dunnettreader + capital   74

Ravi Kanbur, Joseph Stiglitz - Wealth and income distribution: New theories needed for a new era | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 18 August 2015
Growth theories traditionally focus on the Kaldor-Kuznets stylised facts. Ravi Kanbur and Nobelist Joe Stiglitz argue that these no longer hold; new theory is needed. The new models need to drop competitive marginal productivity theories of factor returns in favour of rent-generating mechanism and wealth inequality by focusing on the ‘rules of the game.’ They also must model interactions among physical, financial, and human capital that influence the level and evolution of inequality. A third key component will be to capture mechanisms that transmit inequality from generation to generation. -- short and sweet summary of the various gaps in standard models and where both new explanatory and normative work needed -- also see references -- downloaded as pdf to Note
paper  economic_growth  economic_theory  economic_models  capital  productivity-labor_share  production  macroeconomics  distribution-wealth  distribution-income  inequality  inequality-wealth  labor_share  wages  inequality-opportunity  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Frank Hahn - Some Adjustment Problems | JSTOR - Econometrica, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 1970), pp. 1-17
Some Adjustment Problems, F. H. Hahn, Econometrica, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 1970), pp. 1-17 -- This paper first takes a rather pessimistic look at what has been accomplished in recent years in understanding the "price mechanism." It then takes up two points in some detail. First, it is shown that stationary expectations do not ensure the convergence of all equilibrium paths on to a steady state in a neoclassical model with heterogeneous capital goods (an appendix works an example). Secondly, a tatonnement process is outlined and discussed for an economy with constant returns to scale. -- via Lars Syll -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_theory  prices  equilibrium  capital  investment  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Toby Nangle - Labour power sets the neutral real rate | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 09 May 2015
The recent remarkably low interest rates have puzzled economists. The standard explanation rests on the extraordinary manoeuvres of the world’s largest central banks. This column argues, however, that it is due to economic developments, specifically globalisation and the collapse in labour power in the west. -- downloaded page as pdf to Note
macroeconomics  global_economy  globalization  labor_share  Labor_markets  inequality-global  inequality  OECD_economies  interest_rates  asset_prices  investment  capital  stagnation  central_banks  capital_markets  China-economy  off-shoring  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Piketty Interview - Potemkin Review - 2015
(Deutsch ) Photo: Potemkin Review Potemkin Review met with Thomas Piketty at his Paris office and talked to him about his book Capital in the 21st Century ,… The more interesting sections deal with critique from the left, and his use of wealth in lieu of classic definitions of capital -- most critiques are answered with "I don't believe in the neoclassical framework that I used to illustrate the problem, but it's the only way that most trained economists can be communicated with -- I see myself as more of an historian and sociologist"
economic_theory  macroeconomics  economic_sociology  social_theory  economic_history  inequality  capital  capitalism  1-percent  Piketty  Instapaper  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Richard Cantillon, An Essay on Economic Theory, Chantal Saucier, trans., Mark Thornton, ed. (2010) Books | Mises Institute
Mark Thornton and Chantal Saucier have accomplished the arduous task of bringing forth a new and improved translation of Cantillon’s famous work. Heretofore the only English translation of the Essai available has been the 1931 edition produced by Henry Higgs for the Royal Economic Society. Though competent, it has become less serviceable over time, as more and more of its shortcomings devolved (not the least of which is the antiquated use of “undertaker” in place of “entrepreneur”). Saucier provides a more accurate and lucid account, better suited to the 21st century. Thornton’s hand shows not only in competent guidance of the translator but in the inclusion of numerous explanatory footnotes that add historical context. Robert F. Hébert writes the foreword. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  intellectual_history  18thC  France  Cantillon  political_economy  economic_theory  value-theories  systems_theory  business_cycles  financial_system  interest_rates  FX  capital_flows  banking  profit  risk  entrepreneurs  agriculture  demography  natural_resources  labor  capital  money  money_supply  money_market  mercantilism  trade-policy  trade-theory  downloaded 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Chuck Marr and Chye-Ching Huang - Obama’s Capital Gains Tax Proposals Would Make Tax Code More Efficient and Fair | Center on Budget and Policy Priorities -Jan 2015
The tax code strongly favors income from capital gains — increases in the value of assets, such as stocks — over income from wages and salaries. These preferences are economically inefficient: they promote tax schemes that convert ordinary income into capital gains and encourage people to hold assets just to escape tax, even if they have better investment opportunities. They are also highly regressive, since capital gains are heavily concentrated at the top of the income scale. The President has proposed to make the tax code more efficient and equitable by reducing one of the biggest subsidies for capital gains (a preferential rate compared to wage and salary income) and largely eliminating another (the ability to avoid capital gains tax completely by holding on to an asset until death). These changes would allow investments to flow to where they are most productive and reduce investment in creating tax avoidance schemes instead of in real economic activity, among other economic benefits. And, because the benefits of the current preferences for capital gains flow overwhelmingly to the top, fully 99 percent of the revenue from the President’s capital gains proposals would come from the top 1 percent of filers, the Treasury Department estimates. -- 7 page report downloaded as pdf to Note
US_economy  US_politics  Obama_administration  taxes  tax_policy  tax_reform  capital  investment  1-percent  inheritance  tax_collection  public_finance  public_policy  trickle-down  incentives  incentives-distortions  distribution-wealth  distribution-income  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Mike Konczal - The 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Did Nothing to Help the Real Economy | Next New Deal January 2015
Pre Obama proposal to reverse part of Bush tax cuts - Berkeley economist Danny Yagan’s fantastic new paper, “Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut” -- He uses a large amount of IRS data on corporate tax returns to compare S-corporations with C-corporations. C-corps are publicly-traded, S-corps are closely held without institutional investors. But they are largely comparable in the range Yagan looks at (between $1 million and $1 billion dollars in size), as they are competing in the same industries and locations. -- S-corps don’t pay a dividend tax and thus didn’t benefit from the big 2003 dividend tax cut, while C-corps do pay them and did benefit. So that allows Yagan to set up S-corps as a control group and see what the effect of the massive dividend tax cut on C-corporations has been. -- [Yagan finds no difference in things we want to encourage] -- The one thing that does increase for C-corps of course, is the disgorgement of cash to shareholders -- an increase in dividends and share buybacks. This shows that these corps are responding to the tax cut; they just happen to be decisions that benefit, well, probably not you. If right now you are worried that too much cash is leaving firms to benefit a handful of investors while the real economy stagnates, suddenly Clinton-era levels of dividend taxation don’t look so bad. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  US_economy  US_politics  21stC  taxes  corporate_finance  corporate_tax  capital  dividends  investment  shareholders  investors  GOP  shareholder_value  tax_policy  tax_reform  supply-side  trickle-down  Obama_administration  Bush_administration  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  1-percent  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Lorena S. Walsh, review - Nuala Zahedieh, The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700 (2010) | EH.net Review - Feb 2011
Zahedieh finds increasing concentration of plantation commerce among large merchants specializing in particular commodities and regions in the 1680s, when falling commodity prices and increased taxes eroded profit margins and drove out small traders. Colonial merchants seldom invested in overseas property, but made a massive contribution to expansion of empire in the form of short-term credit extended to settlers. The larger operators accumulated enough capital to diversify investment into shipbuilding, slave-trading, joint-stocks, insurance, wharves, industry, landed property, loans, and public credit. This decade was a turning point, as merchant concentration and specialization led to improved productivity, economies of scale, and reduced costs. (..) attempts of the later Stuarts to corner the profits of empire by restricting free trade among Englishmen as having limited success. (..) she sees the effect of the Glorious Revolution, not as leading to an economically optimal political arrangement, but as consolidating the capacity of the transatlantic trading elite to enforce regulation in its own interests and enhance the value and scale of rent-seeking enterprises at the expense of competition and efficiency, leading to a period of slower growth in colonial trade and shipping at the end of the century. Unlike trade with Europe, colonial commerce required an unusually large fixed capital investment in the greater tonnage needed to transport large volumes of bulky goods over long distances. (..) English- and plantation-built ships were better suited to most colonial commerce than were Dutch (..) it was long-distance commerce, rather than the protection of the Navigation Acts, that revived the English shipbuilding industry. By 1700 plantation shipping accounted for 40% of London's overseas trading capacity. (..) increased education among mariners (..) managerial skills, (..) navigational instruments. (..) London's prosperity by stimulating the construction of wharfs and warehouses, (.) naval refitting, repair, and provisioning trades. Although technology and unit input costs were fairly stable across the period, increased volumes and growing experience with colonial conditions led to organizational improvements which made more efficient use of inputs. - page encoding a mess on Note - try to save page or copy to EF in Air
books  bookshelf  reviews  17thC  economic_history  British_history  British_Empire  London  colonialism  North-Weingast  American_colonies  West_Indies  trade  trade-policy  shipping  Navigation_Acts  1680s  1690s  entrepôts  economic_growth  economic_culture  Charles_II  James_II  Atlantic  capital  investment  trade_finance  Dutch  education-training  Glorious_Revolution  Whigs  Whig_Junto  City_politics  infrastructure  ports  technology  navigation  interlopers  regulatory_capture  commodities  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic: Can Black Death explain the Industrial Revolution? | globalinequality - Jan 11 2015
re presentation by a young scholar at Santa Fe suggesting that Why England (and Dutch) due to higher wages in Northern Europe post Black Death in contrast with South where non market repression or property arrangements were able to push adjustment costs inti agricultural workers without impact on wage rates. Milanovic compares with other theoretical approaches ie Pomerantz, Acemoglu & Robinson, Robert Allen etc. Link to 2007 paper by Pamuk Milanovic thinks may be 1st work to seriously look at differential impact of Black Death on northern & southern Europe as distinct from the common story if Western vs Central and Eastern Europe.
economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  Black_Death  North-Weingast  landowners  demography  economic_sociology  labor  agriculture  wages  productivity  colonialism  medieval  14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  institutional_economics  capital  capitalism  China  Japan  ancient_Rome  slavery  bibliography 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Krugmam blog - Recent History in One Chart (Branko Milanovic global inequality trends) | NYTimes.com Jan 2015
A number of people have been putting up candidates for chart of the year. For me, the big chart of 2014 wasn’t actually from 2014 — it was from earlier work (pdf) by Branko Milanovic, which I somehow didn’t see until a few months ago. It shows income growth since 1988 by percentiles of the world income distribution (as opposed to national distributions): {chart} What you see is the surge by the global elite (the top 0.1, 0.01, etc. would be doing even better than his top 1), plus the dramatic rise of many but not all people in emerging markets. In between is what Branko suggests corresponds to the US lower-middle class, but what I’d say corresponds to advanced-country working classes in general, at least if you add post-2008 data with the effects of austerity. I’d call it the valley of despond, and I think it’s going to be a crucial factor in developments over the next few years.
economic_history  post-Cold_War  globalization  20thC  21stC  economic_growth  inequality  labor  wages  middle_class  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  LDCs  capital  profit  plutocracy  China  India  political_economy  poverty  stagnation  downloaded 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Eric Rauchway, review - Martin Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks (2014) | TLS Jan 2015
... his analysis, which holds that we knew how to avoid, counter and cure these troubles; we have simply – largely out of wilful ignorance and lack of courage – failed to do more than the barest minimum of what was necessary. Governments, banks and international institutions did “just enough, almost too late” to prevent the worst possible result, which would have been a note-for-note replay of the 1930s including a slide into fascism and world war. But having done no more than avoid world-historic catastrophe, we find ourselves mired in a dim morass of our own making, with no sunlit uplands in sight. Wolf offers a persuasive account that is also clear, though he relies on no single factor but several: hence the title of the book. It took both long-term shifts and a series of shocks to cause a crisis of such magnitude. Our world was born in the end of the Cold War. With capitalism triumphant, the victors liberalized their economies and so did the Communist nations, particularly China. Yet all was not well in this brave new world; international finance and trade threatened the stability of smaller, emerging economies, as the crises of the 1990s demonstrated.
financialization  bad_history  shadow  banking  Pocket  risk  global  economy  money  markets  global_imbalance  keynesian  business_influence  bad_economics  books  financial_regulation  liquidity  deregulation  minsky  investment  economic_growth  reviews  fed  Bank_of_England  great_recession  us_politics  leverage  capital_flows  race-to-the-bottom  business  ethics  political_economy  ecb  rents  uk  central_banks  investors  financial  crisis  financial_system  austerity  capital  economic_theory  us_economy  eurozone 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
The Impact of Financial Market Volatility on Emerging Market Economies - Sangyup Choi PhD advisee of Roger Farmer
To understand why an increase in the VIX has a much larger impact on output fluctuations in emerging market economies than on the U.S. economy, I build a small open economy model with credit market imperfections. The model incorporates a portfolio decision by international investors and an increase in the VIX makes these investors withdraw their funds from emerging markets. In Sam’s theory, VIX shocks, in a world of integrated capital markets, cause investors to pull their money from emerging markets. Because emerging market economies have poorly developed credit markets, the sudden outflow of cash causes domestic firms to cut back on production and lay off workers.
uncertainty  global  governance  economic_theory  capital  markets  us_economy  financial_system  economy  emerging  Pocket 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Bichler, Shimshon and Nitzan, Jonathan - Differential Accumulation (Reprint) | bnarchives
Dissident Voice. 28 December 2011. pp. 1-13. (Magazine Article; English). -- This is the latest version of this eprint. -- Early in 2011, we received a surprising invitation from the Financial Times Lexicon. A reader had suggested that an entry on differential accumulation be added to the Lexicon, and the online content developer asked us if we would be willing to write it. Our first thought was that this must have been a mistake. . . . Keywords: capital, capitalization, differential accumulation, finance, investment, modes of power, sabotage -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  capital_as_power  capital  capitalism  capitalization  accumulation  accumulation-differential  financial_system  finance_capital  financialization  investment  power  power-asymmetric  sabotage-by_business  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Nitzan - Global Capital: Political Economy of Capitalist Power (YorkU, Graduate Seminar, Fall Term, 2014-15) | bnarchives
The seminar has two related goals: substantive and pedagogical. The substantive purpose is to tackle the question of capital head on. The course explores a spectrum of liberal and Marxist theories, ideologies and dogmas – as well as a radical alternative to these views. The argument is developed theoretically, historically and empirically. The first part of the seminar provides a critical overview of political economy, examining its historical emergence, triumph and eventual demise. The second part deals with the two ‘materialistic’ schools of capital – the liberal theory of utility and the Marxist theory of labour time – dissecting their structure, strengths and limitations. The third part brings power back in: it analyses the relation between accumulation and sabotage, studies the institutions of the corporation and the state and introduces a new framework – the capitalist mode of power. The final part offers an alternative approach – the theory of capital as power – and illustrates how this approach can shed light on conflict-ridden processes such as corporate merger, stagflation, imperialism and Middle East wars. Pedagogically, the seminar seeks to prepare students toward conducting their own independent re-search. Students are introduced to various electronic data sources, instructed in different methods of analysis and tutored in developing their empirical research skills. As the seminar progresses, these skills are used both to assess various theories and to develop the students’ own theoretical/empirical research projects. -- Keywords: arms accumulation capital capitalism conflict corporation crisis distribution elite energy finance globalization growth imperialism GPE liberalism Marxism military Mumford national interest neoclassical neoliberalism oil ownership peace power profit ruling class security stagflation state stock market technology TNC Veblen violence war -- syllabus and session handouts downloaded pdf to Note
bibliography  syllabus  capital_as_power  international_political_economy  political_economy  economic_theory  liberalism  neoliberalism  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  capital  capitalism  social_theory  power-asymmetric  globalization  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  international_finance  finance_capital  financialization  production  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  inequality  MNCs  corporations  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  corporate_control_markets  economic_growth  economic_models  imperialism  military  military-industrial_complex  IR_theory  ruling_class  class_conflict  energy  energy-markets  MENA  accumulation  accumulation-differential  capital_markets  public_finance  profit  investment  technology  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  capitalism-systemic_crisis  Veblen  Mumford  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Bichler, Shimshon and Nitzan, Jonathan - Palan on Piketty - New Left Project, September 2014 | bnarchives
In late August, 2014, we received an invitation from the New Left Project to comment on Ronen Palan’s article ‘Capitalising the Future’. Palan’s piece examines Thomas Piketty’s book ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’ (2014), and the editors felt it had strong affinities with our approach. The affinities are certainly there (albeit unmentioned). But they are largely superficial. Palan demonstrates little understanding of our framework, and we very much doubt he has comprehended Piketty’s. His article contains so many elementary errors and fallacies that it is unclear how it got published in the first place. [The NLP piece has been revised to make the text less confrontational. For those interested, we also provide the original unedited version.] -- Keywords: futurity leverage, Sokal Hoax, postism Piketty -- Keywords includes "Sokal Hoax" so looks like B&N have vented their ire at posties on the hapless Palan -- downloaded pdf of unedited version to Note
article  books  review  Piketty  capitalism  inequality  capital_as_power  postmodern  capitalization  political_economy  capital  leverage  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Structuralist Response to Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century | INET
New School Economist Lance Taylor released a symposium of literature on Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century in conjunction with the INET-sponsored research project on Economic Sustainability, Distribution and Stability. It includes papers offering a structuralist response to Piketty's explanation of inequality and advancing alternative theories. **--** Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century: Introduction to a Structuralist Symposium - Lance Taylor (The New School) *--* Capitalism, Inequality and Globalization: Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century - Prabhat Patnaik (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi *--* Elasticity of substitution and social conflict: a structuralist note on Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century - Nelson Barbosa-Filho (São Paulo School of Economics) *--* Piketty’s Elasticity of Substitution: A Critique - Gregor Semieniuk (The New School) *--* The Triumph of the Rentier? Thomas Piketty vs. Luigi Pasinetti and John Maynard Keynes - Lance Taylor (The New School -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  Piketty  economic_history  institutional_economics  class_conflict  rentiers  inequality  globalization  capital  capitalism  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: Piketty and the Money View - September 2014
All the empirical material in the book relates to stocks and flows of money. But when he turns to explain the patterns he finds in this data, he does it in terms of physical inputs to physical production. The money wealth present in a country is assumed to correspond to the physical capital goods, somehow converted to a scalar quantity. And the incomes received by wealth owners is assumed to correspond to a physical product somehow attributable to these capital goods. But the production processes that are supposed to explain these shifts are described without any data at all, purely deductively. You would think that if Piketty believed that the share of property income in total income depends on physical production technologies, returns to scale, depreciation, etc., then at least half the book would be taken up with technological history. In fact, of course, these topics are not discussed at all. Terms like “production” and “depreciation” are black boxes, pure mathematical formalism. -- Unfortunately, discussion of the book has been almost entirely about the irrelevant formalism. I think that is why the conversation has been so noisy yet advanced so little. -- the disconnect between the two different Pikettys shows, in a negative way, why what I've been calling the money view is so important. The historical data assembled in Capital in the 21st Century is a magnificent accomplishment and will be drawn on by economic historians for years to come. Many of the concrete observations he makes about this material are original and insightful. But all of this is lost when translated into Piketty's preferred theoretical framework. To make sense of the historical evolution of money payments and claims, we need an approach that takes those payments and claims as objects of study in themselves.
books  Piketty  wealth  capitalism  capital  macroeconomics  economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  money  investment  investors  profit  technology  production  productivity  political_economy  financial_economics  financial_system  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Squarely Rooted - I Wrote Way Too Much About “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” — Medium - July 2014
Very thought provoking re changes in the composition and returns to capital -- Depreciation is the great systemic regulator — absent productivity/technology growth, depreciation is an absolute limit on our ability to accumulate capital ad infinitum. Or is it? Depreciation is a law of the physical world, and therefore a limit on the accumulation of physical capital, which many people intensely associate with “capital” in their minds. But it is extremely important not to do so in this context, as Piketty uses capital synonymously with all wealth. And the nature of capital itself is changing What does this mean? It means that the focus on capital as stuff is fundamentally off-base — capital, at least as defined by Piketty, is at least to some degree detached from stuff. This makes more sense when you look at the Q-ratio of many of today’s most valuable firms [Apple et al]. These are all vastly above not just the current national average but the highest the national average has ever been, and by an astonishing amount. But investors believe that these tech companies, which have rapidly become a vast part of the economy, are worth way, way more than the sum of their parts. -- ... all these claims [against assets] are, on a fundamental level, determined by legal and political systems that are mutable by humans. They are not laws of nature. This is most clear in Piketty’s discussion of “Rhenish capitalism,” specifically in the curious phenomenon of the relatively-low levels of German capital relative to income - which vanishes when you compare book value instead of market value of capital - overwhelmingly a Tobin’s Q issue. -- Land, in fact, may be the key to explaining why the returns to capital decline much more slowly than models with traditional assumptions would predict. If you confuse “capital” as Piketty defines it with “machines,” even subconsciously, this would make much less sense. -- Oh, and one last thing — land doesn’t depreciate.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  investment  profit  capitalism  inequality  rentiers  landowners  capital  wealth  sovereign_wealth_funds  plutocracy  1-percent  capital_markets  investors  manufacturing  technology  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Anne Mayhew, review - Laurence Shute, John Maurice Clark: A Social Economics for the Twenty-First Century | EH.Net, H-Net Reviews. November, 1997
[F]rom Clark's earliest work through his post-World War II comments on the formalization of Keynes' work, he sought a "non-euclidean" economics that would be more "scientific" than most economic analysis in fact was. In a 1924, essay on "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," Clark argued that it was "unscientific" to exclude relevant evidence. He wrote: "... comprehensiveness is scientific, even if it involves some sacrifice of other qualities for which science likes to strive" . In a critique of a 1949 essay by Paul Samuelson, Clark repeats the theme by complaining of ... what happens to the Keynesian theory when it is simplified by isolating the central mathematical formula and its corollaries from the context of factors that do not lend themselves to this treatment, and which Keynes handled in 'literary' fashion ... . -- Clark (and his fellow Institutionalists) made major contributions to what was then the "mainstream" of American economics during a period of lively innovation. During the early 1930s Clark had already developed both multiplier and accelerator concepts and he welcomed Keynes' "income-flow analysis." However, in the early 1940s he was worrying--in print and in exchanges with Keynes--that this analysis would be undiscriminatingly applied, and there were problems with sole reliance on deficit spending for stabilization. Clark's concern was a wider variety of stabilization tools--including attention to the legal arrangement of costs--would be required. In his last major work, Competition as A Dynamic Process (1961), Clark returned to some of the issues with which he began his career. Shute stresses that this work was not the "major general treatise" that Clark had once hoped to write, but rather an attempt to develop a practical notion of "workable competition" appropriate for analysis and policy guidance in a dynamic economy. Clark was realist enough to worry that this work would not be well received [inadequate formalism and assumptions they expected from "theory"]
books  reviews  intellectual_history  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  social_sciences-post-WWII  economic_theory  economic_history  institutional_economics  industry  production  investment  costs  labor  Labor_markets  capital  capitalism  business_cycles  Keynes  Keynesianism  macroeconomics  Great_Depression  competition  prices 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - The Four Big Valid Issues People Have with Thomas Piketty's Grand Argument: Friday Focus for June 27, 2014 (Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality...)
I think there are four big valid issues with Thomas Piketty's grand argument: [they're all pretty feeble or wishful thinking unfortunately - DeLong puts too heavy a weight on several of them, producing a guesstimate of 50:50 we will have Piketty world if things left on autopilot] -- see comments, especially Dan Kervick who once again challenges Piketty critics for not reading the last chapters (which don't readily translate into mainstream macro models, so their criticism is generally nonresponsive to Piketty’s historical data and explanations)
Piketty  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_models  capital  wealth  profit  savings  charity  1-percent  economic_culture  status  elite_culture  inequality  political_culture  political_economy  moral_economy  capitalism 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: Mehrling on Black on Capital - June 2014
From Mehrking - downloaded pdf to Note -- Black’s emphasis is on the market value of wealth calculated as the expected present value of future income flows, rather than on the quantity of wealth calculated as the historical accumulation of savings minus depreciation. This allows Black to treat knowledge and technology as forms of capital, since their expected effects are included when we measure capital at market value. For Black, the standard aggregative neoclassical production function is inadequate because it obscures sectoral and temporal detail by attributing current output to current inputs of capital and labor, -- It’s familiar math, but the meaning it expresses remains very far from familiar to the trained economist. For one, the labor input has been replaced by human capital so there is no fixed factor. For another, both physical and human capital are measured at market values, and so are supposed to include technological change. This means that the A coefficient is not the usual technology shift factor (the familiar “Solow residual”) but only a multiplier, indeed a kind of inverse price earnings ratio, that converts the stock of effective composite capital into a flow of composite output. -- In retrospect, the most fundamental source of misunderstanding came (and comes still) from the difference between an economics and a finance vision of the nature of the economy. The classical economists habitually thought of the present as determined by the past. The financial point of view, by contrast, sees the present as determined by the future, or rather by our ideas about the future...and the quantity of capital can therefore change without prior saving.
economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  macroeconomics  Piketty  neoclassical_economics  financial_economics  capital  wealth  investment  savings  interest_rates  profit  productivity  human_capital  technology  labor  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic - globalinequality: Limits of neoclassical economics - June 2014
Great summary of the obvious that unfortunately needs to be said -- When people criticize Piketty for elevating a mere economic identity... to a Fundamental Law of Capitalism they show their inability to go back to economics as a social science [and] transcend neoclassical economics. The share of capital income in total income is not only a reflection of the fact that people with a factor of production B have so much, and people with the factor of production A have the rest.. We are basically saying: 20% of people ..claim 1/2 of national output and they do so without having to work. If it were a question of changing the distribution in favor of factor A (donuts) and against factor B (pecan pies), there would be no reason to be concerned. But here you change the distribution in favor of those who do not need to work, and against those that do. You thereby affect the entire social structure of society. This is where social science comes in, and neoclassical economics goes away. The entire 100 years of neoclassical economics [has made us] us forget this key distinction: between having or not having to work for a living. Hence neoclassicists like to treat capital (and labor) as basically the same thing: factors of production: a donut and a pecan pie...Thence also the attempt to treat labor as human capital. We are all capitalists now: a guy who works at Walmart for less than the minimum wage is a capitalist since he is using his human capital; a broker who makes a million in a day is also a capitalist, he just works with a different type of capital.The true social reality was thus entirely hidden. [Picketty returns us to] social science and you ask yourself questions like, would a society where 20% of non-workers earn 70% of total income be okay? What are the values that such a society would promote? (..more political, moral philosophy Qs)
Piketty  19thC  20thC  21stC  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  social_theory  social_sciences  political_economy  social_order  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  economic_history  economic_theory  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  classical_economics  Marx  inequality  distribution-income  capitalism  capital  labor  human_capital  markets_in_everything  class_conflict  economic_culture  political_culture  economic_sociology  bad_economics  memory-group 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » The accidental controversialist: deeper reflections on Thomas Piketty’s “Capital” - April 2014
Using a conventional marginal productivity framework, Piketty provides an explanation of rising inequality based on increases in the gap between the marginal product of capital, which determines the rate of profit (r), and the rate of growth (g). Because capital ownership is so concentrated, a higher profit rate or slower growth rate increases inequality as the incomes of the wealthy grow faster than the overall economy. The conventional character of Piketty’s theoretical thinking rears its head in his policy prescriptions. -- Mainstream economists will assert the conventional story about the profit rate being technologically determined. However, as Piketty occasionally hints, in reality the profit rate is politically and socially determined by factors influencing the distribution of economic and political power. Growth is also influenced by policy and institutional choices. That is the place to push the argument....My prediction is “r minus g” arithmetic will make its way into the curriculum, with the profit rate explained as the marginal product of capital; Chicago School economists will counter the economy has mechanisms limiting prolonged wide divergence of r and g; and Harvard and MIT graduate students will have opportunities to do market failure research arguing the opposite. The net result is economics will be left essentially unchanged and even more difficult to change.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  productivity  capital  labor  technology  inequality  wealth  political_economy  profit  capitalism  institutional_economics  laisser-faire  information-asymmetric  competition  education-higher  economic_culture  sociology_of_knowledge  heterodox_economics  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Seth Ackerman - Piketty’s Fair-Weather Friends | Jacobin May 2014
Re Piketty not fitting in MIT-liberal economics -- Piketty “misreads the literature by conflating gross and net returns to capital,” Summers wrote. “I know of no study suggesting that measuring output in net terms, the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1, and I know of quite a few suggesting the contrary.” A reader at this point could be forgiven for feeling confused. Didn’t Piketty gather his own data? He did, of course. --As Piketty makes clear, those data — which he’s made freely available on the internet for anyone to check — are indeed “explained” by a net elasticity of 1.3-1.6, which would indicate an extremely weak force of diminishing returns to capital. Yet it’s also true that this figure is far higher than any found in the existing literature — probably more than twice as high as the highest typical estimates. -- Piketty’s estimate of the elasticity of substitution can’t really be compared with those in the literature. His is based on economy-wide data covering decades and centuries while estimates in the literature typically cover only a few years, and often just a few industries. Moreover, his pertain to all private wealth, while the literature focuses narrowly on production capital. -- But most importantly, given the flawed marginalist theory behind it, and its even more flawed basis of measurement... the elasticity of substitution simply cannot be regarded as a meaningful measure of an economy’s technology (or anything else), or as providing any clue to its future. What’s essential, rather, is Piketty’s empirical demonstration that the rate of return on wealth has been remarkably stable over centuries — and, contra Summers, with no visible tendency to vary in any consistent way against the “supply of capital.”
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  heterodox_economics  productivity  capital  labor  profit  wages  technology  economic_growth  savings  inheritance  1-percent  inequality  meritocracy  wealth  supermanagers  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_sociology  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Jesus Felipe, John S.L. McCombie - The Aggregate Production Function And The Measurement Of Technical Change (2013) - Edward Elgar Publishing
Prologue: ‘Not Even Wrong’ *-* Introduction 1. Some Problems with the APF *-* 2. The APF: Behavioural Relationship or Accounting Identity? *-* 3. Simulation Studies, the APF and the Accounting Identity *-* 4. ‘Are There Laws of Production?’ The Work of Cobb and Douglas and its Early Reception *-* 5. Solow’s ‘Technical Change and the APF’, and the Accounting Identity *-* 6. What does Total Factor Productivity Actually Measure? Further Observations on the Solow Model *-* 7. Why Are Some Countries Richer than Others? A Sceptical View of Mankiw–Romer–Weil’s Test of the Neoclassical Growth Model *-* 8. Some Problems with the Neoclassical Dual-Sector Growth Model *-* 9. Is Capital Special? The Role of the Growth of Capital and its Externality Effect in Economic Growth *-* 10. Problems Posed by the Accounting Identity for the Estimation of the Degree of Market Power and the Mark-up *-* 11. Are Estimates of Labour Demand Functions Mere Statistical Artefacts? *-* 12. Why Have the Criticisms of the APF Generally Been Ignored? On Further Misunderstandings and Misinterpretations of the Implications of the Accounting Identity --- Felipe and McCombie have gathered all of the compelling arguments denying the existence of APFs and showing that econometric estimates based on these fail to measure what they purport to quantify: they are artefacts. Their critique, which ought to be read by any economist doing empirical work, is destructive of nearly all that is important to mainstream economics: NAIRU and potential output measures, measures of wage elasticities, of output elasticities and of total factor productivity growth.– Marc Lavoie, University of Ottawa, Canada
books  kindle-available  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  productivity  capital  labor  technology  prices  firms-theory  economic_growth  econometrics 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Suresh Naidu - Capital Eats the World | Jacobin May 2014
A first step could be a multisector model with both a productive sector and an extractive, rent-seeking outlet for investment, so that the rate of return on capital has the potential to be unanchored from the growth of the economy. This model could potentially do a better job of explaining r > g in a world where capital has highly profitable opportunities in rent-seeking ....More fundamentally, a model that started with the financial and firm-level institutions underneath the supply and demand curves for capital, rather than blackboxing them in production and utility functions, could illuminate complementarities among the host of other political demands that would claw back the share taken by capital and lower the amount paid out as profits before the fiscal system gets its take. This is putting meat on what Brad Delong calls the “wedge” between the actual and warranted rate of profit. -- We need even more and even better economics to figure out which of these may get undone via market responses and which won’t, and to think about them jointly with the politics that make each feasible or not. While Piketty’s book diagnoses the problem of capital’s voracious appetite, it would require a different kind of model to take our focus off the nominal quantities registered by state fiscal systems, and instead onto the broader distribution of political power in the world economy.
books  reviews  kindle-available  Piketty  political_economy  economic_theory  heterodox_economics  neoclassical_economics  economic_models  economic_growth  wealth  capital  finance_capital  capitalism  labor  Labor_markets  unemployment  markets_in_everything  tax_havens  investment  investors  savings  inheritance  profit  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  inequality  technology  1-percent  rent-seeking  rentiers  class_conflict  oligarchy  taxes  productivity  corporate_finance  property  property_rights  neoliberalism 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Matt Bruening - On Piketty's Capital: r, g, and s | Demos - April 28 2014
The mechanics of how this work don't just involve r and g though. They also involve, as few reviewers except Robert Solow have pointed out, savings, or s. This should be obvious. After all, if wealthy people consumed all their r-derived income each year and laborers saved at least some of their wages, eventually laborers would pile up more wealth than the super-capitalists have. The longevity of the the super-capitalists' advantage is not determined solely by r. It is determined by r multipled by s, i.e. the rate of return on capital multiplied by the savings rate.
Piketty  capital  savings  wages  economic_growth  inequality  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Matt Bruening - What Larry Summers Gets Wrong On Piketty's 'Capital' | Demos May 15 2014
Does Piketty argue that if r > g , then the wealth-to-income ratio will rise? Or does Piketty argue that the wealth-to-income ratio moves towards s/g (savings rate divided by the growth rate)? Summers has him saying both! Despite Summers' first sentence, Piketty does not use "r > g" to explain the wealth-to-income ratio. He explains the wealth-to-income ratio solely by s/g. If the savings rate of an economy is 5% and the growth rate is 1%, then the wealth-to-income ratio will go to 5-to-1 and stay there at equilibrium. This is true whether r > g or not. Piketty does claim that the wealth-to-income ratio will increase, but it is based on this s/g logic. More specifically, he thinks the savings rate will probably stay where it is and growth will decline, and this will therefore cause s/g to get bigger.
capital  savings  economic_growth  investment  economic_models  Piketty  inequality  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Marx Myths & Legends - website
Series of serious essays, including on relations to other thinkers (e.g. Hegel) and how Marx was contested and distorted by both enemies and friends in 20thC -- We believe that what Marx had to say remains of considerable relevance to an understanding of problems we face today, but that a reading of Marx now must maintain a critical caution which does not merely reproduce received ideas- positive or negative- about Marx’s work. The distortion and questionable interpretation of Marx’s work is in many senses a direct result of his great success. ... Interpretation of Marx has thus been driven by a number of historical factors, and any attempts to gain, for example, a “scholarly” understanding have necessarily been secondary. ... To set against the distortions we cannot raise up a singular, uncontradictory Marx, abstracted from history and ultimately separable from everything that comes within “Marxism”, yet it remains that there is much in that received wisdom about Marx that is refutable, or at least rendered distinctly questionable, with a little attention to the textual and historical evidence.
intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  political_economy  social_theory  Marx  Hegel  Hegelian  Hegelians-French  Marxist  historiography-19thC  capitalism  capital  labor  Industrial_Revolution  industry  technology  ideology  property  legal_system  bourgeoisie  working_class  elites  money  markets  website  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Ricardo Hausmann - Why technological diffusion does not occur according to economic theory. - Project Syndicate - May 2014
That is why cities, regions, and countries can absorb technology only gradually, generating growth through some recombination of the knowhow that is already in place, maybe with the addition of some component – a bassist to complete a string quartet. But they cannot move from a quartet to a philharmonic orchestra in one fell swoop, because it would require too many missing instruments – and, more important, too many musicians who know how to play them. Progress happens by moving into what the theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman calls the “adjacent possible,” which implies that the best way to find out what is likely to be feasible in a country is to consider what is already there. Politics may indeed impede technological diffusion; but, to a large extent, technology does not diffuse because of the nature of technology itself.
economic_theory  economic_growth  economic_history  institutional_economics  institutional_change  institution-building  development  US_foreign_policy  rent-seeking  elites  oligarchy  technology  capital  labor  knowhow 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
James Galbraith - review of Thomas Piketty - Kapital for the Twenty-First Century? | Dissent Magazine
Very useful critique of notion of "capital" used by Piketty. Doesn't quarrel with the accumulation dynamics but the attempt to tie rates of return on "capital" and growth rates (presumably reflecting capital labor ratio). What Piketty is really measuring isn't capital in the production function (which in any event Galbraith dings per the Cambridge capital theorists), but financial wealth, which varies with asset prices. The historical pattern of the ratio of wealth to GDP is accurate, but not the causal story.
books  reviews  capital  capitalism  inequality  economic_growth  economic_history  economic_theory  taxes  interest_rates  rentiers  plutocracy  financialization  finance_capital  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - The Equalizing Hand: Why Adam Smith Thought the Market Should Produce Wealth Without Steep Inequality | Cambridge Journals Online - Perspectives on Politics - Dec 2013
For long overview of the article, see her post from the LSE blog -- Perspectives on Politics, 11, pp 1051-1070. doi:10.1017/S153759271300282X. - That the market economy inevitably leads to inequality is widely accepted today, with disagreement confined to the desirability of redistributive action, its extent, and the role of government in the process. The canonical text of liberal political economy, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, is assumed even in the most progressive interpretations to accept inequality, rationalized as the inevitable trade-off for increasing prosperity compared to less developed but more equal economies. I argue instead that Smith's system, if fully implemented, would not allow steep inequalities to arise. In Smith, profits should be low and labor wages high, legislation in favor of the worker is “always just and equitable,” land should be distributed widely and evenly, inheritance laws liberalized, taxation can be high if it is equitable, and the science of the legislator is necessary to put the system in motion and keep it aligned. Market economies are made in Smith's system. Political theorists and economists have highlighted some of these points, but the counterfactual “what would the distribution of wealth be if all the building blocks were ever in place?” has not been posed. Doing so encourages us to question why steep inequality is accepted as a fact, instead of a pathology that the market economy was not supposed to generate in the first place. --Deborah Boucoyannis is Assistant Professor at the University of Virginia (dab5fw@virginia.edu). Her interests lie in the historical preconditions for the emergence of the liberal order and of constitutionalism.
paper  paywall  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Deborah Boucoyannis - For Adam Smith, inequality was contrary to the Wealth of Nations | British Politics and Policy at LSE – Feb 2014
Overview of her article in Perspectives on Politics - see Cambridge Journals bookmark - The assumption that Adam Smith accepted inequality as the necessary trade-off for a more prosperous economy is wrong, writes Deborah Boucoyannis. In reality, Smith’s system precluded steep inequalities not out of a normative concern with equality but by virtue of the design that aimed to maximise the wealth of nations. Much like many progressive critics of current inequality, Smith targets rentier practices by the rich and powerful as distorting economic outcomes.
paper  political_economy  intellectual_history  economic_theory  Smith  18thC  British_history  Scottish_Enlightenment  inequality  wages  taxes  landowners  monopolies  rent-seeking  luxury  consumer_demand  competition  profit  regulation  power  investment  capital  neoliberalism  Labor_markets  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
EconoSpeak: Inequality and Sabotage: Piketty, Veblen and Kalecki (for anne at Economist's View)
Nearly a century ago, Thorstein Veblen offered insights into this mechanism in his The Engineers and the Price System. To Veblen r>g (although he didn't use that term) was a strategy pursued by business, not simply a statistical finding. As Veblen points out, "this is matter of course, and notorious. But it is not a topic on which one prefers to dwell." -- Kalecki outlined three categories of business objection to a full employment by government spending: "(i) dislike of government interference in the problem of employment as such; (ii) dislike of the direction of government spending... (iii) dislike of the social and political changes resulting from the maintenance of full employment." It is the first and third of these objections that have the most direct bearing on the issue of r>g -- There are different modes of efficiency and those differences result in different effects on the rate of return to capital. In other words, there are r>g efficiencies and there are r<g efficiencies. An example of an r>g efficiency would be a new machine that uses less fuel and less labour to produce a given amount of output. An example of an r<g efficiency would be a reduction in the length of the standard working day that improves worker productivity by reducing fatigue and increasing overall well being. Both are examples of efficiencies but they differ as to whom the benefit of the efficiency gain primarily accrues.
US_economy  US_history  19thC  20thC  Great_Depression  economic_history  economic_growth  political_economy  capital  capitalism  labor  Labor_markets  wages  unemployment  consumer_demand  profit  investment  unions  Veblen  Kalecki  productivity  inequality  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Karl Smith - Not All Forms of Wealth Are Equally Pernicious | FT Alphaville Feb 2014
Responding to Ryan Advent re Smith's earlier Alphaville post on Piketty book on trends in wealth and inequality -- Let me be clear. I am a fan of Piketty’s brute mechanistic approach. It is one that I have employed myself and on much the same question. It is one that led me to conjecture, and still suspect, that landlords are the once and future global plutocracy. And this happens precisely because all wealth is not created equal and some forms are more persistent and pernicious than others.

In the wake of the subprime crisis, I understand the temptation to rally against big banks and global finance. However, Lehman Brothers is dead. Sam Zell, founder and CEO of Equity Residential, is still alive. This is not an accident. The future does not belong to high flying titans. It belongs to dogged men and women who squirrel away rent checks when times are good, and buy your home when times are tight. This is the tyranny of land. Ignore it at your peril.
economic_history  economic_growth  capital  capitalism  capital_markets  landowners  France  US_economy  UK_economy  plutocracy  inequality  cities  urban_development  urban_elites  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Pagina Web del Prof. Fabio Petri [papers, draft textbook, class materials] - heterodox microeconomics, Sraffa capital debates, intellectual history, political economy
Links to pdfs and docs -- Lecture On Economic Policy *--* (downloaded to Note) Comment on Gintis (with E. Bilancini) with Appendix *--*- Una prospettiva disincantata sulla crisi e sulla teoria contemporanea *--* (downloaded to Note) On the current debate on capital theory *--*- On the relevance of reswitching. *--* (downloaded to Note) *--* (downloaded to Note)-Investment depends on output. *--* (downloaded to Note and reformatted for spacing, converted to pdf)- Capital Theory: a synthetic introduction to its historical development. *--* - Investment depends on output - a new critique of Say's Law ('Neglected Implications...') *--* (downloaded to Note)- Blaug Versus Garegnani on the Formalist Revolution and the Evolution of Neoclassical Capital Theory ***---*** Advanced Microeconomics Textbook "Microeconomics for the critical mind" - Some Provisional Chapters ***---*** Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch0, Contents and Preface *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch1, The Classical or Surplus Approach *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch2, The Classical Approach: Formal Treatment. *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch3, The Marginal or Neoclassical Approach: A Simple Description. *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch4 , Neoclassical Consumer Theory, and Exchange General Equilibrium. *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch5, Neoclassical Theory of the Firm, and GE of Production and Exchange. *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch6, Uniqueness and Stability of Atemporal Acapitalistic GE. *--* .
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch7, Long-Period General Equilibrium, and Reswitching. *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch8, Intertemporal and Temporary General Equilibrium (new version) *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri Ch9PartFirst Uncertainty and Insurance. *--*
Advanced Microeconomics Petri References - Very Incomplete
books  courses  paper  website  economic_theory  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  Physiocrats  Smith  Ricardo  Marx  Sraffa  classical_economics  marginalists  capital  profit  investment  Labor_markets  wages  heterodox_economics  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Heterodox Economics - Readings | HMiRN
Extensive list of books, chapters, journal articles, periodically updated since 2011 -- Contents --
1. History and Methodology of Heterodox Microeconomics
2. Critiques of Mainstream Microeconomics
3. Principles of Heterodox Microeconomic Theory
4. Theory of the Business Enterprise
5. Structure of Production and Costs of the Business Enterprise
6. Costing, Pricing, and Prices
7. Investment, Finance, and Employment
8. Households, Consumption, and Market Demand
9. Industry and Market
10. Competition
11. Corporate Governance, Market Governance, and Market Regulation
12. Social Welfare
13. Heterodox Microfoundations and Modeling the Economy
bibliography  economic_theory  economic_history  economic_models  economic_sociology  firms-theory  Labor_markets  capital  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  M&A  regulation  consumers  consumer_demand  monopolies  finance_capital  taxes  competition  investment  prices  wages  heterodox_economics  microeconomics  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Simon Wren-Lewis - mainly macro: Stages of Economic Recovery in the UK - Nov 2013
Lots of links -- Presentation re 3 stages of economic recovery and why UK stalled for 3 years in not getting Stage 2 bounce back growth due to austerity after returning to growth in 2010 - and fears won't reach Stage 3, maintenance of high growth for long period to return to pre recession productive capacity trend line. Banks as a central worry

-- quote-- So answering the productivity puzzle is the key to knowing what kind of recovery we will have. My suspicion, shared by others at the Bank of England and elsewhere, is that some of the answer is to be found back where the recession began – with UK banks. Bank lending to firms is important in increasing productivity, because it allows the productive firms to expand (at home and overseas), and the new start ups to displace the older, less efficient firms. So when bank lending collapsed in the recession, productivity collapsed. If banks start lending again to these new and more productive (but also more risky) firms, we may be able to make up a good deal of that lost ground......

So how are we with fixing the banks? The honest answer is I do not know, but let me end with a concern. So this is a recession created by banks, and there is a real danger that the power banks have over governments, and this government in particular, may mean we never make up the ground we have lost.
21stC  UK_economy  Great_Recession  banking  financialization  financial_regulation  rent-seeking  risk  austerity  productivity  unemployment  wages  capital  investment  links  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Daniel Little Why the corporation? « Understanding Society Sept 2012
Recently I posted about C. Wright Mills and his analysis of power elites in America (post). A major theme in Mills’s book is the new power associated with the American corporation following World War II. Charles Perrow’s Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism (2002) offers an historical account of how this system of power came into being. Perrow is a historical sociologist, and he focuses his analysis on the structural features of the organizations he considers; the historical and social factors that favored the emergence of these kinds of organizations; and the role that they now play within the complex social and political system of modern America.
books  kindle-available  reviews  economic_history  social_history  US_economy  US_politics  US_history  19thC  20thC  business  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capitalism  capital  firms-theory  organizations  profit  infrastructure  historical_sociology  political_economy  EF-add 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
Izabella Kaminska: Dark inventory, death of a city edition | FT Alphaville Oct 2013
There is actually a lot to the idea that we are living in an inevitable age of bubbles, and that such bubbles will not disappear until savers and capital owners acknowledge that they must be haircutted on the misvalued section of their wealth (the savings glut). Only this would stop it from disruptively and flightily flowing from one speculative asset class to the next because as soon as it anchors anywhere for too long its real (depreciated) value is exposed.

As we’ve argued before, the world is beset by a capital crisis not a debt crisis. There is too much capital and not enough productive use for it — at least not in western markets. At least nowhere near enough to guarantee the sort of returns “savers” have become accustomed to over the last few decades. The truth is that nowadays all savings come with risk. Yet most capital investors are simply not prepared to accept that.

This is where the problem begins.
Great_Recession  capital_markets  bubbles  investment  global_imbalance  global_economy  capital  capital_flows  debt  creditors  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Philip Arestis, Ana Rosa. González Óscar Dejuán - Investment, Financial Markets, and Uncertainty WORKING PAPER NO. 743 | December 2012 - Levy Economics Institute | Publications
This paper provides a theoretical explanation of the accumulation process, which accounts for the developments in the financial markets over the recent past. Specifically, our approach is focused on the presence of correlations between physical and financial investment, and how the latter could affect the former. In order to achieve this objective, two assets are considered: equities and bonds. This choice permits us to account for two extreme alternative possibilities: taking risk in the short run with unknown profits, or undertaking a commitment to the long run with known yields. This proposal also accounts for the influence of the cost of external finance and the impact of financial uncertainty, as proxied by the interest rate in the former case and the exchange rate in the latter case; thereby utilizing the Keynesian notion of conventions in the determination of investment. The model thus formulated is subsequently estimated by applying the difference GMM and the system GMM in a panel of 14 OECD countries from 1970 to 2010.
20thC  21stC  post-WWII  economic_history  OECD_economies  financialization  economic_models  investment  equity  debt  risk  capital  Keynesianism  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Janet Yellen on Bubbles and Minsky Meltdowns (2009) « Multiplier Effect
Speech at Levy Institute Minsky conference -- The current crisis has afforded plentiful opportunities for supervisors to reflect on the effectiveness of our current system of micro-prudential supervision. The “lessons learned” will undoubtedly enhance its conduct going forward.(16) But, regardless of how well micro-prudential supervision is executed, on its own it will never be adequate to safeguard the economy from the destructive boom and bust cycles that Minsky considered endemic in capitalistic systems. Analogous to Keynes’s paradox of thrift, the assumption that safe institutions automatically result in a safe system reflects a fallacy of composition. Thus, macro-prudential supervision—to protect the system as a whole—is needed to mitigate financial crises.

The roles of micro- and macro-prudential supervision are fundamentally different. In principle, many individual institutions could be managing risk reasonably well, while the system as a whole remained vulnerable due to interconnections among financial institutions that could lead to contagious cycles of loss and illiquidity. For example, it is prudent for institutions to sell risky assets and pay off debt when a decline in asset prices depletes capital. But the simultaneous behavior of many institutions to protect themselves in this way only intensifies the decline in prices. Moreover, when many institutions try to de-lever simultaneously, market liquidity can instantly evaporate. Systemic risk is endogenous to the working of the financial system.
21stC  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  bubbles  monetary_policy  financial_system  international_finance  global_imbalance  global_economy  financial_regulation  macroprudential_policies  capital  leverage  central_banks  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Charles A.E. Goodhart - Are CoCos from Cloud Cuckoo-Land? | vox June 2010
As a consensus among academics begins to emerge over counter-cyclical financial regulation, former Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee member Charles A E Goodhart outlines why he is sceptical about “conditional convertibles” or CoCos – a form of debt that is “quasi-automatically” transformed into equity when banks get into trouble. Goodhart argues that CoCos would make the system more complex, potentially leading to problematic market dynamics
banking  capital  equity  creditors  capital_markets  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Bulow, Jacob Goldfield, Paul Klemperer - Market-based bank capital regulation | vox August 2013
Today’s regulatory rules – especially the ineffective capital requirements – have led to costly bank failures. This column proposes a new, robust approach that uses market information but does not depend upon markets being ‘right’. Under the proposed regulatory system (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii) systemically important institutions cannot collapse suddenly; (iii) bank investment is counter-cyclical; and (iv) regulatory actions depend upon market signals. One key innovation is ‘Equity Recourse Notes’ that gradually ‘bail in’ equity as needed. These are superficially similar to, but importantly distinct from, ’CoCos’ [contingent convertible bonds].
banking  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital  equity  capital_markets  leverage  creditors  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
PDF! - Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman: Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010 (2013)
Downloaded pdf -- How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why? We address this question using 1970-2010 national balance sheets recently compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise of wealth-income ratios in recent decades, from about 200-300% in 1970 to 400-600% in 2010. In effect, today’s ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600-700%). This can be explained by a long run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth....Our results have important implications for capital taxation and regulation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and the rise of capital shares. -- This research includes four PDF documents: the Main Paper (71p.), the Data Appendix (163p.), the Chartbook (179p.) and the Databook (594p.). It can also be downloaded as a single pdf document (976p.) -- This work is supported by a detailed wealth and income database, available in Excel format. The database includes 13 Excel sheets: 9 country-specific, and 4 cross-country summary spreadsheets. The complete database can be downloaded as a single zip file
paper  economic_history  economic_growth  demography  capital  labor  inequality  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  post-WWII  downloaded 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
BPEA Fall 2013: Offshoring Linked to Declining U.S. Labor Share, Likely to Continue
A Fall 2013 BPEA paper by Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Aysegul Sahin --
Manufacturing and trade sectors causing most recent drops; ACA could drive further declines -- The authors note that if globalization continues apace, the labor share will most likely continue to decline, especially in sectors that face the largest increases in foreign competition. -- They also point to the public policy implications of the labor share, writing that in addition to the fact that developments in certain industries affect the aggregate labor share, particular types of legislation -- such as the Affordable Care Act -- are also likely to drive movements in the near future. “Since health insurance benefits are part of payroll compensation, a change in the prevalence of these benefits that is not offset by changes in wages and salaries will affect the labor share.”
paper  20thC  21stC  US_economy  globalization  international_political_economy  Labor_markets  wages  EF-add  off-shoring  health_care  profit  capital 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
McCloskey, Deirdre (2009): Saving, Investment, Greed, and Original Accumulation Do Not Explain Growth - Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Thrift was not the cause of the Industrial Revolution or its astonishing follow on. For one thing, every human society must practice thrift, and pre-industrial Europe, with its low yield-seed ratios, did so on a big scale. British thrift during the Industrial Revolution, for another, was rather below the European average. And for still another, savings is elastically supplied, by credit expansion for example (as Schumpeter observed). Attributing growth to investment, therefore, resembles attributing Shakespeare’s plays to the Roman alphabet: “necessary” in a reduced sense, but in fact an assumed background, not the cause in any useful sense. Certainly Europeans did not develop unusual greed, and the Catholics---in a society of bourgeois dignity and liberty---did as well as the Protestants (in Amsterdam, for example). Ben Franklin, for example, was not (as D. H. Lawrence portrayed him in a humorless reading of this most humorous man) “dry and utilitarian.” If capitalism accumulates “endlessly,” as many say, one wonder why Franklin give up accumulating at age 42. The evidence also does not support Marx’s notion of an “original accumulation of capital.” Saving and investment must be used when they are made, or they depreciate. They cannot accumulate from an age of piracy to an age of industry. Yet modern growth theory, unhappily, reinstates as initiating the theory of stages and, especially, capital accumulation. They are not initiating, whether in physical or human capital. Innovation 1700-2010 pushed the marginal product of all capitals steadily out, and the physical and human capital followed. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  economic_growth  economic_theory  economic_culture  Marxist  capital  investment  Industrial_Revolution  18thC  19thC  20thC  Innovation  technology  credit  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Zhang Monan: Chinese Reform Goes Local - Project Syndicate August 2013
Indeed, while China’s overall capital stock is by no means small, capital-structure and maturity mismatches have led to the accumulation of massive volumes of non-performing assets, undermining China’s economic stability and financial efficiency. In order to create the stability needed to reach the next stage of economic development, China must shift its focus from sustaining high GDP growth toward revitalizing its capital stock.

If China’s leaders are genuinely committed to revitalizing the capital stock, they must begin with fiscal and financial decentralization. Such an approach would promote efficiency, stability, innovation, and dynamism at the local level – exactly what China needs to support its progress toward advanced-economy status.
economic_growth  capital  investment  SOEs  banking  China  development  local_government  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Erkan Gürpınar: Notes on Institutional Complementarities and Organizational Forms | Dipartimento di Economia Politica
Downloaded pdf to Note

This paper analyses the concept of organizational forms, and derives some implications for the economics of production organization. To this end, after pointing out the role of knowledge in the organization of production, we discuss the theories based on technology (new institutional economics) and property rights (so-called radical school). When the effect of property rights is not taken into account, technology alone entails unique solution to the problem of production organization. After ruling out this technologically deterministic argument, by recourse to a simple model, we study the complementarities between these two domains. Finally, we derive some implications: (a) the asymmetry between the characteristics of labour and capital under the existing property relations, (b) the importance of workers’ preferences for different ways of production organization. In so doing, we show that efficiency driven arguments on the relative success of different organizational forms may be misleading. Hence, we argue that, change in production organization should be described not as a linear path, but rather as a branching tree.
firms-theory  property  institutional_economics  technology  Labor_markets  capital  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Maria Cristina Marcuzzo: Joan Robinson and the three cambridge revolutions - Review of Political Economy
Volume 15, Issue 4 - June 2010 Joan Robinson's association with three Cambridge ‘revolutions’—imperfect competition, effective demand and capital theory—is examined in the context of her personal and intellectual partnership with Richard Kahn, John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa. Initially, imperfect competition appeared to have successfully extended marginal analysis to all market forms. It also allowed Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson to persuade Keynes to present the main argument of The General Theory in terms of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. By the early 1950s, however, Joan Robinson had rejected the Marshallian methodology and had become a strenuous censor of neoclassical theory. In this paper the origin of her critique is traced to her reading of Sraffa's Introduction to Ricardo's Principles. Downloaded pdf to Note
20thC  economic_history  economic_models  Keynesianism  Keynes  Sraffa  Joan_Robinson  neoclassical_economics  Ricardo  capital  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Krugman is right: "Macroeconomics is all wrong" | NAKED KEYNESIANISM July 2013
Krugman seems to be surprised to find out that there is no direct relation between fiscal deficits and higher interest rates, and that for the most part the relation seems to be upside down. He gets everything right, including the bold claim that mainstream macro [the only one he acknowledges, even though he knows better] is all wrong.

And seriously why is he surprised that crowding out does not hold water?!It's not new that the evidence for crowding out is weak, at best. For the most part the evidence on the positive effects of fiscal policy on the level of activity has been well established (see here Eisner, and here a review by Arestis and Sawyer).
economic_models  fiscal_policy  capital  interest_rates  crowding_out  investment  economic_growth  austerity  capital_markets 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
NAKED KEYNESIANISM: The meaning of short and long-term and the natural rate July 2013
Less than impressed by Miles Kimball explanation and 5 different model durations (short, short to medium, medium, medium to long, long) which make different key assumptions, especially re equilibrium and factor remuneration and substitution
Thinks the old capital debates made much of this meaningless
economic_models  capital  Labor_markets 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
The capital debates: A brief introduction | NAKED KEYNESIANISM March 2012
It must be noted that, even though the capital debates are fundamentally about the logical coherence of the neoclassical approach, the results of the capital debates have important empirical implications. Neoclassical theory makes strong predictions vis-à-vis substitution effects and the relation between relative scarcity and remuneration. Yet the capital debates suggest that some of those predictions might not be consistent, and, as a result, the absence of those relations might be expected in the real world. Interesting bibliography
economic_theory  economic_models  neoclassical_economics  political_economy  18thC  20thC  capital  Labor_markets 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Labor's Declining Share of Income and Rising Inequality :: Margaret Jacobson and Filippo Occhino :: Economic Commentary :: 09.25.12 :: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
One consequence of the labor share decline has raised concerns. Since labor income is more evenly distributed across U.S. households than capital income, the decline made total income less evenly distributed and more concentrated at the top of the distribution, and this contributed to increased income inequality. In this Commentary, we look at how the labor share decline has affected income inequality in the past, and we study the likely future path of the labor share and its implications for inequality.
US_economy  political_economy  inequality  Labor_markets  capital  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Making a Case for Transparent Corporate Accounting Information | Berkeley-Haas
A new study by accounting professor Yaniv Konchitchki finds greater transparency in firms’ earnings has a positive effect on the bottom line.

The researchers studied a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies over a 27-year period.  They tested their hypothesis that transparency affects a firm’s value by modeling how the cost of capital changes dependent on the lack or abundance of information.  They considered “transparency” on a range from zero percent to 100 percent whereas categories of information may include sales, growth, management quality, global offices, cost of goods sold, etc.  For example, 100 percent earnings transparency means that accounting earnings offer the ability to fully explain changes in a firm’s value. Lower percentages of transparency means more information than earnings is needed to explain changes in a firm’s value. Konchitchki refers to the economic mechanism that drives the link between transparency and cost of capital as the “information asymmetry” effect. “When the amount of available information is not symmetrical, some investors will have more information, others will have less. This drives the significant negative relation between earnings transparency and the cost of capital, and thus our paper also provides the economic intuition that links between transparency and valuation,” says Konchitchki.
business  corporate_governance  capital 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Mike Mariathasan, Ouarda Merrouche, Capital adequacy and hidden risk | vox June 2013
The regulation of bank capital has recently come under renewed scrutiny. This column argues that the way we implement capital regulation needs to be reconsidered because banks under-report risk, thereby escaping government intervention and maintaining market access. One possible way forward, something already implemented under Basel III, is to ask banks to satisfy a capital requirement relative to total (rather than risk-weighted) assets. Overall, simple, transparent, workable rules are what we should be aiming for.
banking  financial_regulation  financial_system  capital  risk  Basle  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
The Manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights by Mike Mariathasan, Ouarda Merrouche :: SSRN May 2013
SSRN briefcase $5
Abstract:     
 In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks’ approval for the internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches of Basel II and the ratio of risk-weighted over total assets. Analysing a panel of 115 banks from 21 OECD countries that were eventually approved for applying the IRB to their credit portfolio, we find that risk-weight density is lower once regulatory approval is granted. The effect persists when we control for different loan categories, and we provide evidence showing that it cannot be explained by flawed modelling, or improved risk-measurement alone.

Consistent with theories of risk-weight manipulation, we find the decline in risk-weights to be particularly prevalent among weakly capitalised banks, when the legal framework for supervision is weak, and in countries where supervisors are overseeing many IRB banks. We conclude that part of the decline in reported riskiness under the IRB results from banks’ strategic risk-modelling.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Basel II, capital regulation, internal ratings-based approach
JEL Classification: G20, G21, G28
working papers series 
banking  financial_regulation  risk  capital  Basle 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Recapitalization, Credit and Liquidity by Mike Mariathasan, Ouarda Merrouche :: SSRN Oct 2012
SSRN briefcase $
Mariathasan, Mike and Merrouche, Ouarda, Recapitalization, Credit and Liquidity (October 2012). Economic Policy, Vol. 27, Issue 72, pp. 603-646, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164013 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2012.00293.x

Abstract:      This paper documents the characteristics of public recapitalizations of banks undertaken since 2008 and examines their relationship with bank lending. The analysis covers the 15 OECD countries whose banking sectors were most severely hit by the crisis and that provided the largest public bailouts relative to their national gross domestic product (GDP). We show that the design of the interventions varied considerably across banks and countries. Larger and higher loss‐absorbing capital injections were targeted at weaker banks and at banks of ‘systemically relevant’ size, when the state of public finances allowed. Our results encourage theoretical research with respect to non‐linear and potentially adverse effects of bailouts, as well as further investigation into the link between the loss absorbing properties of bank capital and loan growth.

With respect to bank lending, we find that only large recapitalizations and infusions of common equity are associated with higher total regulatory capital ratios and sustained loan growth.

We find no significant relationship between public capital provisions and interbank lending and challenge the view that local banks increase loan growth relatively more in response to a recapitalization.
banking  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  bailouts  OECD_economies  capital 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Finance and the Preservation of Wealth by Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny :: SSRN June 2013
SSRN briefcase NBER $
Abstract:      We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs to trusting investors. In this model, the size of the financial sector rises with aggregate wealth, and wealth grows relative to GDP. As a consequence, the ratio of financial income to GDP rises over time, even though fees for given financial services decline. Because the size of the financial sector fluctuates with changes in investor trust, the model can account for the sharp decline of finance in the Great Depression, as well as its slow recovery afterwards. Entry by financial intermediaries as wealth increased in recent years may have further deepened investor trust and encouraged growth of financial income.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Gennaioli, Nicola, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., Finance and the Preservation of Wealth (June 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19117. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280969
macroeconomics  economic_growth  capital  institutional_investors  financialization  economic_history  20thC  21stC  economic_models  behavioral_economics  trust  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Andrew Fieldhouse: Rising Income Inequality and the Role of Shifting Market-Income Distribution, Tax Burdens, and Tax Rates | EPI Briefing Paper June 2013
Pdf available
This paper reviews empirical trends in pre- and post-tax income inequality since 1979 and summarizes recent empirical and theoretical research on the role of tax policy in exacerbating market-based income inequality. It finds that increasing top marginal tax rates could yield potentially large results in slowing the growth of income inequality, and as shown in Fieldhouse (2013a), do so without substantially reducing productive economic activity:
US_economy  taxes  capital  Labor_markets  inequality 
june 2013 by dunnettreader

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