dunnettreader + fairness   12

Jeffrey Edward Green - Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable Envy toward the Superrich (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article aims to correct the widespread imbalance in contemporary liberal thought, which makes explicit appeal to the "least advantaged" without parallel attention to the "most advantaged" as a distinct group in need of regulatory attention. Rawls's influential theory of justice is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this imbalance, but I show how a Rawlsian framework nonetheless provides three justifications for why implementers of liberal justice—above all, legislators—should regulate the economic prospects of a polity's richest citizens: as a heuristic device for ensuring that a system of inequalities not reach a level at which inequalities cease being mutually advantageous, as protection against excessive inequalities threatening civic liberty, and as redress for a liberal society's inability to fully realize fair equality of opportunity with regard to education and politics. Against the objection that such arguments amount to a defense of envy, insofar as they support policies that in certain instances impose economic costs on the most advantaged with negative or neutral economic impact on the rest of society, I attend to Rawls's often overlooked distinction between irrational and reasonable forms of envy, showing that any envy involved in the proposed regulation of the most advantaged falls within this latter category. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
politics-and-money  political_participation  inequality-wealth  regulatory_capture  political_philosophy  political_culture  tax_havens  Early_Republic  inequality  estate_tax  intellectual_history  inheritance  republicanism  Plato-Republic  elites-political_influence  Jefferson  Harrington  crony_capitalism  Europe-Early_Modern  fairness  article  Aristotle  social_capital  social_theory  Rawls  social_democracy  Machiavelli  Plato  inequality-opportunity  jstor  bibliography  ancient_Rome  regulation  justice  liberalism  egalitarian  regulatory_avoidance  interest_groups  legitimacy  deliberative_democracy  political_history  class_conflict  downloaded  education-elites  social_order  elites-self-destructive  Roman_Republic  ancient_Greece  republics-Ancient_v_Modern 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Florent Guénard & Hélène Landemore - Entretien avec Jon Elster - La Vie des idées - 2 juillet 2008.
Florent Guénard & Hélène Landemore , « Le tirage au sort, plus juste que le choix rationnel. Entretien avec Jon Elster », La Vie des idées, 2 juillet 2008. -- Video - transcript downloaded as pdf to Note
social_theory  social_sciences  social_sciences-post-WWII  French_moralists  17thC  Tocqueville  rational_choice  rationality-economics  justice  justice-retributive  fairness  Elster  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Ideology of Jury Autonomy in the Early Common Law :: SSRN - Nov 2000
Washington & Lee Public Law Research Paper No. 00-5 -- This article looks closely at the substantial discretion exercised by the premodern English jury. Through the sixteenth century, jurors enjoyed broad autonomy with respect to fact-finding. For much of the medieval period they came to court already knowledgeable about the facts of a case and rendered their verdicts on that basis. Even after they ceased to be self-informed and had to rely instead on evidence presented in court, jurors continued to exercise their fact-finding authority with substantial independence from judicial control and review. The premodern jury also had significant autonomy regarding what we would call questions of law, an aspect of jury discretion that has received little attention from historians. In this article I look closely at the evidence bearing on both facets of jury autonomy, including trial records, accounts of trial proceedings, and legislation relating to the jury. In addition, I attempt to shed some light on the ideological assumptions that justified the early common law's commitment to jury autonomy, a commitment that is hard to understand in light of the modern rule of law idea. -- PDF File: 44. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  legal_history  British_history  medieval_history  16thC  common_law  trials  juries  evidence  epistemology-social  Europe-Early_Modern  legal_culture  legal_validity  legitimacy  civic_virtue  citizenship  local_government  public_goods  commonwealth  governance-participation  status  cities-governance  persona  judgment-independence  autonomy  authority  elites  clientelism  duties  duties-civic  community  rule_of_law  fairness  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams, eds. - Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction :: SSRN - (Edward Elgar 2013)
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, both University of Chicago Law School -- University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 704 -- This introduction, prepared for an edited volume, offers some observations on the importance — indeed, inescapability — of fairness concerns in law and economics. The relationship between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually cast as an adversarial one. Rational choice economics typically describes human behavior as motivated by simple self-interest, rather than by concerns of morality, justice, or fairness. But we have found that the connections between concepts of fairness and the economic analysis of law are robust and diverse. After discussing some of these linkages, we describe the organization and content of the volume we have compiled. In it, economics engages with fairness, challenging the idea that the two concepts are alien to each other. -- PDF File: 18 -- Keywords: fairness, law and economics -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  fairness  efficiency  welfare_economics  self-interest  altruism  microeconomics  policymaking  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  utility  status_quo_bias  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Raymond Boudon - Utilité ou Rationalité (2002) | Scribd
21 page article -- Explains why "rational choice" fails as explanatory theory in lots of collective action, public opinion, game theory, etc. -- domains where decisions to act aren't based exclusively on instrumental, consequentialist, cost-benefit calculative, and egoistic (directly concerned with impact on self) forms of, and context for, reasoning. Boudon finds "rational choice" superior to hand-wavy explanations that are speculative "black boxes" -- e.g. (1) sociobiology or evo-devo that we're hardwired, (2) Kahneman and Tversky heuristics and biases -- fascinating observations but aren't explanatory, (3) social/cultural explanations such as "socialization" which are tautological or a black box that provide no mechanisms that can differentiate situations or variations in outcomes. E.g. in Roman Empire peasants were more likely to remain pagan and soldiers were more likely to be attracted to the new religion. "Socialization" doesn't explain why soldiers raised in the traditional religious milieu and belief system were more likely to change their beliefs. Great examples of how rationality includes cognitive processes dealing with (1) non-instrumental contexts - e.g. identification with communitarian concerns ranging from voting to immigration policies, (2) aligning actions with one's judgment of what's more likely "true" based on core beliefs and how one has learned to evaluate "evidence" [e.g. Swedes are even more likely to reject "lump of labor" than Americans!] (3) axiological reasoning, including norms of fairness that may be fairly universal (e.g. reaction to Antigone, ultimatum game) or specific to a culture (e.g. due process in political application of "rule of law") -- see article for his tripartite classification of rationality and types of cognition that "rational choice" rejects in its definition. He thinks Weber and Adam Smith got there before, and better than, Becker.
article  Scribd  social_theory  mechanisms-social_theory  evolutionary_biology  evo_psych  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  rationality  reasons  Weber  Smith  Becker_Gary  Simon_Herbert  fairness  community  identity  norms  epistemology-social  game_theory  altruism  cognitive_bias  cognition  cognition-social  democracy  citizens  voting  political_participation  collective_action  political_culture  public_choice  public_opinion  common_good  socialization  social_psychology  cost-benefit  self-interest  self-interest-cultural_basis  self-and-other  EF-add 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Herbert Gintis - Gene–culture coevolution and the nature of human sociality | Royal Society - Issue Theme "Human Niche Construction" - Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 27 March 2011, vol. 366, no. 1566, 878-888
Human characteristics are the product of gene–culture coevolution, which is an evolutionary dynamic involving the interaction of genes and culture over long time periods. Gene–culture coevolution is a special case of niche construction. Gene–culture coevolution is responsible for human other-regarding preferences, a taste for fairness, the capacity to empathize and salience of morality and character virtues. -- Keywords: gene–culture coevolution, sociobiology, epistatic information transfer -- Published 14 February 2011 doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0310 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  gene-culture_coevolution  sociobiology  social_theory  genetics  cultural_change  social_process  niche_construction  evolution  evolution-social  evolutionary_biology  human_nature  character  preferences  altruism  fairness  empathy  moral_sentiments  moral_psychology  morality-innate  morality-conventional  virtue  tradition  cultural_transmission  evolution-group_selection  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Donald Frey, review - Gabriel Abend, Moral Background: An Inquiry into the History of Business Ethics (2014) | EH.net Review - August 2014
Princeton University Press, 2014. ix + 399 pp., ISBN: 978-0-691-15944-7. -- Donald E. Frey, Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, author of America’s Economic Moralists: A History of Rival Ethics and Economics (SUNY Press, 2009). -- Gabriel Abend argues that a range of cultural beliefs and thought patterns provide an influential “moral background” as context for the more obvious everyday morality. Most of his book looks at business ethics during the period from the 1850s through the 1930s through the lens of the moral background concept. (..) In my own work on economic moralists, something like a “moral background” appeared to be enlightening. My thesis was that economic moralities (yes, two competing moralities, just as Abend deals with two competing business ethics) drew support from alternative economic theories (again differing economic theories, just as Abend has different moral backgrounds). Perhaps economic theory is a much narrower kind of “moral background” than Abend envisions, but it is a reasonable proxy for a moral background. It is a distinct body of thought, often familiar — in one form or another — to much of the population. And economic theory can indeed support or undermine some kinds of moralities (for example, if economic outcomes are viewed as the efficient work of impersonal markets, moral concerns for equity are put on the defensive). I think Abend might have described a convincing moral foundation in Chapter 6, perhaps by linking the Standards school to antecedents such as Benjamin Franklin (briefly noted in Chapter 2), and to ideas that were abroad in economics. Abend, I think, has a good concept, and is at least partially successful.
books  reviews  18thC  19thC  20thC  US_history  business-ethics  norms  norms-business  morality-conventional  morality-Christian  utilitarianism  Franklin_Ben  economic_theory  economic_sociology  economic_culture  education-higher  professionalization  managerialism  self-interest  self-regulation  lobbying  business-and-politics  business_practices  business_schools  business_influence  market_fundamentalism  invisible_hand  efficiency  cultural_history  fairness  elites  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Stumbling and Mumbling: Hayek on desert - Jan 2005
Elizabeth Anderson does a fine job of demolishing, on Hayekian grounds, the idea that people deserve their incomes. And Tyler Cowen gives an excellent reply. The one thing that’s missing are some direct quotes from Hayek himself. Let me fill the gaps. There’s this from volume II of Law, Legislation and Liberty (p71-72 in my copy): " [The function of the price system] is not so much to reward people for what they have done as to tell them what in their own as well as in general interest they ought to do. …To hold out a sufficient incentive for those movements which are required to maintain a market order, it will often be necessary that the return to people’s efforts do not correspond to recognizable merit…In a spontaneous order the question of whether or not someone has done the ‘right’ thing cannot always be a matter of merit." -- lots of quotes and links
political_philosophy  economic_theory  markets  prices  incentives  meritocracy  fairness  libertarianism  Hayek  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Stumbling and Mumbling: Markets as ideology - May 2014
Report on a dictator game - They found that when the dictator chose competition, the weaker parties were significantly less likely to punish him even if the wealth he transferred was the same as when the dictator chose a unilateral transfer: "A powerful trading party, who could simply dictate the terms of trade, can deflect the blame for unequal outcomes by letting the market decide, i.e., by delegating the determination of the terms of trade to a competitive procedure." All this is consistent with Marx. Market competition can reconcile people to inequalities which they would otherwise reject. There's more. In competition, the weaker parties were more likely to punish each other. In this sense, the dictator's choice to use markets acts (unintentionally) as a "divide and rule" strategy. There is, I fear, a direct analogy here with unskilled white workers blaming immigrants rather than capitalists for their unemployment. These results are also consistent with a McCloskeyan reading - that markets help promote peace and social stability, because they reduce people's inclination to spend resources predating upon others'. In one sense, the McCloskeyan and Marxian interpretations are similar - both predict that markets reduce discontent.
economic_culture  economic_sociology  Marx  capitalism  markets_in_everything  social_psychology  fairness  inequality  accountability  McCloskey  laisser-faire  cognitive_bias  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Chris D. Frith and Tania Singer - The Role of Social Cognition in Decision Making | JSTOR: Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol. 363, No. 1511 (Dec. 12, 2008), pp. 3875-3886
Successful decision making in a social setting depends on our ability to understand the intentions, emotions and beliefs of others. The mirror system allows us to understand other people's motor actions and action intentions. 'Empathy' allows us to understand and share emotions and sensations with others. 'Theory of mind' allows us to understand more abstract concepts such as beliefs or wishes in others. In all these cases, evidence has accumulated that we use the specific neural networks engaged in processing mental states in ourselves to understand the same mental states in others. However, the magnitude of the brain activity in these shared networks is modulated by contextual appraisal of the situation or the other person. An important feature of decision making in a social setting concerns the interaction of reason and emotion. We consider four domains where such interactions occur: our sense of fairness, altruistic punishment, trust and framing effects. In these cases, social motivations and emotions compete with each other, while higher-level control processes modulate the interactions of these low-level biases. -- didn't download -- large references list
article  jstor  social_theory  cognition-social  decision_theory  altruism  fairness  trust  framing_effects  emotions  neuroscience  mind-theory_of  empathy  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader

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