dunnettreader + corporate_ownership   8

José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, Isabel Tecu - Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership :: SSRN July 5, 2016
José Azar , University of Navarra, IESE Business School
Martin C. Schmalz , University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Isabel Tecu , Charles River Associates (CRA)
Ross School of Business Paper No. 1235
Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large diversified institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities. We use within-route variation over time to identify a positive effect of common ownership on ticket prices. A panel-IV strategy that exploits BlackRock's acquisition of Barclays Global Investors confirms these results. We conclude that a hidden social cost -- reduced product market competition -- accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance. -- Pages 61
Keywords: Competition, Ownership, Diversification, Pricing, Antitrust, Governance, Product Market
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industry_consolidation  corporate_ownership  SSRN  interlocking_holdings  industry_structure  corporate_governance  conflict_of_interest  downloaded  rent-seeking  paper  institutional_investors  capital_markets  anti-competive_behavior  competition  cross-holdings 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
La Porta et al -- Investor Protection and Corporate Governance by :: SSRN 2000
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny -- Recent research on corporate governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of financial markets, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, summarize the consequences of these differences, and suggest potential strategies of reform of corporate governance. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems. -- PDF File: 40 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_governance  fiduciaries  investor_protection  corporate_ownership  shareholders  capital_markets  banking-universal 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court - Delaware Benefit Corporations: Making It Easier for Directors To “Do The Right Thing” in Harvard Business Law Review — The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regul
Pdf of a recently published an article in the Harvard Business Law Review. -- Abstract - Some scholars(..) argue that managers should “do the right thing,” while ignoring that in the current corporate accountability structure, stockholders are the only constituency given any enforceable rights, and thus are the only one with substantial influence over managers. Few (..real proposals) that would give corporate managers more ability and greater incentives to consider the interests of other constituencies. This Article posits that benefit corporation (bencorps) statutes have the potential to change the accountability structure within which managers operate. Certain provisions (..) can create a meaningful shift in the balance of power that will in fact give corporate managers more ability to and impose upon them an enforceable duty to “do the right thing.” But (..) important questions must be answered to determine whether (bencorp) statutes will have the durable, systemic effect desired. (1) the initial wave of entrepreneurs who form (bencorps) must demonstrate a genuine commitment to (..CSR) to preserve the credibility of the movement. (2) (..) socially responsible investment funds must be willing to vote their long-term consciences instead of cashing in for short-term gains. To that end, it is crucial that (bencorps) show that doing things “the right way” will be profitable in the long run. (3) (bencorpos) must pass the “going public” test. Finally, subsidiaries that are governed as (bencorps) must honor their commitments and grow successfully, if the movement is to grow to scale. - downloaded pdf to Note
article  US_legal_system  corporate_law  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_ownership  corporate_control  principal-agent  management  CSR  institutional_investors  investment-socially_responsible  stakeholders  investment  accountability  benefit_corporations  public_interest  common_good  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Kobi Kastiel - Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies — The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation - November 13, 2014
Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation -- Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists has long suggested that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. My Article (..) forthcoming (,..) proposes a different view that is based on an agency problem paradigm, and presents a comprehensive framework for understanding the relationship between concentrated ownership and executive pay. On the theoretical level, the Article shows that controlling shareholders often have incentives to overpay professional managers instead of having an arm’s-length contract with them, and therefore it suggests that compensation practices in a large number of controlled companies may have their own pathologies. (..) controllers may wish to overpay managers in order to maximize their consumption of private benefits, while providing professional managers with a premium for their “loyalty” and for colluding with tunneling activities. (..) aggravated by the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual-class share structures, which distort controllers’ monitoring incentives due to the wedge it creates between controllers’ cash flow rights and control rights. (..) certain controllers, (..) could be “weak” due to their lack of experience, motivation or talent, and thus are more easily captured by professional CEOs.(..) biased due to their longstanding professional and social relationship with professional managers, (..) help explain recent puzzling phenomena such as the overly generous pay patterns in Viacom or other controlled companies, as well as the rise in say-on-pay rules in countries with concentrated ownership (as observed in a recent study by Thomas & Van der Elst). -- links to article
article  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_ownership  corporate_control  principal-agent  asset_stripping  tunneling  conflict_of_interest  executive_compensation  1-percent  investors  shareholders  shareholder_voting  institutional_investors 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Nitzan - Global Capital: Political Economy of Capitalist Power (YorkU, Graduate Seminar, Fall Term, 2014-15) | bnarchives
The seminar has two related goals: substantive and pedagogical. The substantive purpose is to tackle the question of capital head on. The course explores a spectrum of liberal and Marxist theories, ideologies and dogmas – as well as a radical alternative to these views. The argument is developed theoretically, historically and empirically. The first part of the seminar provides a critical overview of political economy, examining its historical emergence, triumph and eventual demise. The second part deals with the two ‘materialistic’ schools of capital – the liberal theory of utility and the Marxist theory of labour time – dissecting their structure, strengths and limitations. The third part brings power back in: it analyses the relation between accumulation and sabotage, studies the institutions of the corporation and the state and introduces a new framework – the capitalist mode of power. The final part offers an alternative approach – the theory of capital as power – and illustrates how this approach can shed light on conflict-ridden processes such as corporate merger, stagflation, imperialism and Middle East wars. Pedagogically, the seminar seeks to prepare students toward conducting their own independent re-search. Students are introduced to various electronic data sources, instructed in different methods of analysis and tutored in developing their empirical research skills. As the seminar progresses, these skills are used both to assess various theories and to develop the students’ own theoretical/empirical research projects. -- Keywords: arms accumulation capital capitalism conflict corporation crisis distribution elite energy finance globalization growth imperialism GPE liberalism Marxism military Mumford national interest neoclassical neoliberalism oil ownership peace power profit ruling class security stagflation state stock market technology TNC Veblen violence war -- syllabus and session handouts downloaded pdf to Note
bibliography  syllabus  capital_as_power  international_political_economy  political_economy  economic_theory  liberalism  neoliberalism  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  capital  capitalism  social_theory  power-asymmetric  globalization  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  international_finance  finance_capital  financialization  production  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  inequality  MNCs  corporations  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  corporate_control_markets  economic_growth  economic_models  imperialism  military  military-industrial_complex  IR_theory  ruling_class  class_conflict  energy  energy-markets  MENA  accumulation  accumulation-differential  capital_markets  public_finance  profit  investment  technology  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  capitalism-systemic_crisis  Veblen  Mumford  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Hyeng-Joon Park - Korea’s Post-1997 Restructuring: An Analysis of Capital as Power | forthcoming in Review of Radical Political Economics (2015) pp. 1-44 | bnarchives
This paper aims to transcend current debates on Korea’s post-1997 restructuring, which rely on a dichotomy between domestic industrial capital and foreign financial capital, by adopting Nitzan and Bichler’s capital-as-power perspective. Based on this approach, the paper analyzes Korea’s recent political economic restructuring as the latest phase in the evolution of capitalist power and its transformative regimes of capital accumulation. -- Keywords: differential accumulation dominant capital chaebols transnationalization strategic sabotage -- Subjects: BN State & Government, BN Institutions, BN Power, BN International & Global, BN Region - Asia, BN Business Enterprise, BN Value & Price, BN Crisis, BN Production, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Money & Finance, BN Distribution, BN Comparative, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Policy, BN Class, BN Labour, BN Growth -- downloaded from author's blog to Note
article  international_political_economy  capital_as_power  globalization  Korea  East_Asia  20thC  21stC  economic_history  1990s  2000s  2010s  Asian_crisis  Asia_Pacific  international_finance  FDI  finance_capital  financialization  emerging_markets  oligopoly  chaebols  crony_capitalism  industry  production  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalization  accumulation  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  cross-border  trade  productivity-labor_share  class_conflict  labor_share  Labor_markets  unions  violence  economic_growth  sabotage-by_business  business-and-politics  business-norms  power-asymmetric  public_policy  public_goods  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  investment  banking  political_culture  economic_culture  economic_reform  economic_policy  democracy  opposition  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader

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