dunnettreader + bank_runs   23

Dewatripont, M. and Rochet, J., Tirole, J. - Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis (orig 2010) - Princeton University Press
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, Balancing the Banks draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future.

While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an adaptive prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints.

Offering a global perspective, Balancing the Banks should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.
Downloaded Chapters 1 & 2 to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  capital_markets  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  liquidity  risk_management  incentives-distortions  incentives  international_finance  global_governance  regulatory_arbitrage  regulatory_avoidance  regulation-costs  regulation-enforcement  regulation-harmonization  regulation 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Michael T. Kiley - Macroeconomic Modeling of Financial Frictions for Macroprudential Policymaking: A Review of Pressing Challenges | FRB: FEDS Notes: May 2016
Structural macroeconomic modeling plays a central role economic policy discussions. Over the past fifty years, the overwhelming majority of such efforts have focused on the structural features of household, firm, and government behavior that lead to cyclical fluctuations in employment and inflation and the roles of monetary and fiscal policy in ameliorating undesirable volatility in economic performance. In recent years, the potential role of macroprudential policies in limiting excessive volatility in the financial sector and the consequent effects on economic performance has risen to the fore in academic and policy discussions. While progress in modeling for macroprudential policy analysis has been substantial, there remain many important challenges, and consensus on a core modeling framework remains far away. This note reviews some of the progress witnessed in recent years and challenges that remain. - downloaded to Tab S2
paper  Fed  macroprudential_policies  macroeconomics  economic_models  economic_theory  financial_stability  Great_Recession  bank_runs  money_market  housing  households  house_prices  leverage  intermediation  non-linear_models  downloaded 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Quaker bankers: building trust on the basis of sincerity, reciprocity and charity | Magic, Maths & Money - Feb 2016
This post follows discussions of the norms sincerity, reciprocity and charity in financial markets. It suggests that the success of Quaker finance, that funded… Tracks the importance of Quaker-owned banks to the development of UK financial system - the number of big-name banking families with Quaker founders is striking. Their personalized methods of working on reputation (theirs and their borrowers) based on shared standards of probity and transparency, disciplined by membership in the Quaker community - allowed them to not only grow in the loan business, but become big in the bills market. The Quaker method of collecting views re appropriate moral life practices, which were documented and circulated among the members - and set mutual expectations for ethical practices, including areas like bookkeeping and full disclosure. The Quaker firms were central to the system of country banks, capable of providing liquidity to halt bank runs, wind down problem institutions etc. Their bills business didn't survive the switch to the Bank of England becoming lender of last resort in the 1844 crisis. And their information advantages don't seem to have remained a competitive advantage as it had been in the pre Napoleonic_Wars era.
Instapaper  economic_history  financial_innovation  banking  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  Quakers  dissenters  Industrial_Revolution  ethics  norms  norms-business  accounting  accountability  reputation  disclosure  information-intermediaries  information-markets  money_market  Bank_of_England  country_banks  financial_crisis  bank_runs  lender-of-last-resort  from instapaper
february 2016 by dunnettreader
The Tri-Party Repo Market Like You Have Never Seen It Before | Liberty Street Economics - October 2015
They've got a database analytical tool that, like FRED, allows lots of slicing and dicing at all sorts of levels of details - history doesn't extend very far back since until the last 2 decades the repo market was tiny and dominated by a few specialist firms, not the brand-name players
Instapaper  financial_economics  databases  money_market  credit_booms  credit_crunch  bubbles  financial_crisis  shadow_banking  markets-structure  liquidity  bank_runs  from instapaper
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Symposium: The Bailouts of 2007-2009 (Spring 2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 29 No.2
Austan D. Goolsbee and Alan B. Krueger - A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and Restructuring General Motors and Chrysler (pp. 3-24) **--** W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery - The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (pp. 25-52) **--** Charles W. Calomiris and Urooj Khan - An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions (pp. 53-80) **--** Robert McDonald and Anna Paulson - AIG in Hindsight (pp. 81-106) **--** Phillip Swagel - Legal, Political, and Institutional Constraints on the Financial Crisis Policy Response (pp. 107-22) -- available online, didn't download
article  journals-academic  financial_system  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  bailouts  bail-ins  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capital_markets  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  NBFI  securitization  credit_booms  credit_ratings  incentives-distortions  public-private_partnerships  Fannie_Mae  housing  leverage  financial_system-government_back-stop  financial_innovation  firesales  liquidity  asset_prices  Fed  lender-of-last-resort  regulatory_capture  regulatory_avoidance  credit_crunch  bankruptcy  government_agencies  government_finance  global_economy  global_governance  international_finance  international_monetary_system  international_crisis  property_rights  derivatives  clearing_&_settlement  GSEs  bubbles 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Clément Fontan - La BCE et la crise du capitalisme en Europe - La Vie des idées - 24 février 2015
Selon Clément Fontan, la Banque centrale européenne a outrepassé ses prérogatives et a, sans contrôle démocratique, traité de manière trop différenciée l’aide qu’elle apporte aux États et celle qu’elle alloue au système financier. Mots-clés : Europe | banque centrale | capitalisme | Grèce | euro -- quite helpful for details of how the various powers, decision-making processes and authority in the EU, the Eurozone, the member states, and the ECB interact -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  capitalism-systemic_crisis  finance_capital  financialization  Greece-Troika  Eurocrsis  QE  bank_runs  payments_systems  bailouts  Germany-Eurozone  France  accountability  democracy_deficit  austerity  Maastricht  sovereign_debt  sovereignty  Europe-federalism  European_integration  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Werner Plumpe - The hour of the expert - economic expertise over 4 centuries - Eurozine - October 2012
What constitutes economic expertise? Looking at how European politics has answered this question over the last four centuries, Werner Plumpe argues that, at any given time, economic expertise is judged according to its coincidence with the conjuncture. -- Original in German -- Translation by Samuel Willcocks -- First published in Merkur 9-10/2012 (German version); Eurozine (English version) -- quite amusing, but nice overview that isn't excessively Anglo oriented
economic_history  economic_theory  expertise  sociology_of_knowledge  social_sciences  positivism  social_sciences-post-WWII  macroeconomics  economic_models  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Europe-Early_Modern  intellectual_history  grand_narrative  narrative-contested  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_policy  capitalism  capitalism-varieties  capitalism-systemic_crisis  laisser-faire  cameralism  government-roles  business_cycles  business-and-politics  Keynesianism  neoclassical_economics  Austrian_economics  liberalism-19thC  finance_capital  bank_runs  financial_crisis  regulation  Marxism  public_enterprise  public_goods  infrastructure  market_fundamentalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
interfluidity » Greece - July 2015
Steve Randy Waldmann -- his 1st take on what's been going on, and how the Eurozone gives all the power to creditors, which produces a bunch of terribly misaligned incentives -- and what business bankruptcy law guards against
Instapaper  EU  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  Greece-Troika  IMF  bailouts  political_economy  democracy_deficit  austerity  bank_runs  central_banks  lender-of-last-resort  international_organizations  international_finance  creditors  bankruptcy  incentives-distortions  sovereign_debt  default  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Ashoka Mody - In bad faith | Bruegel.org - July 3 2015
On July 2, the IMF released its analysis of whether Greek debt was sustainable or not. The report said that Greek debt was not sustainable and deep debt relief…
Instapaper  Greece-Troika  Eurozone  IMF  sovereign_debt  international_organizations  international_finance  global_governance  austerity  default  bank_runs  ECB  lender-of-last-resort  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Karl Whelan - The Grexit Mechanism: What It Means For The Future Of the Euro | Medium - June 26 2015
Greek crisis exposes cracks in the euro’s design that won’t be fixed by Greece leaving. Despite the euro’s legal status as an irrevocable currency union, the… Nice review of the tangle of economic, political and legal issues -- Default isn't by itself enough to force Grexit, so it's really what political stance the ECB takes, and even with Grexit there are the other members of the Eurozone suffering from similar problems as Greece -- Whelan: In recent years, the single most important factor that has papered over the cracks in the euro has been Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” commitment to preserve the euro. But if whatever-it-takes doesn’t prevent a Greek exit, there would be serious questions about what kind of euro the ECB was actually willing to bother preserving. Worth remembering is that what Draghi actually said was: "Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough." The “within our mandate” bit has provided Draghi with plenty of wiggle room to decide what kind of euro he wants to preserve. It clearly doesn’t have to be one that includes Greece. And there may be others that get jettisoned. Whether this kind of a la carte euro will survive the test of time is highly questionable.
Instapaper  Eurozone  EU  ECB  EU_governance  Europe-federalism  monetary_policy  FX  lender-of-last-resort  Greece  Greece-Troika  IMF  sovereign_debt  banking  bank_runs  austerity  FX-misalignment  Spain  Portugal  Italy  political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Caspar Siegert and Matthew Willison - Estimating the extent of the ‘too big to fail’ problem – a review of existing approaches | Bank of England -- Financial Stability Paper 32: 13 February 2015
​How big is the ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) problem? Different approaches have been developed to estimate the impact being perceived as TBTF might have on banks’ costs of funding. One approach is to look at how the values of banks’ equity and debt change in response to events that may have altered expectations that banks are TBTF. Another is to estimate whether debt costs vary across banks according to features that make them more or less likely to be considered TBTF. A third approach is to estimate a model of the expected value of government support to banks in distress. We review these different approaches, discussing their pros and cons. Policy measures are being implemented to end the TBTF problem. Approaches to estimating the extent of the problem could play a useful role in the future in evaluating the success of those policies. With that in mind, we conclude by outlining in what ways we think approaches need to develop and suggest ideas for future research. -- didn't download
paper  banking  financial_crisis  bank_runs  financial_system-government_back-stop  too-big-to-fail  rents  rent-seeking  risk_premiums  capital_markets  margin_requirements  equity_markets  leverage 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Policy Statement - The implementation of ring-fencing: legal structure, governance and the continuity of services and facilities | Bank of England – PS10/15 - May 2015
The Prudential Regulation Authority is required under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013) to make policy to implement the ring-fencing of core UK financial services and activities. This policy statement will be of interest to banks which will be required to ring-fence their core activities. This will include banking groups with core deposits greater than £25 billion. It will also be of interest to financial and other institutions and customers who have dealings with ring-fenced bodies. The policy statement provides feedback on the responses received to Consultation Paper 19/14 published in October 2014, and the amendments to the draft rules and supervisory statements included in CP19/14. The policy statement covers three areas: (1) legal structure arrangements of banking groups subject to ring-fencing; (2) governance arrangements of ring-fenced bodies; and (3) arrangements to ensure continuity of services and facilities to ring-fenced bodies. -- plan for effective date in 2019 -- didn't download
public_policy  financial_regulation  Bank_of_England  banking  deposit_insurance  bank_runs  bank_holding_cos  corporate_governance  too-big-to-fail 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Filippo Occhino - Debt-Overhang Banking Crises | Cleveland Fed - Dec 2014
WP 14-25 -- This paper studies how a worsening of the debt overhang distortion on bank lending can explain banking solvency crises that are accompanied by a plunge of bank asset values and by a severe contraction of lending and economic activity. Since the value of bank assets depends on economic prospects, a pessimistic view of the economy can be self-fulfilling and can trigger a financial crisis: If economic prospects are poor, bank asset values decline, the bank risk of default rises, and the associated debt overhang distortion worsens. The worsening of the distortion leads to a contraction in bank loans and a decline in economic activity, which confirms the initial pessimistic view. Signals of the existence of systemic risk include: a rise in the volatility and the presence of two modes in the probability distribution functions of the returns of bank-issued bonds and of portfolios of bank-issued bonds and equities; and a surge in the correlation between bank-issued bond returns. Macroprudential policy should limit the sensitivity of bank balance sheets to the aggregate economy and to the financial sector, using investment restrictions, capital requirements, and stress tests. In the event of a crisis, policy options include reducing the above sensitivity with commitments and guarantees, stimulating the economy, and restructuring bank capital and ownership. -- didn't download -- wonder if he uses Minsky
paper  banking  financial_crisis  leverage  deleverage  economic_growth  risk-systemic  business_cycles  bank_runs  capital_markets  bond_markets  macroprudential_regulation  macroprudential_policies  volatility  default  firesales  FDIC  Fed  demand-side  credit  business-forecasts  Minsky  financial_economics 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz -The mythic quest for early warnings — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
Reviews a number of stress indexes developed since the financial crisis -- most show a good way of indicating where we are at any one time, and several may be useful in crisis management for identifying institutions with liquidity vs insolvency problems, but none tell us where we're going **--** Where does this leave us? Our answer is that we have yet another reason to be skeptical of time-varying, discretionary regulatory policy. In an earlier post, we noted that the combination of high information requirements, long transmission lags and significant political resistance made it unlikely time-varying capital requirements will be effective in reducing financial vulnerabilities. Our conclusion then, which we reiterate now, is that the solution is to build a financial system that is safe and resilient all of the time, since we really never know what is coming. That means a regulatory system based on economic function, not legal form, with sufficient capital buffers to guard against all but the very worst possibilities. In the end, a financial system that relies on an early warning indicator of imminent financial collapse seems destined to fail. -- copied to Pocket
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_adequacy  capital_markets  NBFI  information-markets  information-asymmetric  risk  risk-systemic  risk_management  Great_Recession  global_governance  banking  bank_runs  liquidity  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Giovanni Dosi, et al -Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Complex Evolving Economies -- 2013 :: SSRN
Giovanni Dosi, Giorgio Fagiolo, Mauro Napoletano, Andrea Roventini, Tania Treibich -- In this paper we explore the effects of alternative combinations of fiscal and monetary policies under different income distribution regimes. In particular, we aim at evaluating fiscal rules in economies subject to banking crises and deep recessions. We do so using an agent-based model populated by heterogeneous capital- and consumption-good firms, heterogeneous banks, workers/consumers, a Central Bank and a Government. We show that the model is able to reproduce a wide array of macro and micro empirical regularities, including stylised facts concerning financial dynamics and banking crises. Simulation results suggest that the most appropriate policy mix to stabilize the economy requires unconstrained counter-cyclical fiscal policies, where automatic stabilizers are free to dampen business cycles fluctuations, and a monetary policy targeting also employment. Instead, "discipline-guided" fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact or the Fiscal Compact in the Eurozone always depress the economy, without improving public finances, even when escape clauses in case of recessions are considered. Consequently, austerity policies appear to be in general self-defeating. Furthermore, we show that the negative effects of austere fiscal rules are magnified by conservative monetary policies focused on inflation stabilization only. Finally, the effects of monetary and fiscal policies become sharper as the level of income inequality increases. -- Pages in PDF File: 38 -- Keywords: agent-based model, fiscal policy, monetary policy, banking crises, income inequality, austerity policies, disequilibrium dynamics -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  macroeconomics  fiscal_policy  fiscal_drag  austerity  Eurozone  EU_governance  EU  equilibrium  financial_crisis  bank_runs  inequality  countercyclical_policy  agent-based_models  complexity  recessions  dynamic_attractors  complex_adaptive_systems  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew W. Lo, Thomas J. Brennan - Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses?: An Analytical Framework - Texas Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 7, 2012 :: SSRN
Andrew Lo - Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) *--* Thomas J. Brennan - Northwestern University School of Law. **--** A common theme in the regulation of financial institutions and transactions is leverage constraints. Although such constraints are implemented in various ways — from minimum net capital rules to margin requirements to credit limits — the basic motivation is the same: to limit the potential losses of certain counterparties. However, the emergence of dynamic trading strategies, derivative securities, and other financial innovations poses new challenges to these constraints. We propose a simple analytical framework for specifying leverage constraints that addresses this challenge by explicitly linking the likelihood of financial loss to the behavior of the financial entity under supervision and prevailing market conditions. An immediate implication of this framework is that not all leverage is created equal, and any fixed numerical limit can lead to dramatically different loss probabilities over time and across assets and investment styles. This framework can also be used to investigate the macroprudential policy implications of microprudential regulations through the general-equilibrium impact of leverage constraints on market parameters such as volatility and tail probabilities. -- Pages in PDF File: 36 -- Leverage, Liquidity, Financial Regulation, Capital Requirements, Macroprudential Policies, Net Capital Rules -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  markets-structure  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  leverage  capital_adequacy  liquidity  capital_markets  money_market  derivatives  arbitrage  macroprudential_policies  macroprudential_regulation  risk-systemic  financial_innovation  bank_runs  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review by Andrew W. Lo :: SSRN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- The recent financial crisis has generated many distinct perspectives from various quarters. In this article, I review a diverse set of 21 books on the crisis, 11 written by academics, and 10 written by journalists and one former Treasury Secretary. No single narrative emerges from this broad and often contradictory collection of interpretations, but the sheer variety of conclusions is informative, and underscores the desperate need for the economics profession to establish a single set of facts from which more accurate inferences and narratives can be constructed. -- Pages in PDF File: 41 -- Keywords: Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, Book Review -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  reviews  books  economic_history  21stC  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  regulation-enforcement  rent-seeking  fraud  debt  debtors  housing  securitization  derivatives  bank_runs  banking-universal  Glass-Steagal  risk_management  risk-systemic  financial_economics  global_system  global_imbalance  capital_flows  institutional_investors  institutional_economics  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Narrow Banks Won't Stop Bank Runs — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2014
Banks serve capitalist economies in two ways that are costly to replicate. First, they are experts in providing liquidity both to depositors and to borrowers. For the former, it is deposits and for the latter, lines of credit (such as home equity loans that can be used when the borrower needs the funds). Second, they have expertise both in screening potential borrowers and then in monitoring those to whom they make loans. That is, they specialize in mitigating the information problems that plague all financial transactions.(..) the main point: would narrow banking really eliminate runs? Would it solve the fragility problem its proponents suggest is a consequence of fractional reserve banking? Our short answer to these questions is no. The mutual funds of the narrow banking world would be subject to the same runs. Indeed, recent research highlights that – in the presence of small investors – relatively illiquid mutual funds are more likely to face exit in the event of past bad performance. Thus, in practice, illiquidity plays the same role in a world of mutual funds with many investors as it does in the classic Diamond-Dybvig model of a bank run. And, without deposit insurance, the runs could be both more frequent and more devastating. Even modest declines in confidence, for reasons that are either real or imaginary, could readily turn into panics. (...) After this happened even once, people would simply flock to the narrow banks, and there would be no source of lending. That is, a financial panic in a system with narrow banks would devastate the credit intermediation process. (..) the government’s initial commitment to let the not-so-narrow funds fail in a crisis would not be credible, adding to the funds’ incentive to take on credit and liquidity risk and – contrary to the goals of narrow banking – raising the probability and cost of a future crisis.
financial_system  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  NBFI  FDIC  liquidity  investors 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Regulating Money Market Mutual Funds: An Update — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - July 2014
The SEC has finally acted(..) 859 pages of new rules for the operation of some money market funds. To summarize our reaction: we are underwhelmed! It is hard to see how the new rules will reduce systemic risk in any meaningful way. We first wrote about money market funds in May. The original post is here. (..) Let’s start by summarizing the new final regulation. It has three parts: 1) It applies to institutional prime money funds only. 2) These funds are required to have floating net asset values (NAV). 3) Fund boards will have the option to impose liquidity fees and redemption gates if the funds “weekly liquid assets” fall below a threshold. -- This new framework simply will not stop runs. Discretionary liquidity fees and redemption gates increase the risks of a run, not decrease them. Think about it. If you are worried that a fund you own is about to impose a 1% or 2% fee for withdrawals, would you wait around until they did it? What if you became concerned that the fund would suspend redemptions for the next two weeks? Rational, prudent, informed institutional investors will do exactly what we all expect: withdraw ASAP! -- good discussion of various recommendations and research, but it comes down to the MMFs are acting like depository institutions and should be required to maintain capital buffers and pay an FDIC fee. Liquidity fees might be imposed at all times across the board - probably wouldn't do much in a crunch but at least wouldn't create *incentives* for bank runs!
US_economy  financial_system  financial_crisis  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  NBFI  SEC  FDIC  capital_adequacy 
november 2014 by dunnettreader

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