dunnettreader + contracts   12

Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan - The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust (2002)| Administrative Science Quarterly at JSTOR
Administrative Science Quarterly
Vol. 47, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 534-559
DOI: 10.2307/3094850
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094850
Topics: Contracts, Cooperation, Trust, Interpersonal interaction, Psychology, Social interaction, Social psychology, Situational attribution, Motivation, Organizational behavior
social_psychology  contracts  article  altruism  moral_psychology  punishment-altruistic  trust  organizations  downloaded  cooperation  firms-organization  motivation 
april 2017 by dunnettreader
Stefan Linder, Nicolai J. Foss - Agency Theory :: SSRN April 23, 2013
Stefan Linder, ESSEC Business School -- Nicolai J. Foss, Copenhagen Business School - Department of Strategic Management and Globalization *--* Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from clear assumptions about rationality, contracting and informational conditions, the theory addresses problems of ex ante (“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information asymmetry (“hidden action”), and examines conditions under which various kinds of incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable criticism. -- PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: adverse selection, agency costs, compensation, conflict of interest, contracting, corporate governance, delegation, hidden action, hidden characteristics, incentive intensity, information asymmetry, informativeness, monitoring, moral hazard, motivation, nexus of contracts, pay-for-performance -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  microeconomics  microfoundations  behavioral_economics  incentives  incentives-distortions  agency  agents  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  information-asymmetric  adverse_selection  delegation  moral_psychology  moral_hazard  contracts  principal-agent  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Frank Pasquale - Four Futures of Legal Automation | Balkinization: June 2015
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/four-futures-of-legal-automation.html -- overview of new article dealing with different scenarios for "disruption" promised by "innovators" and venture capitalists, which is likely to take the new fashion of arbitraging "inefficiencies" without any thoughts as to consequences for unraveling the "logic" of the current systems of legal services, re both content and access -- Instapaper has a number of links -- also downloaded pdf to Note
Instapaper  article  legal_system  legal_culture  automation  Innovation  technology  access_to_services  corporate_law  criminal_justice  family_law  property_rights  rights-legal  contracts  links  downloaded  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Katharina Pistor: Creating A Legal Foundation For Finance | The Institute for New Economic Thinking
Katharina Pistor, a grantee of the Institute for New Economic Thinking, professor at Columbia University Law School, and the director of Columbia’s Center on Global Legal Transformation, is developing a Legal Theory of Finance.
In this interview, Pistor focuses in particular on the paradoxical relationship between law and finance. On the one hand, finance needs law to provide credibility. After all, financial assets are contracts, the value of which depends on their legal validation. But on the other hand, changing conditions in the financial world over time necessitate flexibility in law. An overly rigid legal system can render regulation irrelevant if financial innovation ultimately surpasses laws designed for another era. In a worst-case scenario, legal rigidity also can play a role in causing a financial accident. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank legislation represents one response to this challenge. In Europe, the melding of finance and the law is even more complex because policy makers, regulators, and legislators are dealing with 17 different nations, all of which operate with a common currency but in a series of different national jurisdictions with vastly different legal traditions and precedents.
The tension in Europe has become particularly acute in relation to some of the unconventional measures undertaken by the European Central Bank in response to the existential threat to the euro itself - have come under challenge in Germany’s Constitutional Court. Can a national constitutional court effectively invalidate an entire program undertaken by a supranational central bank, which ostensibly is responsible for a common monetary policy? This is one of the issues that Professor Pistor discusses in the exchange below.
video  legal_theory  legal_system  financial_system  financial_regulation  law-and-finance  property_rights  contracts  debt  central_banks  Eurozone  monetary_policy  money  capital_markets  banking  international_political_economy  international_law  international_finance  international_monetary_system 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, vol. 1 of 3 (1911) - Online Library of Liberty
Frederic William Maitland, The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, ed. H.A.L. Fisher (Cambridge University Press, 1911). 3 Vols. Vol. 1. 07/17/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/871> -- Vol. 1 of a three volume collection of the shorter works of the great English legal historian, including in vol. 1 his “Historical Sketch of Liberty and Equality”, an essay on Herbert Spencer, and essays on aspects of medieval law -- downloaded mobi version of book scan OCR
books  etexts  intellectual_history  legal_history  legal_system  common_law  medieval_history  Anglo-Saxons  Norman_Conquest  feudalism  English_constitution  property  contracts  torts  judiciary  Spencer_Herbert  Victorian  British_history  12thC  13thC  14thC  15thC 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Consent in Contract Law (revised 2011) :: SSRN
Chapter in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, Alan Wertheimer, Franklin G. Miller, eds., Oxford University Press, 2010 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-36 -- Consent, in terms of voluntary choice, is - or, at least, appears to be or purports to be - at the essence of contract law. Contract law, both in principle and in practice, is about allowing parties to enter arrangements on terms they choose - each party imposing obligations on itself in return for obligations another party has placed upon itself. This freedom of contract- an ideal by which there are obligations to the extent, but only to the extent, freely chosen by the parties - is contrasted to the duties of criminal law and tort law, which bind all parties regardless of consent. At the same time, consent, in the robust sense expressed by the ideal of freedom of contract, is arguably absent in the vast majority of the contracts we enter these days, but its absence does little to affect the enforceability of those agreements. Consent to contractual terms often looks like consent to government: present, if at all, only under a fictional (as if) or attenuated rubric. The article begins by a brief examination of the nature of consent, then turns to contract doctrines that turn on the alleged absence of consent (e.g., duress and undue influence); contract rules and principles (e.g., implied terms) that turn on hypothetical consent; the challenges to consent that arise from electronic contracting and bounded rationality, and theories of contract law that emphasize consent. -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  contracts  social_contract  consent  rational_choice  rationality-bounded  power-asymmetric  e-commerce  commercial_law  libertarianism  freedom_of_contract  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence between Law and Morality (last revised 2011) :: SSRN - Ratio Juris, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 194-211, June 2008
There is an ongoing debate in the philosophical and jurisprudential literature regarding the nature and possibility of Contract theory. On one hand are those who argue (or assume) that there is, or should be, a single, general, universal theory of Contract Law, one applicable to all jurisdictions and all times. On the other hand are those who assert that Contract theory should be localized to particular times and places, perhaps even with different theories for different types of agreements. This article considers one facet of this debate: evaluating the relevance of the fact that the remedies available for breach of contract can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another. This wide variation in remedies for breach of a (contractual) promise is one central difference between promises in morality and enforceable agreements in law. The article asserts that variation of remedies strongly supports the conclusion that there is (and can be) no general, universal theory of Contract Law. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  morality-objective  natural_law  contracts  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Amalia D. Kessler: Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century Merchant Court (2004)
JSTOR: Law and History Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 2004), pp. 71-118 -- though I don't think she frames it this way the merchant court was a sort of self-regulatory organization that imposed norms of charitable virtue where ordinary contract law would have produced anomalous results -- enforcement of community norms reduced transaction costs and supplemented trust networks which expanded the zone of profitable commerce beyond what Ancien_régime legal system would have produced -- though community norms were Christian the Court and its officials could see themselves as promoting common good as virtuous citizens in contrast with a narrow self-interest of eg caveat emptor or strict contract construction
article  jstor  legal_history  economic_history  18thC  France  commerce  merchants  norms  transaction_costs  contracts  SROs  charity  civic_virtue  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader

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