dunnettreader + fact-value   5

Special Issue - Michael Oakeshott | Cosmos + Taxis, Vol 1, Issue 3, 2014
Editorial Note - Gene Callahan and Leslie Marsh *-* (1) The Critique of Rationalism and the Defense of Individuality: Oakeshott and Hayek - Chor-Yung Cheung *-* (2) Jane Jacobs’ Critique of Rationalism in Urban Planning - Gene Callahan and Sanford Ikeda *-* (3) Oakeshott on Modernity and the Crisis of Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Western Liberal Democracy - Noël O’sullivan. &-* (4) Oakeshott and the Complex Ecology of the Moral Life - Kevin Williams. *-* (5) Homo Ludens and Civil Association: The Sublime Nature of Michael Oakeshott’s Civil Condition - Thomas J. Cheeseman *-* (6) The Instrumental Idiom in American Politics: The ‘City on the Hill’ as a Spontaneous Order - Corey Abel *-* (7) Dogmatomachy: Ideological Warfare - David D. Corey. *-* Oakeshott on the Rule of Law: A Defense - Stephen Turner -- downloaded pdf to Note
journal  Academia.edu  article  political_philosophy  political_economy  judgment-political  political_culture  legitimacy  democracy  liberalism  Oakeshott  Jacobs_Jane  emergence  social_order  rationalist  modernity  Hayek  rule_of_law  Weber  fact-value  civil_society  associations  individualism  ideology  polarization  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Stephen Turner - Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value (Routledge, 1984) | bookmark for book abstract - Academia.edu
The problem of the nature of values and the relation between values and rationality is one of the defining issues of twentieth-century thought and Max Weber was one of the defining figures in the debate. In this book, Turner and Factor consider the development of the dispute over Max Weber's contribution to this discourse, by showing how Weber's views have been used, revised and adapted in new contexts. The story of the dispute is itself fascinating, for it cuts across the major political and intellectual currents of the twentieth century, from positivism, pragmatism and value-free social science, through the philosophy of Jaspers and Heidegger, to Critical Theory and the revival of Natural Right and Natural Law. As Weber's ideas were imported to Britain and America, they found new formulations and new adherents and critics and became absorbed into different traditions and new issues. This book was first published in 1984 by Routledge. -- Research Interests: Ethics, Political Theory, Continental Philosophy, Max Weber (Philosophy), Social and Political Philosophy, and Max Weber
books  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Weber  social_theory  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  philosophy_of_social_science  epistemology  epistemology-social  positivism  rationality  values  fact-value  constructivism  pragmatism  German_scholarship  German_historical_school  hermeneutics  Heidegger  Frankfurt_School  critical_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Kenan Malik - A BOOK IN PROGRESS [PART 11]: HUME, IS AND OUGHT | Pandaemonium - Dec 2012
For Hume, then, moral duties and obligations cannot be rationally deduced from purely factual premises. Hence the failure of much traditional moral philosophy that sought through reasoned argument to deduce ought from is. He does not argue, however, that values cannot derive from the facts of the world, nor that there is an unbridgeable chasm between facts and values. Distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong, were, for Hume, the products not of reason but of a moral sense. But moral sense was itself a natural disposition, an aspect of human nature. Indeed, Hume claims that ‘no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality’. Patricia Churchland’s reading of Hume seems more appropriate, then, than that of philosophers who claim that for Hume values do not, and cannot, derive from the facts of the world. Her insistence that Hume accepted that ‘in a much broader sense of “infer” than derive you can infer (figure out) what you ought to do, drawing on knowledge, perception, emotions and understanding, and balancing considerations against each other’, and that morally, just as socially, humans could ‘figure out what to do based on the facts of the case, and our background understanding’ appears in keeping with the spirit of Hume’s argument.
intellectual_history  18thC  Hume-ethics  Hume-causation  moral_sentiments  taste  induction  fact-value  scepticism-Academic  Pyrrhonism  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Catherine H. Zuckert - On the 'Rationality' of Rational Choice | JSTOR: Political Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 179-198
Proponents argue that rational choice theory is a form of positive science, one whose simplified model of the human psyche generates useful predictions of human behavior. But their assumptions are contrary to fact. Their analyses of public policy decisions are cast in terms of the sharp and now largely discredited distinction logical positivists drew between "facts" and "values" or efficient "means" and affective "ends." And their models arouse suspicions concerning and objections to the political and psychological effects of the methods they employ and the policy options they endorse. All of this makes the theory not only less useful for understanding politics but also more subject to criticism by "postmodern" thinkers than it need be. Were its proponents explicitly to acknowledge the "prescriptive" character of "rational choice," however, they would help foster a broader discussion of the different kinds of rationality and their interaction in the formulation of public policy. That discussion of the forms of rationality would, in turn, bring out a more complex view of the psychological basis of both politics and rationality. -- see bibliography -- didn't download
article  jstor  political_philosophy  political_science  rational_choice  fact-value  postmodern  values  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen G. Salkever - "Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science | JSTOR: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 70-77
Is the fact/value distinction incompatible with the possibility of a social science which is both objective and evaluative (or normative)? Does support of the latter require rejection of the former and vice versa? This article presents an indirect argument against the incompatibility of the fact/value distinction and an objectively evaluative social science. My procedure is to show that David Hume, whose is/ought distinction is the locus classicus of the fact/value distinction, is committed both to the view that values cannot be derived from facts and to the view that social science is not (and should not be) value-neutral. Furthermore, Hume's position is free from any logical laws. My conclusion is that it is false to say that the fact/value distinction entails a value-neutral social science, and that it is therefore utterly unnecessary for critics of such a science to waste their time attempting to @'bridge the gap@' between facts and values -- didn't download
article  jstor  metaethics  fact-value  intellectual_history  18thC  Hume-ethics  science_of_man  epistemology  moral_philosophy  reason  social_sciences  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader

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