dunnettreader + bayesian   4

Sven Ove Hansson -Risk (updated 2011) | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Since the 1970s, studies of risk have grown into a major interdisciplinary field of research. Although relatively few philosophers have focused their work on risk, there are important connections between risk studies and several philosophical subdisciplines. This entry summarizes the most well-developed of these connections and introduces some of the major topics in the philosophy of risk. It consists of six sections dealing with the definition of risk and with treatments of risk related to epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of technology, ethics, and the philosophy of economics.
1. Defining risk [including objective vs subjective and risk vs uncertainty - the latter comparison mostly formalized in decision tgeory]
2. Epistemology
3. Philosophy of science
4. Philosophy of technology
5. Ethics
6. Risk in economic analysis
Related Entries -- causation: in the law | causation: probabilistic | consequentialism | contractarianism | economics, philosophy of | game theory | luck: justice and bad luck | scientific knowledge: social dimensions of | technology, philosophy of
philosophy  epistemology  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  causation  causation-social  probability  Bayesian  moral_philosophy  utilitarianism  utility  rights-legal  game_theory  philosophy_of_science  philosophy_of_social_science  economic_theory  behavioral_economics  financial_economics  sociology_of_knowledge  philosophy_of_law  risk  risk-mitigation  risk_management  uncertainty  rational_choice  rationality-economics 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Seamus Bradley Imprecise Probabilities (Dec 2014) | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
It has been argued that imprecise probabilities are a natural and intuitive way of overcoming some of the issues with orthodox precise probabilities. Models of this type have a long pedigree, and interest in such models has been growing in recent years. This article introduces the theory of imprecise probabilities, discusses the motivations for their use and their possible advantages over the standard precise model. It then discusses some philosophical issues raised by this model. There is also a historical appendix which provides an overview of some important thinkers who appear sympathetic to imprecise probabilities. *-* Related Entries -- belief, formal representations of | epistemic utility arguments for probabilism | epistemology: Bayesian | probability, interpretations of | rational choice, normative: expected utility | statistics, philosophy of | vagueness
epistemology  philosophy_of_science  technology  probability  risk  uncertainty  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality  rationality-bounded  statistics  Bayesian  linguistics  causation  causation-social  causation-evolutionary  complexity  complex_adaptive_systems  utility  behavioral_economics  behavioralism  neuroscience  vagueness 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Ronald J. Allen, Brian Leiter - Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence :: SSRN - Virginia Law Review, 2001
This paper looks at important developments in epistemology, and demonstrates that naturalized epistemology provides a firm conceptual foundation for much research into law of evidence. These developments in epistemology have not been much noted in legal scholarship, despite their importance in philosophy and their coincidence with some widely shared approaches to evidence scholarship. This article is a partial antidote for the unproductive fascination in some quarters of the legal academy with "postmodern" conceptions of knowledge and truth and to the even more common search by the legal professoriat for algorithms that provide answers to important legal questions, such as Bayesian decision theory or micro-economics. The article argues that the naturalistic turn in epistemology of the past thirty years (especially that branch known as social epistemology) provides the appropriate theoretical framework for the study of evidence, as it does for virtually any enterprise concerned with the empirical adequacy of its theories and the truth-generating capacity of its methodologies. It also provides a way to conceptualize and evaluate specific rules of evidence, and concomitantly explains what most evidence scholars do, regardless of their explicit philosophical commitments. For the great bulk of evidentiary scholars, this article should solidify the ground beneath their feet. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 78 - large bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  epistemology-social  analytical_philosophy  evidence  naturalism  sociology_of_knowledge  methodology  decision_theory  law-and-economics  Bayesian  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Elias L. Khalil - Rational, Normative and Procedural Theories of Beliefs: Can They Explain Internal Motivations? I JSTOR: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 45, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2011), pp. 641-664
This paper offers three-way taxonomy of theories of beliefs. For rational theories, beliefs are determined by given information and updated via Bayes's rule. For normative theory, best represented by Hayek and sociological theory, beliefs are categories that precede information and, in fact, formulate the otherwise impenetrable information. For procedural theory, best represented by Herbert Simon and pragmatic philosophy, while beliefs formulate the information, they can be replaced in response to shocks. While each theory manages to capture one kind of belief, all three largely fail to explain internal motivations that characterize entrepreneurship, innovation, and creativity. The failure arises from the fact that the three theories are about cognitive beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the world), while internal motivations are beliefs concerning self-ability. -- paywall -- large references list quite interesting
article  jstor  paywall  economic_sociology  belief  motivation  action-theory  Bayesian  Hayek  pragmatism  Innovation  creativity  cognition  bibliography 
may 2014 by dunnettreader

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