dunnettreader + consciousness   40

Rationally Speaking | 166 - Eric Schwitzgebel on "Why you should expect the truth to be crazy"
Some theories violate common sense so wildly that you want to just reject them out of hand. For example, "The United States is conscious," or "The most moral act would be to replace all living beings with an orgasmic blob." On the other hand, many theories in physics that sounded similarly crazy turned out to be very well-supported (think of quantum theory, or relativity). So what role should "common sense" play in evaluating new theories? This episode features a discussion with philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel on his theory of "Crazyism," that we should expect the truth to be at least a little bit crazy.

Eric's Blog: The Splintered Mind

Eric's Paper: "The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind"

Gustaf Arrhenius's Paper: "An impossibility theorem for welfarist axiologies"

Eric's Pick: "Labyrinths" by Jorge Luis Borges
audio  interview  metaphysics  mind  consciousness  epistemology  materialism  naturalism  folk_psychology  idealism  dualism 
september 2016 by dunnettreader
Eric Schwitzgebel - Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind (2014) Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol 92, No 4
Crazyism about X is the view that something it would be crazy to believe must be among the core truths about X. In this essay, I argue that crazyism is true of the metaphysics of mind. A position is ‘crazy’ in the intended sense if it is contrary to common sense and we are not epistemically compelled to believe it. Crazyism can be treated as the conjunction of two sub-theses: (1) that something contrary to common sense must be true and (2) that whatever that true thing is, we are not epistemically compelled to believe it. I defend the first thesis on grounds of the probable incoherence of folk metaphysics, from which it follows that any fully fleshed-out metaphysics will inevitably conflict with some piece of that incoherent story. I defend the second thesis on three grounds: peer disagreement, lack of a compelling method for resolving metaphysical disputes about the mind, and the dubiousness of the general cosmological claims with which metaphysical claims about the mind are entangled. -- Keywords: common sense, consciousness, dualism, idealism, materialism, metaphilosophy, metaphysics, -- downloaded to Tab S2
article  metaphysics  mind  epistemology  folk_psychology  cosmology  dualism  idealism  materialism  consciousness  reductionism  naturalism  downloaded 
september 2016 by dunnettreader
Consciousness (pages 11-18) | Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences - Jan 2015
Nicholas Rescher

ABSTRACT: Consciousness is sometimes viewed as a particular parametric factor in the analogy of blood pressure or electric charge. The paper argues that this is an erroneous conception becomes consciousness involves a varied assortment of different phenomena that have no single unified commonality. And so even as ‘abnormal psychology’ has to be a disjointed assembly of diverse specialties so will ‘consciousness studies’ have to be.
neuroscience  article  mind-body  philosophy_of_science  reductionism  human_nature  psychology  downloaded  consciousness  mind 
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Ruairidh James Macleod - The Concept of Temporality in John Dewey's Early Works (2015 thesis) - Academic Commons
Ruairidh James Macleod, 2015, The Concept of Temporality in John Dewey's Early Works, Columbia University Academic Commons, http://dx.doi.org/10.7916/D8M044XW : -- It is well understood that a concept of temporality is central to Dewey’s later work, finding its culmination in his essay “Time and Individuality” (1938). What has not been either acknowledged or established is the fact that a detailed and sophisticated concept of temporality, one which is fully in accord with his later work, was already present in Dewey’s early work, particularly in his essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896). This thesis therefore seeks to demonstrate not only that such a concept of temporality exists in Dewey’s early work, but also the nuanced nature of that concept of temporality, particularly in its function as a central, grounding component of the preconditions required for Dewey’s concept of experience. (..) this thesis argues that it in fact constitutes a key contribution to a tradition of philosophy of temporality which starts with the work of Henri Bergson, continues with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (most saliently with Being and Time), and finds its full contemporary statement in Gilles Deleuze’s work on time, based on his concept of ‘the virtual.’ The fact that Dewey’s concept of temporality, as with that of Deleuze, is based on a sophisticated understanding of contemporary scientific findings is also explored, with the argument made that possessing such a foundation in scientific thought allows Dewey’s concept of temporality to become fully compatible to current research in psychology, particularly as it concerns educational psychology. -- downloaded pdf to Note
thesis  downloaded  intellectual_history  18thC  20thC  philosophical_anthropology  mind  consciousness  time  time-perception  subjectivity  Dewey  pragmatism  psychology  physiology  neuroscience  Bergson  Heidegger  Deleuze  education  learning 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Vincent Descombes & Charles Larmore - Les Dernières nouvelles de Moi - PUF book page
« À notre avis, il s’agit de reconnaître qu’on se trouve déjà engagé dans le monde, par le fait même de croire ou désirer des choses, avant d’accéder à une connaissance quelconque de sa vie mentale. Un peu plus loin, il est vrai, nous tombons en désaccord. Car je suis convaincu, à la différence de Descombes, qu’il y a bien un rapport à soi constitutif du sujet (ou du moi, comme je préfère dire), seulement qu’il est de nature pratique ou mieux normative, non cognitive. » (C. Larmore) La philosophie du sujet a été l’un des piliers de la philosophie moderne et elle s’est concentrée, essentiellement depuis Descartes, autour de l’idée selon laquelle le rapport primordial que nous entretenons au monde et à nous-mêmes relève de la connaissance. Le débat entre Vincent Descombes et Charles Larmore naît d’une confrontation des leçons différentes qu’ils tirent d’un commun renversement de ce modèle de la philosophie classique du sujet. -
French_language  books  philosophy_of_language  self  subjectivity  philosophy_of_mind  constructivism  identity  consciousness  phenomenology 
march 2016 by dunnettreader
Fouré Lionel, « Le complément de sujet, de Vincent Descombes. », Le Philosophoire 1/2005
Fouré Lionel, « Le complément de sujet, de Vincent Descombes. », Le Philosophoire 1/2005 (n° 24) , p. 132-135
URL : www.cairn.info/revue-le-philosophoire-2005-1-page-132.htm.
DOI : 10.3917/phoir.024.0132.
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
downloaded  phenomenology  deconstruction  existentialism  structuralist  self  French_intellectuals  philosophy_of_language  subjectivity  consciousness  philosophy_of_social_science  reviews  mind  Wittgenstein  books  Peirce  postmodern  poststructuralist 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Dale Jacquette, review - Ted Honderich, Actual Consciousness (OUP 2014) // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews - August 2015
Ted Honderich’s new book takes the exploration of the mysteries of consciousness in an interesting direction. He develops a certain-to-be-controversial…
subjectivity  books  emotions  consciousness  cognition  analytical_philosophy  self  reviews  mind  qualia  perception  phenomenology  from instapaper
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Jared P. Friedman and Anthony I. Jack - Mapping cognitive structure onto philosophical debate re problems of consciousness, free will and ethics | Minds Online - Sept 2015 - Session 1 - Social Cognition
Mapping cognitive structure onto the landscape of philosophical debate: An empirical framework with relevance to problems of consciousness, free will and ethics -- Department of Philosophy and Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence, Case Western Reserve University -- There are some seemingly intractable questions that have remained at the heart of philosophical discourse since they were first asked. Is the mind distinct from the brain or are we just physical stuff? Are we autonomous agents or merely at the mercy of the causal and mechanistic laws of nature? When, if ever, is it acceptable to sacrifice one for the greater good of many? That these questions have remained at the heart of philosophy for so long, and that their ‘solutions’ (e.g., monism vs. dualism) seem to be incommensurable with each other, strikes us as enigmatic. Might the intractable nature of these and other appropriately identified problems reflect something peculiar about us rather than something peculiar about the way the world is? (...) This account maintains that the difficulties reconciling markedly different philosophical responses to these three questions arise from an unavoidable tension between two anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks, both of which are essential to human understanding. This account is motivated by the observation that both philosophers and non-philosophers experience difficulty in reconciling competing responses to these questions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  conference  cognition  antimonies  consciousness  mind-body  neuroscience  determinism  free_will  naturalism  physicalism  reductionism  causation  moral_philosophy  metaethics  intuitions  brain  experimental_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  James_William  monism  dualism  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Barry Allen, "Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition" (Harvard University Press, 2015)
Barry Allen's new book carefully considers the problem of knowledge in a range of Chinese philosophical discourses, creating a stimulating cross-disciplinary dialogue that's as much of a pleasure to read as it will be to teach with. Taking on the work of Confucians, Daoists, military theorists, Chan Buddhists, Neo-Confucian philosophers, and others, Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition (Harvard University Press, 2015) looks at the common threads and important differences in the ways that scholars have attempted to conceptualize and articulate what it is to be a knowing being in the world. Some of the major themes that recur throughout the work include the nature of non-action and emptiness, the relationship between knowledge and scholarship, the possibility of Chinese epistemologies and empiricisms, and the importance of artifice. Allen pays special attention to the ways that these scholars relate knowledge to a fluid conception of "things" that can be "completed" or "vanished into" by the knower, and to their understanding of things as parts of a collective economy of human and non-human relationships. The book does an excellent job of maintaining its focus on Chinese texts and contexts while making use of comparative cases from Anglophone and European-language philosophy that brings Chinese scholars into conversation with Nietzsche, Latour, Deleuze and Guattari, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and beyond - 1 hour interview
books  interview  audio  intellectual_history  Chinese_philosophy  China  Chinese_history  Asian_philosophy  epistemology  Buddhism  Confucianism  empiricism  epistemology-social  ontology  human_nature  human-non-human_relations  military_theory  military_history  Neo-Confucian  Nietzsche  Deleuze  Aristotle  Machiavelli  Plato  Latour  consciousness  perception 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews - July 2015
This is a ground-breaking philosophical exploration of consciousness and the self as they occur across the states of waking, falling asleep, dreaming, lucid…
Instapaper  books  reviews  consciousness  self  dreaming  neuroscience  Buddhism  meditation  self-consciousness  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
UMA RAMAMURTHY, STAN FRANKLIN, and PULIN AGRAWAL - SELF-SYSTEM IN A MODEL OF COGNITION | International Journal of Machine Consciousness: Vol. 04, No. 02 December 2012 (World Scientific)
Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have proposed various forms of a "self" in humans and animals. All of these selves seem to have a basis in some form of consciousness. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [Baars, 1988, 2003] suggests a mostly unconscious, many-layered self-system. In this paper, we consider several issues that arise from attempts to include a self-system in a software agent/cognitive robot. We explore these issues in the context of the LIDA model [Baars and Franklin, 2009; Ramamurthy et al., 2006] which implements the Global Workspace Theory.
Keywords: Consciousness; self-system; Global Workspace Theory; LIDA model
article  consciousness  self  mind  unconscious  neuroscience  artificial_intelligence  agent-based_models  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
IEEE Xplore Abstract Franklin, S.; Madl, T. ; D'mello, S. ; Snaider, J. - LIDA: A Systems-level Architecture for Cognition, Emotion, and Learning (2014)
IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development, (Volume:6 , Issue: 1 ) Page(s):19 - 41 DOI:10.1109/TAMD.2013.2277589 -- We describe a cognitive architecture learning intelligent distribution agent (LIDA) that affords attention, action selection and human-like learning intended for use in controlling cognitive agents that replicate human experiments as well as performing real-world tasks. LIDA combines sophisticated action selection, motivation via emotions, a centrally important attention mechanism, and multimodal instructionalist and selectionist learning. Empirically grounded in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, the LIDA architecture employs a variety of modules and processes, each with its own effective representations and algorithms. LIDA has much to say about motivation, emotion, attention, and autonomous learning in cognitive agents. In this paper, we summarize the LIDA model together with its resulting agent architecture, describe its computational implementation, and discuss results of simulations that replicate known experimental data. We also discuss some of LIDA's conceptual modules, propose nonlinear dynamics as a bridge between LIDA's modules and processes and the underlying neuroscience, and point out some of the differences between LIDA and other cognitive architectures. Finally, we discuss how LIDA addresses some of the open issues in cognitive architecture research. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  neuroscience  psychology  brain  consciousness  cognition  emotions  learning  memory  attention  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Madl T, Baars BJ, Franklin S (2011) The Timing of the Cognitive Cycle. | PLoS ONE 6(4)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803 -- We propose that human cognition consists of cascading cycles of recurring brain events. Each cognitive cycle senses the current situation, interprets it with reference to ongoing goals, and then selects an internal or external action in response. While most aspects of the cognitive cycle are unconscious, each cycle also yields a momentary “ignition” of conscious broadcasting. Neuroscientists have independently proposed ideas similar to the cognitive cycle, the fundamental hypothesis of the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent) model of cognition. High-level cognition, such as deliberation, planning, etc., is typically enabled by multiple cognitive cycles. In this paper we describe a timing model of LIDA's cognitive cycle. -- The action selection component of the cycle is proposed to involve frontal, striatal and cerebellar regions. Thus the cycle is inherently recurrent, as the anatomy of the thalamocortical system suggests. The LIDA model fits a large body of cognitive and neuroscientific evidence. Finally, we describe two LIDA-based software agents: the LIDA Reaction Time agent that simulates human performance in a simple reaction time task, and the LIDA Allport agent which models phenomenal simultaneity within timeframes comparable to human subjects. While there are many models of reaction time performance, these results fall naturally out of a biologically and computationally plausible cognitive architecture. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  neuroscience  cognition  consciousness  brain  perception  memory  learning  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Melanie Boly et al - Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions (2013) | Frontiers of Psychology - Consciousness Research
Review ARTICLE - Frontiers of Psychology, 31 October 2013 | doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00625 -- Melanie Boly1,2,3*, Anil K. Seth4,5, Melanie Wilke6,7, Paul Ingmundson8, Bernard Baars9, Steven Laureys3, David B. Edelman10 and Naotsugu Tsuchiya11,12 -- This joint article reflects the authors' personal views regarding noteworthy advances in the neuroscience of consciousness in the last 10 years, and suggests what we feel may be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio,. We summarize recent advances in our understanding of subjectivity in humans and other animals, including empirical, applied, technical, and conceptual insights. These include the evidence for the importance of fronto-parietal connectivity and of “top-down” processes, both of which enable information to travel across distant cortical areas effectively, as well as numerous dissociations between consciousness and cognitive functions, such as attention, in humans. In addition, we describe the development of mental imagery paradigms, which made it possible to identify covert awareness in non-responsive subjects. Non-human animal consciousness research has also witnessed substantial advances on the specific role of cortical areas and higher order thalamus for consciousness, thanks to important technological enhancements. In addition, much progress has been made in the understanding of non-vertebrate cognition relevant to possible conscious states. Finally, major advances have been made in theories of consciousness, and also in their comparison with the available evidence. Along with reviewing these findings, each author suggests future avenues for research in their field of investigation.
Keywords: consciousness, animals, human cognition, theoretical neuroscience, biotechnology, neuroimaging

Citation: Boly M, Seth AK, Wilke M, Ingmundson P, Baars B, Laureys S, Edelman DB and Tsuchiya N (2013) Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions. Front. Psychol. 4:625. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00625
article  neuroscience  consciousness  cognition  brain  animals  physiology  mind  mind-body  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeroen J. A. van Boxtel, Naotsugu Tsuchiya and Christof Koch - Consciousness and Attention: On Sufficiency and Necessity | Consciousness Research
Review ARTICLE - Frontiers of Psychology, 20 December 2010 | doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00217 - authors from or affiliated with CalTech (biology and humanities) and Tsuchiya is connected with both CalTech and brain institutes at Tamagawa University, Tokyo, Japan and Korea University, Seoul, Korea -- Recent research has slowly corroded a belief that selective attention and consciousness are so tightly entangled that they cannot be individually examined. In this review, we summarize psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence for a dissociation between top-down attention and consciousness. The evidence includes recent findings that show subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. More contentious is the finding that subjects can become conscious of an isolated object, or the gist of the scene in the near absence of top-down attention; we critically re-examine the possibility of “complete” absence of top-down attention. We also cover the recent flurry of studies that utilized independent manipulation of attention and consciousness. These studies have shown paradoxical effects of attention, including examples where top-down attention and consciousness have opposing effects, leading us to strengthen and revise our previous views. Neuroimaging studies with EEG, MEG, and fMRI are uncovering the distinct neuronal correlates of selective attention and consciousness in dissociative paradigms. These findings point to a functional dissociation: attention as analyzer and consciousness as synthesizer. Separating the effects of selective visual attention from those of visual consciousness is of paramount importance to untangle the neural substrates of consciousness from those for attention. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  neuroscience  psychology  mind  perception  consciousness  attention  unconscious  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Reviewed by Tom Donaldson - David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World (OUP 2014) // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // August 2014
Stanford University -- This is a monumental book, in several respects. Most obviously, it’s very long: longer, by my estimate, than the Critique of Pure Reason b y a margin of about three and a half Tractatus. It is also vast in scope: Chalmers discusses a huge range of topics in formal and informal epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. There is even some history: Carnap is the ‘hero’ of Constructing the World (p. xvii), and one of Chalmers’ goals is to reassess Carnap’s work — especially the Aufbau. Paper copies of the book contain eight chapters and seventeen short supplemental ‘excursuses’. Chalmers has also made one extra chapter and four additional excursuses available online. The book is based on Chalmers’ 2010 John Locke lectures, which the Oxford University philosophy department has to its great credit put online in mp3 format. Chalmers has made no major changes to his position or terminology between delivering the lectures and completing the book, so those who like to take their philosophy aurally can start with the online lectures before turning to the written text for more detail. -- In section one I discuss Chalmers’ use of the vexed term ‘a priori’. In section two I discuss Chalmers’ defence of the claim that there are a priori truths (including synthetic a priori truths) from empiricist doubters. In section three I explain how Chalmers defends his ‘scrutability theses’. In section four I outline the Fregean theory of sense.
books  reviews  kindle-available  logic  Carnap  Frege  Quine  metaphysics  epistemology  philosophy_of_language  mind  consciousness  subjectivity  apriori  philosophy_of_science 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Jack Miles - Tilting Against Naïve Materialism: On Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos" | The Los Angeles Review of Books - Feb 2013
Nagel is a professed scientific realist. He does not put scientific knowledge in scare quotes. He believes that reason is reliable and that science does engage reality. But when an account of the origin of reason that links it entirely to reproductive success has this self-subversive corollary, he chooses to trust reason and question the account rather than trust the account and question reason.Here, for this reviewer, is the core challenge, the core disturbance, of this challenging and intentionally disruptive work. Mind and Cosmos, which has been taken as an oblique defense of creationism, is actually a defense of reason. Yet it is also a fabulous effort of the imagination. The place of imagination, of fantasy, even of dream-life in the history of human thought is a large one. Nagel admits that he is not a scientist, but it would call for imagination and not just analysis for a scientist in any given field to begin thinking past contemporary science as a whole toward the contours of what might someday succeed it. Unless one is a scientific Whig, one must strongly suspect that something someday will indeed succeed it. Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos does not build a road to that destination, but it is much to have gestured toward a gap in the hills through which a road might someday run. -- Swift would agree
books  reviews  kindle-available  philosophy_of_science  evolutionary_biology  evolution  Darwinism  Nagel  reason  epistemology  teleology  monism  panpsychic_monism  materialism  reductionism  truth  Swift  historiography-Whig  history_of_science  consciousness  mind  cosmology  imagination  creativity  human_nature  evo_psych  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers : Richard Marshall : 9780199969531
Contents -- i. Introduction. ; Chapter 1. Brian Leiter: 'Leiter Reports' ; Chapter 2. Jason Stanley : 'Philosophy As The Great Naivete' ; Chapter 3. Eric Schwitzgebel: 'The Splintered Skeptic' ; Chapter 4. Mark Rowlands: 'Hour Of The Wolf' ; Chapter 5. Eric T Olson: 'The Philosopher With No Hands' ; Chapter 6. Craig Callender: ' Time Lord' ; Chapter 7. Kieran Setiya: ' What Anscombe Intended and Other Puzzles' ; Chapter 8. Kit Fine: 'Metaphysical Kit' ; Chapter 9. Patricia Churchland: 'Causal Machines' ; Chapter 10. Valerie Tiberius: 'Mostly Elephant, ErgoEL' ; Chapter 11. Peter Carruthers: 'Mind Reader' ; Chapter 12. Josh Knobe: 'Indie Rock Virtues' ; Chapter 13. Al Mele: 'The Four Million Dollar Philosopher ; Chapter 14.Graham Priest: 'Logically Speaking' ; Chapter 15. Ursula Renz: 'After Spinoza: Wiser, Freer, Happier' ; Chapter 16. Cecile Fabre: ' On The Intrinsic Value Of Each Of Us' ; Chapter 17. Hilde Linderman: ' No Ethics Without Feminism' ; Chapter 18. Elizabeth S. Anderson: 'The New Leveller' ; Chapter 19. Christine Korsgaard: 'Treating People As End In Themselves' ; Chapter 20. Michael Lynch: 'Truth, Reason and Democracy' ; Chapter 21. Timothy Williamson : 'Classical Investigations' ; Chapter 22. Ernie Lapore: 'Meaning, Truth, Language, Reality' ; Chapter 23. Jerry Fodor: 'Meaningful Words Without Sense, And Other Revolutions.' ; Chapter 24. Huw Price: 'Without Mirrors' ; Chapter 25. Gary Gutting: 'What Philosophers Know'
books  buy  philosophy  intellectual_history  metaphysics  metaethics  ontology  scepticism  analytical_philosophy  political_philosophy  epistemology  feminism  philosophy_of_language  mind  mind-body  consciousness  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_law  pragmatism  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Charles Taliaferro - Dualism and the Problem of Individuation | JSTOR: Religious Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 263-276
Quite helpful review of various metaphysical debates from Descartes onwards, how the "substance" debates have evolved, including the old identity of indiscernables claim that's been thoroughly challenged in post WWII analytical_philosophy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  20thC  Descartes  Locke  Butler  Reid  metaphysics  ontology  substance  soul  dualism  physicalism  mind-body  consciousness  immortality  universals  particulars  identity  self  analytical_philosophy  logic  Leibniz  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Walter Ott - LOCKE'S EXCLUSION ARGUMENT | JSTOR: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (APRIL 2010), pp. 181-196
A different take on Locke's superaddition argument re thinking matter that would align him with materialism that treats mental events as mere epiphenomenal, neither identity with physical, nor supervenience -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  17thC  20thC  21stC  mind  mind-body  consciousness  soul  materialism  determinism  Locke  thinking_matter  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Lennon, Thomas M., Stainton, Robert J. (Eds.) 2008 The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology
Downloaded Introduction pdf to Note -- Series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 7 -- newly written papers addressing each of the main contributors to the discussion of the Achilles. Despite the historical importance and intrinsic interest of the argument, very little has been written about it. *--* Contents. *--* Did Plato Articulate the Achilles Argument?. *-- Aristotle on the Unity of Consciousness. *-- The Neoplatonic Achilles. *-- The Unity of the Soul and Contrary Appetites in Medieval Philosophy. *-- Hume, Spinoza and the Achilles Inference. *-- Locke and the Achilles Argument. *-- The Reverse Achilles in Locke. *-- Cudworth and Bayle: An Odd Couple?. *-- The Achilles Argument and the Nature of Matter in the Clarke Collins Correspondence. *-- Leibniz’s ‘Achilles’. *-- Hume’s Reply to the Achilles Argument. *-- Kant and Mendelssohn on the Implications of the ‘I Think’. *-- Kant on the Achilles Argument. *-- William James and the Achilles Argument. *-- The Binding Problem: Achilles in the 21st Century.
books  intellectual_history  mind  mind-body  consciousness  perception  thinking_matter  materialism  soul  immortality  substance  Plato  Neoplatonism  Aristotle  Aquinas  Duns_Scotus  Ockham  Augustine  Descartes  Spinoza  Malebranche  Cartesian  Bayle  Locke  Clarke  Collins_Anthony  Leibniz  Hume  Kant  Mendelssohn  Fichte  cognition  neuroscience  psychology  natural_philosophy  metaphysics  rationalist  James_William  history_of_science  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Three Approaches [chapter] :: SSRN in THE FUTURE OF NATURALISM, J. Shook & P. Kurtz, eds., Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 2009
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 246 -- General jurisprudence - that branch of legal philosophy concerned with the nature of law and adjudication - has been relatively unaffected by the "naturalistic" strains so evident, for example, in the epistemology, philosophy of mind and moral philosophy of the past forty years. This paper sketches three ways in which naturalism might affect jurisprudential inquiry. The paper serves as a kind of precis of the main themes in my book NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Oxford University Press, 2007). -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 16 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, naturalism, legal realism, quine, epistemology
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  naturalism  epistemology  metaphysics  mind  mind-body  consciousness  Quine  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  epistemology-moral  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Nietzsche's Philosophy of Action (2009) :: SSRN - in Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Action, 2010
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 270 -- Nietzsche holds that people lack freedom of the will in any sense that would be sufficient for ascriptions of moral responsibility; that the conscious experience we have of willing is actually epiphenomenal with respect to the actions that follow that experience; and that our actions largely arise through non-conscious processes (psychological and physiological) of which we are only dimly aware, and over which we exercise little or no conscious control. At the same time, Nietzsche, always a master of rhetoric, engages in a “persuasive definition” (Stevenson 1938) of the language of “freedom” and “free will,” to associate the positive valence of these terms with a certain Nietzschean ideal of the person unrelated to traditional notions of free will. -- No of Pages: 18 -- Keywords: Nietzsche, free will, moral responsibility, freedom, philosophy of action, epiphenomenalism -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  intellectual_history  19thC  Germany  action-theory  Nietzsche  free_will  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  mind  consciousness  physiology  psychology  naturalism  responsibility  guilt  freedom  epiphenomenal  aesthetics  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Raphael Van Riel, review essay - David Woodruff Smith et Amy L. Thomasson (dir.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (OUP 2005) - Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 257-259 | Érudit 
Raphael Van Riel - Universität bochum -- La phénoménologie traverse présentement une renaissance dans le domaine de la philosophie de l’esprit. Des philosophes comme Alva Noë, Shaun Gallagher et Dan Zahavi interprètent les résultats neuroscientifiques en ayant recours aux concepts et méthodes de la tradition phénoménologique. Toutefois, l’adaptation de la méthode phénoménologique en philosophie de l’esprit consiste souvent simplement à copier la façon de parler phénoménologique, ce qui ne contribue pas nécessairement à l’éclaircissement de l’objet d’étude. Les textes réunis dans le présent volume... sont libérés de tendances semblables -- la première partie, la relation entre la tradition phénoménologique et la philosophie de l’esprit à tendance « analytique » — Paul Livingston (historical overview) («Functionalism and logical analysis »), Galen Strawson sur la structure conceptuelle de la philosophie de l’esprit (« Intentionality and Experience : Terminological Preliminaries ») et une critique d’inspiration merleau-pontyienne à la théorie de la conscience de Dennett par Carmen Taylor (« On the Incapability of Phenomenology ») -- les quatre autres sections abordent différents complexes thématiques de la phénoménologie : la conscience et la connaissance de soi (2e partie), l’intentionnalité (3e partie), l’unité de la conscience (4e partie) et finalement la perception, la sensation et l’action (5e partie). -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  phenomenology  mind  mind-body  consciousness  self  perception  action-theory  neuroscience  cognition  analytical_philosophy  Dennett  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Giuseppina D’Oro - Le fossé dans l’explication n’est pas épistémologique mais sémantique | Érudit | Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 183-192 |
Giuseppina D’Oro - Université de Keele -- Traduction de l’anglais par Jérôme Havenel -- This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and Mcginn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind body-problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances. -- downloaded pdf to Note
metaphysics  ontology  epistemology  mind-body  consciousness  concepts  semantics  analytical_philosophy  Kripke  Nagel  reductionism  physicalism  naturalism  idealism  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Daniel D. Hutto - Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett’s Project | 1995. The Monist. 78:4. 464–478. - Academia.edu
I challenge the idea that the 'reductive character' of Dennett's project is in any way Wittgensteinian in spirit. I suggest that at a crucial point in their philosophy their views diverge significantly. That is to say, although they are good travelling companions up to an important cross-roads, in the end, their incompatible concerns take them in different directions. Furthermore, by reviewing Dennett's project of 'explaining' consciousness, we might begin to see some good reasons for preferring Wittgenstein's 'road less travelled'. Thus, although Dennett's account of consciousness is often given a centre stage in what follows, my ultimate aim is to throw light on the nature Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology by using Dennett as a foil. This should help us to see precisely how the former's approach differs importantly from those advanced by many of today's philosophers and cognitive scientists. -- downloaded pdf to Note
mind  reductionism  Dennett  Wittgenstein  consciousness  cognition  neuroscience  psychology  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Joyce - Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? | JSTOR: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 2009), pp. 53-75
Vol. 12, No. 1, Empirically Informed Moral Theory -- downloaded pdf to Note -- Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by "objective"? what is meant by "experience"?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis. -- starts with 17thC and 18thC philosophy, especially Hume
article  jstor  intellectual_history  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  morality-objective  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  consciousness  mind  cognition  17thC  18thC  Hume  empiricism  downloaded  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
RS Bakker - The Missing Half of the Global Neuronal Workspace: A Commentary on Stanislaus Dehaene’s Consciousness and the Brain | Three Pound Brain
Stanislaus Dehaene, to my mind at least, is the premier consciousness researcher on the planet, one of those rare scientists who seems equally at home in the theoretical aether (like we are here) and in the laboratory (where he is there). His latest book, Consciousness and the Brain provides an excellent, and at times brilliant, overview of the state of contemporary consciousness research. Consciousness has come a long way in the past two decades, and Dehaene deserves credit for much of the yardage gained. ... Dehaene’s review of Cristopher Koch’s Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, where he concludes with a confession of his own: “Can neuroscience be reconciled with living a happy, meaningful, moral, and yet nondelusional life? I will confess that this question also occasionally keeps me lying awake at night.” Since the implications of the neuroscientific revolution, the prospects of having a technically actionable blueprint of the human soul, often keep my mind churning into the wee hours, I was hoping that I might see a more measured, less sanguine Dehaene in this book, one less inclined to soft-sell the troubling implications of neuroscientific research. And in that one regard, I was disappointed. ?...Dehaene, I think, caters far too much to the very preconceptions his science is in the process of dismantling. As a result, the book, for all its organizational finesse, all its elegant formulations, and economical summaries of various angles of research, finds itself haunted by a jagged shadow, the intimation that things simply are not as they seem.
books  reviews  mind  consciousness  neuroscience  cognition  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Strawson on Consciousness - Waggish 2005
Long quote from TLS with broken link -- For those of us like me who can’t help wondering about the physical reality of subjective mental events, here’s a passage from the ever-excellent Galen Strawson, from a review of Antonio Damasio: The standard formulation of the “mind-body problem” rests on a huge and wholly unjustified assumption (this assumption, in fact, is Descartes’s deepest error). It is not content with the obvious truth that matter and consciousness seem to us to be utterly heterogeneous things. It slides on to the claim that matter and consciousness are in fact utterly heterogeneous things, in such a way that it is mysterious how one could ever be the basis or “realization” of the other. It shifts from a harmless and true epistemological claim about how things seem to us to a mega-therial metaphysical claim about how things are in reality.Why? Why indeed? .... So, if our best picture of matter makes it seem incomprehensible that matter should be the basis of (or simply be) conscious experience, all this shows is the inadequacy of our best picture of matter. Locke, Hume, Priestley, Kant and others were very clear about this, but few understand it today. Many now make Descartes’s deepest error, in fact, with far less justification than him – while condemning him for his errors.
mind-body  consciousness  reductionism  materialism  metaphysics  epistemology  Descartes  Locke  analytical_philosophy  thinking_matter  dualism  qualia  essence  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert Brandom: A Spirit of Trust: A Semantic Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology [ASoT] 2014 draft
As of February of 2014, the 2014 draft is just like the 2013 draft, except that it has a new version of Part Two, i.e. of Chapter Four and Five. -**- Table of Contents (MSword) *--* Notes on 2013 draft of ASoT (docx) -**- Downloaded 5 parts to Note *--* Part One: Knowing and Representing (MSword) *--* Part Two: Mediating the Immediate (MSword) *--* Part Three: Self-Consciousness (MSword) *--* Part Four: Hegel's Expressive Metaphysics of Agency (MSword) *--* Part Five: From Irony to Trust (MSword)
books  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  German_Idealism  Hegel  epistemology  metaphysics  agency  freedom  mind  self  consciousness  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Dermot Moran, review - Steven Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Feb 2014
C Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 321pp., $29.99 (pbk), ISBN 9781107682559.

Reviewed by University College Dublin

Steven Crowell's latest monograph is a careful and nuanced thematic and historically grounded defense of the philosophical importance of what is now frequently called "classical" phenomenology (specifically Husserl and Heidegger) in addressing the issues of meaning, normativity, agency and first-person knowledge, topics central to contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action. This well argued book situates Husserl and Heidegger not just at the center of contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind and action, but also as interlocutors in current disputes over normativity and practical knowledge (as found in the neo-pragmatism of John McDowell and Robert Brandom, among others), as well as the current discussions concerning first-person authority and mental content.

Crowell is not just conversant with the intricacy of the texts of Husserl and Heidegger (whom he reads with detailed documentation as in substantial agreement with one another), but also with a wide range of figures in contemporary philosophy of mind, moral psychology, and neo-pragmatism, including John Searle, Hubert Dreyfus, Alva Noë, Richard Moran (no relation), and Christine Korsgaard). In the course of his interpretations of Husserl and Heidegger, moreover, Crowell has a lot of instructive (and corrective) things to say about such issues as mental content, internalism and externalism, causation, the relation between perception and conception, the connection between self-consciousness and normativity, the transparency and immediacy of self-knowledge (in an interesting engagement with Moran) and the meaning of agency (including moral agency) in relation to Heidegger's notion of authenticity. This is a very rich, often dense but never less than lucid book that offers a systematic defense of phenomenology in the language of contemporary philosophy and thereby achieves a double objective, namely to set a new agenda for phenomenological discussion in the twenty-first century and to show why analytic philosophers would be wrong to neglect the phenomenological heritage.
books  reviews  kindle-available  philosophy  phenomenology  Husserl  Heidegger  idealism-transcendental  mind  action-theory  normativity  consciousness  responsibility  conscience  perception  causation  mind-body  agency  moral_psychology  Kant  analytical_philosophy  meaning  concepts  pragmatism  authenticity  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Daniel Stoljar interviewed by Richard Marshall - epistemic consciousness » 3:AM Magazine March 2014
Daniel Stoljar thinks all the time about what we can and can’t learn from introspection, about ignorance and the imagination, the epistemic view of consciousness, the ignorance hypothesis, slugs and tiles, distinctions between empirical and philosophical questions, physicalism as weltanschauung, whether materialism is part of a scientific world view, on materialism and physics and on whether metaphysics harmonising with science is any different from tourism doing so also. This one keeps hooking to the body. Brawlin’.
metaphysics  mind  mind-body  physicalism  materialism  epistemology  empiricism  phenomenology  consciousness  analytical_philosophy  books  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
The Self Illusion: How Our Social Brain Constructs Who We Are | Brain Pickings
Discusses Bruce Hood book, "The Self Illusion" [not that the self doesn't exist but it's constructed by the brain] -- Hood goes on to trace how the self emerges in childhood and examines why this notion of the illusory self is among the hardest concepts to accept, contrasting the “ego theory” of the self, which holds that we are essential entities inside bodies, with Hume’s “bundle theory,” which constructs the self not as a single unified entity but as a bundle of sensations, perceptions, and thoughts lumped together. Neuroscience, Hood argues, only supports the latter. The Self Illusion tells the story of how that bundle forms and why it sticks together, revealing the brain’s own storytelling as the centripetal force of the self.
books  human_nature  self  consciousness  Hume  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Manuel García-Carpintero - Qualia That It Is Right to Quine | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Sep., 2003), pp. 357-377
Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett-like argument can be based. -- lit survey of debate -- didn't download
article  jstor  20thC  21stC  analytical_philosophy  ontology  mind  mind-body  consciousness  qualia  representation-metaphysics  Quine  Dennett  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
John Michael Corrigan - The Metempsychotic Mind: Emerson and Consciousness | JSTOR: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 71, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 433-455
Makes a case for Emerson taking metempsychosis seriously - a widespread interest in Indian religion combined with esotericism - unity of thought across Eastern and Western traditions, Neoplatonism etc - to deal with increased time dimension from geology and eventually Darwinism. Explains part of Nietzsche's attraction and eternal recurrence? Surveys recent literature on Emerson and the Transcendentals, how they're embraced by postmodernism. -- didn't download
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  US  Emerson  idealism  metempsychosis  Indian_religion  esotericism  Neoplatonism  soul  consciousness  Hegelian  time  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Review by Peter J. Steinberger - Leslie Paul Thiele, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative | JSTOR: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 359-360
Ever since Aristotle, phronesis has been impossible to pin down. Steinberger - inevitable that someone would try to use new neuroscience, and if a book like this had to be written, at least Thiele makes a reasonably thoughtful stab at it. Given that faint praise, review sorts through how Thiele uses scientific evidence and speculation to date. He finds it reductionist and the production of the illusion of self via a MacIntyre type story hand wavy. -- didn't download
books  article  jstor  mind  neuroscience  moral_philosophy  emotions  reason-passions  phronesis  practical_reason  practical_knowledge  narrative  self  identity  consciousness  reflection  deliberation  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
John Dewey: The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other essays | George Herbert Mead Project
Originally published as: John Dewey. Table of Contents to The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays. New York: Henry Holt and Company (1910).


1 The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy

2 Nature and Its Good: A conversation

3 Intelligence and Morals

4 The Experimental Theory of Knowledge

5 The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth

6 A Short Catechism Concerning Truth

7 Beliefs and Existences

8 Experience and Objective Idealism

9 The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism

10 "Consciousness" and Experience

11 The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge
books  online_texts  Dewey  19thC  20thC  intellectual_history  US_history  evolution-as-model  Darwinism  epistemology  moral_philosophy  empiricism  mind  experimental_philosophy  idealism  consciousness  nature  belief  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader

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