dunnettreader + uk_economy   39

Nina Boberg-Fazlic & Paul Sharp - Welfare Spending Lessons from Pre-Industrial England | LSE blogs - Oct 2016
Cutting welfare spending is unlikely to lead to an increase in private voluntary work and charitable giving, explain Nina Boberg-Fazlic and Paul Sharp. Using historical data from late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England, they illustrate how parts of the country that saw increased levels of spending under the Poor Laws also enjoyed higher levels of charitable income.
local_government  social_democracy  Poor_Laws  Labor_markets  UK_economy  Tories  welfare  Industrial_Revolution  unemployment  UK_politics  philanthropy  demography  British_history  19thC  economic_history  18thC  agriculture-productivity  landowners  population_growth 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
Does Welfare Spending Crowd Out Charitable Activity? Evidence from Historical England Under the Poor Laws - Boberg-Fazlić - 2015 - The Economic Journal - Wiley Online Library
This study examines the relationship between government spending and charitable activity. We present a novel way of testing the ‘crowding out hypothesis’, making use of the fact that welfare provision under the Old Poor Laws was decided at the parish level, thus giving heterogeneity within a single country. Using data on poor relief spending combined with data on charitable incomes by county before and after 1800, we find a positive relationship: areas with more public provision also enjoyed higher levels of charitable income. These results are confirmed when instrumenting for Poor Law spending and when looking at first differences.
See the LSE blog post that summarizes this study.
bad_economics  British_politics  British_history  Poor_Laws  18thC  budget_deficit  Industrial_Revolution  agriculture  fiscal_policy  Wiley  welfare  Tories  philanthropy  UK_economy  Labor_markets  UK_politics  unemployment  paywall  article  Brexit  19thC  landowners 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
G Clark, KH O'Rourke, AM Taylor - The Growing Dependence of Britain on Trade during the Industrial Revolution | NBER - Feb 2014
The Growing Dependence of Britain on Trade during the Industrial Revolution -- Gregory Clark, Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke, Alan M. Taylor -- NBER Working Paper No. 19926 -- Many previous studies of the role of trade during the British Industrial Revolution have found little or no role for trade in explaining British living standards or growth rates. We construct a three-region model of the world in which Britain trades with North America and the rest of the world, and calibrate the model to data from the 1760s and 1850s. We find that while trade had only a small impact on British welfare in the 1760s, it had a very large impact in the 1850s. This contrast is robust to a large range of parameter perturbations. Biased technological change and population growth were key in explaining Britain's growing dependence on trade during the Industrial Revolution.
paper  paywall  NBER  economic_history  British_history  UK_economy  trade  Industrial_Revolution  technology  technology-adoption  demography  18thC  19thC 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
There are liars and then there’s Boris Johnson and Michael Gove | Nick Cohen
‘Prospered by treating public life as a game’: Boris Johnson leaves his home in Oxfordshire on Saturday.Photograph: Peter Nicholls/Reuters W here was the…
Instapaper  UK_politics  Brexit  Tories  EU  EU_governance  UK_Government  UK_economy  political_press  from instapaper
june 2016 by dunnettreader
A disrupters view on UK payday — The Paydaynomist - Medium Jan 2016
A disrupters view on UK paydayWe’d love to do it and you know you’ve always had it comingThis is our maiden post. It’s our birth story explaining why we, as two…
Instapaper  access_to_finance  UK_economy  UK_Government  financial_regulation  banking  credit  microfinance  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  from instapaper
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Andrew Haldane: Labour's Share - speech to TUC | Bank of England - Nov 2015 - via Brad DeLong
Good overview of recent work on last 300 years by economic historians and technology impact projections -- lots on internal structural shifts within "labor" and vis a vis capital -- downloaded pdf to Note
speech  economic_history  labor_history  labor_share  Labor_markets  wages  productivity  productivity-labor_share  unemployment  skills  services  AI  IT  unions  UK_economy  monetary_policy  macroeconomic_policy  public_sector  Industrial_Revolution 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Bassino, Broadberry, Fukao, Gupta, and Takashima - Japan and the Great Divergence, 725 to 1874 | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 01 July 2015
Jean-Pascal Bassino, Stephen Broadberry, Kyoji Fukao, Bishnupriya Gupta, Masanori Takashima -- Japan was the first Asian nation to achieve modern economic growth. This column discusses new evidence suggesting that Japan’s growth started from a lower level than Britain’s and grew more slowly until the Meiji Restoration. The key to understanding modern economic growth seems to lie in identifying the forces that dampened growth reversals, rather than the forces responsible for growth itself. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  economic_growth  medieval_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  economic_theory  economic_sociology  Great_Divergence  Japan  development  UK_economy  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Influence of Stock Market Listing on Human Resource Management: Evidence for France and Britain by Neil Conway, Simon Deakin, Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Héloïse Petit, Antoine Reberioux, Frank Wilkinson :: SSRN - British Journal of Industrial Relations,
Neil Conway, Birkbeck College -- Simon Deakin, Cambridge - Centre for Business Research; European Corporate Governance Institute; Cambridge - Faculty of Law -- Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Birkbeck College - Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology; Cambridge - Social and Political Sciences -- Héloïse Petit -- Antoine Reberioux, Université Paris VII Denis Diderot; University Antilles Guyane - Law and Economics -' Frank Wilkinson, Birkbeck College -- We use data from the Relations Professionnelles et Négociations d'Entreprise survey of 2004 and the Workplace Employment Relations Survey of 2004 to analyse how far approaches to human resource management differ according to whether an establishment is part of a company with a stock exchange listing. In both countries we find that listing is positively associated with teamworking and performance-related pay, while in France, but not in Britain, it is also linked to worker autonomy and training. Our findings are inconsistent with the claim that shareholder pressure operates as a constraint on the adoption of high-performance workplace practices. The pattern is similar in the two countries, but with a slightly stronger tendency for listing to be associated with high-performance workplace practices in France. -- PDF File: 43 -- paywall but a working paper version on SSRN -- didn't download
article  SSRN  UK_economy  France  business_practices  labor  workforce  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alan Manning - Shifting the Balance of Power: Workers, Wages and Employers over the Next Parliament | Resolution Foundation - April 2015
Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics and Director of the Community Programme at the Centre for Economic Performance at the LSE -- 40 years ago an improving labour market and prices rising faster than wages would have led trade unions to march into the boardroom demanding higher wages and threatening strike action if those demands were not met. Pretty soon, union leaders would have been invited round to Number 10 for beer and sandwiches to be cajoled into wage moderation to prevent an inflationary spiral taking hold. A lot has changed in the past 40 years.These days the Prosecco remains in the fridge and David Cameron used a speech to the British Chambers of Commerce in February to urge pay rises for workers, a somewhat surprising sight. But, there is a simple explanation. Since the crisis began, the average British worker has suffered a fall in living standards deeper and longer than anything experienced for more than a generation. The recent drop in oil prices and the resulting lower inflation will offer some respite but not much. -- Comparing the situation now and 40 years ago, it is hard to escape the conclusion that there has been a fundamental shift in the balance of power from workers to employers and that perhaps this shift has gone too far and it is time to redress the balance somewhat. -- copied to Pocket
article  political_economy  UK_economy  labor_history  Labor_markets  unemployment  wages  profit  productivity  productivity-labor_share  inequality  unions  British_politics  standard_of_living  employers  working_class  competition  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - Yes, the Past Four Years Are Powerful Evidence for the Keynesian View of What Happens at the Zero Lower Bound. Why Do You Ask?: Daily Focus Jan 6 2015
Quotes Krugman post re austerity impact since 2010 - "Annual data on the growth of real GDP and of government purchases from Eurostat…. 33 countries for 4 years, 132 observations…. Does this picture make you think that Keynesian economics is nonsense?… The raw observations are consistent with the view that in depressed economies, cutting government spending hurts growth." - DeLong adds what multipliers look like as well as how ridiculous the reverse-causation argument (falling GNP -> reduced gov't spending) would look with the Eurostat data - saved to Pocket
GNP  UK_economy  21stC  Eurozone  economic_growth  stats  economic_theory  Great_Recession  keynesian  fiscal  policy  economic_history  austerity  us_economy  Krugman  Pocket 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Douglas M. Peers, review - H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833 (2006) JSTOR: The International History Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 605-606
Cambridge University Press -- very enthusiastic review especially re the data Bowen uses, and purportedly will make available - data shows greater economic impact of trading with the East -- Bowen ends with qualified acceptance of "gentlemanly capitalism" thesis
books  reviews  jstor  find  amazon.com  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  British_Empire  East_India_Company  India  imperialism  economic_history  political_economy  financial_system  City  Parliament  interest_groups  UK_Government  UK_government-colonies  UK_economy 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Alfred Marshall - Industry and Trade (Vol 2) [1919] | Google Books
Vol 2 appears to be available only as a commercial ebook (price c $4) - Vol 1 is a full Google Books copy added to my Google_Books library -- Vol 2 looks interesting in his treatment of the English economy from at least the Black Death -- remarks on "mercantilism" and the economic policies of the British government in the mid 18thC (following Adam Smith characterized as"bad" and "selfish") -- Though the bulk of his work was completed before the turn of the 20th century, the global ramifications of World War I prompted him to reconsider his theories on international economics, and in 1919 he published the two-volume Industry and Trade. Here, in Volume II, he discusses. . how monopolies and competition impact prices . trusts and cartels in the American and German economies . the decline of class differences and advantages in industrial systems . unions, co-opts, and business federations . and much more.
books  etexts  Google_Books  economic_history  British_history  UK_economy  Germany  Prussia  mercantilism  merchants  international_political_economy  international_economics  trading_companies  trade-policy  trade  trade-agreements  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  German_unification  monopolies  corporations  corporate_finance  labor  Labor_markets  wages  unions  imperialism  empire-and_business  US_economy  protectionism  Hamilton  Smith  free_trade  laisser-faire  institutional_economics  institution-building  firms-theory  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Stumbling and Mumbling: Housing vs financial wealth - May 2014
Chris Giles deserves great credit for his careful scrutiny of Thomas Piketty's data, and Piketty also deserves credit for the openness of that data and for his generous response to Chris. Like Justin Wolfers and Paul Krugman, though, I wonder just how damaging Chris's critique is of Piketty's central thesis. Chris says that, in the UK, "there seems to be little consistent evidence of any upward trend in wealth inequality of the top 1 percent." He points to ONS data showing that the top 1% owned 12.5% of all wealth in 2010-12. However, this proportion is depressed because house prices are high. These mean that the owner of quite a modest home has substantial wealth which naturally depresses the proportion of wealth held by the really well-off. If we look only at financial wealth, we see a different picture. The top 1% owns 36.4% of all financial wealth, and the top 10% owns 75.9% (table 2.6b of this Excel file). As the ONS points out, the Lorenz curve for financial wealth is much steeper than that for property wealth. If you believe the ONS is under-counting offshore wealth, inequality is even greater. This poses the question: should we conflate housing and financial wealth as Chris and Thomas both do? Perhaps not, because housing wealth might not have as much "wealthiness" as financial wealth, in four senses: [interesting discussion and links]
economic_history  economic_theory  political_economy  Piketty  inequality  UK_economy  wealth  housing  1-percent  capitalism  power  plutocracy  links  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Karl Smith - Not All Forms of Wealth Are Equally Pernicious | FT Alphaville Feb 2014
Responding to Ryan Advent re Smith's earlier Alphaville post on Piketty book on trends in wealth and inequality -- Let me be clear. I am a fan of Piketty’s brute mechanistic approach. It is one that I have employed myself and on much the same question. It is one that led me to conjecture, and still suspect, that landlords are the once and future global plutocracy. And this happens precisely because all wealth is not created equal and some forms are more persistent and pernicious than others.

In the wake of the subprime crisis, I understand the temptation to rally against big banks and global finance. However, Lehman Brothers is dead. Sam Zell, founder and CEO of Equity Residential, is still alive. This is not an accident. The future does not belong to high flying titans. It belongs to dogged men and women who squirrel away rent checks when times are good, and buy your home when times are tight. This is the tyranny of land. Ignore it at your peril.
economic_history  economic_growth  capital  capitalism  capital_markets  landowners  France  US_economy  UK_economy  plutocracy  inequality  cities  urban_development  urban_elites  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Julian Hoppit - Political Arithmetic in Eighteenth-Century England | JSTOR: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 516-540
With regard to public policy, in late seventeenth-century Britain there was a remarkable development of social statistics, what Petty called 'political arithmetic'. The general view, however, is that this new approach ended early in the eighteenth century only to be rediscovered by the early Victorian statistical movement. In fact, through the eighteenth century public policy continued to be considered partly in quantitative terms. This article explores some of the dimensions and peculiarities of this varied and extensive political arithmetic. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  political_history  18thC  British_politics  political_arithmetick  UK_economy  UK_Government  Parliament  public_policy  public_opinion  political_press  economic_growth  wages  prices  trade  fiscal_policy  sovereign_debt  fiscal-military_state  taxes  Excise_Crisis  luxury  UK_government-colonies  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
N. J. Mayhew - Population, Money Supply, and the Velocity of Circulation in England, 1300-1700 | JSTOR: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 48, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 238-257
The importance of monetary and demographic factors in the later medieval and early modern 'price revolutions' has been much debated. This article analyses this long period in the terms of the Fisher Identity MV=PT, but also fully recognizes the importance of demographic change, and its impact on GDP. Tentative estimates of money supply and GDP are discussed, and from them velocity of circulation is deduced. Velocity has tended to fall over this period, but rising Tudor velocity is regarded as a symptom of economic distress. -- didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  UK_economy  14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  economic_growth  demography  population  prices  money_supply  money_velocity  money  commerce  dearth  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Frank O'Gorman, review essay - Approaches to Hanoverian Society JSTOR: The Historical Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 521-534
(1) Philanthropy and Police: London Charity in the Eighteenth Century by Donna T. Andrew; *--* (2) The Language of Liberty: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World by J. C. D. Clark; *--* (3) Stilling the Grumbling Hive. The Response to Social and Economic Problems in England, 1689-1750 by L. Davison; *--* (4) Riot, Risings and Revolution. Governance and Violence in Eighteenth- Century England by Ian Gilmour; *--* (5) A Patriot Press. National Politics and the London Press in the 1740s by Robert Harris; *--* (6) Judging New Wealth. Popular Publishing and Responses to Commerce in England, 1750-1850 by James Raven; *--* (7)The Local Origins of Modern Society. Gloucestershire 1500-1800 by David Rollison; *--* (8) An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815 by Lawrence Stone; *--* (9) Protest and Survival: The Historical Experience. Essays for E. P. Thompson by John Rule; Robert Malcolmson -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  bookshelf  article  jstor  political_history  cultural_history  political_culture  social_history  political_economy  17thC18thC  19thC  British_politics  British_Empire  UK_economy  UK_Government  UK_government-colonies  British_foreign_policy  military_history  political_press  class_conflict  local_government  political_philosophy  charity  crime  violence  riots  lower_orders  mercantilism  luxury  status  nouveaux_riches  governing_class  governmentality  fiscal-military_state  popular_culture  popular_politics  populism  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Isaac Nakhimovsky, review - Sophus A. Reinert: Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy | EH.net July 2013
Reviewed for EH.Net by Isaac Nakhimovsky, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge. Isaac Nakhimovsky is author of The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

Reinert?s fundamental point is that a history of doctrines of free trade yields at best na?ve dogmas and may even serve as a mask for economic imperialism. A more realistic political economy for our own times, in his view, requires a more realistic historical vision.

At the same time, Reinert draws out a second major insight from his history of Cary?s essay: all of Cary?s translators strove to purge his essay of what they regarded as his toxic variety of patriotism. Cary had equated English prosperity with the defeat and impoverishment of its rivals. His translators sought to substitute this ?jealousy of trade? with a more cosmopolitan vision that allowed for the possibility of ?emulation? or ?noble competition,? but without resorting to an agrarian utopianism. In eighteenth-century terms, they were for Colbertism without Machiavellism (p. 176): they entertained a vision of how a world of competitively industrializing states could be stabilized. In addition to mounting a powerful realist critique of free trade dogma, then, Reinert also advances recent reinterpretations of Enlightenment optimism in terms of a search for non-lethal forms of competition, and opens up a fascinating new prospect on the development of the discipline of political economy. His account goes a long way toward explaining why it was that the transformation of English practical economic experience into a systematic theory of political economy initially took place not in England itself, but in Ireland, Scotland, and continental Europe.
books  reviews  kindle  economic_history  political_economy  17thC  18thC  Enlightenment  British_history  UK_economy  industrialization  import_substitution  free_trade  mercantilism  competition  Italy  France  Germany  French_Enlightenment  nationalism  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Frances Coppola - Zombie alert! | Pieria Dec 2013
There is a prevalent view that part of the reason for the UK’s slow recovery and poor productivity is the existence of large numbers of companies that should have died in the recession. “Zombie firms in danger of strangling the economy”, screams one newspaper headline. And another warns of the “Zombie businesses spreading like a virus”..... Papworth expresses some puzzlement that the rate of corporate insolvency appears low. His puzzlement is understandable. It is not low. He is looking at the wrong data. And because of this, the rest of the paper is seriously flawed. I am not going to argue with his use of Austrian business cycle theory, or Schumpeter’s theory of “creative destruction”. But since he is using the wrong data, he has not put together a convincing case for the existence of the zombies he says need to be cleared out....... Also, because it is widely believed that zombies are kept alive not just by low interest rates, but by damaged banks unable to take losses, there are calls for banks to “end forbearance” even if it means they fail themselves. This is madness. Every bank and building society in the UK has corporate debt on its books, and almost every bank and building society in the UK has a damaged balance sheet which could not cope with large amounts of insolvencies. So banks cannot “end forbearance”. Nor do we wish them to do so. Widespread losses across the entire UK banking sector would catapult the UK back into deep recession. I am no fan of damaged banks – indeed I have called for them to be bypassed so that the UK economy can get the credit it desperately needs. But that doesn’t mean that it would be sensible to bankrupt them all.

So it seems there is little evidence for the existence of zombie companies. But there is considerable evidence for the existence of zombie banks. Indeed the very term “zombie” was originally used about banks. During the American Savings & Loan Crisis of the 1980s & 90s,
UK_economy  banking  credit  SMEs  debt  creative_destruction  interest_rates  leverage  risk  bankruptcy 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Simon Wren-Lewis - mainly macro: UK banks and the productivity puzzle: it may not just be about limited lending
However there may be another process behind the UK's productivity puzzle that has to do with banks, but not the volume of bank lending. About a third of bank lending to SMEs is accounted for by one bank: the Royal Bank of Scotland. (At the time of the financial crisis its market share was 40%: see the Independent Lending Review commissioned by RBS, page 25.) It has become increasingly clear that the RBS has been a seriously mismanaged bank. At the end of 2011 the Financial Services Authority issued a report which was extremely critical of the quality of management at RBS. Part of that poor management included a huge expansion in property based loans before the financial crisis. When those loans went bad, it was many of their SME customers who took the hit, according to a report just issued by Lawrence Tomlinson, the "entrepreneur in residence" at the Business, Innovation and Skills Department. Among other things the report alleges that RBS has been forcing viable businesses with short-term cash flow problems into its corporate restructuring arm with the aim of forcing foreclosure and then making a profit from selling off property assets.. ... Hamish McRae argues that gradually this ‘duty of care’ that banks once had with their customers has been replaced by a desire to flog products. And as the PPI scandal illustrates, banks seem not to worry about whether their customers need these products, as long as the sale is made. In terms of SMEs, some of the major damage may have been done by interest rate swaps: often complex hedging products which buyers may have not understood, or may have been missold. RBS appears to be heavily exposed to compensation claims involving these products.
UK_economy  banking  financialization  financial_regulation  SMEs  productivity 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Simon Wren-Lewis - mainly macro: Stages of Economic Recovery in the UK - Nov 2013
Lots of links -- Presentation re 3 stages of economic recovery and why UK stalled for 3 years in not getting Stage 2 bounce back growth due to austerity after returning to growth in 2010 - and fears won't reach Stage 3, maintenance of high growth for long period to return to pre recession productive capacity trend line. Banks as a central worry

-- quote-- So answering the productivity puzzle is the key to knowing what kind of recovery we will have. My suspicion, shared by others at the Bank of England and elsewhere, is that some of the answer is to be found back where the recession began – with UK banks. Bank lending to firms is important in increasing productivity, because it allows the productive firms to expand (at home and overseas), and the new start ups to displace the older, less efficient firms. So when bank lending collapsed in the recession, productivity collapsed. If banks start lending again to these new and more productive (but also more risky) firms, we may be able to make up a good deal of that lost ground......

So how are we with fixing the banks? The honest answer is I do not know, but let me end with a concern. So this is a recession created by banks, and there is a real danger that the power banks have over governments, and this government in particular, may mean we never make up the ground we have lost.
21stC  UK_economy  Great_Recession  banking  financialization  financial_regulation  rent-seeking  risk  austerity  productivity  unemployment  wages  capital  investment  links  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Paul Krugman - Three Centuries of Debt and Interest Rates - NYTimes.com Oct 2013
Aha — somehow I didn’t know this existed. The Bank of England has produced some very, very long-term series; spreadsheet can be downloaded here. Here’s debt and interest rates since the Bank was founded: - chart from BoE Quarterly Bulletin paper (2010 Q4) - pdf downloaded - see pinboard bookmark
economic_history  Britain  UK_economy  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  capital_markets  18thC  19thC  20thC  Great_Recession  21stC  Bank_of_England 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Sally Hills and Ryland Thomas: The UK recession in context — what do three centuries of data tell us? - Bank of England | Quarterly Bulletin 2010 Q4
From the TOC for 4thQ 2010 bulletin - Pdf downloaded - see Krugman as source of link - The UK recession in context — what do three centuries of data tell us? (178k)
By Sally Hills and Ryland Thomas of the Bank's Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division and Nicholas Dimsdale of The Queen's College, Oxford.
The Quarterly Bulletin has a long tradition of using historical data to help analyse the latest developments in the UK economy. To mark the Bulletin's 50th anniversary, this article places the recent UK recession in a long-run historical context. It draws on the extensive literature on UK economic history and analyses a wide range of macroeconomic and financial data going back to the 18th century. The UK economy has undergone major structural change over this period but such historical comparisons can provide lessons for the current economic situation.
The data annex is available in Excel format (575k).
economic_history  Britain  UK_economy  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Great_Recession  Bank_of_England  capital_markets  downloaded 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Why the 1% should pay tax at 80% | Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty - The Guardian - Oct 24 2013
The Reagan-Thatcher revolution changed society's beliefs about taxes. If we want economic growth shared fairly, we must rethink

In the end, the future of top tax rates depends on what the public believes about whether top pay fairly reflects productivity or whether top pay, rather unfairly, arises from rent-seeking. With higher income concentration, top earners have more economic resources to influence both social beliefs (through thinktanks and media) and policies (through lobbying), thereby creating some "reverse causality" between income inequality, perceptions, and policies.

The job of economists should be to make a top rate tax level of 80% at least "thinkable" again.

• This is an updated version of an article originally published by VoxEU
20thC  21stC  economic_history  economic_growth  neoliberalism  taxes  1-percent  inequality  US_politics  US_economy  UK_economy  UK_politics  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong : Lighting the Rocket of Growth and Lightening the Toil of Work: Another Outtake from My "Slouching Towards Utopia" Ms….
1870 is when we finally get takeoff -- The inventions since 1712 and perhaps since 1640 had in fact lightened the toil and boosted the real incomes of England’s working class. But the pace was very slow: an average annual growth rate of working-class real wages of only 0.2% per year from 1640-1800, and only 0.4% per year from 1800-1870. Each generation had, on average, a real wage level 10% higher than its predecessor. Contrast that with us today, where we expect real incomes to rise by 10% in five years—or with China today where 10% is the real income growth of a year and a half.The pace of improvement was slow because higher living standards meant faster population growth and because the pace of invention was slow. The pace of invention was relatively slow because science was not yet hooked to invention and invention and innovation were not yet hooked together to business, industrial research, and profit. Things did not change that much even in the age of the first Industrial Revolution. That was what did change around 1870. But it did not change until then.
economic_history  Great_Divergence  19thC  Industrial_Revolution  technology  Innovation  capitalism  UK_economy  economic_growth  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
"Alternatives" Isn't a Dirty Economic Word - Justin Fox - Harvard Business Review August 2013
Thatcher mantra TINA = There Is No Alternative - but thriving OECD economies show there are lots of ways to me a market economy that works
economic_history  20thC  neoliberalism  capitalism  OECD_economies  UK_economy  UK_politics  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong : Return to Jekyl Island - Eichengreen re lender-of-last-resort | June 2013
Barry Eichengreen comments on paper dealing with development of Bank of England lender-of-last-resort function in book of papers on centenary of Jekyll Island.

The Origins, History, and Future of the Federal Reserve

A Return to Jekyll IslandEdited by: Michael D. Bordo, Rutgers University, New JerseyEdited by: William Roberds, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

This book contains essays presented at a conference held in November 2010 to mark the centenary of the famous 1910 Jekyll Island meeting of leading American financiers and the U.S. Treasury. The 1910 meeting resulted in the Aldrich Plan, a precursor to the Federal Reserve Act that was enacted by Congress in 1913. The 2010 conference, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and Rutgers University, featured assessments of the Fed's near 100-year track record by prominent economic historians and macroeconomists. The final chapter of the book records a panel discussion of Fed policy making by the current and former senior Federal Reserve officials
economic_history  central_banks  19thC  capital_markets  money_market  20thC  US  UK_economy  international_finance 
june 2013 by dunnettreader
J Weil: Bank of America’s Foreclosure Frenzy - Bloomberg 6-21-13
The former employees’ statements were filed with a federal court in Boston as part of a lawsuit against Bank of America by homeowners who say they were improperly denied permanent loan modifications. Bank of America says it will respond to the statements in greater detail in a court filing.The workers gave horrific accounts about Bank of America’s compliance with the Home Affordable Modification Program. One consistent theme was that they said they were told to deceive borrowers about the status of their applications.

We have known for years that the U.S. Treasury Department’s Home Affordable Modification Programfailed miserably at its stated goal of helping struggling homeowners. In part, that’s because companies and divisions of major banks that service mortgage loans often can make more money from foreclosures than from loan modifications.

There already has been a $25 billion nationwide whitewash of a settlement between regulators and big banks over improper foreclosure practices, along with billion-dollar payments under a different settlement to consultants who were hired to review those practices. Nobody was prosecuted, much less wrist-slapped.
UK_economy  housing  banking  financial_regulation  consumers  property  fraud  financial_crisis 
june 2013 by dunnettreader
Simon Wren-Lewis - mainly macro: Must we live with a post-truth media? June 2013
So the idea that the last Labour government seriously mismanaged the nation’s finances is a myth. What is more, unlike older myths like the earth is flat, as these charts show it is not something that is generated by perception and which requires expertise to unravel.

Of course you could say that the Great Recession was the government’s fault. It should have foreseen the financial crisis coming. It should have known that levels of GDP in 2007 were going to be interpreted, five years later, as a massive economic boom rather than as they appeared at the time as something close to trend. It should have known this, despite the advice it was getting to the contrary from the Bank of England, the IMF, OECD, most economists …. and Her Majesty’s opposition! You can take that idealist view - but not if you were agreeing with all this advice at the time.

Now we all know who manufactured the myth. Yet I think most people believe that if a political party started telling a story that was clearly at variance with the facts, it would be found out. In short, people expect journalists and economic commentators to confront politicians who attempt to create and perpetuate myths. In this case they did not. Its also pretty obvious why they did not. The incentive for organisations like the BBC is to stay out of trouble.

So it really is the duty of academics to speak to truth, as loudly as they can, when it is being ignored by the media. On this topic, the media in general and the BBC in particular have been hopelessly biased in allowing the government to get away with this myth. They have some serious explaining to do
UK_politics  political_culture  political_press  UK_economy  economic_history  bad_journalism  propaganda 
june 2013 by dunnettreader

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