dunnettreader + competition   63

New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate | Journal of European Competition Law & Practice | Oxford Academic
Over the last two years, a growing number in America have concluded that the United States has a monopoly problem. The Obama Administration’s Council of…
antitrust  monopolies  industry_concentration  competition  Labor_markets  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Antitrust in the Labor Market: Protectionist, or Pro-Competitive? -
Redirecting antitrust enforcement to confront monopsony power would be a substantial departure from the way it has been conducted in recent decades, but just…
Labor_markets  wages  monopsony  antitrust  competition  industry_concentration  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Strong Employers and Weak Employees: Study Sheds New Light on How Labor Market Concentration Hurts Workers -
New study finds that wages are significantly lower in concentrated labor markets—and even lower in labor markets where unionization rates are low. Strikers and…
Labor_markets  wages  unions  human_capital  monopsony  antitrust  competition  industry_concentration  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Robert S. Taylor - Market Freedom as Antipower (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
Historically, republicans were of different minds about markets: some, such as Rousseau, reviled them, while others, like Adam Smith, praised them. The recent republican resurgence has revived this issue. Classical liberals such as Gerald Gaus contend that neorepublicanism is inherently hostile to markets, while neorepublicans like Richard Dagger and Philip Pettit reject this characterization—though with less enthusiasm than one might expect. I argue here that the right republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent and that republicanism demands such markets for the same reason it requires the rule of law: because both are essential institutions for protecting individuals from arbitrary interference. I reveal how competition restrains—and in the limit, even eradicates— market power and thereby helps us realize "market freedom," i.e., freedom as nondomination in the context of economic exchange. Finally, I show that such freedom necessitates "Anglo-Nordic" economic policies. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
Pettit  capitalism-alternatives  downloaded  markets_in_everything  capitalism-varieties  republicanism  bibliography  political_economy  Rousseau  Smith  market_failure  markets-dependence_on_government  jstor  commerce-doux  freedom  domination  market_fundamentalism  Gaus_Gerald  markets  political_theory  capitalism  article  competition  markets-structure 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Henry Farrell - Privatization as State Transformation — Crooked Timber - Sept 2016
This account helps explain not only why key parts of the state have become privatized or semi-privatized, being put out to private operators, but why states are increasingly relying on private systems of ordering. It shows how the privatization of governance spans the international sphere as well as domestic politics, since international and cross-national forms of regulation have sometimes been partly privatized, and sometimes structured so as to provide private entities with new opportunities to challenge government decisions. Finally, it provides the basis for a specific normative critique of privatization. Here, I do not try to evaluate whether the economy works worse, or better, after privatization than it did in an era when the state exercised control through ownership rather than regulation. Instead, more simply, I show that privatization did not work as its enthusiasts argued and believed that it would, looking to evaluate it in terms of its own promises. Rather than pushing back the state, and replacing political inefficiency with the competitive disciplines of the market, it has replaced one form of political control with another. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
competition-political  political_science  efficiency  political_change  downloaded  international_organizations  international_political_economy  IR-domestic_politics  hierarchy  accountability  reform-political  competition  political_economy  risk_management  paper  government-forms  political_sociology  political_order  politics-and-money  political_discourse  privatization  organizations  decision_theory  bureaucracy  political_culture 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, Isabel Tecu - Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership :: SSRN July 5, 2016
José Azar , University of Navarra, IESE Business School
Martin C. Schmalz , University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Isabel Tecu , Charles River Associates (CRA)
Ross School of Business Paper No. 1235
Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large diversified institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities. We use within-route variation over time to identify a positive effect of common ownership on ticket prices. A panel-IV strategy that exploits BlackRock's acquisition of Barclays Global Investors confirms these results. We conclude that a hidden social cost -- reduced product market competition -- accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance. -- Pages 61
Keywords: Competition, Ownership, Diversification, Pricing, Antitrust, Governance, Product Market
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
industry_consolidation  corporate_ownership  SSRN  interlocking_holdings  industry_structure  corporate_governance  conflict_of_interest  downloaded  rent-seeking  paper  institutional_investors  capital_markets  anti-competive_behavior  competition  cross-holdings 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Noah Smith - The Illusion of Lagging Productivity | Bloomberg View - August 2016
Re Dietrich Vollrath's recent posts on how part of it may be statistical illusion from industry collecting rents due to increased industry concentration, IP etc., which makes the stats on production look too capital-heavy.
economic_growth  US_economy  21stC  2010s  productivity  rents  rent-seeking  competition  statistics  from instapaper
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer - “Competition for Attention” (2016) Rev of Econ Studies
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. 2016. “Competition for Attention.” Review of Economic Studies 83 (2): 481-513. -- Abstract
We present a model of market competition in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. Strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit “commoditized” price salient equilibria, while others exhibit “de-commoditized” quality salient equilibria. When the costs of quality change, innovation can lead to radical shifts in markets, as in the case of decommoditization of the coffee market by Starbucks. In the context of financial innovation, the model generates the phenomenon of “reaching for yield”. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
behavioral_economics  attention  paywall  consumerism  competition  cognition  article  cognitive_bias  downloaded  prices  rational_choice  commodities  cognitive_science  consumer_demand 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Management as a Technology?
Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun, John Van Reenen
NBER Working Paper No. 22327
Issued in June 2016
NBER Program(s):   CF   DEV   EFG   IO   LS   PR
Are some management practices akin to a technology that can explain company and national productivity, or do they simply reflect contingent management styles? We collect data on core management practices from over 11,000 firms in 34 countries. We find large cross-country differences in the adoption of basic management practices, with the US having the highest size-weighted average management score. We present a formal model of “Management as a Technology”, and structurally estimate it using panel data to recover parameters including the depreciation rate and adjustment costs of managerial capital (both found to be larger than for tangible non-managerial capital). Our model also predicts (i) a positive effect of management on firm performance; (ii) a positive relationship between product market competition and average management quality (part of which stems from the larger covariance between management with firm size as competition strengthens); and (iii) a rise (fall) in the level (dispersion) of management with firm age. We find strong empirical support for all of these predictions in our data. Finally, building on our model, we find that differences in management practices account for about 30% of cross-country total factor productivity differences.
competition  NBER  business_practices  paper  productivity  management 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Political Rents and Profits in Regulated Industries - ProMarket July 2016
A new working paper by James Bessen from Boston University finds that much of the rise in corporate profits since 2000 was caused by political rent seeking.
profit  business-and-politics  utilities  consumer_protection  competition  regulation  anti-trust  rents  market_failure  political_economy  paper  from instapaper
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Paul Glastris - Elizabeth Warren just gave the most sneakily important speech of 2016
Re pattern of industry consolidation in US, and need for aggressive competition policies - Glastris thinks EW has figured out how to package it as "common sense", easy to understand, political discourse for Democrats
US_politics  US_economy  Democrats  elections-2016  competition  antitrust  political_economy  political_discourse  Instapaper  from instapaper
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Bond Economics: review, "Capitalism" - By Anwar Shaikh - April 2016
Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises is a comprehensive overview of economics published by the noted heterodox economist Anwar Shaikh. This article is…
Instapaper  books  reviews  economic_theory  heterodox_economics  macroeconomics  capitalism  business_cycles  competition  capitalism-systemic_crisis  financial_crisis  emergence  econophysics  economic_models  from instapaper
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Les usages de la peur dans la mondialisation: Entretien avec Zygmunt Bauman - Desaunay, Fœssel and Padis | JSTOR - Esprit 2005
Les usages de la peur dans la mondialisation: Entretien avec Zygmunt Bauman -- Zygmunt Bauman, Cécile Desaunay, Michaël Fœssel and Marc-Olivier Padis, Esprit, No. 316 (7) (Juillet 2005), pp. 71-98 -- Loin d'uniformiser la planète, la mondialisation provoque un morcellement des espaces et une montée de la peur. Comment, dans ces conditions, penser une mondialisation positive qui ne signifierait pas l'abandon de la politique sociale, pensée jusqu'ici dans le cadre de l'État-nation? -- downloaded pdf to Note
interview  jstor  political_economy  globalization  French_intellectuals  French_language  EU_governance  European_integration  global_governance  universalism  fragmentation  competition  status  hierarchy  inequality  inequality-global  nation-state  imagined_communities  welfare_state  neoliberalism  solidarity  social_theory  economic_sociology  economic_culture  social_order  social_democracy  downloaded 
march 2016 by dunnettreader
Akerlof, G.A. and Shiller, R.J.: Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception. (eBook and Hardcover)
Phishing for Phools therefore strikes a radically new direction in economics, based on the intuitive idea that markets both give and take away. Akerlof and Shiller bring this idea to life through dozens of stories that show how phishing affects everyone, in almost every walk of life. We spend our money up to the limit, and then worry about how to pay the next month’s bills. The financial system soars, then crashes. We are attracted, more than we know, by advertising. Our political system is distorted by money. We pay too much for gym memberships, cars, houses, and credit cards. Drug companies ingeniously market pharmaceuticals that do us little good, and sometimes are downright dangerous. Phishing for Phools explores the central role of manipulation and deception in fascinating detail in each of these areas and many more. It thereby explains a paradox: why, at a time when we are better off than ever before in history, all too many of us are leading lives of quiet desperation. At the same time, the book tells stories of individuals who have stood against economic trickery—and how it can be reduced through greater knowledge, reform, and regulation. -- Intro downloaded pdf to Note
financial_crisis  kindle-available  behavioral_economics  competition  downloaded  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  financial_system  pharma  accountability  books  politics-and-money  marketing  information-asymmetric  markets-dependence_on_government  disclosure  markets-failure  financial_innovation  financial_regulation 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: The End of the Supermanager? - June 2015
Like Larry at EPI, he finds the new highly heralded paper that claims the growth of inequality has been principally between firms rather than between "classes" -- some of the results don't fully pass the smell test e.g. that different sectors don't appear to be an important variable, which doesn't square with what we know about the financial services industry. More interesting is breaking down "sources" of income for those at the top of the income distribution pyramid, and what's been happening with the mix of sources. There was a huge spurt in CEO compensation "from labor" from, say $1M to $10M. Then since c. 2000, it's dropped back down to $5M. So the continued process of the lion's share of growth in GNP going to the tippy-top is now increasingly income from wealth, not "labor". A pattern to chew on, but it further complicates the claims of the paper that we're seeing inequality emerge from n apparently less nefarious process than rampant greed of superstars. It's inter-firm competition, the benefits of which the lower orders participate in via higher compensation than peers in less competitive firms.
Instapaper  US_economy  economic_history  post-Cold_War  21stC  inequality  inequality-wealth  executive_compensation  competition  Innovation  labor_share  productivity  productivity-labor_share  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Oren Levintal, Joseph Zeira - Toxic assets in the 18th century | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 21 September 2009
Problems of regulation appear whenever financial innovations change the ways capital markets operate. This column describes the 18th century emergence of the inconvertible banknote, a "toxic asset” ended by government regulation. The lesson is that free financial markets promote financial innovation, but government must provide adequate regulation keeping the market on track. -- downloaded page as pdf to Note
economic_history  British_history  18thC  financial_innovation  banking  currency  Scotland  free_banking  competition  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Dietz Vollrath - Mathiness versus Science in Growth Economics | Growth Economics - May 2015
Paul Romer created a bit of a firestorm over the last week or so with his paper and posts regarding “Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth”. I finally was… -- he talked with Moll re the Lucas and Moll paper that Romer has been going ballistic about -- Vollrath seems to think that theoretical models addressing growth-enducing technologies may need to consider monopolistic style competition in some markets, but in, e.g. peasants adopting higher yield techniques, a "price-taker" model might be appropriate -- but the crucial point is not the key assumption underpinning a model, but that it be framed and specified in a fashion that empirical research can be done to rule out some factors and gradually adjust and refine both theoretical explanation and empirical evidence -- very Popperian approach to interplay between theory and "falsification"
economic_theory  economic_growth  macroeconomics  scientific_method  technology  technology_transfer  technology-adoption  competition  monopolies  increasing_returns  Chicago_School  Romer  Instapaper  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Martens, Rusconi and Leuze, eds. - New Arenas of Education Governance: The Impact of International Organizations and Markets on Educational Policy Making | Palgrave Macmillan - November 2007
Edited by Kerstin Martens, Alessandra Rusconi, Kathrin Leuze -- How and to what extent is education becoming a field of international and market governance? Traditionally, education policy making has been viewed as the responsibility of the nation state, falling within the realm of domestic politics. But recent years have witnessed the transformation of the state. Globalization has introduced new actors and led to the internationalization and marketization of education. This volume provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date account of these new arenas of education governance, examining the impact of international organizations and the role of the market in policymaking. It demonstrates how education policy is formulated at international levels and what the consequences for national policy making will be. -- excerpt = TOC, Introduction and index -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  public_policy  education  education-higher  education-training  education-privatization  education-finance  international_organizations  globalization  markets_in_everything  market_fundamentalism  privatization  public_goods  governance  global_governance  business-and-politics  business_influence  education-civic  values  accountability  Labor_markets  human_capital  competition  competition-interstate  development  distance_learning  IT  communication  nation-state  national_ID  knowledge_economy  OECD  World_Bank  WTO  trade-policy  trade-agreements  student_debt  democracy_deficit  political_participation  EU  EU_governance  standards-setting  testing  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Roger Backhouse, Mauro Boianovsky - Secular Stagnation: The History of a Macroeconomic Heresy :: SSRN - May 5, 2015
Roger Backhouse, University of Birmingham - Department of Economics -- Mauro Boianovsky, Universidade de Brasilia. *--* This paper covers the history of secular stagnation from Alvin's Hansen's AEA Presidential address in 1938 to the recent re-discovery of the idea by Lawrence Summers. It is argued that the story of secular stagnation is more complicated than the simple version usually told: the theory changed in ways that meant that, though its immediate relevance might be less, postwar prosperity left open the possibility that it might one day become relevant. It is also pointed out that the history of the term has never been free of political concerns, and it is suggested that changing conceptions of economic theory played an important role in the fate of secular stagnation -- Pages in PDF File: 36 -- Keywords: secular stagnation, unemployment equilibrium, Keynesian economics, Hansen -' downloaded to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  intellectual_history  economic_history  US_economy  US_politics  20thC  Great_Depression  post-WWII  Keynesianism  stagnation  macroeconomics  institutional_economics  prices  competition  deficit_finance  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Alan Manning - Shifting the Balance of Power: Workers, Wages and Employers over the Next Parliament | Resolution Foundation - April 2015
Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics and Director of the Community Programme at the Centre for Economic Performance at the LSE -- 40 years ago an improving labour market and prices rising faster than wages would have led trade unions to march into the boardroom demanding higher wages and threatening strike action if those demands were not met. Pretty soon, union leaders would have been invited round to Number 10 for beer and sandwiches to be cajoled into wage moderation to prevent an inflationary spiral taking hold. A lot has changed in the past 40 years.These days the Prosecco remains in the fridge and David Cameron used a speech to the British Chambers of Commerce in February to urge pay rises for workers, a somewhat surprising sight. But, there is a simple explanation. Since the crisis began, the average British worker has suffered a fall in living standards deeper and longer than anything experienced for more than a generation. The recent drop in oil prices and the resulting lower inflation will offer some respite but not much. -- Comparing the situation now and 40 years ago, it is hard to escape the conclusion that there has been a fundamental shift in the balance of power from workers to employers and that perhaps this shift has gone too far and it is time to redress the balance somewhat. -- copied to Pocket
article  political_economy  UK_economy  labor_history  Labor_markets  unemployment  wages  profit  productivity  productivity-labor_share  inequality  unions  British_politics  standard_of_living  employers  working_class  competition  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Tom Walker - EconoSpeak: The Hours of Labour and the Problem of Social Cost - Jan 2015
Coase argued that the suggested courses of action in the Pigovian tradition – liability, taxation or regulation – were inappropriate and often undesirable.(..) However, Coase didn't consider the full range of Pigou's examples and analysis. While Coase’s restatement of the problem may have been appropriate to the specific externality problems discussed by Pigou in part II, it entirely overlooked the radically different labour market problem encountered in part III, in which competitive pressure compels an employing firm to inflict harm on both itself and its employees and thus regulatory restraint of the firm (and competing employers) may benefit both. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  economic_sociology  intellectual_history  welfare_economics  institutional_economics  Coase  markets  markets-structure  property_rights  transaction_costs  externalities  competition  Labor_markets  social_costs  cost-benefit  regulation-costs  collective_action  common_good  efficiency  labor_law  wages  labor_standards  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
"No, the Internet Is Not Killing Culture" - Evan Kindley on Scott Timberg's Culture Crash: The Killing of the Creative Class | Slate Jan 2015
Scott Timberg’s Culture Crash begins with a harrowing and by now familiar personal narrative of the Great Recession. In 2008, Timberg, an arts reporter for the Los Angeles Times, was laid off, a casualty of the infamous Sam Zell regime; soon after, the bank foreclosed on his family’s house. These back-to-back misfortunes made Timberg worry about more than making ends meet: They shook his faith in the entire enterprise of American creativity. “I saw myself in the third generation of people who had worked in culture without either striking it rich or going broke,” he writes, but such a career path no longer seemed available in the 21st century, and he wanted to understand why. Though there was a temptation to blame the awesome leveling power of the Internet, he concluded that “this was about more than just technology. … Some of the causes were as new as file sharing; others were older than the nation. Some were cyclical, and would pass in a few years; others were structural and would get worse with time.” -- Kindley points out that precarious living of creative workers is the historical norm, and the few decades in the 2nd half of the 20thC during which a reasonably talented, reasonably hard-working writer, artist etc might be able to have a reasonably secure middle class life was the extreme exception. He also shows how Timberg is mostly writing about the bubble he lives in, so doesn't "get" the experiences of even his contemporaries who weren't middle class white males.
Instapaper  books  reviews  cultural_history  cultural_critique  literary_history  art_history  journalism  lit_crit  middle_class  post-WWII  Internet  media  competition  patrons  1-percent  patronage-artistic  creativity  creative_economy  from instapaper
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Réka Juhász: Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade - LSE job market paper -Brad DeLong
Réka Juhász: Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade: "I find that, in the short-run... ...regions in the French Empire which became better-protected from trade with the British for exogenous reasons during the Napoleonic Wars... increased capacity in... mechanised cotton spinning to a larger extent than regions which remained more exposed to trade. Temporary protection had long term effects.... Firms located in regions with higher post-war spinning capacity were more productive 30 years later.... After... peace, exports of cotton goods from France increased substantially, consistent with evolving comparative advantage in cottons.... As late as 1850, France and Belgium... had larger cotton spinning industries than other Continental European countries... not protected from British trade during the wars...
paper  downloaded  economic_history  industrialization  19thC  trade  protectionism  competition  infant_industries  Britain  France  Napoleonic_wars 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Laurent Belsie - The Link between High Employment and Labor Market Fluidity | NBER Digest - Jan 2015
Declining rates of creative destruction and factor reallocation raise concerns about future productivity growth and youth employment. U.S. labor markets lost much of their fluidity well before the onset of the Great Recession, according to Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance (NBER Working Paper No. 20479). The economy's ability to move jobs quickly from shrinking firms to young, growing enterprises slowed after 1990. Job reallocation rates fell by more than a quarter. After 2000, the volume of hiring and firing - known as the worker reallocation rate - also dropped. The decline was broad-based, affecting multiple industries, states, and demographic groups. The groups that suffered the most were the less-educated and the young, particularly young men.
US_economy  economic_history  1990s  2000s  2010s  links  creative_destruction  labor_markets  unemployment  wages  competition  firm-theory  economic_growth 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Lori Wallach & Ben Beachy - Eyes on Trade: Defending Foreign Corporations' Privileges Is Hard, Especially When Looking At The Facts - Nov 11 2014
Forbes just published this response from Lori Wallach and Ben Beachy (GTW director and research director) to a counterfactual Forbes opinion piece by John Brinkley in support of investor-state dispute settlement. Even those who support the controversial idea of a parallel legal system for foreign corporations, known as investor-state dispute settlement or ISDS, likely cringed at John Brinkley’s recent attempt to defend that system. (“Trade Dispute Settlement: Much Ado About Nothing,” October 16.) In trying to justify trade agreement provisions that provide special rights and privileges to foreign firms to the disadvantage of their domestic competitors, Brinkley wrote 24 sentences with factual assertions. Seventeen of them were factually wrong.
US_foreign_policy  US_legal_system  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  cross-border  treaties  ISDS  free_trade  trade-policy  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  Trans-Pacific-Partnership  fast_track  US_trade_agreements  international_law  property_rights  property-confiscations  competition  Congress  consumer_protection  environment  FDI  investor-State_disputes  investment-bilateral_treaties  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Mike Konczal, review essay - Selling Fast: Public Goods, Profits, and State Legitimacy | Boston Review - November 10, 2014
Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940, Yale University Press, $55 (paper) -- Dana Goldstein, The Teacher Wars: A History of America’s Most Embattled Profession, Doubleday, $26.95 (cloth) -- Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces, PublicAffairs, $17.99 (paper) -- Adam Smith was not the first, but he was certainly one of the most eloquent defenders of justice delivered according to the profit motive (..)since courts could charge fees for conducting a trial, each court would endeavor, “by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could.” Competition meant a judge would try “to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit, for every sort of injustice.” Left unsaid is what this system does to those who can’t afford to pay up. Our government is being remade in this mold—the mold of a business. The past thirty years have seen massive, outright privatization of government services. Meanwhile the logic of business, competition, and the profit motive has been introduced into what remains. But for those with a long enough historical memory, this is nothing new. Through the first half of our country’s history, public officials were paid according to the profit motive, and it was only through the failures of that system that a fragile accountability was put into place during the Progressive Era. One of the key sources of this accountability was the establishment of salaries for public officials who previously had been paid on commission.
books  reviews  kindle-available  US_government  US_society  governance  legitimacy  accountability  inequality  justice  privatization  US_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  competition  profit  Gilded_Age  Progressive_Era  civil_society  civil_liberties  US_constitution  Evernote  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
ECONOMICS AS SOCIAL THEORY - Routledge Series edited by Tony Lawson - Titles List
Social theory is experiencing something of a revival within economics. Critical analyses of the particular nature of the subject matter of social studies and of the types of method, categories and modes of explanation that can legitimately be endorsed for the scientific study of social objects, are re-emerging. Economists are again addressing such issues as the relationship between agency and structure, between the economy and the rest of society, and between inquirer and the object of inquiry. There is renewed interest in elaborating basic categories such as causation, competition, culture, discrimination,evolution, money, need, order, organisation, power, probability, process, rationality, technology, time, truth, uncertainty and value, etc. The objective for this series is to facilitate this revival further. In contemporary economics the label `theory' has been appropriated by a group that confines itself to largely a-social, a-historical, mathematical `modelling'. Economics as Social Theory thus reclaims the `theory' label, offering a platform for alternative, rigorous, but broader and more critical conceptions of theorising.
books  social_theory  economic_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  political_economy  causation-social  economic_sociology  economic_culture  rationality-economics  rational_choice  rationality-bounded  rational_expectations  critical_realism  evolution-social  history_of_science  historical_sociology  agency-structure  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  capitalism  capital_as_power  Marxist  Post-Keynesian  epistemology  epistemology-social  conventions  social_order  civil_society  public_policy  public_goods  anarchism  competition  financialization  development  economic_growth 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Nash and Liza Rybak - On Logical Difficulties, Philosophy, and the T.C.E. Explanation of the Firm | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 68, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 339-363
By exploring the implications of the linkage between Knight and Pragmatism, some non-trivial implications can be argued to exist. Specifically, section 2 outlines the T. C. E. literature, and how it exists in an atmosphere mixed with Marshallian competition and Knightian uncertainty. Section 3 then considers the disparate philosophical positions behind the work of Knight and Marshall. Knight's critique of Marshall is seminal, not because of any trivial technical innovations that Knight may have inspired within economic theory, but because Knight grounds his work on a philosophical viewpoint that effectively devastated Hegelian philosophy: American Pragmatism. Section 4 then links together the previous two sections by considering how the T. C. E. literature exhibits a dependency on both Pragmatism and Hegelian philosophy. The non-trivial implications of understanding the T. C. E. literature as a branch of Marshallian economics, which recognises Knightian uncertainty, are developed in section 5. Possible conclusions and a summary of the argument are provided in section 6. -- over 100 references from Kant through the pragmatists, Knight and 20thC economics, variants of neoclassical, and empirical evidence including probability and uncertainty in econometrics with heavy emphasis on theories of the firm, transaction cost analysis, Coase and Williamson, markets and hierarchies-- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  econometrics  probability  risk  certainty  uncertainty  Kant  Hegel  Hegelian  Marshall  transaction_costs  markets  markets-structure  firms-theory  organizations  hierarchy  management  Knight  Coase  Williamson_O  pragmatism  Peirce  Dewey  economic_sociology  economic_culture  evolution-social  competition  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Franco Fiordelisi, Davide Salvatore Mare - Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks | Journal of International Money and Finance, July 2014, Vol.45:1–16 — ScienceDirect
doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2014.02.008 Highlights • We investigate competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks. • We assess the dynamic relationship both in the short and long run. • Higher competition increases bank stability. • No impact of the recent financial crisis on the competition and stability link. • Herding behaviour affects positively bank stability. **--** Cooperative banks are a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, accounting for around one fifth of the European Union (EU) bank deposits and loans. Despite their importance, little is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition for these small credit institutions. Does competition affect the stability of cooperative banks? Does the financial stability of banks increase/decrease when competition is higher? We assess the dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness (both in the short and long run) among European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009. We obtain three main results. First, we provide evidence in line with the competition-stability view proposed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Bank market power negatively “Granger-causes” banks' soundness, meaning that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. Second, we find that this fundamental relationship does not change during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Third, we show that increased homogeneity in the cooperative banking sector positively affects bank soundness. Our findings have important policy implications for designing and implementing regulations that enhance the overall stability of the financial system and in particular of the cooperative banking sector.
paper  paywall  financial_economics  financial_sector_development  financial_system  competition  banking  SMEs  Eurozone  financial_regulation 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
R. Michael Gadbaw - Existential Risks to the Global Trading System and the Problem of Currency Intervention as a Case Study :: SSRN June 16, 2014
Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown University Law Center -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) - Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/10. *&--** As countries seek to promote growth in the aftermath of the financial crisis, currency intervention has become more prevalent and distortions in exchange rates with their resulting imbalances in trade flows have prompted call for new initiatives to address them, including in the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Both economic and legal experts have brought new insight into the impact of currency intervention on trade and a fresh legal perspective on the application of the rules in the WTO against measures that frustrate the intent of the GATT/WTO agreements. This paper reviews the underlying legal and policy issues and provides possible language for inclusion in the TPP or TTIP, and eventually in the WTO, that would build on the existing disciplines in the WTO and IMF agreements by authorizing remedial action in the form of safeguard and countervailing duties in response to a finding of actionable currency intervention. -- Number of Pages: 10 -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  global_governance  international_monetary_system  international_organizations  IMF  FX  FX-misalignment  WTO  trade-agreements  global_imbalance  trade-policy  Trans-Pacific-Partnership  Transatlantic_Trade_and_InvestmentPartnership  competition  capital_flows  investment-bilateral_treaties  central_banks  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Anne Mayhew, review - Laurence Shute, John Maurice Clark: A Social Economics for the Twenty-First Century | EH.Net, H-Net Reviews. November, 1997
[F]rom Clark's earliest work through his post-World War II comments on the formalization of Keynes' work, he sought a "non-euclidean" economics that would be more "scientific" than most economic analysis in fact was. In a 1924, essay on "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," Clark argued that it was "unscientific" to exclude relevant evidence. He wrote: "... comprehensiveness is scientific, even if it involves some sacrifice of other qualities for which science likes to strive" . In a critique of a 1949 essay by Paul Samuelson, Clark repeats the theme by complaining of ... what happens to the Keynesian theory when it is simplified by isolating the central mathematical formula and its corollaries from the context of factors that do not lend themselves to this treatment, and which Keynes handled in 'literary' fashion ... . -- Clark (and his fellow Institutionalists) made major contributions to what was then the "mainstream" of American economics during a period of lively innovation. During the early 1930s Clark had already developed both multiplier and accelerator concepts and he welcomed Keynes' "income-flow analysis." However, in the early 1940s he was worrying--in print and in exchanges with Keynes--that this analysis would be undiscriminatingly applied, and there were problems with sole reliance on deficit spending for stabilization. Clark's concern was a wider variety of stabilization tools--including attention to the legal arrangement of costs--would be required. In his last major work, Competition as A Dynamic Process (1961), Clark returned to some of the issues with which he began his career. Shute stresses that this work was not the "major general treatise" that Clark had once hoped to write, but rather an attempt to develop a practical notion of "workable competition" appropriate for analysis and policy guidance in a dynamic economy. Clark was realist enough to worry that this work would not be well received [inadequate formalism and assumptions they expected from "theory"]
books  reviews  intellectual_history  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  social_sciences-post-WWII  economic_theory  economic_history  institutional_economics  industry  production  investment  costs  labor  Labor_markets  capital  capitalism  business_cycles  Keynes  Keynesianism  macroeconomics  Great_Depression  competition  prices 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE -- PARTING COMPANIES: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, COMPANY POWER, AND IMPERIAL MERCANTILISM. (2014). | The Historical Journal, 57, pp 617-638. Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW - University of Kent and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE - Seattle University School of Law --This article revisits the late seventeenth-century histories of two of England's most successful overseas trading monopolies, the East India and Royal African Companies. It offers the first full account of the various enforcement powers and strategies that both companies developed and stresses their unity of purpose in the seventeenth century. It assesses the complex effects that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ had on these powers and strategies, unearthing much new material about the case law for monopoly enforcement in this critical period and revising existing accounts that continue to assert the Revolution's exclusively deregulating effects and that miss crucial subtleties in the case law and related alterations in company behaviour. It asks why the two companies parted company as legal and political entities and offers an explanation that connects the fortunes of both monopoly companies to their public profile and differing constituencies in the English empire and the varying non-European political contexts in which they operated. -- * We warmly thank Michael R. T. Macnair for his indispensable advice and assistance regarding matters of seventeenth-century English law and are grateful to Clive Holmes for encouraging us to look into these issues and to Simon Douglas and Jeffrey Hackney for initial help in doing so. Paul Halliday, Daniel Hulsebosch, and Philip J. Stern provided helpful responses to specific research queries.
article  paywall  find  17thC  British_history  British_politics  economic_history  Glorious_Revolution  mercantilism  monopolies  trading_companies  East_India_Company  Royal_African_Co  colonialism  slavery  piracy  competition  parties  London  legal_history  judiciary  commercial_law  interest_groups  Whig_Junto  Tories  James_II  William_III  Parliament  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  regulation  West_Indies  ports  shipping  trade-policy  entrepôts  exports  imports  luxury_goods  consumers  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Joshua Clover, review essay - Autumn of the Empire [post the Great Recession] | The Los Angeles Review of Books July 2011
Books discussed - Richard Duncan, The Dollar Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures *--* Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence *--* Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times *--* Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing *--*--*--* All three authors are heterodox from view of what passes for informed discourse about economic theory or political economy - by the conclusion of the essay, Giovanni Arrighi's longue-durée of transitions of a succession of capitalist empires becomes the vantage point for discussions of how we got to the Great Recession as well as where we have to start thinking about another way of understanding the geopolitical dynamics of global capitalism (or the global capitalist dynamics of geopolitics) Other TAGGED AUTHORS - Jill Ciment, Paul Krugman, Fernand Braudel, Joseph Schumpeter, John Maynard Keynes, Karl Marx, T.S. Eliot *--* Other TAGGED BOOKS - Reinhardt and Rogoff, This Time It's Different, *--* Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
books  reviews  global_economy  globalization  international_political_economy  financialization  financial_crisis  economic_history  geopolitics  empires  empire-and_business  world_history  world_systems  cycles  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  Genoa  city_states  Dutch_Revolt  Dutch  British_Empire  US-China  US-empire  imperialism  imperial_overreach  trade  trading_companies  production  productivity  capitalism  competition  profit  investment  international_monetary_system  translatio_imperii  Annales  bubbles  labor  off-shoring  investors  American_exceptionalism  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - The Concept and the Rule of Law (2008) :: SSRN - Georgia Law Review, Forthcoming
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-5 -- This article explores and connects two issues: (1) the relation between the Rule of Law (or legality) and the work we do in general jurisprudence on the concept of law; and (2) the distinction between conceptions of the Rule of Law that emphasize certainty, rules, and predictability and conceptions of the Rule of Law that also emphasize procedure and argument, even when legal argumentation detracts from the certainty emphasized the first set of conceptions. It argues (1) in favour of a more demanding understanding of what law is (informed by the ideal of the Rule of Law) and against "casual positivism" that takes almost any instance of centralized command and control as a legal system. And it argues (2) in favour of a procedural and argumentative conception of the Rule of Law. It connects the two arguments by observing that casual positivism is commonly associated with an impoverished rule-oriented understanding of the Rule of Law is associated commonly; and (following Dworkin and MacCormick) it suggests that a jurisprudence that emphasizes the role of legal argumentation and the institutions that sponsor it, will inevitably bring our conceptions of law and legality very close together. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 67 -- Keywords: general jurisprudence, Hart, legality, positivism, procedure, Rule of Law -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  legal_validity  rule_of_law  positivism-legal  procedure-legal  Hart  institutions  decision_theory  governmentality  competition  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Case Against Free Speech (July 2014 working paper) :: SSRN
Free societies employ a variety of institutions — including courts and schools — in which speech is heavily regulated on the basis of its content ... in order to promote other desirable ends, including discovery of the truth. I illustrate this with the case of courts and rules of evidence. Three differences between courts and the polity might seem to counsel against extending that approach more widely. First, the courtroom has an official and somewhat reliable (as well as reviewable) arbiter of the epistemic merits, while the polity may not. Second, no other non-epistemic values of speech are at stake in the courtroom, whereas they are in the polity. Third, the courtroom’s jurisdiction is temporally limited in a way the polity’s may not be. I argue that only the first of these poses a serious worry about speech regulation outside select institutions like courts. I also argue for viewing "freedom of speech" like "freedom of action": speech, like everything else human beings do, can be for good or ill... and thus the central question in free speech jurisprudence should really be how to regulate speech effectively — to minimize its very real harms, without undue cost to its positive values — rather than rationalizing (often fancifully) the supposed special value of speech. In particular, I argue against autonomy-based defenses of a robust free speech principle. I conclude that the central issue in free speech jurisprudence is not about speech but about institutional competence; I offer some reasons — from the Marxist "left" and the public choice "right"— for being skeptical that capitalist democracies have the requisite competence; and make some suggestive but inconclusive remarks about how these defects might be remedied. - No of Pages: 41
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  free_speech  Mill  Hayek  Adorno  Frankfurt_School  Kant  Kant-ethics  Marx  autonomy  networks-information  evidence  epistemology-social  education  regulation  public_choice  public_sphere  public_opinion  political_participation  competition 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
András Körösényi - Monopolistic Competition, Auction and Authorization. A Schumpeterian View of Leadership and the Political Market | JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 37, No. 1 (139) (2012), pp. 57-72
The market analogy of democracy played a central role in one of the leading versions of democratic theory in the last fifty years, in the so-called "elite" or "competitive" theory of democracy. In the present paper, I first clarify that the dominant school of the market analogy (Downs and his followers) turned its back on the approach of the originator of the analogy, Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter argued that both economic and political competition -due to the activity of entrepreneurs -are necessarily monopolistic and destroy equilibrium. Second, I show how followers of the Schumpeterian market analogy improved upon it by using the concept of natural monopolies and making it conform to the characteristics of politics, while further distancing themselves from Downsian interpretation and the dominant Public Choice approach. Finally, I demonstrate a normative implication of monopolistic competition, namely its consequences for the concept of "agency loss". -- looks good re post WWII social sciences -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  political_science  markets  competition  competition-political  parties  democracy  elites  political_culture  political_participation  monopolies  Schumpter  neoclassical_economics  public_choice  equilibrium  social_order  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » The accidental controversialist: deeper reflections on Thomas Piketty’s “Capital” - April 2014
Using a conventional marginal productivity framework, Piketty provides an explanation of rising inequality based on increases in the gap between the marginal product of capital, which determines the rate of profit (r), and the rate of growth (g). Because capital ownership is so concentrated, a higher profit rate or slower growth rate increases inequality as the incomes of the wealthy grow faster than the overall economy. The conventional character of Piketty’s theoretical thinking rears its head in his policy prescriptions. -- Mainstream economists will assert the conventional story about the profit rate being technologically determined. However, as Piketty occasionally hints, in reality the profit rate is politically and socially determined by factors influencing the distribution of economic and political power. Growth is also influenced by policy and institutional choices. That is the place to push the argument....My prediction is “r minus g” arithmetic will make its way into the curriculum, with the profit rate explained as the marginal product of capital; Chicago School economists will counter the economy has mechanisms limiting prolonged wide divergence of r and g; and Harvard and MIT graduate students will have opportunities to do market failure research arguing the opposite. The net result is economics will be left essentially unchanged and even more difficult to change.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  productivity  capital  labor  technology  inequality  wealth  political_economy  profit  capitalism  institutional_economics  laisser-faire  information-asymmetric  competition  education-higher  economic_culture  sociology_of_knowledge  heterodox_economics  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Neil Fligstein - Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions | JSTOR: American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Aug., 1996), pp. 656-673
I use the metaphor "markets as politics" to create a sociological view of action in markets. I develop a conceptual view of the social institutions that comprise markets, discuss a sociological model of action in which market participants try to create stable worlds and find social solutions to competition, and discuss how markets and states are intimately linked. From these foundations, I generate propositions about how politics in markets work during various stages of market development--formation, stability, and transformation. At the formation of markets, when actors in firms are trying to create a status hierarchy that enforces noncompetitive forms of competition, political action resembles social movements. In stable markets, incumbent firms defend their positions against challengers and invaders. During periods of market transformation, invaders can reintroduce more fluid social-movement-like conditions. -- cited by more than 100 on jstor -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_theory  institutional_economics  economic_culture  networks-social  networks-business  networks-exchange  status  competition  action-theory  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - The Equalizing Hand: Why Adam Smith Thought the Market Should Produce Wealth Without Steep Inequality | Cambridge Journals Online - Perspectives on Politics - Dec 2013
For long overview of the article, see her post from the LSE blog -- Perspectives on Politics, 11, pp 1051-1070. doi:10.1017/S153759271300282X. - That the market economy inevitably leads to inequality is widely accepted today, with disagreement confined to the desirability of redistributive action, its extent, and the role of government in the process. The canonical text of liberal political economy, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, is assumed even in the most progressive interpretations to accept inequality, rationalized as the inevitable trade-off for increasing prosperity compared to less developed but more equal economies. I argue instead that Smith's system, if fully implemented, would not allow steep inequalities to arise. In Smith, profits should be low and labor wages high, legislation in favor of the worker is “always just and equitable,” land should be distributed widely and evenly, inheritance laws liberalized, taxation can be high if it is equitable, and the science of the legislator is necessary to put the system in motion and keep it aligned. Market economies are made in Smith's system. Political theorists and economists have highlighted some of these points, but the counterfactual “what would the distribution of wealth be if all the building blocks were ever in place?” has not been posed. Doing so encourages us to question why steep inequality is accepted as a fact, instead of a pathology that the market economy was not supposed to generate in the first place. --Deborah Boucoyannis is Assistant Professor at the University of Virginia (dab5fw@virginia.edu). Her interests lie in the historical preconditions for the emergence of the liberal order and of constitutionalism.
paper  paywall  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - For Adam Smith, inequality was contrary to the Wealth of Nations | British Politics and Policy at LSE – Feb 2014
Overview of her article in Perspectives on Politics - see Cambridge Journals bookmark - The assumption that Adam Smith accepted inequality as the necessary trade-off for a more prosperous economy is wrong, writes Deborah Boucoyannis. In reality, Smith’s system precluded steep inequalities not out of a normative concern with equality but by virtue of the design that aimed to maximise the wealth of nations. Much like many progressive critics of current inequality, Smith targets rentier practices by the rich and powerful as distorting economic outcomes.
paper  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
interfluidity » “Incentives to produce” are incentives to rig the game - March 2014
Steve Randy Waldman - Suppose, reasonably I think, that ceteris paribus humans prefer to “be good”. That is, we prefer to do work that is productive and engage in behavior that is ethical. Suppose, also reasonably, that a well ordered society depends upon people sometimes making choices opposed to their material interests on ethical or other grounds. Then it is obvious how inequality might be costly. Instead of talking about “incentives to” (produce, extract rents, whatever), we might describe outcome dispersion as a tax on refraining from mercenary behavior. If the difference between economic winners and losers is modest, people of ordinary virtue might refrain from participating in activities they consider corrupt, might even be willing to “blow the whistle”, because the cost of doing so is outweighed by their preference for behaving well. But as outcome dispersion grows, absenting oneself from or even opposing activities that would be personally remunerative but socially undesirable becomes too costly. The required sacrifice eventually overcomes a ceteris paribus preference for virtue. Preventing the misbehavior of large coalitions is a collective action problem. An isolated malcontent or whistleblower is likely to be evicted from the coalition without meaningfully improving behavior, if others choose to “circle the wagon”. Outcome dispersion both increases the costs to individuals of engaging in pro-social behavior, and diminishes the likelihood that bearing those costs will be fruitful, since others will have strong incentives not to follow.
political_economy  international_political_economy  finance_capital  inequality  civic_virtue  rent-seeking  monopolies  intellectual_property  health_care  migration  competition  plutocracy  incentives  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Heterodox Economics - Readings | HMiRN
Extensive list of books, chapters, journal articles, periodically updated since 2011 -- Contents --
1. History and Methodology of Heterodox Microeconomics
2. Critiques of Mainstream Microeconomics
3. Principles of Heterodox Microeconomic Theory
4. Theory of the Business Enterprise
5. Structure of Production and Costs of the Business Enterprise
6. Costing, Pricing, and Prices
7. Investment, Finance, and Employment
8. Households, Consumption, and Market Demand
9. Industry and Market
10. Competition
11. Corporate Governance, Market Governance, and Market Regulation
12. Social Welfare
13. Heterodox Microfoundations and Modeling the Economy
bibliography  economic_theory  economic_history  economic_models  economic_sociology  firms-theory  Labor_markets  capital  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  M&A  regulation  consumers  consumer_demand  monopolies  finance_capital  taxes  competition  investment  prices  wages  heterodox_economics  microeconomics  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Antonio Capaldo - Network Structure and Innovation: The Leveraging of a Dual Network as a Distinctive Relational Capability | JSTOR: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Jun., 2007), pp. 585-608
This paper employs comparative longitudinal case study research to investigate why and how strong dyadic interfirm ties and two alternative network architectures (a 'strong ties network' and a 'dual network') impact the innovative capability of the lead firm in an alliance network. I answer these intrinsically cross-level research questions by examining how three design-intensive furnishings manufacturers managed their networks of joint-design alliances with consulting industrial design firms over more than 30 years. Initially, in order to explore the sample lead firms' alliance behavior, I advance an operationalization of interorganizational tie strength. Next, I unveil the strengths of strong ties and the weaknesses of a strong ties network. Finally, I show that the ability to integrate a large periphery of heterogeneous weak ties and a core of strong ties is a distinctive lead firm's relational capability, one that provides fertile ground for leading firms in knowledge-intensive alliance networks to gain competitive advantages whose sustainability is primarily based on the dynamic innovative capability resulting from leveraging a dual network architecture. -- see bibliography on jstor information page -- didn't download
article  jstor  firms-theory  networks-social  networks-business  networks-architecture  Innovation  coordinator  alliances  competition  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
John Tosh - Gentlemanly Politeness and Manly Simplicity in Victorian England | JSTOR: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vol. 12 (2002), pp. 455-472
Between the late eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century the notion of the 'polite gentleman' lost its political purchase. 'Manliness' became the identifying code of both the business class and the 'respectable' working class. The virtues of rugged individualism and personal integrity were emphasised at the expense of sociability and ease of manner. In the political sphere debates about who should be included in the franchise were permeated by the language of manliness, and the politicians with the greatest popular following were hailed as 'plain men' possessing a 'simple manliness'. -- lots of good stuff on contrast between 18thC and 19thC that helps explain part of hostility towards Bolingbroke as representing the unmanliness of the polite aristocrat both in his politics (easily accused of hypocrisy, a major Victorian sin), his sociability, (especially his relations with women) to say nothing of his religion, which wasn't serious enough,no struggle with faith or conscience -- just a fribble overall whose charisma counted against him as well as against those who were gulled by him -- Disraeli a throwback -- useful references -- didn't download
article  jstor  cultural_history  social_history  18thC  19thC  British_history  Victorian  political_culture  working_class  bourgeoisie  professions  independence  individualism  competition  masculinity  politeness  manners  Evangelical  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Joe Henrich - Website | University of British Columbia
Research Program: Coevolution, Development, Cognition & Cultural Learning -- Published Papers and Book Chapters by Category

- Societal Complexity and Cultural Evolution
- Social Norms and Cooperation
- Social Status (Prestige and Dominance)
- Religion
- Methodological Contributions and Population Variations
- Overviews
- Cultural Learning (Models and Evidence)
- Ethnography (Fiji, Machiguenga, Mapuche)
- Chimpanzee Sociality
- General Interest
bibliography  research  paper  biocultural_evolution  culture  social_psychology  anthropology  behavioral_economics  sociology_of_religion  status  norms  morality-conventional  moral_psychology  emotions  networks  institutions  complexity  demography  children  learning  tools  cooperation  competition  Innovation 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Gowdy et al - Economic cosmology and the evolutionary challenge | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Special Issue 2013
2nd lead articl5 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The intellectual histories of economics and evolutionary biology are closely intertwined because both subjects deal with living, complex, evolving systems. Because the subject matter is similar, contemporary evolutionary thought has much to offer to economics. In recent decades theoretical biology has progressed faster than economics in understanding phenomena like hierarchical processes, cooperative behavior, and selection processes in evolutionary change. This paper discusses three very old “cosmologies” in Western thought, how these play out in economic theory, and how evolutionary biology can help evaluate their validity and policy relevance. These cosmologies are: (1) “natural man” as a rational, self-sufficient, egotistical individual, (2) competition among individuals can lead to a well-functioning society, and (3) there exists an ideal optimal state of nature. These correspond to Colander et al. (2004) “holy trinity of orthodox economics”, rationality, greed, and equilibrium. It is argued below that current breakthroughs in evolutionary biology and neuroscience can help economics go beyond these simple cosmologies.

They equate Pope’s Essay (self love and social are the same) with Mandeville Fable of the Bees
paper  journal  intellectual_history  ancient_philosophy  Western_civ  natural_law  cosmology  Providence  self-interest  competition  markets  economic_theory  economic_sociology  economic_culture  evolution-social  biocultural_evolution  evo_psych  evolution-as-model  reason  rationality-economics  rational_choice  downloaded  EF-add  equilibrium  complexity  Smith  Pope  Mandeville 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Isaac Nakhimovsky, review - Sophus A. Reinert: Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy | EH.net July 2013
Reviewed for EH.Net by Isaac Nakhimovsky, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge. Isaac Nakhimovsky is author of The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

Reinert?s fundamental point is that a history of doctrines of free trade yields at best na?ve dogmas and may even serve as a mask for economic imperialism. A more realistic political economy for our own times, in his view, requires a more realistic historical vision.

At the same time, Reinert draws out a second major insight from his history of Cary?s essay: all of Cary?s translators strove to purge his essay of what they regarded as his toxic variety of patriotism. Cary had equated English prosperity with the defeat and impoverishment of its rivals. His translators sought to substitute this ?jealousy of trade? with a more cosmopolitan vision that allowed for the possibility of ?emulation? or ?noble competition,? but without resorting to an agrarian utopianism. In eighteenth-century terms, they were for Colbertism without Machiavellism (p. 176): they entertained a vision of how a world of competitively industrializing states could be stabilized. In addition to mounting a powerful realist critique of free trade dogma, then, Reinert also advances recent reinterpretations of Enlightenment optimism in terms of a search for non-lethal forms of competition, and opens up a fascinating new prospect on the development of the discipline of political economy. His account goes a long way toward explaining why it was that the transformation of English practical economic experience into a systematic theory of political economy initially took place not in England itself, but in Ireland, Scotland, and continental Europe.
books  reviews  kindle  economic_history  political_economy  17thC  18thC  Enlightenment  British_history  UK_economy  industrialization  import_substitution  free_trade  mercantilism  competition  Italy  France  Germany  French_Enlightenment  nationalism  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Steve Coulter, review - The Third Globalization: Can Wealthy Nations Stay Rich in the Twenty-First Century? Dan Breznitz and John Zysman | Pieria Nov 2013
In The Third Globalization, Dan Breznitz and John Zysman gather leading political economists to assess the prospects for growth and prosperity among advanced industrial nations. The contributors aim to examine the core transformations in the economies of advanced countries, the character of the challenge from emerging economies, and the varied policy responses of the advanced countries. This is a consistently well written and tightly organised book with policy-maker appeal, writes Steve Coulter.
The Third Globalization: Can Wealthy Nations Stay Rich in the Twenty-First Century? Dan Breznitz and John Zysman. Oxford University Press. March 2013.
books  reviews  international_political_economy  OECD_economies  competition  emerging_markets  public_policy  economic_growth  EF-add 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
Italian business: No way back (from crony capitalism) | FT.com August 2013
Northern Italy "friends and family" system of interlocking cross-holdings and outsized influence is being unwound as the ongoing crisis threatens contagion via ownership webs. Some guys fired, some unwinding like Fiat (except for its media holdings eg Corriere della Sera), and now some arrests. Will Italy adopt French model (protecting national priorities) or British (free market with governance norms) or Wild West by default? Or what's not listed as an option, reconfiguring the old game of insider power, just now with a new cast of characters.
Italy  business  corporate_governance  corruption  plutocracy  competition  crony_capitalism 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Pamela A. Popielarz and Zachary P. Neal: The Niche as a Theoretical Tool (2007)
JSTOR: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33 (2007), pp. 65-78, C-1a, C-2a, 79-84 --- For several decades, the concept of the niche has enriched sociological theory. The niche represents the position or function of an entity, such as an organization or population of organizations, within a larger community environment. Using the concept of the niche allows researchers to go beyond classifying entities to understanding (a) their life chances under different and changing environmental conditions and (b) how they interact under the competitive conditions induced by a finite environment. We briefly review the intellectual history of the niche concept as it came from bioecology to sociology. The bulk of the article reviews the two major streams of sociological research that use the niche concept: the population ecology of organizations and McPherson's ecology of affiliation. Finally, we survey commonalities between these approaches and highlight new directions, including applications that take the niche concept well beyond its origins in organizational studies.
article  jstor  social_theory  methodology  organizations  networks  competition  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Estates of Mind - Antitrust and patent policy has reversed FDR's competition policies Barry C. Lynn | The Washington Monthly July 2013
Nice history of the FDR antitrust approach that focused on technology monopolies and the post Reagan reversal of antitrust and patent policy that had enforced technological competition and new entrants. Alfred Chandler last work c 2000 goes into the impact of forcing eg Bell Labs to license their technology at a low price. In a return to pre New Deal industrial structure, tge Monsantos, big Pharma and Googles are acquiring small ventures and competitors to lock in monopoly positions and keep innovation in house, where it will be developed only if it doesn't disturb business model. GE under Welch in 1st decade after Reagan closed down antitrust is a great cautionary tale. Attacks Mandel for claiming US corporations have to be giants to have staying power in global arena (the Schumpter monopoly justification). Also thinks Cowen's Great Stagnation is symptom of screwed up intellectual property system, not cause of decline in investment opportunity and economic growth. And our trade treaties are seriously messed up, reversing the logic of the US building and maintaining an international commons.
US_economy  economic_history  20thC  competition  technology  intellectual_property  political_economy  Schumpter  business  firms-theory  economic_growth  international_political_economy  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Robert Brenner: What is Good for Goldman Sachs is Good for America - The Origins of the Present Crisis [eScholarship] October 2009
Robert Brenner outlines the long-term causes of the present economic crisis. Rather than understanding the current downturn as merely a function of financial incompetence and miscalculation, he demonstrates that the US economy and that of the G7 has been slower growth in most of the major indices with each passing business cycle since the 1970s. In the last two cycles, asset bubbles inclined US consumers to take on more debt in order to spend and achieve limited GDP growth. Brenner outlines in detail how and why the financial sector played a key role in the creation and inflation of debt bubbles with new financial instruments. The implications for the US and the global economy are also outlined including the US current account deficit, trade imbalances, the rise of China and the East Asian economies as well as declining investment in the real economy and overcapacity in manufacturing worldwide.

Downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  financialization  international_finance  international_political_economy  capitalism  investment  profit  Labor_markets  Great_Recession  banking  FX  competition  bubbles  financial_crisis  emerging_markets  China  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities by Saule T. Omarova :: SSRN
Omarova, Saule T., The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities (November 24, 2012). Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 98, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180647 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2180647
This article examines the principal legal, policy, and theoretical implications of a transformative – but so far unrecognized – change in the banking industry: the emergence, over the last decade, of U.S. financial conglomerates as leading global merchants in physical commodities, including crude and refined oil products, natural gas, coal, base metals, and wholesale electricity. Historically, one of the core principles of U.S. bank regulation has been the separation of banking from commerce. Several statutes – including the National Bank Act of 1863, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, and even the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 – affirm this foundational principle, which generally prohibits banks and bank holding companies from conducting commercial (i.e., non-financial) activities. Notwithstanding these statutory restrictions, however, large U.S. bank holding companies – notably, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and JPMorgan – have since the early 2000s been moving aggressively into the purely commercial businesses of mining, processing, transporting, storing, and trading a wide range of vitally important physical commodities. And, equally surprisingly, it is virtually impossible under the current system of public disclosure and regulatory reporting to understand the true nature and scope of these institutions’ commodity activities.

?...... Finally, the article argues that these developments in banks’ activities raise fundamental theoretical and conceptual questions about the very nature and social functions of financial intermediation. A factually-grounded examination of large financial institutions’ physical commodity activities lays a necessary conceptual foundation for potentially reconfiguring the entire system of financial services regulation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 77
Downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  20thC  21stC  financial_system  banking  capital_markets  commodities  financial_regulation  competition  US_economy  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Competition for Attention by Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer :: SSRN May 2013
SSRN briefcase NBER $
Abstract:     
 We present a model of market competition and product differentiation in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. With salience, strategic positioning of each product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit “commoditized” price salient equilibria, while others exhibit “de-commoditized” quality salient equilibria. When the cost of producing quality changes, innovation can lead to a radical change in markets. In the context of financial innovation, the model generates the well documented phenomenon of “reaching for yield”.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Bordalo, Pedro, Gennaioli, Nicola and Shleifer, Andrei, Competition for Attention (May 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19076. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2269529
markets  Innovation  competition  financial_system  capital_markets  behavioral_economics  financial_crisis  financialization  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Izabella K: The robot economy and the new rentier class | FT Alphaville Dec 2012
It seems more top-tier economists are coming around to the idea that robots and technology could be having a greater influence on the economy (and this crisis in particular) than previously appreciated. Paul Krugman being the latest.But first a quick backgrounder on the debate so far (as tracked by us).

..... For what Rogoff is saying is that if we are experiencing technology stagnation, it’s not because humanity has suddenly become less innovative. Rather, it’s because incumbent interests now have the biggest incentive ever to impose artificial scarcity, which is stopping the speed of innovation.

Our own personal view is that this is because we’ve now arrived at a point where technology begins to threaten return on capital, mostly by causing the sort of abundance that depresses prices to the point where many goods have no choice but to become free. This is related to the amount of “free working” hours now being pumped into the economy .... as everyone tries to keep up with the competition by doing yet more hours voluntarily.

Patent wars, meanwhile… and the rise of companies whose entire raison d’etre is focused on protecting patents… is the ultimate counter force. As a recent Fed paper spelled out, there is real evidence to suggest that idea monopolisation has become a hugely counter-productive force in the economy.

We particularly enjoyed this opinion piece by Steven Levy at Wired Magazine on what he described as the emerging “patent problem“.
21stC  global_system  international_economics  international_political_economy  technology  economic_growth  economic_history  Labor_markets  macroeconomics  capitalism  rents  intellectual_property  Innovation  consumerism  competition  investment  monopolies  plutocracy  links  EF-add 
june 2013 by dunnettreader

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