dunnettreader + great_divergence   52

Blaydes
We document a divergence in the duration of rule for monarchs in Western Europe and the Islamic world beginning in the medieval period. While leadership tenures in the two regions were similar in the 8th century, Christian kings became increasingly long lived compared to Muslim sultans. We argue that forms of executive constraint that emerged under feudal institutions in Western Europe were associated with increased political stability and find empirical support for this argument. While feudal institutions served as the basis for military recruitment by European monarchs, Muslim sultans relied on mamlukism—or the use of military slaves imported from non-Muslim lands. Dependence on mamluk armies limited the bargaining strength of local notables vis-à-vis the sultan, hindering the development of a productively adversarial relationship between ruler and local elites. We argue that Muslim societies' reliance on mamluks, rather than local elites, as the basis for military leadership, may explain why the Glorious Revolution occurred in England, not Egypt. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
governance-participation  Sultans  Islamic_empires  Europe  military_history  medieval_history  political_participation  article  political_history  political_culture  feudalism  militarization-society  Mamluks  bibliography  Europe-Medieval  monarchy  Great_Divergence  governing_class  government-forms  elites-political_influence  downloaded  state-building  jstor 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Dietrich Vollrath - The Early Transformation of Britain's Economy | Growth Economics
On Wallis et al WP - Structural Change in the British economy 1500-1800 - Your Bayesian prior on “the probability the Great Divergence had its origins prior to the Industrial Revolution” should get updated to a higher number. - These numbers are bad news if you have “Glorious Revolution” in the “monocausal origins of economic growth” office pool. The data reinforce the argument that the Glorious Revolution was as much a response to economic change, as it was a cause of economic change.Britain experiencing a structural change from 1550 to 1750 does not mean it was already experiencing sustained growth. The growth experienced in that period may well have been snuffed out by Malthusian forces of population growth in time. But perhaps that structural change helped bring on the changes in demographic behavior that allowed sustained growth to occur? This structural shift bleeds directly into the Industrial Revolution, which bleeds directly into the demographic shifts involved with sustained growth. Whether this implies a chain of causality is too much to make of this evidence. - downloaded paper to Tab S2
paper  Great_Divergence  16thC  17thC  18thC  British_history  economic_history  agriculture  economic_growth  Malthusian  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  downloaded 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Guillaume Calafat & Éric Monnet - Le retour de l’histoire économique ? - La Vie des idées - 5 janvier 2016
Le récent succès d’ouvrages d’histoire économique, alors même que cette spécialité paraît souvent négligée à l’université, ainsi que des évolutions disciplinaires simultanées, font espérer de nouveaux rapprochements entre l’histoire et l’économie. -- downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  economic_theory  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  trade  trade-cultural_transmission  networks-information  networks-business  development  sociology_of_knowledge  economic_sociology  economic_culture  econometrics  consumer_revolution  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
John Dunn, ed. - The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (1992) | Cambridge University Press
The central problem of modern government and political action is how to choose and implement effective economic policies. For this reason, the economic considerations of public policy have assumed a more prominent place in contemporary political thought. Despite efforts among political scientists, economists, and sociologists to fathom the complexities of this added dimension, none of these solid sciences offers a satisfying approach to the problem. This volume attempts to display the historical novelty and intellectual importance of this dilemma, to uncover its origins, and to procure a remedy through a clearer and steadier focus. The book's contributors range from historians of ideas to economic theorists, who bring the approach of their own intellectual discipline to bear upon the issue. **--** Introduction, John Dunn *-* 1. The economic limits to modern politics, John Dunn *-* 2. The wealth of one nation and the dynamics of international competition, Istvan Hont *-* 3. The political limits to pre-modern politics, J. G. A. Pocock *-* 4. The economic constraints on political programs, Frank H. Hahn *-* 5. International liberalism reconsidered, Robert O. Keohane *-* 6. Capitalism, socialism, and democracy: compatibilities and contradictions John Dunn. -- ebook Adobe Reader - not clear whether in kindle format -- excerpt (10 ogs Intro) downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle-available  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  intellectual_history  economic_history  political_history  political_philosophy  political_economy  judgment-political  public_policy  capitalism  competition-interstate  economic_growth  development  raison-d'-état  British_history  British_politics  British_Empire  trade  trade-policy  Great_Divergence  economic_theory  political_culture  economic_culture  macroeconomic_policy  Innovation  innovation-government_policy  collective_action  property_rights  Labor_markets  redistribution  fiscal_policy  fiscal-military_state  Davenant  Smith  social_order  social_democracy  liberalism  elites-political_influence  IR_theory  globalization  international_political_economy  public_finance  public_goods  class_conflict  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Bassino, Broadberry, Fukao, Gupta, and Takashima - Japan and the Great Divergence, 725 to 1874 | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 01 July 2015
Jean-Pascal Bassino, Stephen Broadberry, Kyoji Fukao, Bishnupriya Gupta, Masanori Takashima -- Japan was the first Asian nation to achieve modern economic growth. This column discusses new evidence suggesting that Japan’s growth started from a lower level than Britain’s and grew more slowly until the Meiji Restoration. The key to understanding modern economic growth seems to lie in identifying the forces that dampened growth reversals, rather than the forces responsible for growth itself. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  economic_growth  medieval_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  economic_theory  economic_sociology  Great_Divergence  Japan  development  UK_economy  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alan Jacobs - the three big stories of modernity | TextPatterns July 2015
So far there have been three widely influential stories about the rise of modernity: the Emancipatory, the Protestant, and the Neo-Thomist. (..) all these narrators of modernity see our own age as one in which the consequences of 500-year-old debates conducted by philosophers and theologians are still being played out. I think all of these narratives are wrong. They are wrong because they are the product of scholars in universities who overrate the historical importance and influence of other scholars in universities, and because they neglect ideas that connect more directly with the material world. All of these grands recits should be set aside, and they should not immediately be replaced with others, but with more particular, less sweeping, and more technologically-oriented stories. The technologies that Marshall McLuhan called "the extensions of Man" are infinitely more important for Man's story, for good and for ill, than the debates of the schoolmen and interpreters of the Bible. Instead of grand narratives of the emergence of The Modern we need something far more plural: technological histories of modernity.
Instapaper  cultural_history  cultural_capital  modernity  technology  Tech/Culture  social_theory  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  religious_history  Thomism-21stC  Reformation  Renaissance  Enlightenment  Enlightenment_Project  Enlightenment-ongoing  modernity-emergence  material_culture  economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  colonialism  Military_Revolution  Scientific_Revolution  consumer_revolution  technology-history  historiography  medicine  public_health  public_sphere  public_goods  media  print_culture  history_of_science  history_of_book  history-and-social_sciences  narrative  narrative-contested  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Hoffman, P.T.: Why Did Europe Conquer the World? (eBook and Hardcover).
Between 1492 and 1914, Europeans conquered 84% of the globe. But why did Europe rise to the top, when for centuries the Chinese, Japanese, Ottomans, and South Asians were far more advanced? Why didn’t these powers establish global dominance? ...distinguished economic historian Hoffman demonstrates that conventional explanations— eg geography, epidemic disease, and the Industrial Revolution—fail to provide answers. Arguing instead for the pivotal role of economic and political history, Hoffman shows that if variables had been at all different, Europe would not have achieved critical military innovations, and another power could have become master of the world. In vivid detail, he sheds light on the two millennia of economic, political, and historical changes that set European states on a distinctive path of development and military rivalry. Compared to their counterparts in China, Japan, South Asia, and the Middle East, European leaders—whether chiefs, lords, kings, emperors, or prime ministers—had radically different incentives, which drove them to make war. These incentives, which Hoffman explores using an economic model of political costs and financial resources, resulted in astonishingly rapid growth in Europe’s military sector from the Middle Ages on, and produced an insurmountable lead in gunpowder technology. The consequences determined which states established colonial empires or ran the slave trade, and even which economies were the first to industrialize. -- Professor of Business Economics and professor of history at CalTech. His books include Growth in a Traditional Society (PUP), Surviving Large Losses, and Priceless Markets. -- ebook and pbk not yet released --text 200 pgs, data, mideks in appendices ~35 pgs -- downloaded 1st chapter excerpt
books  kindle-available  Great_Divergence  economic_history  political_history  political_culture  military_history  technology  gunpowder  colonialism  imperialism  Europe  Europe-exceptionalism  Europe-Medieval  Europe-Early_Modern  incentives  wars-causes  war  Innovation  technology-adoption  historical_sociology  historical_change  balance_of_power  path-dependency  Tilly  Mann_Michael  state-building  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Joseph Adelson, review essay - What Caused Capitalism? | Foreign Affairs - May 2015
Once upon a time, smart people thought the world was flat. As globalization took off, economists pointed to spreading market forces that… Includes new Cambridge History of Capitalism, Mokyr Enlightened Economy, Acemoglu and Robinson Why Nations Fail, and Beckert Empire of Cotton -- contrasts tales that are, in broad brush, optimistic and internalist re origins (especially Mokyr) vs pessimistic and externalist (especially Cotton) -- copied to Instapaper
books  reviews  bookshelf  economic_history  capitalism  Great_Divergence  ancient_history  global_economy  global_history  global_system  Europe-Early_Modern  city_states  Italy  Spain  France  British_history  India  US_history  colonialism  imperialism  empires  institutional_economics  technology  development  Scientific_Revolution  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  industrial_policy  US_Civil_War  slavery  property  property_rights  mercantilism  mercantilism-violence  Instapaper  markets  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_growth  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert C. Allen - Progress and Poverty in Early Modern Europe | JSTOR - The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Aug., 2003) , pp. 403-443
An econometric model of economic development is estimated with data from leading European countries between 1300 and 1800. The model explores the impact of population, enclosure, empire, representative government, technology, and literacy on urbanization, agricultural productivity, proto-industry, and the real wage. Simulations show that the main factors leading to economic success in north-western Europe were the growth of American and Asian commerce and, especially, the innovations underlying the export of the new draperies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The enclosure of the open fields, representative government, and the spread of literacy did not play major roles. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  Europe-Early_Modern  Great_Divergence  North-Weingast  agrarian_capitalism  literacy  14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  British_Empire  Dutch  colonialism  trade  Asia  textiles  Innovation  agriculture  urbanization  wages  labor_history  manufacturing  productivity  export-led  Industrial_Revolution  proto-industry  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic: Can Black Death explain the Industrial Revolution? | globalinequality - Jan 11 2015
re presentation by a young scholar at Santa Fe suggesting that Why England (and Dutch) due to higher wages in Northern Europe post Black Death in contrast with South where non market repression or property arrangements were able to push adjustment costs inti agricultural workers without impact on wage rates. Milanovic compares with other theoretical approaches ie Pomerantz, Acemoglu & Robinson, Robert Allen etc. Link to 2007 paper by Pamuk Milanovic thinks may be 1st work to seriously look at differential impact of Black Death on northern & southern Europe as distinct from the common story if Western vs Central and Eastern Europe.
economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  Black_Death  North-Weingast  landowners  demography  economic_sociology  labor  agriculture  wages  productivity  colonialism  medieval  14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  institutional_economics  capital  capitalism  China  Japan  ancient_Rome  slavery  bibliography 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Black, review - Philip E. Tetlock; Richard Ned Lebow; Geoffrey Parker, eds. , Unmaking the West: 'What-If?' Scenarios That Rewrite World History | JSTOR: The International History Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 587-588
Black gives it high marks for (1) the introductory chapters that set up the issues and debates re use of counterfactuals and (2) the diversity of issue areas tackled, such as what if Europe hadn't adopted Christianity. Goldstone has a chapter framing William_III victory in the Glorious Revolution as critical turning point for industrial revolution, European political economy and Great Divergence. Carla Pestana has a brief contrary comment piece. Includes usual suspects like Victor Hanson and Joel Mokyr.
books  reviews  jstor  historiography  historical_sociology  historical_change  counterfactuals  contingency  Great_Divergence  North-Weingast  Industrial_Revolution  British_history  Western_civ  religious_culture  Christendom 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Matias Vernengo NAKED KEYNESIANISM: Manufacturing matters - Jan 2013
Chart of distribution of manufacturing capacity over the centuries pre and post Industrial Revolution from Robert Allen -- Note that the West, narrowly defined as England the rest of Western Europe, what was to become the US and Russia (called for the whole period USSR) had a share of less than 20% in 1750, it had expanded to more than 80% on the eve of WW-I. If you add Australia, Canada and Latin America (which are all in Rest of the World, but are what Maddison would call Western offshoots), the numbers are even larger. Most of the changes were associated to the squeeze of China. And most of the recent changes are associated with expansion of China and East Asia (which includes Japan). We have not gone full circle, by the way. In other words, the process of development (or indutrialization in the center) went hand in hand with the process of underdevelopment (deindustrialization) in the periphery, and old lesson from a little book by Osvaldo Sunkel which is still worth reading. [1972 study of Latin American development and underdevelopment from 1750, tracking exports, FDI etc]
economic_history  economic_theory  economic_growth  development  emerging_markets  Latin_America  Great_Divergence  China  India  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  manufacturing  exports  British_history  capitalism  18thC  19thC 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Matias Vernengo - NAKED KEYNESIANISM: Institutions, what institutions? - September 2014
Nice breakdown of theorists of causes of development and underdevelopment and problems of trying to catch up -- So if you believe most heterodox economists institutions are relevant, but not primarily those associated to the supply side; the ones linked to the demand side, in Keynesian fashion are more important than the mainstream admits. Poor countries that arrive late to the process of capitalist development cannot expand demand without limits since the imports of intermediary and capital goods cause recurrent balance of payments crises. The institutions that allow for the expansion of demand, including those that allow for higher wages to expand consumption and to avoid the external constraints, are and have been central to growth and development. The role of the State in creating and promoting the expansion of domestic markets, in the funding of research and development, and in reducing the barriers to balance of payments constraints, both by guarantying access to external markets (sometimes militarily, like in the Opium Wars) and reducing foreign access to domestic ones was crucial in the process of capitalist development. In this view, for example, what China did not have that England did, was not lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, but a rising bourgeoisie (capitalists) that had to compete to provide for a growing domestic market that had acquired a new taste (and hence explained expanding demand) for a set of new goods, like cotton goods from India, or china (porcelain) from… well China, as emphasized by economic historian Maxine Berg among others (for the role of consumption in the Industrial Revolution go here). Or simply put, China did not have a capitalist mode of production (for the concept of mode of production and capitalism go here). Again, I argued that Robert Allen’s view according to which high wages and cheap energy forced British producers to innovate to save labor, leading to technological innovation and growth, and the absence of those conditions in China led to stagnation is limited since it presupposes that firms adopt more productive technologies even without growing demand. -- see links
economic_history  economic_theory  economic_growth  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  development  emerging_markets  Latin_America  Great_Divergence  demand  consumer_demand  British_history  China  institutional_economics  institutional_change  institution-building  institutions  supply-side  demand-side  cultural_history  economic_culture  political_culture  industrialization  Industrial_Revolution  international_political_economy  international_monetary_system  balance_of_payments  state-building  rent-seeking  rentiers  commodities  links 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Alan Macfarlane, The Invention of the Modern World (2014) | Amazon.com:
From the preface: 'This is a book which synthesizes a lifetime of reflection on the origins of the modern world. Through forty years of travel in Europe, Australia, India, Nepal, Japan and China I have observed the similarities and differences of cultures. I have read as widely as possible in both contemporary and classical works in history, anthropology and philosophy.' - Prof Macfarlane is also the author of The Culture of Capitalism, The Savage Wars of Peace, The Riddle of the Modern World and The Making of the Modern World, among many others. - This is the third book published by Odd Volumes, the imprint of The Fortnightly Review. -- only pbk
books  amazon.com  modernity  modernity-emergence  anthropology  cultural_history  economic_history  political_economy  Great_Divergence  capitalism 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
FROM THE ARCHIVES: Review of David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Allen Lane, 2001) | Pandaemonium
There may seem to be something wilfully perverse about the idea that 19thC Britain, or its empire, was ‘less racist’ than the contemporary nation. Nevertheless there is an element of truth to Cannadine’s argument. 19thC thinkers and administrators combined a belief in natural inequality with a belief in the ‘universality’ of the world – the conviction that they lived in ‘one vast interconnected world’, as Cannadine puts it. Today, in the post-Holocaust era, we have by and large rejected ideas of natural inequality – but also ideas of universality. Indeed, in the ‘West and the Rest’ tradition, universalism is itself regarded as a product of racism, a means by which the West has silenced the voices of the Rest. The consequence has been not the embrace of equality, but the reframing of inequality as ‘difference’. We have managed to combine today a formal belief in equality with the practical creation of a more fractious, fragmented, identity-driven world. Against this background, the moral of Cannadine’s story is not so much that an empire built ‘on individual inequality, had ways of dealing with race that contemporary societies, dedicated to collective equality do not’. It is rather that an age that enjoyed a bullish belief in the ‘sameness’ of the word possessed certain resources to cope with problems of difference that we no longer do, despite the fact that race and inequality were much more central aspects of the Victorian world-view. If we truly want to bury Victorian ideas of inequality, then we must repossess their belief in universality.
books  reviews  kindle-available  intellectual_history  cultural_history  19thC  British_history  British_Empire  social_order  hierarchy  patriarchy  elites  elite_culture  imperialism  global_system  universalism  identity  identity_politics  racism  equality  difference  Other  Victorian  national_ID  post-WWII  post-colonial  Great_Divergence  orientalism  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
ALEXIS D. LITVINE, review essay - THE INDUSTRIOUS REVOLUTION, THE INDUSTRIOUSNESS DISCOURSE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ECONOMIES (2014) | The Historical Journal, 57, pp 531-570. - Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
ALEXIS D. LITVINE - Trinity College, Cambridge -- The idea of industriousness has been an ever-recurring issue since Max Weber launched it as a putative explanation of the advent of economic modernity. The notion of ‘industrious revolution’ has provoked a renewed flourishing of publications focusing on this issue. Although most historians agree on the emergence of industriousness in seventeenth-century Europe, there is no consensus regarding the chronology, hence the real causes, of this mental and discursive shift. This article emphasizes the problematic role played by literary evidences in these social and cultural models of diffusion of new consumer values and desires. It then establishes the timing of the emergence of the ‘industriousness discourse’ using an original approach to diffusion based both on the quantitative analysis of very large corpora and a close reading of seventeenth-century economic pamphlets and educational literature. It concludes first that there was not one but several competing discourses on industriousness. It then identifies two crucial hinges which closely match the chronology proposed by Allen and Muldrew, but refutes that championed by de Vries and McCloskey. The industrious revolution as described by these authors would have happened both too late to fit its intellectual roots and too early to signal the beginning of a ‘consumer revolution’. -- * I am extremely grateful to Peter Mandler, Craig Muldrew, participants in the Early Modern Economic and Social History seminar, and two anonymous referees, for their comments on previous versions of this article. I am also indebted to Andrew Hardie, Jean-Baptiste Michel, and Paul Schaffner for allowing me to use their data and to Billy Janitsch, Andreas Vlachos, and Andrew Wilson for technical assistance.
article  paywall  find  historiography  17thC  Europe-Early_Modern  Great_Divergence  economic_history  intellectual_history  cultural_history  social_order  consumerism  Industrial_Revolution  industriousness  virtue  discourse  bourgeoisie  modernity-emergence  education  values  publishing  readership  Protestant_Ethic  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Forum - “Deirdre McCloskey and Economists’ Ideas about Ideas” (July, 2014) - Online Library of Liberty
Deirdre McClosky is over the halfway point of her 4 volume work on The Bourgeois Era. Two volumes have already appeared, Bourgeois Virtues (2006) and Bourgeois Dignity (2010), and a third is close to appearing [2015]. This Liberty Matters online discussion will assess her progress to date with a Lead Essay by Don Boudreaux and comments by Joel Mokyr and John Nye, and replies to her critics by Deirdre McCloskey. The key issue is to try to explain why “the Great Enrichment” of the past 150 years occurred in northern and western Europe rather than elsewhere, and why sometime in the middle of the 18th century. Other theories have attributed it to the presence of natural resources, the existence of private property and the rule of law, and the right legal and political institutions. McCloskey’s thesis is that a fundamental change in ideas took place which raised the “dignity” of economic activity in the eyes of people to the point where they felt no inhibition in pursuing these activities which improved the situation of both themselves and the customers who bought their products and services.
intellectual_history  cultural_history  economic_history  economic_growth  Medieval  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  Great_Divergence  British_history  Scientific_Revolution  Enlightenment  Scottish_Enlightenment  Industrial_Revolution  bourgeoisie  political_economy  France  Germany  Prussia  China  development  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  legal_history  property  property_rights  commerce  trade  trading_companies  free_trade  improvement  technology  Innovation  agriculture  energy  natural_capital  nature-mastery  transport  capitalism  colonialism  industry  industrialization  social_order  Great_Chain_of_Being  consumers  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  equality  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  liberalism  incentives  microeconomics  historical_sociology  historical_change  social_theory  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Faustine Perrin - Unified Growth Theory: An Insight | JSTOR: Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 36, No. 3 (137) (2011), pp. 362-372
The Unified Growth Theory is receiving increasing attention from growth theorists since the seminal work of Galor and Weil (1999, 2000). These authors emphasize the need for a unified theory of growth that could account for the transition from Malthusian Stagnation to the Modern Growth Regime (1999). This interest is motivated by the lack of explanation and knowledge regarding the historical evolution of the relationship among population growth, technological change and the standard of living. This paper gives an overview of the Unified Growth Theory, its determinants and its implications. -- didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  economic_growth  historical_sociology  demography  Malthusian  Malthus  technology  Great_Divergence 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic - globalinequality: Where I disagree and agree with Debraj Ray’s critique of Piketty’s Capital in the 21s Century - June 2014
Debraj’s error consists...in not realizing that normal capitalist relations of production (where capitalists tend to be rich) are forgotten when we look at economic laws in an abstract manner. Not doing that is precisely a great virtue of Piketty’s book. Surely, (a) if capital/labor proportions were the same across income distribution; (b) if, more extremely, capitalists were poor and workers rich; (c) if capital were state-owned, all of these contradictions would disappear. But none of (a)-(c) conditions holds in contemporary capitalism. So Piketty’s economic laws and contradictions of capitalism do exist. Where do I agree wit Debraj? That Kuznets curve cannot be easily dismissed. I am currently working on the idea that we are now witnessing the upswing of the 2nd Kuznets curve since the Industrial revolution. Moreover I believe this is not only the 2nd but perhaps 5th, 6th or 10th curve over the past 1000 years in the West. Does this agreement on Kuznets then, by itself, imply that my defense of Piketty’s mechanism cannot be right or consistent? Not at all. Piketty isolated the key features of capitalist inequality trends when they are left to themselves: the forces of divergence (inequality) will win. But there are also other forces: capital destruction, wars, confiscatory taxation, hyperinflation, pressure of trade unions, high taxation of capital, rising importance of labor and higher wages, that at different times go the other way, and, in a Kuznets-like fashion, drive inequality down. So, I believe, Piketty has beautifully uncovered the forces of divergence, mentioned some of the forces of convergence, but did not lay to rest the ghost of Kuznets inverted U shaped curve
books  reviews  economic_history  economic_theory  political_economy  Piketty  capitalism  wealth  labor  wages  Marx  macroeconomics  economic_growth  inequality  cliometrics  Kuznets_curve  savings  investment  profit  rentiers  consumers  Medieval  Renaissance  Europe-Early_Modern  Great_Divergence  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Peter Temin - Economic History and Economic Development: New Economic History in Retrospect and Prospect | NBER Working Paper - May 2014
Abstract -- I argue in this paper for more interaction between economic history and economic development. Both subfields study economic development; the difference is that economic history focuses on high-wage countries while economic development focuses on low-wage economies. My argument is based on recent research by Robert Allen, Joachim Voth and their colleagues. Voth demonstrated that Western Europe became a high-wage economy in the 14th century, using the European Marriage Pattern stimulated by the effects of the Black Death. This created economic conditions that led eventually to the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. Allen found that the Industrial Revolution resulted from high wages and low power costs. He showed that the technology of industrialization was adapted to these factor prices and is not profitable in low-wage economies. The cross-over to economic development suggests that demography affects destiny now as in the past, and that lessons from economic history can inform current policy decisions. This argument is framed by a description of the origins of the New Economic History, also known as Cliometrics, and a non-random survey of recent research emphasizing the emerging methodology of the New Economic History.
paper  paywall  economic_history  development  demography  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  Industrial_Revolution  Great_Divergence 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Understanding Society: The Brenner debate revisited - Jan 2010
Very useful summary of the various causal theories re transition to capitalist agriculture and difference between England and France - though couched as Brenner debate it is much broader and slides into Great Divergence, rise of the West, etc -- But it seems clear in hindsight that these are false dichotomies. We aren't forced to choose: Malthus, Marx, or Smith. Economic development is not caused by a single dominant factor -- a point that Guy Bois embraces in his essay (Aston and Philpin, 117). Rather, all these factors were in play in European economic development -- and several others as well. (For example, Ken Pomeranz introduces the exploitation of the natural resources, energy sources, and forced labor of the Americas in his account of the economic growth of Western Europe (The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy). And I suppose that it would be possible to make a climate-change argument for this period of change as well.) Moreover, each large factor (population, prices, property relations) itself is the complex result of a number of great factors -- including the others on the list. So we shouldn't expect simple causal diagrams of large outcomes like sustained economic growth.
social_theory  economic_history  feudalism  capitalism  British_history  France  medieval_history  16thC  17thC  18thC  Great_Divergence  agriculture  industrialization  Industrial_Revolution  property_rights  entrepreneurs  class_conflict  economic_growth  causation-social  links  bibliography  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Daniel Little - Understanding Society: Making institutions Dec 2013
Looks at range of institutional work (Thelen, Pierson etc) - mostly praise for recent work that's a comparative combination of historical sociology, political science, political economy, with implications for work in Tilly's tradition of fiscal-military_state -- Wenkai HE's Paths toward the Modern Fiscal State: England, Japan, and China is a timely and interesting contribution. HE undertakes a comparative study of the emergence of what he calls the "modern fiscal state" in Britain, China, and Japan. He has undertaken to learn enough about these three cases in detail to be able to tell a reasonably detailed story of the emergence of this set of state tax and revenue institutions in the three settings, and he is thereby poised to consider some important institutional-causal questions about the innovations he observes. The book is a "cross-over" work, with political science methods and historical research content. The book combines new institutionalism, comparative historical sociology, and first-rate historical scholarship to make a compelling historical argument.. .... One thing that I particularly appreciate about HE's work is his ability to combine structure and agency into a single coherent analysis and explanation.
books  kindle-available  reviews  social_theory  historical_sociology  fiscal-military_state  political_economy  political_culture  institutions  bureaucracy  taxes  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  James_I  China  Japan  modernization  nation-state  governance  government_officials  governmentality  economic_history  Great_Divergence  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Kenneth Chase: Firearms: A Global History to 1700: 9780521722407: Amazon.com: Books
Kenneth Chase traces the history of firearms from their invention in China in the 1100s to the 1700s, when European firearms had become clearly superior. In Firearms, Chase asks why it was the Europeans who perfected firearms, not the Chinese, and answers this question by looking at how firearms were used throughout the world. Early firearms were restricted to infantry and siege warfare, limiting their use outside of Europe and Japan. Steppe and desert nomads imposed a different style of warfare on the Middle East, India, and China--a style incompatible with firearms. By the time that better firearms allowed these regions to turn the tables on the nomads, Japan's self-imposed isolation left Europe with no rival in firearms design, production, or use, with lasting consequences.
books  military_history  economic_history  medieval_history  15thC  16thC  17thC  Asia  China  India  Ottomans  Europe-Early_Modern  Military_Revolution  Great_Divergence 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
NAKED KEYNESIANISM: The Fiscal-Military State and Western Hegemony - Nov 2013
An often neglected, at least in economics, argument for the rise of the West (leaving the debate of when the Big Divergence took place, if around 1800 or before, for another post), is its fiscal advantage when compared to the Oriental Empires (Mughal, Ottoman, Safavid and Qing). Patrick O'Brien, the prominent author of the idea of Western fiscal exceptionalism, suggests that the smaller and more urbanized polities of the West found it easier to tax their populations than the Eastern empires with more extensive territories, larger populations and less urbanized economies, even if the latter were in many respects more advanced than the former. The figure below shows that to some extent the Dutch dominance, and then the English ascension, go hand in hand with and increase of tax revenue as a share of GDP.

In this respect, the work by Jan Glete on the effects of a permanent navy on State formation deserves also careful reading.

However, the reasons for the militaristic nature of the Western economies is not well developed in the Fiscal-Military State literature. Kenneth Chase's book on the history of firearms provides an interesting answer.

He argues that early firearms were not very effective when used against cavalry because of their overall lack of mobility, poor rates of fire, and limited accuracy. As a result, their effectiveness was restricted to infantry and siege warfare, and were not used in regions threatened by nomads
economic_history  historical_sociology  Great_Divergence  fiscal-military_state  military_history  Military_Revolution  links 
november 2013 by dunnettreader
Douglas W. Allen - In defence of the institutional revolution - Springer
The Review of Austrian Economics
December 2013, Volume 26, Issue 4

I defend my thesis laid out in The Institutional Revolution against the comments made by McCloskey, Espin and Mokyr, and Langlois, who all believe that the weight of the great institutional transition is too great for my theory of measurement, and who all quibble with some aspects of my historical analysis. I argue that some of the comments fail to fully appreciate the Coasean approach, and that most of the historical comments miss the mark. I begin with a short discussion of Coase, and then turn to each author in turn.
books  kindle-available  reviews  economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  17thC  18thC  19thC  Britain  institutional_economics  transaction_costs  microeconomics  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Richard N. Langlois - The Institutional Revolution: A review essay - Springer
The Review of Austrian Economics
December 2013, Volume 26, Issue 4

This review essay discusses and appraises Douglas Allen’s The Institutional Revolution (2011) as a way of reflecting on the uses of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) in economic history. It praises and defends Allen’s method of asking “what economic problem were these institutions solving?” But it insists that such comparative-institutional analysis be imbedded within a deeper account of institutional change, one driven principally by changes – often endogenous changes – in the extent of the market and in relative scarcities. The essay supports its argument with a variety of examples of the NIE applied to economic history.
books  kindle-available  reviews  paywall  economic_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  Britain  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  institutional_economics  institutions  economic_sociology  historical_sociology  NIE  cultural_history  causation-social  change-social  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Joel Mokyr, José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez: The Institutional Revelation: A comment on Douglas W. Allen’s The Institutional Revolution - Springer
The Review of Austrian Economics
December 2013, Volume 26, Issue 4

Institutions are a central topic in economic history. Allen’s work differs in that he is interested in institutions per se, not as a means to economic performance and prosperity. The purpose of this book is to explain the institutions of the premodern world and to show why they changed. His argument is that in a Principal-Agent situation, before the Industrial Revolution, it was harder for the Principal to attribute whether the failure of the project was due to acts of nature or some acts of the agent, hence the “strange” institutions. In a modern world, with a much improved monitoring technology, we can use more “efficient” institutions, hence the Institutional Revolution. Although innovative and interesting, the author over-stresses his argument. Much more than monitoring in a principal-agent relationship is needed to explain the Industrial Revolution and the changes in institutions associated with it.
books  reviews  economic_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  Britain  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  institutional_economics  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Deirdre N. McCloskey: A comment on Douglas Allen’s The Institutional Revolution - Springer
The Review of Austrian Economics
December 2013, Volume 26, Issue 4, pp 363-373

In his elegant book Douglas Allen claims that an improvement in the measurement of Nature made for lower transaction costs and the Industrial Revolution. His argument is a typical example of neo-institutionalism in the style of Douglass North (1990) and North et al. (2009). A fall in a wedge of inefficiency is supposed to provide Good Incentives, and the modern world. But the elimination of wedges lead merely to Harberger Triangles of improved efficiency—not to the factor of 100 in properly measured real income per head, which is the Great Enrichment 1800 to the present to be explained. Allen does yeoman work in explaining some of the peculiarities of British public administration, such as the reliance on aristocratic honor and on the prize system in naval warfare. But he attributes to public administration an implausible effect on private incomes. The merging of power and plenty is mistaken. Further, the alleged increase in a modern ability to measure marginal products is implausible. Large modern enterprises face greater, not smaller, problems of assessing the contribution of individuals. Allen’s book on measurement does not measure, and the probable order of magnitude of the items he focuses on is too small to explain any but the details of administration.
books  reviews  economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  Britain  17thC  18thC  institutional_economics  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Precocious Albion: A New Interpretation of the British Industrial Revolution by Morgan Kelly, Joel Mokyr, Cormac O'Grada :: SSRN
Downloaded pdf - Why was Britain the cradle of the Industrial Revolution? Answers vary: some focus on resource endowments, some on institutions, some on the role of empire. In this paper, we argue for the role of labour force quality or human capital. Instead of dwelling on mediocre schooling and literacy rates, we highlight instead the physical condition of the average British worker and his higher endowment of skills. These advantages meant that British workers were more productive and better paid than their Continental counterparts and better equipped to capitalize on the technological opportunities and challenges confronting them.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34 - Date posted: September 4, 2013
economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  Britain  labor  Labor_markets  18thC  19thC  downloaded 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Hilton Root - Dynamics among Nations: The Evolution of Legitimacy and Development in Modern States | The MIT Press
Liberal internationalism has been the West’s foreign policy agenda since the Cold War, and the West has long occupied the top rung of a hierarchical system. In this book, Hilton Root argues that international relations, like other complex ecosystems, exists in a constantly shifting landscape, in which hierarchical structures are giving way to systems of networked interdependence, changing every facet of global interaction. Accordingly, policymakers will need a new way to understand the process of change. Root suggests that the science of complex systems offers an analytical framework to explain the unforeseen development failures, governance trends, and alliance shifts in today’s global political economy.

Root examines both the networked systems that make up modern states and the larger, interdependent landscapes they share. Using systems analysis—in which institutional change and economic development are understood as self-organizing complexities—he offers an alternative view of institutional resilience and persistence. From this perspective, Root considers the divergence of East and West; the emergence of the European state, its contrast with the rise of China, and the network properties of their respective innovation systems; the trajectory of democracy in developing regions; and the systemic impact of China on the liberal world order. Complexity science, Root argues, will not explain historical change processes with algorithmic precision, but it may offer explanations that match the messy richness of those processes.
books  IR_theory  networks  complexity  Great_Divergence  development  legitimacy  nation-state  global_economy  global_system  global_governance  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Deepak Nayyar - Developing countries in the world economy | OUPblog Oct 2013
The dramatic transformation of the world economy began around 1820. Slowly but surely, the geographical divides in the world turned into economic divides. The divide rapidly became a wide chasm. The economic significance of Asia, Africa, and Latin America witnessed a precipitous decline such that by 1950 there was a pronounced asymmetry between their share of world population at two-thirds and their share of world income at about one-fourth.

In sharp contrast, between 1820 and 1950, Europe, North America, and Japan increased their share in world population from one-fourth to one-third and in world income from more than one-third to almost three-fourths. The rise of ‘The West’ was concentrated in Western Europe and North America. The decline and fall of ‘The Rest’ was concentrated in Asia, much of it attributable to China and India.

On the whole, the significance of developing countries in the world economy circa 2010 is about the same as it was in 1870 or a little earlier. Given this situation in 2010, which is an outcome of the catch up process since 1950, it is likely that the significance of developing countries in the world economy circa 2030 will be about the same as it was in 1820.
economic_history  economic_growth  Great_Divergence  19thC  20thC  21stC  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
McCloskey, Deirdre (2009): Foreign Trade Was Not an Engine of Growth - Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trade reshuffles. No wonder, then, that it doesn’t work as an engine of growth—not for explaining the scale of growth that overcame the West and then the Rest 1800 to the present. Yet many historians, such as Walt Rostow or Robert Allen or Joseph Inikori, have put foreign trade at the center of their accounts. Yet the Rest had been vigorously trading in the Indian Ocean long before the Europeans got there—indeed, that’s why the West wanted to get there. Trade certainly set the prices that British industrialists faced, such as the price of wheat or the interest rate. But new trade does not put people to work, unless they start unemployed. If they are, then any source of demand, such as the demand for domestic service, would be as important as the India trade. Foreign trade is not a net gain, but a way of producing importables at the sacrifice of exportables. The Harberger point implies that static gains from trade are small beside the 1500% of growth to be explained, or even the 100% in the first century in Britain. Trade is anyway too old and too widespread to explain a uniquely European—even British—event. One can appeal to “dynamic” effects, but these too can be shown to be small, even in the case of the gigantic British cotton textile industry. And if small causes lead to large consequences, the model is instable, and any old thing can cause it to tip. Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke favor foreign trade on the argument that power led to plenty. But domination is not the same thing as innovation. In short, the production possibility curve did not move out just a little, as could be explained by trade or investment or reshuffling. It exploded, and requires an economics of discovery, not an economics of routine exchanges of cotton textiles for tea. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  economic_growth  economic_models  trade-theory  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  Innovation  technology  investment  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Peter Temin - Two Views of the British Industrial Revolution (1997)
JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 63-82 -- There are two views of the British Industrial Revolution in the literature today. The more traditional description sees the Industrial Revolution as a broad change in the British economy and society. This broad view of the Industrial Revolution has been challenged by Crafts and Harley who see the Industrial Revolution as the result of technical change in only a few industries. This article presents a test of these views using the Ricardian model of international trade with many goods. British trade data are used to implement the test and discriminate between the two views of the Industrial Revolution.
article  jstor  economic_history  economic_growth  economic_theory  Industrial_Revolution  Great_Divergence  18thC  19thC  British_history  technology  Innovation  industry  industrialization  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Tim Leunig, Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis: Networks in the Premodern Economy: The Market for London Apprenticeships, 1600—1749 (2011)
JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 71, No. 2 (JUNE 2011), pp. 413-443 -- Cambridge paywall but jstor has references -- We examine the role of social and geographical networks in structuring entry into premodern London's skilled occupations. Newly digitized apprenticeship indenture records for 1600—1749 offer little evidence that personal ties strongly shaped apprentice recruitment. The typical London apprentices had no identifiable tie to their master through kin or place of origin. Migrant apprentices' fathers were generally outside the craft sector. The apprenticeship market was strikingly open: well-to-do families accessed a wide range of apprenticeships, and would-be apprentices could match ability and aptitude to opportunity. This fluidity aided human capital formation, with obvious implications for economic development.
article  jstor  paywall  economic_history  social_history  17thC  18thC  Britain  London  Labor_markets  mobility  human_capital  networks  bibliography  Great_Divergence 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Jan De Vries: The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution (1994)
JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 249-270 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- De Vries theory basis of his book -- The Industrial Revolution as a historical concept has many shortcomings. A new concept--the "industrious revolution"--is proposed to place the Industrial Revolution in a broader historical setting. The industrious revolution was a process of household-based resource reallocation that increased both the supply of marketed commodities and labor and the demand for market-supplied goods. The industrious revolution was a household-level change with important demand-side features that preceded the Industrial Revolution, a supply-side phenomenon. It has implications for nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic history.
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  economic_history  economic_growth  social_history  political_economy  Europe-Early_Modern  labor  Labor_markets  consumerism  trade  industry  17thC  18thC  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Robert Brenner and Christopher Isett: England's Divergence from China's Yangzi Delta: Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of Development (2002)
JSTOR: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 609-662 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- a Marxian attack on Pomeranz moving the Divergence to the 19thC and assigning imperialism access to resources, especially slave economies, for difference
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  economic_history  economic_growth  social_history  social_theory  historical_sociology  property  imperialism  American_colonies  Early_Republic  US_economy  Atlantic  British_Empire  India  China  slavery  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta: The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages, Prices and Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500-1800 (2006)
JSTOR: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb., 2006), pp. 2-31 -- Contrary to the claims of Pomeranz, Parthasarathi, and other 'world historians', the prosperous parts of Asia between 1500 and 1800 look similar to the stagnating southern, central, and eastern parts of Europe rather than the developing north-western parts. In the advanced parts of India and China, grain wages were comparable to those in north-western Europe, but silver wages, which conferred purchasing power over tradable goods and services, were substantially lower. The high silver wages of north-western Europe were not simply a monetary phenomenon, but reflected high productivity in the tradable sector. The 'great divergence' between Europe and Asia was already well underway before 1800. -- I think Robert Allen uses some of this price and wage data for his theory re why capital technology took off faster in Britain when combined with energy resources
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  economic_history  economic_growth  prices  wages  Britain  Europe-Early_Modern  China  India  Asia  17thC  18thC  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
E. A. Wrigley: The Divergence of England: The Growth of the English Economy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: The Prothero Lecture (2000)
JSTOR: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vol. 10 (2000), pp. 117-141 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- though it's part of Great Divergence debates, Wrigley focus on Britain during 17thC and 18thC and his economic_history work is worth special attention
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  economic_history  Britain  Europe-Early_Modern  economic_growth  political_economy  population  agriculture  trade  industry  colonialism  British_Empire  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Joel Mokyr: Why Was the Industrial Revolution a European Phenomenon? (2003)
JSTOR: Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 10 (2003), pp. 27-63 -- In this paper, I link the economic growth of the West in the past two centuries with the Industrial Revolution, and search for the underlying causes of technological progress. It is argued that we cannot understand modern economic growth unless we realize that technology is part of "useful knowledge," and that we have to understand the dynamics of useful knowledge and the interaction between different kinds of knowledge if we are to come to grips with the expansion of techniques in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Such a model is sketched and illustrated in some detail. It is further argued that the particular path followed by technology leading to modern industrialized society is typically western, and that a non-European Industrial Revolution could well have taken place but would have led to very different historical outcomes.
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  economic_history  economic_growth  technology  Innovation  Industrial_Revolution  industry  Europe-Early_Modern  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Kenneth Pomeranz: (response to P Huang) Beyond the East-West Binary: Resituating Development Paths in the Eighteenth-Century World (2002)
JSTOR: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 539-590 -- Great Divergence debates - this one between Huang and Pomeranz -- Huang original article titled " Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century Britain and China?"
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  economic_history  historical_sociology  historiography  China  Europe-Early_Modern  Britain  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Review essay by: Philip C. C. Huang - The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy by Kenneth Pomeranz (2002)
JSTOR: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 501-538 -- Great Divergence debates - this one between Huang and Pomeranz with follow up by Pomeranz - see response article - this article titled " Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century Britain and China?"
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  economic_history  historical_sociology  historiography  China  Europe-Early_Modern  Britain  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
R. Bin Wong: Early Modern Economic History in the Long Run - Returning to the Early Modern World from the Postmodern One (2004)
JSTOR: Science & Society, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring, 2004), pp. 80-90 -- downloaded pdf to Note -- starts with big picture historiography questions re change, causation, directions or patterns in history -- are master narratives dead or worth trying to at least inquire then becomes another response to Duschene
article  jstor  historiography  postmodern  Great_Divergence  social_sciences-post-WWII  economic_history  social_history  political_economy  social_theory  historical_sociology  Britain  China  Europe-Early_Modern  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Ricardo Duchesne: The Post-Malthusian World Began in Western Europe in the Eighteenth Century: A Reply to Goldstone and Wong (2003)
JSTOR: Science & Society, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 195-205 -- Symposium on Eurocentrism, Sinocentrism, and World History in which Wong and Goldstone attack Duchsene for his critical review of Gunter Frank in which D. maintained Britain had broken through Malthusian limit in 18thC so rejected Wong and Goldstone comparison with China in 18thC as if they were at same point and that 19thC takeoff was contingent that it happened only in England. Symposium includes paper by Wong, Goldstone and response by Duchsene. Recent historiography helpful, though most of debate precedes Pomerantz.
article  jstor  economic_history  historical_sociology  Great_Divergence  China  Europe-Early_Modern  Britain  American_colonies  colonialism  empires  historiography  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Jack A. Goldstone: Europe Vs. Asia: Missing Data and Misconceptions (2003)
JSTOR: Science & Society, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 184-195 -- Symposium on Eurocentrism, Sinocentrism, and World History in which Wong and Goldstone attack Duchsene for his critical review of Gunter Frank in which D. maintained Britain had broken through Malthusian limit in 18thC so rejected Wong and Goldstone comparison with China in 18thC as if they were at same point and that 19thC takeoff was contingent that it happened only in England. Symposium includes paper by Wong, Goldstone and response by Duchsene. Recent historiography helpful, though most of debate precedes Pomeranz.
article  jstor  economic_history  historical_sociology  Great_Divergence  China  Europe-Early_Modern  Britain  historiography  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
R. Bin Wong: Beyond Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism (2003)
JSTOR: Science & Society, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 173-184 - introduction to Symposium on Eurocentrism, Sinocentrism, and World History in which Wong and Goldstone attack Duchsene for his critical review of Gunter Frank in which D. maintained Britain had broken through Malthusian limit in 18thC so rejected Wong and Goldstone comparison with China in 18thC as if they were at same point and that 19thC takeoff was contingent that it happened only in England. Symposium includes paper by Wong, Goldstone and response by Duchsene. Recent historiography helpful, though most of debate precedes Pomerantz.
article  jstor  Great_Divergence  historiography  bibliography  economic_history  historical_sociology  China  Europe-Early_Modern  Britain  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong : Lighting the Rocket of Growth and Lightening the Toil of Work: Another Outtake from My "Slouching Towards Utopia" Ms….
1870 is when we finally get takeoff -- The inventions since 1712 and perhaps since 1640 had in fact lightened the toil and boosted the real incomes of England’s working class. But the pace was very slow: an average annual growth rate of working-class real wages of only 0.2% per year from 1640-1800, and only 0.4% per year from 1800-1870. Each generation had, on average, a real wage level 10% higher than its predecessor. Contrast that with us today, where we expect real incomes to rise by 10% in five years—or with China today where 10% is the real income growth of a year and a half.The pace of improvement was slow because higher living standards meant faster population growth and because the pace of invention was slow. The pace of invention was relatively slow because science was not yet hooked to invention and invention and innovation were not yet hooked together to business, industrial research, and profit. Things did not change that much even in the age of the first Industrial Revolution. That was what did change around 1870. But it did not change until then.
economic_history  Great_Divergence  19thC  Industrial_Revolution  technology  Innovation  capitalism  UK_economy  economic_growth  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong : Where Was China?: Why the Twentieth-Century Was Not a Chinese Century:
A Deleted Scene from My "Slouching Towards Utopia?: The Economic History of the Twentieth Century" Ms.
Great_Divergence  China  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
Deaton, A.: The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. | Princeton University Press
I tell the story of material progress, but that story is one of both growth and inequality. This book is mostly about two topics: material living standards and health. They are not the only things that matter for a good life, but they are important in and of themselves. Looking at health and income together allows us to avoid a mistake that is too common today, when knowledge is specialized and each specialty has its own parochial view of human wellbeing. Downloaded Introduction and Enlightenment chapter - pdf to Note
books  economic_history  social_history  science  medicine  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Great_Divergence  inequality  economic_growth  trade  intellectual_property  international_political_economy  emerging_markets  Malthus  colonialism  globalization  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2013 by dunnettreader

related tags

14thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  agrarian_capitalism  agriculture  amazon.com  American_colonies  ancient_history  ancient_Rome  anthropology  article  Asia  Atlantic  balance_of_payments  balance_of_power  bibliography  Black_Death  books  bookshelf  bourgeoisie  Britain  British_Empire  British_history  British_politics  bureaucracy  capital  capitalism  causation-social  change-social  China  Christendom  city_states  class_conflict  cliometrics  collective_action  colonialism  commerce  commodities  competition-interstate  complexity  consumerism  consumers  consumer_demand  consumer_revolution  contingency  counterfactuals  cultural_capital  cultural_history  Davenant  default  demand  demand-side  demography  development  difference  discourse  downloaded  Dutch  Early_Republic  econometrics  economic_culture  economic_growth  economic_history  economic_models  economic_sociology  economic_theory  education  EF-add  elites  elites-political_influence  elite_culture  emerging_markets  empires  energy  Enlightenment  Enlightenment-ongoing  Enlightenment_Project  entrepreneurs  equality  Europe  Europe-Early_Modern  Europe-exceptionalism  Europe-Medieval  export-led  exports  feudalism  find  fiscal-military_state  fiscal_policy  France  free_trade  Germany  globalization  global_economy  global_governance  global_history  global_system  governance  governance-participation  governing_class  government-forms  governmentality  government_officials  Great_Chain_of_Being  Great_Depression  Great_Divergence  gunpowder  hierarchy  historical_change  historical_sociology  historiography  history-and-social_sciences  history_of_book  history_of_science  human_capital  identity  identity_politics  imperialism  improvement  incentives  India  industrialization  industrial_policy  Industrial_Revolution  industriousness  industry  inequality  Innovation  innovation-government_policy  Instapaper  institution-building  institutional_change  institutional_economics  institutions  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  intellectual_property  interest_rates  international_monetary_system  international_political_economy  investment  IR_theory  Islamic_empires  Italy  James_I  Japan  jstor  judgment-political  kindle-available  Kuznets_curve  labor  labor_history  Labor_markets  landowners  Latin_America  legal_history  legitimacy  liberalism  links  literacy  London  macroeconomics  macroeconomic_policy  Malthus  Malthusian  Mamluks  Mann_Michael  manufacturing  markets  Marx  material_culture  media  medicine  medieval  medieval_history  mercantilism  mercantilism-violence  microeconomics  militarization-society  military_history  Military_Revolution  mobility  modernity  modernity-emergence  modernization  monarchy  moral_philosophy  narrative  narrative-contested  nation-state  national_ID  natural_capital  nature-mastery  networks  networks-business  networks-information  NIE  North-Weingast  OECD_economies  orientalism  Other  Ottomans  paper  path-dependency  patriarchy  paywall  Piketty  political_culture  political_economy  political_history  political_participation  political_philosophy  population  post-colonial  post-WWII  postmodern  prices  print_culture  productivity  profit  property  property-confiscations  property_rights  Protestant_Ethic  proto-industry  Prussia  public_finance  public_goods  public_health  public_policy  public_sphere  publishing  racism  raison-d'-état  readership  redistribution  Reformation  religious_culture  religious_history  Renaissance  rent-seeking  rentiers  representative_institutions  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  research  reviews  risk_management  savings  science  Scientific_Revolution  Scottish_Enlightenment  slavery  Smith  social_democracy  social_history  social_order  social_sciences-post-WWII  social_theory  sociology_of_knowledge  sovereign_debt  Spain  state-building  Sultans  supply-side  syllabus  taxes  Tech/Culture  technology  technology-adoption  technology-history  textiles  Thomism-21stC  Tilly  trade  trade-cultural_transmission  trade-policy  trade-theory  trading_companies  transaction_costs  transport  UK_economy  universalism  urbanization  US_Civil_War  US_economy  US_history  values  Victorian  virtue  wages  war  wars-causes  wealth  Western_civ 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: