dunnettreader + concepts   50

J-H Glock - What is a theory of meaning? (2912 | JSTOR - Cahiers de Ferdinand Saussure
This article discusses the contrast between two types of theories of meaning: 'analytic' theories that provide an explanation of the concept of linguistic meaning and 'constructive' theories that allow the derivation of statements specifying the meaning of the sentences of a specific language. Contrary to Davidson, Dummett and McDowell, reflecting on the form that a constructive theory for a natural language should take neither solves the task of explaining the concept of meaning nor does it show that enterprise to be superfluous. Conceptual analysis remains essential at two levels: an illuminating constructive theory would have to analyse the concepts of the object language; and the adequacy of a particular type of constructive theory can only be assessed on the basis of an adequate understanding of semantic concepts. To establish these conclusions I reject the Davidson/McDowell proposal that a constructive theory should be (conceptually) 'modest' while defending the idea that it should be 'psychologically' modest. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
analytical_philosophy  downloaded  McDowell  jstor  Dummett  article  meaning  concepts  Davidson 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Quentin Skinner - On the Liberty of the Ancients and the Moderns: A Reply | JSTOR - Journal of the History of Ideas (Jan 2012)
On the Liberty of the Ancients and the Moderns: A Reply to My Critics -- in Symposium: On Quentin Skinner, from Method to Politics (conference held for 40 years after "Meaning") -- Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 127-146 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism  rhetoric-political  rhetoric-moral_basis  Cambridge_School  Skinner  speech-act  contingency  concepts  concepts-change  contextualism  genealogy-method  liberty  liberty-positive  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Bryan Garsten - Liberalism and the Rhetorical Vision of Politics | JSTOR - Journal of the History of Ideas (Jan 2012)
in Symposium: On Quentin Skinner, from Method to Politics (conference held for 40 years after "Meaning") Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 83-93 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism  rhetoric-political  rhetoric-moral_basis  Cambridge_School  Skinner  speech-act  contingency  concepts  concepts-change  contextualism  bibliography  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Melissa Lane - Doing Our Own Thinking for Ourselves: On Quentin Skinner's Genealogical Turn on JSTOR
Doing Our Own Thinking for Ourselves: On Quentin Skinner's Genealogical Turn - in Symposium: On Quentin Skinner, from Method to Politics (conference held for 40 years after "Meaning") -- Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 71-82 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  philosophy_of_history  epistemology-history  Cambridge_School  Skinner  history-and-social_sciences  political_philosophy  political_discourse  language-politics  language-history  speech-act  concepts  concepts-change  contextualism  genealogy-method  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
John Sellars - Stoic Ontology and Plato's "Sophist" (2010) | Academia.edu
in V. Harte, M.M. McCabe, R.W. Sharples, A. Sheppard, eds, Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Suppl. 107 (2010), 185-203 -- Keywords: Metaphysics, Plato, and Stoicism -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  Academia.edu  intellectual_history  Stoicism  metaphysics  ancient_philosophy  ancient_Greece  ontology  Being  nothing  ideas-theories  concepts  universals  categories  Plato  Platonism  Seneca  Zenon_of_Citium  commentaries  late_antiquity  ancient_Rome  bibliography  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir and Asaf Kedar - Concept Formation in Political Science: An Anti-Naturalist Critique of Qualitative Methodology on JSTOR - Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep., 2008), pp. 503-517
This article offers an anti-naturalist philosophical critique of the naturalist tendencies within qualitative concept formation as developed most prominently by Giovanni Sartori and David Collier. Whereas naturalism assumes that the study of human life is not essentially different from the study of natural phenomena, anti-naturalism highlights the meaningful and contingent nature of social life, the situatedness of the scholar, and so the dialogical nature of social science. Naturalism encourages concept formation that involves reification, essentialism, and an instrumentalist view of language. Anti-naturalism, conversely, challenges reified concepts for eliding the place of meanings, essentialist concepts for eliding the place of contingency, and linguistic instrumentalism for eliding the situatedness of the scholar and the dialogical nature of social science. Based on this philosophical framework, we subject qualitative concept formation to a philosophical critique. We show how the conceptual strategies developed by Sartori and Collier embody a reification, essentialism, and instrumentalist view of language associated with naturalism. Although Collier's work on concept formation is much more flexible and nuanced than Sartori's, it too remains attached to a discredited naturalism. -- see for bibliography of 168 references -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  political_science  political_philosophy  political_culture  concepts  concepts-change  comparative_politics  social_sciences  social_theory  methodology-qualitative  meaning  bibliography  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicola Lacey - Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 919 (2015)
A cri de coeur for putting legal theory and history back together with social theory and empirical social sciences,. -- In the early part of my career, legal history and the history of legal ideas were closed books to me, as I made my way in a field of criminal law scholarship dominated by doctrinal scholarship and by concept-focused philosophical analysis of the foundations of criminal law. These 2 very different paradigms have 1 big thing in common: They tend to proceed as if the main intellectual task is to unearth the deep logic of existing legal doctrines, not infrequently going so far as to read them back onto history, as if things could never have been other than they are. (..)I have increasingly found myself turning to historical resources (1) [to examine] the contingency of particular legal arrangements, and (2) ...to develop causal and other theses about the dynamics which shape them and hence about the role and quality of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies. So, in a sense, I have been using history in support of an analysis driven primarily by the social sciences. (..) it is no accident that all of the great social theorists, from Marx to Foucault via Weber, Durkheim, and Elias, ..have incorporated significant historical elements into their interpretations .... Indeed, without the diachronic perspective provided by history (or the perspective offered by comparative study) we could have no critical purchase on social theory’s characterizations of or causal hypotheses about the dynamics of social systems. Hence, (...) my boundless gratitude to the historians whose meticulous research makes this sort of interpretive social theory possible). -- Lacey is not over-dramatizing -- see the "commentary" from a "legal philosopher" who believes the normative basis of criminal responsibility can be investigated as timeless "moral truths". -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_change  philosophy_of_law  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_social_science  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  morality-conventional  morality-objective  criminal_justice  responsibility  mind  human_nature  norms  power-asymmetric  power-symbolic  power  Neoplatonism  neo-Kantian  a_priori  historiography  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  moral_philosophy  evidence  mental_health  social_order  epistemology  epistemology-moral  change-social  change-intellectual  comparative_law  comparative_anthropology  civil_liberties  women-rights  women-property  rights-legal  rights-political  access_to_services  discrimination  legal_culture  legal_system  legal_reasoning  Foucault  Marx  Weber  Durkheim  metaethics  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steven Walt - What Can The History of Jurisprudence Do For Jurisprudence? A Commentary on Schauer's "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 977 (2015)
Walt's response (at least the abstract) appears to prove Schauer's point quite nicely, as if logic and argument by legal theorists takes place in an abstract world where "how did we get here" is universally ignored, despite its possible relevance for "why are we here", "what are we doing here" and "where does it look like we might be headed" -- but Walt devoted 10 pages to his response, so one hopes he has more to justify his position than what comes across as a mix of arrogance (we don't need to learn from history because our theoretical grounding and argumentative methods are self-contained and self-sufficient) and cynicism (history might be interesting, but no way will anybody change what gets them published and tenure) -- out of curiosity as to whether it's really as bad as the abstract makes it sound, downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  positivism  positivism-legal  historiography  legal_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Gerald J. Postema - Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 869 (2015)
Renaissance jurisprudence strove to be a sociable science. Following Ulpian’s lead, it refused to relegate jurisprudence either to pure speculation or to mere practice. Jurisprudence was a science, a matter of knowledge and of theoretical understanding, not merely an applied art or practice of prudence innocent of theory. It was regarded as the very heart of theoretical studies, drawing to itself all that the traditional sciences of theology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, as well as the newly emerging humanist sciences of philology and hermeneutics, had to offer. No less resolutely, however, it refused to abandon its foothold in the life of practice. (..) Rather than reject philosophical reflection, (..) Renaissance jurists sought to locate it in concrete human life and experience. (..) Philosophy.., was most true to its vocation, and was most engaged in human life, when its reflections were anchored in the social life acknowledged, comprehended, and informed by and informing law. Jurisprudence, vera philosophia, was ...the point at which the theoretical and the practical intersected (..) at its “sociable” best sought to integrate them. Analytic jurisprudence began as self-consciously, even militantly, “unsociable,” and its matured and much-sophisticated descendant, fin de siècle analytic legal philosophy, remained largely if not exclusively so. (..) It may be time, in this period of self-conscious attention to jurisprudential method, to press beyond the current limits of this debate over method to a reassessment of the ambitions of jurisprudence and of philosophy’s role in it. (..) my aim is not critical but constructive. (..) to recover something of the ideal of jurisprudence as a sociable science, to retrieve as much as our disenchanted age can be challenged to embrace, or at least to entertain, of the ambition of jurisprudence as vera philosophia. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  Renaissance  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  common_law  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  norms  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  change-social  change-intellectual  social_order  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  pragmatism  Peirce  continuity  historical_change  methodology-qualitative  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - What do the Philosophers Have against Dignity? (Nov 2014) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-59 -- Among analytic philosophers, there is considerable antipathy towards the concept of human dignity. It is not always expressed, but the impression is conveyed that this is a rather disreputable idea and that its trumpeting in legal and political theory is to be deplored. The present paper tries to get to grips with the sources of this antipathy. Is it based on the unclarity of the concept, its religious overtones, its speciesism, or its redundancy as a moral idea. The paper makes a case for dignity as a status-concept -- denoting a particular sort of moral/legal status that all humans have. -- Pages in PDF File: 23 -- Keywords: definition, dignity, foundationalism, human dignity, religion, rights -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  dignity  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  status  human_rights  foundationalism  politics-and-religion  natural_law  natural_rights  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - What is Law? :: SSRN - Jan 2015
Brian Z. Tamanaha -- Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-01-01 -- Theorists who tackle “What is law?” usually acknowledge the difficulty of the question, then, with hardly a pause, launch into their proposed answer. Instead, focusing on three main categories of concepts of law, I examine in detail why previous attempts have failed to achieve a consensus. Several factors have contributed. One source of disagreement involves clashes among intuitions about law. Further problems are created by the narrowness of functional analysis, on which nearly all concepts of law are based. Confusion also arises because law shares basic characteristics with many social institutions, as I show drawing on insights from the philosophy of society. Theorists also typically fail to recognize two distinct orientations of law, and multiple forms of law, which singular concepts of law cannot accommodate. Finally, variability and change owing to the social-historical nature of law defeats efforts of legal philosophers to identify essential features and universally true concepts of law. At the conclusion I present a way of understanding law that emerges out of the lessons learned from past unsuccessful efforts. -- topic headings in the essay: Three Categories of the Concept of Law; Pivotal Role of Intuitions About Law; Over-Inclusiveness of Functionalism; Under-Inclusiveness of Functionalism; Why Functionalism Cannot Answer ‘What is Law?’; Error of Conflating ‘Rule System’ and ‘Legal System’; Law as Part of the Institutional Substrate of Society; State Law’s Two Orientations; Coexisting Multiple Legal Forms; Necessary and Essential Features Or Typical Features; Universal Application Versus Universal Truth; What is Law -- No. Pages: 49 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, philosophy of law, law and society, legal anthropology, legal sociology, legal history, and comparative law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_culture  legal_realism  legal_reasoning  legal_validity  functionalism  institutions  institutional_change  social_order  universalism  normativity  norms  custom  customary_law  sociology_of_law  comparative_law  concepts  concepts-change  rule_of_law  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Ian Ward - Helping the Dead Speak: Leo Strauss, Quentin Skinner and the Arts of Interpretation in Political Thought | JSTOR: Polity, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 2009), pp. 235-255
In the wake of the "hermeneutical turn" two approaches to textual interpretation have come to wield considerable disciplinary influence in North American political theory circles: those of Leo Strauss and Quentin Skinner. Their respective approaches to texts in the history of political thought are generally regarded as competitor endeavors; indeed, the view that these approaches are downright antithetical enjoys the status of a disciplinary commonplace. I interrogate this commonplace and attempt to clarify what exactly is at stake in the differences between these two thinkers' interpretative approaches. Such efforts are repaid, I believe, by a more nuanced methodological self-awareness that discloses a more cooperative, and less antagonistic, view of the relationship between the two thinkers' hermeneutical understandings. -- check bibliography on jstor information page -- paywall
article  jstor  paywall  intellectual_history  historiography  political_philosophy  Skinner  Strauss  Cambridge_School  Straussians  hermeneutics  Gadamer  concepts  concepts-change  meaning  philosophy_of_language  rhetoric  bibliography  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Kevin Cahill - Ethics and the "Tractatus": A Resolute Failure | JSTOR: Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 307 (Jan., 2004), pp. 33-55
He's in the New Wittgenstein camp. Very useful development of themes across the New Wittgenstein crowd, distinguishing PI from Tractatus and why Wittgenstein came to see the Tractatus as a failure, not only in method, but in still being wedded to the intellectualizing impulse of philosophy, to elaborate the world as it really is by unlocking the central problem. His ethical objectives in the Tractatus have been developed by New Wittgenstein proponents, with analogies to Kierkegaard, St Paul and Augustine. -- read online, didn't download
article  jstor  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_language  moral_philosophy  dogmatism  analytical_philosophy  Wittgenstein  Frege  Russell_Bertrand  Kierkegaard  Paul  Augustine  logic  Logical_Positivism  syntax  language-bad_metaphysics  language_games  concepts  propositions  predicate  bibliography  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Galen Strawson - The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional | JSTOR: Analysis, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 271-282
Attacks the bad metaphysics that results from projecting our ability to conceptualize different aspects of objects etc separately, project them onto reality where those concepts can't exist independently, and then draw elaborate metaphysical non puzzles from the mess -- quotes Ramsey and Nietzsche, not Wittgenstein -- ftbt Ramsey 1925: 60.
He agrees with Nietzsche, who writes that 'language is built in terms of the most naive prejudices ... we read disharmonies and problems into things because we think only in the form of language - thus believing in the "eternal truth" of "reason" (e.g. subject, predicate, etc.). ... That we have a right to distinguish between subject and predicate - ... that is our strongest belief; in fact, at bottom, even the belief in cause and effect itself, in conditio and conditionatum, is merely an individual case of the first and general belief, our primeval belief in subject and predicate. ... Might not this belief in the concept of subject and predicate be a great stupidity?'" -- claims but without developing that Locke's consistent with his approach read but didn't download
article  jstor  metaphysics  analytical_philosophy  concepts  realism  properties  modal_logic  possible_worlds  Locke  language-bad_metaphysics  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Review Essay: Legal Thought in Enlightenment's Wake by Jeffrey A. Pojanowski :: SSRN - 4 Jurisprudence, 2013, Forthcoming
Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 12-80 -- This review essay considers Steven D. Smith’s most recent book, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse. Rather than focusing on the book’s argument about the practices and pathologies of the public square, this essay uses Smith’s chapter on scientific thought as a platform for exploring connections between Disenchantment and Smith’s prior work in legal theory. The catalyst for these reflections is Scandinavian legal realism. Considering these elements together sheds light on both the limits and virtues of central ideas about legal obligation and authority in contemporary jurisprudence. Such perspective points to a broader argument that jurisprudential debates about methodology and concepts may be as much about how we read the universe as they are about how we understand law. -- Keywords: jurisprudence, legal theory, obligation, authority, conceptual analysis, legal positivism
books  reviews  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  obligation  secularism  secularization  legal_realism  authority  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  legal_culture  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism :: SSRN - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2012
Legal philosophers have been preoccupied with specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance - law and morality. Positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and Raz propose a solution to this “Demarcation Problem” according to which the legal validity of a norm can not depend on its being morally valid, either in all or at least some possible legal systems. The proposed analysis purports to specify the essential and necessary features of law.... Yet the concept of law is an “artifact concept,” that is, a concept that picks out a phenomenon that owes its existence to human activities. Artifact concepts, even simple ones like “chair,” are notoriously resistant to analyses in terms of their essential attributes, precisely because they are hostage to human ends and purposes, and also can not be individuated by their natural properties. 20th-century philosophy of science dealt with a kindred Demarcation Problem: ...how to demarcate science from pseudo-science or nonsense. -- they sought to identify the essential properties of a human artifact (namely, science). They failed, and spectacularly so, which led some philosopher to wonder, “Why does solving the Demarcation Problem matter?” This essay develops the lessons for legal philosophy -- lest we want to become embroiled in pointless Fullerian speculations about the effects of jurisprudential doctrines on behavior, it is time to abandon the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  Logical_Positivism  linguistic_turn  concepts  analytical_philosophy  essentialism  natural_kinds  modal_logic  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  legal_system  positivism-legal  psychologism  natural_law  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  Carnap  Hempel  Popper  Fuller  Hart  Kelsen  Raz  Finnis  normativity  moral_sentiments  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Alex Langlinais, Brian Leiter - The Methodology of Legal Philosophy [chapter] (2013) :: SSRN - H. Cappelen, T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Forthcoming
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 407 -- This is the revised and penultimate version of this paper. The essay surveys issues about philosophical methodology as they arise in general jurisprudence. Certainly in the Anglophone world and increasingly outside it, H.L.A. Hart’s 1961 book The Concept of Law has dominated the discussion. ...methodological debates typically scrutinize either one of two (related) ... claims in Hart’s classic work. The first is that his theory is both general and descriptive (Hart 1994: 239). The second is that his theory is an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology (Hart 1994: vi). We explicate both ideas, arguing, in particular, that (1) Hart aims to give an essentialist analysis of law and legal systems (a point clearest in those who follow him like J. Raz, J. Dickson and [though less of a follower] S. Shapiro), and (2) we can make sense of the linking of linguistic (and conceptual) analysis and descriptive sociology if we understand "law" as a constructed bit of "social reality" in something like John Searle's sense. The ensuing methodological debates in legal philosophy can then be understood as arguing against either linguistic or conceptual analysis (naturalists like B. Leiter), or against the idea of a purely descriptive jurisprudence (in different ways, J. Finnis, S. Perry, M. Murphy, L. Murphy, R. Dworkin). -- Keywords: H.L.A. Hart, methodology, descriptive jurisprudence, conceptual analysis, John Searle, legal philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  methodology  legal_theory  intellectual_history  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_law  concepts  constructivism  Hart  Raz  Dworkin  Finnis  Searle  natural_law  naturalism  positivism-legal  legal_realism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence (2005) :: SSRN
Heavily cited -- U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 34 -- For three decades now, much of the Anglo-American legal philosophy curriculum has been organized around something called the Hart/Dworkin debate, a debate whose starting point is Ronald Dworkin's 1967 critique of the seminal work of Anglophone jurisprudence in the twentieth-century, H.L.A. Hart's 1961 book, The Concept of Law. This essay reviews the Hart/Dworkin debate and argues that it no longer deserves to play the same organizing role in the jurisprudential curriculum of the twenty-first century that it played at the close of the twentieth: on the particulars of the Hart/Dworkin debate, Hart has emerged the clear victor, so much so that even the heuristic value of the Dworkinian criticisms of Hart are now in doubt. (Dworkin's quite recent polemic against legal positivism in the 2002 Harvard Law Review is also addressed briefly.) The significant philosophical challenges that face legal positivists are now different, often in kind, from the ones Dworkin made famous. These, I shall argue, fall into two broad categories: first, the correct account of the content of the rule of recognition and its relationship to the possibility of law's authority (the Hart/Raz debate); and second, the proper methodology of jurisprudence, a debate which aligns defenders of descriptive conceptual jurisprudence (like Hart and Raz) against two sets of opponents: natural lawyers like Finnis, Perry and Stavropoulos who challenge whether jurisprudence can be descriptive; and philosophical naturalists, like the present author, who question whether conceptual analysis is a fruitful philosophical method in jurisprudence (or elsewhere). -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  intellectual_history  positivism-legal  legal_realism  naturalism  natural_law  natural_rights  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  Hart  Dworkin  Finnis  Raz  moral_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  historical_change  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_law  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - American Legal Realism (2002) :: SSRN
Heavily cited -- U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 42 -- This essay sets out the main elements of the revisionary and philosophical interpretation of the jurisprudence of American Legal Realism that I have developed in a series of articles over the last decade. This reading emphasizes the commitment of all the Realists to a core descriptive claim about adjudication (judges respond primarily to the underlying facts of the cases, rather than to legal rules and reasons); shows how the Realists divide in to two camps over the correct interpretation of this "core" claim (the Idiosncyrasy Wing of Frank, and the Sociological Wing of Llewellyn, Oliphant, Moore, Green, and the vast majority of Realists); demonstrates the connection of the Sociological Wing of Realism to the Realist project of law reform, including the work of the American Law Institute; examines and distinguishes the Realist arguments for the indeterminacy of law from Critical Legal Studies arguments; and shows how the Realists lay the foundation for the program of a "naturalized" jurisprudence, in opposition to the dominant "conceptual" jurisprudence of Anglophone legal philosophy. The revisionary reading also debunks certain popular myths about Legal Realism, like the following: the Realists believed "what the judge ate for breakfast determines the decision"; a critique of the public/private distinction was a central part of Realist jurisprudence; and the Realists were committed to an incoherent form of rule-skepticism. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_realism  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  sociology_of_law  reform-legal  naturalism  concepts  analytical_philosophy  Anglo-American  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis :: SSRN - American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 56, pp. 45-57, 2011 (last revised 2012 )
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-13 -- Gustav Radbruch, in well-known work that appeared just after World War II, put forward a formula that stated that state-promulgated rules that are sufficiently unjust lose their status as valid law. Radbruch’s Formula has generally been understood as a claim about the nature of law, and recent variations of Radbruch’s Formula, like Robert Alexy’s “claim to correctness,” have similarly been characterized as offering a truth about the nature of law. Additionally, both Radbruch’s and Alexy’s theories have been presented as criticisms of, and alternatives to, legal positivism. An alternative understanding of the Formula (and its modern variations) is as (mere) prescriptions for judicial decision-making, and thus compatible with a variety of different conceptual theories of the nature of law, including legal positivism. This article shows the difficulties of understanding Radbruch’s Formula as it was presented and conventionally understood. In particular, the article focuses on the way that seeing the Formula as a claim about the nature of law leads to outcomes inconsistent with the basic reasons for the Formula. -- Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Radbruch's Formula, Robert Alexy, Conceptual Analysis
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  positivism-legal  natural_law  concepts  legal_theory  norms 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Conceptual Jurisprudence and Socio-Legal Studies :: SSRN - Rutgers Law Journal, Vol. 32, 2000
This article was part of a conference on Brian Tamanaha's book, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory (Oxford, 1997). This article summarizes how Tamanaha's work seeks to merge the sociology of law with conceptual legal theory, though not always fully successfully. Tamanaha does not appreciate the extent to which the two tasks - sociology and conceptual analysis - may have different aims, and therefore their theories will be constructed along different and inconsistent lines. The article also considers the extent to which conceptual theories do or do not need to make ambitious metaphysical claims, and the connections between conceptual theories in jurisprudence and empirical data about the way law is practiced. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  reviews  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  sociology_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  social_theory  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Raz on Necessity (last revised 2009 ) :: SSRN - Law and Philosophy, vol. 22, pp. 537-559 (2003)
The article uses Joseph Raz's work as the starting point for a general discussion of the role of necessity and essence in jurisprudence. Analytical legal theorists commonly assert (or assume) that they are offering conceptual truths, claims regarding attributes necessarily true of all legal systems. Is it tenable to speak about necessary truths with a humanly created institution like law? Upon closer investigation, the use of necessary truths in writers like Raz and Jules Coleman clearly differs from the way such terms are used in classical metaphysics, and even in contemporary discussions of natural kind terms. Nonetheless, theorists making conceptual statements regarding law are making significant and ambitious claims that need to be defended - for example, against naturalists like Brian Leiter, who doubt the value of conceptual analysis, and normative theorists like Stephen Perry, who argue that assertions about the nature of law require value-laden moral and political choices between tenable alternatives. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  modal_logic  possible_worlds  universalism  universals  natural_kinds  natural_law  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  morality-conventional  normativity  essence  naturalism  legal_realism  philosophy_of_language  Raz  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - [Scandinavian legal realists] Ross and Olivecrona on Rights :: SSRN - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2009
Scandinavian legal realism was a movement of the early and middle decades of the 20th century, which paralleled the American legal realist movement, while presenting a more skeptical challenge to legal reasoning and discourse. The present paper was written for a forthcoming Oxford University Press collection on the Scandinavian realists. The approach to jurisprudence of Scandinavian realists Alf Ross and Karl Olivecrona was simultaneously simple and radical: they wanted to rid our thinking about law of all the mystifying references to abstract concepts and metaphysical entities. This paper offers a critical overview of Ross's and Olivecrona's views on legal rights, while also summarizing the critiques of those views (e.g., by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz). -- Keywords: legal rights, Scandinavian legal realism, Alf Ross, Karl Olivecrona -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  philosophy_of_language  metaphysics  ontology  concepts  legal_realism  rights-legal  intellectual_history  20thC  Scandinavia  Anglo-American  Hart  Raz  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Robert Alexy's Radbruch Formula, and the Nature of Legal Theory (2006) :: SSRN
Rechtstheorie, Vol. 37, pp. 139-149, 2006 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 06-13 -- Gustav Radbruch is well known for a formula that addresses the conflict of positive law and justice, a formula discussed in the context of the consideration of Nazi laws by the courts in the post-War German Federal Republic, and East German laws in the post-unification German courts. More recently, Robert Alexy has defended a version of Radbruch's formula, offering arguments for it that are different from and more sophisticated than those that were adduced by Radbruch himself. Alexy also placed Radbruch's formula within a larger context of conceptual analysis and theories about the nature of law. Both Radbruch and Alexy claim that their positions are incompatible with legal positivism, and therefore count as a rejection (and perhaps, refutation) of it. This paper, presented at a Conference on the work of Gustav Radbruch, looks at Radbruch's formula and Alexy's version of it. It focuses not so much on the merit of the Radbruch-Alexy formula, as on its proper characterization, and its appropriate placement within the larger context of legal philosophy. The particular focus is the methodological question of what Radbruch and Alexy's formulations - and their strengths and weaknesses - can show us about the nature of theorizing about law. -- Keywords: Robert Alexy, Gustav Radbruch, legal positivism, natural law theory, nature of law, conceptual theories, unjust laws -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  Germany  social_sciences-post-WWII  Nazis  analytical_philosophy  concepts  natural_law  moral_philosophy  positivism-legal  sociology_of_law  justice  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis (2007, revised 2009):: SSRN
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2007 - Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-65 -- The paper explores the justification for conceptual analysis as the methodology for theories about the nature of law. Using the example of Joseph Raz's theory, and Raz's own recent work on jurisprudential methodology, the paper explores the challenges to this standard approach: whether conceptual analysis is the appropriate approach, whether it needs to be supplemented by moral evaluation, and whether conceptual analysis can yield theories of substantial interest. -- Keywords: conceptual analysis, jurisprudence, legal philosophy, Joseph Raz, naturalism -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  moral_philosophy  naturalism  social_theory  Raz  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Legal Positivism (posted 2003) :: SSRN - BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson, eds., Blackwell, 2005
This article tries to present the jurisprudential school of thought, legal positivism, within a larger context than is usual in contemporary English-language discussions of that approach: (1) showing the intellectual and political contexts in which the movement began; (2) emphasizing the variety of theories that fit under that label (e.g., how the Kelsenian tradition varies significantly from the Hartian tradition); and (3) discussing how the future development of legal positivism will depend on its discussion of wider theoretical issues (e.g., the proper approach to social theory, and the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy). The article also summarizes the main criticisms of legal positivism, and gives an overview of the internal debate of inclusive legal positivism versus exclusive legal positivism. Note: This is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Germany  Anglo-American  positivism-legal  Kelsen  Hart  social_theory  sociology_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Giuseppina D’Oro - Le fossé dans l’explication n’est pas épistémologique mais sémantique | Érudit | Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 183-192 |
Giuseppina D’Oro - Université de Keele -- Traduction de l’anglais par Jérôme Havenel -- This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and Mcginn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind body-problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances. -- downloaded pdf to Note
metaphysics  ontology  epistemology  mind-body  consciousness  concepts  semantics  analytical_philosophy  Kripke  Nagel  reductionism  physicalism  naturalism  idealism  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Dermot Moran, review - Steven Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Feb 2014
C Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 321pp., $29.99 (pbk), ISBN 9781107682559.

Reviewed by University College Dublin

Steven Crowell's latest monograph is a careful and nuanced thematic and historically grounded defense of the philosophical importance of what is now frequently called "classical" phenomenology (specifically Husserl and Heidegger) in addressing the issues of meaning, normativity, agency and first-person knowledge, topics central to contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action. This well argued book situates Husserl and Heidegger not just at the center of contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind and action, but also as interlocutors in current disputes over normativity and practical knowledge (as found in the neo-pragmatism of John McDowell and Robert Brandom, among others), as well as the current discussions concerning first-person authority and mental content.

Crowell is not just conversant with the intricacy of the texts of Husserl and Heidegger (whom he reads with detailed documentation as in substantial agreement with one another), but also with a wide range of figures in contemporary philosophy of mind, moral psychology, and neo-pragmatism, including John Searle, Hubert Dreyfus, Alva Noë, Richard Moran (no relation), and Christine Korsgaard). In the course of his interpretations of Husserl and Heidegger, moreover, Crowell has a lot of instructive (and corrective) things to say about such issues as mental content, internalism and externalism, causation, the relation between perception and conception, the connection between self-consciousness and normativity, the transparency and immediacy of self-knowledge (in an interesting engagement with Moran) and the meaning of agency (including moral agency) in relation to Heidegger's notion of authenticity. This is a very rich, often dense but never less than lucid book that offers a systematic defense of phenomenology in the language of contemporary philosophy and thereby achieves a double objective, namely to set a new agenda for phenomenological discussion in the twenty-first century and to show why analytic philosophers would be wrong to neglect the phenomenological heritage.
books  reviews  kindle-available  philosophy  phenomenology  Husserl  Heidegger  idealism-transcendental  mind  action-theory  normativity  consciousness  responsibility  conscience  perception  causation  mind-body  agency  moral_psychology  Kant  analytical_philosophy  meaning  concepts  pragmatism  authenticity  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Edouard Machery - Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind* | JSTOR: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 72, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 444-467
In cognitive psychology, concepts are those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long‐term memory and are used by default in human beings’ higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, etc.). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the natural kind assumption. This article challenges the natural kind assumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate, if one aims at formulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations about the human mind. -- an early paper that's developed in his recent book -- didn't download
article  jstor  philosophy_of_science  psychology  cognition  neuroscience  concepts  kinds  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis - Concepts and Conceptual Analysis | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Sep., 2003), pp. 253-282
Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether. -- serves as a lit survey of 20thC analytical_philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  intuitions  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Gordon Park Stevenson - Revamping Action Theory | JSTOR: Behavior and Philosophy, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2004), pp. 427-451
Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, action theorists propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of folk psychological action ascriptions. However, several key doctrinal and methodological features of contemporary action theory are troubling, in particular (i) the insistence that folk psychological kinds like beliefs and desires have neurophysiological correlates, (ii) the assumption that the concept of action is "classical" in structure (making it amenable to definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for its proper application), and (iii) the assumption that deferring to intuitions about the application of the concept of action amidst the context of fantastical thought experiments furnishes an effective method for judging the adequacy of proposed analyses. After consideration of these problems it is argued that action theory needs to be reoriented in a more naturalistic direction, the methods and aims of which are continuous with those of the empirical sciences. The paper concludes with a sketch (and defense) of the methodological foundations of a naturalistic approach to intentional action. -- serves as a lit survey of 1970s and 1980s mostly -- didn't download
article  jstor  analytical_philosophy  concepts  action-theory  intentionality  mind-body  naturalism  lit_survey  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir - Notes Toward an Analysis of Conceptual Change [eScholarship] (2003)
This is an early or unrevised version, and is not definitive, and therefore should not be cited. The Citation is Social Epistemology, 2003, 17, pp. 55-63. -- Extends insights from philosophy and sociology of science to conceptual changes more generally, often triggered by a dilemma that can't be handled well using concepts within existing background knowledge or web of beliefs. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  eScholarship  philosophy_of_science  concepts  epistemology-social  historical_change  psychology  cognition  rationality  holism  belief  Innovation  Kuhn  Popper  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir - Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Power: A Response to Critics [eScholarship] | Rethinking History (2000)
This is Bevir's response to the roundtable of articles on his book, The Logic of the History of Ideas -- Additional Info: This is an electronic version of an article published in Rethinking History© 2000 Copyright Taylor & Francis; Rethinking History is available online at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/13642529.asp -- Keywords:
hermeneutics, intentionality, philosophy, power, rationality, rhetoric
article  eScholarship  intellectual_history  philosophy_of_history  concepts  historical_change  historiography  narrative  White_Hayden  power  Foucault  intentionality  meaning  rhetoric  rhetoric-political  rationality  agency  individualism-methodology  philosophy_of_language  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir - Anglophone Historicism: From Modernist Method to Post-analytic Philosophy [eScholarship] (2009)
Original Citation:
Mark Bevir, “Anglophone Historicism: From Modernist Method to Post-analytic Philosophy”, Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (2009), 211-224

Historicism, Modernism, Postanalytic Philosophy, Quentin Skinner
article  eScholarship  intellectual_history  historiography  20thC  historicism  Modernism  positivism  philosophy_of_history  philosophy_of_language  concepts  meaning  Skinner  Cambridge_School  contextualism  postanalytic_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  epistemology-history  epistemology-social  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Timo Pankakoski - Conflict, Context, Concreteness: Koselleck and Schmitt on Concepts | JSTOR: Political Theory, Vol. 38, No. 6 (December 2010), pp. 749-779
In Reinhart Koselleck's history of concepts, the general orientation that concepts are to be understood in their proper contexts is intertwined with the assumption that they are manifestations of particular political conflicts. The essay shows that the dense compound of context and conflict in Koselleck's thought springs from Carl Schmitt's political theory and also forms an important point of continuity between Koselleck's early work and his later methodological writings. The formalized assumption of conflict, somewhat problematically, binds Koselleckian conceptual history to a particular conception of politics, one that sees politics ultimately as struggle and conflict. Once the historical-theoretical contingency of this conception is recognized, it becomes both possible and necessary to reassess the role of conflict in the methodology of conceptual history. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  20thC  Germany  concepts  Koselleck  Schmitt  conflict  political_philosophy  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Group includes Mark Knights? -- The article explores 'commonwealth' both as a term and a conceptual field across the early modern period, with a particular focus on the Anglophone world. The shifts of usage of 'commonwealth' are explored, from a term used to describe the polity, to one used to describe a particular, republican form of polity, through to its eclipse in the eighteenth century by other terms such as 'nation' and 'state'. But the article also investigates the variety of usages during any one time, especially at moments of crisis, and the network of related terms that constituted 'commonwealth'. That investigation requires, it is argued, not just a textual approach but one that embraces social custom and practice, as well as the study of literary and visual forms through which the keyword 'commonwealth' was constructed. The article emphasizes the importance of social context to language; the forms, metaphors and images used to describe and depict the polity; and to show how linguistic change could occur through the transmutation of elements of the conceptual field that endowed the keyword with its meaning. -- lots of references -- looks immensely useful, of course cites original version of Skinner on Bolingbroke -- paywall Cambridge journals
article  jstor  paywall  find  libraries  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  Europe-Early_Modern  16thC  17thC  18thC  British_politics  commonwealth  body_politic  common_good  republicanism  Whigs-Radicals  macro-microcosm  keywords  political_press  images-political  English_lit  metaphor  concepts  metaphor-political  political-theology  Bolingbroke  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Branko Mitrović: Intentionalism, Intentionality, and Reporting Beliefs | JSTOR: History and Theory, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Oct., 2009), pp. 180-198
Downloaded pdf to Note -- The dominant view of twentieth-century analytic philosophy has been that all thinking is always in a language, that languages are vehicles of thought. The same view has been widespread in continental philosophy as well. In recent decades, however, the opposite view—that languages serve merely to express language-independent thought-contents or propositions—has been more widely accepted. The debate has a direct equivalent in the philosophy of history: when historians report the beliefs of historical figures, do they report the sentences or propositions that these historical figures believed to be true or false? In this paper I argue in favor of the latter, intentionalist, view. My arguments center mostly on the problems with translation that are likely to arise when a historian reports the beliefs of historical figures who expressed them in a language other than the one in which the historian is writing. In discussing these problems the paper presents an application of John Searle's theory of intentionality to the philosophy of history.
paper  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  translation  concepts  intentionality  philosophy_of_language  mind  bibliography  Cambridge_School  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
John Dewey: How We Think (1910) | George Herbert Mead Project
John Dewey. How we think. Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, (1910)

Part One: The Problem of Training Thought

Chapter One: What is Thought?

Chapter Two: The Need for Training Thought

Chapter Three: Natural Resources in the Training of Thought

Chapter Four: School Conditions and the Training of Thought

Chapter Five: The Means and End of Mental Training: The Psychological and The Logical

Part Two: Logical Considerations

Chapter Six: The Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought

Chapter Seven: Systematic Inference: Induction and Deduction

Chapter Eight: Judgment: the Interpretation of Facts

Chapter Nine: Meaning: or Conceptions and Understanding

Chapter Ten: Concrete and Abstract Thinking

Chapter Eleven: Empirical and Scientific Thinking

Part Three: The Training of Thought

Chapter Twelve: Activity and the Training of Thought

Chapter Thirteen: Language and the Training of Thought

Chapter Fourteen: Observation and Information in the Training of Mind

Chapter Fifteen: The Recitation and the Training of Thought

Chapter Sixteen: Some General Conclusions

books  online_texts  Dewey  intellectual_history  20thC  US_history  mind  psychology  thought  logic  language  education  meaning  concepts  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Gad Prudovsky: Can we Ascribe to Past Thinkers Concepts They had no Linguistic Means to Express? (1997)
JSTOR: History and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 15-31 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- This article takes a clear-cut case in which a historian (Alexander Koyré) ascribes to a writer (Galileo) a concept ("inertial mass") which neither the writer nor his contemporaries had the linguistic means to express. On the face of it the case may seem a violation of a basic methodological maxim in historiography: "avoid anachronistic ascriptions!" The aim of the article is to show that Koyré's ascription, and others of its kind, are legitimate; and that the methodological maxim should not be given the strict reading which some writers recommend. More specifically, the conceptual repertoire of historical figures need not be reconstructed solely in terms of the social and linguistic conventions of their time and place.
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  methodology  language  concepts  history_of_science  philosophy_of_science  Cambridge_School  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
C Knight: Unit-ideas unleashed: a reinterpretation and reassessment of Lovejovian methodology in the history of ideas (2012) - Enlighten
Knight, C. (2012) Unit-ideas unleashed: a reinterpretation and reassessment of Lovejovian methodology in the history of ideas. Journal of the Philosophy of History, 6 (2). pp. 195-217 -- pdf from philpapers -- This article argues for an unconventional interpretation of Arthur O. Lovejoy’s distinctive approach to method in the history of ideas. It is maintained that the value of the central concept of the ‘unit-idea’ has been misunderstood by friends and foes alike. The commonality of unit-ideas at different times and places is often defined in terms of familial resemblance. But such an approach must necessarily define unit-ideas as being something other than the smallest conceptual unit. It is therefore in tension with Lovejoy’s methodological prescription and, more importantly, disregards a potentially important aspect of intellectual history – the smaller conceptual units themselves. In response to this, an alternative interpretation of unit-ideas as ‘elemental’ – as the smallest identifiable conceptual components – is put forward. Unlike the familial resemblance approach, the elemental approach can provide a plausible explanation for changes in ideas. These are construed as being either the creation of new unit-ideas, the disappearance of existing ones, or alterations in the groups of unit-ideas that compose idea-complexes. The focus on the movement of unit-ideas and idea-complexes through history can also be sensitive to contextual issues, carefully distinguishing the different meanings that single words may have, in much the way that both Lovejoy and his influential critic Quentin Skinner suggest.
article  intellectual_history  historiography  Lovejoy  Cambridge_School  concepts  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Leo Catana: Lovejoy's Readings of Bruno: Or How Nineteenth-century History of Philosophy was "Transformed" into the History of Ideas
Project MUSE - Leo Catana. "Lovejoy's Readings of Bruno: Or How Nineteenth-century History of Philosophy was "Transformed" into the History of Ideas." Journal of the History of Ideas71.1 (2010): 91-112. Project MUSE. Web. 28 Aug. 2013. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.....Available as html and pdf. Arthur O. Lovejoy made rather grand methodological statements about the nature of history of ideas in his Great Chain of Being (1936). These statements were, it is argued, rhetorical declarations, intended to produce the conviction in the minds of his readers that history of ideas was distinct from history of philosophy and thus deserved institutional independence; they were not adequate descriptions of the method actually practiced. Instead, Lovejoy's historiographical practice can be contextualized within nineteenth-century general histories of philosophy. His studies on Giordano Bruno, dating from 1904 and 1936 respectively, illustrate this historiographical continuity.
article  Project_MUSE  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Bruno  Spinoza  Bayle  Neoplatonism  metaphysics  eclecticism  Lovejoy  concepts  EF-add  historiography  Cambridge_School  18thC  Germany  Renaissance 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
John Patrick Diggins: Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Challenge of Intellectual History (2006)
JSTOR: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 181-208.....Heavy on anti pragmatism and anti modernism. ?...Downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  20thC  intellectual_history  historiography  pragmatism  Lovejoy  Cambridge_School  Dewey  James_William  concepts  culture  culture_wars  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen: Making Sense of Conceptual Change (2008)
JSTOR: History and Theory, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Oct., 2008), pp. 351-372.....Downloaded pdf to Note. ?... Arthur Lovejoy's history of unit-ideas and the history of concepts are often criticized for being historically insensitive forms of history-writing. Critics claim that one cannot find invariable ideas or concepts in several contexts or times in history without resorting to some distortion. One popular reaction is to reject the history of ideas and concepts altogether, and take linguistic entities as the main theoretical units. Another reaction is to try to make ideas or concepts context-sensitive and to see their histories as dynamic processes of transformation. The main argument in this paper is that we cannot abandon ideas or concepts as theoretical notions if we want to write an intelligible history of thought. They are needed for the categorization and classification of thinking, and in communication with contemporaries. Further, the criterion needed to subsume historical concepts under a general concept cannot be determined merely on the basis of their family resemblances, which allows variation without an end, since talk of the same concepts implies that they share something in common. I suggest that a concept in history should be seen to be composed of two components: the core of a concept and the margin of a concept. On the basis of this, we can develop a vocabulary for talking about conceptual changes. The main idea is that conceptual continuity requires the stability of the core of the concept, but not necessarily that of the margin, which is something that enables a description of context-specific features. If the core changes, we ought to see it as a conceptual replacement.
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  concepts  Lovejoy  Cambridge_School  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 3 (October 2011), pp. 303-327 -- Many long-standing debates about anachronistic concept-attributions derive from an essentialist understanding of concepts that is often difficult to sustain for metaphysical or epistemological reasons. The intentionalist alternative to essentialism elaborated in this article successfully clarifies and avoids many standard problems with anachronism. -- very interesting bibliography covering post WWII analytic philosophy of social sciences, epistemology, and debates over "meaning" - concepts, intentionality conceptual change etc after logical positivism was dead -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  epistemology-history  historiography  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  intentionality  intentionality-collective  Cambridge_School  belief  downloaded 
august 2013 by dunnettreader

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