asterisk2a + greatdepression + irvingfisher   3

IMF's epic plan to conjure away debt and dethrone bankers - Telegraph
The Chicago Plan Revisited

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12202.pdf

Benes and Kumhof argue that credit-cycle trauma - caused by private money creation - dates deep into history and lies at the root of debt jubilees in the ancient religions of Mesopotian and the Middle East.

[...]

The key of the Chicago Plan was to separate the "monetary and credit functions" of the banking system. "The quantity of money and the quantity of credit would become completely independent of each other."

[...] Private lenders would no longer be able to create new deposits "ex nihilo". New bank credit would have to be financed by retained earnings.

[...] The finding is startling. Simons and Fisher understated their claims. It is perhaps possible to confront the banking plutocracy head without endangering the economy.
WallStreet  plutocracy  oligopol  banking  banking  crisis  miltonfriedman  Fed  moneysupply  monetary  theory  monetary  policy  System  fiat  money  deleveraging  balance  sheet  recession  debtoverhang  GFC  greatrecession  greatdepression  IMF  fiat  currency  fractional  reserve  banking  IrvingFisher  Irving  debt  jubilee  credit  bubble  credit  cycle  economic  cycle  economic  history 
october 2012 by asterisk2a
Nasar: Fisher, the Crash and Economics of the Whole - Bloomberg
When too little, too late monetary policy failed to arrest the Great Depression, Keynes struck out in a new direction. In 1934, at a meeting in New York, Keynes gave a paper arguing that under certain conditions cheap money would not prevent unemployment from persisting in a free market. The economy could stagnate unless government stimulated private investment and consumption with tax cuts and public works. The paper was a preview of “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,” which appeared two years later.
greatdepression  keynes  Keynesianism  IrvingFisher  economics  history 
september 2011 by asterisk2a
Crisis lessons from Irving Fisher: Fix the debt-deflation disease, not its symptoms | vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists
This column rehabilitates Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation theory to explain the current crisis. It suggests that fiscal stimulus will do little to prevent the crisis from becoming a protracted slump because the problem lies in finance. A cure will require reversing deflation and restarting the credit system.
“…in the great booms and depressions, each of the above named factors (over production, underconsumption, over capacity, price dislocation, over confidence, over investment, over saving etc.) has played a subordinate role as compared with two dominant factors, namely, over indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after;… where any of the other factors do become conspicuous, they are often merely effects or symptoms of these two.” (Irving Fisher, 1933, p. 341)
deflation  debt  macroeconomics  2010  2011  IrvingFisher  consumption  greatrecession  greatdepression  capacity  public  private  economics  fiscal  stimulus  book 
february 2011 by asterisk2a

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