dunnettreader + apriori   11

Kenneth R Westphal - Empiricism, Pragmatic Realism & the A Priori in "Mind and the World Orde" (draft - forthcoming 2017 | Academia.edu
Forthcoming in: Carl SACHS & Peter OLEN eds., Contemporary Perspectives on C. I. Lewis: Pragmatism in Transition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) --This paper re-examines how C.I. Lewis’s pragmatic realism in Mind and the World Order (1929, ‘MWO’) contrasts to logical empiricism, and to Lewis’s later An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946, ‘AKV’), to highlight several important philosophical points Lewis clearly understood and argued for in MWO, which we need to recover today. MWO is expressly an ‘Outline of a Theory of Knowledge’; nevertheless, it provides several important lessons about human knowledge, action and our worldly context. These are highlighted by contrast to some key points in Carnap’s empiricist semantics (§2) and by considering a point important to scientific realism, not properly accommodated by Carnap’s semantics: Reichenbach’s (1920, 1922) ‘coördination’ (Zuordnung) principles – a very important point about scientific measurement procedures, central both to Peirce and to MWO (§3). These coördinating principles for exact scientific measurements highlight the contrast between the meta-linguistic ‘relative a priori’ admissible by empiricist semantics (Friedman 1999, 2001), and Lewis’ robustly realist ‘pragmatic a priori’ in MWO. I re-examine key features of MWO (§4), including Lewis’s rejection of mythical givenness and of a series of false dichotomies which still plague current discussions of epistemology, pragmatism and history and philosophy of science. -- Research Interests: Epistemology, Semantic Externalism, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Explication (Philosophy), Clarence Irving Lewis,
paper  downloaded  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  Logical_Positivism  empiricism  Lewis_CI  Carnap  metaphysics  epistemology  apriori  philosophy_of_science  logic  semantics  Peirce  realism-scientific  scientific_method  myth_of_the_given 
september 2016 by dunnettreader
The Virtual Issue No. 1 – Truth (2014 - conference 2013 | The Aristotelian Society
In celebration of the 125th year of the Proceedings, we are proud to present the first Virtual Issue of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. The Virtual Issue is based upon an Online Conference on the theme of Truth that took place 12th–18th April 2013. This weeklong event featured papers from our back catalogue, commentaries on these papers delivered by contemporary philosophers, and an online-based discussion forum that was open to all. The Virtual Issue comprises the classic papers and commentaries from the conference.
epistemology  21stC  apriori  intellectual_history  books  anti-foundationalism  epistemology-naturalism  downloaded  logic  analytical_philosophy  ebooks  aporia  20thC  foundationalism  moral_philosophy  social_epistemology  truth  virtue_epistemology 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis - Certainly Not! A Critical Realist Recasting of Ludwig Von Mises’s Methodology of the Social Sciences (Journal of Economic Methodology (2010), 17(3): 277-99) :: SSRN
King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- This paper focuses on Ludwig von Mises methodological apriorism. It uses Wittgenstein’s private language argument as the basis for a critique of Mises’s claim to have found apodictically certain foundations for economic analysis. It is argued instead that Mises’s methodology is more fruitfully viewed as an exercise in social ontology, the objective of which is to outline key features of the socio-economic world that social scientific research ought to take into account if it is to be fruitful. The implications of this perspective for three key methodological issues, namely the relationship between theory and history, the possibility of naturalism, and the place of Austrian economics within the discipline of economics as a whole, are brought out. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 -- Keywords: Austrian economics; Ludwig von Mises; praxeology; private language -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_social_science  social_theory  ontology-social  Mises  apriori  Wittgenstein  philosophy_of_language  economic_theory  economic_models  heterodox_economics  Austrian_economics  methodology  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Reviewed by Tom Donaldson - David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World (OUP 2014) // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // August 2014
Stanford University -- This is a monumental book, in several respects. Most obviously, it’s very long: longer, by my estimate, than the Critique of Pure Reason b y a margin of about three and a half Tractatus. It is also vast in scope: Chalmers discusses a huge range of topics in formal and informal epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. There is even some history: Carnap is the ‘hero’ of Constructing the World (p. xvii), and one of Chalmers’ goals is to reassess Carnap’s work — especially the Aufbau. Paper copies of the book contain eight chapters and seventeen short supplemental ‘excursuses’. Chalmers has also made one extra chapter and four additional excursuses available online. The book is based on Chalmers’ 2010 John Locke lectures, which the Oxford University philosophy department has to its great credit put online in mp3 format. Chalmers has made no major changes to his position or terminology between delivering the lectures and completing the book, so those who like to take their philosophy aurally can start with the online lectures before turning to the written text for more detail. -- In section one I discuss Chalmers’ use of the vexed term ‘a priori’. In section two I discuss Chalmers’ defence of the claim that there are a priori truths (including synthetic a priori truths) from empiricist doubters. In section three I explain how Chalmers defends his ‘scrutability theses’. In section four I outline the Fregean theory of sense.
books  reviews  kindle-available  logic  Carnap  Frege  Quine  metaphysics  epistemology  philosophy_of_language  mind  consciousness  subjectivity  apriori  philosophy_of_science 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Nietzsche Against the Philosophical Canon (2013) :: SSRN
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 438 -- Nietzsche views the Western philosophical tradition as organized around a conception of philosophy deriving from Socrates. According to this (loosely) Socratic philosophical canon: (1) Philosophy, as the “love of wisdom,” aims for knowledge of timeless and non-empirical truths, including truths about the good and the right; (2) Knowledge of the truth is the overriding value in philosophy and is also essential for living well; and (3) Philosophical knowledge is acquired through the exercise of reason, understood as a faculty that can operate independently, in whole or in part, of a posteriori evidence. This paper explores Nietzsche's reasons for rejecting this conception of philosophy on each count, especially as developed in his book, Twilight of the Idols. Nietzsche's replacement of metaphysical speculation with psychological diagnosis is compared to Carnap's own critique of metaphysics, and helps explain Carnap's high appraisal of Nietzsche compared to other major figures in post-Kantian German philosophy. Nietzsche's rejection of the traditional philosophical canon is contrasted with that of other critics of the tradition, including Marx, Quine, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. The reaction against naturalism in recent Anglophone philosophy is offered, finally, as a case study in support of Nietzsche's skepticism about the philosophical canon. --Keywords: Nietzsche, Socrates, Quine, Marx, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Carnap, meta-philosophy, ethics -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  21stC  ancient_philosophy  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  metaphysics  metaethics  epistemology  truth  good  flourishing  Socrates  post-truth  German_Idealism  Marx  Carnap  Quine  Heidegger  Wittgenstein  canon  ethics  reason  apriori  empiricism  naturalism  scepticism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Gary Ostertag, review - John P. Burgess, Kripke // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Dec 2013
John Burgess's book is a gem: an accessible yet nuanced introduction to the work of one of our greatest living philosophers. -- The discussions of Kripke on modal epistemology, on Wittgenstein on rules, and on a posteriori necessities involving natural kinds ... will be read with interest by anyone working in the relevant areas. -- The chapters concern, in order: names, necessity, identity, rules, belief and the mind. -- detailed discussion of "modal mystery" - Kant writes: "Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise." The mystery of modality is how we can learn that a thing cannot be otherwise (when indeed it cannot be). [Or]: 'How is a priori knowledge possible?' In the case of analytic truths, the answer - at least for Kant - was not particularly elusive: the concept of the predicate is (in some way) contained in the concept of the subject. But 'How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?' remained unanswered. By the middle of the 20thC the question of the mystery of modality had been re-conceived: the most pressing cases of putative synthetic a priori knowledge - that is, the truths of arithmetic - were reclassified as analytic. All else was either analytic (and thus a priori) or synthetic a posteriori. Moreover, the analytic itself had been rendered entirely un-mysterious, since these were truths known on the basis of linguistic convention. -- Kripke reversed the thumbnail sketch just provided... "According to Kripke, the whole line of thought from Kant to Frege to Carnap went wrong at its very first step". The error was in supposing that, since experience is never sufficient to show us that something cannot be otherwise, it is also never necessary to show that something cannot be otherwise. But there are many examples Kripke provides that show this to be false: there are truths (that water is H­2­0, that Hesperus is Phosphorus, etc.) that are, while necessary, only ascertainable as such via sense experience. As Burgess argues, this raises a mystery of its own. The question now is: "How is a posteriori knowledge of necessity possible?"
books  reviews  20thC  analytical_philosophy  Kripke  kinds  Wittgenstein  modal_logic  Kant  apriori  analytic-synthetic  a_posteriori  necessity  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Ali Hasan, review - Albert Casullo, Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // Jan 2014
The last thirty years or so have seen a significant resurgence of interest in the a priori. Albert Casullo's collection of excellent essays spans this period. The first six published essays (from 1977 to 2002) provide background to and central arguments for a number of themes covered in A Priori Justification (2003): (1) a defense of a minimal analysis of a priori justified belief as nonexperientially justified belief; (2) a critique of traditional criteriological arguments both for and against the existence of the a priori -- arguments that appeal to necessity, certainty, and empirical irrefutability or indefeasibility as criteria for a priori knowledge (or justification); (3) a critique of Laurence BonJour's (1998) argument that rationalism is preferable to empiricism since the rejection of the a priori leads to radical skepticism; (4) an assessment of the reliabilist approach to the a priori, including a defense of reliabilist responses to concerns with the coherence of the approach and its consistency with fallibilism and epistemological naturalism; and (5) a defense, on the basis of these critiques and the resulting stalemate between rationalism and empiricism, of the coherence of, and need for, empirical investigation into the existence of non-experiential sources of justification. The next four, published after A Priori Justification, explore some of the above issues in more detail. These include an extension of the critique of traditional arguments by considering Mill's, Quine's, Putnam's and Kitcher's arguments against the existence of the a priori ... and other topics such as the relationship between testimony and the a priori, and the relevance of socio-historical accounts of knowledge to the a priori.The final four pieces are unpublished essays that address some issues in the recent literature. The first is an extension of critiques of skeptical arguments for the a priori (like theme 3 above).... The second and third essays raise problems for some recent accounts of modal knowledge or knowledge of the modal status of propositions. The final piece defends the a priori/a posteriori distinction from recent attempts to challenge its cogency and significance, arguing that these attacks all miss their target, and ending by pointing to a different challenge raised by reflection on entitlement theories: that perhaps some warrant or justification is neither a priori nor a posteriori.
books  reviews  epistemology  apriori  rationalist  empiricism  evidence  historicism  fallibility  Putnam  Quine  Mill  scepticism  analytical_philosophy  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues: Laurence BonJour, Ernest Sosa: 9780631182849: Amazon.com: Books
Book Description -- Ever since Plato it has been thought that one has knowledge only if one has belief, ones belief hits the mark of truth, and does so with adequate justification. The debate between Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa primarily concerns the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge.BonJour defends a traditional, internalist epistemology, according to which epistemic justification derives from the subject's taking what is given to his conscious awareness, and accepting claims or steps of reasoning on an a priori basis. Sosa defends an externalist virtue epistemology. He rejects the sort of internalist foundationalism favored by BonJour, while agreeing to put aside questions of knowledge and its conditions, in order to focus on epistemic, rational, justification. He accepts that a belief's having a reliable source is not enough to render it thus justified. The two comprehensive positions that are the antagonists in this debate represent syntheses of the main views that have been proposed with regard to the nature of epistemic justification. The confrontation between them throws light on significant and interacting aspects of the subject. *--* Review -- "It is a wonderful treat for anyone interested in epistemology to find an exchange on the most basic epistemological problems between two such distinguished practicioners as BonJour and Sosa. This debate is conducted with the mastery and sophistication we have come to expect from them. Epistemic Justification is particularly valuable because not only does each author present and defend a position, but each responds at considerable length to the other." William P. Alston, Syracuse University -- “This book is both a livelv debate between two top epistemologists and a recapitulation of the main lines of the debate about epistemic justification over the last few decades. This makes it at once appropriate for undergraduate courses in epistemology as well as for graduate seminars. This debate is … always rewarding.” Review of Metaphysics
books  amazon.com  epistemology  apriori  rationalist  empiricism  virtue_epistemology  epistemology-social  foundationalism  analytical_philosophy  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert Sinclair - Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism | JSTOR: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 335-355
Quine famously concluded that his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction resulted in a more ‘thorough' pragmatism. While suggesting a possible link to American pragmatism, Quine would later explain that he was only extending the use of ‘pragmatic’ found in Carnap's thought. However, Quine has also acknowledged the influence of his teacher C.I. Lewis, who defended his ‘Conceptual Pragmatism’ in the 1920s and 1930s. This essay focuses on Quine's alleged connection to pragmatism by examining the influence of Lewis's pragmatism on Quine's developing epistemological perspective. It makes reference to Quine's unpublished graduate papers in order to argue that the structural affinities between Quine's and Lewis's conceptions of epistemology suggest an important historical source of the pragmatic elements in Quine's view. This further highlights a forgotten element of the epistemological backdrop to Quine's mid-century interpretation and criticism of Carnap's use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. -- paywall
article  jstor  paywall  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  epistemology  Quine  Carnap  Logical_Positivism  apriori  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader

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