dunnettreader + antitrust   15

A New Study of Labor Market Concentration - Roosevelt Institute
Labor economists have traditionally focused on worker-side characteristics, such as education, as the crucial causal variable for explaining outcomes like…
Labor_markets  antitrust  monopsony  unemployment  skills  human_capital  wages  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate | Journal of European Competition Law & Practice | Oxford Academic
Over the last two years, a growing number in America have concluded that the United States has a monopoly problem. The Obama Administration’s Council of…
antitrust  monopolies  industry_concentration  competition  Labor_markets  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
New Study Shows Just How Bad the US Labor Market’s Competition Problem Really Is -
In recent decades, antitrust policy has all but ignored the issue of monopsony power. Yet a new paper shows that across the US economy, labor markets are highly…
Labor_markets  monopsony  labor_share  antitrust  industry_concentration  Evernote  wages  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Antitrust in the Labor Market: Protectionist, or Pro-Competitive? -
Redirecting antitrust enforcement to confront monopsony power would be a substantial departure from the way it has been conducted in recent decades, but just…
Labor_markets  wages  monopsony  antitrust  competition  industry_concentration  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Strong Employers and Weak Employees: Study Sheds New Light on How Labor Market Concentration Hurts Workers -
New study finds that wages are significantly lower in concentrated labor markets—and even lower in labor markets where unionization rates are low. Strikers and…
Labor_markets  wages  unions  human_capital  monopsony  antitrust  competition  industry_concentration  Evernote  from instapaper
march 2018 by dunnettreader
Lords of Misrule | Matt Stoller - The Baffler - Sept 2017
In 1937, future Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson gave a toast at the New York State Bar Association on the civic responsibilities of the legal profession.…
Evernote  legal_culture  corporate_law  legal_system  US_politics  US_legal_system  US_government  white-collar_crime  criminal_justice  DOJ  fraud  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  SEC  antitrust  Obama_administration  accountability  from instapaper
september 2017 by dunnettreader
Paul Glastris - Elizabeth Warren just gave the most sneakily important speech of 2016
Re pattern of industry consolidation in US, and need for aggressive competition policies - Glastris thinks EW has figured out how to package it as "common sense", easy to understand, political discourse for Democrats
US_politics  US_economy  Democrats  elections-2016  competition  antitrust  political_economy  political_discourse  Instapaper  from instapaper
july 2016 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Michael Hudson - Veblen’s Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory - Working Paper No. 729 | Levy Economics Institute - August 2012
As the heirs to classical political economy and the German historical school, the American institutionalists retained rent theory and its corollary idea of unearned income. More than any other institutionalist, Thorstein Veblen emphasized the dynamics of banks financing real estate speculation and Wall Street maneuvering to organize monopolies and trusts. Yet despite the popularity of his writings with the reading public, his contribution has remained isolated from the academic mainstream, and he did not leave behind a “school.” Veblen criticized academic economists for having fallen subject to “trained incapacity” as a result of being turned into factotums to defend rentier interests. Business schools were painting an unrealistic happy-face picture of the economy, teaching financial techniques but leaving out of account the need to reform the economy’s practices and institutions. In emphasizing how financial “predation” was hijacking the economy’s technological potential, Veblen’s vision was as materialist and culturally broad as that of the Marxists, and as dismissive of the status quo. Technological innovation was reducing costs but breeding monopolies as the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sectors joined forces to create a financial symbiosis cemented by political-insider dealings—and a trivialization of economic theory as it seeks to avoid dealing with society’s failure to achieve its technological potential. The fruits of rising productivity were used to finance robber barons who had no better use of their wealth than to reduce great artworks to the status of ownership trophies and achieve leisure-class status by funding business schools and colleges to promote a self-congratulatory but deceptive portrayal of their wealth-grabbing behavior. -- Associated Program: Explorations in Theory and Empirical Analysis -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Veblen  entre_deux_guerres  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  political_economy  classical_economics  neoclassical_economics  marginalists  German_historical_school  professionalization  academia  philanthropy  Gilded_Age  robber_barons  finance_capital  technology  investment  monopolies  speculative_finance  financial_system  financialization  antitrust  history-and-social_sciences  rentiers  rent-seeking  business-and-politics  business-norms  busisness-ethics  business_schools  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
The People vs. Federal Bank Settlements and Liquidity Rules | Demos - September 2014
The Big Six settlements are negligible compared to the damage their practices (and the practices of the investment banks they bought at the onset of the crisis rendering them bigger) considering that since 2006, there have been foreclosure actions brought against nearly 15 million homes. With an average value of about $191,000 per home, the total value represented by those foreclosure actions is approximately $2.8 trillion - a far cry from $106 billion. Let this sink in. Our government and bankers settled on $32 billion in maybe-aid to borrowers relative to $2.8 trillion of foreclosed properties many of which are being scooped up by hedge and private equity funds financed by the same big banks. Not only that. These banks have been able to access money at close to 0 percent interest courtesy of the Federal Reserve for nearly six years. Yet, rather than reducing mortgage principals with that extra cheap money, they stockpiled a record volume of $2.5 trillion in excess reserves at the Federal Reserve for which they are reaping 0.25% interest – higher interest than they give their mere mortal customers. -- and the banks are throwing a tizzy fit over increasing liquidity from 1 to 2% of assets -- post also gives figures on obscene consolidation of US banking since the crisis in BofA, Wells Fargo and JPMorganChase
US_economy  US_government  Fed  financial_regulation  banking  Great_Recession  housing  regulation-enforcement  financialization  financial_crisis  inequality  antitrust  oligarchy  political_economy  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Zephyr Teachout, Lina Khan - Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power :: SSRN September 7, 2014
Zephyr Teachout, Fordham University School of Law -- Lina Khan, Yale University - Law School -- Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, Forthcoming. **--** The goal of this Article is to create a way of seeing how market structure is innately political. It provides a taxonomy of ways in which large companies frequently exercise powers that possess the character of governance. Broadly, these exercises of power map onto three bodies of activity we generally assign to government: to set policy, to regulate markets, and to tax. We add a fourth category — which we call "dominance," after Brandeis — as a kind of catchall describing the other political impacts. The activities we outline will not always fit neatly into these categories, nor do all companies engage in all of these levels of power — that is not the point. The point is that Bank of America and Exxon govern our lives in a way that, say, the local ice cream store in your hometown does not. Explicitly understanding the power these companies wield as a form of political power expands the range of legal tools we should consider when setting policy around them. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 38 - Keywords: antitrust
paper  SSRN  political_economy  economic_culture  big_business  antitrust  regulation  power-asymmetric  legal_system  consumers  governance  governmentality  corporate_citizenship  consumer_protection  concentration-industry  dispute_resolution  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader

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