  NBFI  shadow_banking  money_market  institutional_investors  consumer_protection  leverage  capital_adequacy  inter-agency  liquidity  arbitrage  markets-structure  intermediation  financial_instiutions  financial_system-government_back-stop  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Macroprudentialism – A new Vox eBook | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal 15 December 2014
Dirk Schoenmaker -- overview and TOC -- Macroprudentialism is now part of the standard macroeconomic toolkit but it involves a set of relatively untested policies. This column introduces a new VoX eBook that collects the thinking of a broad range of leading US and European economists on the matter. A consensus emerges on broad objectives of macroprudential supervision, but important disagreements remain among the authors. -- downloaded pdf to Note
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  central_banks  macroprudential_regulation  leverage  business_cycles  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  monetary_policy  EU  Eurozone  OECD_economies  credit  mortgages  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew W. Lo - The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry | NBER June 2015
NBER Working Paper No. 21267 -- Culture is a potent force in shaping individual and group behavior, yet it has received scant attention in the context of financial risk management and the recent financial crisis. I present a brief overview of the role of culture according to psychologists, sociologists, and economists, and then present a specific framework for analyzing culture in the context of financial practices and institutions in which three questions are answered: (1) What is culture?; (2) Does it matter?; and (3) Can it be changed? I illustrate the utility of this framework by applying it to five concrete situations—Long Term Capital Management; AIG Financial Products; Lehman Brothers and Repo 105; Société Générale’s rogue trader; and the SEC and the Madoff Ponzi scheme—and conclude with a proposal to change culture via “behavioral risk management.” -- check SSRN
paper  paywall  SSRN  financial_instiutions  business_practices  business-norms  risk_management  economic_culture  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  incentives  incentives-distortions  social_psychology  economic_sociology  firms-structure  firms-organization 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Georges Gloukoviezoff - Les banques face à leurs clients: Salariés de banque et inclusion bancaire | La Vie des idées - 28 janvier 2013
English translation March 2014 -- http://www.booksandideas.net/When-French-Banks-Encounter-their.html -- Most banks have now abandoned their previous function of providing advice. Instead, they view their services as products designed to maximize profits. They have started invoking the client’s autonomy as a way of passing on the risk of financial exclusion to their customers. In what ways have bank employees reacted to these new circumstances? -- Georges Gloukoviezoff est docteur en économie et spécialiste des questions d’inclusion financière des particuliers. Il est membre de l’Observatoire national de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale. Il a publié en octobre 2010 aux Presses Universitaires de France "L’Exclusion bancaire. Le Lien social à l’épreuve de la rentabilité". Il tient également un blog sur la page d’Alternatives Economiques. -- downloaded French version as pdf to Note
article  France  financial_system  banking  access_to_finance  access_to_services  labor  labor-service_sector  consumer_protection  risk_management  risk_shifting  knowledge_economy  knowledge_workers  financial_innovation  advisory_services  business_practices  business-norms  profit  profit_maximization  financial_regulation  customer_relations  exclusion  exclusion-economic  economic_sociology  poverty  workforce  know-how  services  services-worker_autonomy  managerialism  productivity  incentives-distortions  consumer-know-how  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Pedro Gurrola-Perez and David Murphy - :Filtered historical simulation Value-at-Risk models and their competitors | Bank of England - Working Paper No. 525 March 2015-
Financial institutions have for many years sought measures which cogently summarise the diverse market risks in portfolios of financial instruments. This quest led institutions to develop Value-at-Risk (VaR) models for their trading portfolios in the 1990s. Subsequently, so-called filtered historical simulation VaR models have become popular tools due to their ability to incorporate information on recent market returns and thus produce risk estimates conditional on them. These estimates are often superior to the unconditional ones produced by the first generation of VaR models. This paper explores the properties of various filtered historical simulation models. We explain how these models are constructed and illustrate their performance, examining in particular how filtering transforms various properties of return distribution. The procyclicality of filtered historical simulation models is also discussed and compared to that of unfiltered VaR. A key consideration in the design of risk management models is whether the model’s purpose is simply to estimate some percentile of the return distribution, or whether its aims are broader. We discuss this question and relate it to the design of the model testing framework. Finally, we discuss some recent developments in the filtered historical simulation paradigm and draw some conclusions about the use of models in this tradition for the estimation of initial margin requirements. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  financial_instiutions  risk  risk_management  financial_regulation  banking  business_cycles  capital_markets  capital_adequacy  NBFI  probability  economic_models  Basel  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Piotr Danisewicz, Dennis Reinhardt and Rhiannon Sowerbutts - On a tight leash: does bank organisational structure matter for macroprudential spillovers? | Bank of England Working Paper No. 524: February 2015
This paper examines whether cross-border spillovers of macroprudential regulation depend on the organisational structure of banks’ foreign affiliates. Our analysis compares the response of foreign banks’ branches versus subsidiaries in the United Kingdom to changes in macroprudential regulations in foreign banks’ home countries. By focusing on branches and subsidiaries of the same banking group, we are able to control for all the factors affecting parent banks’ decisions regarding the lending of their foreign affiliates. We document that there are important differences between the type of regulation and the type of lending. Following a tightening of capital regulation, branches of multinational banks reduce interbank lending growth by 6 percentage points more relative to subsidiaries of the same banking group. Lending to non-banks does not exhibit such differences. A tightening in lending standards or reserve requirements at home does not have differential effects on both interbank and non-bank lending in the United Kingdom. -- didn't download
paper  international_finance  banking  financial_regulation  bank_holding_cos  cross-border  money_market  capital_adequacy 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Policy Statement - The implementation of ring-fencing: legal structure, governance and the continuity of services and facilities | Bank of England – PS10/15 - May 2015
The Prudential Regulation Authority is required under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013) to make policy to implement the ring-fencing of core UK financial services and activities. This policy statement will be of interest to banks which will be required to ring-fence their core activities. This will include banking groups with core deposits greater than £25 billion. It will also be of interest to financial and other institutions and customers who have dealings with ring-fenced bodies. The policy statement provides feedback on the responses received to Consultation Paper 19/14 published in October 2014, and the amendments to the draft rules and supervisory statements included in CP19/14. The policy statement covers three areas: (1) legal structure arrangements of banking groups subject to ring-fencing; (2) governance arrangements of ring-fenced bodies; and (3) arrangements to ensure continuity of services and facilities to ring-fenced bodies. -- plan for effective date in 2019 -- didn't download
public_policy  financial_regulation  Bank_of_England  banking  deposit_insurance  bank_runs  bank_holding_cos  corporate_governance  too-big-to-fail 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Douglas J. Elliott and Qiao Yu - Reforming shadow banking in China | Brookings Institution - May 12, 2015
Shadow banking has become an important, and rapidly growing, part of Chinese finance. Much of the reporting and analysis for this sector focuses on the risks of shadow banking, which clearly do exist and are significant. However, the societal benefits, on the whole, appear to be even greater. Therefore, shadow banking should be reformed, to reduce the risks and increase the benefits, not abolished or shrunk simply for the sake of reducing its importance. The right approach is to find the optimum balance of societal benefits and risks, not to aim for an arbitrary size or role. Further, much of shadow banking results from a web of regulatory, bureaucratic, and policy constraints and pressures on the formal banking sector, as well as some internal weaknesses at the banks. Therefore, reform recommendations arising from a consideration of shadow banking need to extend into the formal banking sector. -- This paper will focus on recommendations for regulatory reform -- didn't download
paper  China-economy  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  regulation-enforcement  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_sector_development  financial_stability 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Oren Levintal, Joseph Zeira - Toxic assets in the 18th century | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 21 September 2009
Problems of regulation appear whenever financial innovations change the ways capital markets operate. This column describes the 18th century emergence of the inconvertible banknote, a "toxic asset” ended by government regulation. The lesson is that free financial markets promote financial innovation, but government must provide adequate regulation keeping the market on track. -- downloaded page as pdf to Note
economic_history  British_history  18thC  financial_innovation  banking  currency  Scotland  free_banking  competition  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - An Open Letter to Bill McNabb, CEO of Vanguard Group - May 2015
Dear Mr. McNabb, We find your WSJ op-ed (Wednesday, May 6) misleading, short-sighted, self-serving, and very disappointing. Vanguard has been in the forefront… No kidding! Appaling that the money market fund industry has been allowed to reach such insane size while providing money-equivalents for all investors/savers that can't hold up in an incipient panic. If the government is going to be forced to, effectively, provide deposit insurance, at least the amounts should be capped and transparent and the risks properly priced. That the SEC couldn't get its act together on NNFs is the most glaring evidence of regulatory capture in the whole sorry mess.
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  shadow_banking  NBFI  money_market  financial_system-government_back-stop  SEC  regulatory_capture  risk-systemic  liquidity  asset_management  asset_prices  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
The strategic under-reporting of banks’ risk - Taylor Begley, Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Kuncheng Zheng | VOXEU - 08 May 2015
A key regulatory response to the Global Crisis has involved higher risk-weighted capital requirements. This column documents systematic under-reporting of risk by banks that gets worse when the system is under stress. Thus banks’ self-reported levels of risk are least informative in states of the world when accurate risk measurement matters the most.
paper  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_adequacy  risk-systemic  banking  Basle 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Economist's View: 'Social Costs of the Financial Sector' - Luigi Zingale lecture and paper - May 2015
Via Tim Taylor, a quotation from Luigi Zingales ("watch video of the lecture or read the talk at his website"): "While there is no doubt that a developed economy needs a sophisticated financial sector, at the current state of knowledge there is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence to support the notion that all the growth of the financial sector in the last forty years has been beneficial to society. In fact, we have both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to claim that a component has been pure rent seeking. ..." -- downloaded pdf to Note of Zingale paper
financial_system  financial_innovation  financial_sector_development  rent-seeking  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  economic_growth  video  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Jonathan D. Ostry , Atish R. Ghosh , and Mahvash S. Qureshi - Managing Capital Flows in Frontier Economies | IMF Direct - April 2015
By Jonathan D. Ostry , Atish R. Ghosh , and Mahvash S. Qureshi  There has been a remarkable increase in financial flows to frontier economies from private… Enfin! Just 20+ years late. Nice roundup of various people (like Rodrik) thinking about all the variables, including what sorts of local institutional capacity (government and financial markets and institutions) are required for (1) absorbing different types of capital flows or (2) if a country wants to restrict flows in some fashion, to manage different types of restrictions. Additionally, there are challenges to the basic premise of encouraging capital flows to frontier markets -- these countries are more likely to be investment constrained than the unproven assumption that they're savings constrained. Macroeconomic impacts are also getting a closer look, not only the dilemmas of managing monetary policy and exchange rates -- e. g., FDI can be defeated if inflows raise the rate to reduce trade advantages. Since the biggest issuers from frontier markets tend to be the state, there's a big potential impact on sustainability of fiscal policy (to say nothing of corruption), and again the exchange rate impacts can be severe in both directions. The post is mainly an outline of an ambitious, multidimensional research program that's emerging among development economists, financial economists, macroeconomics in both the OECD countries and think tanks in emerging markets and the IFIs. -- finally the discussion has moved off the obsession with flight capital that took root in the 1980s and was the trump played anytime anyone questioned the happy-happy conventional wisdom of capital liberalization promoters.
economic_theory  macroeconomics  capital_flows  FDI  IFIs  IMF  capital_controls  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  FX  FX-misalignment  neoliberalism  globalization  emerging_markets  frontier_markets  competitiveness  technology_transfer  infrastructure  development  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_sector_development  financial_stability  banking  interest_rates  institutional_investors  institutional_capacity  institution-building  central_banks  governance  bibliography  Instapaper  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Interview with Otmar Issing — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
President, Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University; former member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank; former member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank. -- remarkably smug about how well the ECB was able to handle the immediate crisis and the steps they've taken re monetary_policy and strengthening financial supervision within the constraints of EU and ECB treaty and authority limits -- unsurprisingly he wants to raise interest rates and normalize policy since he thinks we're already seeing build up of asset prices, risk etc that he thinks were responsible for the global financial crisis.
economic_policy  monetary_policy  central_banks  ECB  interest_rates  ZLB  yield  asset_prices  spreads  EU  Eurozone  Germany-Eurozone  financial_crisis  bubbles  financial_regulation  macroprudential_regulation  macroprudential_policies 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Residential real estate in China: the delicate balance of supply and demand — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
Some observers believe that demand for housing in China is price-insensitive for cultural reasons. Among other things, housing is viewed as a “status good” for those wishing to get married. Another favorable factor is the preparedness of Chinese policymakers to intervene and support housing markets should they soften. Then there is the possibility that central bank policy will be adjusted in a manner designed to further support real estate lending. Yet, there remain grounds for skepticism. The role of big-city home ownership as a status good in Japan did not prevent the massive and destructive land and housing price boom and bust in the 1980s. And, government actions to support China’s housing prices will be fighting an uphill battle if private expectations of capital gains weaken. Not only that, but the day may come when China sees the need to implement a tax on property, if only to provide a better underpinning for municipal finances. This would almost surely drive prices down quickly. Finally, the government’s other objectives of liberalizing the financial system (as a step toward internationalizing the renminbi) and increasing housing supply to meet the needs of a migrating population may prove incompatible with supporting high house price-to-rent ratios. -- really fine update on what's been happening in urbanization, local governments, policies re financial sector liberalization, GNP and personal income growth (and slow down) etc -- copied to Pocket
China  China-economy  financial_system  housing  asset_prices  bubbles  urbanization  economic_growth  financial_regulation  financial_sector_development  financial_stability  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  regulation-enforcement  tax_reform  taxes  local_government  infrastructure  wages  economic_culture  municipal_finance  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz -The mythic quest for early warnings — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
Reviews a number of stress indexes developed since the financial crisis -- most show a good way of indicating where we are at any one time, and several may be useful in crisis management for identifying institutions with liquidity vs insolvency problems, but none tell us where we're going **--** Where does this leave us? Our answer is that we have yet another reason to be skeptical of time-varying, discretionary regulatory policy. In an earlier post, we noted that the combination of high information requirements, long transmission lags and significant political resistance made it unlikely time-varying capital requirements will be effective in reducing financial vulnerabilities. Our conclusion then, which we reiterate now, is that the solution is to build a financial system that is safe and resilient all of the time, since we really never know what is coming. That means a regulatory system based on economic function, not legal form, with sufficient capital buffers to guard against all but the very worst possibilities. In the end, a financial system that relies on an early warning indicator of imminent financial collapse seems destined to fail. -- copied to Pocket
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_adequacy  capital_markets  NBFI  information-markets  information-asymmetric  risk  risk-systemic  risk_management  Great_Recession  global_governance  banking  bank_runs  liquidity  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew W. Lo, Thomas J. Brennan - Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses?: An Analytical Framework - Texas Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 7, 2012 :: SSRN
Andrew Lo - Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) *--* Thomas J. Brennan - Northwestern University School of Law. **--** A common theme in the regulation of financial institutions and transactions is leverage constraints. Although such constraints are implemented in various ways — from minimum net capital rules to margin requirements to credit limits — the basic motivation is the same: to limit the potential losses of certain counterparties. However, the emergence of dynamic trading strategies, derivative securities, and other financial innovations poses new challenges to these constraints. We propose a simple analytical framework for specifying leverage constraints that addresses this challenge by explicitly linking the likelihood of financial loss to the behavior of the financial entity under supervision and prevailing market conditions. An immediate implication of this framework is that not all leverage is created equal, and any fixed numerical limit can lead to dramatically different loss probabilities over time and across assets and investment styles. This framework can also be used to investigate the macroprudential policy implications of microprudential regulations through the general-equilibrium impact of leverage constraints on market parameters such as volatility and tail probabilities. -- Pages in PDF File: 36 -- Leverage, Liquidity, Financial Regulation, Capital Requirements, Macroprudential Policies, Net Capital Rules -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  markets-structure  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  leverage  capital_adequacy  liquidity  capital_markets  money_market  derivatives  arbitrage  macroprudential_policies  macroprudential_regulation  risk-systemic  financial_innovation  bank_runs  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review by Andrew W. Lo :: SSRN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- The recent financial crisis has generated many distinct perspectives from various quarters. In this article, I review a diverse set of 21 books on the crisis, 11 written by academics, and 10 written by journalists and one former Treasury Secretary. No single narrative emerges from this broad and often contradictory collection of interpretations, but the sheer variety of conclusions is informative, and underscores the desperate need for the economics profession to establish a single set of facts from which more accurate inferences and narratives can be constructed. -- Pages in PDF File: 41 -- Keywords: Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, Book Review -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  reviews  books  economic_history  21stC  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  regulation-enforcement  rent-seeking  fraud  debt  debtors  housing  securitization  derivatives  bank_runs  banking-universal  Glass-Steagal  risk_management  risk-systemic  financial_economics  global_system  global_imbalance  capital_flows  institutional_investors  institutional_economics  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Ashoka Mody - Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union | Bruegel.org - March 24 2015
The euro area’s political contract requires member nations to rely principally on their own resources when confronted with severe economic distress. Since monetary policy is the same for all, national fiscal austerity is the default response to counter national fiscal stress. Moreover, the monetary policy was itself stodgy in countering the crisis, and banking-sector problems were allowed to fester. And it was considered inappropriate to impose losses on private sector creditors. Thus, the nature of the incomplete monetary union and the self-imposed taboos led deep and persistent fiscal austerity to become the norm. As a consequence, growth was hurt, which undermined the primary objective of lowering the debt burden. To prevent a meltdown, distressed nations were given official loans to repay private creditors. But the stress and instability continued and soon it became necessary to ease the repayment terms on official loans. When even that proved insufficient, the German-inspired fiscal austerity was combined with the deep pockets of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s safety net for insolvent or near-insolvent banks and sovereigns, in effect, substituted for the absent fiscal union and drew the central bank into the political process. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  Great_Recession  Eurozone  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  austerity  ECB  banking  financial_system-government_back-stop  financial_crisis  too-big-to-fail  creditors  sovereign_debt  financial_regulation  capital_adequacy  capitalization  bailouts  bail-ins  debt-restructuring  debt  debt_crisis  debt-seniority  deleverage  political_economy  EU_governance  monetary_union  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
GF&Co - Joshua Rosner - Is the CDS Market Manipulated? - Dec 2014
Appalling details re ISDA procedures for determining credit events. The Determination Committee is stacked with the 10 big banks that are the major dealers and have a huge financial interest in the outcome. Since they explicitly have no duty of care, no duty to disclose information on which they base their votes even to the other committee members, no transparency re the basis on which the Committee makes a determination or how members voted, and can defer decisions for several meetings running, that would allow them to adjust their book. The example of the Caesars default, which was clear as possible in the indenture but was delayed being determined as a credit event by weeks, is instructive re how little investors can rely on the actual facts but are at the mercy of the big banks' totally arbitrary discretion. Other examples include Elliott on the committee that determined the Argentine credit event *caused* by Elliott. The amounts in the CDS of a high profile company can distort company operations and financial structure to game the declaration of a credit event with the participation of some of the very banks that will decide when an event is triggered -- see RadioShack. The entire risk management function that in theory justifies CDS and the positions investors take, has been completely annulled by the interests of the financial institutions who make the market. The ISDA has become effectively a credit rating agency with no regulatory oversight or controls. The potential amounts involved are staggering, making the LIBOR scandal look penny ante.
Scribd  international_finance  derivatives  self-regulation  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  markets-structure  market_manipulation  conflict_of_interest  fiduciaries  corporate_finance  bankruptcy 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
John Irons and Isaac Shapiro - Report: Regulation, employment, and the economy: Fears of job loss are overblown | Economic Policy Institute - April 2011
After the first midterms debacle -- . In the first months since the new Congress convened, the House has held dozens of hearings designed to elicit criticisms of regulations, introduced legislation that would dramatically alter the regulatory process by requiring congressional approval of all major regulations, and passed a spending bill that would slash the funding levels of regulatory agencies and restrict their ability to enact rules covering areas such as greenhouse gas emissions. (..) opponents of regulation argue that agency rules are damaging to the economy in general and job generation in particular. Some say specific regulations will destroy millions of jobs and cite a study (critiqued later in this paper) purporting to show that regulations cost $1.75 trillion per year. Regulations are frequently discussed only in the context of their threat to job creation, while their role in protecting lives, public health, and the environment is ignored. This report reviews whether the evidence backs the perspective of regulatory opponents. The first section looks broadly at the effects of regulations, whether they play a useful role in the economy, and whether their overall benefits outweigh their overall costs. The second section assesses the theory and evidence for the assertion that regulations undermine jobs and the economy. The last section examines the kinds of studies that are discussed when regulations are being formulated; these studies, often cited in debates and therefore of great importance, tend to be prospective
estimates of the effects of proposed regulations. -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_economy  US_politics  Obama_administration  Congress  GOP  deregulation  cost-benefit  unemployment  business_influence  public_policy  public_goods  public_health  environment  climate  financial_regulation  US_government  regulation  regulation-environment  regulation-costs  common_good  commons  economic_sociology  economic_theory  economic_culture  statistics  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
James Kwak - Why Capitalism Is Against Big Banks (like JP Morgan) — Bull Market — Medium - Jan 2015
Pressure now from stock analysts to break up JPM, which isn't just too-big-to-fail but too big to manage -- The debate over JPMorgan is not a debate between capitalists and socialists. It’s a debate between two types of capitalists: those who care solely about returns, and those who care about size for its own sake. In this debate, let’s hope the greedy bastards win over the megalomaniacs.
banking  banking-universal  shareholder_value  financial_regulation  financialization  finance_capital 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Claus Holm, Morten Balling and Thomas Poulsen - Corporate governance ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric information (2014) | T&A Online
Downloaded to iPhone -- Cogent Economics & Finance - Volume 2, Issue 1, 2014 -- Can corporate governance ratings reduce problems of asymmetric information between companies and investors? To answer this question, we set out to examine the information basis for providing such ratings by reviewing corporate governance attributes that are required or recommended in laws, accounting standards, and codes, respectively. After that, we scrutinize and organize the publicly available information on the methodologies actually used by rating providers. However, important details of these methodologies are treated as confidential property, thus we approach the evaluation of corporate governance ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric information in a more general manner. We propose that the rating process may be seen as consisting of two general activities, namely a data reduction phase, and a data weighting, aggregation, and classification phase. Findings based on a Danish data-set suggest that rating providers by selecting relevant attributes in an intelligent way can improve the screening of companies according to governance quality. In contrast, it seems questionable that weighting, aggregation, and classification of corporate governance attributes considerably improve discrimination according to governance quality.
paper  corporate_finance  asymmetric_information  capital_markets  disclosure  investors  risk  asset_prices  corporate_governance  ratings  reputation  EMH  accountability  financial_regulation  self-regulation  norms  business_practices  business-ethics  downloaded 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Living Wills or Phoenix Plans: Making sure banks can rise from their ashes — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
Re tranches of non-convertible debt in levels of subordination & conversion to equity in a resolution process - More important, safeguarding the financial system will still require other complex rules and enforcement. Above all, in addition to more equity, each systemic intermediary must issue an adequate supply of long-term debt in good times to absorb its potential losses in the worst times. Were it instead to issue short-term debt, the intermediary would be vulnerable to a run. In addition, (as one of us has argued here) rules must prevent other leveraged intermediaries from owning this risky long-term debt, because it is in fact a close substitute for equity capital. Otherwise, losses incurred by the holders of this debt would transmit one intermediary’s insolvency to the broader financial system. And there is no free lunch, at least not for the debt issuers. It remains to be seen whether unleveraged buyers of phoenix debt would price it in a way that is economically viable for systemic intermediaries. After all, in the worst state of the world, it is designed to be no different from equity. Making it attractive to buyers might require banks to issue more equity, to streamline and simplify their operations, and to become more transparent. But that kind of market discipline would go a long way to making the financial system safer, reducing our reliance on the omniscience of regulators.
financial_system  financial_crisis  banking  shadow_banking  financial_regulation  FDIC  capital_adequacy  leverage 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
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