dunnettreader + cognition   79

Nicolas Claidière and Dan Sperber - The natural selection of fidelity in social learning (2010) - Communicative and Integrative Biology
Follow-up to Royal Society article -- Social learning mechanisms are usually assumed to explain both the spread and the persistence of cultural behavior. In a recent article, we showed that the fidelity of social learning commonly found in transmission chain experiments is not high enough to explain cultural stability. Here we want to both enrich and qualify this conclusion by looking at the case of song transmission in song birds, which can be faithful to the point of being true replication. We argue that this high fidelity results from natural selection pressure on cognitive mechanisms. This observation strengthens our main argument. Social learning mechanisms are unlikely to be faithful enough to explain cultural stability because they are generally selected not for high fidelity but for generalization and adjustment to the individual’s needs, capacities and situation.
Key words: cultural evolution, bird song, imitation, memetic, social learning, transmission chain study
article  evolutionary_biology  evolution-social  social_learning  cultural_transmission  imitation  cultural_change  cultural_evolution  cultural_stability  tradition  cognitive_science  social_process  cognition-social  cognition 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Ilkka Pyysiainen - Religon: From mind to society and back (2012) | Academia.edu
Book chapter - Exploring the cognitive basis of the social sciences and trying to ground the social in the cognitive requires taking an explicit stance on reduction(ism) as discussed in philosophy of science. In social science and the humanities, the question of reductionism has been especially salient in the study of religion. This chapter begins with a philosophical analysis of reduction; after that, two relatively new research programs in the study of religious thought and behavior are discussed: the standard model of the cognitive science of religion and approaches based on gene-culture coevolutionary theories. Finally, the question of reductionism is addressed and the possibility of combining multilevel explanations of religious phenomena is evaluated. -- Downloaded to Tab S2
chapter  Academia.edu  downloaded  cognitive_science  religion  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  level_of_analysis  reductionism  religious_belief  religious_experience  neuroscience  cognition  cognition-social  gene-culture_coevolution  cultural_transmission  cultural_change  sociology_of_religion  naturalism  natural_selection  evolution-social  evolution-as-model  evolution-group_selection 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Nicola Gennaioli, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer - Expectations and Investment (2016) | Andrei Shleifer
Gennaioli, Nicola, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer. 2016. “Expectations and Investment.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 30 (2015): 379-442.
Abstract
Using micro data from Duke University quarterly survey of Chief Financial Officers, we show that corporate investment plans as well as actual investment are well explained by CFOs’ expectations of earnings growth. The information in expectations data is not subsumed by traditional variables, such as Tobin’s Q or discount rates. We also show that errors in CFO expectations of earnings growth are predictable from past earnings and other data, pointing to extrapolative structure of expectations and suggesting that expectations may not be rational. This evidence, like earlier findings in finance, points to the usefulness of data on actual expectations for understanding economic behavior. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
cognition  rational_choice  microeconomics  behavioral_economics  article  cognitive_bias  investment  cognitive_science  downloaded  rational_expectations  corporate_finance  extrapolation  microfoundations  heuristics 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer - “Competition for Attention” (2016) Rev of Econ Studies
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. 2016. “Competition for Attention.” Review of Economic Studies 83 (2): 481-513. -- Abstract
We present a model of market competition in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. Strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit “commoditized” price salient equilibria, while others exhibit “de-commoditized” quality salient equilibria. When the costs of quality change, innovation can lead to radical shifts in markets, as in the case of decommoditization of the coffee market by Starbucks. In the context of financial innovation, the model generates the phenomenon of “reaching for yield”. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
behavioral_economics  attention  paywall  consumerism  competition  cognition  article  cognitive_bias  downloaded  prices  rational_choice  commodities  cognitive_science  consumer_demand 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Psychologists at the Gate: Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2012) | Andrei Shleifer - J of Econ Lit
Shleifer, Andrei. 2012. “Psychologists at the Gate: Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow.” Journal of Economic Literature 50 (4): 1080-1091. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
investors  cognition  neuroscience  reviews  books  credit  cognitive_bias  cognitive_science  financial_regulation  Minsky  risk_assessment  asset_prices  bubbles  creditors  downloaded  financial_system  credit_booms  behavioral_economics  financial_crisis 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer - Salience and Asset Prices (2013) | Andrei Shleifer - Am Econ Rev Papers
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. 2013. “Salience and Asset Prices.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 103 (3): 623-628. -- In Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012a)— henceforth, BGS (2012a)—we described a new approach to choice under risk that we called salience theory. In comparisons of risky lotter- ies, we argued, individuals’ attention is drawn to those payoffs which are most different or salient relative to the average. In making choices, indi- viduals overweight these salient payoffs relative to their objective probabilities. A simple for- malization of such salience-based probability weighting provides an intuitive account of a vari- ety of puzzling evidence in decision theory, such as Allais paradoxes and preference reversals.
Salience theory naturally lends itself to the analysis of the demand for risky assets. After all, risky assets are lotteries evaluated in a context described by the alternative investments avail- able in the market. An asset’s salient payoff is naturally de ned as one most different from the average market payoff in a given state of the world. We present a simple model of inves- tor choice and market equilibrium in which salience in uences the demand for risky assets. This model accounts for several time series and cross-sectional puzzles in nance in an intuitive way, based on its key implication that extreme payoffs receive disproportionate weight in the market valuation of assets. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
downloaded  risk_management  investors  investment  cognitive_bias  behavioral_economics  article  cognition  risk  heuristics  asset_prices 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Pedro Bordalo, Katherine Coffman, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer - “Stereotypes” (Forthcoming 2016) Quarterly Journal of Economics
Citation:
Bordalo, Pedro, Katherine Coffman, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. Forthcoming. “Stereotypes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. -- We present a model of stereotypes based on Kahneman and Tversky’s representative-ness heuristic. A decision maker assesses a target group by overweighting its representative types, defined as the types that occur more frequently in that group than in a baseline ref-erence group. Stereotypes formed in this way contain a “kernel of truth”: they are rooted in true di˙erences between groups. Because stereotypes focus on di˙erences, they cause belief distortions, particularly when groups are similar. Stereotypes are also context dependent: beliefs about a group depend on the characteristics of the reference group. In line with our predictions, beliefs in the lab about abstract groups and beliefs in the field about political groups are context dependent and distorted in the direction of representative types. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
behavioral_economics  cognitive_bias  credit_crunch  financial_system  article  heuristics  bubbles  credit_booms  downloaded  cognition  investors  capital_markets 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Embodied Cognition (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
1. Embodied vs Traditional Cognitive Science
2. Some Historical Anchors for Embodied Cognitive Science
2.1 Metaphor and Cognition
2.2 Enactive Cognition.
2.3 Rethinking Robotics.
2.4 Ecological Perception.
2.5 Dynamicism and Development
2.6 Phenomenology
3. What Embodied Cognition Is
4. Embodiment vs Tradition on Three Issues
4.1 Modularity
4.2 Mental Representation.
4.3 Nativism
5. Empirical Domains for Embodied Cognition
5.1 Visual Consciousness
5.2 Concepts
5.3 Memory.
5.4 Other Minds.
5.5 Moral Cognition.
6. Sharper Divides Over Embodied Cognition
6.1 Payoffs for empirical research.
6.2 Accommodation by traditional cognitive science
6.3 Embodied cognition and the extended mind thesis.
6.4 Agency, the self, and subjectivity.
bibliography  philosophy_of_mind  mind-body  mind  embodied_cognition  neuroscience  phenomenology  innatism  innate_ideas  theory_of_mind  perception  memory  cognition  emotions  representation-metaphysics  child_development  language  moral_psychology 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Edward Slingerland - What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body and Culture | Cambridge University Press (2008)
What Science Offers the Humanities examines some of the deep problems facing current approaches to the study of culture. It focuses especially on the excesses of postmodernism, but also acknowledges serious problems with postmodernism's harshest critics. In short, Edward Slingerland argues that in order for the humanities to progress, its scholars need to take seriously contributions from the natural sciences—and particular research on human cognition—which demonstrate that any separation of the mind and the body is entirely untenable. The author provides suggestions for how humanists might begin to utilize these scientific discoveries without conceding that science has the last word on morality, religion, art, and literature. Calling into question such deeply entrenched dogmas as the "blank slate" theory of nature, strong social constructivism, and the ideal of disembodied reason, Slingerland replaces the human-sciences divide with a more integrated approach to the study of culture. --
Introduction
Part I. Exorcising the Ghost in the Machine:
1. The disembodied mind
2. They live among us
3. Pulling the plug
Part II. Embodying Culture:
4. Embodying culture
Part III. Defending Vertical Integration:
5. Defending the empirical
6. Who's afraid of reductionism?
Conclusion.
Edward Slingerland, University of British Columbia, Vancouver - taught in the School of Religion and Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at USC.... currently Associate Professor of Asian Studies at the University of British Columbia and is Canada Research Chair in Chinese Thought and Embodied Cognition. His previous books include The Annalects of Confucius and Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China, which won the American Academy of Religion's 2003 Best First Book in the History of Religions Award. -- downloaded Intro
books  kindle-available  downloaded  humanities  philosophy_of_social_science  cognition  mind  philosophy_of_religion  human_nature  Chinese_thought  embodied_cognition  naturalism  reductionism  postmodern  two_cultures  constructivism  cultural_history  religious_history  social_theory  sociology_of_knowledge 
june 2016 by dunnettreader
Review of Richard Cross - Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) is one of the great medieval philosophers, but also one of the most difficult. Very few outside the group of scholars that work…
Instapaper  books  reviews  intellectual_history  medieval_philosophy  Duns_Scotus  cognition  from instapaper
march 2016 by dunnettreader
Videos from conference on Herman Cappelen, Philosophy without Intuitions (OUP, 2012) - School of Advanced Study
Knowledge and Intuitions - A one-day conference with papers on Professor Herman Cappelen's recent publication, Philosophy without Intuitions (OUP, 2012), with Professor Brain Weatherson (Michigan), Dr Ana-Sara Malmgren (Stanford), Professor Jonathan Weinberg (Arizona) and Professor Mark Richard (Harvard), with responses from the author.
epistemology  knowledge  conference  analytical_philosophy  lecture  intuitionism  methodology  video  books  intuitions  evidence  belief  cognition  cognitive_bias 
march 2016 by dunnettreader
Mahrad Almotahari interview with Richard Marshall - Not and Other Metalinguistic Stuff - 3AM
Interview by Richard Marshall. Mahrad Almotahari is an Assistant Professor and a member of UIC’s Laboratory of Integrative Neuroscience. He earned his PhD from…
Instapaper  interview  philosophy_of_science  neuroscience  cognition  mind  mind-body  linguistics  logic  from instapaper
march 2016 by dunnettreader
Philip Ball - Why story is used to explain symphonies and sport matches - Aeon
It’s a movie classic. The lovers are out for a walk when a villain dashes out of his house and starts fighting the man. The woman takes refuge in the house;…
neuroscience  evo_psych  narrative  complexity  causation  cognitive_bias  cognition  cognition-social  epistemology-naturalism  Instapaper  from instapaper
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Dale Jacquette, review - Ted Honderich, Actual Consciousness (OUP 2014) // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews - August 2015
Ted Honderich’s new book takes the exploration of the mysteries of consciousness in an interesting direction. He develops a certain-to-be-controversial…
subjectivity  books  emotions  consciousness  cognition  analytical_philosophy  self  reviews  mind  qualia  perception  phenomenology  from instapaper
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Jared P. Friedman and Anthony I. Jack - Mapping cognitive structure onto philosophical debate re problems of consciousness, free will and ethics | Minds Online - Sept 2015 - Session 1 - Social Cognition
Mapping cognitive structure onto the landscape of philosophical debate: An empirical framework with relevance to problems of consciousness, free will and ethics -- Department of Philosophy and Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence, Case Western Reserve University -- There are some seemingly intractable questions that have remained at the heart of philosophical discourse since they were first asked. Is the mind distinct from the brain or are we just physical stuff? Are we autonomous agents or merely at the mercy of the causal and mechanistic laws of nature? When, if ever, is it acceptable to sacrifice one for the greater good of many? That these questions have remained at the heart of philosophy for so long, and that their ‘solutions’ (e.g., monism vs. dualism) seem to be incommensurable with each other, strikes us as enigmatic. Might the intractable nature of these and other appropriately identified problems reflect something peculiar about us rather than something peculiar about the way the world is? (...) This account maintains that the difficulties reconciling markedly different philosophical responses to these three questions arise from an unavoidable tension between two anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks, both of which are essential to human understanding. This account is motivated by the observation that both philosophers and non-philosophers experience difficulty in reconciling competing responses to these questions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  conference  cognition  antimonies  consciousness  mind-body  neuroscience  determinism  free_will  naturalism  physicalism  reductionism  causation  moral_philosophy  metaethics  intuitions  brain  experimental_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  James_William  monism  dualism  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Beatrice Kobow - How to Do Things with Fictions: Reconsidering Vaihinger for a Philosophy of Social Sciences (2013) | Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44: 201 via Cambridge Realist Workshop
The article reconstructs three key concepts of Hans Vaihinger: the idea of mental fictions as self-contradictory, provisory, conscious, and purposeful; the law of the devolution of ideas stating that an idea oscillates between dogma, hypothesis, or fiction; and the underlying assumption about human consciousness that the psyche constructs thoughts around perceptions like an oyster produces a pearl. In a second, constructive part, these concepts are applied in a discussion of John Searle’s social ontologically extended theory of speech acts. The article introduces the Vaihingerian as-if to Searle’s account of declarations. The explanatory work in a model of social reality as Searle has proposed it rests on the ability to show a necessary connection between collective and individual intentionality facilitated through linguistic structure. The methodological individualism of the model requires that motivational assumptions about collective structures be realized in individual brains. The as-if stance of the declarer provides just this connection. -- Keywords as-if, fiction, status function declarations, double direction of fit, deonticity, collective intentionality, speech act theory, social ontology, Vaihinger, Searle - downloaded to iPhone from http://www.csog.econ.cam.ac.uk/Cambridge-Realist-Workshop/realist-images/HowtoDoThingswithFictions.pdf/at_download/file
article  ontology-social  cognition-social  fiction-cognition  methodological_individualism  critical_realism  perception  downloaded  hypothesis  Searle  as-if  speech_acts  logic  sociology_of_knowledge  cognition  philosophy_of_social_science 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Lockean Empathy | Colin Marshall - Academia.edu - forthcoming, Southern Journal of Philosophy
This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke’s theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone’s pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain and pleasure must be a primary quality of the mind, just as shape is a primary quality of bodies. Though Locke did not make that claim, I argue that pain and pleasure satisfy his criteria for primary qualities. I consider several objections to the analogy between empathy and shape-perception, and show how Locke’s theory has resources for answering them. In addition, the claim that empathetic ideas are object-matching sidesteps Berkeley’s influential objection to Locke’s theory of resemblance. I conclude by briefly considering the prospects for a similar defense of empathy in contemporary terms.-- Philosophy of perception, John Locke, Empathy (Philosophy), and Empathy -- bookmark but didn't download
article  Academia.edu  Locke  primary_qualities  epistemology  mind-theory_of  perception  empathy  correspondence  Berkeley  pain  pleasure  cognition 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Daniel Dennett - Information, Evolution, and intelligent Design - Video | 3quarksdaily - August 2015
2 YouTube videos, 1st (1 hour+) of Dennett's presentation and then the Q&A -- looks like it was at RI Institute. He's NOT dealing with Intelligent Design initial caps.
speech  video  Dennett  human_nature  epistemology-social  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  mind  cognition  information  information_theory  information-intermediaries  design  social_process  decision_theory 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Roundtable - Romanticism, Enlightenment, and Counter-Enlightenment | Philoctetes Center - April 17, 2010
, 2:30 PM
Romanticism, Enlightenment, and Counter-Enlightenment

Participants: Akeel Bilgrami, Taylor Carman, Garrett Deckel, Colin Jager, Joel Whitebook Isaiah Berlin introduced the work of a range of philosophers in the German romantic and German idealist tradition to the English-speaking world. His fascination with some of their ideas was accompanied by a concomitant anxiety about them. The anxiety issued from his staunch liberal commitment to the orthodox Enlightenment. Yet, the fascination was an implicit acknowledgement on his part of some of the limitations of the Enlightenment's liberal ideas. This roundtable will look at this underlying tension in Berlin, which many liberals feel to this day. Panelists will probe the role of reason, perception, and emotion in our individual and political psychology, and ask the question of whether or not there is something for liberalism to learn from what Berlin—rightly or wrongly—called the "Counter-Enlightenment." -- see YouTube bookmark for direct link -- video also embedded in program page
video  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  Enlightenment  Counter-Enlightenment  Romanticism  Enlightenment_Project  Enlightenment-ongoing  German_Idealism  liberalism  Berlin_Isaiah  reason  rationality  perception  emotions  reason-passions  political_philosophy  political_culture  social_psychology  moral_psychology  nature  nature-mastery  cognition  prejudice  cognitive_bias  mind  mind-body  philosophical_anthropology 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Emmanuel Bezy, review - Pascale Gillot, L’esprit, figures classiques et contemporaines - Histoire du mind-body problem - La Vie des idées - 10 janvier 2008
Pascale Gillot, L’esprit, figures classiques et contemporaines, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2007, 315 p., 30 euros. -- Si l’esprit et le corps sont des substances séparées et distinctes, comment peuvent-ils agir l’un sur l’autre ? P. Gillot montre dans son ouvrage les différentes réponses que la philosophie de l’esprit a apportées au problème ainsi formulé par Descartes. Mais ces réponses parviennent difficilement, selon elle, à s’affranchir totalement du cartésianisme. -- L’ouvrage de Pascale Gillot peut se lire de deux manières, qui ne sont pas exclusives l’une de l’autre : il constitue à la fois une introduction à la philosophie de l’esprit et une mise en perspective de la philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine, telle qu’elle s’est développée aux Etats-Unis depuis le tournant cognitiviste. Pascale Gillot expose la construction du problème du corps et de l’esprit, puis elle met en évidence les rémanences de cette problématique de William James à Jaegwon Kim. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  French_language  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  20thC  21stC  mind  mind-body  cogito  Cartesian  Descartes  James_William  dualism  cognition  neuroscience  psychology  metaphysics  essence  substance  human_nature  analytical_philosophy  naturalism  reductionism  thinking_matter  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Frédérique Aït-Touati, Stephen Gaukroger, Le monde en images. Voir, représenter, savoir, de Descartes à Leibniz (2015) | Classiques Garnier, coll. « Histoire et philosophie des sciences »
Frédérique Aït-Touati, Stephen Gaukroger, Le monde en images. Voir, représenter, savoir, de Descartes à Leibniz, Paris, Classiques Garnier, coll. « Histoire et philosophie des sciences », 2015, 128 p., ISBN : 978-2-8124-2589-9. -- Dans les débats classiques des 17thC-18thC, la représentation est considérée avant tout comme une question rhétorique et psychologique, mais à la fin du 18thC, elle devient une question épistémologique. Cet ouvrage explore le contexte de cette transformation et ses sources. l’émergence du problème de la représentation -- not edited collection, but co-authored study of a bit over 100 pages -- Chapters in TOC -- 1. Rhétorique et théorie de l’image vive 2. la révolution cartésienne  3. représenter l’invisible - Philosophie naturelle et visualisation chez Robert Hooke   4. les limites de la visualisation - Le débat entre Newton et Leibniz sur l’algèbre (a) La géométrie contre l’analyse  (b) L’analyse infnitésimale et la question de la preuve directe (c) La géométrie contre le calcul diférentiel  (d) Visualisation et capacités cognitives humaines  (e) Visualisation -- online pruce 19€
books  history_of_science  philosophy_of_science  sociology_of_knowledge  natural_philosophy  astronomy  ontology  epistemology  17thC  18thC  Descartes  representation-metaphysics  ideas-theories  Hooke  Leibniz  Newton  scientific_method  scientific_culture  instruments  microscope  telescope  unobservables  mathematics  geometry  calculus  cognition  analysis-logic  images  rhetoric  rhetoric-visual 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Raymond Boudon - Utilité ou Rationalité (2002) | Scribd
21 page article -- Explains why "rational choice" fails as explanatory theory in lots of collective action, public opinion, game theory, etc. -- domains where decisions to act aren't based exclusively on instrumental, consequentialist, cost-benefit calculative, and egoistic (directly concerned with impact on self) forms of, and context for, reasoning. Boudon finds "rational choice" superior to hand-wavy explanations that are speculative "black boxes" -- e.g. (1) sociobiology or evo-devo that we're hardwired, (2) Kahneman and Tversky heuristics and biases -- fascinating observations but aren't explanatory, (3) social/cultural explanations such as "socialization" which are tautological or a black box that provide no mechanisms that can differentiate situations or variations in outcomes. E.g. in Roman Empire peasants were more likely to remain pagan and soldiers were more likely to be attracted to the new religion. "Socialization" doesn't explain why soldiers raised in the traditional religious milieu and belief system were more likely to change their beliefs. Great examples of how rationality includes cognitive processes dealing with (1) non-instrumental contexts - e.g. identification with communitarian concerns ranging from voting to immigration policies, (2) aligning actions with one's judgment of what's more likely "true" based on core beliefs and how one has learned to evaluate "evidence" [e.g. Swedes are even more likely to reject "lump of labor" than Americans!] (3) axiological reasoning, including norms of fairness that may be fairly universal (e.g. reaction to Antigone, ultimatum game) or specific to a culture (e.g. due process in political application of "rule of law") -- see article for his tripartite classification of rationality and types of cognition that "rational choice" rejects in its definition. He thinks Weber and Adam Smith got there before, and better than, Becker.
article  Scribd  social_theory  mechanisms-social_theory  evolutionary_biology  evo_psych  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  rationality  reasons  Weber  Smith  Becker_Gary  Simon_Herbert  fairness  community  identity  norms  epistemology-social  game_theory  altruism  cognitive_bias  cognition  cognition-social  democracy  citizens  voting  political_participation  collective_action  political_culture  public_choice  public_opinion  common_good  socialization  social_psychology  cost-benefit  self-interest  self-interest-cultural_basis  self-and-other  EF-add 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Piet Strydom - ‘The Cognitive and Metacognitive Dimensions of Social and Political Theory’, in Routledge International Handbook of Social and Political Theory (2011) | Piet Strydom - Academia.edu
‘The Cognitive and Metacognitive Dimensions of Social and Political Theory’, in Gerard Delanty and Stephen Turner (eds) Routledge International Handbook of Social and Political Theory. London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 328-38. -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  social_theory  political_philosophy  cognition  cognition-social  downloaded 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Kim Sterelny - From hominins to humans: how sapiens became behaviourally modern | Royal Society - Issue Theme " Human Niche Construction " - Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 27 March 2011, vol. 366, no. 1566, 809-822
Philosophy Program and Tempo and Mode, Australian National University and Philosophy Program, Victoria University of Wellington -- This paper contributes to a debate in the palaeoarchaeological community about the major time-lag between the origin of anatomically modern humans and the appearance of typically human cultural behaviour. Why did humans take so long—at least 100,000 years—to become ‘behaviourally modern’? The transition is often explained as a change in the intrinsic cognitive competence of modern humans: often in terms of a new capacity for symbolic thought, or the final perfection of language. These cognitive breakthrough models are not satisfactory, for they fail to explain the uneven palaeoanthropological record of human competence. Many supposed signature capacities appear (and then disappear) before the supposed cognitive breakthrough; many of the signature capacities disappear again after the breakthrough. So, instead of seeing behavioural modernity as a simple reflection of a new kind of mind, this paper presents a niche construction conceptual model of behavioural modernity. Humans became behaviourally modern when they could reliably transmit accumulated informational capital to the next generation, and transmit it with sufficient precision for innovations to be preserved and accumulated. In turn, the reliable accumulation of culture depends on the construction of learning environments, not just intrinsic cognitive machinery. I argue that the model is (i) evolutionarily plausible: the elements of the model can be assembled incrementally, without implausible selective scenarios; (ii) the model coheres with the broad palaeoarchaeological record; (iii) the model is anthropologically and ethnographically plausible; and (iv) the model is testable, though only in coarse, preliminary ways. - Keywords : niche construction, behavioural modernity, hominins -- doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0301 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  sociobiology  anthropology  paleontology  prehistoric  evolution  evolution-social  evolutionary_biology  genetics  gene-culture_coevolution  niche_construction  brain  social_process  cultural_change  learning  cognition  cognition-social  cultural_transmission  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
I lost weight by eating lots of bacon and cream. Here's a scientific explanation for why. - Vox
some quasi-science behind quasi-paleo diet -- at least it shows why low-fat priducts are actively bad and artificial sweetners can be countrr productive
health  cognition  public_health  medicine  evidence  Lon  quantified_self 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
humanbenchmark.com (
I lost weight by eating lots of bacon and cream. Here's a scientific explanation for why. - Vox)
website  cognition  brain  links 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
quantified-mind.com
(I lost weight by eating lots of bacon and cream. Here's a scientific explanation for why. - Vox)
website  cognition  brain  links 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Pei Wang - A General Theory of Intelligence [an e-book under development] | Home
This eBook is an attempt to establish a theory that identifies the commonality within various forms intelligence, including human intelligence, computer intelligence, animal intelligence, alien intelligence, group intelligence, etc. -- NARS (Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System) - Most of the existing AI inference works with semi-axiomatic systems, which attempt to make partial extension or revision of mathematical logic, while keeping the other parts. What AI really needs are non-axiomatic systems, which do not assume the sufficiency of knowledge and resources in any aspect of the system. NARS is a concrete example of non-axiomatic system which uses a formal language "Narsese" to represent goals, actions, and beliefs.The basic unit of the language is term, which can be thought of as the name or label of a concept in the system. (..) The meaning of a term is determined by its extension and intension, which are the collection of the inheritance relations between this term and other terms, obtained from the experience of the system. NARS includes three variants of the inheritance relation: similarity (symmetric inheritance), implication (derivability), and equivalence (symmetric implication). (..)The meaning of a compound term is partially determined by its logical relations with its components, and partially by the system's experience on the compound term as a whole. Event is a special type of statement that have a time-dependent truth-value. Operation is a special type of event that can occur by the system's decision. Goal is a special type of event, that the system is attempting to realize, by carrying out certain operations. Beside goals to be achieved, NARS can accept tasks that are knowledge to be absorbed and questions to be answered. (..)If a event is judged to imply the achieving of a goal, then the desirability of the event is increased, and the system will also evaluate its plausibility(..). When an event is both desirable and plausible, the system will make the decision to turn the event into a goal to be actually pursued. The basic function of inference rules in NARS is to derive new beliefs from current beliefs.
etexts  books  intelligence  artificial_intelligence  mind  systems-complex_adaptive  systems-reflexive  systems_theory  epistemology-social  cognition  cognition-social  agent-based_models  logic  inference  decision_theory  rationality  rationality-bounded  learning  website  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
IEEE Xplore Abstract Franklin, S.; Madl, T. ; D'mello, S. ; Snaider, J. - LIDA: A Systems-level Architecture for Cognition, Emotion, and Learning (2014)
IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development, (Volume:6 , Issue: 1 ) Page(s):19 - 41 DOI:10.1109/TAMD.2013.2277589 -- We describe a cognitive architecture learning intelligent distribution agent (LIDA) that affords attention, action selection and human-like learning intended for use in controlling cognitive agents that replicate human experiments as well as performing real-world tasks. LIDA combines sophisticated action selection, motivation via emotions, a centrally important attention mechanism, and multimodal instructionalist and selectionist learning. Empirically grounded in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, the LIDA architecture employs a variety of modules and processes, each with its own effective representations and algorithms. LIDA has much to say about motivation, emotion, attention, and autonomous learning in cognitive agents. In this paper, we summarize the LIDA model together with its resulting agent architecture, describe its computational implementation, and discuss results of simulations that replicate known experimental data. We also discuss some of LIDA's conceptual modules, propose nonlinear dynamics as a bridge between LIDA's modules and processes and the underlying neuroscience, and point out some of the differences between LIDA and other cognitive architectures. Finally, we discuss how LIDA addresses some of the open issues in cognitive architecture research. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  neuroscience  psychology  brain  consciousness  cognition  emotions  learning  memory  attention  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Madl T, Baars BJ, Franklin S (2011) The Timing of the Cognitive Cycle. | PLoS ONE 6(4)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803 -- We propose that human cognition consists of cascading cycles of recurring brain events. Each cognitive cycle senses the current situation, interprets it with reference to ongoing goals, and then selects an internal or external action in response. While most aspects of the cognitive cycle are unconscious, each cycle also yields a momentary “ignition” of conscious broadcasting. Neuroscientists have independently proposed ideas similar to the cognitive cycle, the fundamental hypothesis of the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent) model of cognition. High-level cognition, such as deliberation, planning, etc., is typically enabled by multiple cognitive cycles. In this paper we describe a timing model of LIDA's cognitive cycle. -- The action selection component of the cycle is proposed to involve frontal, striatal and cerebellar regions. Thus the cycle is inherently recurrent, as the anatomy of the thalamocortical system suggests. The LIDA model fits a large body of cognitive and neuroscientific evidence. Finally, we describe two LIDA-based software agents: the LIDA Reaction Time agent that simulates human performance in a simple reaction time task, and the LIDA Allport agent which models phenomenal simultaneity within timeframes comparable to human subjects. While there are many models of reaction time performance, these results fall naturally out of a biologically and computationally plausible cognitive architecture. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  neuroscience  cognition  consciousness  brain  perception  memory  learning  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Melanie Boly et al - Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions (2013) | Frontiers of Psychology - Consciousness Research
Review ARTICLE - Frontiers of Psychology, 31 October 2013 | doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00625 -- Melanie Boly1,2,3*, Anil K. Seth4,5, Melanie Wilke6,7, Paul Ingmundson8, Bernard Baars9, Steven Laureys3, David B. Edelman10 and Naotsugu Tsuchiya11,12 -- This joint article reflects the authors' personal views regarding noteworthy advances in the neuroscience of consciousness in the last 10 years, and suggests what we feel may be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio,. We summarize recent advances in our understanding of subjectivity in humans and other animals, including empirical, applied, technical, and conceptual insights. These include the evidence for the importance of fronto-parietal connectivity and of “top-down” processes, both of which enable information to travel across distant cortical areas effectively, as well as numerous dissociations between consciousness and cognitive functions, such as attention, in humans. In addition, we describe the development of mental imagery paradigms, which made it possible to identify covert awareness in non-responsive subjects. Non-human animal consciousness research has also witnessed substantial advances on the specific role of cortical areas and higher order thalamus for consciousness, thanks to important technological enhancements. In addition, much progress has been made in the understanding of non-vertebrate cognition relevant to possible conscious states. Finally, major advances have been made in theories of consciousness, and also in their comparison with the available evidence. Along with reviewing these findings, each author suggests future avenues for research in their field of investigation.
Keywords: consciousness, animals, human cognition, theoretical neuroscience, biotechnology, neuroimaging

Citation: Boly M, Seth AK, Wilke M, Ingmundson P, Baars B, Laureys S, Edelman DB and Tsuchiya N (2013) Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions. Front. Psychol. 4:625. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00625
article  neuroscience  consciousness  cognition  brain  animals  physiology  mind  mind-body  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Yvonne Brehmer*, Helena Westerberg and Lars Bäckman - Working-memory training in younger and older adults: training gains, transfer, and maintenance (2012) | Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Original Research ARTICLE - Frontiers of Human Neuroscience, 27 March 2012 | doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00063 -- Yvonne Brehmer*, Helena Westerberg and Lars Bäckman - Aging Research Center, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, Sweden -- Working memory (WM), a key determinant of many higher-order cognitive functions, declines in old age. Current research attempts to develop process-specific WM training procedures, which may lead to general cognitive improvement. Adaptivity of the training as well as the comparison of training gains to performance changes of an active control group are key factors in evaluating the effectiveness of a specific training program. In the present study, 55 younger adults (20–30 years of age) and 45 older adults (60–70 years of age) received 5 weeks of computerized training on various spatial and verbal WM tasks. Half of the sample received adaptive training (i.e., individually adjusted task difficulty), whereas the other half-worked on the same task material but on a low task difficulty level (active controls). Performance was assessed using criterion, near-transfer, and far-transfer tasks before training, after 5 weeks of intervention, as well as after a 3-month follow-up interval. Results indicate that (a) adaptive training generally led to larger training gains than low-level practice, (b) training and transfer gains were somewhat greater for younger than for older adults in some tasks, but comparable across age groups in other tasks, (c) far-transfer was observed to a test on sustained attention and for a self-rating scale on cognitive functioning in daily life for both young and old, and (d) training gains and transfer effects were maintained across the 3-month follow-up interval across age. -- didn't download
article  cognition  brain-aging  memory 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Denis Larrivee and Adriana Gini - Neuroplasticity and the Reemergence of Virtue | Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2014
Opinion ARTICLE - Front. Hum. Neurosci., 18 September 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00731 -- Is the philosophical construct of “habitus operativus bonus” compatible with the modern neuroscience concept of human flourishing through neuroplasticity? A consideration of prudence as a multidimensional regulator of virtue - Denis Larrivee1* and Adriana Gini2 - 1Educational Outreach Office, Catholic Diocese of Charleston, Charleston, SC, USA - 2Neuroradiology Division, Neuroscience Department, San Camillo-Forlanini Medical Center, Rome, Italy Unlike ancient Greece where personal virtue was the route to fulfillment, modern man typically seeks to improve human well-being by external means, in a process known as the medicalization of society. The apparent novelty of recent proposals in psychological theory to develop character strength, therefore, lies in their reemphasis on a personal implementation of positive values. Among the factors contributing to a new look at self-determination has been the capacity for the neural substrate to selectively alter itself via neuroplasticity. Indeed, the confluence of past and contemporary thinking may presage a consideration of neurobiological instantiation within which virtuous behavior may be enhanced in accord with principles governing neuroplastic change. But what are virtues and positive traits? And to what extent can these conceptions inform our growing understanding of the neural contribution to human behavior? -- full title is enormous, referring to Aquinas formula and written by at least one author committed to Catholic Thomism - discussion of Aristotle also -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy  ancient_philosophy  Aristotle  Aquinas  Thomism-21stC  moral_philosophy  mind  habit  neuroscience  cognition  plasticity  prudence  practical_reason  character  virtue  psychology  brain  brain-development  self-development  self-regulation  phronesis  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Bernacer J and Murillo JI - The Aristotelian conception of habit and its contribution to human neuroscience (2014) | Frontiers of Human Neuroscience. 8:883. - doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00883 Frontiers | The Aristotelian conception of habit and its contribut
Mind-Brain Group, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra, Pamplona, Navarra, Spain, Edited by: Jose Angel Lombo, Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Italy -- Reviewed by: Katie A. Jennings, University of Oxford, UK - Carol Seger, Colorado State University, USA - Hypothesis & Theory ARTICLE - The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance.(..) We summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and compare it with that of James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; (2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”); and (3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as a cognitive enrichment of behavior, are a crucial resource for understanding human learning and behavioral plasticity. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  human_nature  behavior  habit  psychology  epistemology  learning  neuroscience  cognition  brain-development  memory  Aristotle  Aristotelian  James_William  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard - Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology, Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2 (8): 105-120 (2013).
University of Edinburgh -- Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology -- The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and methodology of the former. We are rather suspicious of this apparent tension, which we believe can be significantly mitigated by paying attention to certain recent advances within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Accordingly, we attempt to explain how extended knowledge, the result of combining active externalism from contemporary philosophy of mind with contemporary epistemology, can offer an alternative conception of the future of social epistemology.
analytical_philosophy  social_theory  epistemology  epistemology-social  philosophy_of_language  mind  mind-body  cognition  cognition-social  neuroscience  mind-external  bibliography  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  philosophy_of_science  psychology  social_psychology  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Collin Finn - Two Kinds of Social Epistemology « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 79-104. (2013)
Steve Fuller’s programme of Social Epistemology was initiated some 25 years ago with the launching of a journal and the publication of a monograph with those very words as their title. Since then, the programme has evolved in a constant critical dialogue with other players in the fields of epistemology and science studies. Fuller’s main confrontation has been with analytic epistemology which, in its classical form, adopts a contrary position on most key issues. However, analytic epistemologists have gradually moved in the direction of Fuller’s views and even adopted the term “social epistemology” for their emerging position. Still, substantial disagreement remains between the two identically named programmes with regard to the proper philosophical approach to knowledge as a social phenomenon; in this article, I try to pinpoint the locus of this disagreement. However, Fuller has also been engaged in minor skirmishes with his Science Studies fellows; I also examine these clashes. Finally, I express my wishes concerning the future direction of social epistemology. -- downloaded pdf to Note
epistemology  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  history_of_science  scientific_method  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_language  social_theory  downloaded  EF-add  cognition  cognition-social  institutions  power  power-knowledge  knowledge  knowledge_economy  power-asymmetric  Rawls  democracy  expertise  epistemology-naturalism  human_nature  posthumanism  post-truth  Latour  humanities  humanism  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  political_culture  cultural_capital  social_capital  neoliberalism  instrumentalist 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Anthony Chemero and Michael Silberstein - After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science | JSTOR: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 1-27
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist‐mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends. -- partially a lit survey so good bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  philosophy_of_science  metaphysics  mind  mind-body  neuroscience  reductionism  mechanism  cognition  ontology  methodology  levels_of_analyis  critical_realism  emergence  individualism-methodology  unit_of_analysis  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Lennon, Thomas M., Stainton, Robert J. (Eds.) 2008 The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology
Downloaded Introduction pdf to Note -- Series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 7 -- newly written papers addressing each of the main contributors to the discussion of the Achilles. Despite the historical importance and intrinsic interest of the argument, very little has been written about it. *--* Contents. *--* Did Plato Articulate the Achilles Argument?. *-- Aristotle on the Unity of Consciousness. *-- The Neoplatonic Achilles. *-- The Unity of the Soul and Contrary Appetites in Medieval Philosophy. *-- Hume, Spinoza and the Achilles Inference. *-- Locke and the Achilles Argument. *-- The Reverse Achilles in Locke. *-- Cudworth and Bayle: An Odd Couple?. *-- The Achilles Argument and the Nature of Matter in the Clarke Collins Correspondence. *-- Leibniz’s ‘Achilles’. *-- Hume’s Reply to the Achilles Argument. *-- Kant and Mendelssohn on the Implications of the ‘I Think’. *-- Kant on the Achilles Argument. *-- William James and the Achilles Argument. *-- The Binding Problem: Achilles in the 21st Century.
books  intellectual_history  mind  mind-body  consciousness  perception  thinking_matter  materialism  soul  immortality  substance  Plato  Neoplatonism  Aristotle  Aquinas  Duns_Scotus  Ockham  Augustine  Descartes  Spinoza  Malebranche  Cartesian  Bayle  Locke  Clarke  Collins_Anthony  Leibniz  Hume  Kant  Mendelssohn  Fichte  cognition  neuroscience  psychology  natural_philosophy  metaphysics  rationalist  James_William  history_of_science  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Raphael Van Riel, review essay - David Woodruff Smith et Amy L. Thomasson (dir.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (OUP 2005) - Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 257-259 | Érudit 
Raphael Van Riel - Universität bochum -- La phénoménologie traverse présentement une renaissance dans le domaine de la philosophie de l’esprit. Des philosophes comme Alva Noë, Shaun Gallagher et Dan Zahavi interprètent les résultats neuroscientifiques en ayant recours aux concepts et méthodes de la tradition phénoménologique. Toutefois, l’adaptation de la méthode phénoménologique en philosophie de l’esprit consiste souvent simplement à copier la façon de parler phénoménologique, ce qui ne contribue pas nécessairement à l’éclaircissement de l’objet d’étude. Les textes réunis dans le présent volume... sont libérés de tendances semblables -- la première partie, la relation entre la tradition phénoménologique et la philosophie de l’esprit à tendance « analytique » — Paul Livingston (historical overview) («Functionalism and logical analysis »), Galen Strawson sur la structure conceptuelle de la philosophie de l’esprit (« Intentionality and Experience : Terminological Preliminaries ») et une critique d’inspiration merleau-pontyienne à la théorie de la conscience de Dennett par Carmen Taylor (« On the Incapability of Phenomenology ») -- les quatre autres sections abordent différents complexes thématiques de la phénoménologie : la conscience et la connaissance de soi (2e partie), l’intentionnalité (3e partie), l’unité de la conscience (4e partie) et finalement la perception, la sensation et l’action (5e partie). -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  phenomenology  mind  mind-body  consciousness  self  perception  action-theory  neuroscience  cognition  analytical_philosophy  Dennett  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Daniel D. Hutto - Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett’s Project | 1995. The Monist. 78:4. 464–478. - Academia.edu
I challenge the idea that the 'reductive character' of Dennett's project is in any way Wittgensteinian in spirit. I suggest that at a crucial point in their philosophy their views diverge significantly. That is to say, although they are good travelling companions up to an important cross-roads, in the end, their incompatible concerns take them in different directions. Furthermore, by reviewing Dennett's project of 'explaining' consciousness, we might begin to see some good reasons for preferring Wittgenstein's 'road less travelled'. Thus, although Dennett's account of consciousness is often given a centre stage in what follows, my ultimate aim is to throw light on the nature Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology by using Dennett as a foil. This should help us to see precisely how the former's approach differs importantly from those advanced by many of today's philosophers and cognitive scientists. -- downloaded pdf to Note
mind  reductionism  Dennett  Wittgenstein  consciousness  cognition  neuroscience  psychology  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Elias L. Khalil - Rational, Normative and Procedural Theories of Beliefs: Can They Explain Internal Motivations? I JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 45, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2011), pp. 641-664
This paper offers three-way taxonomy of theories of beliefs. For rational theories, beliefs are determined by given information and updated via Bayes's rule. For normative theory, best represented by Hayek and sociological theory, beliefs are categories that precede information and, in fact, formulate the otherwise impenetrable information. For procedural theory, best represented by Herbert Simon and pragmatic philosophy, while beliefs formulate the information, they can be replaced in response to shocks. While each theory manages to capture one kind of belief, all three largely fail to explain internal motivations that characterize entrepreneurship, innovation, and creativity. The failure arises from the fact that the three theories are about cognitive beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the world), while internal motivations are beliefs concerning self-ability. -- paywall -- large references list quite interesting
article  jstor  paywall  economic_sociology  belief  motivation  action-theory  Bayesian  Hayek  pragmatism  Innovation  creativity  cognition  bibliography 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Joyce - Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? | JSTOR: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 2009), pp. 53-75
Vol. 12, No. 1, Empirically Informed Moral Theory -- downloaded pdf to Note -- Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by "objective"? what is meant by "experience"?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis. -- starts with 17thC and 18thC philosophy, especially Hume
article  jstor  intellectual_history  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  morality-objective  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  consciousness  mind  cognition  17thC  18thC  Hume  empiricism  downloaded  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
RS Bakker - The Missing Half of the Global Neuronal Workspace: A Commentary on Stanislaus Dehaene’s Consciousness and the Brain | Three Pound Brain
Stanislaus Dehaene, to my mind at least, is the premier consciousness researcher on the planet, one of those rare scientists who seems equally at home in the theoretical aether (like we are here) and in the laboratory (where he is there). His latest book, Consciousness and the Brain provides an excellent, and at times brilliant, overview of the state of contemporary consciousness research. Consciousness has come a long way in the past two decades, and Dehaene deserves credit for much of the yardage gained. ... Dehaene’s review of Cristopher Koch’s Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, where he concludes with a confession of his own: “Can neuroscience be reconciled with living a happy, meaningful, moral, and yet nondelusional life? I will confess that this question also occasionally keeps me lying awake at night.” Since the implications of the neuroscientific revolution, the prospects of having a technically actionable blueprint of the human soul, often keep my mind churning into the wee hours, I was hoping that I might see a more measured, less sanguine Dehaene in this book, one less inclined to soft-sell the troubling implications of neuroscientific research. And in that one regard, I was disappointed. ?...Dehaene, I think, caters far too much to the very preconceptions his science is in the process of dismantling. As a result, the book, for all its organizational finesse, all its elegant formulations, and economical summaries of various angles of research, finds itself haunted by a jagged shadow, the intimation that things simply are not as they seem.
books  reviews  mind  consciousness  neuroscience  cognition  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Ruth Leyes - “Both of Us Disgusted in My Insula”: Mirror Neuron Theory and Emotional Empathy | nonsite.org March 2012
Attacks mirror neuron experiments and conclusions - ... the presuppositions of Wicker and his team can be traced most directly to the work of the American psychologist Silvan S. Tomkins, and especially to that of his follower, Paul Ekman, both of whom have proposed an evolutionary-classificatory approach to the affects. Key features of their approach include the claim that there exists a small number of basic emotions, such as disgust, which can be defined in evolutionary terms as universal or pancultural, adaptive responses of the organism; that these emotions are discrete, innate, reflex-like “affect programs” located in subcortical parts of the brain; that the basic emotions manifest themselves in distinct patterns of physiological arousal and especially in characteristic facial expressions; that according to Ekman’s “neurocultural” model for explaining commonalities and variations in human facial displays, socialization and learning may determine the range of stimuli that can “trigger” the emotions and... “display rules,” ...and that the more complex or “higher” emotions are made up of blends of the basic emotions. A further claim associated with the Basic Emotions View, ..., is that although the emotions can and do combine with the cognitive systems in the brain, they are essentially separate processes. For Freud and the “appraisal theorists” such as Richard Lazarus, Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum, Phoebe Ellsworth and others, emotions are embodied intentional states that are directed toward objects and depend on our beliefs and desires. But the Basic Emotion View denies this by interpreting the affects as non-intentional responses. It thus posits a constitutive disjunction between our emotions on the one hand and our knowledge of what causes and maintains them on the other, because feeling and cognition are two separate systems.
article  neuroscience  cognition  evolutionary_biology  cognition-social  epistemology-social  empathy  emotions  Smith  Nussbaum  bibliography  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Amazon.com: Herbert Gintis' review of Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking - Feb 2014
Great review on 3 types of cognition, of which only 1(me-thinking) shared with great apes. Gintis recasts Searle's collective intentionality, which deals with collaboration, using Timasello's version of social epistemology, ability to deal with other minds in a social network of shared representation.
books  reviews  kindle-available  amazon.com  biology  cognition  cognition-social  epistemology-social  mind  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Corey W. Dyck, review - Avi Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Dec 2013
For its competition of 1771, the Berlin Academy of Sciences asked: "Supposing men abandoned to their natural faculties, are they in a position to invent language? And by what means will they arrive at this invention?" The winning essay was Herder's "On the Origin of Language." This was actually the Academy's 2nd on language. In 1759 they asked: "What is the reciprocal influence of the opinions of people on language, and of language on opinions?" The winner was the orientalist Johann David Michaelis. Lifschitz's lucid and engaging book is about the 1759 contest, as he considers the historical, philosophical, and political circumstances that led to its proposal and the broader scholarly views of Michaelis. -- While one might quibble with Lifschitz's attempt to find deep roots in the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy for the 1759 Academy question, there is no doubting that in Berlin of the 1750s a number of thinkers took an active interest in language, its role in framing social institutions, and its relation to the mind, primarily under the influence of the work of Condillac and Rousseau. These include the president of the Academy, Maupertuis, and Moses Mendelssohn There was also lively discussion among Academy members regarding the (synchronic) connection between language and opinions, esp French as the language of the Academy. -- Already in the 1750s ...mainstream Enlightenment figures recognized the "linguistic rootedness of all human forms of life" and the importance of language as a "tool of cognition". Lifschitz rightly contends [this counters the story that such a view ], with its focus on the historical and non-rational aspects of human nature, [came from counter-Enlightenment figures] such as Herder and Hamann. [This directly] challenge[s] the characterization ... in Isaiah Berlin's seminal studies [as well as more recent studies] such as Michael Forster's work on Herder's philosophy of language. ...Herder's claim, as characterized by Forster, that "thought is essentially dependent upon and bounded by language" and that "one cannot think unless one has a language and one can only think what one can express linguistically" must be taken in the broader context of these earlier philosophical (and political) debates.
books  reviews  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  1750s  1760s  1770s  Enlightenment  Germany  French_Enlightenment  philosophy_of_language  human_nature  language-national  language  language-history  Biblical_criticism  perception  cognition  historicism  Hobbes  Locke  Condillac  Rousseau  Leibniz  Wolff  Mendelssohn  Herder  Hamann  academies  social_theory  Counter-Enlightenment  Berlin_Isaiah  Frederick_the_Great  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Fred Rush, review essay - Michael Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition, AND German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // 2011
Michael Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition, Oxford University Press, 2010, 482pp., $99.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199228119. -**- Michael Forster, German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond, Oxford University Press, 2011, 350pp., $85.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199604814. -**- Reviewed by Fred Rush, University of Notre Dame
books  reviews  kindle-available  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  Germany  philosophy_of_language  German_Idealism  idealism-transcendental  hermeneutics  anthropology  cognition  translation  Herder  Hamann  Kant  Schleiermacher  Dilthey  Schlegel  Hegel  rationalist  empiricism  Enlightenment  Counter-Enlightenment  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Ian Ravenscroft, review - Alvin I. Goldman, Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // March 2014
The title Joint Ventures alludes to Goldman's view that understanding cognition requires both scientific and philosophical expertise. "It would be", he notes, "intellectually irresponsible to ignore the huge swaths of evidence and theory that science has generated" (p. 3). Nevertheless, there is "ample place for philosophers to make theoretical contributions, to argue for this or that theoretical interpretation as the best explanation of the data" (p. 3). Cognitive science is thus a joint venture between philosophy and the behavioral sciences (p. 2). The rich and fascinating essays in this collection are testimony to Goldman's vision. The volume focuses on four themes to which he has made important contributions: simulation theory, empathy, embodied cognition, and the metaphysics of action. I will focus on the first three themes because they are striking examples of the "joint ventures" program.
books  reviews  epistemology  cognition  cognition-social  mind  mind-body  neuroscience  action-theory  empathy  philosophy_of_science  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Edouard Machery - Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind* | JSTOR: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 72, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 444-467
In cognitive psychology, concepts are those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long‐term memory and are used by default in human beings’ higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, etc.). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the natural kind assumption. This article challenges the natural kind assumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate, if one aims at formulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations about the human mind. -- an early paper that's developed in his recent book -- didn't download
article  jstor  philosophy_of_science  psychology  cognition  neuroscience  concepts  kinds  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Joëlle Proust - Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View | JSTOR: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 108 (2008), pp. 241-268
Looks reasonably helpful in sorting out internalist vs externalist debates and how cognitive science is starting to influence analytical epistemology -- didn't download
article  jstor  epistemology  virtue_epistemology  cognition  epistemology-social  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir - Notes Toward an Analysis of Conceptual Change [eScholarship] (2003)
This is an early or unrevised version, and is not definitive, and therefore should not be cited. The Citation is Social Epistemology, 2003, 17, pp. 55-63. -- Extends insights from philosophy and sociology of science to conceptual changes more generally, often triggered by a dilemma that can't be handled well using concepts within existing background knowledge or web of beliefs. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  eScholarship  philosophy_of_science  concepts  epistemology-social  historical_change  psychology  cognition  rationality  holism  belief  Innovation  Kuhn  Popper  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Eric D. Beinhocker : Reflexivity, complexity, and the nature of social science - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 - Taylor & Francis Online
pages 330-342 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- In 1987, George Soros introduced his concepts of reflexivity and fallibility and has further developed and applied these concepts over subsequent decades. This paper attempts to build on Soros's framework, provide his concepts with a more precise definition, and put them in the context of recent thinking on complex adaptive systems. The paper proposes that systems can be classified along a ‘spectrum of complexity’ and that under specific conditions not only social systems but also natural and artificial systems can be considered ‘complex reflexive.’ The epistemological challenges associated with scientifically understanding a phenomenon stem not from whether its domain is social, natural, or artificial, but where it falls along this spectrum. Reflexive systems present particular challenges; however, evolutionary model-dependent realism provides a bridge between Soros and Popper and a potential path forward for economics.
article  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  epistemology  methodology  complexity  Soros  reflexivity  intentionality  evolution-as-model  Popper  scientific_method  downloaded  EF-add  systems-complex_adaptive  systems-reflexive  systems_theory  economic_theory  economic_models  EMH  rationality-economics  rational_expectations  information-markets  cognition  cognition-social  falsification  neuroscience  uncertainty  laws_of_nature  covering_laws  causation  explanation  prediction 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Contents | Yi-Cheng Zhang - The Structure of Information Economy [book chapter drafts]
TOC and links to chapter drafts. Zhang is at Fribourg, a physicist who uses Soros reflexivity insights as part of top level Darwinian inflected theory of NESS - non-equilibrium social sciences.
books  philosophy_of_social_science  economic_theory  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  Soros  reflexivity  information-markets  information-asymmetric  cognition  cognition-social  fallibility  Innovation  marketing  networks-social  supply_chains  equilibrium  networks-information  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Yi-Cheng Zhang :: Broader scopes of the reflexivity principle in the economy - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 -Taylor & Francis Online
pages 446-453 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The reflexivity principle of George Soros – that man's fallible understanding can have reflexivity impacts that shape reality – challenges mainstream economics in a fundamental way. This essay will outline a research program that corroborates the reflexivity principle and extends it to broader economic issues. We shall often use examples of consumer and finance markets, but the implications go beyond these examples. The following eight sections build up our main thesis that reflexivity plays an essential role in understanding the economy. -- see bookmark for his draft book on information economy (Oxford 2014 or 2015) and the project he leads on NESS non-equilibrium social sciences
article  philosophy_of_social_science  economic_theory  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  Soros  reflexivity  information-markets  information-asymmetric  cognition  cognition-social  fallibility  Innovation  marketing  networks-social  supply_chains  equilibrium  networks-information  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
George Soros - Fallibility, reflexivity, and the human uncertainty principle - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 - Taylor & Francis Online
Lead article for special issue devoted to Soros and epistemology in social sciences more broadly compared with natural sciences and Popper's version of falsibility in scientific method -- He's making progress in formalizing his theory and putting it in context of other theorists - sees his fallibility and reflexivity combination as major factor in "Knightian uncertainty" - Downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_social_science  philosophy_of_science  epistemology  scientific_method  falsification  deduction  Popper  Soros  uncertainty  economic_theory  economic_models  financial_economics  capital_markets  FX  EMH  rationality-economics  rational_expectations  complexity  equilibrium  reflexivity  ontology-social  free_will  financial_crisis  financial_system  fallibility  downloaded  EF-add  fundamentals  methodology  cognition  agency  intentionality 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
The Paradox of Automatic Planning [FIERY CUSHMAN:] HeadCon '13 What's new in social science: Part III | Edge.org
Neurosciences at Brown - some interesting stuff about stimulus-response and basal ganglia that can control both motor response and seems to interact with working memory for goal oriented action -- but where he thinks research is going is the pretty obvious bio-cultural synthesis. Scary that brain researchers on cognition that are hooked with artificial intelligence modeling seem to ignore the humanities perspectives -- quote -- In the literature right now there's a debate between two rival theories for what makes humans unique. One theory calls itself the "cognitive niche" and it basically says what makes us unique is that we can think very, very carefully and hard about things in a controlled way. Another hypothesis calls itself the "cultural niche", and it says, no, what makes us unique is that we get for free the answers to problems culturally. Other people have worked it out through trial and error and they tell us.

What I find really exciting is the idea that it's not just that both of those things are true but that they're codependent. That in principle you could not make the mathematics of controlled cognition work, you couldn't solve the computational intractability without the support of cultural input, and that cultural knowledge wouldn't be much good if you couldn't flexibly reassemble it in the way that hierarchical representations allow you to.
neuroscience  cognition  cognition-social  evolutionary_biology  evolution  evolution-social  human_nature  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Joshua Greene: Moral Tribes - DEEP PRAGMATISM | Edge.org Aug 2013
Text & video - Introduction to the concepts in his new book -- What I'd like to do today is present two ideas about morality on two different levels. One is: What is the structure of moral problems? Are there different kinds of moral problems? And the other is: What is the structure of moral thinking? Are there different kinds of moral thinking? And then put those together to get at a kind of normative idea, which is that the key to moral progress is to match the right kind of thinking with the right kind of problem.

Morality is fundamentally about the problem of cooperation....... There are different ways for groups to be cooperative, and they can work fine separately, but what happens when you have different groups that come together? First, there are really two different kinds of cooperation problems. One is getting individuals within a group to cooperate, and the other is getting groups that are separately cooperative to cooperate with each other. One is the basic moral problem, and that's the problem that our brains were designed to solve. Then you have this more complex modern problem,,...... At least for some people a lot of the time, the first thought is to be cooperative. That suggests that we do, indeed, have these claims of instincts, whether they're genetic instincts, or culturally honed instincts, or instincts honed from one's personal experience, whatever it is, the point-and-shoot automatic settings say, "Go ahead and do the cooperative thing." It's manual mode thinking that says, "Wait a second, hold on, I could really get screwed here. Maybe I shouldn't do this."
books  kindle-available  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  utilitarianism  moral_sentiments  tragedgy_of_the_commons  cognition  thinking_fast-slow  human_nature  tribes  nationalism  identity  hierarchy  egalitarian  federalism  democracy  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Aaron Beim: The Cognitive Aspects of Collective Memory | Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 7-26
The Cognitive Aspects of Collective Memory
Aaron Beim
Symbolic Interaction
Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2007) (pp. 7-26)
Downloaded pdf to Note

While these conceptions [from research to date] provide powerful frameworks for thinking about group remembrance, they describe exclusively institutional manifestations of collective memory. There are two characteristics of current collective memory research that account for this phenomenon. First, collective memory researchers assume that collective memory is collective only if it is institutionalized; they argue implicitly that collective memory is discernible only in institutionalized objects. Second, collective memory analyses conflate the production of the object and its reception. Objects are analyzed both in terms of their development as cultural objects (Griswold 1986) and in terms of their representativeness of the memory of a given population.

While these conceptions of collective memory are insightful, they preclude the analysis of both collective memory sui generis and the mechanisms of collective memory’s production and reception. I contend that we can undertake these types of analysis by including the cognitive processes that produce schemata that define the past.
article  jstor  social_theory  social_psychology  cognition  collective_memory  lit_survey  bibliography  methodology  institutionalization  sociology-process  symbolic_interaction  culture  cognition-social  cultural_objects  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
John Mikhail - Review of Patricia S. Churchland, 'Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality':: SSRN
The treatment of these subjects is generally informative and often quite illuminating, albeit occasionally superficial. Churchland writes elegantly and presents a clear, distinctive, and forceful viewpoint on the science of morality, which draws inspiration from Aristotle, Hume, and Darwin. Her principal thesis, that moral and social values are rooted in the neurobiology of care, trust, and cooperation, deserves to be taken seriously by scientists and philosophers alike. In this review, I focus on three perceived weaknesses of Churchland’s stimulating book that likely will be of particular interest to philosophers: her interpretation of Hume, her skepticism toward innate moral principles, and her treatment of moral rules. I then conclude by making a few brief observations about the general significance of Braintrust. Keywords: Churchland, Darwin, Hume, Aristotle, Plato, morality, nativism, epistemology, computation, rules, neurobiology, care, attachment, norms, genes, evolution -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle  reviews  moral_philosophy  cognition  neuroscience  Hume  naturalism  evolutionary_biology  evo_psych  epistemology  genetics  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Sam Fleischacker, Economics and the Ordinary Person: Re-reading Adam Smith (2004) | Library of Economics and Liberty
Far more important to Smith's work is the belief that ordinary people normally understand their own interests without help from politicians or professional philosophers. The distinctive mark of Smith's thought is his view of human cognition, not of human motivation: he is far more willing than practically any of his contemporaries to endorse the ability of ordinary people to know what they need to know in life. ......Smith's distrust of the ability of "systems"—whether philosophical, religious, or political—to improve human beings goes with a belief that what really provides us with moral education are the humble institutions of everyday social interaction, including the market. The foundation of all virtue for Smith is "self-command,"......The point of these famous lines is not that my butcher and baker are self-interested but that I know how to "address" that self-interest, that I know how to "shew them that it is for their own advantage" to do something that will help me. But my ability to address their interests takes me beyond myself, whatever it does to them; I must go beyond my own self-love in order to enlist theirs in my aid. And it is that ability to restrain our own self-love, and understand and further the interests of others, Smith says, that distinguishes human beings from other animals. -- downloaded pdf
article  18thC  Britain  Scottish_Enlightenment  Smith  intellectual_history  moral_philosophy  political_economy  egalitarian  cognition  lower_orders  self-interest  self-love  cooperation  downloaded 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
JENNIFER KAHN Can Emotional Intelligence Be Taught? | NYT Mag Education Issue September 2013
Starting in the late 19th century, the philosopher John Dewey argued against the development of purely vocational elementary schools, insisting that the true purpose of schooling was not simply to teach children a trade but to train them in deeper habits of mind, including “plasticity” (the ability to take in new information and be changed by it) and interdependence (the ability to work with others).Social-emotional learning takes Dewey’s theory further, suggesting that all emotions — not just the right ones — are adaptive if properly managed. Studies have shown that people in a slightly sad mood are better at analyzing or editing a written document (they focus better on details), while people who are slightly angry are better able to discriminate between weak and strong arguments. The purpose of a social-emotional learning program, then, isn’t to elide emotion but to channel it: to surf the rapids rather than to be swamped by them. 
human_nature  emotions  reason  education  mind-body  cognition  neuroscience  Dewey  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
John F. Tomer: Brain Physiology, Egoistic and Empathic Motivation, and Brain Plasticity: Toward a More Human Economics | World Economic Review: working papers 2012
Back to the Enlightenment and Adam Smith. -- comments section has interesting cites to other cognitive neuroscience models and connections to social theories that involve individual decision making. -- downloaded pdf to Note -- Brain plasticity refers to the ability of the brain to change structurally and functionally as a result of input from the environment. Some of this plasticity is no doubt genetically determined but some brain change is a product of individual effort and represents the individual’s investment in intangible capital (standard human capital, social capital, personal capital, and so on). In this revised view, the balance that individuals, groups, and societies strike between ego and empathy orientation is to a great extent determined by these intangible investments, not simply by brain physiology. In other words, it is the plastic aspect of the brain that determines how the capacity associated with brain physiology gets expressed.
paper  economic_models  economic_sociology  social_theory  cognition  neuroscience  self-interest  rationality-economics  empathy  social_capital  human_capital  education  work  rational_choice  feminist_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
How Poverty Taxes the Brain - Emily Badger - The Atlantic Cities August 2013
We only have so much cognitive capacity to spread around. It's a scarce resource.This understanding of the brain’s bandwidth could fundamentally change the way we think about poverty. Researchers publishing some groundbreaking findings today in the journal Science have concluded that poverty imposes such a massive cognitive load on the poor that they have little bandwidth left over to do many of the things that might lift them out of poverty – like go to night school, or search for a new job, or even remember to pay bills on time. In a series of experiments run by researchers at Princeton, Harvard, and the University of Warwick, low-income people who were primed to think about financial problems performed poorly on a series of cognition tests, saddled with a mental load that was the equivalent of losing an entire night’s sleep. Put another way, the condition of poverty imposed a mental burden akin to losing 13 IQ points, or comparable to the cognitive difference that’s been observed between chronic alcoholics and normal adults.
cognition  poverty  mind  neuroscience  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Margaret Koehler: Poetry of Attention in the Eighteenth Century | The 18th - Century Common
My book, Poetry of Attention in the Eighteenth Century (Palgrave, 2012) , makes a case for the relevance of eighteenth-century models of attention..... The current model of the human brain, 90% of which is estimated to function automatically, is one such autopoietic system.  Stafford argues that the current understanding of brain/ mind as a largely automatic system reverses eighteenth-century epistemology, which likened cognition to seeing.  Her critique casts the discrepancy explicitly in terms of attention: “What’s left of selective attention?”..... One way to escape a hyper-Romantic theory of consciousness is to look back to earlier models.  I would argue that this call for a new aesthetic commitment to “outward-directed attentiveness” finds a vital precedent in eighteenth-century poems.
cognition  psychology  18thC  English_lit  poetry  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Avi Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century (2012) - Oxford University Press
What is the role of language in human cognition? Could we attain self-consciousness and construct our civilisation without language? Such were the questions at the basis of eighteenth-century debates on the joint evolution of language, mind, and culture. Language and Enlightenment highlights the importance of language in the social theory, epistemology, and aesthetics of the Enlightenment. While focusing on the Berlin Academy under Frederick the Great, Avi Lifschitz situates the Berlin debates within a larger temporal and geographical framework. He argues that awareness of the historicity and linguistic rootedness of all forms of life was a mainstream Enlightenment notion rather than a feature of the so-called 'Counter-Enlightenment'. Enlightenment authors of different persuasions investigated whether speechless human beings could have developed their language and society on their own. Such inquiries usually pondered the difficult shift from natural signs like cries and gestures to the artificial, articulate words of human language. This transition from nature to artifice was mirrored in other domains of inquiry, such as the origins of social relations, inequality, the arts and the sciences. By examining a wide variety of authors - Leibniz, Wolff, Condillac, Rousseau, Michaelis, and Herder, among others - Language and Enlightenment emphasises the open and malleable character of the eighteenth-century Republic of Letters. The language debates demonstrate that German theories of culture and language were not merely a rejection of French ideas. New notions of the genius of language and its role in cognition were constructed through a complex interaction with cross-European currents, especially via the prize contests at the Berlin Academy.
books  18thC  Enlightenment  Republic_of_Letters  Germany  France  Frederick_the_Great  language  cognition  human_nature  Leibniz  Condillac  Rousseau  social_theory  epistemology  Counter-Enlightenment  academies  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Cultural Cognition Blog - Who distrusts whom about what in the climate science debate? August 2013
I think it won’t really be necessary, even, for me to say what I think about the contending claims about the role of “scientist advocacy” in the climate debate.  That’ll be clear enough.Those points reduce to three: ...1. Members of the public do trust scientists... .2. Members of culturally opposing groups distrust each other when they perceive their status is at risk in debates over public policy.... 3. When facts become entangled in cultural status conflicts, members of opposing groups (all of whom do trust scientists) will form divergent perceptions of what scientists believe.
political_culture  cognition  climate  culture_wars  human_nature  Hume  epistemology  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Adam Smith's Theory of Probability and the Roles of Risk and Uncertainty in Economic Decision Making by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics,Volume 19, No.4,October -December 2011,pp. 86-111. 

Adam Smith rejected the use of the mathematical laws of the calculus of probabilities because the basic information-data-knowledge provided in the real world of decision making did not allow a decision maker to specify precise, definite, exact, numerical probabilities or discover the probability distributions. This means that Smith rejected the classical interpretation of probability of La Place and the Bernoulli brothers, the limiting frequency-relative frequency interpretation of probability, and the personalist, subjectivist, psychological Bayesian approach used by all neoclassical schools of thought because all of these approaches to probability claim that ALL probabilities can be represented by a single numeral between 0 and 1 and the decision maker knows the probability distributions. Smith, like Keynes, rejects this immediately. 

An important conclusion of this paper is that it was Adam Smith who first explicitly recognized that the mathematical concept of probability is not applicable, in general, in real world decision making. Smith also rejects the normative and prescriptive roles of mathematical probability in decision making. 

Downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  political_economy  economic_models  risk  probability  uncertainty  cognition  rational_choice  neoclassical_economics  investment  Smith  Keynes  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
A Comparison-Contrast of Adam Smith, JM Keynes and Jeremy Bentham on Probability, Risk, Uncertainty, Optimism-Pessimism and Decision Making with Applications Concerning Banking, Insurance and Speculation by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
Smith and Keynes would reject the Kahneman-Tversky behavioral economist “Heuristics and Biases“ approach that regards mathematical probability as the normative criterion that all decision makers should attempt to emulate since this approach is a more advanced mathematical version of Bentham’s original approach. Mathematical probability, which requires the use of precise or sharp numerical probabilities, can only be normative in the case where the decision maker has a complete information set and/or knows for certain that a specific probability distribution will apply now and in the future. The mathematical laws of the probability calculus only hold as a limiting case whenever humans are part of the equation. Both Keynes and Smith rely on an inexact, interval, non additive, nonlinear approach that directly conflicts with the exact, single number, additive, linear approach recommended by Tversky and Kahneman as being the hallmark of human rationality in decision making.

 On the other hand, Bentham’s approach is an earlier version of the exact, linear and additive approach recommended as being rational by Tversky-Kahneman. Smith and Keynes, however, did emphasize fields that today are called Cognitive Science and Cognitive Psychology. Here pattern recognition, similarity, induction and intuition played an important role.

Downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  banking  risk  probability  uncertainty  usury  cognition  Smith  Keynes  Bentham  rational_choice  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture, ed by David Martel Johnson, Christina E. Erneling (2005)
Very interesting & extensive collection of papers on emerging interdisciplinary approaches to mind and the ontology and methodology debates, including eliminativism, evolutionary biology, cultural approaches including constructivism, neurobiology models etc. In cultural section, see paper on Bakhtin and dialogic modes.

Conclusion chapter by Erneling has interesting remarks re classification - what Cartesian dualism (mind/body, subject/object, inside/outside, material/immaterial etc) and even those who opposed one or more dualism have maintained is grouping certain things together that may actually be differences in kind. See paper that treats beliefs and perceptions as so different that trying to deal with them together when thinking about mechanisms or cultural dimensions is actively counterproductive. Erneling also discusses model of 5 different types of "self" that each person has (is)
books  Questia  cognition  mind  philosophy_of_science  evo_psych  biocultural_evolution 
july 2013 by dunnettreader

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