dunnettreader + article + keynes   9

Palley, Rochon and Vernengo » The Relevance of Keynes’s General Theory after 80 years - Review of Keynesian Economics 2016
Thomas Palley, Louis-Philippe Rochon and Matías Vernengo -- The Relevance of Keynes’s General Theory after 80 years -- This year marks two important anniversaries in macroeconomics: the 80th anniversary of the publication of Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, and the 70th anniversary of Keynes’s premature death, at the age of 63. To mark these anniversaries, the first issue of the fourth year of the Review of Keynesian Economics is dedicated to Keynes -' downloaded pdf to Note
article  economic_theory  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  Keynesianism  Keynes  downloaded 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
ADRIAN BLAU - UNCERTAINTY AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS | JSTOR - History and Theory (Oct 2011)
History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 3 (October 2011), pp. 358-372 -- Intellectual historians often make empirical claims, but can never know for certain if these claims are right. Uncertainty is thus inevitable for intellectual historians. But accepting uncertainty is not enough: we should also act on it, by trying to reduce and report it. We can reduce uncertainty by amassing valid data from different sources to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations, rather than trying to "prove" an empirical claim by looking for evidence that fits it. Then we should report our degree of certainty in our claims. When we answer empirical questions in intellectual history, we are not telling our readers what happened: we are telling them how strong we think our evidence is—a crucial shift of emphasis. For intellectual historians, then, uncertainty is subjective, as discussed by Keynes and Collingwood; the paper thus explores three differences between subjective and objective uncertainty. Having outlined the theoretical basis of uncertainty, the paper then offers examples from actual research: Noel Malcolm's work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about composition, and David Wootton's work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about beliefs. -- VERY Anti Straussian based on extensive bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  intellectual_history-distorted  philosophy_of_history  hermeneutics  hermeneutics_of_suspicion  Strauss  Straussians  epistemology-history  evidence  coherence  uncertainty  Keynes  Keynes-uncertainty  Collingwood  objectivity  positivism  post-foundational  Cambridge_School  author_intention  reception  audience  bibliography  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Jeet Heer - Sex, Economics, and Austerity | The American Prospect - 2013
John Maynard Keynes was the sexiest economist who ever lived. This might seem like half-hearted praise since in our mind’s eye the typical economist appears as… On the decades of right-wing attacks on Keynes and Keynesianism using sexual "immorality" as linked to purported moral failings of Keynes' policy responses from Versailles onward.
article  Instapaper  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  20thC  21stC  Keynes  Keynesianism  economic_history  economic_theory  macroeconomics  Great_Depression  right-wing  neoconservatism  fiscal_policy  budget_deficit  austerity  economics-and-morality  from instapaper
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Comparing J.M. Keynes’s and F. Von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as it Relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept Versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, Volume 19, No.3, July-September 2011, pp.1-20 

J.M. Keynes and F. von Hayek had completely different views about the meaning of the term “uncertainty” as it was related to the concept of knowledge. Keynes viewed uncertainty through his concept of the weight of the argument, V, (a logical operator) and weight of the evidence, w (a mathematical variable). Uncertainty, U, is an inverse function of w so that one can write U=f (w). The existence of complete, relevant knowledge requires that w=1, where w is defined on the closed unit interval [0,1]. A degree of uncertainty occurs if w<1. A w<1 means that the relevant knowledge is not just incomplete but is missing and/or not available to any decision maker. A w=0 means that there is no relevant knowledge. Keynes viewed the case of 0 Hayek’s definition of uncertainty is that relevant knowledge is completely dispersed into small or tiny bits and pieces. All of the total information/knowledge is divided up among the set of decision makers. However, this dispersed knowledge, while scattered, is complete. Market prices concentrate this dispersed knowledge into a form that alert, savvy, knowledgeable entrepreneurs can understand and act on efficiently. Market prices concentrate the relevant knowledge so that uncertainty is eliminated for savvy, smart, alert entrepreneurs. This is equivalent to arguing that w =1 for alert entrepreneurs. 

Keynes’s and Hayek’s definitions of uncertainty directly conflict with each other. Keynes argues that, especially in the case of producer goods, w, while w is not equal to 0, is little, flimsy, vague, ambiguous, small, fluctuating,and tiny. The prices of producer good DO NOT concentrate the knowledge so that savvy, alert entrepreneurs can act on it efficiently. Hayek argues that they do. The conflict over the meaning of uncertainty is insurmountable. The Hayekian outcome is not possible in a world of Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty.

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article  SSRN  intellectual_history  political_economy  20thC  capitalism  economic_models  uncertainty  Keynes  Hayek  markets  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
The ‘Early’ Logical Empiricism of J.M. Keynes versus the Rhetoric of Subjectivism by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, Volume 20, No. 2, April-June 2012, pp. 278-310 

Abstract:      Economists have been unable to comprehend the logical framework of Keynes’ A Treatise on Probability (1921) and General Theory (1936). This is due to their failure to read both works in their entirety. Instead, they concentrate on the first three chapters of Part I of the General Theory or the Treatise. This can be attributed to an “approach” to philosophy which rejects any type of formal, analytical, logical technique in favor of a purely speculative approach that eventually leads down the road to a priorism and subjectism. Keynes's decision approach is based on the general case of non-linearity and non-additivity. His decision theory incorporates neoclassical decision theory as a special case.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 71

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article  SSRN  economic_models  rational_choice  Keynes  logic  probability  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Adam Smith's Theory of Probability and the Roles of Risk and Uncertainty in Economic Decision Making by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics,Volume 19, No.4,October -December 2011,pp. 86-111. 

Adam Smith rejected the use of the mathematical laws of the calculus of probabilities because the basic information-data-knowledge provided in the real world of decision making did not allow a decision maker to specify precise, definite, exact, numerical probabilities or discover the probability distributions. This means that Smith rejected the classical interpretation of probability of La Place and the Bernoulli brothers, the limiting frequency-relative frequency interpretation of probability, and the personalist, subjectivist, psychological Bayesian approach used by all neoclassical schools of thought because all of these approaches to probability claim that ALL probabilities can be represented by a single numeral between 0 and 1 and the decision maker knows the probability distributions. Smith, like Keynes, rejects this immediately. 

An important conclusion of this paper is that it was Adam Smith who first explicitly recognized that the mathematical concept of probability is not applicable, in general, in real world decision making. Smith also rejects the normative and prescriptive roles of mathematical probability in decision making. 

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article  SSRN  political_economy  economic_models  risk  probability  uncertainty  cognition  rational_choice  neoclassical_economics  investment  Smith  Keynes  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
A Comparison-Contrast of Adam Smith, JM Keynes and Jeremy Bentham on Probability, Risk, Uncertainty, Optimism-Pessimism and Decision Making with Applications Concerning Banking, Insurance and Speculation by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
Smith and Keynes would reject the Kahneman-Tversky behavioral economist “Heuristics and Biases“ approach that regards mathematical probability as the normative criterion that all decision makers should attempt to emulate since this approach is a more advanced mathematical version of Bentham’s original approach. Mathematical probability, which requires the use of precise or sharp numerical probabilities, can only be normative in the case where the decision maker has a complete information set and/or knows for certain that a specific probability distribution will apply now and in the future. The mathematical laws of the probability calculus only hold as a limiting case whenever humans are part of the equation. Both Keynes and Smith rely on an inexact, interval, non additive, nonlinear approach that directly conflicts with the exact, single number, additive, linear approach recommended by Tversky and Kahneman as being the hallmark of human rationality in decision making.

 On the other hand, Bentham’s approach is an earlier version of the exact, linear and additive approach recommended as being rational by Tversky-Kahneman. Smith and Keynes, however, did emphasize fields that today are called Cognitive Science and Cognitive Psychology. Here pattern recognition, similarity, induction and intuition played an important role.

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article  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  banking  risk  probability  uncertainty  usury  cognition  Smith  Keynes  Bentham  rational_choice  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader

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