dunnettreader + disclosure   20

Quaker bankers: building trust on the basis of sincerity, reciprocity and charity | Magic, Maths & Money - Feb 2016
This post follows discussions of the norms sincerity, reciprocity and charity in financial markets. It suggests that the success of Quaker finance, that funded… Tracks the importance of Quaker-owned banks to the development of UK financial system - the number of big-name banking families with Quaker founders is striking. Their personalized methods of working on reputation (theirs and their borrowers) based on shared standards of probity and transparency, disciplined by membership in the Quaker community - allowed them to not only grow in the loan business, but become big in the bills market. The Quaker method of collecting views re appropriate moral life practices, which were documented and circulated among the members - and set mutual expectations for ethical practices, including areas like bookkeeping and full disclosure. The Quaker firms were central to the system of country banks, capable of providing liquidity to halt bank runs, wind down problem institutions etc. Their bills business didn't survive the switch to the Bank of England becoming lender of last resort in the 1844 crisis. And their information advantages don't seem to have remained a competitive advantage as it had been in the pre Napoleonic_Wars era.
Instapaper  economic_history  financial_innovation  banking  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  Quakers  dissenters  Industrial_Revolution  ethics  norms  norms-business  accounting  accountability  reputation  disclosure  information-intermediaries  information-markets  money_market  Bank_of_England  country_banks  financial_crisis  bank_runs  lender-of-last-resort  from instapaper
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Akerlof, G.A. and Shiller, R.J.: Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. (eBook and Hardcover)
Phishing for Phools therefore strikes a radically new direction in economics, based on the intuitive idea that markets both give and take away. Akerlof and Shiller bring this idea to life through dozens of stories that show how phishing affects everyone, in almost every walk of life. We spend our money up to the limit, and then worry about how to pay the next month’s bills. The financial system soars, then crashes. We are attracted, more than we know, by advertising. Our political system is distorted by money. We pay too much for gym memberships, cars, houses, and credit cards. Drug companies ingeniously market pharmaceuticals that do us little good, and sometimes are downright dangerous. Phishing for Phools explores the central role of manipulation and deception in fascinating detail in each of these areas and many more. It thereby explains a paradox: why, at a time when we are better off than ever before in history, all too many of us are leading lives of quiet desperation. At the same time, the book tells stories of individuals who have stood against economic trickery—and how it can be reduced through greater knowledge, reform, and regulation. -- Intro downloaded pdf to Note
financial_crisis  kindle-available  behavioral_economics  competition  downloaded  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  financial_system  pharma  accountability  books  politics-and-money  marketing  information-asymmetric  markets-dependence_on_government  disclosure  markets-failure  financial_innovation  financial_regulation 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Bernard S. Black - The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors :: SSRN -:Asia Business Law Review, pp. 3-16, July 2001
This article offers my personal, idiosyncratic overview of the principal fiduciary duties of outside directors, from a common law perspective, and what the remedies should be for breach of each of these duties. I discuss the four core fiduciary duties of directors: the duty of loyalty; the duty of care; the duty of disclosure; and the duty of special care when your company is a takeover target. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 36 -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_governance  fiduciaries  duties-legal  duty_of_loyalty  duty_of_care  disclosure  conflict_of_interest  corporate_control_markets 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Michael Minnis, Andrew G. Sutherland - Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans :: SSRN February 1, 2015
Both at University of Chicago - Booth School of Business -- We examine when banks use financial statements to monitor small commercial firms. Theoretical research offers competing predictions surrounding the use of financial statements as a monitoring device in such settings where reporting between firms and banks is not mandated. Using a proprietary dataset of bank information requests after loan initiation, we examine these predictions and find that financial statements are requested for only half of the loans in the sample. This variation is mediated by borrower credit risk, contracting mechanisms, such as collateral, and alternative information sources, such as tax returns. However, the relations we identify are not straightforward — the relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests is nonlinear and financial statements can be both substitutes and complements to the alternative mechanisms. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of the fundamental demand for financial reporting in the small commercial loan market and the manner in which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors. -- PDF File: 50 -- Keywords: loan monitoring, financial contracting, collateral, debt, relationship lending, taxes -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  banking  SMEs  access_to_finance  credit  collateral  relationship_lending  intermediation  risk_management  risk_assessment  accounting  disclosure  credit_ratings 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Anne Beatty, Scott Liao - Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Review of the Empirical Literature:: SSRN October 23, 2013
Anne Beatty, Ohio State - Dept of Accounting & Management Information Systems; Scott Liao, U of Toronto, Rotman School of Management -- Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2346752 -- We survey research on financial accounting in the banking industry. After providing a brief background of the micro-economic theories of the economic role of banks, why bank capital is regulated, and how the accounting regime affects banks’ economic decisions, we review three streams of empirical research. Specifically we focus on research examining the relation between bank financial reporting and the valuation and risk assessments of outside equity and debt, the relation between bank financial reporting discretion, regulatory capital and earnings management, and banks’ economic decisions under differing accounting regimes. We provide our views about what we have learned from this research and about what else we would like to know. We also provide some empirical analyses of the various models that have been used to estimate discretion in the loan loss provision. We further discuss the inherent challenges associated with predicting how bank behavior will respond under alternative accounting and regulatory capital regimes.-- PDF File: 121 -- Keywords: financial accounting; bank regulatory capital; information asymmetry -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  banking  disclosure  accounting  capital_adequacy  asset_prices  risk  investors  leverage  incentives  incentives-distortions  balance_sheet  Basle 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Misrepresentation of Earnings by Ilia D. Dichev, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Shivaram Rajgopal :: SSRN June 2, 2015
Ilia D. Dichev, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- John R. Graham, Duke University; NBER -- Campbell R. Harvey, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; NBER -- Shivaram Rajgopal, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- We ask nearly 400 CFOs about the definition and drivers of earnings quality, with a special emphasis on the prevalence and detection of earnings misrepresentation. CFOs believe that the hallmarks of earnings quality are sustainability, absence of one-time items, and backing by actual cash flows. Earnings quality is determined in about equal measure by controllable factors like internal controls and corporate governance, and non-controllable factors like industry membership and macroeconomic conditions. On earnings misrepresentation, CFOs believe that in any given period a remarkable 20% of firms intentionally distort earnings, even though they are adhering to generally accepted accounting principles. The economic magnitude of the misrepresentation is large, averaging about 10% of reported earnings. While most misrepresentation involves earnings overstatement, interestingly, one third of the firms that are misrepresenting performance are low-balling their earnings or reversing a prior intentional overstatement. Finally, CFOs provide a list of red flags that can be used to detect earnings misrepresentation. --"PDF File: 23 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  disclosure  accounting  GAAP  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  business-norms  business-ethics  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  profits  investors  investor_protection  incentives-distortions 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Jock Herron, George Serafeim - Reliable Sustainability Ratings: The Influence of Business Models on Information Intermediaries (revised October 2014) :: SSRN
ility Ratings: The Influence of Business Models on Information Intermediaries

Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Jock Herron, Harvard University - School of Design -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School -- Chapter in Routledge Handbook on Responsible Investing (Forthcoming) *--* A new generation of corporate reporting - integrated reporting - is emerging that will help investors and other key stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, and NGOs develop a deeper and more comprehensive appreciation of corporate performance than what is currently provided by GAAP financial reporting. The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimal design of information intermediaries that can increase the impact of sustainability information on corporate conduct. Specifically, we focus on two issues: who pays for the information and which performance metrics should be included in assessing the sustainability performance of a company. -- Pages in PDF File: 28 -- Keywords: sustainability, ratings, corporate performance, rating agencies, conflicts of interest, integrated reporting, corporate social responsibility -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  SSRN  CSR  sustainability  accounting  disclosure  disclosure-integrated  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  information-markets  information-intermediaries  rating_agencies  ratings  conflict_of_interest  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, George Serafeim - Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional Perspective (revised September 2014) :: SSRN
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* Chapter in Stewardship of the Future, edited by Ed Lawler, Sue Mohrman, and James O’Toole, Greenleaf, 2015. *--* In this paper, we present the two primary functions of corporate reporting (information and transformation) and why currently isolated financial and sustainability reporting are not likely to perform effectively those functions. We describe the concept of integrated reporting and why integrated reporting could be a superior mechanism to perform these functions. Moreover, we discuss, through a series of case studies, what constitutes an effective integrated report (Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company) and the role of regulation in integrated reporting (Anglo-American). -- Pages in PDF File: 21 -- Keywords: corporate reporting, integrated reporting, information, investing, sustainability, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  CSR  sustainability  accounting  disclosure  disclosure-integrated  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  information-markets  investors  risk_management  institutional_change  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
George Serafeim - The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future Research b(revised June 2014) :: SSRN
Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this alternative view better fits actual corporate conduct, I discuss opportunities for future research. Specifically, I call for research on the materiality of environmental and social issues for the future financial performance of corporations, the design of incentive and control systems to guide strategy execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm. -- Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: corporate performance, corporate size, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  global_economy  global_governance  international_political_economy  shareholder_value  shareholders  CSR  disclosure  accountability  accounting  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  incentives  institutional_change  long-term_orientation  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_practices  business_influence  sustainability  MNCs  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  power  power-concentration  concentration-industry  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance - May 19, 2011 | Strategic Management Journal, 35 (1): 1-23. :: SSRN
Beiting Cheng, Harvard University - Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School **--** In this paper, we investigate whether superior performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies leads to better access to finance. We hypothesize that better access to finance can be attributed to a) reduced agency costs due to enhanced stakeholder engagement and b) reduced informational asymmetry due to increased transparency. Using a large cross-section of firms, we find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital constraints. Moreover, we provide evidence that both of the hypothesized mechanisms, better stakeholder engagement and transparency around CSR performance, are important in reducing capital constraints. The results are further confirmed using several alternative measures of capital constraints, a paired analysis based on a ratings shock to CSR performance, an instrumental variables and also a simultaneous equations approach. Finally, we show that the relation is driven by both the social and the environmental dimension of CSR. -- Pages in PDF File: 43 -- Keywords: corporate social responsibility, sustainability, capital constraints, ESG (environmental, social, governance) performance -- didn't download
article  SSRN  business_practices  business-norms  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  CSR  environment  sustainability  accounting  accountability  firms-theory  firms-structure  information-asymmetric  disclosure  finance-cost 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance - November 23, 2011 :: SSRN - Management Science, Forthcoming
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* We investigate the effect of a corporate culture of sustainability on multiple facets of corporate behavior and performance outcomes. Using a matched sample of 180 companies, we find that corporations that voluntarily adopted environmental and social policies many years ago – termed as High Sustainability companies – exhibit fundamentally different characteristics from a matched sample of firms that adopted almost none of these policies – termed as Low Sustainability companies. In particular, we find that the boards of directors of these companies are more likely to be responsible for sustainability and top executive incentives are more likely to be a function of sustainability metrics. Moreover, they are more likely to have organized procedures for stakeholder engagement, to be more long-term oriented, and to exhibit more measurement and disclosure of nonfinancial information. Finally, we provide evidence that High Sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance. The outperformance is stronger in sectors where the customers are individual consumers instead of companies, companies compete on the basis of brands and reputations, and products significantly depend upon extracting large amounts of natural resources. -- Keywords: sustainability, corporate social responsibility, culture, governance, disclosure, performance -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_finance  CSR  brands  reputation  incentives  sustainability  long-term_orientation  natural_resources  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  executive_compensation  business-norms  profit  disclosure 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
CDP - About us
CDP works to transform the way the world does business to prevent dangerous climate change and protect our natural resources. We see a world where capital is efficiently allocated to create long-term prosperity rather than short-term gain at the expense of our environment.

Evidence and insight is vital to driving real change. We use the power of measurement and information disclosure to improve the management of environmental risk. By leveraging market forces including shareholders, customers and governments, CDP has incentivized thousands of companies and cities across the world’s largest economies to measure and disclose their environmental information. We put this information at the heart of business, investment and policy decision making.

We hold the largest collection globally of self reported climate change, water and forest-risk data. Through our global system companies, investors and cities are better able to mitigate risk, capitalize on opportunities and make investment decisions that drive action towards a more sustainable world.
website  Lon  risk_management  risk-systemic  climate  climate-adaptation  institutional_investors  disclosure  water  energy  energy-markets  industry  supply_chains  sustainability  corporate_governance  green_finance  green_economy 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Claus Holm, Morten Balling and Thomas Poulsen - Corporate governance ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric information (2014) | T&A Online
Downloaded to iPhone -- Cogent Economics & Finance - Volume 2, Issue 1, 2014 -- Can corporate governance ratings reduce problems of asymmetric information between companies and investors? To answer this question, we set out to examine the information basis for providing such ratings by reviewing corporate governance attributes that are required or recommended in laws, accounting standards, and codes, respectively. After that, we scrutinize and organize the publicly available information on the methodologies actually used by rating providers. However, important details of these methodologies are treated as confidential property, thus we approach the evaluation of corporate governance ratings as a means to reduce asymmetric information in a more general manner. We propose that the rating process may be seen as consisting of two general activities, namely a data reduction phase, and a data weighting, aggregation, and classification phase. Findings based on a Danish data-set suggest that rating providers by selecting relevant attributes in an intelligent way can improve the screening of companies according to governance quality. In contrast, it seems questionable that weighting, aggregation, and classification of corporate governance attributes considerably improve discrimination according to governance quality.
paper  corporate_finance  asymmetric_information  capital_markets  disclosure  investors  risk  asset_prices  corporate_governance  ratings  reputation  EMH  accountability  financial_regulation  self-regulation  norms  business_practices  business-ethics  downloaded 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson - Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending - Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 101, April 2013, pp. 923-967 :: SSRN (last revised August 2014)
Lucian A. Bebchuk - Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) -- Robert J. Jackson Jr. - Columbia Law School --- The SEC is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the SEC develop rules requiring that public companies disclose their spending on politics. The petition, which was submitted by a committee of ten corporate law professors that we co-chaired, has received unprecedented support, including comment letters from nearly half a million individuals. (...)the petition has also attracted opponents, including prominent members of Congress and business organizations.This Article puts forward a comprehensive, empirically grounded case for the rulemaking advocated in the petition. We present (..) evidence indicating that a substantial amount of corporate spending on politics occurs under investors’ radar screens, and that shareholders have significant interest in receiving information about such spending. We argue that disclosure of corporate political spending is necessary to ensure that such spending is consistent with shareholder interests. We discuss the emergence of voluntary disclosure practices in this area and show why voluntary disclosure is not a substitute for SEC rules. We also provide a framework for the SEC’s design of these rules. Finally, we consider and respond to ten objections that have been raised to disclosure rules of this kind. We show that all of the considered objections, both individually and collectively, provide no basis for opposing rules that would require public companies to disclose their spending on politics. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  US_government  administrative_law  administrative_agencies  financial_system  SEC  disclosure  corporate_law  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  campaign_finance  capital_markets  investors  political_participation  lobbying  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
The 21st Century Investor: Ceres Blueprint for Sustainable Investing — Ceres
Unprecedented risks to the global economy make this a challenging time for the 21st century investor—institutional asset owners and their investment managers—most of which have multi-generational obligations to beneficiaries. Climate change, resource scarcity, population growth, energy demand, ensuring the human rights of workers across global supply chains, and access to fresh water are some of the major issues challenging our ability to build a sustainable economy, one that meets the needs of people today without compromising the needs of future generations. -- This Blueprint is written for the 21st Century investor— institutional asset owners and their investment managers—who need to understand and manage the growing risks posed by climate change, resource scarcity, population growth, human and labor rights, energy demand and access to water—risks that will challenge businesses and affect investment returns in the years and decades to come. -- section of Ceres website devoted to investor related initiatives - proxy voting guides, etc - and corporate and public finance isuues, such as sustainability risk disclosure, listing srandards, Climate Bonds Principles -- downloaded pdf of executive summary of report
report  climate  energy  water  ocean  demography  supply_chains  global_economy  global_governance  sustainability  financial_system  capital_markets  institutional_investors  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  public_finance  investors  disclosure  asset_management  political_economy  international_political_economy  Labor_markets  human_rights  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Home -- European Securities and Markets Authority - ESMA [formerly CESR]
ESMA’s mission is to enhance the protection of investors and reinforce stable and well functioning financial markets in the European Union. ESMA, as an independent EU Authority, achieves this mission by building a single rule book for EU financial markets and ensuring its consistent application and supervision across the EU. ESMA contributes to the supervision of financial services firms with a pan-European reach, either through direct supervision or through the active co-ordination of national supervisory activity. -- successor agency as of January 2011 to the Committee of European Securities Regulators
website  government_agencies  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  EU  Europe  capital_markets  financial_regulation  regulation-harmonization  rating_agencies  equity-corporate  derivatives  markets-structure  market_integration  clearing_&_settlement  cross-border  corporate_finance  NBFI  disclosure  accounting  corporate_governance 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
WFE response to IOSCO consultation on market structure -May 2013 | World Federation of Exchanges
Executive Summary - The WFE commends IOSCO for carefully analyzing the issues raised by the growing and disruptive fragmentation and loss of visibility (darkness) in equity markets. The four sensible recommendations in this consultation progress efforts on the part of regulators and exchange operators worldwide to ensure that equity markets continue to serve investors by becoming ever more efficient, transparent and fair. The WFE supports competition and believes that regulators must promote market designs that foster order interaction in a free, transparent and fair competitive environment. Unfortunately, regulations intended to promote competition between and on-exchanges have in recent years been misused to enable the growth of venues designed to avoid competition. The WFE is concerned about the integrity and efficiency of fragmented, complex and dark markets, particularly as it relates to price formation, surveillance, and market resiliency. Market participants are increasingly discouraged from posting competing prices in lit venues, and evidence indicates that spreads are wider than they could be otherwise. Similarly, diminishing transparency and fair access leads to market complexity that makes markets less capable of handling volatility. Finally, the WFE is concerned that a greater share of equities trading occurs away from full regulatory protection offered by regulated exchanges. The WFE calls into question two common practices in fragmented markets. First, retail and institutional orders are systematically segmented toward venues designed to avoid quote competition, where conflicts of interest are unavoidable. Second, fragmented markets increasingly allow participants to step in front of displayed public limit orders on dark venues with little to no price improvement or block trading. The incentive to segment markets and reduce transparency jeopardizes the price discovery process and can adversely impact costs for all investors. The WFE calls attention to the problems that investors and security commissions face in receiving reliable data from OTC equity trading venues. While the WFE believes that the quality of data, and the costs associated with aggregating data should be weighed when changes to market structure are considered, consistent transparency regulations across venues is fundamental to efficient trading and market surveillance.
The WFE supports recent changes made by the security commissions of Canada and Australia in curbing the excesses of OTC equity trading -- didn't download
report  IOSCO  international_organizations  financial_system  financial_regulation  law-and-finance  disclosure  capital_markets  equity-corporate  OTC_markets  competition-financial_sector  market_integration  markets-structure  HFT  self-regulation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Green Bond Principles 2014: Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds — Ceres
Green Bonds enable capital-raising and investment for new and existing projects with environmental benefits. Recent activity indicates that the market for Green Bonds is developing rapidly. The Green Bond Principles (GBP) are voluntary process guidelines that recommend transparency and disclosure and promote integrity in the development of the Green Bond market by clarifying the approach for issuance of a Green Bond. The GBP are intended for broad use by the market: they provide issuers guidance on the key components involved in launching a credible Green Bond; they aid investors by ensuring availability of information necessary to evaluate the environmental impact of their Green Bond investments; and they assist underwriters by moving the market towards standard disclosures which will facilitate transactions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
green_economy  green_finance  reform-economic  reform-finance  climate  capital_markets  investors  environment  disclosure  financial_innovation  standards-sustainability  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Network for Sustainable Financial Markets | Home
The Network for Sustainable Financial Markets is an International, non-partisan network of finance sector professionals, academics and others who have an active interest in long-term investing. We believe that the recurring crises recently experienced in our financial markets are not isolated incidents. Rather, this instability is evidence that the financial market system is in need of well thought-out reform so that it can better serve its core purpose of creating long-term sustainable value. Our primary concern today is not that reform efforts will result in the adoption of too much or too little regulation. Rather, we see the greatest peril as inappropriate regulation and governance reforms that fail to address the real causes of financial market instability. While increased transparency, better risk management, additional liquidity and other surface fixes might address the current symptoms, they are not enough to resolve underlying systemic problems. Delay will only make things worse since failure to deal with these deep-rooted design flaws can only mean repetitive, deepening crises with growing economic and social destabilisation. The time to act is now. The Network’s goal is to foster interdisciplinary collaboration on research and advocacy projects between market professionals, academics and other opinion-leaders. We seek to fill the gaps between existing initiatives, to engage on problems which have received attention but have not still been solved and also to involve many more opinion-shapers than has previously been the case. We also intend that the Network be time-limited – our ultimate goal is to embed the Network’s guiding principles into the approaches used by other entities involved in research and public policy, then dissolve. -- connected to Climate Bond Initiative
website  financial_system  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  financial_innovation  financial_sector_development  reform-finance  green_finance  investors  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  banking  international_finance  international_monetary_system  risk-systemic  standards-sustainability  disclosure  accounting 
september 2014 by dunnettreader

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