dunnettreader + bentham   14

Dan Priel - Toward Classical Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015)
I have two major aims: (1) set the historical record straight(...) Hobbes’s and Bentham’s work that seeks to understand their views on law not by isolating it from the rest of their wide-ranging body of work, but by understanding their jurisprudential work as part of a broader project. (2) My main aim is to contribute to contemporary jurisprudential debates and to suggest that the largely neglected approach of earlier positivists is superior to the view held by most contemporary legal positivists. (...) to what extent it is useful for us to call Hobbes and Bentham “legal positivists.” My answer to this question consists of three interrelated points. The first is that we draw an explicit link between their ideas and the view that (some time later) would come to be known as “positivism,” roughly the view that the methods of the “human sciences” are essentially the same as those of the natural sciences. The second point is that the classical legal positivists’ decisive break with natural law ideas prevalent in their day is to be found exactly here, in their views about metaphysics and nature. The third point is that this aspect of their work has been, in my view regrettably, abandoned by contemporary legal positivists. Though all three points are related, in this Article I will say relatively little about the first point, as I discussed it in greater detail elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski - Positivism(s): A Commentary on Priel's "Toward Classical Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (2015)
Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it insulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor Postema’s phrase from his symposium article. And, in part due to the exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminating the recent history and current state of inquiry. His article demonstrates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurisprudence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this rediscovered path, and I am not sure I always agree with his suggested answers. Any misgivings I have about Priel’s particular approach, however, do not diminish my appreciation; I find even the points of disagreement to be live and meaningful, and that itself is refreshing. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Emmanuelle de Champs - Enlightenment and Utility: Bentham in French, Bentham in France (to be released March 2015) | Ideas in Context series | Cambridge University Press
Jeremy Bentham (..) was a seminal figure in the history of modern political thought. This lively monograph presents the numerous French connections of an emblematic British thinker. (..) Placing Bentham's thought in the context of the French-language Enlightenment through to the post-Revolutionary era, (..) the case for a historical study of 'Global Bentham'. Examining previously unpublished sources, she traces the circulation of Bentham's letters, friends, manuscripts, and books in the French-speaking world. (..) transnational intellectual history reveals how utilitarianism, as a doctrine, was both the product of, and a contribution to, French-language political thought at a key time(..). The debates (re) utilitarianism in France cast new light on the making of modern Liberalism. **--** Intro **--** Part I. An Englishman in the Republic of Letters: 1. Languages of Enlightenment *-* 2. Satire and polemics *-* 3. Defining utilitarianism: private connections and correspondence **--** Part II. 'Projet d'un corps de loix complet' and the Reform of Jurisprudence in Europe: 4. The Genesis of Projet *-* 5. Projet in Enlightenment legal thought *-* 6. The politics of legal reform **--** Part III. Reflections for the Revolution in France: 7. Frenchmen and Francophiles: Lord Lansdowne's network *-* 8. British expertise for French legislators *-* 9. Utility, rights and revolution: missed encounters? **--** Part IV. Utile Dulcis? Bentham in Paris, 1802: 10. Dumont's editorship: from the Bibliothèque Britannique to Traités de législation civile et pénale *-* 11. A mixed reception *-* 12. Autumn 1802: Bentham in Paris **--** Part V. Liberty, Utility and Rights (1815–1832): 13. 'For one disciple in this country, I have 50 at least in France' *-* 14. Utilitarian arguments in French politics *-* 15. A Utilitarian moment? French liberals and utilitarianism *-* Epilogue: Bentham in the July Revolution *-* Conclusion -- marketing materials not yet available
books  find  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_economy  legal_theory  18thC  19thC  British_history  France  French_Enlightenment  Enlightenment  Bentham  utilitarianism  utility  reform-political  reform-social  reform-legal  reform-economic  jurisprudence  civil_code  Republic_of_Letters  networks-policy  networks-information  Anglo-French  British_foreign_policy  diplomats  diplomacy-environment  francophile  Landsdowne_Marquis_of  faction  British_politics  patrons  patronage  elite_culture  cross-border  cultural_history  cultural_influence  technical_assistance  criminal_justice  liberalism  rights-legal  rights-political  civil_law  civil_liberties  civil_society  French_Revolutionary_Wars  Peace_of_Amiens  Napoleonic_Wars  Restoration-France  bourgeoisie  July_Monarchy  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron Who Needs Rules of Recognition? by :: SSRN in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, Matthew Adler and Kenneth Himma, eds., Oxford University Press, 2009
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-21 -- I argue against the idea (made popular by H.L.A. Hart) that the key to a legal system is its "rule of recognition." I argue that much of the work allegedly done by a rule of recognition is either done by a different kind of secondary rule (what Hart called "a rule of change") or it is not done at all (and doesn't have to be done). A rule of change tells us the procedures that must be followed and the substantive conditions that must be satisfied if law is to be changed legislatively; and a judge "recognizes" changes simply by using this checklist. In common law, there is no clear rule of change (because we are profoundly ambivalent about judicial lawmaking). But we get by without one, and without a determinate rule of recognition that would tell us precisely how to infer rules from precedents. It is quite liberating, really, to abandon the idea of a rule of recognition. Apart from anything else, it relieves us from having to participate in endless debates about whether the US Constitution is (or contains) a rule of recognition for American law. The Constitution contains rules of change; that's what matters. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 28 -- Keywords: certainty, closure, common law, constitution, grundnorm, H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, Jeremy Bentham, jurisprudence, legal positivism, rule of change, rule of recognition -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  legal_system  sociology_of_law  legal_validity  constitutionalism  positivism-legal  common_law  change-social  institutional_change  legislation  judiciary  precedent  judicial_review  foundationalism  US_constitution  Bentham  Hart  Kelsen  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - The Decline of Natural Right [chapter] (2009) :: SSRN in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF NINETEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY, Allen Wood and Songsuk Susan Hahn, eds., Cambridge University Press
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-38 -- What happened to the doctrine of natural right in the 19thC? We know that it flourished in the 17thC and 18thC. We know that something like it - the doctrine of human rights and new forms of social contract theory - flourished again in the second half of the 20thC and continues to flourish in the 21stC. In between there was a period of decline and hibernation - ... in which to invoke natural right was always to invite intellectual ridicule and accusations of political irresponsibility. Thus article asks: How far can the decline of natural right in the 19thC be attributed to the reaction against the revolution in France? How far it was the effect of independent streams of thought, like positivism and historicism? Why was radical thought so ambivalent about natural right throughout the 19thC, and why was socialist thought in particular inclined to turn its back on it? As a framework for thought, natural right suffered a radical decline in the social and political sciences. But things were not so clear in jurisprudence, and natural right lived on to a much riper old age in the writings of some prominent economists. What is it about this theory that allowed it to survive in these environments, when so much of the rest of intellectual endeavor in the 19thC was toxic or inhospitable to it. Finally, I shall ask how far American thought represents an exception to all of this. Why and to what extent did the doctrine survive as a way of thinking in the United States, long after it had lost its credibility elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_social_science  natural_law  natural_rights  human_rights  counter-revolution  historicism  positivism  legal_theory  nationalism  national_interest  conservatism  socialism  social_contract  relativism  revolutions  1848_revolutions  French_Revolution  anticlerical  Bentham  Burke  Hume  Jefferson  Kant  Locke  Marx  Mill  Savigny  Spencer_Herbert  George_Henry  US_society  American_exceptionalism  liberalism  social_theory  social_sciences  Social_Darwinism  social_order  mass_culture  political_participation  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Does ‘Equal Moral Status’ Add Anything to Right Reason? (2011) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-52 -- This paper explores the possibility that the principle of basic equality might be explicated by reference to the idea that humans constitute a "single-status" community. It explores some difficulties with the idea of status in its original legal habitat. These difficulties include skepticism about status fostered by John Austin and others. The paper attempts to answer this skepticism, and it concludes (along with Jeremy Bentham, who in this respect disagreed with his disciple) that once one takes a dynamic view of a legal system, the idea of legal status is not an eliminable idea. The paper then examines the distinction between what I call "sortal-status" and "condition-status." Sortal status works from the idea that law recognizes different kinds of human being: racist and sexist legal systems are characterized by sortal-status concepts. Condition-status recognizes that persons may get into various scrapes, situations, conditions, and vicissitudes, or pass through certain stages, that are marked by status distinctions. (These include infancy, alienage, felony, bankruptcy, matriage, military service etc.) Once one makes this distinction, then the idea of a single (sortal) status society becomes a promising vehicle for expressing ideas about moral equality. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 19 -- Keywords: Austin, Bentham, equality, legal system, racial discrimination, sex discrimination, status
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  social_theory  equality  status  discrimination  social_order  civil_society  civil_liberties  Bentham  Austin_John  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter -The Radicalism of Legal Positivism (2010) :: SSRN - Guild Practitioner, 2010
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 303 -- “Legal positivism” is often caricatured by its jurisprudential opponents, as well as by lawyers and legal scholars not immediately interested in jurisprudential inquiry. “Positivist” too often functions now as an “epithet” in legal discourse, equated (wrongly) with “formalism,” the view that judges must apply the law “as written,” regardless of the consequences. Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, and the Critical Legal Studies writers have all contributed in different ways to the sense that "positivism" is either a political conservative or politically sterile position. This essay revisits the actual theory of law developed by positivist philosophers like Bentham, Hart, and Raz, emphasizing why it is, and was, understood by its proponents, to be a radical theory of law, one unfriendly to the status quo and anyone, judge or citizen, who thinks obedience to the law is paramount. To be clear, the leading theorists of legal positivism thought the theory gave the correct account of the nature of law as a social institution; they did not endorse it because of the political conclusions it entailed, and which they supported. Yet these theorists realized that the correct account of the nature of law had radical implications for conventional wisdom about law. We would do well to recapture their wisdom today. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  positivism-legal  conservatism  radicals  Bentham  Hart  Raz  Critical_Legal_Studies  Dworkin  Fuller  natural_rights  moral_philosophy  political_philosophy  institutions  institutional_change  reform-legal  formalism-legal  judiciary  sociology_of_law  social_theory  social_order  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols. (1838-43) ed., John Bowring - Online Library of Liberty
Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. 07/11/2014. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1920> -- An 11 volume collection of the works of Jeremy Bentham edited by the philosophic radical and political reformer John Bowring.
books  etexts  18thC  19thC  intellectual_history  British_history  British_politics  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  legal_theory  constitutionalism  utilitarianism  Bentham  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Christian Nadeau, review essay - Blaise Bachofen (dir.), Le libéralisme au miroir du droit. L’État, la personne, la propriété - Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 249-253 | Érudit 
Christian Nadeau - Université de Montréal -- Ces auteurs, pour la plupart spécialistes de philosophie politique moderne, se sont penchés sur des notions fondamentales du libéralisme en les situant dans leur contexte théorique d’émergence. Sont ainsi passés au crible de l’analyse philosophique les oeuvres de Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, Bentham, Constant et Tocqueville, mais aussi, celles des auteurs associés au conservatisme, comme Burke ou Bonald. Dans son introduction, Blaise Bachofen explique les raisons pour lesquelles les textes rassemblés dans ce recueil se recoupent sur la notion de libéralisme normatif, et plus précisément de libéralisme juridique. La norme de droit propre au libéralisme permet en effet de rendre compte à la fois de sa dimension politique et de sa dimension économique. L’égal traitement de droit contient en lui-même les motivations morales des principes fondamentaux du libéralisme. -- Trois grandes notions ont été retenues pour expliciter le paradigme du libéralisme juridique : L’État, comme lieu des échanges et des protections individuelles ; la personne, comme sujet du droit et de la liberté ; la propriété, comme notion canonique du rapport de l’individu à lui-même et aux objets qu’il peut légitimement faire siens. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  British_history  France  Locke-2_Treatises  Hume-politics  Hume-ethics  Montesquieu  Bentham  Burke  Constant  Tocqueville  liberalism  property  property_rights  equality  civil_liberties  nation-state  utilitarianism  legal_system  counter-revolution  social_contract  legitimacy  public_opinion  political_culture  natural_law  natural_rights  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Charles Camic - The Utilitarians Revisited | JSTOR: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Nov., 1979), pp. 516-550
For generations sociologists have attacked utilitarian social theory as inadequate theoretically. At the same time, their presentist orientation toward sociology's past has prevented a direct examination of the utilitarians in their own right. This paper rejects that orientation and investigates the social theory of the major utilitarians. David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. No alleged characteristic of utilitarianism-from the atomistic, rationalistic model of social action to the failure to solve the problem of order-adduced in the traditional attack upon it is actually found in the work of the utilitarians. The paper then outlines the historical process whereby the prevailing mythology concerning utilitarianism developed. The hallmark of that process is not the cumulative development of social theories but the displacement, in changing cultural and social circumstances, of the concerns of utilitarian social theory-a displacement succesively evident in the work of Spencer, early American social scintists, and Park and climaxing in Parson's The Structure of Social Action. The paper concludes by offering a sociological interpretation of Parson's selective account of utilitarian social theory and by identifying the constricting, but still pervasive, theoretical implications of that account. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  social_theory  utilitarianism  Hume  Bentham  Mill  Parsons  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Frances Coppola - Experiment with Basic Income: The Speenhamland System |Pieria Jan 2014
In 1795, the parish of Speen, in Berkshire, England, embarked on a radical new system of poor relief. Due to the ruinous French wars and a series of poor harvests, grain prices were rising sharply. As bread was the staple food of the poor, rising grain prices increased poverty and caused unrest. Concerned by the possibility of riots, the parish decided to provide subsistence-level income support to the working poor. -- Discusses Poor Laws pre 1832, Bentham attitude to work, Ricardo concern with labor supply, Malthus contrihution to debate - and Deidre McCloskey studies - and post 1834 workhouse system
18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  social_history  economic_history  political_economy  Poor_Laws  poverty  Bentham  Ricardo  Malthus  agriculture  taxes  landowners  wages  Labor_markets  Industrial_Revolution  prices  Napoleonic_Wars  Victorian  market_integration  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Paul G. Kuntz: THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORICISM AND ANTI-HISTORICISM | JSTOR: The Monist, Vol. 53, No. 4, Philosophy of the History of Philosophy (October, 1969), pp. 656-670
THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORICISM AND ANTI-HISTORICISM
Paul G. Kuntz
The Monist
Vol. 53, No. 4, Philosophy of the History of Philosophy (October, 1969) (pp. 656-670)
Page Count: 15 -- didn't download paper -- see for long quote and discussion of why history important for philosophy by JS Mill re Bentham's narrow personal experience -- nice elaboration re learning about oneself via others and expanding knowledge beyond limits of personal experience
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  Mill  Bentham  Study_and_Uses  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Review by: Frank Cunningham: Retrieving Macpherson: Critical Appraisal of a New Study (2003)
JSTOR: Science & Society, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 236-244 -- review of C. B. Macpheson and the Problem of Liberal Democracy by Jules Townshend
books  reviews  political_philosophy  liberalism  democracy  17thC  18thC  19thC  Hobbes  Locke  Mill  Bentham  Macpherson  individualism  Marxist  social_sciences-post-WWII  capitalism  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader
A Comparison-Contrast of Adam Smith, JM Keynes and Jeremy Bentham on Probability, Risk, Uncertainty, Optimism-Pessimism and Decision Making with Applications Concerning Banking, Insurance and Speculation by Michael Emmett Brady :: SSRN
Smith and Keynes would reject the Kahneman-Tversky behavioral economist “Heuristics and Biases“ approach that regards mathematical probability as the normative criterion that all decision makers should attempt to emulate since this approach is a more advanced mathematical version of Bentham’s original approach. Mathematical probability, which requires the use of precise or sharp numerical probabilities, can only be normative in the case where the decision maker has a complete information set and/or knows for certain that a specific probability distribution will apply now and in the future. The mathematical laws of the probability calculus only hold as a limiting case whenever humans are part of the equation. Both Keynes and Smith rely on an inexact, interval, non additive, nonlinear approach that directly conflicts with the exact, single number, additive, linear approach recommended by Tversky and Kahneman as being the hallmark of human rationality in decision making.

 On the other hand, Bentham’s approach is an earlier version of the exact, linear and additive approach recommended as being rational by Tversky-Kahneman. Smith and Keynes, however, did emphasize fields that today are called Cognitive Science and Cognitive Psychology. Here pattern recognition, similarity, induction and intuition played an important role.

Downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  banking  risk  probability  uncertainty  usury  cognition  Smith  Keynes  Bentham  rational_choice  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2013 by dunnettreader

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