dunnettreader + corporate_citizenship   48

Corporate Criminal Accountability for International Crimes
Above: The International Criminal Court Ed. note. This post is the latest in our series on the upcoming U.S. Supreme Court case Jesner. v. Arab Bank , a case…
corporate_citizenship  corporate_personhood  accountability  international_law  international_crimes  Evernote  from instapaper
december 2017 by dunnettreader
David Ciepley - Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article challenges the liberal, contractual theory of the corporation and argues for replacing it with a political theory of the corporation. Corporations are government-like in their powers, and government grants them both their external "personhood" and their internal governing authority. They are thus not simply private. Yet they are privately organized and financed and therefore not simply public. Corporations transgress all the basic dichotomies that structure liberal treatments of law, economics, and politics: public/private, government/market, privilege/equality, and status/contract. They are "franchise governments" that cannot be satisfactorily assimilated to liberalism. The liberal effort to assimilate them, treating them as contractually constituted associations of private property owners, endows them with rights they ought not have, exacerbates their irresponsibility, and compromises their principal public benefit of generating long-term growth. Instead, corporations need to be placed in a distinct category—neither public nor private, but "corporate"—to be regulated by distinct rules and norms. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
organizations  institutional_economics  corporations  corporate_citizenship  markets-dependence_on_government  article  corporate_control  institutions  management  public-private_gaps  bibliography  social_contract  liberalism  jstor  property_rights  downloaded  corporate_law  political_theory  managerialism  corporate_governance  corporate_personhood  firms-organization  property 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
What It's Worth - Building a Strong Financial Future
Americans everywhere struggle to build strong financial futures for themselves and their families. The new book, What It's Worth, provides a roadmap for what families, communities and our nation can do to move forward on the path to financial well-being.
Collection of essays by people working on financial inclusion, asset-building etc. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
gig_economy  education-finance  philanthropy  credit  usury  financial_innovation  US_society  inequality-wealth  local_government  pensions  corporate_citizenship  mobility  banking  wages  health_care  access_to_finance  housing  financial_regulation  report  social_entrepreneurs  poverty  downloaded  welfare  US_economy  US_politics  families  mortgages  segregation  inequality  NBFI  unemployment  US_government 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Emily Erikson : Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company, 1600–1757 | Princeton University Press
The EIF was one of the most powerful and enduring organizations in history. "Between Monopoly and Free Trade" locates the source of that success in the innovative policy by which the Court of Directors granted employees the right to pursue their own commercial interests while in the firm’s employ. Exploring trade network dynamics, decision-making processes, and ports and organizational context, Emily Erikson demonstrates why the EIC was a dominant force in the expansion of trade between Europe and Asia, and she sheds light on the related problems of why England experienced rapid economic development and how the relationship between Europe and Asia shifted in the 18thC and 19thC.(..) Building on the organizational infrastructure of the Company and the sophisticated commercial institutions of the markets of the East, employees constructed a cohesive internal network of peer communications that directed English trading ships during their voyages. This network integrated Company operations, encouraged innovation, and increased the Company’s flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness to local circumstance. -- assistant professor in the department of sociology and the school of management (by courtesy) at Yale University, as well as a member of the Council of South Asian Studies. -- excerpt Chapter 1 downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle-available  buy  economic_history  business_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  colonialism  imperialism  networks-business  networks-political  networks-information  networks-social  India  Indian_Ocean  Central_Asia  Chinese_history  China-international_relations  monopolies  trading_companies  trading_privileges  VOC  East_India_Company  trade  trade_finance  shipping  ports  British_Navy  business-and-politics  business_practices  business_influence  business-norms  nabobs  MPs  Board_of_Trade  Parliament  entrepreneurs  organizations  firms-structure  firms-organization  consumer_revolution  exports  Navigation_Acts  Anglo-Dutch_wars  French_foreign_policy  competition-interstate  risk-mitigation  risk_management  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine - A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications :: SSRN - Journal of Corporation Law, 2015, Forthcoming (rev'd March 2015)
Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School -- This article connects the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby to the history of “corporate paternalism.” It details the history of employer efforts to restrict the freedom of employees, and legislative attempts to ensure worker freedom. It also highlights the role of employment in healthcare coverage, and situates the Affordable Care Act’s “minimum essential guarantees” in a historical and global context. The article also discusses how Hobby Lobby combines with the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius to constrain the government’s ability to extend the social safety net, and shows how those decisions put pressure on corporate law itself. -- Note: The article was the subject of lectures to the Securities Regulation Institute of Northwestern University School of Law and the American Constitution Society Student Chapter at Harvard Law School. -- PDF File: 76 -- Keywords: Hobby Lobby; corporate law; corporate paternalism -- right on Leo! -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  US_constitution  US_legal_system  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholders  freedom_of_conscience  SCOTUS  labor  labor_standards  employers  employee_benefits  welfare_economics  welfare_state  health_care  campaign_finance  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine - The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Law :: SSRN Wake Forest Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming (March 20, 2015)
Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; Penn Law School -- There is now a tendency among those who believe that corporations should be more socially responsible to pretend that corporate directors do not have an obligation under Delaware corporate law to make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance within the limits of their legal discretion. These advocates of CSR contend that Delaware directors may subordinate stockholder welfare to other interests, such as those of the company’s workers or society generally. (..) But, the problem with that argument is that it is inconsistent with both judge-made common law of corporations in Delaware and the design of the Delaware General Corporation Law. More important, pretending that the nation’s leading corporate law is fundamentally different than it is runs contrary to the goal of ensuring that for-profit corporations behave lawfully, responsibly, and ethically. Lecturing others to do the right thing without acknowledging the rules that apply to their behavior and the power dynamics to which they are subject is not a responsible path to social progress. Rather, it provides an excuse to avoid tougher policy challenges, such as advocating for stronger externality regulation and encouraging institutional investors to exercise their power as stockholders responsibly. Those challenges must be confronted if we are to ensure that for-profit corporations are vehicles for responsible, sustainable, long-term wealth creation. -- PDF File: 43 -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_legal_system  US_politics  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  profit_maximization  principal-agent  fiduciaries  law-and-economics  CSR  capital_as_power  duties-legal  duties-civic  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  Delaware_law  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling "Citizens United" with Corporate Law History :: SSRN - Notre Dame Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming (rev'd March 2015)
Leo E. Strine Jr., Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; Penn Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz -- Citizens United has been the subject of a great deal of commentary, but one important aspect of the decision that has not been explored in detail is the historical basis for Justice Scalia’s claims in his concurring opinion that the majority holding is consistent with originalism. In this article, we engage in a deep inquiry into the historical understanding of the rights of the business corporation as of 1791 and 1868 — two periods relevant to an originalist analysis of the First Amendment. Based on the historical record, Citizens United is far more original than originalist, and if the decision is to be justified, it has to be on jurisprudential grounds originalists traditionally disclaim as illegitimate. -- PDF File: 94 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, constitutional interpretation, original intent, original understanding, originalism, election law, campaign finance reform, corporate personhood, general corporation statutes, political speech, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  US_constitution  constitutional_law  originalism  free_speech  civil_liberties  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  elections  campaign_finance  politics-and-money  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Misrepresentation of Earnings by Ilia D. Dichev, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Shivaram Rajgopal :: SSRN June 2, 2015
Ilia D. Dichev, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- John R. Graham, Duke University; NBER -- Campbell R. Harvey, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; NBER -- Shivaram Rajgopal, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- We ask nearly 400 CFOs about the definition and drivers of earnings quality, with a special emphasis on the prevalence and detection of earnings misrepresentation. CFOs believe that the hallmarks of earnings quality are sustainability, absence of one-time items, and backing by actual cash flows. Earnings quality is determined in about equal measure by controllable factors like internal controls and corporate governance, and non-controllable factors like industry membership and macroeconomic conditions. On earnings misrepresentation, CFOs believe that in any given period a remarkable 20% of firms intentionally distort earnings, even though they are adhering to generally accepted accounting principles. The economic magnitude of the misrepresentation is large, averaging about 10% of reported earnings. While most misrepresentation involves earnings overstatement, interestingly, one third of the firms that are misrepresenting performance are low-balling their earnings or reversing a prior intentional overstatement. Finally, CFOs provide a list of red flags that can be used to detect earnings misrepresentation. --"PDF File: 23 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  disclosure  accounting  GAAP  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  business-norms  business-ethics  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  profits  investors  investor_protection  incentives-distortions 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lyman Johnson, David Millon - Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby :: SSRN (rev'd Jan 2015) THE BUSINESS LAWYER, Vol 70 - November 2014
Lyman Johnson, Washington and Lee University - School of Law; University of St. Thomas, St. Paul/Minneapolis, MN - School of Law -- David Millon
Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- We evaluate the U.S. Supreme Court's controversial decision in the Hobby Lobby case from the perspective of state corporate law. We argue that the Court is correct in holding that corporate law does not mandate that business corporations limit themselves to pursuit of profit. Rather, state law allows incorporation 'for any lawful purpose.' We elaborate on this important point and also explain what it means for a corporation to 'exercise religion.' In addition, we address the larger implications of the Court's analysis for an accurate understanding both of state law's essentially agnostic stance on the question of corporate purpose and also of the broad scope of managerial discretion. -- PDF File: 33 -- Keywords: Corporate purpose, Corporate personhood, Shareholder wealth maximization, Shareholder primacy, Corporate social responsibility -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholders  freedom_of_conscience  SCOTUS  civil_liberties  corporate_control  corporate_personhood  limited_liability  corporations-closely-held  corporations  CSR  shareholder_value  shareholder_voting  profit_maximization  law-and-economics  labor_law  employee_benefits  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  constitutional_law  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - Radical Shareholder Primacy :: SSRN - Aug 2014
Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- University of St. Thomas Law Journal, Vol. 10:4 (2013) -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-17 -- written for a symposium on the history of CSR, seeks to make sense of the surprising disagreement on the foundational legal question of corporate purpose: does the law require shareholder primacy or not? (..) disagreement is due to the unappreciated ambiguity in the shareholder primacy idea. (.. ) 2 models, the 'radical' and the 'traditional.' Radical shareholder primacy originated at Chicago in the later 1970s, (Daniel Fischel and Frank Easterbrook). [It asserts] that corporate management is the agent of the shareholders, charged with maximizing their wealth. There is no legal authority for this claim; Fischel drew it from the financial economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling, who used the agency idea in a non-legal sense. [The traditional model is] the idea that shareholders hold a privileged position within the corporation's governance structure, ... and (..) fiduciary duties as being owed to 'the corporation and its shareholders.' (..) shareholders enjoy primacy over (..) other stakeholders, although there is no maximization mandate and shareholders [have limited effective legal means] to insist that management privilege their interests. Nevertheless, this version of shareholder primacy is enshrined in the law, and, if the radical version's agency claim is laid to rest, there is no harm in acknowledging that fact. -- PDF File: 34 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  profit_maximization  principal-agent  fiduciaries  law-and-economics  CSR  capital_as_power  status_quo_bias 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Margaret Blair - What must corporate directors do? Maximizing shareholder value versus creating value through team production | Brookings Institution - June 2015
Blair reviews the legal and economic theories behind the share-value maximization norm, and then lays out a theory of corporate law building on the economics of team production. Arguing that the corporate form itself helps solve the team production problem, Blair details five features which distinguish corporations from other organizational forms: 1. Legal personality -- 2. Limited liability -- 3. Transferable shares -- 4. Management under a Board of Directors -- 5. Indefinite existence -- Blair concludes that these five characteristics are all problematic from a principal-agent point of view where shareholders are principals. However, the team production theory makes sense out of these arrangements. This theory provides a rationale for the role of corporate directors consistent with the role that boards of directors historically understood themselves to play: balancing competing interests so the whole organization stays productive. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  shareholder_value  hedge_funds  corporate_law  firms-theory  firms-structure  equity-corporate  equity_markets  investors  long-term_orientation  labor_share  cooperation  coordination  teams  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Perlstein - Social Capital, Corporate Purpose, and the Revival of American Capitalism | Brookings Institution - January 2014
Since the Great Recession of 2008, corporate profits have more than rebounded, and yet the rest of the American economy has struggled to recover. Widening income inequality and an erosion of social capital and economic trust has deprived capitalism of its moral high ground. The public has lost confidence in big businesses--asking what purpose they serve in society writ large. Pearlstein argues we can begin to restoring the economic and moral legitimacy of American capitalism by reconsidering the purpose of corporations in American life. Despite the current dominance of the theory of “maximizing shareholder value,” this idea has little basis in history or law. Shifting to a more balanced form of capitalism will take time, but some possible steps for reform include: #-# Support investment funds dedicated to long-term horizons, including socially responsible investment funds #-# Recalibrate corporate governance law to allow for more flexible decision making #-# Rebalance capital gains taxes to encourage long-term stock holding by investors #-# Explore regulatory options for financial services, like a financial transaction tax to dampen the influence of short-term trading #-# Encourage a wider range of corporate metrics beyond quarterly earnings guidance #-# Reform shareholder voting rights to foster a sense of stewardship -- didn't download it -- Brookings also has video of Perlstein in Charlie Rose
paper  video  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  corporate_finance  corporate_law  corporate_tax  financial_crisis  investors  institutional_investors  shareholder_value  capital_markets  shareholder_voting  capital_gains  financial_transaction_tax  short-termism  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Bill Galston and Elaine Karmack - Overcoming corporate short-termism: Blackrock's chairman weighs in | Brookings Institution - April 2015
hen the head of the world’s largest investment fund raises fundamental questions about U.S. corporations, we should all pay attention.

In a letter earlier this week to the Fortune 500 CEOs, BlackRock Chairman Larry Fink criticized the short-term orientation that he believes shapes too much of today’s corporate behavior. “It concerns us,” he declared, that “in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from investing in the future growth of their companies. Too many have cut capital expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks.” And he concluded, “When done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, [returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable long-term returns.”
institutional_investors  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_finance  CSR  short-termism  capital_markets  shareholder_value  capital_gains  investment  R&D  buybacks 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, George Serafeim - Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional Perspective (revised September 2014) :: SSRN
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* Chapter in Stewardship of the Future, edited by Ed Lawler, Sue Mohrman, and James O’Toole, Greenleaf, 2015. *--* In this paper, we present the two primary functions of corporate reporting (information and transformation) and why currently isolated financial and sustainability reporting are not likely to perform effectively those functions. We describe the concept of integrated reporting and why integrated reporting could be a superior mechanism to perform these functions. Moreover, we discuss, through a series of case studies, what constitutes an effective integrated report (Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company) and the role of regulation in integrated reporting (Anglo-American). -- Pages in PDF File: 21 -- Keywords: corporate reporting, integrated reporting, information, investing, sustainability, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  CSR  sustainability  accounting  disclosure  disclosure-integrated  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  information-markets  investors  risk_management  institutional_change  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Jock Herron, George Serafeim - Reliable Sustainability Ratings: The Influence of Business Models on Information Intermediaries (revised October 2014) :: SSRN
ility Ratings: The Influence of Business Models on Information Intermediaries

Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Jock Herron, Harvard University - School of Design -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School -- Chapter in Routledge Handbook on Responsible Investing (Forthcoming) *--* A new generation of corporate reporting - integrated reporting - is emerging that will help investors and other key stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, and NGOs develop a deeper and more comprehensive appreciation of corporate performance than what is currently provided by GAAP financial reporting. The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimal design of information intermediaries that can increase the impact of sustainability information on corporate conduct. Specifically, we focus on two issues: who pays for the information and which performance metrics should be included in assessing the sustainability performance of a company. -- Pages in PDF File: 28 -- Keywords: sustainability, ratings, corporate performance, rating agencies, conflicts of interest, integrated reporting, corporate social responsibility -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  SSRN  CSR  sustainability  accounting  disclosure  disclosure-integrated  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  information-markets  information-intermediaries  rating_agencies  ratings  conflict_of_interest  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
George Serafeim - The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future Research b(revised June 2014) :: SSRN
Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this alternative view better fits actual corporate conduct, I discuss opportunities for future research. Specifically, I call for research on the materiality of environmental and social issues for the future financial performance of corporations, the design of incentive and control systems to guide strategy execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm. -- Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: corporate performance, corporate size, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  global_economy  global_governance  international_political_economy  shareholder_value  shareholders  CSR  disclosure  accountability  accounting  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  incentives  institutional_change  long-term_orientation  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_practices  business_influence  sustainability  MNCs  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  power  power-concentration  concentration-industry  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance - November 23, 2011 :: SSRN - Management Science, Forthcoming
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* We investigate the effect of a corporate culture of sustainability on multiple facets of corporate behavior and performance outcomes. Using a matched sample of 180 companies, we find that corporations that voluntarily adopted environmental and social policies many years ago – termed as High Sustainability companies – exhibit fundamentally different characteristics from a matched sample of firms that adopted almost none of these policies – termed as Low Sustainability companies. In particular, we find that the boards of directors of these companies are more likely to be responsible for sustainability and top executive incentives are more likely to be a function of sustainability metrics. Moreover, they are more likely to have organized procedures for stakeholder engagement, to be more long-term oriented, and to exhibit more measurement and disclosure of nonfinancial information. Finally, we provide evidence that High Sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance. The outperformance is stronger in sectors where the customers are individual consumers instead of companies, companies compete on the basis of brands and reputations, and products significantly depend upon extracting large amounts of natural resources. -- Keywords: sustainability, corporate social responsibility, culture, governance, disclosure, performance -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_finance  CSR  brands  reputation  incentives  sustainability  long-term_orientation  natural_resources  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  executive_compensation  business-norms  profit  disclosure 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Geoffrey Jones (HBS Working Papers 2013) - Debating the Responsibility of Capitalism in Historical and Global Perspective
This working paper examines the evolution of concepts of the responsibility of business in a historical and global perspective. It shows that from the nineteenth century American, European, Japanese, Indian and other business leaders discussed the responsibilities of business beyond making profits, although until recently such views have not been mainstream. There was also a wide variation concerning the nature of this responsibility. This paper argues that four factors drove such beliefs: spirituality; self-interest; fears of government intervention; and the belief that governments were incapable of addressing major social issues.

Keywords: Rachel Carson; Sustainability; Local Food; Operations Management; Supply Chain; Business And Society; Business Ethics; Business History; Corporate Philanthropy; Corporate Social Responsibility; Corporate Social Responsibility And Impact; Environmentalism; Environmental Entrepreneurship; Environmental And Social Sustainability; Ethics; Globalization; History; Religion; Consumer Products Industry; Chemical Industry; Beauty and Cosmetics Industry; Energy Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; Forest Products Industry; Green Technology Industry; Manufacturing Industry; Asia; Europe; Latin America; Middle East; North and Central America; Africa
paper  downloaded  economic_history  business_history  imperialism  US  British_Empire  France  Germany  Japan  Spain  Dutch  Latin_America  Ottoman_Empire  India  18thC  19thC  20thC  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  business  busisness-ethics  business-and-politics  common_good  communitarian  environment  labor  patriarchy  paternalism  labor_standards  regulation  product_safety  inequality  comparative_economics  capital_as_power  capitalism  CSR  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_sociology  self-interest  ideology 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - For worker control | Stumbling & Mumbling - Dec 2014
Neal Lawson is absolutely right. Social democracy is "hopelessly prepared for the 21st century." This is because it is yet another example of an idea that has outlived its usefulness. Social democrats used to think that they did not need to challenge the fundamental power structures of capitalism because, with a few good top-down economic and social policies, capitalism could be made to deliver increased benefits for workers and the poor in terms both of rising real wages and better public services. (..) Secular stagnation means real incomes mightn't grow much. Globalized (pdf) labour markets and mass unemployment might exacerbate the effect of this in depressing real wages. Job polarization and the degradation of once-good jobs means workers face deteriorating job quality. And (self-imposed) austerity means that what economic growth we do get won't translate into better public services. Times have changed. So the left must change. Neal says: "Instead of pulling policy levers, the job is to create the platforms so that people can collectively change things for themselves." There's one context in which this is especially necessary - the workplace.
21stC  political_economy  stagnation  labor  wages  social_democracy  left-wing  corporate_governance  worker_co-ops  unions  managrrialism  corporate_citizenship  common_good  profit  links  ideology  power-asymnetric 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Lori Wallach & Ben Beachy - Eyes on Trade: Defending Foreign Corporations' Privileges Is Hard, Especially When Looking At The Facts - Nov 11 2014
Forbes just published this response from Lori Wallach and Ben Beachy (GTW director and research director) to a counterfactual Forbes opinion piece by John Brinkley in support of investor-state dispute settlement. Even those who support the controversial idea of a parallel legal system for foreign corporations, known as investor-state dispute settlement or ISDS, likely cringed at John Brinkley’s recent attempt to defend that system. (“Trade Dispute Settlement: Much Ado About Nothing,” October 16.) In trying to justify trade agreement provisions that provide special rights and privileges to foreign firms to the disadvantage of their domestic competitors, Brinkley wrote 24 sentences with factual assertions. Seventeen of them were factually wrong.
US_foreign_policy  US_legal_system  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  cross-border  treaties  ISDS  free_trade  trade-policy  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  Trans-Pacific-Partnership  fast_track  US_trade_agreements  international_law  property_rights  property-confiscations  competition  Congress  consumer_protection  environment  FDI  investor-State_disputes  investment-bilateral_treaties  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court - Delaware Benefit Corporations: Making It Easier for Directors To “Do The Right Thing” in Harvard Business Law Review — The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regul
Pdf of a recently published an article in the Harvard Business Law Review. -- Abstract - Some scholars(..) argue that managers should “do the right thing,” while ignoring that in the current corporate accountability structure, stockholders are the only constituency given any enforceable rights, and thus are the only one with substantial influence over managers. Few (..real proposals) that would give corporate managers more ability and greater incentives to consider the interests of other constituencies. This Article posits that benefit corporation (bencorps) statutes have the potential to change the accountability structure within which managers operate. Certain provisions (..) can create a meaningful shift in the balance of power that will in fact give corporate managers more ability to and impose upon them an enforceable duty to “do the right thing.” But (..) important questions must be answered to determine whether (bencorp) statutes will have the durable, systemic effect desired. (1) the initial wave of entrepreneurs who form (bencorps) must demonstrate a genuine commitment to (..CSR) to preserve the credibility of the movement. (2) (..) socially responsible investment funds must be willing to vote their long-term consciences instead of cashing in for short-term gains. To that end, it is crucial that (bencorps) show that doing things “the right way” will be profitable in the long run. (3) (bencorpos) must pass the “going public” test. Finally, subsidiaries that are governed as (bencorps) must honor their commitments and grow successfully, if the movement is to grow to scale. - downloaded pdf to Note
article  US_legal_system  corporate_law  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_ownership  corporate_control  principal-agent  management  CSR  institutional_investors  investment-socially_responsible  stakeholders  investment  accountability  benefit_corporations  public_interest  common_good  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson - Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending - Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 101, April 2013, pp. 923-967 :: SSRN (last revised August 2014)
Lucian A. Bebchuk - Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) -- Robert J. Jackson Jr. - Columbia Law School --- The SEC is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the SEC develop rules requiring that public companies disclose their spending on politics. The petition, which was submitted by a committee of ten corporate law professors that we co-chaired, has received unprecedented support, including comment letters from nearly half a million individuals. (...)the petition has also attracted opponents, including prominent members of Congress and business organizations.This Article puts forward a comprehensive, empirically grounded case for the rulemaking advocated in the petition. We present (..) evidence indicating that a substantial amount of corporate spending on politics occurs under investors’ radar screens, and that shareholders have significant interest in receiving information about such spending. We argue that disclosure of corporate political spending is necessary to ensure that such spending is consistent with shareholder interests. We discuss the emergence of voluntary disclosure practices in this area and show why voluntary disclosure is not a substitute for SEC rules. We also provide a framework for the SEC’s design of these rules. Finally, we consider and respond to ten objections that have been raised to disclosure rules of this kind. We show that all of the considered objections, both individually and collectively, provide no basis for opposing rules that would require public companies to disclose their spending on politics. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  US_government  administrative_law  administrative_agencies  financial_system  SEC  disclosure  corporate_law  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  campaign_finance  capital_markets  investors  political_participation  lobbying  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Sept 2014) - OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Tax | OECD
The spread of the digital economy poses challenges for international taxation. This report sets out an analysis of these tax challenges. It notes that because the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself, it would not be feasible to ring-fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes. The report notes, however, that certain business models and key features of the digital economy may exacerbate BEPS risks. These BEPS risks will be addressed by the work on the other Actions in the BEPS Action Plan, which will take the relevant features of the digital economy into account. The report also analyses a number of broader tax challenges raised by the digital economy, and discusses potential options to address them, noting the need for further work during 2015 to evaluate these broader challenges and potential option. - Report can be read online or $ for download
report  OECD  G20  BEPS  21stC  international_political_economy  global_governance  MNCs  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  OECD_economies  transfer_pricing  transaction_costs  digital_economy  accounting  firms-structure  IP  profit  arms-length_transactions  treaties  corporate_citizenship  corporate_law  corporate_tax  reform-legal  fiscal_policy 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Oct 2014 - Release of discussion draft on Action 7 of the BEPS Action Plan (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status) | Tax treaties - OECD
The OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, July 2013, identifies 15 actions to address BEPS in a comprehensive manner and sets deadlines to implement these actions. Action 7 – Prevent the Artificial Avoidance of PE (permanent establishment) Status -- including through the use of commissionnaire arrangements and the specific activity exemptions. Work on these issues will also address related profit attribution issues. -- Public comments are invited on a discussion draft which ... includes proposals for changes to the definition of PE in the OECD Model Tax Convention. -- The Action Plan also notes that MNCs may artificially fragment their operations among multiple group entities to qualify for the exceptions to PE status for preparatory and auxiliary activities. -- Further, the Report Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy has identified issues in the digital economy that need to be taken into account in the course of the work on Action 7, namely ensuring that core activities cannot inappropriately benefit from the exception from PE status and that artificial arrangements relating to sales of goods and services cannot be used to avoid PE status.
OECD  OECD_economies  international_political_economy  global_governance  MNCs  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  transfer_pricing  treaties  BEPS  accounting  corporate_tax  corporate_citizenship  corporate_law  reform-legal  digital_economy  G20  profit  arms-length_transactions  transaction_costs  firms-structure 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Bichler, Shimshon and Nitzan, Jonathan - The Asymptotes of Power - Real-World Economics Review. No. 60. June 2012. pp. 18-53 | bnarchives
Article workup of earlier conference paper -- This is the latest in a series of articles we have been writing on the current crisis. The purpose of our previous papers was to characterize the crisis. We claimed that it was a 'systemic crisis', and that capitalists were gripped by 'systemic fear'. In this article, we seek to explain why. The problem that capitalists face today, we argue, is not that their power has withered, but, on the contrary, that their power has increased. Indeed, not only has their power increased, it has increased by so much that it might be approaching its asymptote. And since capitalists look not backward to the past but forward to the future, they have good reason to fear that, from now on, the most likely trajectory of this power will be not up, but down. The paper begins by setting up our general framework and key concepts. It continues with a step-by-step deconstruction of key power processes in the United States, attempting to assess how close these processes are to their asymptotes. And it concludes with brief observations about what may lie ahead. -- Keywords: capitalization distribution power, systemic crisis -- Subjects: BN Money & Finance, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Distribution, BN Resistance, BN Power, BN Region - North America, BN Business Enterprise, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Value & Price, BN Class, BN Crisis -- downloaded pdf to Note, also Excel data sheet
article  international_political_economy  capital_as_power  financial_system  international_finance  global_economy  global_system  ruling_class  transnational_elites  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  globalization  power-asymmetric  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  finance_capital  financialization  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  profit  labor_share  risk-systemic  inequality  plutocracy  1-percent  conflict  violence  class_conflict  neoliberalism  corporate_citizenship  systems-complex_adaptive  systems_theory  grassroots  opposition  democracy  democracy_deficit  accumulation  capitalization  US_politics  US_economy  political_economy  political_culture  economic_culture  elites  rebellion  failed_states  property_rights  business-and-politics  business-norms  economic_growth  fear  data  capitalism-systemic_crisis  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
What Is ISDS? | AFL-CIO Issues
What’s the risk? -- The risk is that foreign property owners can use this system of "corporate courts" to challenge anything from plain packaging rules for cigarettes to denials of permits for toxic waste dumps to increases in the minimum wage. For any law, regulation or other government decision that the foreign investor does not like, all it has to do is think of an argument for why the decision somehow violated its right to “fair and equitable treatment” or why it might reduce its expected profits and it’s got a case. And, sometimes, just threatening the case is enough for the proposed law or regulation to be withdrawn. -- downloaded pdf to Note "End Corporate Courts Now"
US_economy  US_politics  Congress  Obama_administration  US_government  state_government  regulation  regulation-harmonization  trade-agreements  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  unions  investor-State_disputes  investment-bilateral_treaties  corporate_citizenship  MNCs  dispute_resolution  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark S. Mizruchi - Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations | JSTOR: Theory and Society, Vol. 33, No. 5 (Oct., 2004), pp. 579-617
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), Berle and Means warned of the concentration of economic power brought on by the rise of the large corporation and the emergence of a powerful class of professional managers, insulated from the pressure not only of stockholders, but of the larger public as well. In the tradition of Thomas Jefferson, Berle and Means warned that the ascendance of management control and unchecked corporate power had potentially serious consequences for the democratic character of the United States. Social scientists who drew on Berle and Means in subsequent decades presented a far more benign interpretation of the rise of managerialism, however. For them, the separation of ownership from control actually led to an increased level of democratization in the society as a whole. Beginning in the late 1960s, sociologists and other social scientists rekindled the debate over ownership and control, culminating in a series of rigorous empirical studies on the nature of corporate power in American society. In recent years, however, sociologists have largely abandoned the topic, ceding it to finance economists, legal scholars, and corporate strategy researchers. In this article, I provide a brief history of the sociological and finance/legal/strategy debates over corporate ownership and control. I discuss some of the similarities between the two streams of thought, and I discuss the reasons that the issue was of such significance sociologically. I then argue that by neglecting this topic in recent years, sociologists have failed to contribute to an understanding of some of the key issues in contemporary business behavior. I provide brief reviews of four loosely developed current perspectives and then present an argument of my own about the changing nature of the U.S. corporate elite over the past three decades. I conclude with a call for sociologists to refocus their attention on an issue that, however fruitfully handled by scholars in other fields, cries out for sociological analysis. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  US_economy  US_politics  political_economy  political_sociology  economic_sociology  law-and-finance  law-and-economics  capitalism  corporations  MNCs  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  shareholder_value  shareholders  principal-agent  management  managerialism  corporate_citizenship  corporate_control_markets  corporate_law  M&A  business-and-politics  business-norms  power  power-asymmetric  status  interest_groups  lobbying  regulation  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Brayden G King and Nicholas A. Pearce - The Contentiousness of Markets: Politics, Social Movements, and Institutional Change in Markets | JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 36 (2010), pp. 249-267
While much of economic sociology focuses on the stabilizing aspects of markets, the social movement perspective emphasizes the role that contentiousness plays in bringing institutional change and innovation to markets. Markets are inherently political, both because of their ties to the regulatory functions of the state and because markets are contested by actors who are dissatisfied with market outcomes and who use the market as a platform for social change. Research in this area focuses on the pathways to market change pursued by social movements, including direct challenges to corporations, the institutionalization of systems of private regulation, and the creation of new market categories through institutional entrepreneurship. Much contentiousness, while initially disruptive, works within the market system by producing innovation and restraining capitalism from destroying the resources it depends on for survival. -- still paywall -- 155 references-- see bibliography on jstor information page
article  jstor  paywall  social_theory  political_sociology  economic_sociology  markets-structure  markets_in_everything  Innovation  social_movements  conflict  political_economy  regulation  capitalism  environment  institutional_change  social_process  change-social  CSR  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  self-regulation  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
John Groenewegen - European Integration and Changing Corporate Governance Structures: The Case of France | JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 471-479
Speculates that the economic and business cultures of major countries are distinctive enough that the expectation of global convergence on Anglo-Saxon corporate governance norms is too simplistic. It's based implicitly or explicitly on the assumption that liberalization of European capital markets will produce a European-wide market in corporate control that will impose its Anglo-Saxon norms and values via access to and pricing of international capital. He looks at ways that European Integration might reinforce local norms or converge toward a more European set of values and governance practices. Short article, didn't download
article  jstor  France  Eurozone  EU  market_integration  capital_markets  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  corporate_control_markets  busisness-ethics  business-norms  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
theAIRnet.org - Home
The Academic-Industry Research Network – theAIRnet – is a private, 501(c)(3) not-for-profit research organization devoted to the proposition that a sound understanding of the dynamics of industrial development requires collaboration between academic scholars and industry experts. We engage in up-to-date, in-depth, and incisive research and commentary on issues related to industrial innovation and economic development. Our goal is to understand the ways in which, through innovation, businesses and governments can contribute to equitable and stable economic growth – or what we call “sustainable prosperity”.
website  economic_growth  industry  technology  Innovation  green_economy  development  business  business-and-politics  capitalism  global_economy  public-private_partnerships  public_policy  public_health  public_goods  urban_development  health_care  IP  Labor_markets  wages  unemployment  education-training  sustainability  financial_system  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  CSR  firms-theory  management  plutocracy  MNCs  international_political_economy  human_capital  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  supply_chains  R&D  common_good  1-percent  inequality  working_class  work-life_balance  workforce  regulation  regulation-harmonization  incentives  stagnation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Ruud de Mooij, Michael Keen, Victoria Perry - Fixing international corporate taxation | vox 14 September 2014
IMF experience in developing countries points to some distinctive policy issues. Over the past 2 decades, developing countries have signed a huge number of tax treaties. But the evidence on whether they actually affect FDI (plagued by endogeneity issues) is mixed at best. What we do see in our country work are sometimes significant revenue losses, reinforced by the ability of MNCs to route and structure their intra-group payments to exploit treaty arrangements. This has for some while led IMF staff to (cautiously) urge caution in signing treaties – a view... included in the G20-OECD Action Plan of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project. [A less prominent but important issue] is the tax treatment of capital gains on the transfer of interest in assets, such as telecoms or mineral licenses – it may be possible to avoid tax in the country where these assets are inherently located by holding them through a chain of offshore companies, and then selling the claim to a low-tax jurisdiction. This has emerged as a macro-relevant concern in several low-income countries (such as Mauritania and Uganda). *-* The underlying policy issue is one of spillovers in international taxation – the effects that, through the ways in which business reacts, one country’s tax decisions have an impact on others. A low or zero tax rate on income arising in a country is only the most obvious route. Network externalities also arise from the signing of treaties (if A, which has a treaty with B, signs another with C, in effect creating a treaty between B and C without consent from B); and countries can compete over tax bases by special regimes for types of income or activities. *-* one has to start by looking at the basic architecture of international taxation. -- closer to where the world may be heading, is moving toward a combination of arm’s-length pricing on transactions where this is relatively easy (such as for most tangibles) and a formulaic profit split where it is not (such as for most intangibles). And there are other suggestions for fundamentally different international tax policies, such as that for destination-based corporate tax, which mimics a VAT but with a deduction for the cost of labour.
international_political_economy  global_economy  global_governance  taxes  tax_havens  MNCs  transfer_pricing  trade-agreements  treaties  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  law-and-finance  corporate_citizenship  emerging_markets  G20  OECD_economies  OECD  IMF  FDI  investment-bilateral_treaties  externalities  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Zephyr Teachout, Lina Khan - Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power :: SSRN September 7, 2014
Zephyr Teachout, Fordham University School of Law -- Lina Khan, Yale University - Law School -- Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, Forthcoming. **--** The goal of this Article is to create a way of seeing how market structure is innately political. It provides a taxonomy of ways in which large companies frequently exercise powers that possess the character of governance. Broadly, these exercises of power map onto three bodies of activity we generally assign to government: to set policy, to regulate markets, and to tax. We add a fourth category — which we call "dominance," after Brandeis — as a kind of catchall describing the other political impacts. The activities we outline will not always fit neatly into these categories, nor do all companies engage in all of these levels of power — that is not the point. The point is that Bank of America and Exxon govern our lives in a way that, say, the local ice cream store in your hometown does not. Explicitly understanding the power these companies wield as a form of political power expands the range of legal tools we should consider when setting policy around them. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 38 - Keywords: antitrust
paper  SSRN  political_economy  economic_culture  big_business  antitrust  regulation  power-asymmetric  legal_system  consumers  governance  governmentality  corporate_citizenship  consumer_protection  concentration-industry  dispute_resolution  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Edward D. Kleinbard - 'Competitiveness' Has Nothing to Do With It (Tax Notes, Forthcoming) :: SSRN August 27, 2014
USC Gould School of Law -- USC CLASS Research Papers Series No. CLASS 14-26 - USC Legal Studies Research Papers Series No. 14-34 -- The recent wave of corporate tax inversions has triggered interest in what motivates these tax-driven transactions now. Corporate executives have argued that inversions are explained by an "anti-competitive" U.S. tax environment, as evidenced by the federal corporate tax statutory rate, which is high by international standards, and by its "worldwide" tax base. This paper explains why this competitiveness narrative is largely fact-free, in part by using one recent articulation of that narrative (by Emerson Electric Co.’s former vice-chairman) as a case study. The recent surge in interest in inversion transactions is explained primarily by U.S. based multinational firms’ increasingly desperate efforts to find a use for their stockpiles of offshore cash (now totaling around $1 trillion), and by a desire to "strip" income from the U.S. domestic tax base through intragroup interest payments to a new parent company located in a lower-taxed foreign jurisdiction. These motives play out against a backdrop of corporate existential despair over the political prospects for tax reform, or for a second "repatriation tax holiday" of the sort offered by Congress in 2004. '- Number of Pages in PDF File: 32 -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  US_economy  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  Congress  US_politics  globalization  global_economy  business-and-politics  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Whatever Happened to Corporate Stewardship? - Rick Wartzman - Harvard Business Review
Rick Wartzman is the executive director of the Drucker Institute at Claremont Graduate University. Author or editor of five books, he is currently writing one about how the social contract between employer and employee in America has changed since the end of World War II -- In November 1956, Time magazine explored a phenomenon that went by various names: “capitalism with a conscience,” “enlightened conservatism,” “people’s capitalism,” and, most popularly, “The New Conservatism.” No matter which label one preferred, the basic concept was clear: Business leaders were demonstrating an ever increasing willingness, in the words of the story, to “shoulder a host of new responsibilities” and “judge their actions, not only from the standpoint of profit and loss” in their financial results “but of profit and loss to the community.” -- It is easy to overly romanticize 1950s corporate America. People of color faced terrible workplace discrimination at that time, as did women. Late in the decade, many big companies hardened their stance against organized labor, hastening its steep decline. Business culture could be rigid and stifling. Fear of communism and socialism, as much as altruism, was often at the root of corporate generosity. But for all the faults of that period, an ethos has been lost. The University of Michigan’s Mark Mizruchi, in his book The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite, describes it as “concern for the well-being of the broader society.” Notably, Mizruchi points to the 1956 Time article as a good representative of the ideas that then “dominated in the corporate discourse.”
CSR  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  shareholders  elites  elite_culture  labor  labor_history  post-WWII  neoliberalism  unions  US_history  US_economy  norms-business  business_cycles  business  business-and-politics  firms-theory  tax_havens 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Ronald Collins - Ask the author: Robert Post – Citizens Divided : SCOTUSblog - August 2014
The following is a series of questions posed by Ronald Collins on the occasion of the publication of Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform & the Constitution by Robert C. Post, with commentaries by Pamela Karlan, Lawrence Lessig, Frank Michelman, and Nadia Urbinati. -- The central thesis of my book is to distinguish between two forms of American constitutional self-government. In the first and historically prior form of self-government, self-determination consists of a process of representation mediated by elections. I call this view of self-government “representation.” In the second form of self-government, which did not emerge until the twentieth century, self-determination consists of processes of ongoing communication constituted by First Amendment rights. I call this view of self-government “discursive democracy.” It turns out that representation and discursive democracy possess entirely different constitutional structures and properties. The tension between representation and discursive democracy is at the heart of the doctrinal confusion of cases like Citizens United. -- Question: You write that the “Justices who joined the majority opinion in Citizens United did not seem aware that the constitutional value of electoral integrity is implicit in their own reliance on First Amendment rights.” In this regard you add that your hope in this book is to “build a bridge between the majority and the dissent by illuminating the entailments of our own contemporary commitment to First Amendment ideals.” Tell us about that “bridge” you hope to construct between the Court’s so-called conservative and liberal wings?
books  reviews  kindle-available  US_constitution  SCOTUS  free_speech  elections  political_participation  legitimacy  campaign_finance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_law  democracy  discourse-political_theory  deliberation-public  representative_institutions  oligarchy  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
"Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein" by David A. Skeel Jr. | Penn Law School
C David A. Skeel Jr., University of Pennsylvania -- published as 2 Berkeley J. L. & Bus. 105 -- Recommended Citation -- Skeel, David A. Jr., "Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein" (2005). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 692. - http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/692 -- downloaded pdf to Note
corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_law  busisness-ethics  downloaded 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Suresh Naidu - Capital Eats the World | Jacobin May 2014
A first step could be a multisector model with both a productive sector and an extractive, rent-seeking outlet for investment, so that the rate of return on capital has the potential to be unanchored from the growth of the economy. This model could potentially do a better job of explaining r > g in a world where capital has highly profitable opportunities in rent-seeking ....More fundamentally, a model that started with the financial and firm-level institutions underneath the supply and demand curves for capital, rather than blackboxing them in production and utility functions, could illuminate complementarities among the host of other political demands that would claw back the share taken by capital and lower the amount paid out as profits before the fiscal system gets its take. This is putting meat on what Brad Delong calls the “wedge” between the actual and warranted rate of profit. -- We need even more and even better economics to figure out which of these may get undone via market responses and which won’t, and to think about them jointly with the politics that make each feasible or not. While Piketty’s book diagnoses the problem of capital’s voracious appetite, it would require a different kind of model to take our focus off the nominal quantities registered by state fiscal systems, and instead onto the broader distribution of political power in the world economy.
books  reviews  kindle-available  Piketty  political_economy  economic_theory  heterodox_economics  neoclassical_economics  economic_models  economic_growth  wealth  capital  finance_capital  capitalism  labor  Labor_markets  unemployment  markets_in_everything  tax_havens  investment  investors  savings  inheritance  profit  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  inequality  technology  1-percent  rent-seeking  rentiers  class_conflict  oligarchy  taxes  productivity  corporate_finance  property  property_rights  neoliberalism 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Martin Wolf - AstraZeneca is more than investors’ call - FT.com - May 8 2014
The questions any normal person would ask are three. Would a takeover increase competition? Would it increase investment in life-transforming research? Would assurances given by the bidder about future production and research be credible? The answer to all is “no”. Yet the merger is likely to go ahead, because the only people whose interests count are shareholders, whether they have owned their shares for 10 years or 10 seconds. AstraZeneca can be sold and bought like a sack of potatoes. Does this make sense? Until recently I believed it to be the least bad arrangement. Now I am not so sure, as I shall argue in a conference on Inclusive Capitalism in London later this month. We need to rethink ownership and control of limited liability companies
UK_Government  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  shareholders  investors  Innovation  M&A  pharma  R&D 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Determining Materiality | Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
SASB’s Materiality Map™ creates a unique materiality profile for different industries. In order to comply with the SEC’s view of materiality, our approach is designed to provide a view into the information needs of the reasonable investor. The Map relies heavily on evidence of investor interest and evidence of financial impact, and it allows for adjustments based on financial impact and long-term sustainability principles. The quantitative model is designed to prioritize the issues that are most important within an industry, to keep the standards to a minimum set of issues that are likely to be material. Sustainability accounting standards are then developed based on both the quantitative results from the Map and a qualitative research process informed by SASB’s research team. The Map looks at 40+ sustainability issues and analyzes their importance in the context of the 80+ industries in SICS. -- Issues are classified under five categories: Environmental Capital, Social Capital, Human Capital, Business Model & Innovation, and Leadership & Governance. Traditionally, sustainability issues are classified under the common ESG structure; however, SASB uses a finer grained analysis in order to surface potential impacts on the company’s ability to create long-term value.
financial_regulation  accountability  accounting  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  CSR  risk  sustainability  climate  investment  capital_markets  industry 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Vision and Mission | Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
Facts About SASB *--* The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board is an independent 501(c)3 non-profit. *--* Through 2016 SASB is developing sustainability accounting standards for more than 80 industries in 10 sectors. *--* SASB standards are designed for the disclosure of material sustainability issues in mandatory SEC filings, such as the Form 10-K and 20-F. -**- SASB is accredited to establish sustainability accounting standards by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Accreditation by ANSI signifies that SASB’s procedures to develop standards meet ANSI’s requirements for openness, balance, consensus, and due process. *--* SASB is not affiliated with FASB, GASB, IASB or any other accounting standards boards. --- For more information about the principles, processes and definitions relevant to SASB’s standards setting process, please read our Conceptual Framework. (Pdf downloaded to Note)
financial_regulation  accountability  accounting  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  CSR  risk  sustainability  climate  investment  capital_markets  industry  downloaded  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
An Insider’s Guide to The SASB Experience | Sustainability Accounting Standards Board - May 2014
After a year of research, stakeholder engagement, feedback and refinement, SASB celebrated the reveal of its latest research results with evocative discourse about the Services Industry and its role in non-financial reporting. With over 190 participants representing 120 companies, the May Delta Series, which is the research process capstone, brought together its Industry Working Group participants as well as other integral stakeholders, to discuss the outcomes of their sector-specific research. -- panelists discussed experience getting buy in from different parts of organization and Board -- how using the quarterly 10-K form provided a familiar focus for measurement and reporting -- links to CSR and risk management, not just profitability measures, were especially important for directors
financial_regulation  accountability  accounting  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship  CSR  risk  sustainability  climate  investment  capital_markets  industry 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Dirk Matten and Andrew Crane - Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization | JSTOR: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 166-179
We critically examine the content of contemporary understandings of corporate citizenship and locate them within the extant body of research dealing with business-society relations. Our main purpose is to realize a theoretically informed definition of corporate citizenship that is descriptively robust and conceptually distinct from existing concepts in the literature. Specifically, our extended perspective exposes the element of "citizenship" and conceptualizes corporate citizenship as the administration of a bundle of individual citizenship rights--social, civil, and political--conventionally granted and protected by governments. -- cited by more than 35 in jstor -- didn't download
article  jstor  political_philosophy  political_economy  liberalism  markets  nation-state  civil_society  business  business-and-politics  corporate_citizenship  CSR  civil_liberties  privatization  legal_system  international_political_economy  globalization  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten - Corporate Citizenship: Missing the Point or Missing the Boat? A Reply to van Oosterhout | JSTOR: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 681-684
Short follow up to earlier article challenging mushy use of CC relative to CSR. This piece clarifies what they were tackling in the article and areas where the concept needs to be expanded to deal with what's happening. A decade later after Citizens United etc their distinction from CSR and expansion to deal with blurred boundaries between state, civil society, business, politics, citizen rights and responsibilities is even more appropriate. -- didn't download
article  jstor  political_philosophy  political_economy  nation-state  civil_society  business  business-and-politics  corporate_citizenship  CSR  civil_liberties  privatization  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Ulf Henning Richter - Liberal Thought in Reasoning on CSR | JSTOR: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 625-649
In this article, I argue that conventional reasoning on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is based on the assumption of a liberal market economy in the context of a nation state. I build on the study of Scherer and Palazzo (Acad Manage Rev 32(4):1096-1120, 2007), developing a number of criteria to identify elements of liberal philosophy in the ongoing CSR debate. I discuss their occurrence in the CSR literature in detail and reflect on the implications, taking into account the emerging political reading of the firm. I conclude that the apolitical framework in the mainstream CSR literature has to be overcome since it does not reflect recent changes in the socio-economic conditions for economic actors in a globalizing world. -- over 200 references -- didn't download
article  jstor  international_political_economy  globalization  global_system  corporations  corporate_governance  CSR  nation-state  corporate_citizenship  firms-theory  regulation  accountability  business-and-politics  externalities  capitalism  political_economy  economic_sociology  management  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader

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