dunnettreader + great_recession   178

Understanding the Surge in Commercial Real Estate Lending - Economic Brief, August 2017 | Richmond FRB
HELEN FESSENDEN AND CATHERINE MUETHING
U.S. banks have increased their commercial real estate (CRE) lending significantly in the past five years. Economists and regulators note that some positive factors are driving this trend, but they also see potential risks. Analysts at the Richmond Fed have found that some banks could be especially vulnerable if economic conditions deteriorate. These include institutions that are in certain major urban areas and have high concentrations of CRE loans, rapid CRE loan growth, and heavy reliance on "noncore" (or illiquid) funding. But the analysts also conclude that, overall, banks' CRE exposures do not appear to be as elevated as they were before the Great Recession.
commercial_real_estate  liquidity  risk_management  credit_booms  leverage  mortgages  financial_regulation  real_estate  Great_Recession  business_cycles  financial_crisis  Evernote  banking 
august 2017 by dunnettreader
Reading: Barry Eichengreen (2011): Economic History and Economic Policy via Brad DeLong
Barry Eichengreen (2011): Economic History and Economic Policy - EHA Presidential Address 2011
As you read, formulate your answers to the following questions:
1. What does Eichengreen think are the uses of history, as shown in the use of history in trying to understand the macroeconomic crisis that began in 2008?
2.What does Eichengreen think are the abuses of history, as shown in the use of history in trying to understand the macroeconomic crisis that began in 2008?
3.What rules and approaches does Eichengreen arrive it for future people trying to use history better?
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
monetary_policy  historiography-postWWII  QE  fiscal_policy  unemployment  historiography-19thC  economic_history  economic_policy  Keynesianism  speech  FX-rate_management  downloaded  central_banks  Great_Depression  historiography  FX  austerity  financial_system  financial_crisis  financial_regulation  Minsky  historiography-20thC  FX-misalignment  Great_Recession  inflation 
january 2017 by dunnettreader
Larry Summers
The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations
Antonio Fatás, Lawrence H. Summers
NBER Working Paper No. 22374
Issued in June 2016
NBER Program(s):   EFG
The global financial crisis has permanently lowered the path of GDP in all advanced economies. At the same time, and in response to rising government debt levels, many of these countries have been engaging in fiscal consolidations that have had a negative impact on growth rates. We empirically explore the connections between these two facts by extending to longer horizons the methodology of Blanchard and Leigh (2013) regarding fiscal policy multipliers. Our results provide support for the presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy. The large size of the effects points in the direction of self-defeating fiscal consolidations as suggested by DeLong and Summers (2012). Attempts to reduce debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt to GDP ratio through their long-term negative impact on output.
austerity  fiscal_policy  macroeconomics  NBER  paper  fiscal_multipliers  economic_theory  Great_Recession  hysterisis  paywall 
november 2016 by dunnettreader
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk - The heterogeneity of world trade collapses
Abstract
This paper analyses drivers of imports during the major world trade collapses of the Great Depression (1930s; 34 countries) and the Great Recession (1930s; 173 countries). The analysis deals with the first year of these episodes and develops a small empirical model that shows a significant impact of the development of GDP, the share of manufacturing goods in total imports and the political system. The analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity with respect to regional importance of these drivers. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
public_policy  political_participation  economic_growth  global_economy  economic_history  political_economy  trade-policy  paper  institutions  government-forms  business-and-politics  international_political_economy  global_system  downloaded  trade  Great_Recession 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Atif Mian, Amir Sufi - Who Bears the Cost of Recessions? The Role of House Prices and Household Debt | NBER -:May 2016
NBER Working Paper No. 22256 -- This chapter reviews empirical estimates of differential income and consumption growth across individuals during recessions. Most existing studies examine the variation in income and consumption growth across individuals by sorting on ex ante or contemporaneous income or consumption levels. We build on this literature by showing that differential shocks to household net worth coming from elevated household debt and the collapse in house prices play an underappreciated role. Using zip codes in the United States as the unit of analysis, we show that the decline in numerous measures of consumption during the Great Recession was much larger in zip codes that experienced a sharp decline in housing net worth. In the years prior to the recession, these same zip codes saw high house price growth, a substantial expansion of debt by homeowners, and high consumption growth. We discuss what models seem most consistent with this striking pattern in the data, and we highlight the increasing body of macroeconomic evidence on the link between household debt and business cycles. Our main conclusion is that housing and household debt should play a larger role in models exploring the importance of household heterogeneity on macroeconomic outcomes and policies.
paper  paywall  NBER  economic_history  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  debt_crisis  debt-overhang  business_cycles  house_prices  mortgages  consumer_demand  US_economy 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
FRB: FEDS Notes: Government-Backed Mortgage Insurance Promoted a Speedier Recovery from the Great Recession
URL is for Fed Note that summarizes one part of the larger Paper - April 2016 -- Government-Backed Mortgage Insurance, Financial Crisis, and the Recovery from the Great Recession (PDF) -- Wayne Passmore and Shane M. Sherlund -- Abstract: The Great Recession provides an opportunity to test the proposition that government mortgage insurance programs mitigated the effects of the financial crisis and enhanced the economic recovery from 2009 to 2014. We find that government-sponsored mortgage insurance programs have been responsible for better economic outcomes in counties that participated heavily in these programs. In particular, counties with high levels of participation from government-sponsored enterprises and the Federal Housing Authority had relatively lower unemployment rates, higher home sales, higher home prices, lower mortgage delinquency rates, and less foreclosure activity, both in 2009 (soon after the peak of the financial crisis) and in 2014 (six years after the crisis) than did counties with lower levels of participation. The persistence of better outcomes in counties with heavy participation in federal government programs is consistent with a view that lower government liquidity premiums , lower government credit-risk premiums, and looser government mortgage-underwriting standards yield higher private-sector economic activity after a financial crisis. - Keywords: Financial crisis, Great Recssion, government policy, mortgages - paper downloaded to Tab S2
paper  Fed  Great_Recession  Great_Depression  housing  mortgages  financial_crisis  GSEs  securitization  unemployment  house_prices  countercyclical_policy  downloaded 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Michael T. Kiley - Macroeconomic Modeling of Financial Frictions for Macroprudential Policymaking: A Review of Pressing Challenges | FRB: FEDS Notes: May 2016
Structural macroeconomic modeling plays a central role economic policy discussions. Over the past fifty years, the overwhelming majority of such efforts have focused on the structural features of household, firm, and government behavior that lead to cyclical fluctuations in employment and inflation and the roles of monetary and fiscal policy in ameliorating undesirable volatility in economic performance. In recent years, the potential role of macroprudential policies in limiting excessive volatility in the financial sector and the consequent effects on economic performance has risen to the fore in academic and policy discussions. While progress in modeling for macroprudential policy analysis has been substantial, there remain many important challenges, and consensus on a core modeling framework remains far away. This note reviews some of the progress witnessed in recent years and challenges that remain. - downloaded to Tab S2
paper  Fed  macroprudential_policies  macroeconomics  economic_models  economic_theory  financial_stability  Great_Recession  bank_runs  money_market  housing  households  house_prices  leverage  intermediation  non-linear_models  downloaded 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - No: We Can't Wave a Magic Demand Wand Now and Get the Recovery We Threw Away in 2009 - Feb 2016
The estimable Mike Konczal writes: Mike Konczal: Dissecting the CEA Letter and Sanders's Other Proposals: "I would have done Gerald Friedman’s paper…
Instapaper  Great_Recession  macroeconomic_policy  macroeconomics  economic_growth  economic_models  hysterisis  elections-2016  from instapaper
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Larry Summers - No free lunches but plenty of cheap ones - Feb 2016
February 7, 2016 Trade-offs have long been at the center of economics. The aphorism “there is no such thing as a free lunch” captures a central economic idea:…
Instapaper  US_economy  US_government  Summers  stagnation  demand-side  economic_growth  Great_Recession  investment-government  government_finance  interest_rates  from instapaper
february 2016 by dunnettreader
The Changing Composition of Productivity Growth | The Growth Economics Blog - Nov 2015
After the post I did recently on profit shares and productivity calculations, I’ve been picking around the BLS, OECD, and Penn World Tables methodologies for…
Instapaper  US_economy  economic_growth  productivity  productivity-labor_share  investment  Great_Recession  stagnation  from instapaper
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Symposium: The Bailouts of 2007-2009 (Spring 2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 29 No.2
Austan D. Goolsbee and Alan B. Krueger - A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and Restructuring General Motors and Chrysler (pp. 3-24) **--** W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery - The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (pp. 25-52) **--** Charles W. Calomiris and Urooj Khan - An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions (pp. 53-80) **--** Robert McDonald and Anna Paulson - AIG in Hindsight (pp. 81-106) **--** Phillip Swagel - Legal, Political, and Institutional Constraints on the Financial Crisis Policy Response (pp. 107-22) -- available online, didn't download
article  journals-academic  financial_system  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  bailouts  bail-ins  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capital_markets  banking  bank_runs  shadow_banking  NBFI  securitization  credit_booms  credit_ratings  incentives-distortions  public-private_partnerships  Fannie_Mae  housing  leverage  financial_system-government_back-stop  financial_innovation  firesales  liquidity  asset_prices  Fed  lender-of-last-resort  regulatory_capture  regulatory_avoidance  credit_crunch  bankruptcy  government_agencies  government_finance  global_economy  global_governance  international_finance  international_monetary_system  international_crisis  property_rights  derivatives  clearing_&_settlement  GSEs  bubbles 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Maurice Obstfeld - Understanding past and future financial crises | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal
Summary of their long paper, see bookmark -- Reposted 21 July 2015 - What explains the different effects of the crisis around the world? This column compares the 2007–09 crisis to earlier episodes of banking, currency, and sovereign debt distress and identifies domestic-credit booms and real currency appreciation as the most significant predictors of future crises, in both advanced and emerging economies. It argues these results could help policymakers determine the need for corrective action before crises hit. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  20thC  financial_crisis  emerging_markets  capital_flows  credit_booms  leverage  business_cycles  FX-rate_management  FX  Great_Recession  bibliography  links  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Maurice Obstfeld - Stories of the 20thC for the 21stC | CEPR via Ideas.repec.org
A key precursor of twentieth-century financial crises in emerging and advanced economies alike was the rapid buildup of leverage. Those emerging economies that avoided leverage booms during the 2000s also were most likely to avoid the worst effects of the twenty-first century’s first global crisis. A discrete-choice panel analysis using 1973-2010 data suggests that domestic credit expansion and real currency appreciation have been the most robust and significant predictors of financial crises, regardless of whether a country is emerging or advanced. For emerging economies, however, higher foreign exchange reserves predict a sharply reduced probability of a subsequent crisis. -- enormous lit review bibliography, see references links on Ideas page -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  20thC  financial_crisis  emerging_markets  capital_flows  credit_booms  leverage  business_cycles  FX-rate_management  FX  Great_Recession  bibliography  links  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » The US Economy: Explaining Stagnation and Why It Will Persist - August 2015
The US Economy: Explaining Stagnation and Why It Will Persist
This paper examines the major competing interpretations of the economic crisis in the US and explains the rebound of neoliberal orthodoxy. It shows how US policymakers acted to stabilize and save the economy, but failed to change the underlying neoliberal economic policy model. That failure explains the emergence of stagnation, which is likely to endure. Current economic conditions in the US smack of the mid-1990s. The 1990s expansion proved unsustainable and so will the current modest expansion. However, this time it is unlikely to be followed by financial crisis because of the balance sheet cleaning that took place during the last crisis. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  US_economy  stagnation  macroeconomics  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  neoliberalism  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol - La zone euro est-elle viable? Une perspective historique - La Vie des idées - 20 mai 2014
La crise de la zone euro a révélé les faiblesses constitutives de la monnaie unique ; mais les débats portant sur sa viabilité se limitent trop souvent à une vision purement économique de la zone euro. L’histoire complexe de la création de l’euro éclaire les enjeux financiers et politiques internationaux de l’unification monétaire. -- in many ways it's the same-old, same-old -- a group of countries with intense economic interaction that gets whip-sawed by exchange rates in a constantly evolving world that's increasingly globalized, especially capital movements -- under a series of arrangements from Bretton Woods onwards, they've been trying to manage or mitigate the problem, but they never solve it -- he repeatedly notes that the entire EC budget isn't more than 1% of the aggregate GNP of the member states -- useful aide-mémoire for each step in the evolution of the EU and European money arrangements paralled with each modification of the international monetary system -- though he notes repeatedly that finance is extremely mobile, not only within the Eurozone or within the EU but globally, and that labor and fiscal adjustments are extremely immobile within the Eurozone by comparison, he doesn't draw the obvious link of these severe mismatches to the repeated problems the EU has faced re money -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  economic_history  political_history  European_integration  post-WWII  post-Cold_War  international_monetary_system  Bretton_Woods  EU_governance  FX  FX-rate_management  FX-misalignment  Eurozone  Eurocrsis  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  sovereign_debt  Europe-federalism  EU-regulation  cross-border  Labor_markets  banking  ECB  EU-elections  political_participation  EU-Parliament  EU-parties  monetary_union  monetary_theory  international_economics  capital_flows  capital_controls  EU-fiscal_policy  convergence-econimic  fiscal_policy  Maastricht  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Clément Fontan - La BCE et la crise du capitalisme en Europe - La Vie des idées - 24 février 2015
Selon Clément Fontan, la Banque centrale européenne a outrepassé ses prérogatives et a, sans contrôle démocratique, traité de manière trop différenciée l’aide qu’elle apporte aux États et celle qu’elle alloue au système financier. Mots-clés : Europe | banque centrale | capitalisme | Grèce | euro -- quite helpful for details of how the various powers, decision-making processes and authority in the EU, the Eurozone, the member states, and the ECB interact -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  capitalism-systemic_crisis  finance_capital  financialization  Greece-Troika  Eurocrsis  QE  bank_runs  payments_systems  bailouts  Germany-Eurozone  France  accountability  democracy_deficit  austerity  Maastricht  sovereign_debt  sovereignty  Europe-federalism  European_integration  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Hyun-Sung Khang - Help Wanted -- Finance & Development, June 2015
Pretty balanced discussion of youth labor market problems, challenging the excuses of "skills mismatch" and overly burdensome labor regulations. In the F&D issue downloaded as pdf to Note
article  unemployment  unemployment-youth  skills  Labor_markets  labor_standards  labor_law  education-training  austerity  Eurozone  Eurocrsis  hysterisis  migration  Great_Recession  economic_growth  economic_sociology  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Lipton - The Key to Raising Business Investment: Keep Pushing the Accelerator | iMFdirect - The IMF Blog - July 2015
By David Lipton Why have businesses in advanced economies not been investing more in machinery, equipment and plants? Business investment is the largest…
Instapaper  Great_Recession  economic_growth  investment  fiscal_policy  demand-side  Keynesianism  macroeconomics  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Rand Ghayad - US labour market: Broken with and without unemployment benefits | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 22 July 2013
Will US unemployment benefits help or hinder those out of work? Much recent economic theory suggests that benefits reduce people’s likelihood of getting work. This column presents new research that looks in detail at various types of unemployment – job loser, job leaver, new entrant, re-entrant – suggesting that there is a limit to the extent that unemployment benefits reduce the amount of effort put into searching for a new job. The increase in the unemployment rate relative to job openings will persist when unemployment benefit programmes expire.
US_economy  Great_Recession  Labor_markets  stagnation  unemployment  safety_net 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Erlend W Nier, Tahsin Saadi Sedik - Capital flows, emerging markets and the global financial cycle | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 04 January 2015
Large and volatile capital flows into emerging economies since the Global Financial Crisis have re-invigorated efforts to unearth the determinants of these flows. This column investigates the interplay between global risk aversion (captured by the VIX) and countries’ characteristics. The authors also explore what policies countries should employ to protect themselves against the volatility of capital flows. The findings indicate that capital flows to emerging markets cannot be controlled without incurring substantial costs.
paper  emerging_markets  capital_flows  capital_markets  global_system  international_finance  global_financial_cycle  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  capital_controls  volatility  contagion  risk-systemic 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Anton Korinek - Going against the flow: Dealing with capital flows to emerging markets | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 22 December 2010
Capital flows to emerging markets are controversial territory. This column argues that they create externalities that make the recipient economies more vulnerable to financial fragility and crises. It adds that policymakers can make their economies better off by regulating and discouraging the use of risky forms of external finance – in particular short-term dollar-denominated debts
paper  emerging_markets  capital_flows  capital_markets  global_system  international_finance  global_financial_cycle  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  capital_controls  volatility  contagion  risk-systemic  risk-mitigation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jesse Rothstein - The Great Recession and its aftermath: What role do structural changes play? - Washington Center for Equitable Growth - July 6, 2015
My research, based on a review of extensive data on labor market outcomes since the end of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, finds no basis for concluding that the recent trend of stagnant wages and low employment is the “new normal.” Rather, the data point to continued business cycle weakness as the most important determinant of workers’ outcomes over the past several years. It is only in the past few months that we have started to see data consistent with growing labor market tightness, and even this trend is too new to be confident. The continued stagnation of wages through the end of 2014 implies that, at a minimum, a fair amount of slack remained in the labor market as of that late date. In turn, policies that would promote faster recoveries and encourage aggregate demand during and after recessions remain key policy tools. -- didn't download
paper  US_economy  Great_Recession  Labor_markets  stagnation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Luca Corchia - Europe: Streeck replies to Habermas, and the debate goes on | Reset Dialogues on Civilizations - April 2014
The task of this brief presentation is to “establish a dialogue” with Streeck’s text, attempting to fill the hiatus between the answer and the original question that Habermas’ interpretation intended to pose to those wishing to simply dispose of economic and monetary union, ending up by dismantling the political and cultural integration project that inspired the founding fathers. -- downloaded pdf to Note
political_economy  international_finance  EU  EU_governance  ECB  Greece-Troika  monetary_union  Eurozone  Habermas  Europe-federalism  European_integration  nationalism  nation-state  national_interest  political_press  political_culture  economic_culture  financial_crisis  finance_capital  Great_Recession  democracy_deficit  public_opinion  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Luca Corchia - Europe: The debate between Habermas and Streeck about the Left and Europe’s future | Reset Dialogues on Civilizations - 25 March 2014
Over the next few months the press and television networks will one again focus on European events, returning the interest of Italian public opinion to these matters, and this will take place on the basis of the pressing timeframe dictated by political issues. In a few weeks’ time the election campaign for a European Union’s parliament, scheduled for May 22-25, will be fully under way in all 28 member states. -- check out footnotes -- downloaded pdf to Note
EU  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  Greece-Troika  democracy  democracy_deficit  legitimacy  elections  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalism-varieties  capital_as_power  Eurosceptic  European_integration  elites  elites-self-destructive  parties  social_democracy  right-wing  nationalism  nation-state  national_interest  political_press  political_culture  economic_culture  Habermas 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jürgen Habermas - Re Wolfgang Streeck - Freedom and Democracy: Democracy or Capitalism? | Reset Dialogues on Civilizations - 1 July 2013
1st of a back-and-forth with Streeck and others -- Freedom and Democracy: Democracy or Capitalism? On the Abject Spectacle of a Capitalistic World Society fragmented along National Lines -- In his book on the deferred crisis of democratic capitalism Wolfgang Streeck develops an unsparing analysis of the origins of the present banking and debt crisis that is spilling over into the real economy. This bold, empirically based study developed out of Adorno Lectures at the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt. At its best—that is, whenever it combines political passion with the eye-opening force of critical factual analysis and telling arguments—it is reminiscent of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. It takes as its starting point a justified critique of the crisis theory developed by Claus Offe and me in the early 1970s. The Keynesian optimism concerning governance prevalent at the time had inspired our assumption that the economic crisis potential mastered at the political level would be diverted into conflicting demands on an overstrained governmental apparatus and into “cultural contradictions of capitalism” (as Daniel Bell put it a couple of years later) and would find expression in a legitimation crisis. Today we are not (yet?) experiencing a legitimation crisis but we are witnessing a palpable economic crisis.
political_economy  political_philosophy  international_political_economy  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capital_as_power  finance_capital  financialization  Great_Recession  democracy  democracy_deficit  legitimacy  nationalism  financial_crisis  sovereign_debt  social_theory  globalization  global_governance  political_culture  economic_culture  stagnation  economic_sociology  Habermas  post-secular  Eurozone  European_integration  monetary_union  EU_governance  EU  Europe-federalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Marc Fovargue-Davies - Anglo-Saxon Capitalism in Crisis? Models of Liberal Capitalism and the Preconditions for Financial Stability :: SSRN (rev'd September 2011) Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 422
Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Birkbeck College - Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology; Cambridge - Social and Political Sciences -- Marc Fovargue-Davies, U of London - The London Centre for Corporate Governance & Ethics -- The return to economic liberalism in the Anglo-Saxon world was motivated by the apparent failure of Keynesian economic management to control the stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this context, the theories of economic liberalism, championed by Friederich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and the Chicago School economists, provided an alternative. However, the divergent experience of the US, UK, Canada and Australia reveals two distinct ‘varieties’ of economic liberalism: the ‘neo-classical’ incarnation, which describes American and British liberal capitalism, and the more ‘balanced’ economic liberalism that evolved in Canada and Australia. In large part, these were a product of the way that liberal economic theory was understood and translated into policy, which in turn shaped the evolving relationship between the state and the private sector and the relative position of the financial sector within the broader economic system. Together, these determined the nature and extent of financial market regulation and the system’s relative stability during the 2008 crisis. -- PDF File: 61 -- Keywords: Corporate governance, Regulation, Financial market instability, Liberal capitalism, Varieties of capitalism -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_history  20thC  21stC  post-WWII  post-Cold_War  US_politics  UK_politics  political_economy  political_culture  ideology  neoliberalism  economic_theory  economic_sociology  business_practices  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_influence  Keynesianism  neoclassical_economics  Austrian_economics  Chicago_School  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalism-varieties  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  capital_markets  capital_as_power  financialization  finance_capital  financial_regulation  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  policymaking  trickle-down  Canada  Australia  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
interfluidity » Greece - July 2015
Steve Randy Waldmann -- his 1st take on what's been going on, and how the Eurozone gives all the power to creditors, which produces a bunch of terribly misaligned incentives -- and what business bankruptcy law guards against
Instapaper  EU  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  Greece-Troika  IMF  bailouts  political_economy  democracy_deficit  austerity  bank_runs  central_banks  lender-of-last-resort  international_organizations  international_finance  creditors  bankruptcy  incentives-distortions  sovereign_debt  default  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert Waldmann - Angry Bear » What Remains of the Keynesian Revolution ? - February 2009
Robert Waldmann I like to criticize financies, financial regulators and fresh water economists. I should defend something for once. It is easy to criticize. So… -- with one outlier, the data still looking Keynesian
Instapaper  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  Great_Recession  Keynesianism  neoclassical_economics  RBC  rational_expectations  supply-side  demand-side  business_cycles  monetary_policy  fiscal_policy  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Ching-Wai (Jeremy) Chiu, Haroon Mumtaz and Gabor Pinter - Forecasting with VAR models: fat tails and stochastic volatility | Bank of England Working Paper No. 528: May 29 2015
In this paper, we provide evidence that fat tails and stochastic volatility can be important in improving in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting performance. Specifically, we construct a VAR model where the orthogonalised shocks feature Student’s t distribution and time-varying variance. We estimate this model using US data on output growth, inflation, interest rates and stock returns. In terms of in-sample fit, the VAR model featuring both stochastic volatility and t-distributed disturbances outperforms restricted alternatives that feature either attributes. The VAR model with t disturbances results in density forecasts for industrial production and stock returns that are superior to alternatives that assume Gaussianity, and this difference is especially stark over the recent Great Recession. Further international evidence confirms that accounting for both stochastic volatility and Student’s t-distributed disturbances may lead to improved forecast accuracy. -- didn't download
paper  macroeconomics  economic_models  financial_crisis  probability  Great_Recession 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Xavier Giroud, Holger M. Mueller - Firm Leverage and Unemployment during the Great Recession | NBER April 2015
NBER Working Paper No. 21076 -- We argue that firms’ balance sheets were instrumental in the propagation of shocks during the Great Recession. Using establishment-level data, we show that firms that tightened their debt capacity in the run-up (“high-leverage firms”) exhibit a significantly larger decline in employment in response to household demand shocks than firms that freed up debt capacity (“low-leverage firms”). In fact, all of the job losses associated with falling house prices during the Great Recession are concentrated among establishments of high-leverage firms. At the county level, we find that counties with a larger fraction of establishments belonging to high-leverage firms exhibit a significantly larger decline in employment in response to household demand shocks. Thus, firms’ balance sheets also matter for aggregate employment. -- paywall
paper  paywall  NBER  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  corporate_finance  leverage  unemployment  macroeconomics  economic_models  economic_shocks-propagation  networks-business  demand-side  housing  business_practices  business_cycles 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Zero matters — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
What to conclude? Fears of deflation can surely be overdone: the economic impact of annual price changes of -0.1% would be difficult to distinguish from changes of +0.1%. It would take nearly 700 years for the price level to halve or to double at this pace! Yet, policymakers are warranted in taking the view that even mild deflations of 1% or 2% annually are meaningfully different from comparable inflations. Conventional monetary policy tools – adjusting nominal interest rates – are ill-suited to restoring price stability in the face of modest single-digit deflation. And the presence of downward wage rigidities makes things even worse. -- nice collection of historical and comparative data -- copied to Pocket
economic_theory  macroeconomics  monetary_policy  ZLB  wages  wages-sticky  inflation  inflation-expectations  deflation  interest_rates  economic_growth  economic_culture  Labor_markets  Great_Recession  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - The euro area's debt hangover — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
You wouldn’t know it from the record low level of government bond yields, but much of Europe lives under a severe debt burden. Nonfinancial corporate debt exceeds 100 percent of GDP in Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. And, gross government debt (as measured by Eurostat) is close to or exceeds this threshold in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Debt levels this high have important long-run consequences. (...) they are a drag on growth. High debt means that households have more difficulty maintaining consumption when income falls; firms may be unable to keep up production and investment when revenue dips; and governments are in no position to smooth expenditure when revenue falls. More economic volatility means lower growth. Beyond that, high levels of debt reduce the effectiveness of central bank stimulus. (...) So, what is the euro area to do? We see three paths out of this predicament: (1) breathtaking supply reforms that trigger an investment boom; (2) inflation; or (3) a mix of asset sales and debt relief.The first option is the best. The alternatives would threaten the survival of the euro, undermine the fiscal credibility of major governments, or both. [After pointing out the problems with 1 and 2, they look at how much would sovereign_debt have to be reduced to reach debt sustainability targets embodied in Maastricht] For Greece, the write-down is 71% of face value; for Spain, 63%; and for France 50%. Taken as a whole, meeting the 60% Maastricht criterion (while maintaining bank system capital) would require that (..the) combined debt of [Greece, Spain and France of] €9.36 trillion be written down by a total of €5.07 trillion. As extreme as this sounds, it is, in fact, insufficient. Many euro-area governments also face significant unfunded pension liabilities. (...) The sooner they own up to this, the better for their long-term growth prospects. -- copied to Pocket
EU  Eurozone  debt  debt-overhang  debt-restructuring  sovereign_debt  leverage  deleverage  economic_growth  economic_reform  creditors  default  monetary_policy  ECB  central_banks  interest_rates  investment  deficit_finance  debt_crisis  corporate_finance  demand-side  supply-side  capital_markets  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  banking  capital_adequacy  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz -The mythic quest for early warnings — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
Reviews a number of stress indexes developed since the financial crisis -- most show a good way of indicating where we are at any one time, and several may be useful in crisis management for identifying institutions with liquidity vs insolvency problems, but none tell us where we're going **--** Where does this leave us? Our answer is that we have yet another reason to be skeptical of time-varying, discretionary regulatory policy. In an earlier post, we noted that the combination of high information requirements, long transmission lags and significant political resistance made it unlikely time-varying capital requirements will be effective in reducing financial vulnerabilities. Our conclusion then, which we reiterate now, is that the solution is to build a financial system that is safe and resilient all of the time, since we really never know what is coming. That means a regulatory system based on economic function, not legal form, with sufficient capital buffers to guard against all but the very worst possibilities. In the end, a financial system that relies on an early warning indicator of imminent financial collapse seems destined to fail. -- copied to Pocket
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_adequacy  capital_markets  NBFI  information-markets  information-asymmetric  risk  risk-systemic  risk_management  Great_Recession  global_governance  banking  bank_runs  liquidity  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review by Andrew W. Lo :: SSRN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- The recent financial crisis has generated many distinct perspectives from various quarters. In this article, I review a diverse set of 21 books on the crisis, 11 written by academics, and 10 written by journalists and one former Treasury Secretary. No single narrative emerges from this broad and often contradictory collection of interpretations, but the sheer variety of conclusions is informative, and underscores the desperate need for the economics profession to establish a single set of facts from which more accurate inferences and narratives can be constructed. -- Pages in PDF File: 41 -- Keywords: Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, Book Review -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  reviews  books  economic_history  21stC  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  financial_regulation  financialization  capital_markets  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  regulation-enforcement  rent-seeking  fraud  debt  debtors  housing  securitization  derivatives  bank_runs  banking-universal  Glass-Steagal  risk_management  risk-systemic  financial_economics  global_system  global_imbalance  capital_flows  institutional_investors  institutional_economics  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicolas Duvoux - Interview with Luc Boltanski - Le pouvoir est de plus en plus savant | January 2011 - La Vie des idées
Dossier(s) : Pierre Bourdieu et la culture Classes sociales et inégalités : portrait d’une France éclatée -- Mots-clés : Bourdieu | critique | sociologie | institutions | pragmatisme | épistémologie | domination | classes sociales | théorie politique -- Le sociologue Luc Boltanski revient sur ses deux publications les plus récentes : "Rendre la réalité inacceptable" et "De la critique". Après avoir situé ces ouvrages dans sa trajectoire intellectuelle, l’entretien procède à une explicitation des concepts centraux de De la critique puis évoque des pistes pour renouveler la critique à un moment historique qui est celui de l’apogée du capitalisme et de l’État mais aussi de leur crise et de la crise de leur relation. -- Cet entretien a été réalisé avec l’aide d’Arnaud Esquerre et de Jeanne Lazarus (membre du conseil de rédaction de La Vie des idées). La version écrite est la transcription de la conversation orale. Elle ne constitue pas un texte indépendant même si certaines précisions ont pu être apportées par rapport à l’entretien vidéo. -- 1st part translated into English -- downloaded French pdf to Note
social_theory  cultural_capital  classes  Bourdieu  cultural_critique  political_economy  political_culture  critical_theory  Great_Recession  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis  downloaded  from instapaper
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Ashoka Mody - Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union | Bruegel.org - March 24 2015
The euro area’s political contract requires member nations to rely principally on their own resources when confronted with severe economic distress. Since monetary policy is the same for all, national fiscal austerity is the default response to counter national fiscal stress. Moreover, the monetary policy was itself stodgy in countering the crisis, and banking-sector problems were allowed to fester. And it was considered inappropriate to impose losses on private sector creditors. Thus, the nature of the incomplete monetary union and the self-imposed taboos led deep and persistent fiscal austerity to become the norm. As a consequence, growth was hurt, which undermined the primary objective of lowering the debt burden. To prevent a meltdown, distressed nations were given official loans to repay private creditors. But the stress and instability continued and soon it became necessary to ease the repayment terms on official loans. When even that proved insufficient, the German-inspired fiscal austerity was combined with the deep pockets of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s safety net for insolvent or near-insolvent banks and sovereigns, in effect, substituted for the absent fiscal union and drew the central bank into the political process. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  Great_Recession  Eurozone  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  austerity  ECB  banking  financial_system-government_back-stop  financial_crisis  too-big-to-fail  creditors  sovereign_debt  financial_regulation  capital_adequacy  capitalization  bailouts  bail-ins  debt-restructuring  debt  debt_crisis  debt-seniority  deleverage  political_economy  EU_governance  monetary_union  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Nick Bunker - Mortgage fraud, income growth, and credit supply | Feb 11, 2015 - Washington Center for Equitable Growth
Earlier this year, a new working paper cast doubt on one of the dominant explanations of the reasons for the 2002-2006 housing bubble in the United States—that growth in mortgage credit and income growth uncoupled as credit flowed to areas to with declining income growth. Instead, economists Manuel Adelino of Duke University, Antoinette Schoar of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Felipe Severino of Dartmouth College, argue that the cause of the increase on household debt was a classic speculative mania. But a new paper by economists Atif Mian of Princeton University and Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago questions this view of the debt build-up. The seeming flaws in the dominant narrative that an increase in the supply of credit caused the bubble, they say, can be explained by one thing: mortgage fraud. -- Bunker links to both papers - didn't download but will follow debate via "House of Debt" blog
paper  21stC  US_economy  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  housing  securitization  capital_markets  mortgages  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  asset_prices  bubbles  fraud  GSEs  bankruptcy  debt  investors  yield  risk  credit  rating_agencies  credit_ratings  speculative_finance  EF-add  from instapaper
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Eva Botella-Ordinas - La démocratie directe de la Puerta del Sol | La Vie des idées - May 2011
This article written within a week of the events in Spain, with a focus on the debates on the left in Spain re what a "republicanism" entails. Another article at the same time focused more on the history of democracy and various forms of political participation in Spain from the Early Modern era onwards. The follow up in the Fall of 2011 was a series of articles covering political philosophy, political sociology of social movements and more discussion of the history of democracy in Spain, including a response to this analysis of flavors of republicanism by José Luis Martí and Félix Ovejero (mentioned in this article) and another article by Botella-Ordinas with 2 other historians. -- Pourquoi les Espagnols se mobilisent-ils en occupant les places des grandes villes ? Dans ce texte écrit sur le vif, une historienne de la pensée politique ouvre le débat. Elle montre que le mouvement du 15M s’appuie sur l’expérience de pratiques démocratiques autonomes mises en place par les centres sociaux autogérés. Elle signale aussi le fossé grandissant, au sein de la gauche espagnole, entre deux visions du républicanisme et de la participation démocratique. -- Ce texte est précédé d’une chronique écrite par un autre historien de l’Université Autonome de Madrid, Juan Luis Simal, qui permet de replacer les événements de la semaine dernière dans leur contexte. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  political_philosophy  republicanism  Spain  21stC  socialism  parties  social_movements  democracy  democracy_deficit  political_participation  Pettit  Great_Recession  austerity  1-percent  Eurozone  international_finance  political  economy  institutions  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Adelino, Schoar, and Severino - Changes in Buyer Composition and the Expansion of Credit During the Boom :: SSRN - Jan 2015
Manuel Adelino, Duke University, Fuqua School of Business -- Antoinette Schoar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- Felipe Severino, Dartmouth College,Tuck School of Business -- Earlier research has suggested that distortions in the supply of mortgage credit during the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, in particular a decoupling of credit flow from income growth, may have been responsible for the rise in house prices and the subsequent collapse of the housing market. Focusing on individual mortgage transactions rather than whole zip codes, we show that the apparent decoupling of credit from income shown in previous research was driven by changes in buyer composition. In fact, the relationship between individual mortgage size and income growth during the housing boom was very similar to previous periods (..). Zip codes that had large house price increases experienced significant changes in the composition of buyers, i.e. home buyers (mortgage applicants) had increasingly higher income than the average residents in an area. Poorer areas saw an expansion of credit mostly through the extensive margin, i.e. a larger numbers of mortgages originated, but at DTI levels in line with borrower income. When we break out the volume of mortgage origination from 2002 to 2006 by income deciles across the US population, we see that the distribution of mortgage debt is concentrated in middle and high income borrowers, not the poor. Middle and high income borrowers also contributed most significantly to the increase in defaults after 2007. These results are consistent with an interpretation where house price expectations led lenders and buyers to buy into an unfolding bubble based on inflated asset values, rather than a change in the lending technology. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  housing  securitization  capital_markets  mortgages  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  asset_prices  bubbles  bad_economics  bad_history  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Roger Farmer - Secular stagnation: a neo-paleo-Keynesian perspective - Jan 2015
Farmer distinguishes Alvin Hansen's 1938 (pre Samuelson synthesis) theory of secular stagnation as equilibrium of high unemployment from confused way it's been used since Summers reintroduced the term -/ "Contemporary accounts of secular stagnation, beginning with Larry Summers, confound two distinct ideas. The first, and this is Hansen’s meaning, is that a market economy, in the absence of counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies, may experience prolonged periods of high involuntary unemployment. The second, is that a market economy may experience a period of depressed productivity growth." -- Farmer diesn't see any clear evidence of downward shift in productivity - rate if GNP growth seems within pre-crisis pattern, but crisis produced a major drop in *lecel* of GNP, leaving a huge output gap that suggests the risk of a long-term higher unemployment level along the lines of Hansen's meaning.
unemployment  economic_theory  20thc  economic_growth  great_recession  21stc  secular  stagnation  economic_history  GNP  monetarism 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - Comment on Eberly and Krishnamurthy: Efficient Credit Policies in a Housing Debt Crisis - Jan 2015
On a Brookings study (pdf link) & panel re foreclosure crisis & housing construction way below pre-bubble trend & population growth -- The single-family housing credit channel has not been restored to its old status. Is this a good finance pattern? Was the previous pattern a poor idea in the first place? Or is the country now incurring enormous societal welfare losses due to the Obama administration's failure to use its administrative powers to fix the housing-finance credit channel?
US_economy  financial_system  Great_Recession  housing  banking  securitization  financial_crisis  GSEs  Obama_administration 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - Yes, the Past Four Years Are Powerful Evidence for the Keynesian View of What Happens at the Zero Lower Bound. Why Do You Ask?: Daily Focus Jan 6 2015
Quotes Krugman post re austerity impact since 2010 - "Annual data on the growth of real GDP and of government purchases from Eurostat…. 33 countries for 4 years, 132 observations…. Does this picture make you think that Keynesian economics is nonsense?… The raw observations are consistent with the view that in depressed economies, cutting government spending hurts growth." - DeLong adds what multipliers look like as well as how ridiculous the reverse-causation argument (falling GNP -> reduced gov't spending) would look with the Eurostat data - saved to Pocket
GNP  UK_economy  21stC  Eurozone  economic_growth  stats  economic_theory  Great_Recession  keynesian  fiscal  policy  economic_history  austerity  us_economy  Krugman  Pocket 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Simon Wren-Lewis - The Eurozone Scandal - Jan 2015
EZ output gap produced by austrrity fiscal policy equivalent to wasting entire EU annual budget, and quoting Ashok Mody, ECB's effective monetary policy is in fact extraordinarily tight given failire to pursue QE -- But if countercyclical fiscal policy is effectively illegal in the Eurozone, these objections do not apply. QE for the people may have additional legal merits within the Eurozone. The ECB is constrained to some (uncertain) extent in its ability to buy government debt. But, as John Muellbauer suggests, mailing a cheque to every EZ citizen using electoral registers would seem to circumvent these legal difficulties. One objection to the ECB embarking on ‘QE for the people’ is that it goes well beyond the remit of a central bank. [3] Yet the ECB appears to have no qualms on that score: besides routine references for the need for fiscal consolidation and ‘structural reform’, the letter discussed by Paul De Grauwe here shows the ECB requiring detailed changes to labour market regulations and institutions in Spain. So you have to ask why is it OK for the central bank to override the democratic process in this way, but giving money directly to the people is somehow beyond the pale.
Eurozone  austerity  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  ECB  QE  Great_Recession 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Eric Rauchway, review - Martin Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks (2014) | TLS Jan 2015
... his analysis, which holds that we knew how to avoid, counter and cure these troubles; we have simply – largely out of wilful ignorance and lack of courage – failed to do more than the barest minimum of what was necessary. Governments, banks and international institutions did “just enough, almost too late” to prevent the worst possible result, which would have been a note-for-note replay of the 1930s including a slide into fascism and world war. But having done no more than avoid world-historic catastrophe, we find ourselves mired in a dim morass of our own making, with no sunlit uplands in sight. Wolf offers a persuasive account that is also clear, though he relies on no single factor but several: hence the title of the book. It took both long-term shifts and a series of shocks to cause a crisis of such magnitude. Our world was born in the end of the Cold War. With capitalism triumphant, the victors liberalized their economies and so did the Communist nations, particularly China. Yet all was not well in this brave new world; international finance and trade threatened the stability of smaller, emerging economies, as the crises of the 1990s demonstrated.
financialization  bad_history  shadow  banking  Pocket  risk  global  economy  money  markets  global_imbalance  keynesian  business_influence  bad_economics  books  financial_regulation  liquidity  deregulation  minsky  investment  economic_growth  reviews  fed  Bank_of_England  great_recession  us_politics  leverage  capital_flows  race-to-the-bottom  business  ethics  political_economy  ecb  rents  uk  central_banks  investors  financial  crisis  financial_system  austerity  capital  economic_theory  us_economy  eurozone 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Monetary Policy: A Lesson Learned
Nice potted comparison of Fed inaction in 1930s vs recent agressive QE --The post-crisis actions of the Fed and responses of the banks have a very important implication. Quite a few observers argued that a massive increase in reserves would lead to an uncontrolled inflation. Had the money multiplier in the bottom chart been stable, they would have been right. However, when a financial crisis impairs the banking system, reserve increases do not translate into money creation, so they are not inflationary. In fact, as the experience of the 1930s taught us, in the absence of aggressive actions by the Federal Reserve, the financial crisis probably would have led to deflation and a second Great Depression.
economic_history  Great_Depression  Great_Recession  monetary_policy  Fed  QE  US_economy 
december 2014 by dunnettreader
It's the leverage, stupid!
Minsky cycles have always applied especially to real estate due to the long time lags. These guys show how it was key for Great Recession. -- All of this leads us to draw two simple conclusions. First, investors and regulators need to be on the lookout for leverage; that’s the biggest villain. In the United States and many other countries, mortgage borrowing has been at the heart of financial instability, and it may be so again in the future. But we should not be lulled into a sense of security just because banks’ real estate exposure has declined. If leverage starts rising in real estate or elsewhere – on or off balance sheet – then we should be paying attention.
Great_Recession  financial_crisis  leverage  banking  NBFI  shadow_banking  financial_regulation 
december 2014 by dunnettreader
David Fiderer - Guest Post: A Review of Fragile By Design | Next New Deal - Nov 2014
There’s only one reason why The Big Lie seemed so plausible to so many people. The polite word for it is social stereotyping. -- Calomiris and Haber write “At the core of this bargain was a coalition of two very unlikely partners: rapidly growing megabanks and activist groups that promoted expansion of risky mortgage lending to poor and intercity borrowers, such as the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN).” They reference ACORN 11 times. -- And the GSEs did hold about $225 billion of the most senior tranches of private mortgage securities. Court filings and settlements indicate that most of the losses were caused by fraud -- When the GSEs were taken over by the government in September 2008, Fannie’s serious delinquency rate was 1.36%, well below levels seen in the mid-1980s. And Freddie’s serious delinquency rate, 0.93%, was lower than the lowest national average ever recorded by the Mrtg Bnkrs Assoc. According to the MBA, the nationwide serious delinquency rate as of June 30, 2008 was 4.5% For subprime mortgages it was almost 18% -- The irony is rich. This private label securitization system was built over decades, and at every step of the expansion of this predatory and abusive lending system conservative economists were there lending support. Calomiris in particular was an active participant, fighting against any prohibition against single premium credit insurance, opposing prohibitions on loans based on housing collateral that disregarded a borrower’s ability to repay, and writing in 1999 that 125 percent LTV lending was no big deal.
books  reviews  kindle-available  economic_history  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  housing  banking  securitization  GSEs  right-wing  bad_economics  bad_history  capital_markets  shadow_banking  NBFI  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Home - Path to Full Employment | Project of Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
For most of the last few decades, the U.S. labor market has operated with considerable slack. Periods of full employment have been the exception, not the rule. In response, Jared Bernstein, Senior Fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and previously Vice President Biden’s chief economic adviser, and the Center have begun a multiyear project to focus greater attention on the goal of reaching full employment and develop policy ideas to achieve this critical goal. To learn more about the project, visit our events page to watch our April 2 kick-off event at the National Press Club. To read a set of papers on policy ideas to get back to full employment, go to our papers’ page (this event was made possible thanks to a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation). -- Launched with big event and clutch of papers in April 2014 -- downloaded to Note pdf of Jared Bernstein's project overview paper -- as of October 2014 no new activity
US_economy  US_government  US_society  US_politics  Congress  Great_Recession  inequality  unemployment  labor  labor_law  labor_share  wages  wages-minimum  labor_standards  fiscal_policy  state_government  infrastructure  investment  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - LSE Public Event: Can Capitalists Afford Recovery? -- Video and Paper (May 2014) | bnarchives
Presentation at the LSE Department of International Relations. 27 May 2014. -- Theorists and policymakers from all directions and of all persuasions remain obsessed with the prospect of recovery. For mainstream economists, the key question is how to bring about such a recovery. For heterodox political economists, the main issue is whether sustained growth is possible to start with. But there is a prior question that nobody seems to ask: can capitalists afford recovery in the first place? If we think of capital not as means of production but as a mode of power, we find that accumulation thrives not on growth and investment, but on unemployment and stagnation. And if accumulation depends on crisis, why should capitalists want to see a recovery? -- Video duration: 2:24 hours -- Keywords: crisis, differential accumulation, economic policy, economic theory, expectations, growth, income distribution, Keynesianism, Marxism, monetarism, neoclassical economics, profit, underconsumption -- Subjects: BN State & Government, BN Power, BN Region - North America, BN Business Enterprise, BN Value & Price, BN Crisis, BN Production, BN Macro, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Money & Finance, BN Ideology, BN Distribution, BN Methodology, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Policy, BN Class, BN Labour, BN Growth -- links to LSE on YouTube -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  video  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  economic_growth  capital_as_power  capitalism-systemic_crisis  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  monetarism  monetary_policy  fiscal_policy  austerity  sovereign_debt  public_finance  public_policy  productivity  production  consumer_demand  underconsumption  investment  profit  productivity-labor_share  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  finance_capital  financialization  capitalization  accumulation  accumulation-differential  elites-self-destructive  elite_culture  ruling_class  class_conflict  Labor_markets  inequality  unemployment 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Bichler, Shimshon and Nitzan, Jonathan - The Asymptotes of Power - Real-World Economics Review. No. 60. June 2012. pp. 18-53 | bnarchives
Article workup of earlier conference paper -- This is the latest in a series of articles we have been writing on the current crisis. The purpose of our previous papers was to characterize the crisis. We claimed that it was a 'systemic crisis', and that capitalists were gripped by 'systemic fear'. In this article, we seek to explain why. The problem that capitalists face today, we argue, is not that their power has withered, but, on the contrary, that their power has increased. Indeed, not only has their power increased, it has increased by so much that it might be approaching its asymptote. And since capitalists look not backward to the past but forward to the future, they have good reason to fear that, from now on, the most likely trajectory of this power will be not up, but down. The paper begins by setting up our general framework and key concepts. It continues with a step-by-step deconstruction of key power processes in the United States, attempting to assess how close these processes are to their asymptotes. And it concludes with brief observations about what may lie ahead. -- Keywords: capitalization distribution power, systemic crisis -- Subjects: BN Money & Finance, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Distribution, BN Resistance, BN Power, BN Region - North America, BN Business Enterprise, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Value & Price, BN Class, BN Crisis -- downloaded pdf to Note, also Excel data sheet
article  international_political_economy  capital_as_power  financial_system  international_finance  global_economy  global_system  ruling_class  transnational_elites  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  globalization  power-asymmetric  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  finance_capital  financialization  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  profit  labor_share  risk-systemic  inequality  plutocracy  1-percent  conflict  violence  class_conflict  neoliberalism  corporate_citizenship  systems-complex_adaptive  systems_theory  grassroots  opposition  democracy  democracy_deficit  accumulation  capitalization  US_politics  US_economy  political_economy  political_culture  economic_culture  elites  rebellion  failed_states  property_rights  business-and-politics  business-norms  economic_growth  fear  data  capitalism-systemic_crisis  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Sunanda Sen - The Meltdown of the Global Economy: A Keynes-Minsky Episode? - Working Paper No. 623 | Levy Economics Institute | September 2010
The paper begins with some theoretical concerns relating to factors that could trigger a crisis similar to the global economic crisis that began in 2008. The first concern relates to the deregulated financial institutions and the growing uncertainty that can be witnessed in these liberalized financial markets. The second relates to financial engineering with innovations in these markets, simultaneously providing cushions against risks while generating flows of liquidity that remain beyond the conventional sources of bank credit. Interpreting the role of uncertainty, one can observe the connections between investment and finance, both of which are subject to changes in the state of expectations. The initial formulation can be traced back to Keynes’s General Theory, where liquidity preference is linked to asset prices and new investments. The Keynesian analysis was reformulated in 1986 by Minsky, who introduced the possibility of sourcing external finance through debt, which further adds to the impact of uncertainty. Minsky’s characterization of deregulated financial markets considers the newfangled sources of nonbank credit, especially with the involvement of banks in the securities market under the universal banking model. As for the institutional arrangements that provide for profits on transactions, financial assets bought and sold in the primary market as initial public offerings of stocks are usually transacted later, in the secondary market, where these are no longer backed by physical assets.In the upswing, finance creates a myriad of financial claims and liabilities, and thus becomes increasingly remote from the real economy, while innovations to hedge and insulate assets continue to proliferate in the financial market, especially in the presence of uncertainty. The paper looks especially at the US. This is appended by a stylized account of the turn of events in terms of a theoretical model that highlights the role of uncertainty in the process. -- Associated Program: Monetary Policy and Financial Structure -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  financial_crisis  bubbles  Great_Recession  financial_system  finance_capital  financialization  financial_innovation  banking  financial_regulation  derivatives  risk  risk-systemic  uncertainty  expectations  capital_markets  NBFI  intermediation  speculative_finance  securitization  Glass-Steagal  investment  investors  asset_management  real_economy  real_estate  Keynes  liquidity  Minsky  credit  debt  deleverage  leverage  asset_prices  banking-universal  disintermediation  money_market  Ponzi_finance  IPOs  secondary_markets  fragility  resilience  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Gary A. Dymski, Jesus Hernandez, and Lisa Mohanty - Race, Power, and the Subprime/Foreclosure Crisis: A Mesoanalysis - Working Paper No. 669 | Levy Economics Institute - May 2011
Economists’ principal explanations of the subprime crisis differ from those developed by noneconomists in that the latter see it as rooted in the US legacy of racial/ethnic inequality, and especially in racial residential segregation, whereas the former ignore race. This paper traces this disjuncture to two sources. What is missing in the social science view is any attention to the market mechanisms involved in subprime lending; and economists, on their side, have drawn too tight a boundary for “the economic,” focusing on market mechanisms per se,to the exclusion of the households and community whose resources and outcomes these mechanisms affect. Economists’ extensive empirical studies of racial redlining and discrimination in credit markets have, ironically, had the effect of making race analytically invisible. Because of these explanatory lacunae, two defining aspects of the subprime crisis have not been well explained. First, why were borrowers that had previously been excluded from equal access to mortgage credit instead super included in subprime lending? Second, why didn’t the flood of mortgage brokers that accompanied the 2000s housing boom reduce the proportion of minority borrowers who were burdened with costly and ultimately unpayable mortgages? This paper develops a mesoanalysis to answer the first of these questions. This analysis traces the coevolution of banking strategies and client communities, shaped by and reinforcing patterns of racial/ethnic inequality. The second question is answered by showing how unequal power relations impacted patterns of subprime lending. Consequences for gender inequality in credit markets are also briefly discussed. -- Associated Program: Monetary Policy and Financial Structure -- Related Topic(s): Discrimination Ethnicity Foreclosures Mesoanalysis Race Redlining Subprime mortgage crisis -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  US_economy  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  bubbles  housing  securitization  banking  shadow_banking  racism  inequality  power-asymmetric  discrimination  ethnic_ID  redlining  financial_economics  social_sciences  interdisciplinarity  financial_access  downloaded 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Dave Johnson - The Cost To Our Economy From Republican Obstruction And Sabotage | Campaign for America's Future - September 2014
After listing key filibusters -- What would it have meant for the economy and jobs to launch a post-stimulus effort to maintain and modernize our infrastructure? How about reversing the tax structure that pays companies to move jobs out of the country? How about equal pay for women? How about a minimum wage increase? How about hundreds of thousands of teachers and first responders going back to work? How about being able to organize into unions to fight for wages, benefits and safer working conditions? How about relief from crushing student loan debt? -- In the House GOP leadership has been following the “Hastert Rule” to obstruct bills that would win with a majority vote. -- So instead of looking at what has been blocked in the House, we should look at what has passed. What has passed is a record of economic sabotage. Noteworthy is the GOP “Path to Prosperity Budget” (“Ryan budget”), described as “Cuts spending & implements pro-growth reforms that boost job creation.” It dramatically cuts taxes on the rich. It privatizes Medicare. It cuts spending on infrastructure, health care for the poor, education, research, public-safety, and low-income programs. It turns Medicaid, food stamps, and other poverty programs into state block grants. And lo and behold, this GOP budget that passed the House cuts taxes and cuts funding for even maintaining – never mind modernizing – our vital infrastructure needs. This is a budget of economic sabotage. Other GOP House “jobs” bills, listed at Boehner’s “jobs” page include: -- horrifyingly awful policies with Orwellian titles or red meat specials -- special attention to keeping oil & gas subsidies flowing and eviserating regulation, especially EPA -- Johnson stresses, the voters are unaware of all this thanks in part to the MSM which is ballanced re political parties, pro business & anti labor, and guilty of mindlessly peddling what Wren-Lewis calls mediamacro. Good links
US_economy  US_politics  Congress  Great_Recession  GOP  unemployment  public_finance  public_goods  state_government  welfare  social_insurance  poverty  infrastructure  Obama_administration  health_care  women-rights  women-work  wages  fiscal_policy  fiscal_drag  taxes  1-percent  energy  climate  regulation-environment  R&D  Senate  House_of_Representatives  polarization  student_debt  education-finance  education-privatization  corporate_tax  labor_law  unions  trickle-down 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Michael T. Kiley - An Evaluation of the Inflationary Pressure Associated with Short- and Long-term Unemployment - FEDS 2014-28 | Federal Reserve Board
Abstract: In the years following 2009, long-term unemployment has been very elevated while inflation has fallen only moderately, raising the question of whether the long-term unemployed exert less downward pressure on prices than the short-term unemployed, perhaps because such potential workers are disconnected from the labor market. However, empirical evidence is mixed. This analysis demonstrates that the typical approach, using national data, is incapable of discriminating the inflationary pressure exerted by short and long-term unemployment because the series are highly correlated, making inference difficult given the short-span of data used in Phillips-curve estimation. However, application of more data, through the use of regional variation, can discriminate the independent influences of short-and long-term unemployment on price inflation. We present a model illustrating these issues and apply the model to data for U.S. metropolitan regions. We find that that short- and long-term unemployment exert equal downward pressure on price inflation. -- Keywords: Short-term unemployment, phillips curve -- didn't download
US_economy  Great_Recession  unemployment  inflation  prices  wages  macroeconomics  economic_models  statistics  Phillips_curve 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Cassandra Does Tokyo: Sympathy For The Devil -July 2014
Brilliantly horrifying mock CV of a senior executive moving through all the financial ibdustry's greatest "hits" of the past quarter century, starting with Citibank generating loan deals in the NICs to recycle pétrodollars, through Drexel stuffing LBO junk bonds in related fiduciaries, Long Term Capital, dot com bubble, commodity "swaps" as low risk uncorrelated asset class, of course mortgage securitization, HFT "liquidity provision" via order sniffing, front running, dark pools, selective "market making", and designing equity portfolio insurance for post crash terrified institutional investors (who would lose the entire upside of past 5 years stock prices, plus a few ywists, especially from the '90s involving derivatives, the Nikkei, etc that were off my radar screen. Only thing I think he left out were the various municipal finance scams.
20thC  post-Cold_War  21stC  economic_history  financialization  Great_Recession  financial_innovation  bubbles  busisness-ethics  institutional_investors  derivatives  securitization  HFT  emerging_markets  fraud  fiduciaries  financial_regulation  finance_capital 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Joseph E. Stiglitz - Reconstructing Macroeconomic Theory to Manage Economic Policy | NBER - September 2014
Macroeconomics has not done well in recent years: The standard models didn't predict the Great Recession; and even said it couldn't happen. After the bubble burst, the models did not predict the full consequences. The paper traces the failures to the attempts, beginning in the 1970s, to reconcile macro and microeconomics, by making the former adopt the standard competitive micro-models that were under attack even then, from theories of imperfect and asymmetric information, game theory, and behavioral economics. The paper argues that any theory of deep downturns has to answer these questions: What is the source of the disturbances? Why do seemingly small shocks have such large effects? Why do deep downturns last so long? Why is there such persistence, when we have the same human, physical, and natural resources today as we had before the crisis? The paper presents a variety of hypotheses which provide answers to these questions, and argues that models based on these alternative assumptions have markedly different policy implications, including large multipliers. It explains why the apparent liquidity trap today is markedly different from that envisioned by Keynes in the Great Depression, and why the Zero Lower Bound is not the central impediment to the effectiveness of monetary policy in restoring the economy to full employment. -- paywall
paper  paywall  macroeconomics  microfoundations  economic_theory  economic_models  Great_Recession  monetary_policy  Keynes  liquidity  fiscal_policy  Stiglitz 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Developing a Narrative: The Great Recession and Its Aftermath (Part 3 of 5) | Liberty Street Economics - September 24, 2014
Andrea Tambalotti and Argia Sbordone -- This series examines the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (FRBNY DSGE) model—a structural model used by Bank researchers to understand the workings of the U.S. economy and provide economic forecasts. -- Astonishing - exclusively supply side - especially initial hit to TFP which, however, they say has recovered. Demand impacts are exclusively investment demand, which they see as dampened by credit channel frictions (banks scared of risk) and the exclusive policy response discussed is Fed policy. No stimulus, no fiscal drag especially in the states, no unemployment, no consumer declining wealth, no exchange rates -- WTF?!?!?!
US_economy  Great_Recession  macroeconomics  modelling  supply-side  demand-side  investment  monetary_policy  fiscal_policy 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
An Assessment of the FRBNY DSGE Model's Real-Time Forecasts, 2010-13 (Part 4 of 5) | Liberty Street Economics - September 25, 2014
Matthew Cocci, Marco Del Negro, Stefano Eusepi, Marc Giannoni, and Sara Shahanaghi -- This series examines the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model—a structural model used by Bank researchers to understand the workings of the U.S. economy and provide economic forecasts. In predicting output growth, the model’s forecasts have been comparable to, if not better than, the median Survey of Professional Forecasters forecasts. To some extent, the SPF has been too sanguine about growth, especially in the medium-long term, as professional forecasters have repeatedly anticipated a strong recovery in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Conversely, the DSGE model has been consistently predicting a very slow recovery following the financial shock. As a consequence, for each of the years considered, the SPF produced overly optimistic growth forecasts, which, as time passed and more information was accumulated, declined to where the DSGE model had been all along. (Bear in mind that some of the misses reflect the comprehensive revisions of the national income and product accounts data.) The model’s forecasts of continued weak growth reflect financial headwinds that have lasted well past the end of the recession. These headwinds stem from the high perceived riskiness of borrowers—a credit friction that disrupts financial intermediation—and the low perceived return on physical investment, as described in more detail in the previous post in this series. Overall, the DSGE model has historically performed as well as—if not better than—consensus forecasters in predicting macroeconomic trends. Continual refinement of the model specification has helped account for the effects of credit frictions and changes in the perceived risks in the economy as drivers of the Great Recession, enabling the model to predict a slow recovery much earlier than the median SPF forecaster.
US_economy  economic_history  macroeconomics  Great_Recession  modelling  economic_growth  financial_crisis  financial_system  credit  intermediation  financial_economics 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Long-term unemployed struggle as economy improves, Rutgers study finds - September 2014
National survey: 20 percent of workers laid off 5 years are still unemployed, seeking jobs – While the unemployment rate for people out of work for six months or less has returned to prerecession levels, the levels of unemployment for workers who remain jobless for more than six months is among the most persistent, negative effects of the Great Recession, according to a new national study at Rutgers. In fact, one in five workers laid off from a job during the last five years are still unemployed and looking for work, researchers from the John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development found. "While the worst effects of the Great Recession are over for most Americans, the brutal realities of diminished living standards endure for the three million American workers who remain jobless years after they were laid off," said Professor and Heldrich Center Director Carl Van Horn, who co-authored the study with Professor Cliff Zukin of Rutgers' Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy. "These long-term unemployed workers have been left behind to fend for themselves as they struggle to pull their lives back together."
US_economy  Great_Recession  unemployment  mobility  inequality 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
EU to DO 2015-2019: Memos to the new EU leadership | André Sapir, Guntram B. Wolff, Zsolt Darvas, Silvia Merler, Nicolas Véron, Mario Mariniello, Carlo Altomonte, Reinhilde Veugelers, Rainer Münz, Suparna Karmakar, Georg Zachmann and Jim O‘Neill at B
‘THERE IS NOW A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY that this crisis will be remembered as the occasion when Europe irretrievably lost ground, both economically and politically’. This was the starting sentence of our memos to the new EU leadership five years ago. Five years later, it is fair to say that this possibility has become a reality. Unemployment has reached record levels and growth has disappointed. Meanwhile, the world outside the EU has continued to change rapidly. Emerging markets in particular have increased their weight in the global economy and in decision making. The new EU leadership – the president of the European Commission and his team of commissioners, and the presidents of the European Council and of the European Parliament – will have to address pressing challenges. Despite the significant steps taken by Europe – among them the creation of a European Stability Mechanism, the start of a banking union, the strengthening of fiscal rules and substantial structural reforms in crisis countries – results for citizens are still unsatisfactory. It is impossible to summarise all the memos in this volume but a common theme is the need to focus on pro-growth policies, on a deepening of the single market, on better and more global trade integration. Reverting to national protectionism, more state aid for national or European champions – as frequently argued for by national politicians – will not be the right way out of the crisis. On the contrary, more Europe and deeper economic integration in some crucial areas, such as energy, capital markets and the digital economy, would greatly support the feeble recovery. But in other areas, less Europe would also be a highly welcome signal that the new European leadership is serious about subsidiarity. Internal re-organisation of the European Commission to ensure that it better delivers would also be welcome. -- downloaded pdf to Note
report  EU  Eurozone  Great_Recession  economic_growth  unemployment  capital_markets  energy  financial_regulation  banking  sovereign_debt  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Capitalist Revolutionary — Roger E. Backhouse, Bradley W. Bateman | Harvard University Press
The Great Recession of 2008 restored John Maynard Keynes to prominence. After decades when the Keynesian revolution seemed to have been forgotten, the great British theorist was suddenly everywhere. The NYT asked, “What would Keynes have done?” The FT wrote of “the undeniable shift to Keynes.” Le Monde pronounced the economic collapse Keynes’s “revenge.” Two years later, following bank bailouts and Tea Party fundamentalism, Keynesian principles once again seemed misguided or irrelevant to a public focused on ballooning budget deficits. In this readable account, Backhouse and Bateman elaborate the misinformation and caricature that have led to Keynes’s repeated resurrection and interment since his death in 1946. Keynes’s engagement with social and moral philosophy and his membership in the Bloomsbury Group of artists and writers helped to shape his manner of theorizing. Though trained as a mathematician, he designed models based on how specific kinds of people (such as investors and consumers) actually behave—an approach that runs counter to the idealized agents favored by economists at the end of the century. Keynes wanted to create a revolution in the way the world thought about economic problems, but he was more open-minded about capitalism than is commonly believed. He saw capitalism as essential to a society’s well-being but also morally flawed, and he sought a corrective for its main defect: the failure to stabilize investment. Keynes’s nuanced views, the authors suggest, offer an alternative to the polarized rhetoric often evoked by the word “capitalism” in today’s political debates.
books  kindle-available  intellectual_history  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  economic_theory  macroeconomics  Great_Depression  gold_standard  public_finance  unemployment  capitalism  moral_philosophy  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_reform  economic_policy  probability  behavioral_economics  microfoundations  neoclassical_economics  Keynes  Keynesianism  Great_Recession  investment 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Lance Taylor - Maynard's Revenge: The Collapse of Free Market Macroeconomics (2011) | Harvard University Press
Taylor argues that the ideas of J.M. Keynes and others provide a more useful framework both for understanding the crisis and for dealing with it effectively. Keynes’s basic points were fundamental uncertainty and the absence of Say’s Law. He set up machinery to analyze the macro economy under such circumstances, including the principle of effective demand, liquidity preference, different rules for determining commodity and asset prices, distinct behavioral patterns of different collective actors, and the importance of thinking in terms of complete macro accounting schemes. Economists working in this tradition also worked out growth and cycle models. Employing these ideas throughout Maynard’s Revenge, Taylor provides an analytical narrative about the causes of the crisis, and suggestions for dealing with it. 1. Macroeconomics. 2. Macroeconomic Thought during the Long 19thC. 3. Gold Standard, Reparations, Mania, Crash, and Depression. 4. Maynard Ascendant. 5. Keynesian Growth, Cycles, and Crisis. 6. The Counterrevolution. 7. Finance. 8. The International Dimension. 9. Keynesianism and the
books  intellectual_history  economic_theory  economic_history  economic_models  18thC  19thC  20thC  social_sciences-post-WWII  entre_deux_guerres  political_economy  macroeconomics  classical_economics  neoclassical_economics  Keynes  Keynesianism  Post-Keynesian  finance_capital  financial_economics  microfoundations  EMH  rational_expectations  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  behavioral_economics  business_cycles  Great_Depression  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  gold_standard  economic_growth  international_monetary_system  balance_of_payments  FX  uncertainty  liquidity  savings  Labor_markets  wages 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Coen Teulings, Richard Baldwin - Secular stagnation: Facts, causes, and cures – a new Vox eBook | vox 10 September 2014
The CEPR Press eBook on secular stagnation has been viewed over 80,000 times since it was published on 15 August 2014. -- Six years after the Crisis and the recovery is still anaemic despite years of zero interest rates. Is ‘secular stagnation’ to blame? Introduction - Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin **--** I. Opening the debate -- 1. Reflections on the ‘New Secular Stagnation Hypothesis’, Laurence H Summers. **--** II. Three issues: Potential growth, effective demand, and sclerosis -- 2. Secular stagnation: A review of the issues, Barry Eichengreen -- 3. The turtle’s progress: Secular stagnation meets the headwinds, Robert J Gordon -- 4 Four observations on secular stagnation, Paul Krugman. -- 5. Secular joblessness, Edward L Glaeser. **--** III. Further on potential growth. -- 6. Secular stagnation? Not in your life - Joel Mokyr. -- 7 Secular stagnation: US hypochondria, European disease?, Nicholas Crafts. **--** IV. Further on effective demand. -- 8. A prolonged period of low real interest rates?, Olivier Blanchard, Davide Furceri and Andrea Pescatori. -- 9. On the role of safe asset shortages in secular stagnation, Ricardo J Caballero and Emmanuel Farhi. -- 10. A model of secular stagnation, Gauti B. Eggertsson and Neil Mehrotra. -- 11. Balance sheet recession is the reason for secular stagnation, Richard C Koo. -- 12. Monetary policy cannot solve secular stagnation alone
Guntram B Wolff. **--** V. Further on sclerosis -- 13. Secular stagnation: A view from the Eurozone, Juan F. Jimeno, Frank Smets and Jonathan Yiangou -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  kindle-available  economic_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  economic_theory  economic_growth  Great_Recession  stagnation  international_political_economy  capitalism  financialization  productivity  investment  technology  Labor_markets  unemployment  demand-side  supply-side  infrastructure  welfare_state  sovereign_debt  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  central_banks  leverage  risk  uncertainty  macroeconomics  macroprudential_policies  international_monetary_system  global_economy  global_imbalance  interest_rates  profit  wages  Eurozone  US_economy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Joshua Aizenman, Yin-Wong Cheung , Hiro Ito International reserves before and after the Global Crisis: Is there no end to hoarding? | vox 13 September 2014
CIn the aftermath of the global financial crisis new patterns of reserve hoarding have emerged. This column identifies structural changes in international reserve accumulation. Emerging markets with higher savings rates tend to use higher buffers of reserves, partially accounting for the higher levels of reserves in east Asia compared to Latin America. While there is no end in sight for reserve hoarding, some of the newly identified factors may mitigate eventual reserve accumulation.
international_political_economy  international_monetary_system  balance_of_payments  FX  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  emerging_markets  central_banks  China 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
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