dunnettreader + analytical_philosophy   116

Amie L. Thomasson, Ontology Made Easy - Reviewed by Matti Eklund | NDOR - March 2017
Amie L. Thomasson, Ontology Made Easy, Oxford University Press, 2015, 345pp., $53.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199385119.
Reviewed by Matti Eklund, Uppsala University
Carnap  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  reviews  ontology  epistemology  kindle-available  books 
march 2017 by dunnettreader
Kenneth R Westphal - 'Analytic Philosophy
The definitive version of this article appears in:
The Owl of Minerva , 42.1–2 (2010–11):1–18.
Rejection of the philosophical relevance of history of philosophy remains pronounced within contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy. The two main reasons for this rejection presuppose that strict deduction isboth necessary and sufficient for rational justification. However, this justificatory ideal of scientia holds only within strictly formal domains. This is confirmed by a neglected non-sequitur in van Fraassen’s original defence of ‘Constructive Empiricism’. Conversely, strict deduction is insufficient for rationaljustification in non-formal, substantive domains of inquiry. In non-formal, substantive domains, rational justification is also, in part, ineliminably social and historical, for sound reasons Hegel was the first to articulate. -- Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
history_of_philosophy  historical_sociology  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  deduction  contextualism  evolution-social  development_process  Hegel  contingency  intellectual_history  logic  historicism  evolution-as-model  philosophy_of_social_science  van_Frassen  article  downloaded  analysis-logic  epistemology  epistemology-social  empiricism 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Robert Brandom- Inference, Expression, and Induction [in W Sellars] (1988) | JSTOR
Inference, Expression, and Induction
Robert Brandom
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 54, No. 2, Colloquium on Sellarsian Philosophy (Sep., 1988), pp. 257-285
article  Brandom  inference  induction  jstor  Sellars  semantics  epistemology  analytical_philosophy 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Lawrence Cahoone - The Modern Intellectual Tradition: From Descartes to Derrida | The Great Courses
Modern Intellectual Tradition: From Descartes to Derrida
Professor of Philosophy at Holy Cross - PhD from SUNY
36 lectures, starting with 17thC scientific revolution
He devotes a lot to the period starting with fin de sciècle (analytic, pragmatism, Whitehead)
- has a whole lecture on Heidegger's rejection of "humanism" after 1 on existentialism and the Frankfurt School
- but entre dieux guerres and post WWII isn't a total downer - an entire lecture on Dewey
- though Derrida sounds like the endpoint, he's more the endpoint of the trend through Heidegger's version of phenomenology
- he then turns to Rorty's "end of philosophy" and says, not so fast
- he works through several themes from earlier that are re-emerging post-postmodern
- he goes back to Cassirer, Whitehead and the pragmatists - different orientations but working within what he terms pragmatic realism - with emergence and complexity part of the realist story
- my main question re that narrative arc is where is Deluze?
- but the whole show gets uniformly rave reviews - except that he works off a teleprompter which some thought was awkward - looks like audio download is the way to go
analytical_philosophy  18thC  Putnam  pragmatism  existentialism  Marxist  Wittgenstein  technology  Quine  mind  Frege  phenomenology  Frankfurt_School  Marx  Habermas  science-and-religion  Romanticism  philosophy_of_history  Spinoza  Husserl  buy  Sartre  epistemology  Hume  Rorty  emergence  neo-Kantian  biocultural_evolution  humanism  intellectual_history  dualism  James_William  Enlightenment_Project  historiography-Marxist  German_Idealism  Enlightenment  17thC  Hegel  Nietzsche  political_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  mind-body  video  Whitehead  individualism  French_Enlightenment  empiricism  modernity  Derrida  ordinary_language_philosophy  anti-foundationalism  20thC  Kierkegaard  philosophy_of_language  Heidegger  human_nature  truth  Descartes  Kant  complexity  philosophy_of_science  Berkeley  postmodern  philosophy_of_religion  21stC  19thC  Cassirer  metaphysics  Dewey  self  audio  anti-humanism  courses  Locke 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Videos from conference on Herman Cappelen, Philosophy without Intuitions (OUP, 2012) - School of Advanced Study
Knowledge and Intuitions - A one-day conference with papers on Professor Herman Cappelen's recent publication, Philosophy without Intuitions (OUP, 2012), with Professor Brain Weatherson (Michigan), Dr Ana-Sara Malmgren (Stanford), Professor Jonathan Weinberg (Arizona) and Professor Mark Richard (Harvard), with responses from the author.
epistemology  knowledge  conference  analytical_philosophy  lecture  intuitionism  methodology  video  books  intuitions  evidence  belief  cognition  cognitive_bias 
march 2016 by dunnettreader
S. Laygier - La pensée ordinaire et la dèmocratie intellectuelle (2000) | JSTOR - Esprit
L'intellectuel démocratique ne peut être seulement l'homme du social et des justes causes, un redresseur de torts, et se soustraire aux difficultés propres au monde de l'égalité. Il lui faut comprendre le simple, penser l'ordinaire, saisir que la confiance en soi est plus décisive que la mauvaise conscience. En ce sens, la pensée américaine, d'Emerson à Cavell, qui n'est pas réductible aux arabesques de la philosophie analytique, peut nous aider à saisir les problèmes intellectuels propres à la culture et à la politique en terre démocratique. -- Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
French_intellectuals  analytical_philosophy  downloaded  article  ordinary_language_philosophy  Cavell  Rawls  political_philosophy  jstor 
february 2016 by dunnettreader
J-H Glock - What is a theory of meaning? (2912 | JSTOR - Cahiers de Ferdinand Saussure
This article discusses the contrast between two types of theories of meaning: 'analytic' theories that provide an explanation of the concept of linguistic meaning and 'constructive' theories that allow the derivation of statements specifying the meaning of the sentences of a specific language. Contrary to Davidson, Dummett and McDowell, reflecting on the form that a constructive theory for a natural language should take neither solves the task of explaining the concept of meaning nor does it show that enterprise to be superfluous. Conceptual analysis remains essential at two levels: an illuminating constructive theory would have to analyse the concepts of the object language; and the adequacy of a particular type of constructive theory can only be assessed on the basis of an adequate understanding of semantic concepts. To establish these conclusions I reject the Davidson/McDowell proposal that a constructive theory should be (conceptually) 'modest' while defending the idea that it should be 'psychologically' modest. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
analytical_philosophy  downloaded  McDowell  jstor  Dummett  article  meaning  concepts  Davidson 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Richard Rorty - Davidson between Wittgenstein and Tarsk | JSTOR - Critica (1998)
Davidson between Wittgenstein and Tarski
Richard Rorty
Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía
Vol. 30, No. 88 (Apr., 1998), pp. 49-71
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
article  analytical_philosophy  downloaded  logic  Logical_Positivism  pragmatism  epistemology  jstor  truth  Wittgenstein  Davidson  Rorty  epistemology-social 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Michael Williams - Meaning and Deflationary Truth | JSTOR - The Journal of Philosophy (1999)
Meaning and Deflationary Truth
Michael Williams
The Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 96, No. 11 (Nov., 1999), pp. 545-564
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
jstor  downloaded  epistemology  epistemology-social  Davidson  analytical_philosophy  article  truth  meaning 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Donald Davidson - The Folly of Trying to Define Truth | JSTOR - The Journal of Philosophy (1996)
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth
Donald Davidson
The Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 93, No. 6 (Jun., 1996), pp. 263-278
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
jstor  intellectual_history  Davidson  analytical_philosophy  20thC  epistemology  article  post-WWII  downloaded  truth 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Étienne Bimbenet, review - Claude Romano, Au cœur de la raison, la phénoménologie - La Vie des idées - 17 décembre 2010
Recensé : Claude Romano, Au cœur de la raison, la phénoménologie. Gallimard (Folio Essais), 2010 ; 1141 p., 13, 50 €. -- Repenser la phénoménologie dans ses présupposés les plus forts, et la transformer de l’intérieur : tel est le geste théorique de Claude Romano qui, à partir des objections formulées par la philosophie analytique et l’empirisme logique, défend une phénoménologie redonnant toute sa place à la sensibilité dans l’analyse de l’expérience et la saisie des essences. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  French_language  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  21stC  continental_philosophy  phenomenology  Heidegger  Merleau-Ponty  Levinas  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  empiricism  metaphysics  experience  sensation  reason  rationality  epistemology  downloaded 
december 2015 by dunnettreader
Table of contents - John Sellars, ed. - The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition (Feb 2016) | Academia.edu
Introduction | Stoicism in Rome | Stoicism in Early Christianity | Plotinus and the Platonic Response to Stoicism | Augustine’s Debt to Stoicism in the Confessions | Boethius and Stoicism | Stoic Themes in Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury | Stoic Influences in the Later Middle Ages | The Recovery of Stoicism in the Renaissance | Stoicism in the Philosophy of the Italian Renaissance | Erasmus, Calvin, and the Faces of Stoicism in Renaissance and Reformation Thought | Justus Lipsius and Neostoicism | Shakespeare and Early Modern English Literature | Medicine of the Mind in Early Modern Philosophy | Stoic Themes in Early Modern French Thought | Spinoza and Stoicism | Leibniz and the Stoics: Fate, Freedom, and Providence | The Epicurean Stoicism of the French Enlightenment | Stoicism and the Scottish Enlightenment | Kant and Stoic Ethics | Stoicism in Nineteenth Century German Philosophy | Stoicism and Romantic Literature | Stoicism in Victorian Culture | Stoicism in America | Stoic Themes in Contemporary Anglo-American Ethics | Stoicism and Twentieth Century French Philosophy | The Stoic Influence on Modern Psychotherapy
books  intellectual_history  Stoicism  ancient_philosophy  Epictetus  Seneca  Early_Christian  late_antiquity  Neoplatonism  Augustine  Abelard  John_of_Salisbury  medieval_philosophy  Renaissance  Italian_Renaissance  Italy  Shakespeare  Shakespeare-influence  Erasmus  Reformation  Calvin  Justus_Lipsius  Neostoicism  philosophy-as-way-of-life  psychology  self  self-examination  self-knowledge  self-development  early_modern  Europe-Early_Modern  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  Spinoza  Leibniz  fate  determinism  Providence  free_will  freedom  French_Enlightenment  Epicurean  Scottish_Enlightenment  Kant-ethics  German_Idealism  German_scholars  neo-Kantian  Romanticism  literary_history  analytical_philosophy  psychoanalysis  phenomenology 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
The Virtual Issue No. 1 – Truth (2014 - conference 2013 | The Aristotelian Society
In celebration of the 125th year of the Proceedings, we are proud to present the first Virtual Issue of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. The Virtual Issue is based upon an Online Conference on the theme of Truth that took place 12th–18th April 2013. This weeklong event featured papers from our back catalogue, commentaries on these papers delivered by contemporary philosophers, and an online-based discussion forum that was open to all. The Virtual Issue comprises the classic papers and commentaries from the conference.
epistemology  21stC  apriori  intellectual_history  books  anti-foundationalism  epistemology-naturalism  downloaded  logic  analytical_philosophy  ebooks  aporia  20thC  foundationalism  moral_philosophy  social_epistemology  truth  virtue_epistemology 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Dale Jacquette, review - Ted Honderich, Actual Consciousness (OUP 2014) // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews - August 2015
Ted Honderich’s new book takes the exploration of the mysteries of consciousness in an interesting direction. He develops a certain-to-be-controversial…
subjectivity  books  emotions  consciousness  cognition  analytical_philosophy  self  reviews  mind  qualia  perception  phenomenology  from instapaper
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Jared P. Friedman and Anthony I. Jack - Mapping cognitive structure onto philosophical debate re problems of consciousness, free will and ethics | Minds Online - Sept 2015 - Session 1 - Social Cognition
Mapping cognitive structure onto the landscape of philosophical debate: An empirical framework with relevance to problems of consciousness, free will and ethics -- Department of Philosophy and Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence, Case Western Reserve University -- There are some seemingly intractable questions that have remained at the heart of philosophical discourse since they were first asked. Is the mind distinct from the brain or are we just physical stuff? Are we autonomous agents or merely at the mercy of the causal and mechanistic laws of nature? When, if ever, is it acceptable to sacrifice one for the greater good of many? That these questions have remained at the heart of philosophy for so long, and that their ‘solutions’ (e.g., monism vs. dualism) seem to be incommensurable with each other, strikes us as enigmatic. Might the intractable nature of these and other appropriately identified problems reflect something peculiar about us rather than something peculiar about the way the world is? (...) This account maintains that the difficulties reconciling markedly different philosophical responses to these three questions arise from an unavoidable tension between two anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks, both of which are essential to human understanding. This account is motivated by the observation that both philosophers and non-philosophers experience difficulty in reconciling competing responses to these questions. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  conference  cognition  antimonies  consciousness  mind-body  neuroscience  determinism  free_will  naturalism  physicalism  reductionism  causation  moral_philosophy  metaethics  intuitions  brain  experimental_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  James_William  monism  dualism  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann - Idealism | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - 1st published August 2015
This entry discusses philosophical idealism as a movement chiefly in the 18thC and 19thC, although anticipated by certain aspects of 17thC philosophy. It examines the relationship between epistemological idealism (the view that the contents of human knowledge are ineluctably determined by the structure of human thought) and ontological idealism (the view that epistemological idealism delivers truth because reality itself is a form of thought and human thought participates in it). After discussing precursors, the entry focuses on the eighteenth-century versions of idealism due to Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, the nineteenth-century movements of German idealism and subsequently British and American idealism, and then concludes with an examination of the attack upon idealism by Moore and Russell. -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Idealism in early modern Rationalism -- 3. Idealism in early modern British philosophy -- 4. Kant -- 5. German Idealism -- 6. Schopenhauer -- 7. Nietzsche -- 8. British and American Idealism -- 9. The Fate of Idealism in the Twentieth Century -- downloaded as pdf to Note (62 pgs!)
intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  idealism  idealism-transcendental  German_Idealism  epistemology  ontology  Berkeley  Kant  Hegel  Hegelian  Schopenhauer  Nietzsche  neo-Kantian  Absolute_Idealism  British_Idealism  Royce  Bradley  Moore_GE  Russell_Bertrand  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  Pittsburgh_Hegelians  philosophy_of_science  mind  bibliography  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic - All our needs are social | Global Inequality - August 2015
Branko Milanovic dismantles Harry Frankfurt's attempt to differentiate our "real" needs - where considerations of inequality purportedly aren't relevant, or even are counterproductive to our full self/realization -- and "social " needs where some consideration of correcting for those below some certain level is appropriate. It's a common but incoherent philosophical move -- I blame Rousseau!
inequality  amour_propre  economic_culture  self-interest  self-love  capabilities  inequality-opportunity  sociability  analytical_philosophy  socialization  Rousseau  bad_economics  authenticity  moral_philosophy  self-development  from instapaper
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Hartshorne: Biography and Psychology of Sensation | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(..) he insisted that metaphysics and empirical science have different aims and methods, each ensuring in its own way a disciplined objectivity. His “neoclassical” or “process” metaphysics is in the same family of speculative philosophy that one finds in the works of CS Peirce and the later writings of AN Whitehead. Although he did not style himself a disciple of either, he made significant contributions to the study of these philosophers even as he developed his own views. Like them, he endeavored in his own metaphysical thinking to give full weight to the dynamic, relational, temporal, and affective dimensions of the universe. He emphasized, as few before him had, in logic and in the processes of nature, the foundational nature of asymmetrical relations. He was also a theist (...) the revival of the ontological or modal argument for God’s existence...He insisted, however, that it was unavailing to appeal to ...any theistic argument) as support for theism without first rethinking the concept of deity. He argued that thinking about God had been handicapped by lack of attention to the logically possible forms of theism, and in place of the unmoved mover of classical theology, he proposed “the most, and best, moved mover.” He endorsed a “dipolar” version of theism according to which God is both necessary and contingent, but in different respects. He sought a “panentheism” in which God includes the creatures without negating their distinctiveness. -- entry also covers his 1st book on perception -- downloaded pdf to Note
intellectual_history  20thC  metaphysics  philosophy_of_religion  Peirce  Whitehead  theism  Hartshorne  natural_religion  rational_religion  God-attributes  God-existence  analytical_philosophy  logic  logic-Peirce  process_theology  panentheism  ontological_argument  cosmology  Aristotelian  sensation  perception  empiricism  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Hartshorne, Charles : Dipolar Theism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Hartshorne’s views on the existence of a divine reality are treated separately in another article, “Charles Hartshorne: Theistic and Anti-Theistic Arguments.” -- Hartshorne spent much of his career in a philosophical atmosphere in which the question was not so much “Does God exist?” as it was “Does ‘God’ name a coherent idea?” Philosophers from very diverse schools of thought—from Sartre to the Logical Positivists—rejected theism on the basis of alleged inconsistencies in the very idea of deity. Hartshorne himself remarked that there would be fewer atheists if theists had done a better job of making sense of the concept of God. Hartshorne’s response to this situation was to develop his dipolar or neoclassical concept of God. It can plausibly be claimed that Hartshorne accomplished at least two tasks: first, he introduced a sophisticated and religiously important form of theism heretofore unheard of or at least very poorly developed through philosophical argument and, second, he shifted the burden of proof onto those who claim that the concept of God is hopelessly muddled. -- downloaded pdf to Note
philosophy_of_religion  metaphysics  20thC  rational_religion  Whitehead  Hartshorne  God-attributes  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  existentialism  panentheism  theism  atheism  process_theology  modal_logic  ontological_argument  empiricism  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Reformed Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
A thesis about the rationality of religious belief. A central claim made by the reformed epistemologist is that religious belief can be rational without any appeal to evidence or argument. There are, broadly speaking, two ways that reformed epistemologists support this claim. The first is to argue that there is no way to successfully formulate the charge that religious belief is in some way epistemically defective if it is lacking support by evidence or argument. The second way is to offer a description of what it means for a belief to be rational, and to suggest ways that religious beliefs might in fact be meeting these requirements. This has led reformed epistemologists to explore topics such as when a belief-forming mechanism confers warrant, the rationality of engaging in belief forming practices, and when we have an epistemic duty to revise our beliefs. As such, reformed epistemology offers an alternative to evidentialism (the view that religious belief must be supported by evidence in order to be rational) and fideism (the view that religious belief is not rational, but that we have non-epistemic reasons for believing). Reformed epistemology was first clearly articulated in a collection of papers called Faith and Rationality edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff in 1983. However, the view owes a debt to many other thinkers
philosophy_of_religion  epistemology  rational_religion  rationality  evidence  religious_belief  fideism  analytical_philosophy  virtue_epistemology  Protestants 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Emmanuel Bezy, review - Pascale Gillot, L’esprit, figures classiques et contemporaines - Histoire du mind-body problem - La Vie des idées - 10 janvier 2008
Pascale Gillot, L’esprit, figures classiques et contemporaines, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2007, 315 p., 30 euros. -- Si l’esprit et le corps sont des substances séparées et distinctes, comment peuvent-ils agir l’un sur l’autre ? P. Gillot montre dans son ouvrage les différentes réponses que la philosophie de l’esprit a apportées au problème ainsi formulé par Descartes. Mais ces réponses parviennent difficilement, selon elle, à s’affranchir totalement du cartésianisme. -- L’ouvrage de Pascale Gillot peut se lire de deux manières, qui ne sont pas exclusives l’une de l’autre : il constitue à la fois une introduction à la philosophie de l’esprit et une mise en perspective de la philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine, telle qu’elle s’est développée aux Etats-Unis depuis le tournant cognitiviste. Pascale Gillot expose la construction du problème du corps et de l’esprit, puis elle met en évidence les rémanences de cette problématique de William James à Jaegwon Kim. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  French_language  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  20thC  21stC  mind  mind-body  cogito  Cartesian  Descartes  James_William  dualism  cognition  neuroscience  psychology  metaphysics  essence  substance  human_nature  analytical_philosophy  naturalism  reductionism  thinking_matter  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Hartshorne, Charles: Neoclassical Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - July 2015
Hartshorne (1897-2000) was an intrepid defender of the claims of metaphysics ...While many influential voices were explaining what speculative philosophy could not accomplish or even proclaiming an end to it, Hartshorne was trying to show what speculative philosophy could accomplish. Metaphysics, he said, has a future as well as a past. He believed that the history of philosophy exhibits genuine, albeit halting and uneven, progress towards a comprehensive understanding of the nature of existence. Philosophy was, for him, a dialogue that spans centuries, with partners whose wisdom has a perennial relevance. The 2 philosophers who most influenced him, and in whose work he found the greatest parallels with his own thinking, were Charles Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead. Hartshorne was co-editor with Paul Weiss of the first comprehensive edition of Peirce’s philosophical papers, and he served as Whitehead’s assistant during the most metaphysically creative period of the Englishman’s career. (...) there remained important differences between the two philosophers [i.e. H & W]. (..) theism was always a central element of Hartshorne’s metaphysics (addressed briefly here, but see “Charles Hartshorne: Dipolar Theism” and “Charles Hartshorne: Theistic and Anti-theistic Arguments”) whereas Whitehead was preoccupied for much of his career with a philosophy of nature and did not introduce God until he developed the speculative philosophy of his later works. -- downloaded pdf to Note
intellectual_history  20thC  metaphysics  philosophy_of_religion  Peirce  Whitehead  theism  Hartshorne  natural_religion  rational_religion  God-attributes  God-existence  analytical_philosophy  logic-Peirce  ontological_argument  modal_logic  Quine  process_theology  panentheism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicola Lacey - Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 919 (2015)
A cri de coeur for putting legal theory and history back together with social theory and empirical social sciences,. -- In the early part of my career, legal history and the history of legal ideas were closed books to me, as I made my way in a field of criminal law scholarship dominated by doctrinal scholarship and by concept-focused philosophical analysis of the foundations of criminal law. These 2 very different paradigms have 1 big thing in common: They tend to proceed as if the main intellectual task is to unearth the deep logic of existing legal doctrines, not infrequently going so far as to read them back onto history, as if things could never have been other than they are. (..)I have increasingly found myself turning to historical resources (1) [to examine] the contingency of particular legal arrangements, and (2) ...to develop causal and other theses about the dynamics which shape them and hence about the role and quality of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies. So, in a sense, I have been using history in support of an analysis driven primarily by the social sciences. (..) it is no accident that all of the great social theorists, from Marx to Foucault via Weber, Durkheim, and Elias, ..have incorporated significant historical elements into their interpretations .... Indeed, without the diachronic perspective provided by history (or the perspective offered by comparative study) we could have no critical purchase on social theory’s characterizations of or causal hypotheses about the dynamics of social systems. Hence, (...) my boundless gratitude to the historians whose meticulous research makes this sort of interpretive social theory possible). -- Lacey is not over-dramatizing -- see the "commentary" from a "legal philosopher" who believes the normative basis of criminal responsibility can be investigated as timeless "moral truths". -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_change  philosophy_of_law  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_social_science  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  morality-conventional  morality-objective  criminal_justice  responsibility  mind  human_nature  norms  power-asymmetric  power-symbolic  power  Neoplatonism  neo-Kantian  a_priori  historiography  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  moral_philosophy  evidence  mental_health  social_order  epistemology  epistemology-moral  change-social  change-intellectual  comparative_law  comparative_anthropology  civil_liberties  women-rights  women-property  rights-legal  rights-political  access_to_services  discrimination  legal_culture  legal_system  legal_reasoning  Foucault  Marx  Weber  Durkheim  metaethics  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan - Of Weevils and Witches: What Can We Learn from the Ghost of Responsibility Past? A Commentary on Lacey's "Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 947 (2015)
Lacey's article (..) criticizes the scholarship on criminal responsibility for being too concerned with “its conceptual contours and moral foundations,” “rather than with what it is for[:] its social roles, meaning, and functions.” Here is what she is arguing against. There are theorists, myself included, who think of questions of responsibility in philosophical terms. These moral truths are not socially or historically contingent; they are constant questions to which we seek answers. (..) In some ways, this is a (boring) methodological debate. What I care about as responsibility is not what she cares about as responsibility. -- YIKES -- Apart from the travesty of equating legal norms with "moral truths," this looks like moral realism run amok -- the questions may be "constant" but who gets to frame the Qs, what values are doing the framing (blood money, retribution, restitution, prevention, hierarchy reinforcement, group purification), what anthropology and epistemology implicitly govern the framing (universal depravity, trial by ordeal, women's testimony is unreliable?), the defined criteria (lower orders don't have honor they can defend, husbands can't commit rape), how criteria are to be applied, by whom (civil vs religious authority, manor courts vs king's law, lie detector operators, NSA algorithms?) -- "Philosophical" inquiry is limited to *a priori* concerns, and "philosophical" answers are limited to eternal Platonic "moral truths". But if normative Qs & As are by definition not contingent on changing institutions and social assumptions re behavior, what's's the foundation for her inquiry process? Armchair "fine-grained" intuitions re "mental states"? So do we get new "moral truths" along with the each new neuroscience study? "Proof there's no free will!"="moral truth" (let everybody out of jail?) and next month "Latest study finds the free will spot"=oops, new eternal "moral truth" (can we test it like DNA?) -- Analytic philosophy rediscovering Aristotelian categories is bad enough, but analytic neo-Platonic anthropology gets me actively hostile, and it's even more absurd if we're talking about criminal law -- didn't download
article  analytical_philosophy  a_priori  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  jurisprudence  criminal_justice  biocultural_evolution  human_nature  moral_psychology 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steven Walt - What Can The History of Jurisprudence Do For Jurisprudence? A Commentary on Schauer's "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 977 (2015)
Walt's response (at least the abstract) appears to prove Schauer's point quite nicely, as if logic and argument by legal theorists takes place in an abstract world where "how did we get here" is universally ignored, despite its possible relevance for "why are we here", "what are we doing here" and "where does it look like we might be headed" -- but Walt devoted 10 pages to his response, so one hopes he has more to justify his position than what comes across as a mix of arrogance (we don't need to learn from history because our theoretical grounding and argumentative methods are self-contained and self-sufficient) and cynicism (history might be interesting, but no way will anybody change what gets them published and tenure) -- out of curiosity as to whether it's really as bad as the abstract makes it sound, downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  positivism  positivism-legal  historiography  legal_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Dan Priel - Toward Classical Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015)
I have two major aims: (1) set the historical record straight(...) Hobbes’s and Bentham’s work that seeks to understand their views on law not by isolating it from the rest of their wide-ranging body of work, but by understanding their jurisprudential work as part of a broader project. (2) My main aim is to contribute to contemporary jurisprudential debates and to suggest that the largely neglected approach of earlier positivists is superior to the view held by most contemporary legal positivists. (...) to what extent it is useful for us to call Hobbes and Bentham “legal positivists.” My answer to this question consists of three interrelated points. The first is that we draw an explicit link between their ideas and the view that (some time later) would come to be known as “positivism,” roughly the view that the methods of the “human sciences” are essentially the same as those of the natural sciences. The second point is that the classical legal positivists’ decisive break with natural law ideas prevalent in their day is to be found exactly here, in their views about metaphysics and nature. The third point is that this aspect of their work has been, in my view regrettably, abandoned by contemporary legal positivists. Though all three points are related, in this Article I will say relatively little about the first point, as I discussed it in greater detail elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski - Positivism(s): A Commentary on Priel's "Toward Classical Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (2015)
Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it insulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor Postema’s phrase from his symposium article. And, in part due to the exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminating the recent history and current state of inquiry. His article demonstrates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurisprudence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this rediscovered path, and I am not sure I always agree with his suggested answers. Any misgivings I have about Priel’s particular approach, however, do not diminish my appreciation; I find even the points of disagreement to be live and meaningful, and that itself is refreshing. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Luban - Time-Mindedness and Jurisprudence: A Commentary on Postema's "Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 903 (2015)
Postema offers two general programmatic suggestions for jurisprudence besides greater historical consciousness: sociability and synechism. Sociability, has two dimensions. First, it means interdisciplinarity—a continual dialogue with the study of legal phenomena by the sciences, humanities, and even theology. Second, it means embedding jurisprudence in general philosophy, ... [Sellars]: “not only ‘cabbages and kings’, but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death.” Synechism is a less familiar idea, drawn from the philosophy of C.S. Peirce. It is the commitment to seek continuity among phenomena. Peirce was metaphysically committed to the existence of actual continua everywhere in nature, history, and human psychology. So synechism will impose a certain demand on all systematic studies, namely discerning those continua.(..) a certain kind of historiography: The historian’s job is to unearth continuities between past and present rather than studying ruptures. This, it seems to me, is a contestable commitment that rules out a great deal of important historical work. Peirce understood synechism to imply that ideas are intrinsically temporal and historical phenomena. Although Postema does not endorse this general thesis, he does argue for a special case of it, namely that law is “intrinsically temporal.” This conclusion is central to his argument against the possibility of time-slice legal systems. It, too, is contestable; but, I shall suggest, Postema can reach his conclusion on grounds other than synechism, and I agree with him about law’s intrinsic temporality. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  pragmatism  historiography  historical_change  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  analytical_philosophy  legal_history  continuity  change-social  change-intellectual  intellectual_history  Peirce  social_sciences  legal_culture  legal_realism  philosophy_of_history  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Gerald J. Postema - Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 869 (2015)
Renaissance jurisprudence strove to be a sociable science. Following Ulpian’s lead, it refused to relegate jurisprudence either to pure speculation or to mere practice. Jurisprudence was a science, a matter of knowledge and of theoretical understanding, not merely an applied art or practice of prudence innocent of theory. It was regarded as the very heart of theoretical studies, drawing to itself all that the traditional sciences of theology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, as well as the newly emerging humanist sciences of philology and hermeneutics, had to offer. No less resolutely, however, it refused to abandon its foothold in the life of practice. (..) Rather than reject philosophical reflection, (..) Renaissance jurists sought to locate it in concrete human life and experience. (..) Philosophy.., was most true to its vocation, and was most engaged in human life, when its reflections were anchored in the social life acknowledged, comprehended, and informed by and informing law. Jurisprudence, vera philosophia, was ...the point at which the theoretical and the practical intersected (..) at its “sociable” best sought to integrate them. Analytic jurisprudence began as self-consciously, even militantly, “unsociable,” and its matured and much-sophisticated descendant, fin de siècle analytic legal philosophy, remained largely if not exclusively so. (..) It may be time, in this period of self-conscious attention to jurisprudential method, to press beyond the current limits of this debate over method to a reassessment of the ambitions of jurisprudence and of philosophy’s role in it. (..) my aim is not critical but constructive. (..) to recover something of the ideal of jurisprudence as a sociable science, to retrieve as much as our disenchanted age can be challenged to embrace, or at least to entertain, of the ambition of jurisprudence as vera philosophia. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  Renaissance  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  common_law  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  norms  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  change-social  change-intellectual  social_order  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  pragmatism  Peirce  continuity  historical_change  methodology-qualitative  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence? :: SSRN - Nov 2008
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-35 -- General jurisprudence purports to consider law in general. But to break out of the arid abstractions of analytic legal philosophy, it may be worth also giving some jurisprudential consideration to the distinctive features of law in the context of a particular kind of political system. This paper considers the jurisprudence of law in a modern democracy. It explores a suggestion (made by Ronald Dworkin and others) that legal positivism might be a theory particularly apt for a democracy. And it explores the meaning and significance for democratic political theory of ideas like the generality of law, the separation of law and morality, the sources thesis, and law's public orientation. At the very end, the paper also considers Jean-Jacques Rousseau's view that the word "law" should be confined to measures that are applicable to all, made by all, and enacted in the spirit of a general will. -- Pages in PDF File: 5 -- Keywords: analytic legal philosophy, democracy, Hart, jurisprudence, legal positivism, Rousseau, separation of law and morality, sources of law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  government-forms  democracy  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  Hart  general_will  moral_philosophy  Dworkin  lawmaker  politics-and-religion  legal_reasoning  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Ius Gentium: A Defense of Gentili's Equation of the Law of Nations and the Law of Nature :: SSRN November 2008
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-34 -- The relation between the law of nature and the law of nations (ius gnetium) remains unclear. This paper examines Gentili's apparent equation of the two, and it considers more generally how abstract natural law reasoning might be improved by the sort of empirical/comparative law reasoning (as we would call it) that thinkers like Gentili, Grotius and others engaged in when they tried to determine what natural law teaches us about the regulation of war. -- Pages in PDF File: 17 -- Keywords: Gentili, ius gentium, law of nations, laws of war, moral reasoning, natural law, positive law -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  Roman_law  natural_law  international_law  positivism-legal  positive_law  moral_philosophy  comparative_law  17thC  18thC  Europe-Early_Modern  Grotius  gentility  law_of_the_sea  law_of_nations  ius_gentium  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - What do the Philosophers Have against Dignity? (Nov 2014) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-59 -- Among analytic philosophers, there is considerable antipathy towards the concept of human dignity. It is not always expressed, but the impression is conveyed that this is a rather disreputable idea and that its trumpeting in legal and political theory is to be deplored. The present paper tries to get to grips with the sources of this antipathy. Is it based on the unclarity of the concept, its religious overtones, its speciesism, or its redundancy as a moral idea. The paper makes a case for dignity as a status-concept -- denoting a particular sort of moral/legal status that all humans have. -- Pages in PDF File: 23 -- Keywords: definition, dignity, foundationalism, human dignity, religion, rights -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  dignity  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  status  human_rights  foundationalism  politics-and-religion  natural_law  natural_rights  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Markus Gabriel interview with Richard Marshall - Why The World Does Not Exist But Unicorns Do | 3AM - May 2015
Markus Gabriel broods on why the world doesn’t exist and never stops wondering about Kant, existence, pluralism, fields of sense, Huw Price, about why he isn’t po-mo, nor a Meinongian, about why unicorns exist, about why he’s a realist, about dissolving the hard problem, about why naturalism and physicalism are wrong, about Schelling and post-Kantian idealism, about Badiou and Meillassouz, Heidegger, about resisting skepticism, about negative philosophy, mythology, madness, laughter and the need for illusions in metaphysics, and about the insult that is the continental/analytic divide . Gird up for an amazing story… -- humongous interview divided into 2 pages - each about twice as long as one of Marshall's regular interviews -- only page 1 picked up by Instapaper, and no single page option -- saved as 2 pdfs to Note
Instapaper  downloaded  intellectual_history  philosophy  metaphysics  ontology  ontology-social  realism  realism-speculative  postmodern  Rorty  Kant  Schelling  German_Idealism  pragmatism  pragmatism-analytic  Husserl  Heidegger  scepticism  myth  Brandom  French_intellectuals  continental_philosophy  philosophy_of_science  analytical_philosophy  Russell_Bertrand  Frege  physicalism  materialism  naturalism  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Fiona Ellis - God, Value, and Nature (October 2014) - Oxford University Press
** analysis of the familiar contrast between the 'natural' and the 'supernatural' domains ** Explores the idea of expanded nature and develops it in a direction that will accomodate theism. ** Examines the nature of expansive naturalism, drawing on ...Akeel Bilgrami, David Wiggins, and John McDowell ** extensive discussion of Levinas's claim that relating to value is both necessary and sufficient for relating to God **-** Many philosophers believe that God has been put to rest. Naturalism is the default position, and the naturalist can explain what needs to be explained without recourse to God. This book agrees that we should be naturalists, but it rejects the more prevalent scientific naturalism in favour of an 'expansive' naturalism inspired by David Wiggins and John McDowell. (..) expansive naturalism can accommodate the idea of God, (..) the expansive naturalist has unwittingly paved the way towards a form of naturalism which poses a genuine challenge to the atheist. (..) the traditional naturalism vs theism debate must be reconfigured: naturalism and theism (..) can both be true. Ellis draws on ... thinkers from theology and philosophy, ... between analytic and continental philosophy. (..) philosophical problems including the limits of nature and the status of value; theological problems surrounding the natural/supernatural relation, the Incarnation, and the concept of myth; and offers a model - inspired by the secular expansive naturalist's conception of philosophy - to comprehend the relation between philosophy and theology.
books  kindle-available  intellectual_history  philosophy_of_religion  philosophy_of_science  naturalism  natural_religion  theism  Deism  analytical_philosophy  McDowell  atheism  atheism-new  values  secularism  theology  Christology  supernatural  myth 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Fiona Ellis - on her new book "God, Value and Nature" | Oxford University Press Blog
Uses A.C. Grayling as the atheistic-naturalism foil. Suggests more re her argument than in the Oxford University Press catalog -- that her model uses Hegelian dialectic to surmount the "scientism" of the New Atheists and takes McDowell's argument that "value" belongs on the naturalist side of the divide to further extend the boundaries of naturalism.
books  kindle-available  theology  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_religion  naturalism  supernatural  values  theism  Deism  analytical_philosophy  McDowell  atheism  atheism-new  scientism  Hegel  dialectic  Pocket  Instapaper  from instapaper
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Faulkner - Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 121-138 (2013)
University of Sheffield -- Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology -- Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected to reliability. These claims are first made in abstract, and then developed with regard to our practice of trusting testimony, where an epistemological investigation into the grounds of reliability must inevitably detail the ‘logic of everyday practices’. -- looks like interesting fit with the virtue focus and collective knowledge practices of Boyle, Locke et al -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  epistemology  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science  reliabilism  testimony  evidence  Royal_Society  Boyle  Locke  empiricism  virtue_epistemology  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Angelica Nuzzo - The Social Dimension of Dialectical Truth: Hegel’s Idea of Objective Spirit « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 10-25 (2013
Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY -- Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology -- In this essay I argue for the claim that Hegel’s dialectical idea of truth, which is articulated in its pure forms in the Logic as the process of comprehension of partial positions of truth in an ultimate systematic unity, is socially and historically constituted within the structures of what Hegel calls “spirit.” I start by bringing to the fore those controversial issues of the Goldman-Fuller debate on which Hegel has important suggestions to make. In placing Hegel within this debate, my claim is that his theory offers a ‘third way’ of shaping a social epistemology developed on the basis of a dialectic-speculative logic and such as having the notion of spirit at the center. What Hegel has to offer to us is a “dialectical” social epistemology where truth is indeed the fundamental aim of science and yet it is a historical and collective construction of spirit. I examine the access to and the elaboration of truth and knowledge proper, respectively, to subjective and objective spirit: the psychological, individual dimension of subjective spirit, and the social and institutional context of objective spirit. I argue that the dimension of objective spirit is the mediating center that organizes and gives “reality” to all the forms of spirit’s knowledge. I conclude by briefly discussing the role that Bildung plays in shaping and articulating the institutions of knowledge and the activity of science within the social sphere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
social_theory  epistemology  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science  logic  logic-Hegelian  Hegel  constructivism  dialectic-historical  dialectic  bildung  institutions  social_sciences  Absolute  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Miika Vähämaa - Secrets, Errors and Mathematics: Reconsidering the Role of Groups in Social Epistemology « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (9): 36-51 (2013)
Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology (SE) -- This paper claims that analytic social epistemology (ASE) has slowed, if not halted, the development of SE and the social sciences in general. I argue that SE is unavoidably subjective due to its collective nature. SE as it is generally understood, consists of the study of socially shared propositions and how they are understood by those communities. However, socially shared propositions of knowledge are not constrained by propositional logic but are rather enabled by the limited quanta of reason and logic embedded in linguistic structure. From the view of Goldman and his supporters , “real” knowledge is constrained by propositional logic, which is derived from language and is constructed in social settings. This view errs in its attempt to collapse social knowledge into propositional logic, downplaying the many social groups and practices that produce, create, restore and distort knowledge. The “subjective” and group-oriented nature of SE is demonstrated in this text by examples of secrets, errors and mathematics as discrete social domains in which knowledge is created and maintained. Examples in both philosophy and social sciences are important, since they reveal the weaknesses of strict ASE. A simple real-life example may be appealing to emotions and personal experiences of life whereas Wittgensteinian truth tables are rarely matters of personal attachment to anyone. The social in SE can only be properly considered from the viewpoint of social groups. Following an argument presented by Fuller, I show that “knowledge” is not a self-maintaining quality of human life, but rather a qualia that is regenerated situationally. All epistemic activities build upon such reorganization as it is conducted within social groups which seek to regenerate knowledge both to make sense of the world and to make sense of their own selves. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  epistemology  epistemology-social  epistemology-naturalism  analytical_philosophy  social_psychology  philosophy_of_language  philosophy_of_social_science  philosophy_of_science  logic  knowledge  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Sanford C. Goldberg -“Analytic Social Epistemology” and the Epistemic Significance of Other Minds « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2 (8): 26-48 (2013)
Sanford C. Goldberg, Northwestern University -- Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology. -- In this paper I develop a rationale for pursuing a distinctly “social” epistemology, according to which social epistemology is the systematic study of the epistemic significance of other minds. After articulating what I have in mind with this expression, I argue that the resulting rationale informs work presently being done in the emerging tradition of “Analytic Social Epistemology” (ASE). I go on to diagnose Steve Fuller’s (2012) dismissal of ASE (as “retrograde”) as reflecting a rather deep — and, to date, deeply uncharitable — misunderstanding of the aims and rationale of this emerging tradition. Far from being retrograde, the best of the work in the emerging ASE tradition provides a nice compliment to the best of the social epistemology work in the social science tradition. The key to seeing this point is twofold: we need to recognize the normative orientation of (much of) the work in ASE; and, perhaps more importantly, we need to appreciate the difference between how Fuller (2012) understands the normativity of social epistemology, and how this is understood by theorists within the ASE tradition. I conclude with what I hope will be some constructive suggestions on this score. -- downloaded pdf to Note
analytical_philosophy  social_theory  epistemology  epistemology-social  philosophy_of_language  mind  mind-theory_of  normativity  hygiene-mental  sociology_of_knowledge  social_sciences  philosophy_of_science  social_psychology  social_process  power-knowledge  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard - Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology, Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2 (8): 105-120 (2013).
University of Edinburgh -- Special Issue 2: On the Future Direction of Social Epistemology -- The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and methodology of the former. We are rather suspicious of this apparent tension, which we believe can be significantly mitigated by paying attention to certain recent advances within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Accordingly, we attempt to explain how extended knowledge, the result of combining active externalism from contemporary philosophy of mind with contemporary epistemology, can offer an alternative conception of the future of social epistemology.
analytical_philosophy  social_theory  epistemology  epistemology-social  philosophy_of_language  mind  mind-body  cognition  cognition-social  neuroscience  mind-external  bibliography  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  philosophy_of_science  psychology  social_psychology  downloaded  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Collin Finn - Two Kinds of Social Epistemology « Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 79-104. (2013)
Steve Fuller’s programme of Social Epistemology was initiated some 25 years ago with the launching of a journal and the publication of a monograph with those very words as their title. Since then, the programme has evolved in a constant critical dialogue with other players in the fields of epistemology and science studies. Fuller’s main confrontation has been with analytic epistemology which, in its classical form, adopts a contrary position on most key issues. However, analytic epistemologists have gradually moved in the direction of Fuller’s views and even adopted the term “social epistemology” for their emerging position. Still, substantial disagreement remains between the two identically named programmes with regard to the proper philosophical approach to knowledge as a social phenomenon; in this article, I try to pinpoint the locus of this disagreement. However, Fuller has also been engaged in minor skirmishes with his Science Studies fellows; I also examine these clashes. Finally, I express my wishes concerning the future direction of social epistemology. -- downloaded pdf to Note
epistemology  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  history_of_science  scientific_method  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_language  social_theory  downloaded  EF-add  cognition  cognition-social  institutions  power  power-knowledge  knowledge  knowledge_economy  power-asymmetric  Rawls  democracy  expertise  epistemology-naturalism  human_nature  posthumanism  post-truth  Latour  humanities  humanism  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  political_culture  cultural_capital  social_capital  neoliberalism  instrumentalist 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Reviewed by Jocelyn Benoist - Vincent Descombes, The Institutions of Meaning: A Defense of Anthropological Holism // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // August 2014
Reviewed by Jocelyn Benoist, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne This is the English translation by Stephen Adam Schwartz of Vincent Descombes’ Les Institutions du Sens (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1996). It is the sequel to The Mind’s Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism, also translated into English by Schwartz (Princeton University Press, 2001; French original version: La Denrée Mentale, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1995). The two books should be considered together as a whole, to which the author himself gave the title of The Disputes of Mind. -- This impressive work is indeed a major contribution to the philosophy of mind. Perhaps the cognitivist wave is not as powerful today as it was twenty years ago, which may render the ‘dispute’ less intense nowadays, but the concept of mind provided by the author is no less topical. --. It is clear that this book is a milestone in the contemporary philosophy of mind and should absolutely be read by every philosopher or scientist interested in the nature of the mind today. It pursues an intense debate with contemporary cognitivism and with Continental theories and ‘deconstruction’ of mind, and develops a totally unique perspective at the crossroads of the Analytic and French traditions. Maybe, like every polemical work, it depends a bit too much on what it criticizes. However, beyond the polemic, it seems to me that this book does indeed promise a new philosophy of mind that defines the mind by itself and no longer by any transcendent principle — either ‘the Subject’ or ‘Society’ — that in a sense would not already be mindful. Thus, it seems to me that we should read this book as a plea for the non-metaphysical irreducibility of the mind. And what do we need more today than a non-metaphysical (I have not said: anti-metaphysical) anti-reductionism?
books  reviews  philosophy_of_language  mind  sociability  structuralist  poststructuralist  continental_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  phenomenology  hermeneutics  subjectivity  deconstruction  Peirce  logic  society  constructivism 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Gorman - Hayden White as analytical philosopher of mind | Rethinking History Vol. 17, Iss. 4, 2013 - Special Issue : Hayden White’s " Metahistory " 40 Years On - Taylor & Francis Online
Philosophers and historians in Cambridge did not recognise either the relevance or the importance of Metahistory when it was published in 1973. The reasons are here explained in terms of the nature of the analytical tradition: the principled distinctiveness of analytical philosophy from (1) history, (2) speculative metaphysics, and (3) political morality. Following an analysis of ‘analysis’, Metahistory is argued to be an exercise in the recovery of paradigm cases in Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics that offers the outlines of an advanced philosophy of mind and philosophy of time. -- Jonathan Gorman is Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy at the Queen's University of Belfast. His books in philosophy of history are The Expression of Historical Knowledge (Edinburgh 1982), Understanding History (Ottawa 1992) and Historical Judgement (Stocksfield 2007), and he has many articles and reviews in theory of history journals and collections. He continues to apply analytic pragmatic philosophy to historical thought, and writes also in other branches of philosophy and in legal theory.
article  paywall  find  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  historiography  narrative  analytical_philosophy  ordinary_language_philosophy  speech-act  philosophy_of_history  mind  time  metaphysics  Strawson_PF  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
JOEL ISAAC -- DONALD DAVIDSON AND THE ANALYTIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, 1940–1970 (2013). | The Historical Journal, 56, pp 757-779 - Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
JOEL ISAAC - Christ's College, Cambridge -- Histories of analytic philosophy in the United States have typically focused on the reception of logical positivism, and especially on responses to the work of the Vienna Circle. Such accounts often call attention to the purportedly positivist-inspired marginalization of normative concerns in American philosophy: according to this story, the overweening positivist concern for logic and physics as paradigms of knowledge displaced questions of value and social relations. This article argues that the reception framework encourages us to mistake the real sources of the analytic revolution in post-war philosophy. These are to be found in debates about intentional action and practical reasoning – debates in which ‘normative’ questions of value and social action were in fact central. Discussion of these topics took place within a transatlantic community of Wittgensteinians, ordinary languages philosophers, logical empiricists, and decision theorists. These different strands of ‘analytical’ thinking were bound together into a new philosophical mainstream not by a positivist alliance with logic and physics, but by the rapid development of the mathematical and behavioural sciences during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. An illustrative application of this new framework for interpreting the analytic revolution is found in the early career and writings of Donald Davidson.
article  paywall  intellectual_history  20thC  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  Wittgenstein  ordinary_language_philosophy  behavioralism  social_sciences-post-WWII  decision_theory  mathematics  logic  empiricism  US  cultural_history  academia  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
KATRINA FORRESTER -- CITIZENSHIP, WAR, AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1960–1975 (2014). | The Historical Journal, 57, pp 773-801. - Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
KATRINA FORRESTER - St John's College, Cambridge -- This article examines a series of debates about civil disobedience, conscription, and the justice of war that took place among American liberal philosophers, lawyers, and activists during the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War. It argues that these debates fundamentally reshaped American political philosophy, by shifting the focus from the welfare state to the realm of international politics. In order to chart this transition from the domestic to the international, this article focuses on the writings of two influential political theorists, John Rawls and Michael Walzer. The turn to international politics in American political philosophy has its origins, in part, in their arguments about domestic citizenship. In tracing these origins, this article situates academic philosophical arguments alongside debates among the American public at large. It offers a first account of the history of analytical political philosophy during the 1960s and 1970s, and argues that the role played by the Vietnam War in this history, though underappreciated, is significant. -* I would like to thank Duncan Bell, Kenzie Bok, Christopher Brooke, Adam Lebowitz, Peter Mandler, Jamie Martin, Samuel Moyn, Andrew Preston, David Runciman, Tim Shenk, Brandon Terry, Mira Siegelberg, Joshua Specht, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments
article  paywall  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  20thC  US_politics  US_foreign_policy  post-WWII  Vietnam_War  citizenship  civil_liberties  IR-liberalism  IR-domestic_politics  IR_theory  liberalism  Rawls  Walzer  power  power-asymmetric  justice  welfare_state  just_war  moral_philosophy  US_government  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers : Richard Marshall : 9780199969531
Contents -- i. Introduction. ; Chapter 1. Brian Leiter: 'Leiter Reports' ; Chapter 2. Jason Stanley : 'Philosophy As The Great Naivete' ; Chapter 3. Eric Schwitzgebel: 'The Splintered Skeptic' ; Chapter 4. Mark Rowlands: 'Hour Of The Wolf' ; Chapter 5. Eric T Olson: 'The Philosopher With No Hands' ; Chapter 6. Craig Callender: ' Time Lord' ; Chapter 7. Kieran Setiya: ' What Anscombe Intended and Other Puzzles' ; Chapter 8. Kit Fine: 'Metaphysical Kit' ; Chapter 9. Patricia Churchland: 'Causal Machines' ; Chapter 10. Valerie Tiberius: 'Mostly Elephant, ErgoEL' ; Chapter 11. Peter Carruthers: 'Mind Reader' ; Chapter 12. Josh Knobe: 'Indie Rock Virtues' ; Chapter 13. Al Mele: 'The Four Million Dollar Philosopher ; Chapter 14.Graham Priest: 'Logically Speaking' ; Chapter 15. Ursula Renz: 'After Spinoza: Wiser, Freer, Happier' ; Chapter 16. Cecile Fabre: ' On The Intrinsic Value Of Each Of Us' ; Chapter 17. Hilde Linderman: ' No Ethics Without Feminism' ; Chapter 18. Elizabeth S. Anderson: 'The New Leveller' ; Chapter 19. Christine Korsgaard: 'Treating People As End In Themselves' ; Chapter 20. Michael Lynch: 'Truth, Reason and Democracy' ; Chapter 21. Timothy Williamson : 'Classical Investigations' ; Chapter 22. Ernie Lapore: 'Meaning, Truth, Language, Reality' ; Chapter 23. Jerry Fodor: 'Meaningful Words Without Sense, And Other Revolutions.' ; Chapter 24. Huw Price: 'Without Mirrors' ; Chapter 25. Gary Gutting: 'What Philosophers Know'
books  buy  philosophy  intellectual_history  metaphysics  metaethics  ontology  scepticism  analytical_philosophy  political_philosophy  epistemology  feminism  philosophy_of_language  mind  mind-body  consciousness  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_law  pragmatism  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Charles Taliaferro - Dualism and the Problem of Individuation | JSTOR: Religious Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 263-276
Quite helpful review of various metaphysical debates from Descartes onwards, how the "substance" debates have evolved, including the old identity of indiscernables claim that's been thoroughly challenged in post WWII analytical_philosophy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  20thC  Descartes  Locke  Butler  Reid  metaphysics  ontology  substance  soul  dualism  physicalism  mind-body  consciousness  immortality  universals  particulars  identity  self  analytical_philosophy  logic  Leibniz  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Kevin Cahill - Ethics and the "Tractatus": A Resolute Failure | JSTOR: Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 307 (Jan., 2004), pp. 33-55
He's in the New Wittgenstein camp. Very useful development of themes across the New Wittgenstein crowd, distinguishing PI from Tractatus and why Wittgenstein came to see the Tractatus as a failure, not only in method, but in still being wedded to the intellectualizing impulse of philosophy, to elaborate the world as it really is by unlocking the central problem. His ethical objectives in the Tractatus have been developed by New Wittgenstein proponents, with analogies to Kierkegaard, St Paul and Augustine. -- read online, didn't download
article  jstor  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_language  moral_philosophy  dogmatism  analytical_philosophy  Wittgenstein  Frege  Russell_Bertrand  Kierkegaard  Paul  Augustine  logic  Logical_Positivism  syntax  language-bad_metaphysics  language_games  concepts  propositions  predicate  bibliography  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Galen Strawson - The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional | JSTOR: Analysis, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 271-282
Attacks the bad metaphysics that results from projecting our ability to conceptualize different aspects of objects etc separately, project them onto reality where those concepts can't exist independently, and then draw elaborate metaphysical non puzzles from the mess -- quotes Ramsey and Nietzsche, not Wittgenstein -- ftbt Ramsey 1925: 60.
He agrees with Nietzsche, who writes that 'language is built in terms of the most naive prejudices ... we read disharmonies and problems into things because we think only in the form of language - thus believing in the "eternal truth" of "reason" (e.g. subject, predicate, etc.). ... That we have a right to distinguish between subject and predicate - ... that is our strongest belief; in fact, at bottom, even the belief in cause and effect itself, in conditio and conditionatum, is merely an individual case of the first and general belief, our primeval belief in subject and predicate. ... Might not this belief in the concept of subject and predicate be a great stupidity?'" -- claims but without developing that Locke's consistent with his approach read but didn't download
article  jstor  metaphysics  analytical_philosophy  concepts  realism  properties  modal_logic  possible_worlds  Locke  language-bad_metaphysics  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Review Essay: Legal Thought in Enlightenment's Wake by Jeffrey A. Pojanowski :: SSRN - 4 Jurisprudence, 2013, Forthcoming
Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 12-80 -- This review essay considers Steven D. Smith’s most recent book, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse. Rather than focusing on the book’s argument about the practices and pathologies of the public square, this essay uses Smith’s chapter on scientific thought as a platform for exploring connections between Disenchantment and Smith’s prior work in legal theory. The catalyst for these reflections is Scandinavian legal realism. Considering these elements together sheds light on both the limits and virtues of central ideas about legal obligation and authority in contemporary jurisprudence. Such perspective points to a broader argument that jurisprudential debates about methodology and concepts may be as much about how we read the universe as they are about how we understand law. -- Keywords: jurisprudence, legal theory, obligation, authority, conceptual analysis, legal positivism
books  reviews  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  obligation  secularism  secularization  legal_realism  authority  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  legal_culture  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Devin Henry - "Aristotle's Pluralistic Realism" | The Monist 94.2 (2011): 198-222
The University of Western Ontario -- In this paper I explore Aristotle’s views on natural kinds and the compatibility of pluralism and realism, a topic that has generated considerable interest among contemporary philosophers. I argue that, when it came to zoology, Aristotle denied that there is only one way of organizing the diversity of the living world into natural kinds that will yield a single, unified system of classification. Instead, living things can be grouped and regrouped into various cross-cutting kinds on the basis of objective similarities and differences in ways that subserve the explanatory context. Since the explanatory aims of zoology are diverse and variegated, the kinds it recognizes must be equally diverse and variegated. At the same time, there are certain constraints on which kinds can be selected. And those constraints derive more from the causal structure of the world than from the proclivities of the classifier (hence the realism). This distinguishes Aristotle’s version of pluralistic realism from those contemporary versions (like Dupré’s “promiscuous realism”) that treat all or most classifications of a given domain as equally legitimate and not just a sub-set of kinds recognized by the science that studies it. By contrast, Aristotle privileges scientifically important kinds on the basis of their role in causal investigations. On this picture natural kinds are those kinds with the sort of causal structure that allows them to enter into scientific explanations. In the final section I argue that Aristotle’s zoology should remain of interest to philosophers and biologists alike insofar as it combines a pluralistic form of realism with a rank-free approach to classification. - didn't download
article  intellectual_history  Aristotle  history_of_science  philosophy_of_science  ancient_philosophy  analytical_philosophy  natural_kinds  classification  species  explanation  causation  biology  animals  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - On Philosophy in American Law: Analytical Legal Philosophy :: SSRN in PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW, Francis J. Mootz, III, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2009
This short article was written for a collection on American legal philosophy today. It gives a brief overview of analytical legal philosophy, and speculates on why this theoretical approach has been consistently misunderstood in the United States, from the time of the legal realists until today. --Number of Pages in PDF File: 6 -- Keywords: analytical legal philosophy, legal theory, legal positivism
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july 2014 by dunnettreader
Ronald J. Allen, Brian Leiter - Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence :: SSRN - Virginia Law Review, 2001
This paper looks at important developments in epistemology, and demonstrates that naturalized epistemology provides a firm conceptual foundation for much research into law of evidence. These developments in epistemology have not been much noted in legal scholarship, despite their importance in philosophy and their coincidence with some widely shared approaches to evidence scholarship. This article is a partial antidote for the unproductive fascination in some quarters of the legal academy with "postmodern" conceptions of knowledge and truth and to the even more common search by the legal professoriat for algorithms that provide answers to important legal questions, such as Bayesian decision theory or micro-economics. The article argues that the naturalistic turn in epistemology of the past thirty years (especially that branch known as social epistemology) provides the appropriate theoretical framework for the study of evidence, as it does for virtually any enterprise concerned with the empirical adequacy of its theories and the truth-generating capacity of its methodologies. It also provides a way to conceptualize and evaluate specific rules of evidence, and concomitantly explains what most evidence scholars do, regardless of their explicit philosophical commitments. For the great bulk of evidentiary scholars, this article should solidify the ground beneath their feet. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 78 - large bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  evidence  naturalism  sociology_of_knowledge  methodology  decision_theory  law-and-economics  Bayesian  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Rorty and the Philosophical Tradition: A Comment on Professor Szubka :: SSRN
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 298 -- I agree with Tadusz Szubka's thesis that there is a "partial" continuity between Rorty's work in the 1960s (esp. The Linguistic Turn) and his later pragmatic philosophy in which he repudiated "analytic" philosophy. I suggest additional support for the thesis of continuity comes from an examination of Rorty's undergraduate and graduate education. I then argue that the real puzzle about Rorty's intellectual development is not why he gave up on "analytic" philosophy - he had never been much committed to that research agenda, even before it became moribund--but why, beginning with Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (PMN), he gave up on the central concerns of philosophy going back to antiquity. Many contemporary philosophers influenced by Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction and Sellars' attack on "the Myth of the Given" (the two argumentative linchpins of PMN) didn't abandon philosophical questions about truth, knowledge, and mind, they just concluded those questions needed to be naturalized, to be answered in conjunction with the empirical sciences. Why didn't Rorty go this route? The paper concludes with some interesting anecdotes about Rorty that invite speculative explanations. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 6 -- Keywords: Rorty, analytic philosophy, Sellars, Quine, Nietzsche, metaphilosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  intellectual_history  20thC  Rorty  pragmatism  analytical_philosophy  epistemology  Quine  Sellars  naturalism  anti-foundationalism  scepticism  analytic-synthetic  Nietzsche  linguistic_turn  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism :: SSRN - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2012
Legal philosophers have been preoccupied with specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance - law and morality. Positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and Raz propose a solution to this “Demarcation Problem” according to which the legal validity of a norm can not depend on its being morally valid, either in all or at least some possible legal systems. The proposed analysis purports to specify the essential and necessary features of law.... Yet the concept of law is an “artifact concept,” that is, a concept that picks out a phenomenon that owes its existence to human activities. Artifact concepts, even simple ones like “chair,” are notoriously resistant to analyses in terms of their essential attributes, precisely because they are hostage to human ends and purposes, and also can not be individuated by their natural properties. 20th-century philosophy of science dealt with a kindred Demarcation Problem: ...how to demarcate science from pseudo-science or nonsense. -- they sought to identify the essential properties of a human artifact (namely, science). They failed, and spectacularly so, which led some philosopher to wonder, “Why does solving the Demarcation Problem matter?” This essay develops the lessons for legal philosophy -- lest we want to become embroiled in pointless Fullerian speculations about the effects of jurisprudential doctrines on behavior, it is time to abandon the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  Logical_Positivism  linguistic_turn  concepts  analytical_philosophy  essentialism  natural_kinds  modal_logic  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  legal_system  positivism-legal  psychologism  natural_law  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  Carnap  Hempel  Popper  Fuller  Hart  Kelsen  Raz  Finnis  normativity  moral_sentiments  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Science and Morality: Pragmatic Reflections on Rorty's Pragmatism (2007) :: SSRN - University of Chicago Law Review, 2007
U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 128 -- This is an invited commentary on Richard Rorty's Dewey Lecture, given last year at the University of Chicago Law School. "Pragmatism," says Rorty, "puts natural science on all fours with politics and art. It is one more source of suggestions about what to do with our lives." I argue that the truth in pragmatism - that the epistemic norms that help us cope are the ones on which we rely - is obscured by Rorty's promiscuous version of the doctrine, which confuses the criteria for relying on particular epistemic norms (namely, that they work for human purposes) with the content of the norms themselves (most of which make no reference to human purposes, but rather criteria like causal or explanatory power). We need presuppose no Archmiedean standpoint to conclude, as Richard Posner does, that moral inquiry is feeble in a way physics is not; we need only take seriously our best current understanding of the world, how it works, and the epistemic norms that have proven most effective in making sense of it. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 13 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  intellectual_history  20thC  Rorty  pragmatism  analytical_philosophy  epistemology  Quine  Sellars  naturalism  anti-foundationalism  causation  epistemology-moral  relativism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Three Approaches [chapter] :: SSRN in THE FUTURE OF NATURALISM, J. Shook & P. Kurtz, eds., Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 2009
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 246 -- General jurisprudence - that branch of legal philosophy concerned with the nature of law and adjudication - has been relatively unaffected by the "naturalistic" strains so evident, for example, in the epistemology, philosophy of mind and moral philosophy of the past forty years. This paper sketches three ways in which naturalism might affect jurisprudential inquiry. The paper serves as a kind of precis of the main themes in my book NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Oxford University Press, 2007). -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 16 -- Keywords: jurisprudence, naturalism, legal realism, quine, epistemology
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  naturalism  epistemology  metaphysics  mind  mind-body  consciousness  Quine  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  human_nature  epistemology-moral  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Alex Langlinais, Brian Leiter - The Methodology of Legal Philosophy [chapter] (2013) :: SSRN - H. Cappelen, T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Forthcoming
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 407 -- This is the revised and penultimate version of this paper. The essay surveys issues about philosophical methodology as they arise in general jurisprudence. Certainly in the Anglophone world and increasingly outside it, H.L.A. Hart’s 1961 book The Concept of Law has dominated the discussion. ...methodological debates typically scrutinize either one of two (related) ... claims in Hart’s classic work. The first is that his theory is both general and descriptive (Hart 1994: 239). The second is that his theory is an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology (Hart 1994: vi). We explicate both ideas, arguing, in particular, that (1) Hart aims to give an essentialist analysis of law and legal systems (a point clearest in those who follow him like J. Raz, J. Dickson and [though less of a follower] S. Shapiro), and (2) we can make sense of the linking of linguistic (and conceptual) analysis and descriptive sociology if we understand "law" as a constructed bit of "social reality" in something like John Searle's sense. The ensuing methodological debates in legal philosophy can then be understood as arguing against either linguistic or conceptual analysis (naturalists like B. Leiter), or against the idea of a purely descriptive jurisprudence (in different ways, J. Finnis, S. Perry, M. Murphy, L. Murphy, R. Dworkin). -- Keywords: H.L.A. Hart, methodology, descriptive jurisprudence, conceptual analysis, John Searle, legal philosophy -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  methodology  legal_theory  intellectual_history  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_law  concepts  constructivism  Hart  Raz  Dworkin  Finnis  Searle  natural_law  naturalism  positivism-legal  legal_realism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence (2005) :: SSRN
Heavily cited -- U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 34 -- For three decades now, much of the Anglo-American legal philosophy curriculum has been organized around something called the Hart/Dworkin debate, a debate whose starting point is Ronald Dworkin's 1967 critique of the seminal work of Anglophone jurisprudence in the twentieth-century, H.L.A. Hart's 1961 book, The Concept of Law. This essay reviews the Hart/Dworkin debate and argues that it no longer deserves to play the same organizing role in the jurisprudential curriculum of the twenty-first century that it played at the close of the twentieth: on the particulars of the Hart/Dworkin debate, Hart has emerged the clear victor, so much so that even the heuristic value of the Dworkinian criticisms of Hart are now in doubt. (Dworkin's quite recent polemic against legal positivism in the 2002 Harvard Law Review is also addressed briefly.) The significant philosophical challenges that face legal positivists are now different, often in kind, from the ones Dworkin made famous. These, I shall argue, fall into two broad categories: first, the correct account of the content of the rule of recognition and its relationship to the possibility of law's authority (the Hart/Raz debate); and second, the proper methodology of jurisprudence, a debate which aligns defenders of descriptive conceptual jurisprudence (like Hart and Raz) against two sets of opponents: natural lawyers like Finnis, Perry and Stavropoulos who challenge whether jurisprudence can be descriptive; and philosophical naturalists, like the present author, who question whether conceptual analysis is a fruitful philosophical method in jurisprudence (or elsewhere). -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  intellectual_history  positivism-legal  legal_realism  naturalism  natural_law  natural_rights  social_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  Hart  Dworkin  Finnis  Raz  moral_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  historical_change  analytical_philosophy  sociology_of_law  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - American Legal Realism (2002) :: SSRN
Heavily cited -- U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 42 -- This essay sets out the main elements of the revisionary and philosophical interpretation of the jurisprudence of American Legal Realism that I have developed in a series of articles over the last decade. This reading emphasizes the commitment of all the Realists to a core descriptive claim about adjudication (judges respond primarily to the underlying facts of the cases, rather than to legal rules and reasons); shows how the Realists divide in to two camps over the correct interpretation of this "core" claim (the Idiosncyrasy Wing of Frank, and the Sociological Wing of Llewellyn, Oliphant, Moore, Green, and the vast majority of Realists); demonstrates the connection of the Sociological Wing of Realism to the Realist project of law reform, including the work of the American Law Institute; examines and distinguishes the Realist arguments for the indeterminacy of law from Critical Legal Studies arguments; and shows how the Realists lay the foundation for the program of a "naturalized" jurisprudence, in opposition to the dominant "conceptual" jurisprudence of Anglophone legal philosophy. The revisionary reading also debunks certain popular myths about Legal Realism, like the following: the Realists believed "what the judge ate for breakfast determines the decision"; a critique of the public/private distinction was a central part of Realist jurisprudence; and the Realists were committed to an incoherent form of rule-skepticism. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_realism  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  sociology_of_law  reform-legal  naturalism  concepts  analytical_philosophy  Anglo-American  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis :: SSRN - American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 56, pp. 45-57, 2011 (last revised 2012 )
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-13 -- Gustav Radbruch, in well-known work that appeared just after World War II, put forward a formula that stated that state-promulgated rules that are sufficiently unjust lose their status as valid law. Radbruch’s Formula has generally been understood as a claim about the nature of law, and recent variations of Radbruch’s Formula, like Robert Alexy’s “claim to correctness,” have similarly been characterized as offering a truth about the nature of law. Additionally, both Radbruch’s and Alexy’s theories have been presented as criticisms of, and alternatives to, legal positivism. An alternative understanding of the Formula (and its modern variations) is as (mere) prescriptions for judicial decision-making, and thus compatible with a variety of different conceptual theories of the nature of law, including legal positivism. This article shows the difficulties of understanding Radbruch’s Formula as it was presented and conventionally understood. In particular, the article focuses on the way that seeing the Formula as a claim about the nature of law leads to outcomes inconsistent with the basic reasons for the Formula. -- Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Radbruch's Formula, Robert Alexy, Conceptual Analysis
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  positivism-legal  natural_law  concepts  legal_theory  norms 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Conceptual Jurisprudence and Socio-Legal Studies :: SSRN - Rutgers Law Journal, Vol. 32, 2000
This article was part of a conference on Brian Tamanaha's book, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory (Oxford, 1997). This article summarizes how Tamanaha's work seeks to merge the sociology of law with conceptual legal theory, though not always fully successfully. Tamanaha does not appreciate the extent to which the two tasks - sociology and conceptual analysis - may have different aims, and therefore their theories will be constructed along different and inconsistent lines. The article also considers the extent to which conceptual theories do or do not need to make ambitious metaphysical claims, and the connections between conceptual theories in jurisprudence and empirical data about the way law is practiced. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  reviews  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  sociology_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  social_theory  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Raz on Necessity (last revised 2009 ) :: SSRN - Law and Philosophy, vol. 22, pp. 537-559 (2003)
The article uses Joseph Raz's work as the starting point for a general discussion of the role of necessity and essence in jurisprudence. Analytical legal theorists commonly assert (or assume) that they are offering conceptual truths, claims regarding attributes necessarily true of all legal systems. Is it tenable to speak about necessary truths with a humanly created institution like law? Upon closer investigation, the use of necessary truths in writers like Raz and Jules Coleman clearly differs from the way such terms are used in classical metaphysics, and even in contemporary discussions of natural kind terms. Nonetheless, theorists making conceptual statements regarding law are making significant and ambitious claims that need to be defended - for example, against naturalists like Brian Leiter, who doubt the value of conceptual analysis, and normative theorists like Stephen Perry, who argue that assertions about the nature of law require value-laden moral and political choices between tenable alternatives. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  modal_logic  possible_worlds  universalism  universals  natural_kinds  natural_law  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  morality-conventional  normativity  essence  naturalism  legal_realism  philosophy_of_language  Raz  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Legal Positivism and 'Explaining' Normativity and Authority (2006 last revised 2009) :: SSRN
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2006 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-05 -- It has become increasingly common for legal positivist theorists to claim that the primary objective of legal theory in general, and legal positivism in particular, is "explaining normativity." The phrase "explaining normativity" can be understood either ambitiously or more modestly. The more modest meaning is an analytical exploration of what is meant by legal or moral obligation, or by the authority claims of legal officials. When the term is understood ambitiously - as meaning an explanation of how conventional and other empirical facts can give rise to moral obligations - as many legal positivist theorists seem to be using the phrase, the project is contrary to basic tenets of legal positivism, and has regularly led theorists to propose doubtful theories that ignore "is"/"ought" divisions. -- Keywords: legal positivism, analytical legal theory, natural law theory -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  positivism-legal  natural_law  is-ought  normativity  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  moral_sentiments  obligation  authority  legitimacy  constructivism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - [Scandinavian legal realists] Ross and Olivecrona on Rights :: SSRN - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2009
Scandinavian legal realism was a movement of the early and middle decades of the 20th century, which paralleled the American legal realist movement, while presenting a more skeptical challenge to legal reasoning and discourse. The present paper was written for a forthcoming Oxford University Press collection on the Scandinavian realists. The approach to jurisprudence of Scandinavian realists Alf Ross and Karl Olivecrona was simultaneously simple and radical: they wanted to rid our thinking about law of all the mystifying references to abstract concepts and metaphysical entities. This paper offers a critical overview of Ross's and Olivecrona's views on legal rights, while also summarizing the critiques of those views (e.g., by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz). -- Keywords: legal rights, Scandinavian legal realism, Alf Ross, Karl Olivecrona -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  philosophy_of_language  metaphysics  ontology  concepts  legal_realism  rights-legal  intellectual_history  20thC  Scandinavia  Anglo-American  Hart  Raz  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Robert Alexy's Radbruch Formula, and the Nature of Legal Theory (2006) :: SSRN
Rechtstheorie, Vol. 37, pp. 139-149, 2006 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 06-13 -- Gustav Radbruch is well known for a formula that addresses the conflict of positive law and justice, a formula discussed in the context of the consideration of Nazi laws by the courts in the post-War German Federal Republic, and East German laws in the post-unification German courts. More recently, Robert Alexy has defended a version of Radbruch's formula, offering arguments for it that are different from and more sophisticated than those that were adduced by Radbruch himself. Alexy also placed Radbruch's formula within a larger context of conceptual analysis and theories about the nature of law. Both Radbruch and Alexy claim that their positions are incompatible with legal positivism, and therefore count as a rejection (and perhaps, refutation) of it. This paper, presented at a Conference on the work of Gustav Radbruch, looks at Radbruch's formula and Alexy's version of it. It focuses not so much on the merit of the Radbruch-Alexy formula, as on its proper characterization, and its appropriate placement within the larger context of legal philosophy. The particular focus is the methodological question of what Radbruch and Alexy's formulations - and their strengths and weaknesses - can show us about the nature of theorizing about law. -- Keywords: Robert Alexy, Gustav Radbruch, legal positivism, natural law theory, nature of law, conceptual theories, unjust laws -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  Germany  social_sciences-post-WWII  Nazis  analytical_philosophy  concepts  natural_law  moral_philosophy  positivism-legal  sociology_of_law  justice  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis (2007, revised 2009):: SSRN
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2007 - Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-65 -- The paper explores the justification for conceptual analysis as the methodology for theories about the nature of law. Using the example of Joseph Raz's theory, and Raz's own recent work on jurisprudential methodology, the paper explores the challenges to this standard approach: whether conceptual analysis is the appropriate approach, whether it needs to be supplemented by moral evaluation, and whether conceptual analysis can yield theories of substantial interest. -- Keywords: conceptual analysis, jurisprudence, legal philosophy, Joseph Raz, naturalism -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  moral_philosophy  naturalism  social_theory  Raz  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Legal Positivism (posted 2003) :: SSRN - BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson, eds., Blackwell, 2005
This article tries to present the jurisprudential school of thought, legal positivism, within a larger context than is usual in contemporary English-language discussions of that approach: (1) showing the intellectual and political contexts in which the movement began; (2) emphasizing the variety of theories that fit under that label (e.g., how the Kelsenian tradition varies significantly from the Hartian tradition); and (3) discussing how the future development of legal positivism will depend on its discussion of wider theoretical issues (e.g., the proper approach to social theory, and the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy). The article also summarizes the main criticisms of legal positivism, and gives an overview of the internal debate of inclusive legal positivism versus exclusive legal positivism. Note: This is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_culture  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Germany  Anglo-American  positivism-legal  Kelsen  Hart  social_theory  sociology_of_law  analytical_philosophy  concepts  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Kenneth R. Westphal - Enlightenment Fundamentals: Rights, Responsibilities & Republicanism | Diametros
Kenneth R. Westphal is Professorial Fellow in the School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia (Norwich), and currently Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the Martin-Luther-Universität Halle Wittenberg. -- This essay re-examines some key fundamentals of the Enlightenment regarding individual rights, responsibilities and republicanism which deserve and require re-emphasis today, insofar as they underscore the character and fundamental importance of mature judgment, and how developing and fostering mature judgment is a fundamental aim of education. These fundamentals have been clouded or eroded by various recent developments, including mis-guided educational policy and not a little scholarly bickering. Clarity about these fundamentals is more important today than ever. Sapere aude! -- Keywords - Hobbes Hume Rousseau Kant Hegel, rational justification, mature judgment, moral constructivism, realism objectivity rights responsibilities republicanism media culture, Euthyphro question, natural law, Dilemma of the Criterion -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  French_Enlightenment  Germany  German_Idealism  voluntarism  obligation  morality-conventional  morality-objective  natural_rights  civil_liberties  civil_society  civic_virtue  Hobbes  Hume  Hume-ethics  Hume-politics  Rousseau  Kant  Kant-ethics  Hegel  judgment-political  public_sphere  media  political_culture  values  education-civic  education-higher  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add  21stC  Dewey  Quine  Sellars  analytical_philosophy  academia  professionalization 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jay F. Rosenberg - Still Mythic after All Those Years: On Alston's Latest Defense of the Given | JSTOR: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 157-173
Wilfrid Sellars' conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the Given" is a "Myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "Theory of Appearing" which posits irreducible non-conceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that can play a justificatory role vis-à-vis the corresponding beliefs, e.g., that the object is red. I argue that Alston undermines his positive plausibility arguments by first blurring and then ignoring crucial differences among various looks-concepts, and that his own putative "phenomenal" looks-concept demonstrably cannot play the justificatory role that he envisions for it. Both his critique of Sellars' arguments and his own alternative proposal thus fail on all fronts. -- didn't download
article  jstor  epistemology  Sellars  analytical_philosophy 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Marshall interview with Andrew Bowie - schelling, adorno and all that jazz » 3:AM Magazine - June 2014
Andrew Bowie is the ice cool jazz-playing philosopher whose musical riffs can be heard here and gigs checked out here. But when he’s not laying down mood and mellow he’s thinking all the time about how philosophy can fit in with other interests, about the importance of Schelling for the debate about freewill, about the importance of metaphor for Schelling and metaphysics, about Schellings’ links to Heidegger, Davidson and Wittgenstein, about the German philosophical tradition and Romanticism, about what’s wrong with the way analytic philosophers do philosophy of music, about why the East-West Divan Orchestra is an important example, about whether he is a strange pragmatist, about Adorno and how he helps us see what is wrong with some of the contemporary forms of philosophy, and how it might be fixed, about the role of historicism, about Adorno and his criticisms of analytics and Hegelians, about Adorno’s aesthetics, about whether Adorno is an Hegelian, and about Adorno’s writing style.
intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  Germany  German_Idealism  Schelling  Romanticism  Heidegger  Adorno  analytical_philosophy  continental_philosophy  aesthetics  music  Hegelian  historicism  Wittgenstein  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Sébastien Gandon & Mathieu Marion - Issue intro - L’idéalisme britannique : histoire et actualité - Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 3-34 | Érudit 
Sébastien Gandon - Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand & Mathieu Marion -Université du Québec à Montréal -- British Idealism is a philosophical movement that dominated British universities (and those of its empire), for fifty years around the turn from the XIXth to the XXth century, but it went largely unnoticed in the French-speaking world. Condemned by analytic philosophers, these authors were also ignored in their own country, but some of them, notably Bradley and Collingwood, are now enjoying a newly found popularity within the larger trend towards a study of the origins of analytic philosophy. This text is an introduction to British Idealism that plots, in an historical first part, the outlines of its rise, development and decline. In the second part, we provide reasons for further studies of this movement. -- downloaded pdf to Note
intellectual_history  cultural_history  19thC  20thC  21stC  British_history  idealism  British_Idealism  Bradley  Collingwood  Royce  analytical_philosophy  Russell_Bertrand  Logical_Positivism  pragmatism  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Raphael Van Riel, review essay - David Woodruff Smith et Amy L. Thomasson (dir.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (OUP 2005) - Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 257-259 | Érudit 
Raphael Van Riel - Universität bochum -- La phénoménologie traverse présentement une renaissance dans le domaine de la philosophie de l’esprit. Des philosophes comme Alva Noë, Shaun Gallagher et Dan Zahavi interprètent les résultats neuroscientifiques en ayant recours aux concepts et méthodes de la tradition phénoménologique. Toutefois, l’adaptation de la méthode phénoménologique en philosophie de l’esprit consiste souvent simplement à copier la façon de parler phénoménologique, ce qui ne contribue pas nécessairement à l’éclaircissement de l’objet d’étude. Les textes réunis dans le présent volume... sont libérés de tendances semblables -- la première partie, la relation entre la tradition phénoménologique et la philosophie de l’esprit à tendance « analytique » — Paul Livingston (historical overview) («Functionalism and logical analysis »), Galen Strawson sur la structure conceptuelle de la philosophie de l’esprit (« Intentionality and Experience : Terminological Preliminaries ») et une critique d’inspiration merleau-pontyienne à la théorie de la conscience de Dennett par Carmen Taylor (« On the Incapability of Phenomenology ») -- les quatre autres sections abordent différents complexes thématiques de la phénoménologie : la conscience et la connaissance de soi (2e partie), l’intentionnalité (3e partie), l’unité de la conscience (4e partie) et finalement la perception, la sensation et l’action (5e partie). -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  phenomenology  mind  mind-body  consciousness  self  perception  action-theory  neuroscience  cognition  analytical_philosophy  Dennett  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Giuseppina D’Oro - Le fossé dans l’explication n’est pas épistémologique mais sémantique | Érudit | Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 183-192 |
Giuseppina D’Oro - Université de Keele -- Traduction de l’anglais par Jérôme Havenel -- This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and Mcginn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind body-problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances. -- downloaded pdf to Note
metaphysics  ontology  epistemology  mind-body  consciousness  concepts  semantics  analytical_philosophy  Kripke  Nagel  reductionism  physicalism  naturalism  idealism  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists (1982)
Source: Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, 1982. Introduction only reproduced, “Fair Use” provisions; Transcribed Andy Blunden 1998. -- One can use language to criticise and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one’s body to develop and strengthen and enlarge it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end... But Philosophy, the attempt to say “how language relates to the world” by saying what makes certain sentences true, or certain actions or attitudes good or rational, is, on this view, ... the impossible attempt to step outside our skins – the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism – and compare ourselves with something absolute. This Platonic urge to escape from the finitude of one’s time and place, the “merely conventional” and contingent aspects of one’s life, is responsible for the original Platonic distinction between two kinds of true sentence. By attacking this latter distinction, the holistic “pragmaticising” strain in analytic philosophy has helped us see how the metaphysical urge – common to fuzzy Whiteheadians and razor-sharp “scientific realists” – works. It has helped us be sceptical about the idea that some particular science (say physics) or some particular literary genre (say Romantic poetry, or transcendental philosophy) gives us that species of true sentence which is not just a true sentence, but rather a piece of Truth itself.
etexts  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  Platonism  Logical_Positivism  empiricism  neo-Kantian  analytical_philosophy  analytic-synthetic  philosophy_of_language  epistemology  Rorty  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
A BOOK IN PROGRESS [PART 16]: MORALITY’S SUBJECTIVE TURN | Pandaemonium
the unravelling of morality in the 20thC, from the intuitionism of GE Moore to JL Mackie’s ‘error theory’ and moral nihilism. This extract begins with Moore and looks at how intuitionism gave way to emotivism. -- Like moral truths themselves, Prichard clearly saw his case as self-evident and intuitive. The idea of moral truths as intuitions harked back to the English Platonists of the 18thC. Prichard’s essay helped give those ideas new traction, launching the Cambridge Intuitionist school, that included WD Ross, EF Carritt, WHB Joseph and CD Broad. For each of the Intuitionists the good was self-evident. The trouble was that the goods that were self-evident were not the same to all of them. Since no empirical fact or rational argument could settle this debate, ..so the very notion of moral truth began to disintegrate. -- ‘Questions as to “values”’, Bertrand Russell wrote, ‘lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge.’ So arose ‘emotivism’, first sketched by AJ Ayer in his groundbreaking 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic -- Like Hume, Ayer insisted that when we talk of right and wrong we are not directly referring to things in the world but to our own attitudes towards these things. --The American philosopher Charles L Stevenson developed the emotivist argument, especially in his 1944 book Ethics and Language.-- GE Moore was no emotivist, nor thought that values were simply subjective. Yet the argument he set running in the Principia Ethica led inexorably to Stevenson’s emotivism. -- To suggest that slavery is a good would be more than simply ‘odd’. The trouble with emotivism is that it finds it difficult – nay, impossible – to capture this distinction.
intellectual_history  20thC  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  morality-conventional  analytical_philosophy  morality-objective  EF-add  metaethics  utilitarianism  obligation  Logical_Positivism  Cambridge_Platonists 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Davidson's normativity | Stephen Turner - Academia.edu
Turner, Stephen. 2011. Davidson's Normativity. The definitive version of this paper has been published in Dialogues with Davidson: On the Contemporary Significance of His Thought ,edited by Jeff Malpas. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, all rights reserved. Pp. 343-370. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  Academia.edu  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  epistemology  downloaded  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
Strawson on Consciousness - Waggish 2005
Long quote from TLS with broken link -- For those of us like me who can’t help wondering about the physical reality of subjective mental events, here’s a passage from the ever-excellent Galen Strawson, from a review of Antonio Damasio: The standard formulation of the “mind-body problem” rests on a huge and wholly unjustified assumption (this assumption, in fact, is Descartes’s deepest error). It is not content with the obvious truth that matter and consciousness seem to us to be utterly heterogeneous things. It slides on to the claim that matter and consciousness are in fact utterly heterogeneous things, in such a way that it is mysterious how one could ever be the basis or “realization” of the other. It shifts from a harmless and true epistemological claim about how things seem to us to a mega-therial metaphysical claim about how things are in reality.Why? Why indeed? .... So, if our best picture of matter makes it seem incomprehensible that matter should be the basis of (or simply be) conscious experience, all this shows is the inadequacy of our best picture of matter. Locke, Hume, Priestley, Kant and others were very clear about this, but few understand it today. Many now make Descartes’s deepest error, in fact, with far less justification than him – while condemning him for his errors.
mind-body  consciousness  reductionism  materialism  metaphysics  epistemology  Descartes  Locke  analytical_philosophy  thinking_matter  dualism  qualia  essence  EF-add 
april 2014 by dunnettreader
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