dunnettreader + cognition-social   29

Nicolas Claidière and Dan Sperber - Imitation explains the propagation, not the stability of animal culture (2008) - Proceedings of the Royal Society B, Biological Sciences
For acquired behaviour to count as cultural, two conditions must be met: it must propagate in a social group, and it must remain stable across generations in the process of propagation. It is commonly assumed that imitation is the mechanism that explains both the spread of animal culture and its stability. We review the literature on transmission chain studies in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and other animals, and we use a formal model to argue that imitation, which may well play a major role in the propagation of animal culture, cannot be considered faithful enough to explain its stability. We consider the contribution that other psychological and ecological factors might make to the stability of animal culture observed in the wild. -- Keywords: imitation, cultural evolution, animal culture -- See addendum commentary "The natural selection of fidelity in social learning" in Commun Integr Biol, volume 3 (2010) -- Both downloaded to Tab S2
article  downloaded  imitation  cognitive_science  cognition-social  cultural_transmission  cultural_stability  social_learning  cultural_change  evolution-as-model  evolutionary_biology  evolution-social  evolution-group_selection  cultural_evolution  natural_selection  sociobiology  socialization  epistemology-social 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Nicolas Claidière and Dan Sperber - The natural selection of fidelity in social learning (2010) - Communicative and Integrative Biology
Follow-up to Royal Society article -- Social learning mechanisms are usually assumed to explain both the spread and the persistence of cultural behavior. In a recent article, we showed that the fidelity of social learning commonly found in transmission chain experiments is not high enough to explain cultural stability. Here we want to both enrich and qualify this conclusion by looking at the case of song transmission in song birds, which can be faithful to the point of being true replication. We argue that this high fidelity results from natural selection pressure on cognitive mechanisms. This observation strengthens our main argument. Social learning mechanisms are unlikely to be faithful enough to explain cultural stability because they are generally selected not for high fidelity but for generalization and adjustment to the individual’s needs, capacities and situation.
Key words: cultural evolution, bird song, imitation, memetic, social learning, transmission chain study
article  evolutionary_biology  evolution-social  social_learning  cultural_transmission  imitation  cultural_change  cultural_evolution  cultural_stability  tradition  cognitive_science  social_process  cognition-social  cognition 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Ilkka Pyysiainen - Religon: From mind to society and back (2012) | Academia.edu
Book chapter - Exploring the cognitive basis of the social sciences and trying to ground the social in the cognitive requires taking an explicit stance on reduction(ism) as discussed in philosophy of science. In social science and the humanities, the question of reductionism has been especially salient in the study of religion. This chapter begins with a philosophical analysis of reduction; after that, two relatively new research programs in the study of religious thought and behavior are discussed: the standard model of the cognitive science of religion and approaches based on gene-culture coevolutionary theories. Finally, the question of reductionism is addressed and the possibility of combining multilevel explanations of religious phenomena is evaluated. -- Downloaded to Tab S2
chapter  Academia.edu  downloaded  cognitive_science  religion  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  level_of_analysis  reductionism  religious_belief  religious_experience  neuroscience  cognition  cognition-social  gene-culture_coevolution  cultural_transmission  cultural_change  sociology_of_religion  naturalism  natural_selection  evolution-social  evolution-as-model  evolution-group_selection 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Philip Ball - Why story is used to explain symphonies and sport matches - Aeon
It’s a movie classic. The lovers are out for a walk when a villain dashes out of his house and starts fighting the man. The woman takes refuge in the house;…
neuroscience  evo_psych  narrative  complexity  causation  cognitive_bias  cognition  cognition-social  epistemology-naturalism  Instapaper  from instapaper
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Beatrice Kobow - How to Do Things with Fictions: Reconsidering Vaihinger for a Philosophy of Social Sciences (2013) | Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44: 201 via Cambridge Realist Workshop
The article reconstructs three key concepts of Hans Vaihinger: the idea of mental fictions as self-contradictory, provisory, conscious, and purposeful; the law of the devolution of ideas stating that an idea oscillates between dogma, hypothesis, or fiction; and the underlying assumption about human consciousness that the psyche constructs thoughts around perceptions like an oyster produces a pearl. In a second, constructive part, these concepts are applied in a discussion of John Searle’s social ontologically extended theory of speech acts. The article introduces the Vaihingerian as-if to Searle’s account of declarations. The explanatory work in a model of social reality as Searle has proposed it rests on the ability to show a necessary connection between collective and individual intentionality facilitated through linguistic structure. The methodological individualism of the model requires that motivational assumptions about collective structures be realized in individual brains. The as-if stance of the declarer provides just this connection. -- Keywords as-if, fiction, status function declarations, double direction of fit, deonticity, collective intentionality, speech act theory, social ontology, Vaihinger, Searle - downloaded to iPhone from http://www.csog.econ.cam.ac.uk/Cambridge-Realist-Workshop/realist-images/HowtoDoThingswithFictions.pdf/at_download/file
article  ontology-social  cognition-social  fiction-cognition  methodological_individualism  critical_realism  perception  downloaded  hypothesis  Searle  as-if  speech_acts  logic  sociology_of_knowledge  cognition  philosophy_of_social_science 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Raymond Boudon - Utilité ou Rationalité (2002) | Scribd
21 page article -- Explains why "rational choice" fails as explanatory theory in lots of collective action, public opinion, game theory, etc. -- domains where decisions to act aren't based exclusively on instrumental, consequentialist, cost-benefit calculative, and egoistic (directly concerned with impact on self) forms of, and context for, reasoning. Boudon finds "rational choice" superior to hand-wavy explanations that are speculative "black boxes" -- e.g. (1) sociobiology or evo-devo that we're hardwired, (2) Kahneman and Tversky heuristics and biases -- fascinating observations but aren't explanatory, (3) social/cultural explanations such as "socialization" which are tautological or a black box that provide no mechanisms that can differentiate situations or variations in outcomes. E.g. in Roman Empire peasants were more likely to remain pagan and soldiers were more likely to be attracted to the new religion. "Socialization" doesn't explain why soldiers raised in the traditional religious milieu and belief system were more likely to change their beliefs. Great examples of how rationality includes cognitive processes dealing with (1) non-instrumental contexts - e.g. identification with communitarian concerns ranging from voting to immigration policies, (2) aligning actions with one's judgment of what's more likely "true" based on core beliefs and how one has learned to evaluate "evidence" [e.g. Swedes are even more likely to reject "lump of labor" than Americans!] (3) axiological reasoning, including norms of fairness that may be fairly universal (e.g. reaction to Antigone, ultimatum game) or specific to a culture (e.g. due process in political application of "rule of law") -- see article for his tripartite classification of rationality and types of cognition that "rational choice" rejects in its definition. He thinks Weber and Adam Smith got there before, and better than, Becker.
article  Scribd  social_theory  mechanisms-social_theory  evolutionary_biology  evo_psych  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  rationality  reasons  Weber  Smith  Becker_Gary  Simon_Herbert  fairness  community  identity  norms  epistemology-social  game_theory  altruism  cognitive_bias  cognition  cognition-social  democracy  citizens  voting  political_participation  collective_action  political_culture  public_choice  public_opinion  common_good  socialization  social_psychology  cost-benefit  self-interest  self-interest-cultural_basis  self-and-other  EF-add 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Piet Strydom - Discourse and Knowledge: The Making of Enlightenment Sociology, Liverpool University Press, 2000. | -00 Academia.edu
This book offers an original interpretation of the rise of sociology from a contemporary point of view that is both theoretically and historically informed. Rather than assuming the ‘dual revolution’ as watershed, it goes back behind the French Revolution and the industrial revolution in order to start from the more pervasive communication revolution. The central theme of the book is the currently topical one of the role played by discourse in the construction of knowledge. It is substantively developed through an investigation of a neglected period in the history of sociology. By closely analysing the contributions of such theorists as More, Hobbes, Vico, Montesquieu, Ferguson and Millar to the emergence of sociology in its original form, the argument follows the discursive construction of sociology in the context of the society-wide early modern practical discourse about violence and rights – what is here called the rights discourse. Parallels with the nineteenth- and twentieth-century discourse about poverty and justice and the contemporary discourse about risk and responsibility allow the author to reflect not only on the generation of knowledge through discourse, but also on the role that sociology itself plays in this process. The argument draws on the latest epistemological, theoretical and methodological advances. Constructivism is explored, Habermas and Foucault are creatively synthesised to arrive at a new formulation of the theory of discourse, and a finely elaborated frame and discourse analysis is applied – thus making a substantial contribution to the currently emerging cognitive sociology. The contemporary relevance of the analysis lies in its linking of early sociology’s critique of modern society to the need under current conditions of an open history, contingency and uncertainty for cultivating a culture of contradictions and a participatory politics of conflict, contestation and compromise. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  Europe-Early_Modern  sociology  discourse  discourse-political_theory  discourse_ethics  cognition-social  public_sphere  violence  rights-legal  rights-political  sociology_of_knowledge  cultural_critique  Hobbes  Montesquieu  Scottish_Enlightenment  civil_society  civility-political  politeness  commerce-doux  conflict  political_participation  political_discourse  constructivism  Habermas  Foucault  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  downloaded 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Piet Strydom - Inferential Dialectics: On Dialectical Reasoning in Critical Social Science and the Sociocultural World, (2015) | Academia.edu
Unpublished preliminary study for "Towards a New Cognitive Social Science" (book in progress) -- In this paper, I take as my starting point Norman Fairclough’s treatment of critical social analysis as a form of dialectical reasoning. While generally concurring with this equivalency despite a host of smaller disagreements on which I do not dwell, I venture to fill in a largely blank space in his argument by focusing on the internal workings of dialectical reasoning. The reference point for the core of my argument is the fact that Fairclough regards critical social analysis as based on epistemological dialectics which forms part of a larger set of relations, yet passes over the explication of the place and role of this basic form of dialectics in this constellation in favour of focusing on its practical dialectical nature. The point is, however, that an adequate grasp of practical dialectics requires the simultaneous consideration of the principal operative features of epistemological dialectics, not just in critical social analysis but more basically still also in social life itself. My proposal is that this could be done by introducing the inferential stance in order to consider what I call the dialectics of inference or inferential dialectics. This perspective forms part of a broader cognitive sociological approach that focuses on the cognitive processes – of which discourse is but one – on which the construction and structuring of society depend and which pervade the latter’s every fibre. -- Key words: Abduction, Badiou, Brandom, cognitive sociology, critical realism, critical social analysis, Critical Theory, deduction, dialectics, Fairclough, Hegel, induction, inference, Peirce, reasoning, social theory -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  social_theory  sociology_of_knowledge  cognition-social  constructivism  logic  logic-Peirce  deduction  abduction  inference  logic-Hegelian  dialectic  Brandom  critical_theory  critical_realism  pragmatism  induction  downloaded 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Piet Strydom - ‘The Cognitive and Metacognitive Dimensions of Social and Political Theory’, in Routledge International Handbook of Social and Political Theory (2011) | Piet Strydom - Academia.edu
‘The Cognitive and Metacognitive Dimensions of Social and Political Theory’, in Gerard Delanty and Stephen Turner (eds) Routledge International Handbook of Social and Political Theory. London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 328-38. -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  social_theory  political_philosophy  cognition  cognition-social  downloaded 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Kim Sterelny - From hominins to humans: how sapiens became behaviourally modern | Royal Society - Issue Theme " Human Niche Construction " - Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 27 March 2011, vol. 366, no. 1566, 809-822
Philosophy Program and Tempo and Mode, Australian National University and Philosophy Program, Victoria University of Wellington -- This paper contributes to a debate in the palaeoarchaeological community about the major time-lag between the origin of anatomically modern humans and the appearance of typically human cultural behaviour. Why did humans take so long—at least 100,000 years—to become ‘behaviourally modern’? The transition is often explained as a change in the intrinsic cognitive competence of modern humans: often in terms of a new capacity for symbolic thought, or the final perfection of language. These cognitive breakthrough models are not satisfactory, for they fail to explain the uneven palaeoanthropological record of human competence. Many supposed signature capacities appear (and then disappear) before the supposed cognitive breakthrough; many of the signature capacities disappear again after the breakthrough. So, instead of seeing behavioural modernity as a simple reflection of a new kind of mind, this paper presents a niche construction conceptual model of behavioural modernity. Humans became behaviourally modern when they could reliably transmit accumulated informational capital to the next generation, and transmit it with sufficient precision for innovations to be preserved and accumulated. In turn, the reliable accumulation of culture depends on the construction of learning environments, not just intrinsic cognitive machinery. I argue that the model is (i) evolutionarily plausible: the elements of the model can be assembled incrementally, without implausible selective scenarios; (ii) the model coheres with the broad palaeoarchaeological record; (iii) the model is anthropologically and ethnographically plausible; and (iv) the model is testable, though only in coarse, preliminary ways. - Keywords : niche construction, behavioural modernity, hominins -- doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0301 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  sociobiology  anthropology  paleontology  prehistoric  evolution  evolution-social  evolutionary_biology  genetics  gene-culture_coevolution  niche_construction  brain  social_process  cultural_change  learning  cognition  cognition-social  cultural_transmission  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Pei Wang - A General Theory of Intelligence [an e-book under development] | Home
This eBook is an attempt to establish a theory that identifies the commonality within various forms intelligence, including human intelligence, computer intelligence, animal intelligence, alien intelligence, group intelligence, etc. -- NARS (Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System) - Most of the existing AI inference works with semi-axiomatic systems, which attempt to make partial extension or revision of mathematical logic, while keeping the other parts. What AI really needs are non-axiomatic systems, which do not assume the sufficiency of knowledge and resources in any aspect of the system. NARS is a concrete example of non-axiomatic system which uses a formal language "Narsese" to represent goals, actions, and beliefs.The basic unit of the language is term, which can be thought of as the name or label of a concept in the system. (..) The meaning of a term is determined by its extension and intension, which are the collection of the inheritance relations between this term and other terms, obtained from the experience of the system. NARS includes three variants of the inheritance relation: similarity (symmetric inheritance), implication (derivability), and equivalence (symmetric implication). (..)The meaning of a compound term is partially determined by its logical relations with its components, and partially by the system's experience on the compound term as a whole. Event is a special type of statement that have a time-dependent truth-value. Operation is a special type of event that can occur by the system's decision. Goal is a special type of event, that the system is attempting to realize, by carrying out certain operations. Beside goals to be achieved, NARS can accept tasks that are knowledge to be absorbed and questions to be answered. (..)If a event is judged to imply the achieving of a goal, then the desirability of the event is increased, and the system will also evaluate its plausibility(..). When an event is both desirable and plausible, the system will make the decision to turn the event into a goal to be actually pursued. The basic function of inference rules in NARS is to derive new beliefs from current beliefs.
etexts  books  intelligence  artificial_intelligence  mind  systems-complex_adaptive  systems-reflexive  systems_theory  epistemology-social  cognition  cognition-social  agent-based_models  logic  inference  decision_theory  rationality  rationality-bounded  learning  website  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard - Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology, Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2 (8): 105-120 (2013).
University of Edinburgh -- Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology -- The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and methodology of the former. We are rather suspicious of this apparent tension, which we believe can be significantly mitigated by paying attention to certain recent advances within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Accordingly, we attempt to explain how extended knowledge, the result of combining active externalism from contemporary philosophy of mind with contemporary epistemology, can offer an alternative conception of the future of social epistemology.
analytical_philosophy  social_theory  epistemology  epistemology-social  philosophy_of_language  mind  mind-body  cognition  cognition-social  neuroscience  mind-external  bibliography  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  philosophy_of_science  psychology  social_psychology  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Collin Finn - Two Kinds of Social Epistemology « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 79-104. (2013)
Steve Fuller’s programme of Social Epistemology was initiated some 25 years ago with the launching of a journal and the publication of a monograph with those very words as their title. Since then, the programme has evolved in a constant critical dialogue with other players in the fields of epistemology and science studies. Fuller’s main confrontation has been with analytic epistemology which, in its classical form, adopts a contrary position on most key issues. However, analytic epistemologists have gradually moved in the direction of Fuller’s views and even adopted the term “social epistemology” for their emerging position. Still, substantial disagreement remains between the two identically named programmes with regard to the proper philosophical approach to knowledge as a social phenomenon; in this article, I try to pinpoint the locus of this disagreement. However, Fuller has also been engaged in minor skirmishes with his Science Studies fellows; I also examine these clashes. Finally, I express my wishes concerning the future direction of social epistemology. -- downloaded pdf to Note
epistemology  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  history_of_science  scientific_method  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_language  social_theory  downloaded  EF-add  cognition  cognition-social  institutions  power  power-knowledge  knowledge  knowledge_economy  power-asymmetric  Rawls  democracy  expertise  epistemology-naturalism  human_nature  posthumanism  post-truth  Latour  humanities  humanism  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  political_culture  cultural_capital  social_capital  neoliberalism  instrumentalist 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Chris D. Frith and Tania Singer - The Role of Social Cognition in Decision Making | JSTOR: Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol. 363, No. 1511 (Dec. 12, 2008), pp. 3875-3886
Successful decision making in a social setting depends on our ability to understand the intentions, emotions and beliefs of others. The mirror system allows us to understand other people's motor actions and action intentions. 'Empathy' allows us to understand and share emotions and sensations with others. 'Theory of mind' allows us to understand more abstract concepts such as beliefs or wishes in others. In all these cases, evidence has accumulated that we use the specific neural networks engaged in processing mental states in ourselves to understand the same mental states in others. However, the magnitude of the brain activity in these shared networks is modulated by contextual appraisal of the situation or the other person. An important feature of decision making in a social setting concerns the interaction of reason and emotion. We consider four domains where such interactions occur: our sense of fairness, altruistic punishment, trust and framing effects. In these cases, social motivations and emotions compete with each other, while higher-level control processes modulate the interactions of these low-level biases. -- didn't download -- large references list
article  jstor  social_theory  cognition-social  decision_theory  altruism  fairness  trust  framing_effects  emotions  neuroscience  mind-theory_of  empathy  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Eduardo Fernández-Huerga - The Economic Behavior of Human Beings: The Institutional/Post-Keynesian Model | JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep., 2008), pp. 709-726
This paper attempts to present the basic features that would define a model of behavior suited to an institutional and post-Keynesian approach. To facilitate explanation, human behavior is divided into three phases: motivation, cognition and reasoning and decision-making. Motivation appears as a process directed toward the satisfaction of a complex structure of various needs and wants. The role of emotions and the social and cognitive aspects of motivation are recognized. Moreover, it is also recognized that human beings have limited cognitive and rational capacities, and it is accepted that they are potentially creative. Partly as a consequence of that, cognition becomes a social act and knowledge of reality is subject to fundamental uncertainty. Finally, human rationality (or intelligence) is associated with a search for good solutions, and it includes elements of procedural rationality, creativity and emotional rationality. The role of habits and institutions in all these phases is stressed. -- good references -- didn't download
article  jstor  social_theory  economic_theory  economic_sociology  institutional_economics  Post-Keynesian  behavioral_economics  cognition-social  rationality-economics  creativity  uncertainty  motivation  decision_theory  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Ruth Leyes - “Both of Us Disgusted in My Insula”: Mirror Neuron Theory and Emotional Empathy | nonsite.org March 2012
Attacks mirror neuron experiments and conclusions - ... the presuppositions of Wicker and his team can be traced most directly to the work of the American psychologist Silvan S. Tomkins, and especially to that of his follower, Paul Ekman, both of whom have proposed an evolutionary-classificatory approach to the affects. Key features of their approach include the claim that there exists a small number of basic emotions, such as disgust, which can be defined in evolutionary terms as universal or pancultural, adaptive responses of the organism; that these emotions are discrete, innate, reflex-like “affect programs” located in subcortical parts of the brain; that the basic emotions manifest themselves in distinct patterns of physiological arousal and especially in characteristic facial expressions; that according to Ekman’s “neurocultural” model for explaining commonalities and variations in human facial displays, socialization and learning may determine the range of stimuli that can “trigger” the emotions and... “display rules,” ...and that the more complex or “higher” emotions are made up of blends of the basic emotions. A further claim associated with the Basic Emotions View, ..., is that although the emotions can and do combine with the cognitive systems in the brain, they are essentially separate processes. For Freud and the “appraisal theorists” such as Richard Lazarus, Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum, Phoebe Ellsworth and others, emotions are embodied intentional states that are directed toward objects and depend on our beliefs and desires. But the Basic Emotion View denies this by interpreting the affects as non-intentional responses. It thus posits a constitutive disjunction between our emotions on the one hand and our knowledge of what causes and maintains them on the other, because feeling and cognition are two separate systems.
article  neuroscience  cognition  evolutionary_biology  cognition-social  epistemology-social  empathy  emotions  Smith  Nussbaum  bibliography  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Amazon.com: Herbert Gintis' review of Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking - Feb 2014
Great review on 3 types of cognition, of which only 1(me-thinking) shared with great apes. Gintis recasts Searle's collective intentionality, which deals with collaboration, using Timasello's version of social epistemology, ability to deal with other minds in a social network of shared representation.
books  reviews  kindle-available  amazon.com  biology  cognition  cognition-social  epistemology-social  mind  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Ian Ravenscroft, review - Alvin I. Goldman, Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // March 2014
The title Joint Ventures alludes to Goldman's view that understanding cognition requires both scientific and philosophical expertise. "It would be", he notes, "intellectually irresponsible to ignore the huge swaths of evidence and theory that science has generated" (p. 3). Nevertheless, there is "ample place for philosophers to make theoretical contributions, to argue for this or that theoretical interpretation as the best explanation of the data" (p. 3). Cognitive science is thus a joint venture between philosophy and the behavioral sciences (p. 2). The rich and fascinating essays in this collection are testimony to Goldman's vision. The volume focuses on four themes to which he has made important contributions: simulation theory, empathy, embodied cognition, and the metaphysics of action. I will focus on the first three themes because they are striking examples of the "joint ventures" program.
books  reviews  epistemology  cognition  cognition-social  mind  mind-body  neuroscience  action-theory  empathy  philosophy_of_science  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Eric D. Beinhocker : Reflexivity, complexity, and the nature of social science - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 - Taylor & Francis Online
pages 330-342 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- In 1987, George Soros introduced his concepts of reflexivity and fallibility and has further developed and applied these concepts over subsequent decades. This paper attempts to build on Soros's framework, provide his concepts with a more precise definition, and put them in the context of recent thinking on complex adaptive systems. The paper proposes that systems can be classified along a ‘spectrum of complexity’ and that under specific conditions not only social systems but also natural and artificial systems can be considered ‘complex reflexive.’ The epistemological challenges associated with scientifically understanding a phenomenon stem not from whether its domain is social, natural, or artificial, but where it falls along this spectrum. Reflexive systems present particular challenges; however, evolutionary model-dependent realism provides a bridge between Soros and Popper and a potential path forward for economics.
article  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  epistemology  methodology  complexity  Soros  reflexivity  intentionality  evolution-as-model  Popper  scientific_method  downloaded  EF-add  systems-complex_adaptive  systems-reflexive  systems_theory  economic_theory  economic_models  EMH  rationality-economics  rational_expectations  information-markets  cognition  cognition-social  falsification  neuroscience  uncertainty  laws_of_nature  covering_laws  causation  explanation  prediction 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Contents | Yi-Cheng Zhang - The Structure of Information Economy [book chapter drafts]
TOC and links to chapter drafts. Zhang is at Fribourg, a physicist who uses Soros reflexivity insights as part of top level Darwinian inflected theory of NESS - non-equilibrium social sciences.
books  philosophy_of_social_science  economic_theory  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  Soros  reflexivity  information-markets  information-asymmetric  cognition  cognition-social  fallibility  Innovation  marketing  networks-social  supply_chains  equilibrium  networks-information  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Yi-Cheng Zhang :: Broader scopes of the reflexivity principle in the economy - Journal of Economic Methodology [Soros special issue] - Volume 20, Issue 4 -Taylor & Francis Online
pages 446-453 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The reflexivity principle of George Soros – that man's fallible understanding can have reflexivity impacts that shape reality – challenges mainstream economics in a fundamental way. This essay will outline a research program that corroborates the reflexivity principle and extends it to broader economic issues. We shall often use examples of consumer and finance markets, but the implications go beyond these examples. The following eight sections build up our main thesis that reflexivity plays an essential role in understanding the economy. -- see bookmark for his draft book on information economy (Oxford 2014 or 2015) and the project he leads on NESS non-equilibrium social sciences
article  philosophy_of_social_science  economic_theory  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  Soros  reflexivity  information-markets  information-asymmetric  cognition  cognition-social  fallibility  Innovation  marketing  networks-social  supply_chains  equilibrium  networks-information  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
The Paradox of Automatic Planning [FIERY CUSHMAN:] HeadCon '13 What's new in social science: Part III | Edge.org
Neurosciences at Brown - some interesting stuff about stimulus-response and basal ganglia that can control both motor response and seems to interact with working memory for goal oriented action -- but where he thinks research is going is the pretty obvious bio-cultural synthesis. Scary that brain researchers on cognition that are hooked with artificial intelligence modeling seem to ignore the humanities perspectives -- quote -- In the literature right now there's a debate between two rival theories for what makes humans unique. One theory calls itself the "cognitive niche" and it basically says what makes us unique is that we can think very, very carefully and hard about things in a controlled way. Another hypothesis calls itself the "cultural niche", and it says, no, what makes us unique is that we get for free the answers to problems culturally. Other people have worked it out through trial and error and they tell us.

What I find really exciting is the idea that it's not just that both of those things are true but that they're codependent. That in principle you could not make the mathematics of controlled cognition work, you couldn't solve the computational intractability without the support of cultural input, and that cultural knowledge wouldn't be much good if you couldn't flexibly reassemble it in the way that hierarchical representations allow you to.
neuroscience  cognition  cognition-social  evolutionary_biology  evolution  evolution-social  human_nature  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Aaron Beim: The Cognitive Aspects of Collective Memory | Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 7-26
The Cognitive Aspects of Collective Memory
Aaron Beim
Symbolic Interaction
Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2007) (pp. 7-26)
Downloaded pdf to Note

While these conceptions [from research to date] provide powerful frameworks for thinking about group remembrance, they describe exclusively institutional manifestations of collective memory. There are two characteristics of current collective memory research that account for this phenomenon. First, collective memory researchers assume that collective memory is collective only if it is institutionalized; they argue implicitly that collective memory is discernible only in institutionalized objects. Second, collective memory analyses conflate the production of the object and its reception. Objects are analyzed both in terms of their development as cultural objects (Griswold 1986) and in terms of their representativeness of the memory of a given population.

While these conceptions of collective memory are insightful, they preclude the analysis of both collective memory sui generis and the mechanisms of collective memory’s production and reception. I contend that we can undertake these types of analysis by including the cognitive processes that produce schemata that define the past.
article  jstor  social_theory  social_psychology  cognition  collective_memory  lit_survey  bibliography  methodology  institutionalization  sociology-process  symbolic_interaction  culture  cognition-social  cultural_objects  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
Gary Alan Fine and Aaron Beim - Intro to issue: Interactionist Approaches to Collective Memory | Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 1-5
Introduction: Interactionist Approaches to Collective Memory Gary Alan Fine and Aaron Beim Symbolic Interaction Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2007) (pp. 1-5) Downloaded pdf to Note [M]uch of the analytic value in the concept of collective memory is found in its reification.A reified notion of the group mind allows us to analyze patterns of social thought that adhere at a level of social life that transcends the individual, just as long as such a strategy does not neglect the individuals and groups that are conse- quential in establishing memory through reputation work. Although a substantive focus that reifies memory flattens out individual or even group-level behavior, it can reveal behavior patterns that affect individuals and groups even in the absence of their intentions. Ultimately, collective memory is produced through symbolic interaction. Even if collective memory is treated as a reified concept, interactionism is a necessary para- digm for examining how that objectification operates. The articles in this special issue isolate mechanisms of that process.
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november 2013 by dunnettreader

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