dunnettreader + deficit_finance   5

Flores-Maciss
What determines when states adopt war taxes to finance the cost of conflict? We address this question with a study of war taxes in the United States between 1789 and 2010. Using logit estimation of the determinants of war taxes, an analysis of roll-call votes on war tax legislation, and a historical case study of the Civil War, we provide evidence that partisan fiscal differences account whether the United States finances its conflicts through war taxes or opts for alternatives such as borrowing or expanding the money supply. Because the fiscal policies implemented to raise the revenues for war have considerable and often enduring redistributive impacts, war finance—in particular, war taxation—becomes a high-stakes political opportunity to advance the fiscal interests of core constituencies. Insofar as the alternatives to taxation shroud the actual costs of war, the findings have important implications for democratic accountability and the conduct of conflict. - Downloaded via iphone
US_history  downloaded  politics-and-money  US_military  deficit_finance  sovereign_debt  business_cycles  international_finance  fiscal_policy  Congress  US_foreign_policy  capital_markets  fiscal-military_state  political_history  article  political_economy  monetary_policy  taxes  US_politics  accountability  financial_system  redistribution  business-and-politics 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Myth of Reagan’s Debt | Slackwire - June 2015
Arjun and I have been working lately on a paper on monetary and fiscal policy. (You can find the current version here.) The idea, which began with some posts on… It's all about the interplay of interest rates, growth rates and inflation rates -- thanks, Volker!
Instapaper  economic_history  political_history  20thC  post-WWII  US_politics  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  deficit_finance  interest_rates  economic_growth  inflation  Volker  Fed  Reagan  budget_deficit  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Roger Backhouse, Mauro Boianovsky - Secular Stagnation: The History of a Macroeconomic Heresy :: SSRN - May 5, 2015
Roger Backhouse, University of Birmingham - Department of Economics -- Mauro Boianovsky, Universidade de Brasilia. *--* This paper covers the history of secular stagnation from Alvin's Hansen's AEA Presidential address in 1938 to the recent re-discovery of the idea by Lawrence Summers. It is argued that the story of secular stagnation is more complicated than the simple version usually told: the theory changed in ways that meant that, though its immediate relevance might be less, postwar prosperity left open the possibility that it might one day become relevant. It is also pointed out that the history of the term has never been free of political concerns, and it is suggested that changing conceptions of economic theory played an important role in the fate of secular stagnation -- Pages in PDF File: 36 -- Keywords: secular stagnation, unemployment equilibrium, Keynesian economics, Hansen -' downloaded to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  intellectual_history  economic_history  US_economy  US_politics  20thC  Great_Depression  post-WWII  Keynesianism  stagnation  macroeconomics  institutional_economics  prices  competition  deficit_finance  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - The euro area's debt hangover — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
You wouldn’t know it from the record low level of government bond yields, but much of Europe lives under a severe debt burden. Nonfinancial corporate debt exceeds 100 percent of GDP in Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. And, gross government debt (as measured by Eurostat) is close to or exceeds this threshold in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Debt levels this high have important long-run consequences. (...) they are a drag on growth. High debt means that households have more difficulty maintaining consumption when income falls; firms may be unable to keep up production and investment when revenue dips; and governments are in no position to smooth expenditure when revenue falls. More economic volatility means lower growth. Beyond that, high levels of debt reduce the effectiveness of central bank stimulus. (...) So, what is the euro area to do? We see three paths out of this predicament: (1) breathtaking supply reforms that trigger an investment boom; (2) inflation; or (3) a mix of asset sales and debt relief.The first option is the best. The alternatives would threaten the survival of the euro, undermine the fiscal credibility of major governments, or both. [After pointing out the problems with 1 and 2, they look at how much would sovereign_debt have to be reduced to reach debt sustainability targets embodied in Maastricht] For Greece, the write-down is 71% of face value; for Spain, 63%; and for France 50%. Taken as a whole, meeting the 60% Maastricht criterion (while maintaining bank system capital) would require that (..the) combined debt of [Greece, Spain and France of] €9.36 trillion be written down by a total of €5.07 trillion. As extreme as this sounds, it is, in fact, insufficient. Many euro-area governments also face significant unfunded pension liabilities. (...) The sooner they own up to this, the better for their long-term growth prospects. -- copied to Pocket
EU  Eurozone  debt  debt-overhang  debt-restructuring  sovereign_debt  leverage  deleverage  economic_growth  economic_reform  creditors  default  monetary_policy  ECB  central_banks  interest_rates  investment  deficit_finance  debt_crisis  corporate_finance  demand-side  supply-side  capital_markets  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  banking  capital_adequacy  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
JULIAN GOODARE - The debts of James VI of Scotland | JSTOR - The Economic History Review New Series, Vol. 62, No. 4 (NOVEMBER 2009), pp. 926-952
James VI (1567–1625) was chronically indebted, and this caused him frequent problems. This article presents two series of systematic data that together indicate the main contours of his indebtedness: (1) end-of-year deficits, and (2) hived-off debts which the Crown left unpaid for long periods (sometimes permanently). The hived-off debts, reconstructed individually, constitute a narrative of fiscal policy-making. Instead of a large and catastrophic bankruptcy, James in effect had numerous small bankruptcies. He benefited from an emerging structure of Scottish domestic credit. He eventually repaid many of his debts after succeeding to the English throne in 1603. -- huge bibliography, mostly Scottish history -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  political_history  16thC  17thC  James_I  Scotland  Britain  public_finance  fiscal_policy  deficit_finance  sovereign_debt  Crown_finance  financial_system  credit  bankruptcy  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader

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