dunnettreader + cooperation   16

Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan - The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust (2002)| Administrative Science Quarterly at JSTOR
Administrative Science Quarterly
Vol. 47, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 534-559
DOI: 10.2307/3094850
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094850
Topics: Contracts, Cooperation, Trust, Interpersonal interaction, Psychology, Social interaction, Social psychology, Situational attribution, Motivation, Organizational behavior
social_psychology  contracts  article  altruism  moral_psychology  punishment-altruistic  trust  organizations  downloaded  cooperation  firms-organization  motivation 
april 2017 by dunnettreader
David Pietraszewski, et al - Constituents of political cognition: Race, party politics, and the alliance detection system, Cognition (April 2015)
David Pietraszewski, Oliver Scott Curry, Michael Bang Petersen, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby -- Cognition 04/2015; 140:24-39. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.03.007 (Impact Factor: 3.63).Source: PubMed -- ABSTRACT -- Research suggests that the mind contains a set of adaptations for detecting alliances: an alliance detection system, which monitors for, encodes, and stores alliance information and then modifies the activation of stored alliance categories according to how likely they will predict behavior within a particular social interaction. Previous studies have established the activation of this system when exposed to explicit competition or cooperation between individuals. In the current studies we examine if shared political opinions produce these same effects. In particular, (1) if participants will spontaneously categorize individuals according to the parties they support, even when explicit cooperation and antagonism are absent, and (2) if party support is sufficiently powerful to decrease participants' categorization by an orthogonal but typically-diagnostic alliance cue (in this case the target's race). Evidence was found for both: Participants spontaneously and implicitly kept track of who supported which party, and when party cross-cut race-such that the race of targets was not predictive of party support-categorization by race was dramatically reduced. [Same setup for age and gender didn't produce race results] -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  evo-psych-politics  political_science  parties  groups-identity  groups-cohesion  groups-exclusion  groups-cognition  race  bias-unconscious  sociobiology  cooperation  groups-conflict  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Krasnow et al - Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation, PLoS ONE (April 2015) | via Researchgate
Max M Krasnow, Andrew W Delton, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby -- PLoS ONE 04/2015; 10(4):e0124561. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0124561 (Impact Factor: 3.23). -- ABSTRACT -- Humans everywhere cooperate in groups to achieve benefits not attainable by individuals. Individual effort is often not automatically tied to a proportionate share of group benefits. This decoupling allows for free-riding, a strategy that (absent countermeasures) outcompetes cooperation. Empirically and formally, punishment potentially solves the evolutionary puzzle of group cooperation. Nevertheless, standard analyses appear to show that punishment alone is insufficient, because second-order free riders (those who cooperate but do not punish) can be shown to outcompete punishers. Consequently, many have concluded that other processes, such as cultural or genetic group selection, are required. Here, we present a series of agent-based simulations that show that group cooperation sustained by punishment easily evolves by individual selection when you introduce into standard models more biologically plausible assumptions about the social ecology and psychology of ancestral humans. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  biocultural_evolution  evolutionary_biology  evolution-social  evo_psych  natural_selection  cooperation  free-riding  evolution-group_selection  game_theory  punishment-altruistic  norms  agent-based_models  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Inclusive fitness theory and eusociality, Nature, 2011 - Everybody & his cousins reckoned by the dozens defending the theory | via Researchgate
Nature, 03/2011; 471(7339):E1-4; author reply E9-10. DOI: 10.1038/nature09831 (Impact Factor: 41.46). STRATOSOHERIC IMPACT, 100+ cites, so see Researchgate for bibliography -- Source: PubMed -- ABSTRACT -- Arising from M. A. Nowak, C. E. Tarnita & E. O. Wilson 466, 1057-1062 (2010); Nowak et al. reply. Nowak et al. argue that inclusive fitness theory has been of little value in explaining the natural world, and that it has led to negligible progress in explaining the evolution of eusociality. However, we believe that their arguments are based upon a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory and a misrepresentation of the empirical literature. We will focus our comments on three general issues. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  biology  evolutionary_biology  evolution-social  evo_psych  natural_selection  empiricism  scientific_method  eusociality  cooperation  bibliography 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Margaret Blair - What must corporate directors do? Maximizing shareholder value versus creating value through team production | Brookings Institution - June 2015
Blair reviews the legal and economic theories behind the share-value maximization norm, and then lays out a theory of corporate law building on the economics of team production. Arguing that the corporate form itself helps solve the team production problem, Blair details five features which distinguish corporations from other organizational forms: 1. Legal personality -- 2. Limited liability -- 3. Transferable shares -- 4. Management under a Board of Directors -- 5. Indefinite existence -- Blair concludes that these five characteristics are all problematic from a principal-agent point of view where shareholders are principals. However, the team production theory makes sense out of these arrangements. This theory provides a rationale for the role of corporate directors consistent with the role that boards of directors historically understood themselves to play: balancing competing interests so the whole organization stays productive. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  shareholder_value  hedge_funds  corporate_law  firms-theory  firms-structure  equity-corporate  equity_markets  investors  long-term_orientation  labor_share  cooperation  coordination  teams  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicolas Duvoux, interview with Erik Olin Wright - Analytic Marxism and Real Utopias | Books & ideas - 16 November 2012
Erik Olin Wright is a prominent American sociologist and the last president of the American Sociological Association. In this interview, E. O. Wright explains the nature of "analytic Marxism”, which renewed the study of Marxism in the late 1970s and 1980s, and comes back on a more recent project called “ Envisioning Real Utopias”, which focuses on radical emancipatory alternatives to existing social structures. -- downloaded pdf to Note
social_theory  Marxist-analytical  social_sciences-post-WWII  methodology  sociology  classes  class_conflict  capitalism  capitalism-alternatives  Labor_markets  labor  labor_share  cooperation  worker_co-ops  open_source  social_movements  social_order  change-social  change-economic  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Oona A. Hathaway, Scott J. Shapiro - Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law :: SSRN - Yale Law Journal, Vol. 121, No. 2, p. 252, 2011
Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 240 -- This Article offers a new way to understand the enforcement of domestic and international law that we call “outcasting.” Unlike the distinctive method that modern states use to enforce their law, outcasting is nonviolent: it does not rely on bureaucratic organizations, such as police or militia, that employ physical force to maintain order. Instead, outcasting involves denying the disobedient the benefits of social cooperation and membership. Law enforcement through outcasting in domestic law can be found throughout history - from medieval Iceland and classic canon law to modern-day public law. And it is ubiquitous in modern international law, from the World Trade Organization to the Universal Postal Union to the Montreal Protocol. Across radically different subject areas, international legal institutions use others (usually states) to enforce their rules and typically deploy outcasting rather than physical force. Seeing outcasting as a form of law enforcement not only helps us recognize that the traditional critique of international law - that it is not enforced and is therefore both ineffective and not real law - is based on a limited and inaccurate understanding of law enforcement. It also allows us to understand more fully when and how international law matters. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 98 -- Keywords: international law, treaties, World Trade Organization, Enforcement, jurisprudence
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  international_system  international_law  international_organizations  treaties  enforcement  exclusion  excommunication  cooperation  punishment  sanctions  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Amazon.com: Herbert Gintis' review of Michael Tomasello, Natural History of Human Thinking
Herb is very enthusiastic re the key theoretical innovations, a lot less re the attempts to use game theory to describe the innovation
books  reviews  kindle-available  human_nature  evo_psych  evolution-social  sociability  cooperation  mind  philosophy_of_language  metaethics  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Smirnov, Dawes, Fowler, Johnson and McElreath -The Behavioral Logic of Collective Action: Partisans Cooperate and Punish More Than Nonpartisans | JSTOR: Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 595-616
Laboratory experiments indicate that many people willingly contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a personal cost. We hypothesize that these individuals, called strong reciprocators, allow political parties to overcome collective action problems, thereby allowing those organizations to compete for scarce resources and to produce public goods for like-minded individuals. Using a series of laboratory games, we examine whether partisans contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a greater rate than nonpartisans. The results show that partisans are more likely than nonpartisans to contribute to public goods and to engage in costly punishment. Given the broad theoretical literature on altruistic punishment and group selection as well as our own formal evolutionary model, we hypothesize that it is being a partisan that makes an individual more likely to be a strong reciprocator and not vice versa. -- didn't download -- interesting bibliography
article  jstor  political_science  political_participation  parties  evolution-social  punishment-altruistic  cooperation  social_psychology  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Joseph Henrich - A cultural species: How culture drove human evolution | Science Brief - Am Psychological Assoc Nov 2011
Recognizing the centrality of culture in human life leads to a novel evolutionary theory of status and status psychology. Evolutionary researchers have tended to assume that human status is merely an extension of primate dominance hierarchies. However, because humans are so heavily dependent on an information economy for survival, our species has evolved a second avenue to social status that operates alongside dominance and has its own suite of cognitive and affective processes. -- This work connects with the emotion literature where prior empirical studies had indicated the existence of two facets for the emotion pride—labeled authentic and hubristic pride. Our ongoing efforts suggest that hubristic pride is associated with dominance-status and authentic pride with prestige-status. -- Much empirical work treats status as a uni-dimensional construct, and then unknowingly operationalizes it as either prestige or dominance, or some mix of the two. -- The cultural evolution of norms over tens or hundreds of thousands of years, and their shaping by cultural group selection, may have driven genetic evolution to create a suite of cognitive adaptations we call norm psychology. -- This suite facilitates, among other things, our identification and learning of social norms, our expectation of sanctions for norm violations, and our ability to internalize normative behavior as motivations. This approach also predicts that humans ought to be inclined to “over-imitate” for two different evolutionary reasons, one informational and the other normative. The informational view hypothesizes that people over-imitate because of an evolved reliance on cultural learning to adaptively acquire complex and cognitively-opaque skills, techniques and practices that have been honed, often in nuanced and subtle ways, over generations. However, because individuals should also “over-imitate” because human societies have long been full of arbitrary norms (behaviors) for which the “correct” performance is crucial to one’s reputation (e.g., rituals, etiquette), we expect future investigations to reveal two different kinds of over-imitation. -- The selection pressures created by reputational damage and punishment for norm-violation may also favour norm-internalization. Neuroeconomic studies suggest that social norms are in fact internalized as intrinsic motivations in people’s brains.
biocultural_evolution  social_psychology  norms  status  power  leaders  learning  children  innate_ideas  incentives  behavioral_economics  moral_psychology  emotions  morality-conventional  sociology_of_religion  trust  cooperation  Innovation  tools  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Joe Henrich - Website | University of British Columbia
Research Program: Coevolution, Development, Cognition & Cultural Learning -- Published Papers and Book Chapters by Category

- Societal Complexity and Cultural Evolution
- Social Norms and Cooperation
- Social Status (Prestige and Dominance)
- Religion
- Methodological Contributions and Population Variations
- Overviews
- Cultural Learning (Models and Evidence)
- Ethnography (Fiji, Machiguenga, Mapuche)
- Chimpanzee Sociality
- General Interest
bibliography  research  paper  biocultural_evolution  culture  social_psychology  anthropology  behavioral_economics  sociology_of_religion  status  norms  morality-conventional  moral_psychology  emotions  networks  institutions  complexity  demography  children  learning  tools  cooperation  competition  Innovation 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Sam Fleischacker, Economics and the Ordinary Person: Re-reading Adam Smith (2004) | Library of Economics and Liberty
Far more important to Smith's work is the belief that ordinary people normally understand their own interests without help from politicians or professional philosophers. The distinctive mark of Smith's thought is his view of human cognition, not of human motivation: he is far more willing than practically any of his contemporaries to endorse the ability of ordinary people to know what they need to know in life. ......Smith's distrust of the ability of "systems"—whether philosophical, religious, or political—to improve human beings goes with a belief that what really provides us with moral education are the humble institutions of everyday social interaction, including the market. The foundation of all virtue for Smith is "self-command,"......The point of these famous lines is not that my butcher and baker are self-interested but that I know how to "address" that self-interest, that I know how to "shew them that it is for their own advantage" to do something that will help me. But my ability to address their interests takes me beyond myself, whatever it does to them; I must go beyond my own self-love in order to enlist theirs in my aid. And it is that ability to restrain our own self-love, and understand and further the interests of others, Smith says, that distinguishes human beings from other animals. -- downloaded pdf
article  18thC  Britain  Scottish_Enlightenment  Smith  intellectual_history  moral_philosophy  political_economy  egalitarian  cognition  lower_orders  self-interest  self-love  cooperation  downloaded 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Kim: Evolution of Cultural Groups and Persistent Parochialism 2010
Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences

The abstract is gobbledygook, but the paper looks useful in comparing a range of theoretic explanations for cooperation evolution and how each has problems with cooperation extending beyond readily identifiable kinship groups.
social_theory  biocultural_evolution  kinship  cooperation  game_theory  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader

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