asterisk2a + scenario   13

Griechenland vor dem Referendum: Banken sind Herd der Krise - SPIEGEL ONLINE
Angesichts dieser Lage würden rationale Menschen den Schaden begrenzen wollen. Die einzige Möglichkeit, die es jetzt noch gibt, wäre ein verhandelter Schuldenschnitt für Griechenland ohne neues Programm, aber mit einer Refinanzierung der griechischen Banken. Mit anderen Worten: Wir müssten die Schmach über uns ergehen lassen, dass wir einem Teilverzicht unserer Forderungen zustimmen und gleichzeitig einen weiteren Kredit vergeben. So irrsinnig, wie sich das anhört, so sinnvoll wäre ein solcher Schritt aus deutscher Sicht. Nicht aus Mitleid oder Verantwortung. Sondern aus Eigennutz. Die Betonung hier liegt auf Teil-Verzicht. // // in the end it was a bank bailout through the backdoor sold to the people as Greece Bailout, the money went to the EU banks. period. so sell it as it is, the fucking pig. isn't politics about compromise? >> THUS LOL by Merkel call for more compromise - &! Merkel and Junker is at fault for putting them before Europe at large -
haircut  debt  jubilee  Grexit  Greece  PIGS  contagion  EFSF  IMF  Angela  Merkel  Wolfgang  Schäuble  ChristineLagarde  Career  Politicians  Leadership  unintended  consequences  2015  political  error  political  economy  European  Union  political  folly  policy  error  policy  folly  short-term  thinking  short-term  view  solidarity  Podemos  Syriza  Gesellschaft  zombie  banks  banking  bank  crisis  banking  crisis  stresstest  EuropeanSystemicRiskBoard  ECB  MarioDraghi  Jens  Weidmann  sovereign  debt  crisis  default  default  scenario 
june 2015 by asterisk2a
Greece isn't any old troubled debtor - BBC News
What is very striking - and important - about the agonised talks between Greece and its creditors is that no European leader has tried to bind the feuding sides together with a call to European solidarity, or with any emotive rhetoric about how this great monetary project is all about prosperity and peace for all eurozone citizens. [Career Politicians are are managing the status quo. They are no missionaries.] Nor has any great sense been conveyed that maintaining the wholeness and integrity of the eurozone is a matter of passionate principle. Instead the public and private debate has been couched in the language of national interests, rather than the imperative of keeping the so-called great European project on the road. [...] And some of them would say the creditors are in self-harming denial [not accepting a haircut or lengthy pause of repayment till economy is on a growth track] Or to put it another way, Mrs Merkel and Mr Hollande don't want the backlash from their own citizens.
Grexit  Brexit  European  Union  Leadership  Greece  PIGS  sovereign  debt  crisis  GFC  banking  zombie  banks  Career  Politicians  No  Representation  solidarity  crony  capitalism  Wall  Street  lobbyist  lobby  Lobbying  interest  groups  democracy  Angela  Merkel  Wolfgang  Schäuble  European  Parliament  Protest  Partei  Protest  Party  Principle  austerity  IMF  ChristineLagarde  Troika  economic  history  policy  error  policy  folly  short-term  thinking  short-term  view  bailout  haircut  humanitarian  crisis  human  tragedy  dehumanisation  subhuman  Germany  unintended  consequences  unknown  unkown  default  default  scenario 
june 2015 by asterisk2a
Junk's heyday is here and now - YouTube "We would stress that we fully understand why the authorities wouldn't want free markets to operate today as the risk of a huge global default and unemployment cycle would still be very high. However their intervention has a cost in our opinion. Socially this might be worth paying but we do think it exists."
bankruptcy  cycle  unemployment  monetary  policy  bond  bubble  zombie  banks  fixed  income  miltonfriedman  BOJ  artificial  demand  Insolvenzverschleppung  QE  lostgeneration  demand  and  supply  property  bubble  hayek  debt  monetisation  debt  bubble  bubble  default  greatdepression  zombie  consumer  debt  monetization  centralbanks  insolvency  cycle  Free  Lunch  IMF  default  cycle  GFC  refinancing  corporate  debt  haircut  unintended  consequences  high  yield  debt  Student  Loan  zombie  corporations  ECB  monetary  system  default  rate  credit  bubble  greatrecession  lostdecade  NIRP  Fed  economic  history  financial  repression  Super  monetarism  sovereign  debt  crisis  youth  unemployment  unconventional  monetary  policy  default  scenario  ZIRP  Junk  Bonds 
may 2013 by asterisk2a
Kyle Bass' 5 Reasons Why The Japanese Government Bond Market Will Collapse by 2016 - YouTube
>> his balance of payments/trade prediction at current trajectory (from 2011 & 1H 2012) was correct. Q3 & Q4 trade deteriorated dramatically, may have to do w global slowdown 2012/2013 ... or ...

Original Here Oct 2012:

2011 Talk:

>> More:
Kyle Bass on Europe from late 2011

>> More:
Market Pulse: Japan's FX intervention warning...with a twist
JPY  greatrecession  GFC  default  scenario  default  2013  2012  Abenomics  lostdecade  lostgeneration  Politics  BOJ  sovereign  debt  crisis  JGB  Japan 
december 2012 by asterisk2a
Five years on, the Great Recession is turning into a life sentence - Telegraph
Five years on it is clear that subprime was merely the first bubble to pop, a symptom not a cause. Europe had its own parallel follies. Britons were extracting almost 5pc of GDP each year in home equity by the end. Spain built 800,00 homes in 2007 for a market of 250,000. Iceland ran amok, so did Latvia and Hungary. The credit debacle was global. If there was an epicentre, it was Europe’s €35 trillion banking nexus.

There comes a point when extra debt draws down prosperity from the future. The future arrived in 2008.

A study by Stephen Cecchetti at the Bank for International Settlements concludes that debt turns “bad” at roughly 85pc of GDP for public debt, 85pc for household debt, and 90pc corporate debt. If all three break the limit together, the system loses its shock absorbers.

Much of the debt will have to be written off. Whether this done by inflation (1945-1952) or default (1930-1934) will be the great political battle of this decade.
politics  policy  folly  policy  error  default  scenario  inflation  reflation  debt  jubilee  economic  history  globalisation  global-economy  global  imbalances  savings  glut  creditcrunch  economic-thought  economic  model  BIS  banking  crisis  bank  crisis  balance  sheet  recession  deleveraging  debt  bubble  debtoverhang  credit  bubble  subprime  property  bubble  sovereign  debt  crisis  UK  China  USA  Europe  2012  2008  lostdecade  GFC  greatrecession 
august 2012 by asterisk2a
All the bail-out systems under the sun cannot make the eurozone work - Telegraph
Their costs are 30-40pc out of line with Germany's. It is a fantasy to believe that such a gap can be closed by "reform". Whereas money values can move up with dazzling speed, the real economy can be improved only slowly.
Consequently, when nominal values get out of line, the problem can only be solved by a price or exchange rate adjustment. Theoretically, this could be through internal deflation but that would increase the real value of debt and depress aggregate demand still more. Deflation is the road to catastrophe.

Throwing yet more money at the vulnerable countries and calling this by a fancy name is not an answer. Just as with the Gold Standard and with Bretton Woods, the system has to break.

There will be more summits and bail-outs, more fudge and mudge, and more money poured into a black hole. But the end is approaching inexorably.

Roger Bootle is managing director of Capital Economics.
bailout  2012  Grexit  default  scenario  default  economic  history  brettonwoods  goldstandard  sovereign  debt  crisis  Europe  EMU  Cyprus  PIIGSFB  PIIGS 
june 2012 by asterisk2a
Staatsbankrott: Was eine Griechen-Pleite jeden Bundesbürger kosten würde - SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten - Wirtschaft
Deutschland und damit jeder einzelne Steuerzahler haftet für vier Risiken:

für die Zahlungen aus dem ersten Rettungspaket für Griechenland,
für die griechischen Staatsanleihen, die bei der Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) liegen,
ferner für die griechischen Staatsanleihen im Besitz von staatlichen deutschen Banken
und schließlich für Ausfälle im sogenannten Target2-System.

[...] "Wenn Griechenland aus dem Euro austritt und seine Target-Salden nicht bedient, müsste Deutschland gemäß seinem Anteil von rund 27 Prozent an der EZB die Verluste tragen." Im schlimmsten Fall wären das geschätzte 27 Milliarden Euro. Westermann: "Die großen Risiken im Target-System sind meiner Meinung nach der Grund, dass Griechenland von den Euro-Ländern nicht fallengelassen wird."
sovereign  debt  crisis  PIIGS  contagion  Germany  ECB  EFSF  target2-system  2012  default  scenario  default  greece 
february 2012 by asterisk2a
Going Dutch – One Possible Solution To the Euro Debt Crisis? by Edward Hugh
While the new higher interest rates won’t have a huge impact in the short term, as existing debt needs to be steadily refinanced the extra cost will simply mount and mount. Which is why the Italian government is in a huge bind. It doesn’t have a debt flow problem, it has a debt stock problem, and as the risk premium charged on Italian debt rises and rises, and as the growth outcomes fail to meet the often optimistic targets, then the snowball of debt steadily slides its way down the mountain side with little the government can do to stop it growing as it moves.

However the present debate about creating Eurobonds is resolved, these alone will not solve the problem at this point, and, as many observers are noting, may even make matters worse by weakening the sovereign credit ratings in the core. In the longer run they could form part of a more general solution, but the moral hazard dimension they entail ...
sovereign  debt  crisis  2011  August  PIIGS  italy  competitiveness  competitive  germany  eurobond  transferunion  europe  Euro  scenario  outlook 
august 2011 by asterisk2a
We need to keep the stakes and garlic handy - Telegraph
The collapse in aggregate demand is putting sharp downward pressure on pay inflation. There have already been some cases where the workforce has agreed to significant wage cuts to preserve their jobs. The last time such a major change in the climate governing pay happened in the UK was in the early 1990s. Pay inflation came down sharply from 8pc-10pc to 3pc-4pc, where it has remained ever since – until now. To get into mild deflationary territory, pay does not have to fall; it merely needs to rise by less than the rate of productivity growth, with the result that unit labour costs fall. Once you reach that point you have the precondition for deflation, without any help from lower commodity prices or squeezed profit margins.

In most of the developed West, the underlying growth rate of productivity is about 2pc. Accordingly, if the average rate of pay increase falls below 2pc, the conditions will be in place for sustained deflation.
recession  demand  wages  income  scenario  uk  japan  monetary  policy  inflation  deflation  opinion  economist  economy  greatdepression  academic 
october 2009 by asterisk2a

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