dunnettreader + article + analytical_philosophy   55

Kenneth R Westphal - 'Analytic Philosophy
The definitive version of this article appears in:
The Owl of Minerva , 42.1–2 (2010–11):1–18.
Rejection of the philosophical relevance of history of philosophy remains pronounced within contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy. The two main reasons for this rejection presuppose that strict deduction isboth necessary and sufficient for rational justification. However, this justificatory ideal of scientia holds only within strictly formal domains. This is confirmed by a neglected non-sequitur in van Fraassen’s original defence of ‘Constructive Empiricism’. Conversely, strict deduction is insufficient for rationaljustification in non-formal, substantive domains of inquiry. In non-formal, substantive domains, rational justification is also, in part, ineliminably social and historical, for sound reasons Hegel was the first to articulate. -- Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
history_of_philosophy  historical_sociology  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  deduction  contextualism  evolution-social  development_process  Hegel  contingency  intellectual_history  logic  historicism  evolution-as-model  philosophy_of_social_science  van_Frassen  article  downloaded  analysis-logic  epistemology  epistemology-social  empiricism 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Robert Brandom- Inference, Expression, and Induction [in W Sellars] (1988) | JSTOR
Inference, Expression, and Induction
Robert Brandom
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 54, No. 2, Colloquium on Sellarsian Philosophy (Sep., 1988), pp. 257-285
article  Brandom  inference  induction  jstor  Sellars  semantics  epistemology  analytical_philosophy 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
S. Laygier - La pensée ordinaire et la dèmocratie intellectuelle (2000) | JSTOR - Esprit
L'intellectuel démocratique ne peut être seulement l'homme du social et des justes causes, un redresseur de torts, et se soustraire aux difficultés propres au monde de l'égalité. Il lui faut comprendre le simple, penser l'ordinaire, saisir que la confiance en soi est plus décisive que la mauvaise conscience. En ce sens, la pensée américaine, d'Emerson à Cavell, qui n'est pas réductible aux arabesques de la philosophie analytique, peut nous aider à saisir les problèmes intellectuels propres à la culture et à la politique en terre démocratique. -- Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
French_intellectuals  analytical_philosophy  downloaded  article  ordinary_language_philosophy  Cavell  Rawls  political_philosophy  jstor 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
J-H Glock - What is a theory of meaning? (2912 | JSTOR - Cahiers de Ferdinand Saussure
This article discusses the contrast between two types of theories of meaning: 'analytic' theories that provide an explanation of the concept of linguistic meaning and 'constructive' theories that allow the derivation of statements specifying the meaning of the sentences of a specific language. Contrary to Davidson, Dummett and McDowell, reflecting on the form that a constructive theory for a natural language should take neither solves the task of explaining the concept of meaning nor does it show that enterprise to be superfluous. Conceptual analysis remains essential at two levels: an illuminating constructive theory would have to analyse the concepts of the object language; and the adequacy of a particular type of constructive theory can only be assessed on the basis of an adequate understanding of semantic concepts. To establish these conclusions I reject the Davidson/McDowell proposal that a constructive theory should be (conceptually) 'modest' while defending the idea that it should be 'psychologically' modest. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
analytical_philosophy  downloaded  McDowell  jstor  Dummett  article  meaning  concepts  Davidson 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Richard Rorty - Davidson between Wittgenstein and Tarsk | JSTOR - Critica (1998)
Davidson between Wittgenstein and Tarski
Richard Rorty
Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía
Vol. 30, No. 88 (Apr., 1998), pp. 49-71
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
article  analytical_philosophy  downloaded  logic  Logical_Positivism  pragmatism  epistemology  jstor  truth  Wittgenstein  Davidson  Rorty  epistemology-social 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Michael Williams - Meaning and Deflationary Truth | JSTOR - The Journal of Philosophy (1999)
Meaning and Deflationary Truth
Michael Williams
The Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 96, No. 11 (Nov., 1999), pp. 545-564
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
jstor  downloaded  epistemology  epistemology-social  Davidson  analytical_philosophy  article  truth  meaning 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Donald Davidson - The Folly of Trying to Define Truth | JSTOR - The Journal of Philosophy (1996)
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth
Donald Davidson
The Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 93, No. 6 (Jun., 1996), pp. 263-278
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
jstor  intellectual_history  Davidson  analytical_philosophy  20thC  epistemology  article  post-WWII  downloaded  truth 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Nicola Lacey - Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 919 (2015)
A cri de coeur for putting legal theory and history back together with social theory and empirical social sciences,. -- In the early part of my career, legal history and the history of legal ideas were closed books to me, as I made my way in a field of criminal law scholarship dominated by doctrinal scholarship and by concept-focused philosophical analysis of the foundations of criminal law. These 2 very different paradigms have 1 big thing in common: They tend to proceed as if the main intellectual task is to unearth the deep logic of existing legal doctrines, not infrequently going so far as to read them back onto history, as if things could never have been other than they are. (..)I have increasingly found myself turning to historical resources (1) [to examine] the contingency of particular legal arrangements, and (2) ...to develop causal and other theses about the dynamics which shape them and hence about the role and quality of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies. So, in a sense, I have been using history in support of an analysis driven primarily by the social sciences. (..) it is no accident that all of the great social theorists, from Marx to Foucault via Weber, Durkheim, and Elias, ..have incorporated significant historical elements into their interpretations .... Indeed, without the diachronic perspective provided by history (or the perspective offered by comparative study) we could have no critical purchase on social theory’s characterizations of or causal hypotheses about the dynamics of social systems. Hence, (...) my boundless gratitude to the historians whose meticulous research makes this sort of interpretive social theory possible). -- Lacey is not over-dramatizing -- see the "commentary" from a "legal philosopher" who believes the normative basis of criminal responsibility can be investigated as timeless "moral truths". -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_change  philosophy_of_law  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_social_science  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  morality-conventional  morality-objective  criminal_justice  responsibility  mind  human_nature  norms  power-asymmetric  power-symbolic  power  Neoplatonism  neo-Kantian  a_priori  historiography  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  moral_philosophy  evidence  mental_health  social_order  epistemology  epistemology-moral  change-social  change-intellectual  comparative_law  comparative_anthropology  civil_liberties  women-rights  women-property  rights-legal  rights-political  access_to_services  discrimination  legal_culture  legal_system  legal_reasoning  Foucault  Marx  Weber  Durkheim  metaethics  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan - Of Weevils and Witches: What Can We Learn from the Ghost of Responsibility Past? A Commentary on Lacey's "Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 947 (2015)
Lacey's article (..) criticizes the scholarship on criminal responsibility for being too concerned with “its conceptual contours and moral foundations,” “rather than with what it is for[:] its social roles, meaning, and functions.” Here is what she is arguing against. There are theorists, myself included, who think of questions of responsibility in philosophical terms. These moral truths are not socially or historically contingent; they are constant questions to which we seek answers. (..) In some ways, this is a (boring) methodological debate. What I care about as responsibility is not what she cares about as responsibility. -- YIKES -- Apart from the travesty of equating legal norms with "moral truths," this looks like moral realism run amok -- the questions may be "constant" but who gets to frame the Qs, what values are doing the framing (blood money, retribution, restitution, prevention, hierarchy reinforcement, group purification), what anthropology and epistemology implicitly govern the framing (universal depravity, trial by ordeal, women's testimony is unreliable?), the defined criteria (lower orders don't have honor they can defend, husbands can't commit rape), how criteria are to be applied, by whom (civil vs religious authority, manor courts vs king's law, lie detector operators, NSA algorithms?) -- "Philosophical" inquiry is limited to *a priori* concerns, and "philosophical" answers are limited to eternal Platonic "moral truths". But if normative Qs & As are by definition not contingent on changing institutions and social assumptions re behavior, what's's the foundation for her inquiry process? Armchair "fine-grained" intuitions re "mental states"? So do we get new "moral truths" along with the each new neuroscience study? "Proof there's no free will!"="moral truth" (let everybody out of jail?) and next month "Latest study finds the free will spot"=oops, new eternal "moral truth" (can we test it like DNA?) -- Analytic philosophy rediscovering Aristotelian categories is bad enough, but analytic neo-Platonic anthropology gets me actively hostile, and it's even more absurd if we're talking about criminal law -- didn't download
article  analytical_philosophy  a_priori  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  jurisprudence  criminal_justice  biocultural_evolution  human_nature  moral_psychology 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steven Walt - What Can The History of Jurisprudence Do For Jurisprudence? A Commentary on Schauer's "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 977 (2015)
Walt's response (at least the abstract) appears to prove Schauer's point quite nicely, as if logic and argument by legal theorists takes place in an abstract world where "how did we get here" is universally ignored, despite its possible relevance for "why are we here", "what are we doing here" and "where does it look like we might be headed" -- but Walt devoted 10 pages to his response, so one hopes he has more to justify his position than what comes across as a mix of arrogance (we don't need to learn from history because our theoretical grounding and argumentative methods are self-contained and self-sufficient) and cynicism (history might be interesting, but no way will anybody change what gets them published and tenure) -- out of curiosity as to whether it's really as bad as the abstract makes it sound, downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  positivism  positivism-legal  historiography  legal_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Dan Priel - Toward Classical Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015)
I have two major aims: (1) set the historical record straight(...) Hobbes’s and Bentham’s work that seeks to understand their views on law not by isolating it from the rest of their wide-ranging body of work, but by understanding their jurisprudential work as part of a broader project. (2) My main aim is to contribute to contemporary jurisprudential debates and to suggest that the largely neglected approach of earlier positivists is superior to the view held by most contemporary legal positivists. (...) to what extent it is useful for us to call Hobbes and Bentham “legal positivists.” My answer to this question consists of three interrelated points. The first is that we draw an explicit link between their ideas and the view that (some time later) would come to be known as “positivism,” roughly the view that the methods of the “human sciences” are essentially the same as those of the natural sciences. The second point is that the classical legal positivists’ decisive break with natural law ideas prevalent in their day is to be found exactly here, in their views about metaphysics and nature. The third point is that this aspect of their work has been, in my view regrettably, abandoned by contemporary legal positivists. Though all three points are related, in this Article I will say relatively little about the first point, as I discussed it in greater detail elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski - Positivism(s): A Commentary on Priel's "Toward Classical Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (2015)
Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it insulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor Postema’s phrase from his symposium article. And, in part due to the exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminating the recent history and current state of inquiry. His article demonstrates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurisprudence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this rediscovered path, and I am not sure I always agree with his suggested answers. Any misgivings I have about Priel’s particular approach, however, do not diminish my appreciation; I find even the points of disagreement to be live and meaningful, and that itself is refreshing. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Luban - Time-Mindedness and Jurisprudence: A Commentary on Postema's "Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 903 (2015)
Postema offers two general programmatic suggestions for jurisprudence besides greater historical consciousness: sociability and synechism. Sociability, has two dimensions. First, it means interdisciplinarity—a continual dialogue with the study of legal phenomena by the sciences, humanities, and even theology. Second, it means embedding jurisprudence in general philosophy, ... [Sellars]: “not only ‘cabbages and kings’, but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death.” Synechism is a less familiar idea, drawn from the philosophy of C.S. Peirce. It is the commitment to seek continuity among phenomena. Peirce was metaphysically committed to the existence of actual continua everywhere in nature, history, and human psychology. So synechism will impose a certain demand on all systematic studies, namely discerning those continua.(..) a certain kind of historiography: The historian’s job is to unearth continuities between past and present rather than studying ruptures. This, it seems to me, is a contestable commitment that rules out a great deal of important historical work. Peirce understood synechism to imply that ideas are intrinsically temporal and historical phenomena. Although Postema does not endorse this general thesis, he does argue for a special case of it, namely that law is “intrinsically temporal.” This conclusion is central to his argument against the possibility of time-slice legal systems. It, too, is contestable; but, I shall suggest, Postema can reach his conclusion on grounds other than synechism, and I agree with him about law’s intrinsic temporality. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  pragmatism  historiography  historical_change  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  analytical_philosophy  legal_history  continuity  change-social  change-intellectual  intellectual_history  Peirce  social_sciences  legal_culture  legal_realism  philosophy_of_history  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Gerald J. Postema - Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 869 (2015)
Renaissance jurisprudence strove to be a sociable science. Following Ulpian’s lead, it refused to relegate jurisprudence either to pure speculation or to mere practice. Jurisprudence was a science, a matter of knowledge and of theoretical understanding, not merely an applied art or practice of prudence innocent of theory. It was regarded as the very heart of theoretical studies, drawing to itself all that the traditional sciences of theology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, as well as the newly emerging humanist sciences of philology and hermeneutics, had to offer. No less resolutely, however, it refused to abandon its foothold in the life of practice. (..) Rather than reject philosophical reflection, (..) Renaissance jurists sought to locate it in concrete human life and experience. (..) Philosophy.., was most true to its vocation, and was most engaged in human life, when its reflections were anchored in the social life acknowledged, comprehended, and informed by and informing law. Jurisprudence, vera philosophia, was ...the point at which the theoretical and the practical intersected (..) at its “sociable” best sought to integrate them. Analytic jurisprudence began as self-consciously, even militantly, “unsociable,” and its matured and much-sophisticated descendant, fin de siècle analytic legal philosophy, remained largely if not exclusively so. (..) It may be time, in this period of self-conscious attention to jurisprudential method, to press beyond the current limits of this debate over method to a reassessment of the ambitions of jurisprudence and of philosophy’s role in it. (..) my aim is not critical but constructive. (..) to recover something of the ideal of jurisprudence as a sociable science, to retrieve as much as our disenchanted age can be challenged to embrace, or at least to entertain, of the ambition of jurisprudence as vera philosophia. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  Renaissance  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  common_law  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  norms  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  change-social  change-intellectual  social_order  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  pragmatism  Peirce  continuity  historical_change  methodology-qualitative  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Faulkner - Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 121-138 (2013)
University of Sheffield -- Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology -- Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected to reliability. These claims are first made in abstract, and then developed with regard to our practice of trusting testimony, where an epistemological investigation into the grounds of reliability must inevitably detail the ‘logic of everyday practices’. -- looks like interesting fit with the virtue focus and collective knowledge practices of Boyle, Locke et al -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  epistemology  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science  reliabilism  testimony  evidence  Royal_Society  Boyle  Locke  empiricism  virtue_epistemology  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Miika Vähämaa - Secrets, Errors and Mathematics: Reconsidering the Role of Groups in Social Epistemology « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (9): 36-51 (2013)
Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology (SE) -- This paper claims that analytic social epistemology (ASE) has slowed, if not halted, the development of SE and the social sciences in general. I argue that SE is unavoidably subjective due to its collective nature. SE as it is generally understood, consists of the study of socially shared propositions and how they are understood by those communities. However, socially shared propositions of knowledge are not constrained by propositional logic but are rather enabled by the limited quanta of reason and logic embedded in linguistic structure. From the view of Goldman and his supporters , “real” knowledge is constrained by propositional logic, which is derived from language and is constructed in social settings. This view errs in its attempt to collapse social knowledge into propositional logic, downplaying the many social groups and practices that produce, create, restore and distort knowledge. The “subjective” and group-oriented nature of SE is demonstrated in this text by examples of secrets, errors and mathematics as discrete social domains in which knowledge is created and maintained. Examples in both philosophy and social sciences are important, since they reveal the weaknesses of strict ASE. A simple real-life example may be appealing to emotions and personal experiences of life whereas Wittgensteinian truth tables are rarely matters of personal attachment to anyone. The social in SE can only be properly considered from the viewpoint of social groups. Following an argument presented by Fuller, I show that “knowledge” is not a self-maintaining quality of human life, but rather a qualia that is regenerated situationally. All epistemic activities build upon such reorganization as it is conducted within social groups which seek to regenerate knowledge both to make sense of the world and to make sense of their own selves. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  epistemology  epistemology-social  epistemology-naturalism  analytical_philosophy  social_psychology  philosophy_of_language  philosophy_of_social_science  philosophy_of_science  logic  knowledge  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Gorman - Hayden White as analytical philosopher of mind | Rethinking History Vol. 17, Iss. 4, 2013 - Special Issue : Hayden White’s " Metahistory " 40 Years On - Taylor & Francis Online
Philosophers and historians in Cambridge did not recognise either the relevance or the importance of Metahistory when it was published in 1973. The reasons are here explained in terms of the nature of the analytical tradition: the principled distinctiveness of analytical philosophy from (1) history, (2) speculative metaphysics, and (3) political morality. Following an analysis of ‘analysis’, Metahistory is argued to be an exercise in the recovery of paradigm cases in Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics that offers the outlines of an advanced philosophy of mind and philosophy of time. -- Jonathan Gorman is Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy at the Queen's University of Belfast. His books in philosophy of history are The Expression of Historical Knowledge (Edinburgh 1982), Understanding History (Ottawa 1992) and Historical Judgement (Stocksfield 2007), and he has many articles and reviews in theory of history journals and collections. He continues to apply analytic pragmatic philosophy to historical thought, and writes also in other branches of philosophy and in legal theory.
article  paywall  find  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  historiography  narrative  analytical_philosophy  ordinary_language_philosophy  speech-act  philosophy_of_history  mind  time  metaphysics  Strawson_PF  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
JOEL ISAAC -- DONALD DAVIDSON AND THE ANALYTIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, 1940–1970 (2013). | The Historical Journal, 56, pp 757-779 - Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
JOEL ISAAC - Christ's College, Cambridge -- Histories of analytic philosophy in the United States have typically focused on the reception of logical positivism, and especially on responses to the work of the Vienna Circle. Such accounts often call attention to the purportedly positivist-inspired marginalization of normative concerns in American philosophy: according to this story, the overweening positivist concern for logic and physics as paradigms of knowledge displaced questions of value and social relations. This article argues that the reception framework encourages us to mistake the real sources of the analytic revolution in post-war philosophy. These are to be found in debates about intentional action and practical reasoning – debates in which ‘normative’ questions of value and social action were in fact central. Discussion of these topics took place within a transatlantic community of Wittgensteinians, ordinary languages philosophers, logical empiricists, and decision theorists. These different strands of ‘analytical’ thinking were bound together into a new philosophical mainstream not by a positivist alliance with logic and physics, but by the rapid development of the mathematical and behavioural sciences during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. An illustrative application of this new framework for interpreting the analytic revolution is found in the early career and writings of Donald Davidson.
article  paywall  intellectual_history  20thC  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  Wittgenstein  ordinary_language_philosophy  behavioralism  social_sciences-post-WWII  decision_theory  mathematics  logic  empiricism  US  cultural_history  academia  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
KATRINA FORRESTER -- CITIZENSHIP, WAR, AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1960–1975 (2014). | The Historical Journal, 57, pp 773-801. - Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
KATRINA FORRESTER - St John's College, Cambridge -- This article examines a series of debates about civil disobedience, conscription, and the justice of war that took place among American liberal philosophers, lawyers, and activists during the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War. It argues that these debates fundamentally reshaped American political philosophy, by shifting the focus from the welfare state to the realm of international politics. In order to chart this transition from the domestic to the international, this article focuses on the writings of two influential political theorists, John Rawls and Michael Walzer. The turn to international politics in American political philosophy has its origins, in part, in their arguments about domestic citizenship. In tracing these origins, this article situates academic philosophical arguments alongside debates among the American public at large. It offers a first account of the history of analytical political philosophy during the 1960s and 1970s, and argues that the role played by the Vietnam War in this history, though underappreciated, is significant. -* I would like to thank Duncan Bell, Kenzie Bok, Christopher Brooke, Adam Lebowitz, Peter Mandler, Jamie Martin, Samuel Moyn, Andrew Preston, David Runciman, Tim Shenk, Brandon Terry, Mira Siegelberg, Joshua Specht, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments
article  paywall  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  20thC  US_politics  US_foreign_policy  post-WWII  Vietnam_War  citizenship  civil_liberties  IR-liberalism  IR-domestic_politics  IR_theory  liberalism  Rawls  Walzer  power  power-asymmetric  justice  welfare_state  just_war  moral_philosophy  US_government  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Charles Taliaferro - Dualism and the Problem of Individuation | JSTOR: Religious Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 263-276
Quite helpful review of various metaphysical debates from Descartes onwards, how the "substance" debates have evolved, including the old identity of indiscernables claim that's been thoroughly challenged in post WWII analytical_philosophy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  20thC  Descartes  Locke  Butler  Reid  metaphysics  ontology  substance  soul  dualism  physicalism  mind-body  consciousness  immortality  universals  particulars  identity  self  analytical_philosophy  logic  Leibniz  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Kevin Cahill - Ethics and the "Tractatus": A Resolute Failure | JSTOR: Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 307 (Jan., 2004), pp. 33-55
He's in the New Wittgenstein camp. Very useful development of themes across the New Wittgenstein crowd, distinguishing PI from Tractatus and why Wittgenstein came to see the Tractatus as a failure, not only in method, but in still being wedded to the intellectualizing impulse of philosophy, to elaborate the world as it really is by unlocking the central problem. His ethical objectives in the Tractatus have been developed by New Wittgenstein proponents, with analogies to Kierkegaard, St Paul and Augustine. -- read online, didn't download
article  jstor  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_language  moral_philosophy  dogmatism  analytical_philosophy  Wittgenstein  Frege  Russell_Bertrand  Kierkegaard  Paul  Augustine  logic  Logical_Positivism  syntax  language-bad_metaphysics  language_games  concepts  propositions  predicate  bibliography  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Galen Strawson - The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional | JSTOR: Analysis, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 271-282
Attacks the bad metaphysics that results from projecting our ability to conceptualize different aspects of objects etc separately, project them onto reality where those concepts can't exist independently, and then draw elaborate metaphysical non puzzles from the mess -- quotes Ramsey and Nietzsche, not Wittgenstein -- ftbt Ramsey 1925: 60.
He agrees with Nietzsche, who writes that 'language is built in terms of the most naive prejudices ... we read disharmonies and problems into things because we think only in the form of language - thus believing in the "eternal truth" of "reason" (e.g. subject, predicate, etc.). ... That we have a right to distinguish between subject and predicate - ... that is our strongest belief; in fact, at bottom, even the belief in cause and effect itself, in conditio and conditionatum, is merely an individual case of the first and general belief, our primeval belief in subject and predicate. ... Might not this belief in the concept of subject and predicate be a great stupidity?'" -- claims but without developing that Locke's consistent with his approach read but didn't download
article  jstor  metaphysics  analytical_philosophy  concepts  realism  properties  modal_logic  possible_worlds  Locke  language-bad_metaphysics  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Devin Henry - "Aristotle's Pluralistic Realism" | The Monist 94.2 (2011): 198-222
The University of Western Ontario -- In this paper I explore Aristotle’s views on natural kinds and the compatibility of pluralism and realism, a topic that has generated considerable interest among contemporary philosophers. I argue that, when it came to zoology, Aristotle denied that there is only one way of organizing the diversity of the living world into natural kinds that will yield a single, unified system of classification. Instead, living things can be grouped and regrouped into various cross-cutting kinds on the basis of objective similarities and differences in ways that subserve the explanatory context. Since the explanatory aims of zoology are diverse and variegated, the kinds it recognizes must be equally diverse and variegated. At the same time, there are certain constraints on which kinds can be selected. And those constraints derive more from the causal structure of the world than from the proclivities of the classifier (hence the realism). This distinguishes Aristotle’s version of pluralistic realism from those contemporary versions (like Dupré’s “promiscuous realism”) that treat all or most classifications of a given domain as equally legitimate and not just a sub-set of kinds recognized by the science that studies it. By contrast, Aristotle privileges scientifically important kinds on the basis of their role in causal investigations. On this picture natural kinds are those kinds with the sort of causal structure that allows them to enter into scientific explanations. In the final section I argue that Aristotle’s zoology should remain of interest to philosophers and biologists alike insofar as it combines a pluralistic form of realism with a rank-free approach to classification. - didn't download
article  intellectual_history  Aristotle  history_of_science  philosophy_of_science  ancient_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  natural_kinds  classification  species  explanation  causation  biology  animals  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - On Philosophy in American Law: Analytical Legal Philosophy :: SSRN in PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW, Francis J. Mootz, III, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2009
This short article was written for a collection on American legal philosophy today. It gives a brief overview of analytical legal philosophy, and speculates on why this theoretical approach has been consistently misunderstood in the United States, from the time of the legal realists until today. --Number of Pages in PDF File: 6 -- Keywords: analytical legal philosophy, legal theory, legal positivism
article  books  SSRN  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  legal_realism  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Ronald J. Allen, Brian Leiter - Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence :: SSRN - Virginia Law Review, 2001
This paper looks at important developments in epistemology, and demonstrates that naturalized epistemology provides a firm conceptual foundation for much research into law of evidence. These developments in epistemology have not been much noted in legal scholarship, despite their importance in philosophy and their coincidence with some widely shared approaches to evidence scholarship. This article is a partial antidote for the unproductive fascination in some quarters of the legal academy with "postmodern" conceptions of knowledge and truth and to the even more common search by the legal professoriat for algorithms that provide answers to important legal questions, such as Bayesian decision theory or micro-economics. The article argues that the naturalistic turn in epistemology of the past thirty years (especially that branch known as social epistemology) provides the appropriate theoretical framework for the study of evidence, as it does for virtually any enterprise concerned with the empirical adequacy of its theories and the truth-generating capacity of its methodologies. It also provides a way to conceptualize and evaluate specific rules of evidence, and concomitantly explains what most evidence scholars do, regardless of their explicit philosophical commitments. For the great bulk of evidentiary scholars, this article should solidify the ground beneath their feet. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 78 - large bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  evidence  naturalism  sociology_of_knowledge  methodology  decision_theory  law-and-economics  Bayesian  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism :: SSRN - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2012
Legal philosophers have been preoccupied with specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance - law and morality. Positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and Raz propose a solution to this “Demarcation Problem” according to which the legal validity of a norm can not depend on its being morally valid, either in all or at least some possible legal systems. The proposed analysis purports to specify the essential and necessary features of law.... Yet the concept of law is an “artifact concept,” that is, a concept that picks out a phenomenon that owes its existence to human activities. Artifact concepts, even simple ones like “chair,” are notoriously resistant to analyses in terms of their essential attributes, precisely because they are hostage to human ends and purposes, and also can not be individuated by their natural properties. 20th-century philosophy of science dealt with a kindred Demarcation Problem: ...how to demarcate science from pseudo-science or nonsense. -- they sought to identify the essential properties of a human artifact (namely, science). They failed, and spectacularly so, which led some philosopher to wonder, “Why does solving the Demarcation Problem matter?” This essay develops the lessons for legal philosophy -- lest we want to become embroiled in pointless Fullerian speculations about the effects of jurisprudential doctrines on behavior, it is time to abandon the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  Logical_Positivism  linguistic_turn  concepts  analytical_philosophy  essentialism  natural_kinds  modal_logic  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  legal_system  positivism-legal  psychologism  natural_law  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  Carnap  Hempel  Popper  Fuller  Hart  Kelsen  Raz  Finnis  normativity  moral_sentiments  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Science and Morality: Pragmatic Reflections on Rorty's Pragmatism (2007) :: SSRN - University of Chicago Law Review, 2007
U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 128 -- This is an invited commentary on Richard Rorty's Dewey Lecture, given last year at the University of Chicago Law School. "Pragmatism," says Rorty, "puts natural science on all fours with politics and art. It is one more source of suggestions about what to do with our lives." I argue that the truth in pragmatism - that the epistemic norms that help us cope are the ones on which we rely - is obscured by Rorty's promiscuous version of the doctrine, which confuses the criteria for relying on particular epistemic norms (namely, that they work for human purposes) with the content of the norms themselves (most of which make no reference to human purposes, but rather criteria like causal or explanatory power). We need presuppose no Archmiedean standpoint to conclude, as Richard Posner does, that moral inquiry is feeble in a way physics is not; we need only take seriously our best current understanding of the world, how it works, and the epistemic norms that have proven most effective in making sense of it. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 13 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  intellectual_history  20thC  Rorty  pragmatism  analytical_philosophy  epistemology  Quine  Sellars  naturalism  anti-foundationalism  causation  epistemology-moral  relativism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Three Approaches [chapter] :: SSRN in THE FUTURE OF NATURALISM, J. Shook & P. Kurtz, eds., Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 2009
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 246 -- General jurisprudence - that branch of legal philosophy concerned with the nature of law and adjudication - has been relatively unaffected by the "naturalistic" strains so evident, for example, in the epistemology, philosophy of mind and moral philosophy of the past forty years. This paper sketches three ways in which naturalism might affect jurisprudential inquiry. The paper serves as a kind of precis of the main themes in my book NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Oxford University Press, 2007). -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 16 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, naturalism, legal realism, quine, epistemology
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  naturalism  epistemology  metaphysics  mind  mind-body  consciousness  Quine  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  epistemology-moral  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Alex Langlinais, Brian Leiter - The Methodology of Legal Philosophy [chapter] (2013) :: SSRN - H. Cappelen, T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Forthcoming
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 407 -- This is the revised and penultimate version of this paper. The essay surveys issues about philosophical methodology as they arise in general jurisprudence. Certainly in the Anglophone world and increasingly outside it, H.L.A. Hart’s 1961 book The Concept of Law has dominated the discussion. ...methodological debates typically scrutinize either one of two (related) ... claims in Hart’s classic work. The first is that his theory is both general and descriptive (Hart 1994: 239). The second is that his theory is an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology (Hart 1994: vi). We explicate both ideas, arguing, in particular, that (1) Hart aims to give an essentialist analysis of law and legal systems (a point clearest in those who follow him like J. Raz, J. Dickson and [though less of a follower] S. Shapiro), and (2) we can make sense of the linking of linguistic (and conceptual) analysis and descriptive sociology if we understand "law" as a constructed bit of "social reality" in something like John Searle's sense. The ensuing methodological debates in legal philosophy can then be understood as arguing against either linguistic or conceptual analysis (naturalists like B. Leiter), or against the idea of a purely descriptive jurisprudence (in different ways, J. Finnis, S. Perry, M. Murphy, L. Murphy, R. Dworkin). -- Keywords: H.L.A. Hart, methodology, descriptive jurisprudence, conceptual analysis, John Searle, legal philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  methodology  legal_theory  intellectual_history  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_law  concepts  constructivism  Hart  Raz  Dworkin  Finnis  Searle  natural_law  naturalism  positivism-legal  legal_realism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis :: SSRN - American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 56, pp. 45-57, 2011 (last revised 2012 )
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-13 -- Gustav Radbruch, in well-known work that appeared just after World War II, put forward a formula that stated that state-promulgated rules that are sufficiently unjust lose their status as valid law. Radbruch’s Formula has generally been understood as a claim about the nature of law, and recent variations of Radbruch’s Formula, like Robert Alexy’s “claim to correctness,” have similarly been characterized as offering a truth about the nature of law. Additionally, both Radbruch’s and Alexy’s theories have been presented as criticisms of, and alternatives to, legal positivism. An alternative understanding of the Formula (and its modern variations) is as (mere) prescriptions for judicial decision-making, and thus compatible with a variety of different conceptual theories of the nature of law, including legal positivism. This article shows the difficulties of understanding Radbruch’s Formula as it was presented and conventionally understood. In particular, the article focuses on the way that seeing the Formula as a claim about the nature of law leads to outcomes inconsistent with the basic reasons for the Formula. -- Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Radbruch's Formula, Robert Alexy, Conceptual Analysis
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  positivism-legal  natural_law  concepts  legal_theory  norms 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Conceptual Jurisprudence and Socio-Legal Studies :: SSRN - Rutgers Law Journal, Vol. 32, 2000
This article was part of a conference on Brian Tamanaha's book, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory (Oxford, 1997). This article summarizes how Tamanaha's work seeks to merge the sociology of law with conceptual legal theory, though not always fully successfully. Tamanaha does not appreciate the extent to which the two tasks - sociology and conceptual analysis - may have different aims, and therefore their theories will be constructed along different and inconsistent lines. The article also considers the extent to which conceptual theories do or do not need to make ambitious metaphysical claims, and the connections between conceptual theories in jurisprudence and empirical data about the way law is practiced. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  reviews  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  sociology_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  social_theory  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Raz on Necessity (last revised 2009 ) :: SSRN - Law and Philosophy, vol. 22, pp. 537-559 (2003)
The article uses Joseph Raz's work as the starting point for a general discussion of the role of necessity and essence in jurisprudence. Analytical legal theorists commonly assert (or assume) that they are offering conceptual truths, claims regarding attributes necessarily true of all legal systems. Is it tenable to speak about necessary truths with a humanly created institution like law? Upon closer investigation, the use of necessary truths in writers like Raz and Jules Coleman clearly differs from the way such terms are used in classical metaphysics, and even in contemporary discussions of natural kind terms. Nonetheless, theorists making conceptual statements regarding law are making significant and ambitious claims that need to be defended - for example, against naturalists like Brian Leiter, who doubt the value of conceptual analysis, and normative theorists like Stephen Perry, who argue that assertions about the nature of law require value-laden moral and political choices between tenable alternatives. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  modal_logic  possible_worlds  universalism  universals  natural_kinds  natural_law  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  morality-conventional  normativity  essence  naturalism  legal_realism  philosophy_of_language  Raz  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Legal Positivism and 'Explaining' Normativity and Authority (2006 last revised 2009) :: SSRN
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2006 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-05 -- It has become increasingly common for legal positivist theorists to claim that the primary objective of legal theory in general, and legal positivism in particular, is "explaining normativity." The phrase "explaining normativity" can be understood either ambitiously or more modestly. The more modest meaning is an analytical exploration of what is meant by legal or moral obligation, or by the authority claims of legal officials. When the term is understood ambitiously - as meaning an explanation of how conventional and other empirical facts can give rise to moral obligations - as many legal positivist theorists seem to be using the phrase, the project is contrary to basic tenets of legal positivism, and has regularly led theorists to propose doubtful theories that ignore "is"/"ought" divisions. -- Keywords: legal positivism, analytical legal theory, natural law theory -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  positivism-legal  natural_law  is-ought  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  obligation  authority  legitimacy  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - [Scandinavian legal realists] Ross and Olivecrona on Rights :: SSRN - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2009
Scandinavian legal realism was a movement of the early and middle decades of the 20th century, which paralleled the American legal realist movement, while presenting a more skeptical challenge to legal reasoning and discourse. The present paper was written for a forthcoming Oxford University Press collection on the Scandinavian realists. The approach to jurisprudence of Scandinavian realists Alf Ross and Karl Olivecrona was simultaneously simple and radical: they wanted to rid our thinking about law of all the mystifying references to abstract concepts and metaphysical entities. This paper offers a critical overview of Ross's and Olivecrona's views on legal rights, while also summarizing the critiques of those views (e.g., by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz). -- Keywords: legal rights, Scandinavian legal realism, Alf Ross, Karl Olivecrona -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  philosophy_of_language  metaphysics  ontology  concepts  legal_realism  rights-legal  intellectual_history  20thC  Scandinavia  Anglo-American  Hart  Raz  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Robert Alexy's Radbruch Formula, and the Nature of Legal Theory (2006) :: SSRN
Rechtstheorie, Vol. 37, pp. 139-149, 2006 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 06-13 -- Gustav Radbruch is well known for a formula that addresses the conflict of positive law and justice, a formula discussed in the context of the consideration of Nazi laws by the courts in the post-War German Federal Republic, and East German laws in the post-unification German courts. More recently, Robert Alexy has defended a version of Radbruch's formula, offering arguments for it that are different from and more sophisticated than those that were adduced by Radbruch himself. Alexy also placed Radbruch's formula within a larger context of conceptual analysis and theories about the nature of law. Both Radbruch and Alexy claim that their positions are incompatible with legal positivism, and therefore count as a rejection (and perhaps, refutation) of it. This paper, presented at a Conference on the work of Gustav Radbruch, looks at Radbruch's formula and Alexy's version of it. It focuses not so much on the merit of the Radbruch-Alexy formula, as on its proper characterization, and its appropriate placement within the larger context of legal philosophy. The particular focus is the methodological question of what Radbruch and Alexy's formulations - and their strengths and weaknesses - can show us about the nature of theorizing about law. -- Keywords: Robert Alexy, Gustav Radbruch, legal positivism, natural law theory, nature of law, conceptual theories, unjust laws -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  Germany  social_sciences-post-WWII  Nazis  analytical_philosophy  concepts  natural_law  moral_philosophy  positivism-legal  sociology_of_law  justice  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis (2007, revised 2009):: SSRN
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2007 - Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-65 -- The paper explores the justification for conceptual analysis as the methodology for theories about the nature of law. Using the example of Joseph Raz's theory, and Raz's own recent work on jurisprudential methodology, the paper explores the challenges to this standard approach: whether conceptual analysis is the appropriate approach, whether it needs to be supplemented by moral evaluation, and whether conceptual analysis can yield theories of substantial interest. -- Keywords: conceptual analysis, jurisprudence, legal philosophy, Joseph Raz, naturalism -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  moral_philosophy  naturalism  social_theory  Raz  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Kenneth R. Westphal - Enlightenment Fundamentals: Rights, Responsibilities & Republicanism | Diametros
Kenneth R. Westphal is Professorial Fellow in the School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia (Norwich), and currently Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the Martin-Luther-Universität Halle Wittenberg. -- This essay re-examines some key fundamentals of the Enlightenment regarding individual rights, responsibilities and republicanism which deserve and require re-emphasis today, insofar as they underscore the character and fundamental importance of mature judgment, and how developing and fostering mature judgment is a fundamental aim of education. These fundamentals have been clouded or eroded by various recent developments, including mis-guided educational policy and not a little scholarly bickering. Clarity about these fundamentals is more important today than ever. Sapere aude! -- Keywords - Hobbes Hume Rousseau Kant Hegel, rational justification, mature judgment, moral constructivism, realism objectivity rights responsibilities republicanism media culture, Euthyphro question, natural law, Dilemma of the Criterion -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  French_Enlightenment  Germany  German_Idealism  voluntarism  obligation  morality-conventional  morality-objective  natural_rights  civil_liberties  civil_society  civic_virtue  Hobbes  Hume  Hume-ethics  Hume-politics  Rousseau  Kant  Kant-ethics  Hegel  judgment-political  public_sphere  media  political_culture  values  education-civic  education-higher  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add  21stC  Dewey  Quine  Sellars  analytical_philosophy  academia  professionalization 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jay F. Rosenberg - Still Mythic after All Those Years: On Alston's Latest Defense of the Given | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 157-173
Wilfrid Sellars' conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the Given" is a "Myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "Theory of Appearing" which posits irreducible non-conceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that can play a justificatory role vis-à-vis the corresponding beliefs, e.g., that the object is red. I argue that Alston undermines his positive plausibility arguments by first blurring and then ignoring crucial differences among various looks-concepts, and that his own putative "phenomenal" looks-concept demonstrably cannot play the justificatory role that he envisions for it. Both his critique of Sellars' arguments and his own alternative proposal thus fail on all fronts. -- didn't download
article  jstor  epistemology  Sellars  analytical_philosophy 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
LEEMON B. McHENRY - Quine's Pragmatic Ontology | JSTOR: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1995), pp. 147-158
Claims Quine shouldn't be put in with the pragmatists -- lots of references to key Quine articles with links -- see bibliography on jstor information page -- didn't download
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  analytical_philosophy  pragmatism  Quine  ontology  epistemology  bibliography  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert Hanna - Rationality and the Ethics of Logic | JSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103, No. 2 (Feb., 2006), pp. 67-100
Argues for a proto logic that's normative. Extensive discussion of links and separation of logic and psychology from early moderns through Frege and Husserl to various stages of 20thC. Looks useful for intellectual_history -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  moral_philosophy  epistemology  moral_psychology  action-theory  logic  reason  human_nature  psychologism  phenomenology  analytical_philosophy  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Manuel García-Carpintero - Qualia That It Is Right to Quine | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Sep., 2003), pp. 357-377
Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett-like argument can be based. -- lit survey of debate -- didn't download
article  jstor  20thC  21stC  analytical_philosophy  ontology  mind  mind-body  consciousness  qualia  representation-metaphysics  Quine  Dennett  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis - Concepts and Conceptual Analysis | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Sep., 2003), pp. 253-282
Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether. -- serves as a lit survey of 20thC analytical_philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  intuitions  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Gordon Park Stevenson - Revamping Action Theory | JSTOR: Behavior and Philosophy, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2004), pp. 427-451
Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, action theorists propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of folk psychological action ascriptions. However, several key doctrinal and methodological features of contemporary action theory are troubling, in particular (i) the insistence that folk psychological kinds like beliefs and desires have neurophysiological correlates, (ii) the assumption that the concept of action is "classical" in structure (making it amenable to definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for its proper application), and (iii) the assumption that deferring to intuitions about the application of the concept of action amidst the context of fantastical thought experiments furnishes an effective method for judging the adequacy of proposed analyses. After consideration of these problems it is argued that action theory needs to be reoriented in a more naturalistic direction, the methods and aims of which are continuous with those of the empirical sciences. The paper concludes with a sketch (and defense) of the methodological foundations of a naturalistic approach to intentional action. -- serves as a lit survey of 1970s and 1980s mostly -- didn't download
article  jstor  analytical_philosophy  concepts  action-theory  intentionality  mind-body  naturalism  lit_survey  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan Stemmer - The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory | JSTOR: Behavior and Philosophy, Vol. 29 (2001), pp. 187-202
Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. -- frequently cited -- didn't download
article  jstor  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  ontology  mind-body  mind  Quine  behavioralism  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan Stemmer - On universals: an extensionalist alternative to Quine's resemblance theory | JSTOR: Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol. 38, No. 1 (April, 2007), pp. 75-90
The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine's theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine's theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and realism: Universals and Scientific realism (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine's austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. (I will mention below Quine's reason for rejecting properties and possible worlds. For a theory of Universals that assumes possible worlds, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute some of the objections to Quine's approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver [(1996). The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105, 1-80.] and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver in a comment on Lewis [(1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.], Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties. -- looks helpful re the reemergence of old metaphysics re ontology -- didn't download
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  Quine  metaphysics  ontology  analytical_philosophy  universals  nominalism  kinds  possible_worlds  properties  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Heikki J. Koskinen and Sami Pihlström - Quine and Pragmatism | JSTOR: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 309-346
This paper discusses critically W. V Quine's relation to the tradition of pragmatism. Even though Quine is often regarded as a pragmatist, it is far from clear what his commitment to pragmatism actually amounts to. It is argued that while there are pragmatist elements in Quine's position, this is not sufficient to classify him as a pragmatist in any strong historical sense; indeed, he was not even clear himself what it means to be a pragmatist. It is also shown that neither Quine s philosophy nor pragmatism are as anti-metaphysical as has sometimes been thought. In order to enrich the picture of Quine s place in the pragmatist tradition, some neopragmatist criticisms of his ideas (e.g., by Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty) are also discussed. -- extensive bibliography looks good for 20thC US intellectual_history -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  epistemology  Quine  Rorty  Putnam  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert Sinclair - Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism | JSTOR: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 335-355
Quine famously concluded that his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction resulted in a more ‘thorough' pragmatism. While suggesting a possible link to American pragmatism, Quine would later explain that he was only extending the use of ‘pragmatic’ found in Carnap's thought. However, Quine has also acknowledged the influence of his teacher C.I. Lewis, who defended his ‘Conceptual Pragmatism’ in the 1920s and 1930s. This essay focuses on Quine's alleged connection to pragmatism by examining the influence of Lewis's pragmatism on Quine's developing epistemological perspective. It makes reference to Quine's unpublished graduate papers in order to argue that the structural affinities between Quine's and Lewis's conceptions of epistemology suggest an important historical source of the pragmatic elements in Quine's view. This further highlights a forgotten element of the epistemological backdrop to Quine's mid-century interpretation and criticism of Carnap's use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. -- paywall
article  jstor  paywall  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  epistemology  Quine  Carnap  Logical_Positivism  apriori  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Eric Steinhart - Royce's Model of the Absolute | JSTOR: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 356-384
At the end of the 19th century, Royce uses the mathematical ideas of his day to describe the Absolute as a self-representative system. Working closely with Royce's texts, I will develop a model of the Absolute that is both more thoroughly formalized and that is stated in contemporary mathematical language. As I develop this more formal model, I will show how structures found within it are similar to structures widely discussed in current analytic metaphysics. The model contains structures found in the recent analytic metaphysics of modality; it contains Democritean worlds as defined by Quine; it contains Turing-computable sequences; and it contains networks of interacting software objects as defined by Dennett. Much of the content of recent analytic metaphysics is already implicit in Royce's study of the Absolute. Far from being an obsolete system of historical interest only, Royce's metaphysics is remarkably relevant today. -- paywall
article  jstor  paywall  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  21stC  Royce  idealism  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  modality  networks  systems-self-representative  Absolute  Quine  Dennett  Democritus  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Eric Steinhart - Royce's Model of the Absolute | JSTOR: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 356-384
At the end of the 19th century, Royce uses the mathematical ideas of his day to describe the Absolute as a self-representative system. Working closely with Royce's texts, I will develop a model of the Absolute that is both more thoroughly formalized and that is stated in contemporary mathematical language. As I develop this more formal model, I will show how structures found within it are similar to structures widely discussed in current analytic metaphysics. The model contains structures found in the recent analytic metaphysics of modality; it contains Democritean worlds as defined by Quine; it contains Turing-computable sequences; and it contains networks of interacting software objects as defined by Dennett. Much of the content of recent analytic metaphysics is already implicit in Royce's study of the Absolute. Far from being an obsolete system of historical interest only, Royce's metaphysics is remarkably relevant today. -- paywall
article  jstor  paywall  intellectual_history  19thC  US  pragmatism  idealism  mathematics  Absolute  analytical_philosophy  Quine  metaphysics  systems-self-representative  Dennett  networks-information  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Jim Stone - Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 60, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 527-545
Bringing something like mitigated skepticism up to date with brains in vats and conditional truths in possible worlds. In addition to external world he deals with induction and knowledge of the past -- Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday `I know that p' claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such claims is consistent with skepticism; various other vexing problems don't arise. In addition, even if no claim about the world outside my mind can be more probable than its negation, the project of pure scientific research remains well motivated.
article  jstor  epistemology  analytical_philosophy  21stC  scepticism  Hume  Hume-causation  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Bevir - Anglophone Historicism: From Modernist Method to Post-analytic Philosophy [eScholarship] (2009)
Original Citation:
Mark Bevir, “Anglophone Historicism: From Modernist Method to Post-analytic Philosophy”, Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (2009), 211-224

Keywords:
Historicism, Modernism, Postanalytic Philosophy, Quentin Skinner
article  eScholarship  intellectual_history  historiography  20thC  historicism  Modernism  positivism  philosophy_of_history  philosophy_of_language  concepts  meaning  Skinner  Cambridge_School  contextualism  postanalytic_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  epistemology-history  epistemology-social  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
BRANKO MITROVIĆ - ATTRIBUTION OF CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS WITH ANACHRONISM | JSTOR - History and Theory ( Oct 2011)
History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 3 (October 2011), pp. 303-327 -- Many long-standing debates about anachronistic concept-attributions derive from an essentialist understanding of concepts that is often difficult to sustain for metaphysical or epistemological reasons. The intentionalist alternative to essentialism elaborated in this article successfully clarifies and avoids many standard problems with anachronism. -- very interesting bibliography covering post WWII analytic philosophy of social sciences, epistemology, and debates over "meaning" - concepts, intentionality conceptual change etc after logical positivism was dead -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  epistemology-history  historiography  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  intentionality  intentionality-collective  Cambridge_School  belief  downloaded 
august 2013 by dunnettreader

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