dunnettreader + north-weingast   29

Elena Seghezza - Fiscal capacity and the risk of sovereign debt after the Glorious Revolution: A reinterpretation of the North–Weingast hypothesis (2015) — ScienceDirect
European Journal of Political Economy, June 2015, Vol.38:71–81, doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.12.002
Dept. of Economics, University of Genoa, Via Vivaldi 5, 16126 Genova, Italy
Several explanations have been given to account for the fact that, in contrast to the claim made by North and Weingast (1989), the decline in interest rates on British sovereign debt did not occur until several years after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the decline in the risk premium on Britain's sovereign debt was due to the significant increase in excise duties in the early part of the eighteenth century. This increase was possible for two reasons. On the one hand, with the Glorious Revolution, parliament no longer had reason to fear that the King would strengthen his political power due to the availability of more fiscal revenue. On the other hand, the new excise taxes were borne mostly by the poor, that is a social class not represented in parliament. The delay in reducing the interest rate on British sovereign debt, following the Glorious Revolution, was, therefore, due to the length of time needed to increase and improve the fiscal bureaucracy responsible for the collection of excise duties.
Keywords -- Glorious Revolution Fiscal capacity Sovereign debt Interest rates
article  paywall  political_economy  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  Glorious_Revolution  fiscal-military_state  fiscal_space  tax_policy  tax_collection  bureaucracy  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  interest_groups  inequality  excise  lower_orders  taxes-consumption  landed_interest 
december 2016 by dunnettreader
Stéphanie Novak & Will Slauter - Interview with David Stasavage - Small States, Big Credit? | March 2012 - Books & ideas
Tags : state | political representation | the elite | debt | Italy
-- In States of Credit, David Stasavage explains why city-states were able to create long-term debt as early as the 13th century, whereas territorial states began to do so only in the 16th century. This research has major implications for our understanding of state formation and economic growth. Re his book -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle  economic_history  political_economy  political_culture  sovereign_debt  city_states  13thC  property_rights  property-confiscations  default  representative_institutions  state-building  creditors  North-Weingast  institutional_economics  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Anton Perdoncin, review essay - North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders (2009, French 2010) | La Vie des idées - April 2011
Anton Perdoncin, « Misère de l’histoire universelle », La Vie des idées, 20 avril 2011. ISSN : 2105-3030.-- Recensé : Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast, Violence et ordres sociaux, Paris, Gallimard, « Bibliothèque des sciences humaines », 2010, traduit de l’anglais par Myriam Dennehy (éd. originale : 2009). 460 p., 21 €. -- Pourquoi certaines sociétés sont-elles plus violentes que d’autres ? Parcourant 10 000 ans d’histoire, Douglass North et ses coauteurs insistent sur le rôle des institutions dans la pacification des rapports sociaux. Pour Anton Perdoncin, cette théorie élitiste, libérale et européocentriste repose sur une conception erronée de la violence, qui en occulte les aspects proprement politiques. -- see footnotes for interesting bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  kindle-available  social_theory  big_history  North-Weingast  institutional_economics  institutions  change-social  change-economic  elites  violence  social_order  social_sciences-post-WWII  bibliography  downloaded 
march 2015 by dunnettreader
Lorena S. Walsh, review - Nuala Zahedieh, The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700 (2010) | EH.net Review - Feb 2011
Zahedieh finds increasing concentration of plantation commerce among large merchants specializing in particular commodities and regions in the 1680s, when falling commodity prices and increased taxes eroded profit margins and drove out small traders. Colonial merchants seldom invested in overseas property, but made a massive contribution to expansion of empire in the form of short-term credit extended to settlers. The larger operators accumulated enough capital to diversify investment into shipbuilding, slave-trading, joint-stocks, insurance, wharves, industry, landed property, loans, and public credit. This decade was a turning point, as merchant concentration and specialization led to improved productivity, economies of scale, and reduced costs. (..) attempts of the later Stuarts to corner the profits of empire by restricting free trade among Englishmen as having limited success. (..) she sees the effect of the Glorious Revolution, not as leading to an economically optimal political arrangement, but as consolidating the capacity of the transatlantic trading elite to enforce regulation in its own interests and enhance the value and scale of rent-seeking enterprises at the expense of competition and efficiency, leading to a period of slower growth in colonial trade and shipping at the end of the century. Unlike trade with Europe, colonial commerce required an unusually large fixed capital investment in the greater tonnage needed to transport large volumes of bulky goods over long distances. (..) English- and plantation-built ships were better suited to most colonial commerce than were Dutch (..) it was long-distance commerce, rather than the protection of the Navigation Acts, that revived the English shipbuilding industry. By 1700 plantation shipping accounted for 40% of London's overseas trading capacity. (..) increased education among mariners (..) managerial skills, (..) navigational instruments. (..) London's prosperity by stimulating the construction of wharfs and warehouses, (.) naval refitting, repair, and provisioning trades. Although technology and unit input costs were fairly stable across the period, increased volumes and growing experience with colonial conditions led to organizational improvements which made more efficient use of inputs. - page encoding a mess on Note - try to save page or copy to EF in Air
books  bookshelf  reviews  17thC  economic_history  British_history  British_Empire  London  colonialism  North-Weingast  American_colonies  West_Indies  trade  trade-policy  shipping  Navigation_Acts  1680s  1690s  entrepôts  economic_growth  economic_culture  Charles_II  James_II  Atlantic  capital  investment  trade_finance  Dutch  education-training  Glorious_Revolution  Whigs  Whig_Junto  City_politics  infrastructure  ports  technology  navigation  interlopers  regulatory_capture  commodities  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert C. Allen - Progress and Poverty in Early Modern Europe | JSTOR - The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Aug., 2003) , pp. 403-443
An econometric model of economic development is estimated with data from leading European countries between 1300 and 1800. The model explores the impact of population, enclosure, empire, representative government, technology, and literacy on urbanization, agricultural productivity, proto-industry, and the real wage. Simulations show that the main factors leading to economic success in north-western Europe were the growth of American and Asian commerce and, especially, the innovations underlying the export of the new draperies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The enclosure of the open fields, representative government, and the spread of literacy did not play major roles. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  Europe-Early_Modern  Great_Divergence  North-Weingast  agrarian_capitalism  literacy  14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  British_Empire  Dutch  colonialism  trade  Asia  textiles  Innovation  agriculture  urbanization  wages  labor_history  manufacturing  productivity  export-led  Industrial_Revolution  proto-industry  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic: Can Black Death explain the Industrial Revolution? | globalinequality - Jan 11 2015
re presentation by a young scholar at Santa Fe suggesting that Why England (and Dutch) due to higher wages in Northern Europe post Black Death in contrast with South where non market repression or property arrangements were able to push adjustment costs inti agricultural workers without impact on wage rates. Milanovic compares with other theoretical approaches ie Pomerantz, Acemoglu & Robinson, Robert Allen etc. Link to 2007 paper by Pamuk Milanovic thinks may be 1st work to seriously look at differential impact of Black Death on northern & southern Europe as distinct from the common story if Western vs Central and Eastern Europe.
economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  Black_Death  North-Weingast  landowners  demography  economic_sociology  labor  agriculture  wages  productivity  colonialism  medieval  14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  institutional_economics  capital  capitalism  China  Japan  ancient_Rome  slavery  bibliography 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Black, review - Philip E. Tetlock; Richard Ned Lebow; Geoffrey Parker, eds. , Unmaking the West: 'What-If?' Scenarios That Rewrite World History | JSTOR: The International History Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 587-588
Black gives it high marks for (1) the introductory chapters that set up the issues and debates re use of counterfactuals and (2) the diversity of issue areas tackled, such as what if Europe hadn't adopted Christianity. Goldstone has a chapter framing William_III victory in the Glorious Revolution as critical turning point for industrial revolution, European political economy and Great Divergence. Carla Pestana has a brief contrary comment piece. Includes usual suspects like Victor Hanson and Joel Mokyr.
books  reviews  jstor  historiography  historical_sociology  historical_change  counterfactuals  contingency  Great_Divergence  North-Weingast  Industrial_Revolution  British_history  Western_civ  religious_culture  Christendom 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE -- PARTING COMPANIES: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, COMPANY POWER, AND IMPERIAL MERCANTILISM. (2014). | The Historical Journal, 57, pp 617-638. Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW - University of Kent and GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE - Seattle University School of Law --This article revisits the late seventeenth-century histories of two of England's most successful overseas trading monopolies, the East India and Royal African Companies. It offers the first full account of the various enforcement powers and strategies that both companies developed and stresses their unity of purpose in the seventeenth century. It assesses the complex effects that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ had on these powers and strategies, unearthing much new material about the case law for monopoly enforcement in this critical period and revising existing accounts that continue to assert the Revolution's exclusively deregulating effects and that miss crucial subtleties in the case law and related alterations in company behaviour. It asks why the two companies parted company as legal and political entities and offers an explanation that connects the fortunes of both monopoly companies to their public profile and differing constituencies in the English empire and the varying non-European political contexts in which they operated. -- * We warmly thank Michael R. T. Macnair for his indispensable advice and assistance regarding matters of seventeenth-century English law and are grateful to Clive Holmes for encouraging us to look into these issues and to Simon Douglas and Jeffrey Hackney for initial help in doing so. Paul Halliday, Daniel Hulsebosch, and Philip J. Stern provided helpful responses to specific research queries.
article  paywall  find  17thC  British_history  British_politics  economic_history  Glorious_Revolution  mercantilism  monopolies  trading_companies  East_India_Company  Royal_African_Co  colonialism  slavery  piracy  competition  parties  London  legal_history  judiciary  commercial_law  interest_groups  Whig_Junto  Tories  James_II  William_III  Parliament  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  regulation  West_Indies  ports  shipping  trade-policy  entrepôts  exports  imports  luxury_goods  consumers  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Forum - “Deirdre McCloskey and Economists’ Ideas about Ideas” (July, 2014) - Online Library of Liberty
Deirdre McClosky is over the halfway point of her 4 volume work on The Bourgeois Era. Two volumes have already appeared, Bourgeois Virtues (2006) and Bourgeois Dignity (2010), and a third is close to appearing [2015]. This Liberty Matters online discussion will assess her progress to date with a Lead Essay by Don Boudreaux and comments by Joel Mokyr and John Nye, and replies to her critics by Deirdre McCloskey. The key issue is to try to explain why “the Great Enrichment” of the past 150 years occurred in northern and western Europe rather than elsewhere, and why sometime in the middle of the 18th century. Other theories have attributed it to the presence of natural resources, the existence of private property and the rule of law, and the right legal and political institutions. McCloskey’s thesis is that a fundamental change in ideas took place which raised the “dignity” of economic activity in the eyes of people to the point where they felt no inhibition in pursuing these activities which improved the situation of both themselves and the customers who bought their products and services.
intellectual_history  cultural_history  economic_history  economic_growth  Medieval  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  Great_Divergence  British_history  Scientific_Revolution  Enlightenment  Scottish_Enlightenment  Industrial_Revolution  bourgeoisie  political_economy  France  Germany  Prussia  China  development  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  legal_history  property  property_rights  commerce  trade  trading_companies  free_trade  improvement  technology  Innovation  agriculture  energy  natural_capital  nature-mastery  transport  capitalism  colonialism  industry  industrialization  social_order  Great_Chain_of_Being  consumers  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  equality  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism  incentives  microeconomics  historical_sociology  historical_change  social_theory  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo - Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution | British Journal of Political Science - Cambridge Journals Online
Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribution under democracy ex ante. Using global panel data (1972–2008), this study finds that there is a relationship between democracy and redistribution only if elites are politically weak during a transition; for example, when there is revolutionary pressure. Redistribution is also greater if a democratic regime can avoid adopting and operating under a constitution written by outgoing elites and instead create a new constitution that redefines the political game. This finding holds across three different measures of redistribution and instrumental variables estimation. This article also documents the ways in which elites ‘bias’ democratic institutions.
article  paywall  political_science  political_economy  democracy  inequality  elites  redistribution  revolutions  transition_economies  property_rights  economic_culture  economic_reform  political_culture  institutional_change  North-Weingast  Glorious_Revolution  Whig_Junto  Whigs-oligarchy  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
John Wells and Douglas Wills - Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation: The Jacobite Threat to England's Institutions and Economic Growth | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 418-441
This study provides an empirical test of North and Weingast's theory of British capital-market development after the Glorious Revolution. The evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that institutional innovation in the 1690s led to the dramatic growth in London capital markets, and that threats to these institutions caused financial turmoil. We also find the economic motivation for these innovations to be consistent with the work of Ekelund and Tollison. -- they fell for Whig propaganda
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  17thC  18thC  British_politics  North-Weingast  Jacobites  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  institutional_economics  public_choice  interest_groups  Whigs-oligarchy  Bank_of_England  Tories  Hanoverian_Succession  James_III  monied_interest  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh - Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690-1790 | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 906-935
We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690-1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets. -- reasonably up to date bibliography on institutional_economics, behavioral_economics, financial markets (Shleifer et al), emerging markets, economic history of 17thC 18thC 19thC re industrial revolution, crowding_out and public finance -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  political_history  finance_capital  capital_markets  capital_flows  sovereign_debt  17thC  18thC  British_history  Dutch  France  public_finance  taxes  interest_rates  institutional_economics  institutional_change  North-Weingast  constitutionalism  Absolutism  behavioral_economics  emerging_markets  international_finance  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Stefan E. Oppers - The Interest Rate Effect of Dutch Money in 18thC Britain | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 25-43
An early piece in the financial markets, behavioral_economics, crowding_out debates -- It is generally recognized that the Dutch played a major part in financing British government deficits from the 1720s to the late 1770s. This article argues that even though the Dutch continued to hold large amounts of British debt after 1780, they stopped supplying new capital to the British and started a modest repatriation of some of their previous investments. A comparative econometric study of 3 percent consol yields during the two deficit-inducing wars Britain fought between 1750 and 1795 shows that as a result British interest rates became much more sensitive to increases in government borrowing. -- see bibliography of both primary and secondary literature -- didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  18thC  British_history  Dutch  sovereign_debt  capital_markets  capital_flows  interest_rates  North-Weingast  crowding_out  French_Revolutionary_Wars  American_Revolution  public_finance  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Quinn - The Glorious Revolution's Effect on English Private Finance: A Microhistory, 1680-1705 | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 593-615
The lending portfolio of a London banker is analyzed to better understand the relationship between public and private finance during England's Financial Revolution. The Glorious Revolution's political settlement appears to have reduced the risk premium on sovereign debt; but it seems to have raised, not lowered, rates on private debt. Two explanations for these higher private rates are suggested. During the war years 1690-1697, the government's improved capacity to borrow seems to have "crowded out" private borrowing. After peace was restored and the government's borrowing retrenched, the new political regime seems to have stimulated demand for loanable funds. -- check if final version in EagleFiler -- see jstor articles that have cited this - some interesting stuff from 2009 onwards by good authors
article  jstor  find  economic_history  political_economy  British_history  17thC  Glorious_Revolution  1690s  sovereign_debt  financial_system  banking  crowding_out  Nine_Years_War  North-Weingast  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
NUALA ZAHEDIEH - Regulation, rent-seeking, and the Glorious Revolution in the English Atlantic economy | JSTOR: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 63, No. 4 (NOVEMBER 2010), pp. 865-890
The rapid rise of England's colonial commerce in the late seventeenth century expanded the nation's resource base, stimulated efficiency improvements across the economy, and was important for long-term growth. However, close examination of the interests at play in England's Atlantic world does not support the Whiggish view that the Glorious Revolution played a benign role in this story. In the decades after the Restoration, the cases of the Royal African Company and the Spanish slave trade in Jamaica are used to show that the competition between Crown and Parliament for control of regulation constrained interest groups on either side in their efforts to capture the profits of empire. Stuart 'tyranny' was not able to damage growth and relatively competitive (and peaceful) conditions underpinned very rapid increases in colonial output and trade. The resolution of the rules of the Atlantic game in 1689 allowed a consolidated state better to manipulate and manage the imperial economy in its own interests. More secure rent-seeking enterprises and expensive wars damaged growth and European rivals began a process of catch-up. The Glorious Revolution was not sufficient to permanently halt economic development but it was sufficient to slow progress towards industrial revolution. -- very interesting attack on North-Weingast, Pincus et al -- paywall Wiley -- enormous bibliography on jstor information page
article  jstor  paywall  Wiley  economic_history  British_history  British_Empire  American_colonies  West_Indies  Atlantic  17thC  18thC  Glorious_Revolution  fiscal-military_state  North-Weingast  rent-seeking  UK_government-colonies  economic_growth  trade  trading_companies  British_politics  Parliament  Nine_Years_War  War_of_Spanish_Succession  colonialism  mercantilism  tariffs  Whig_Junto  bibliography 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
D'Maris Coffman: Bringing History to Economics | The Institute for New Economic Thinking
This episode features grantee D’Maris Coffman of the Centre for Financial History talking about her organization’s commitment to a New Financial History and what the fruits of their approach can tell us about modern debt crises and sustainable debt levels. She also discusses her research, funded by the Institute for New Economic Thinking, which explores fundamental questions about how Britain averted a Malthusian trap in the early nineteenth century and why the answers matter for global food security today.

our research into the “Credible Commitment” thesis has yielded three key findings. One that political risk is the most important single determinate of sovereign risk. Two, that the willingness of one party to honor the other party’s commitments is essential, and thus 1710 (when the Tories honored Whig commitments) was more of a turning-point than 1688-89. And three, that rather than crowding out the private sector, public sector spending and a coercive and authoritarian fiscal system paid for public borrowing during the Napoleonic wars.

These findings show that that gridlock in Washington is the “worst sort of politics possible.” Indeed, it is my firmly held belief that our research will overturn the relatively glib heuristics proposed by Carmen Reinert and Kenneth Rogoff.
video  books  kindle-available  economic_history  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  sovereign_debt  economic_growth  development  Tories  Whigs  Whig_Junto  Bank_of_England  1710s  Harley  Bolingbroke  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
David Stasavage: Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited (2002)
JSTOR: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Apr., 2002), pp. 155-186 -- to check - already in EF? -- This article proposes a revision to existing arguments that institutions of limited government (characterized by multiple veto points) improve the ability of governments to credibly commit. Focusing on the issue of sovereign indebtedness, I present a simple framework for analyzing credibility problems in an economy divided between owners of land and owners of capital. I then argue that establishing multiple veto points can improve credibility, but whether this takes place depends upon the structure of partisan interests in a society, on the existence of cross-issue coalitions, and on the extent to which management of government debt is delegated. I develop several propositions to take account of these factors and evaluate them with historical evidence from eighteenth century England and France. The results show that incorporating these additional factors can help to explain a broader range of phenomena than is accounted for in existing studies.
article  jstor  economic_history  financial_system  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  17thC  18thC  Britain  France  British_politics  Whig_Junto  public_finance  sovereign_debt  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Mark Potter: Good Offices: Intermediation by Corporate Bodies in Early Modern French Public Finance (2000)
JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 599-626 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- The old-regime monarchy, particularly during the reign of Louis XIV, did much of its borrowing through the mediation of privileged corporate bodies that sought lenders on the private market and then acted as guarantors against royal default. After comparing the creditors of various privileged bodies and considering the reasons why some were more successful than others in attracting a wide circle of creditors, this study argues for a reconsideration of the constitutional-absolutist dichotomy in the historiography of the early modern financial revolution.
article  jstor  economic_history  institutional_economics  financial_system  17thC  18thC  France  French_government  public_finance  sovereign_debt  capital_markets  privileges-corporate  creditors  North-Weingast 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Heather Welland: Taxes are Evil | The 18th - Century Common
1740s and 1750s Patriots fights with establisment Whigs against national debt and taxes - fight over Glorious Revolution legacy- "austerity" has a long history. Also anti imperialism re control of foreign dominions - an empire only of trade. A bit confused re 1st few decades after 1688 and rise of fiscal-military state but lots of links.
British_history  British_politics  18thC  Patriots  fiscal-military_state  taxes  Bolingbroke  Hume  sovereign_debt  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Do Institutions Cause Growth? by Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer :: SSRN
Abstract:      We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and c) subsequently improve their political institutions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Downloaded pdf to Note
political_economy  economic_history  political_culture  institutional_economics  economic_growth  North-Weingast  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
The New Comparative Economics by Andrei Shleifer, Edward L. Glaeser, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Rafael La Porta, Simeon Djankov :: SSRN
Abstract:      In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. The authors argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. They then apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice. This paper - a product of the Private Sector Advisory Department, Private Sector Development Vice Presidency - is part of a larger effort to understand institutional differences in the regulation of business.

Downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  economic_models  institutional_economics  political_economy  North-Weingast  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader
Voth & Drelichman: Banks should learn from Habsburg Spain | FT.com July 2013
The Genoese and Philip had a system that adjusted payment streams, rollovers and renegotiations that limited the impact of default on Philip's fiscal priorities while spreading risk among creditors that limited shocks to the lending system.

They're working on book dealing with Spanish Empire finances.

Wonder how they contrast their story with North Weingast "credible commitment" story re England and fiscal-military_state
economic_history  sovereign_debt  Spain  international_finance  banking  fiscal-military_state  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  16thC  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader
Pranad Barnahm: Little, Big: Two Ideas About Fighting Global Poverty | Boston Review May 2013
Review essay of 4 books on development economics. 2 from micro view by (1) Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2) Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel. 2 from macro political economy view by (1) Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson [Why Nations Fail] (2) Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson.
Re micro books, discusses limits of new fad for RCTs that ignore important studies and methods from prior decades as well as well-known problems with causality and scaling up. How effective when macro conditions bad is questioned in macro books.
Unenthusiastic re macro books. Too reliant on North-Weingast approach that misses tensions between centralization and property rights protection vs pluralism, innovation, democracy, politics of inclusion. Particularly weak on explaining China and India (or even Italy) in past 3 decades and where each is likely to go from here.
books  reviews  EF-add  political_economy  political_culture  development  poverty  20thC  21stC  China  India  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  democracy  clientelism  economic_growth  economic_history  from instapaper
june 2013 by dunnettreader

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