dunnettreader + busisness-ethics   10

Geoffrey Jones (HBS Working Papers 2013) - Debating the Responsibility of Capitalism in Historical and Global Perspective
This working paper examines the evolution of concepts of the responsibility of business in a historical and global perspective. It shows that from the nineteenth century American, European, Japanese, Indian and other business leaders discussed the responsibilities of business beyond making profits, although until recently such views have not been mainstream. There was also a wide variation concerning the nature of this responsibility. This paper argues that four factors drove such beliefs: spirituality; self-interest; fears of government intervention; and the belief that governments were incapable of addressing major social issues.

Keywords: Rachel Carson; Sustainability; Local Food; Operations Management; Supply Chain; Business And Society; Business Ethics; Business History; Corporate Philanthropy; Corporate Social Responsibility; Corporate Social Responsibility And Impact; Environmentalism; Environmental Entrepreneurship; Environmental And Social Sustainability; Ethics; Globalization; History; Religion; Consumer Products Industry; Chemical Industry; Beauty and Cosmetics Industry; Energy Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; Forest Products Industry; Green Technology Industry; Manufacturing Industry; Asia; Europe; Latin America; Middle East; North and Central America; Africa
paper  downloaded  economic_history  business_history  imperialism  US  British_Empire  France  Germany  Japan  Spain  Dutch  Latin_America  Ottoman_Empire  India  18thC  19thC  20thC  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  business  busisness-ethics  business-and-politics  common_good  communitarian  environment  labor  patriarchy  paternalism  labor_standards  regulation  product_safety  inequality  comparative_economics  capital_as_power  capitalism  CSR  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_sociology  self-interest  ideology 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Michael Hudson - Veblen’s Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory - Working Paper No. 729 | Levy Economics Institute - August 2012
As the heirs to classical political economy and the German historical school, the American institutionalists retained rent theory and its corollary idea of unearned income. More than any other institutionalist, Thorstein Veblen emphasized the dynamics of banks financing real estate speculation and Wall Street maneuvering to organize monopolies and trusts. Yet despite the popularity of his writings with the reading public, his contribution has remained isolated from the academic mainstream, and he did not leave behind a “school.” Veblen criticized academic economists for having fallen subject to “trained incapacity” as a result of being turned into factotums to defend rentier interests. Business schools were painting an unrealistic happy-face picture of the economy, teaching financial techniques but leaving out of account the need to reform the economy’s practices and institutions. In emphasizing how financial “predation” was hijacking the economy’s technological potential, Veblen’s vision was as materialist and culturally broad as that of the Marxists, and as dismissive of the status quo. Technological innovation was reducing costs but breeding monopolies as the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sectors joined forces to create a financial symbiosis cemented by political-insider dealings—and a trivialization of economic theory as it seeks to avoid dealing with society’s failure to achieve its technological potential. The fruits of rising productivity were used to finance robber barons who had no better use of their wealth than to reduce great artworks to the status of ownership trophies and achieve leisure-class status by funding business schools and colleges to promote a self-congratulatory but deceptive portrayal of their wealth-grabbing behavior. -- Associated Program: Explorations in Theory and Empirical Analysis -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Veblen  entre_deux_guerres  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  political_economy  classical_economics  neoclassical_economics  marginalists  German_historical_school  professionalization  academia  philanthropy  Gilded_Age  robber_barons  finance_capital  technology  investment  monopolies  speculative_finance  financial_system  financialization  antitrust  history-and-social_sciences  rentiers  rent-seeking  business-and-politics  business-norms  busisness-ethics  business_schools  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Cassandra Does Tokyo: Sympathy For The Devil -July 2014
Brilliantly horrifying mock CV of a senior executive moving through all the financial ibdustry's greatest "hits" of the past quarter century, starting with Citibank generating loan deals in the NICs to recycle pétrodollars, through Drexel stuffing LBO junk bonds in related fiduciaries, Long Term Capital, dot com bubble, commodity "swaps" as low risk uncorrelated asset class, of course mortgage securitization, HFT "liquidity provision" via order sniffing, front running, dark pools, selective "market making", and designing equity portfolio insurance for post crash terrified institutional investors (who would lose the entire upside of past 5 years stock prices, plus a few ywists, especially from the '90s involving derivatives, the Nikkei, etc that were off my radar screen. Only thing I think he left out were the various municipal finance scams.
20thC  post-Cold_War  21stC  economic_history  financialization  Great_Recession  financial_innovation  bubbles  busisness-ethics  institutional_investors  derivatives  securitization  HFT  emerging_markets  fraud  fiduciaries  financial_regulation  finance_capital 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
John Groenewegen - European Integration and Changing Corporate Governance Structures: The Case of France | JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 471-479
Speculates that the economic and business cultures of major countries are distinctive enough that the expectation of global convergence on Anglo-Saxon corporate governance norms is too simplistic. It's based implicitly or explicitly on the assumption that liberalization of European capital markets will produce a European-wide market in corporate control that will impose its Anglo-Saxon norms and values via access to and pricing of international capital. He looks at ways that European Integration might reinforce local norms or converge toward a more European set of values and governance practices. Short article, didn't download
article  jstor  France  Eurozone  EU  market_integration  capital_markets  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  corporate_control_markets  busisness-ethics  business-norms  corporate_finance  corporate_citizenship 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas R. Wells, “Recovering Adam Smith’s ethical economics”| real-world economics review, issue no. 68, 21 August 2014, pp. 90-97 | Real-World Economics Review Blog
Justice was thus central to Smith’s critique of the crony capitalism of his time, and to his alternative proposal of a “system of natural liberty” characterised both by a level playing field (the responsibility of political institutions) and a commitment to “fair play” (the moral responsibility of economic actors). The quotation above is often taken to indicate Smith’s rejection of the interests of the poor by ruling out the kind of redistributive policies found in a modern welfare state as akin to a referee changing the results of a game to favour one “team” over another. Yet that misses Smith’s commitment to procedural fairness, which introduces a concern that the rules of the game—the institutional arrangements that decide who should get what share of the gains of economic activity—should themselves be fair. If a country’s economy creates great wealth but the share going to the workers versus the owners of capital is kept artificially low by unfair institutions—such as restrictions on workers’ ability to bargain (WN I.viii.13)—that is a gross injustice which keeps the country less prosperous than it ought to be. Smith thus appears a more radical critic of the structural origins of economic inequality than many today on the political left. In Smith’s time no less than in our own, a political commitment to a free society and a free economy does not imply that we should simply accept our existing socio-economic institutional arrangements (cf Grusky 2012). On the contrary, it implies rigorous scrutiny and reform.
article  intellectual_history  political_economy  Smith  busisness-ethics  justice  Labor_markets  rent-seeking  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Steve Denning - From CEO 'Takers' To CEO 'Makers': The Great Transformation - Forbes - August 2014
CEOs, through the pervasive use of share buybacks, have become takers, not makers. Instead of creating value for their organizations and society, they are extracting value. Pervasive share buybacks are an economic, social and moral disaster: they contribute to loss of shareholder value, crippled capacity to innovate, runaway executive compensation, destruction of jobs, rapidly increasing inequality and sustained economic stagnation. Yet share buybacks have become “an unhealthy corporate obsession,” even “an addiction.” The situation is one of fundamental institutional failure. CEOs are extracting value from their firms. Business schools are teaching them how to do it. Institutional shareholders are complicit in what the CEOs are doing. Regulators pursue individuals but remain indifferent to systemic failure. Rating agencies reward malfeasance. Analysts applaud short-term gains and ignore obvious long-term rot. Politicians stand by and watch. In a great betrayal, the very leaders who should be fixing the system are complicit in its continuance. Unless our society reverses course, it is heading for a cataclysm. The solution to fundamental institutional failure goes beyond passing a few regulations or changing the behavior of a few CEOs. It involves changes in behavior in a whole set of institutions and actors: -- Change won’t happen merely by pointing out that shareholder primacy is a bad idea. Bad ideas don’t die just because they are bad. They hang around until a consensus forms around another idea that is better. Fortunately, a consensus is emerging around a better idea. The idea isn’t new. It’s Peter Drucker’s foundational insight of 1973: the only valid purpose of a firm is to create a customer. It’s through providing value to customers that firms justify their existence. Profits and share price increases are the result, not the goal of a firm’s activities
business  busisness-ethics  norms-business  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  investment  investors  management  financialization  finance_capital  capital_markets  inequality  1-percent  Drucker_Peter  Friedman_Milton  shareholder_value  profit 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
"Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein" by David A. Skeel Jr. | Penn Law School
C David A. Skeel Jr., University of Pennsylvania -- published as 2 Berkeley J. L. & Bus. 105 -- Recommended Citation -- Skeel, David A. Jr., "Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein" (2005). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 692. - http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/692 -- downloaded pdf to Note
corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_law  busisness-ethics  downloaded 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Krista Bondy - The Paradox of Power in CSR: A Case Study on Implementation | JSTOR: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Oct., 2008), pp. 307-323
Although current literature assumes positive outcomes for stakeholders resulting from an increase in power associated with CSR, this research suggests that this increase can lead to conflict within organizations, resulting in almost complete inactivity on CSR. **Methods** A Single in-depth case study, focusing on power as an embedded concept. **Results** Empirical evidence is used to demonstrate how some actors use CSR to improve their own positions within an organization. Resource dependence theory is used to highlight why this may be a more significant concern for CSR. **Conclusions** Increasing power for CSR has the potential to offer actors associated with it increased personal power, and thus can attract opportunistic actors with little interest in realizing the benefits of CSR for the company and its stakeholders. Thus power can be an impediment to furthering CSR strategy and activities at the individual and organizational level.
article  jstor  CSR  incentives  organizations  busisness-ethics  firms-theory  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston - The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications | JSTOR: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 65-91
The stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified in the management literature on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative validity. These three aspects of the theory, although interrelated, are quite distinct; they involve different types of evidence and argument and have different implications. In this article, we examine these three aspects of the theory and critique and integrate important contributions to the literature related to each. We conclude that the three aspects of stakeholder theory are mutually supportive and that the normative base of the theory-which includes the modern theory of property rights-is fundamental. -- see bibliography on jstor information page -- didn't download -- cited by more than 150 on jstor
article  jstor  corporate_governance  busisness-ethics  legal_theory  property_rights  externalities  CSR  lit_survey  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Elisabet Garriga and Domènec Melé - Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory | JSTOR: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 53, No. 1/2 (Aug., 2004), pp. 51-71
The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) field presents not only a landscape of theories but also a proliferation of approaches, which are controversial, complex and unclear. This article tries to clarify the situation, "mapping the territory" by classifying the main CSR theories and related approaches in four groups: (1) instrumental theories, in which the corporation is seen as only an instrument for wealth creation, and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results; (2) political theories, which concern themselves with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena; (3) integrative theories, in which the corporation is focused on the satisfaction of social demands; and (4) ethical theories, based on ethical responsibilities of corporations to society. In practice, each CSR theory presents four dimensions related to profits, political performance, social demands and ethical values. The findings suggest the necessity to develop a new theory on the business and society relationship, which should integrate these four dimensions. -- see bibliography on jstor information page -- didn't download -- cited by more than 40 on jstor
article  jstor  social_theory  business  business-and-politics  CSR  corporate_governance  capitalism  ethics  busisness-ethics  externalities  profit  civil_society  lit_survey  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader

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